The Energy Transition Where Are We Really
The Energy Transition Where Are We Really
The Energy Transition Where Are We Really
This article is a collaborative effort by Diego Hernandez Diaz, Humayun Tai, and Thomas Hundertmark, with
Michiel Nivard and Nicola Zanardi, representing views from McKinsey’s Global Energy & Materials Practice.
© Getty Images
August 2024
Almost nine years after the landmark Paris and energy efficiency investments) are the
Agreement and nearly halfway through what cornerstone of efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
has been called a “decisive decade” for climate (GHG) emissions in all McKinsey energy scenarios.
change, the world stands at a critical juncture in The period until the end of this decade is a critical
their transition away from fossil fuels. one to put in place a trajectory of accelerated
adoption to meet 2030 and 2050 targets set by
Translating into action the ambitious climate countries and companies.
targets that have been put in place by
governments and companies depends on While significant progress has been made
accelerating the deployment and adoption of in developing and deploying some of these
several interrelated technologies. These include technologies, notably solar and wind, for which
renewable energy sources (RES), electrification installed capacity has risen sharply over the past
technologies such as electric vehicles (EVs), and 15 years, a significant gap has emerged between
heat pumps—as well as comparatively less mature the actual results and the expected ones. The
technologies, such as carbon capture, utilization, at-scale deployment of all these technologies
and storage (CCUS), green and blue hydrogen, is still not happening as fast as needed to reach
and sustainable fuels. 2030 targets (see sidebar “The technology
gap”). Moreover, the technologies are at risk of
These decarbonization technologies (alongside facing raw material and labor shortages and long
many others, such as nuclear, long-term duration permitting procedures.
energy storage, battery energy storage systems,
The gap between what is needed and what has been achieved in the deployment of low-emissions technology is large—to
date, only about 10 percent of the deployment of low-emissions technologies globally by 2050 required for net zero has been
achieved, mostly in less challenging use cases. Closing the gap would require building a new, high-performing energy system
to match or exceed the current one, which would entail developing and deploying new low-emissions technologies, along
with entirely new supply chains and infrastructure to support them.
Given the size and complexity of today’s energy system, this is no easy task. The physical challenges that would need to
be overcome to successfully transform the energy system are significant and would require concerted action to solve.
McKinsey’s recent report, “The Hard Stuff: Navigating the physical realities of the energy transition,” identifies 25 physical
challenges across seven domains of the energy system that would need to be addressed for the energy transition to succeed.¹
Addressing these physical challenges would involve improving the performance of low-emissions technologies, addressing
the interdependencies between multiple challenges, and achieving massive scale-ups, even in technologies where a strong
track record has not yet been established. And, of course, this is only one side of the equation. To overcome these physical
challenges, significant firm investment into low-emission technologies needs to be unlocked.
¹ The hard stuff: Navigating the physical realities of the energy transition, McKinsey Global Institute, August 14, 2024.
1
Final investment decision (FID) is the point at which formal approval from the project developer is given to proceed, marking the
commitment to allocate capital resources to the execution of the project.
2
For the analysis in this article, Europe refers to the European Union plus Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. There may some
gaps in the data based on data availability.
3
“Net Zero Tracker,” accessed June 2024; “Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement, synthesis report by the
secretariat,” United Nations Climate Change, November 14, 2023; Net zero stocktake 2023, a joint report by NewClimate Institute, Oxford
Net Zero, Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, and Data-Driven EnviroLab, June 2023.
4
“Global methane pledge,” Climate and Clean Air Coalition, accessed June 2024.
5
“European green deal,” Council of the European Union, June 17, 2024.
6
Building a clean energy economy: A guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act’s investments in clean energy and climate action, The
White House, January 2023.
7
“A guidebook to the bipartisan infrastructure law,” The White House, January 2024.
8
Renewable energy installation includes solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, onshore wind, and offshore wind.
Our analysis
To shed light on the current status of the energy transition and provide a rigorous, fact-based assessment, we conducted an
extensive analysis involving several steps.
Scope: We identified the key singular technologies that together account for the bulk of decarbonization potential (onshore and
offshore wind, solar PV, clean hydrogen, sustainable fuels, CCUS, electric vehicles, and heat pumps). This means we excluded
several other decarbonization technologies, including energy storage and battery energy storage systems (BESS) because
these technologies are already in vast supply, with very healthy pipelines, and numerous players not only announcing projects
but committing to them. We also excluded energy efficiency, low-carbon thermal generation, and nuclear because these are very
fragmented markets with limitations due to regulation.
Data collection: We gathered comprehensive data from various sources, including proprietary and commercial project-tracking
databases. This allowed us to obtain up-to-date information on the status of numerous projects across different decarbonization
technologies.
Policy and historical capacity review: We reviewed existing policies, historical capacity deployments, and growth trends to
understand the broader context and the trajectory of different technologies. This helped us benchmark current progress against
historical data and policy targets.
Comparative analysis: We compared stated targets with expected capacity deployments, including project status and historical
sales levels for customer adoption-driven technologies, such as EVs and heat pumps. This enabled us to assess the alignment
between ambitious climate targets and actual progress on the ground.
Gap assessment: By examining the project status, including those that have reached FID stage, we assessed the gap between
target volumes, expected volumes (based on current trends), and volumes that have already reached FID. This analysis highlighted
the discrepancies between announced projects and those that are likely to materialize.
1 59 32 8
33 51 7 8
>90% of countries by GDP have net zero commitments—including China and India
>10,000 companies are members of the “Race to Zero” campaign¹
Global cleantech deployment
Installed capacity of wind and solar, Electric vehicle passenger car parc,² Heat pumps installed stock,
terawatts million units million units
50
200
+6% per year
2 40
150
+20% per year
30 +79% per year
100
1 20
50
10
0 0 0
2010 2015 2020 2023 2010 2015 2020 2023 2010 2015 2020 2023
9
“Commitment issues: Markers of real climate action in the Fortune Global 500,” Climate Impact Partners.
10
“Ambitious corporate climate action,” Science Based Targets Initiative, July 2024.
11
“Corporate sustainability reporting,” European Commission, 2023.
12
“An affordable, reliable, competitive path to net zero,” McKinsey, November 30, 2023.
13
“All about the NDCs,” United Nations Climate Action, accessed July 2024.
14
SBTI monitoring report 2023, Science Based Targets initiative, July 2023.
15
Hydrogen Insights Project Tracker, McKinsey.
Clean commodities
Low-carbon power generation production End-use decarbonization
100
Announced Announced Announced
projects for solar PV projects for projects for
meet and exceed clean H₂ meet CCUS meet
target by 3% and exceed and exceed
target by 98% target by 473%
75
50
25
0
Offshore Onshore Solar PV Clean H₂ Sustainable Electric Heat CCUS⁵
wind wind fuels vehicles (EVs) pumps
2030 205 GW⁶ 695 GW 705 GW 15 mtpa⁷ 136 mtpa 56 156 75 mtpa
target⁴ million million
1
EU27 + Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 2Technology deployment is a measurement to understand the gap between actual vs needed deployment.
3
Final investment decision (FID) except for EVs and heat pumps (expected sales based on average sales over the last few years). ⁴Target as defined for 2030 for
both EU27+3 and the US; for solar, sustainable fuels, and heat pumps, no target exists, and the McKinsey Sustainable Transformation scenario was used.
⁵Carbon capture, utilization, and storage. ⁶Gigawatts. ⁶Metric tons per annum.
Source: EHPA; EIA; Eurostat; IEA; Rystad; Wind 4C; McKinsey Energy Solutions; McKinsey Hydrogen Insights
has supported a robust pipeline and project there is less risk of a supply gap (and therefore why
conversion, especially in states like California we excluded BESS from this analysis).
and Texas. In Europe, we expect the solar PV
project pipeline will in turn attract BESS projects, However, our analysis of offshore wind and solar
especially in places like Germany and Spain where PV shows that not all renewable pipelines are
colocation is favorable. All in all, battery production on track to meet 2030 targets and short-term
capacity appears healthy, leading us to believe deceleration is threatening the existing pipeline
16
“Renewable capacity statistics 2023,” International Renewable Energy Agency, March 2023.
Exhibit 3
Clean generation
Clean generationpipelines
pipelinesare
arelargely
largely falling
falling below targets.
+100
+199
450 450
~94 GW required ~61 GW required from
from further projects further projects to reach +228
to reach target McKinsey’s ST 2030⁶
+114
300 +61 300
+94
+84
+56
150 150
0 0
2023 2030 2023 2030 2023 2030 2023 2030
At risk At risk At risk On trajectory
1
Operational GW capacity added in 2023. 2Announced projects that have reached the final investment decision. 3Includes announced projects and prefinal
investment decision. 4Trajectory of capacity if GW addition average of past 3 years would be added every year. 5Trajectory of capacity of 3-year average plus
the additions from 2023. 6Continued momentum scenario. 7EU27 + Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Source: Rystad; WindEurope
17
To achieve true zero-carbon status, these electric alternatives must be powered by green electricity—putting even more pressure on the
European Union and United States to meet their targets.
18
IEA Global EV Data Explorer.
+26
+47
+10
50 50
~21 million ~19 million
additional EVs additional EVs
required to required to
reach target reach target
+14
+19
+21
0 0
2023 2030 2023 2030 2023 2030 2023 2030
At risk On trajectory On trajectory On trajectory
1
Operational gigawatts (GW) capacity added in 2023. 2Announced projects that have reached the final investment decision. 3Includes announced projects and
prefinal investment decision. 4Continued momentum scenario. 5EU27 + Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Source: IEA EV data explorer; Global Energy Perspective 2023, McKinsey, October 2023; McKinsey analysis
momentum in Europe is stronger than that in the the challenges that will still need to be overcome, to
United States. increase consumer confidence in EVs.
19
Ibid.
20
“European green deal,” Council of the European Union, June 17, 2024; “Inflation reduction act overview,” US Environmental Protection
Agency, January 2023.
21
“AHRI releases December 2023 US heating and cooling equipment shipment data,” AHRI, February 9, 2024.
22
Clean hydrogen includes both green hydrogen (hydrogen produced from the electrolysis of water using renewable energy sources) and
blue hydrogen (produced using steam methane reforming or gasification with CCUS).
23
“Hydrogen,” European Commission.
150 150
~132 mtpa
from additional
~170 mtpa projects need
in pipeline to receive FID²
to 2030 to reach
McKinsey’s ST
100 100
2030⁴
~148 mtpa
in pipeline
to 2030
50 50
~44 mtpa
from additional
projects need to
receive FID² to
reach target
0 0
2023 2030 2023 2030
At risk At risk
1
Operational GW capacity added in 2023. 2Announced projects that have reached the final investment decision. 3Includes announced projects and prefinal
investment decision. 4Continued momentum scenario. 5EU27 + Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Source: CCUS project tracker
slow the impetus for sustainable fuels following annum (mtpa) and 33 mtpa of sustainable fuel
policy developments, including ReFuelEU and capacity, respectively, with the vast majority of this
the US sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) “Grand being in hydrotreated vegetable oils (HVO) and
Challenge.”24 hydroprocessed esters and fatty acids (HEFA).25
Although the production of HVO and HEFA is
The current European and US announced largely on track, achieving these goals would
pipelines include around 21 million tons per entail more than quadrupling current European
24
Grand Challenge refers to the combined work of US DOE, DOT, USDA, and other federal government agencies working to scale up the
Sustainable Aviation Fuel value chain.
25
HVO/HEFA, advanced middle distillate and methanol.
~24 mtpa
+52 required from further
projects to reach
McKinsey’s ST 2030⁴
50 50
+24
~2 mtpa required ~3 mtpa from additional
from further projects need to
projects to receive FID² to
reach target reach target
+22
+21
+2
+7 +3
0 0
2023 2030 2023 2030 2023 2030 2023 2030
At risk At risk At risk On trajectory
1
Operational GW capacity added in 2023. 2Announced projects that have reached the final investment decision. 3Includes announced projects and prefinal
investment decision. 4Continued momentum scenario. 5Hydrotreated vegetable oil (HVO)/hydroprocessed esters and fatty acids (HEFA), advanced middle
distillate, methanol. ⁶EU27 + Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Source: Hydrogen Insights Project tracker, McKinsey’s Sustainable Fuels Project database
SAF production and tripling that of the United Factors affecting market performance
States over the next five years. The evolving policy environment has done much
to accelerate the energy transition up till now, but
The SAF project pipeline—while ambitious—is more will be needed to help achieve key climate
largely not yet firm, with only around 25 percent goals as existing policies may be too narrow and
and 30 percent of capacity until 2030 having not long-dated enough. And, policy alone may not
achieved FID in Europe and the United States, be enough to overcome the converging factors
respectively. now affecting progress. Many of these factors
Further reading
In the coming weeks, McKinsey will publish its annual Global Energy Perspective, outlining various projected scenarios for the
energy transition in the years to 2050, alongside the new Global Materials Perspective 2024.
For further reading on the energy transition and what it will take to overcome bottlenecks and challenges, see:
“What would it take to scale critical climate technologies?,” McKinsey, December 1, 2023.
“The hard stuff: Navigating the physical realities of the energy transition,” McKinsey Global Institute, August 14, 2024.
“A radical approach to cost reduction at climate tech companies,” McKinsey, June 18, 2024.
At the current pace, however, Europe and the — Forming partnerships: industrial OEMs and
United States risk missing important 2030 engineering, procurement, and construction
climate targets across critical technologies. The (EPC) players face the challenge of delivering
interdependent nature of these technologies increasingly complex technologies at lower
means that delays could have cascading effects, costs. Forming industrial partnerships
hindering the development and successful could provide better visibility into product
deployment of subsequent innovations and development and help maintain a network of
putting 2050 net-zero goals at risk. trusted EPCs and partners.
Diego Hernandez Diaz is a partner in McKinsey’s Geneva office; Humayun Tai is a senior partner in the New York office;
Thomas Hundertmark is a senior partner in the Houston office; Michiel Nivard is a consultant in the Amsterdam office; and
Nicola Zanardi is an alumnus of the Munich office.
The authors wish to thank Corina Ai-Hua Lo, Eva Mühlebach, Marco Barbaro, Patrícia Ovídio, Sophie FitzGerald, and Tobias
Esswein for their contributions to this article.