Kant Freedom

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Sophia Project

P hilosophy A rchives

A Defense of Human Freedom


Immanuel Kant

The Idea of Freedom as the Key to the Autonomy of the Will

The will is the causality of living beings in so far as they are rational. Freedom is that
causality in so far as it can be regarded as efficient without being determined to activity by
any cause other than itself. Natural necessity is the property of all non-rational beings to be
determined to activity by some cause external to themselves.
The definition of freedom just given is negative, and therefore it does not tell us what
freedom is in itself; but it prepares the way for a positive conception of a more specific
and more fruitful character. The conception of causality carries with it the conception
of determination by law (Gesetz), for the effect is conceived as determined (gesetzt) by
the cause. Hence freedom must not be regarded as lawless (gesetzlos), but simply as
independent of laws of nature. A free cause does conform to unchangeable laws, but these
laws are peculiar to itself; and, indeed, apart from law a free will has no meaning whatever.
A necessary law of nature, as we have seen, implies the heteronomy of efficient causes; for
no effect is possible at all, unless its cause is itself determined to activity by something else.
What, therefore, can freedom possibly be but autonomy, that is, the property of the will to
be a law to itself? Now, to say that the will in all its actions is a law to itself, is simply to
say that its principle is, to act from no other maxim than that the object of which is itself as
a universal law. But this is just the formula of the categorical imperative and the principle
of morality. Hence a free will is the same thing as a will that conforms to moral laws.
If, then, we start from the presupposition of freedom of the will, we can derive morality
and the principle of morality simply from an analysis of the conception of freedom. Yet
the principle of morality, namely, that an absolutely good will is a will the maxim of
which can always be taken as itself a universal law, is a synthetic proposition. For by no
possibility can we derive this property of the maxim from an analysis of the conception of
an absolutely good will. The transition from the conception of freedom to the conception
of morality can be made only if there is a third proposition which connects the other two in
a synthetic unity. The positive conception of freedom yields this third proposition, and not
the conception of nature, in which a thing is related causally only to something else. What
this third proposition is to which freedom points, and of which we have an a priori idea, can
be made clear only after some preliminary investigation.

Freedom is a property of all Rational Beings

It cannot in any way be proved that the will of man is free, unless it can be shown that the
will of all rational beings is free. For morality is a law for us only in so far as we are rational
beings, and therefore it must apply to all rational beings. But morality is possible only for a
free being, and hence it must be proved that freedom also belongs to the will of all rational

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beings. Now I say, that a being -who cannot act except under the idea of freedom, must
for that very reason be regarded as free so far as his actions are concerned. In other words,
even if it cannot be proved by speculative reason that his will is free, all the laws that are
inseparably bound up with freedom must be viewed by him as laws of his will. And I say,
further, that we must necessarily attribute to every rational being that has a will the idea of
freedom, because every such being always acts under that idea. A rational being we must
conceive as having a reason that is practical, that is, a reason that has causality with regard
to its objects. Now, it is impossible to conceive of a reason which should be consciously
biased in its judgments by some influence from without, for the subject would in that case
regard its judgments as determined, not by reason, but by a natural impulse. Reason must
therefore regard itself as the author of its principles of action, and as independent of all
external influences. Hence, as practical reason, or as the will of a rational being, it must
be regarded by itself as free. The will of a rational being, in other words, can be his own
will only if he acts under the idea of freedom, and therefore this idea must in the practical
sphere be ascribed to all rational being.

The Interest Connected with Moral Ideas

We have at last succeeded in reducing the true conception of morality to the idea of freedom.
This, however, does not prove that man actually is free, but only that, without presupposing
freedom, we cannot conceive of ourselves as rational beings, who are conscious of causality
with respect to our actions, that is, as endowed with will. We have also found that on the
same ground all beings endowed with reason and will must determine themselves to action
under the idea of their freedom.
From the presupposition of the idea of freedom there also followed the consciousness
of a law of action, the law that our subjective principles of action, or maxims, must always
be of such a character that they have the validity of objective or universal principles,
and can be taken as universal laws imposed upon our will by ourselves. But why, it may
be asked, should I subject myself to this principle simply as a rational being, and why,
therefore, should all other beings who are endowed with reason come under the same
principle? Admitting that I am not forced to do so by interest — which indeed would make
a categorical imperative impossible — yet I must take an interest in that principle and see
how I come to subject myself to it.
It looks as if we had, strictly speaking, shown merely that in the idea of freedom the
moral law must be presupposed in order to explain the principle of the autonomy of the
will, without being able to prove the reality and objectivity of the moral law itself.
It must be frankly admitted, that there is here a sort of circle from which it seems
impossible to escape. We assume that as efficient causes we are free, in order to explain
how in the kingdom of ends we can be under moral laws; and then we think of ourselves
as subject to moral laws, because we have ascribed to ourselves freedom of will. Freedom
of will and self-legislation of will are both autonomy, and, therefore, they are conceptions
which imply each other ; but, for that very reason, the one cannot be employed to explain
or to account for the other.

How is a Categorical Imperative Possible?

As an intelligence, a rational being views himself as a member of the intelligible world, and
it is only as an efficient cause belonging to this world that he speaks of his own causality as

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will. On the other hand, he is conscious of himself as also a part of the world of sense, and
in this connection his actions appear as mere phenomena which that causality underlies.
Yet he cannot trace back his actions as phenomena to the causality of his will, because
of that causality he has no knowledge; and he is thus forced to view them as if they were
determined merely by other phenomena, that is, by natural desires and inclinations. Were a
man a member only of the intelligible world, all his actions would be in perfect agreement
with the autonomy of the will; were he merely a part of the world of sense, they would
have to be regarded as completely subject to the natural law of desire and inclination, and
to the heteronomy of nature. The former would rest upon the supreme principle of morality,
the latter upon that of happiness. But it must be observed that the intelligible world is the
condition of the world of sense, and, therefore, of the laws of that world. And as the will
belongs altogether to the intelligible world, it is the intelligible world that prescribes the
laws which the will directly obeys. As an intelligence, I am therefore subject to the law
of the intelligible world, that is, to reason, notwithstanding the fact that I belong on the
other side of my nature to the world of sense. Now, as subject to reason, which in the idea
of freedom contains the law of the intelligible world, I am conscious of being subject to
the autonomy of the will. The laws of the intelligible world I must therefore regard as
imperatives, and the actions conformable to this principle as duties.
The explanation of the possibility of categorical imperatives, then, is, that the idea of
freedom makes me a member of the intelligible world. Were I a member of no other world,
all my actions would as a matter of fact always conform to the autonomy of the will. But
as I perceive myself to be also a member of the world of sense, I can say only, that my
actions ought to conform to the autonomy of the will. The categorical ought is thus an a
priori synthetic proposition. To my will as affected by sensuous desires, there is added
synthetically the idea of my will as belonging to the intelligible world, and therefore as
pure and self-determining. The will as rational is therefore the supreme condition of the
will as sensuous. The method of explanation here employed is similar to that by which the
categories were deduced. For the a priori synthetic propositions, which make all knowledge
of nature possible, depend, as we have seen, upon the addition to perceptions of sense of
the pure conceptions of understanding, which, in themselves, are nothing but the form of
law in general.

Limits of Practical Philosophy

Freedom is only an idea of reason, and therefore its objective reality is doubtful. Thus
there arises a dialectic of practical reason. The freedom ascribed to the will seems to stand
in contradiction with the necessity of nature. It is, therefore, incumbent upon speculative
philosophy at least to show that we think of man in one sense and relation when we call him
free, and in another sense and relation when we view him as a part of nature, and as subject
to its laws. But this duty is incumbent upon speculative philosophy only in so far as it has
to clear the way for practical philosophy.
In thinking itself into the intelligible world, practical reason does not transcend its
proper limits, as it would do if it tried to know itself directly by means of perception. In
so thinking itself, reason merely conceives of itself negatively as not belonging to the
world of sense, without giving any laws to itself in determination of the will. There is
but a single point in which it is positive, namely, in the thought that freedom, though it

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is a negative determination, is yet bound up with a positive faculty, and, indeed, with a
causality of reason which is called will. In other words, will is the faculty of so acting that
the principle of action should conform to the essential nature of a rational motive, that is,
to the condition that the maxim of action should have the universal validity of a law. Were
reason, however, to derive an object of will, that is, a motive, from the intelligible world,
it would transcend its proper limits, and would make a pretence of knowing something
of which it knew nothing. The conception of an intelligible world is therefore merely a
point of view beyond the world of sense, at which reason sees itself compelled to take its
stand in order to think itself as practical. This conception would not be possible at all if the
sensuous desires were sufficient to determine the action of man. It is necessary, because
otherwise man would not be conscious of himself as an intelligence, and, therefore, not as a
rational cause acting through reason or operating freely. This thought undoubtedly involves
the idea of an order and a system of laws other than the order and laws of nature, which
concern only the world of sense. Hence it makes necessary the conception of an intelligible
world, a world which comprehends the totality of rational beings as things in themselves.
Yet it in no way entitles us to think of that world otherwise than in its formal condition, that
is, to conceive of the maxims of the will as conformable to universal laws.
Reason would, therefore, completely transcend its proper limits, if it should undertake
to explain how pure reason can be practical, or, what is the same thing, to explain how
freedom is possible.
We can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws, the object of which can be
presented in a possible experience. Freedom, however, is a mere idea, the objective reality
of which can in no way be presented in accordance with laws of nature, and, therefore, not
in any possible experience. It has merely the necessity of a presupposition of reason, made
by a being who believes himself to be conscious of a will, that is, of a faculty distinct from
mere desire. The most that we can do is to defend freedom by removing the objections
of those who claim to have a deeper insight into the nature of things than we can pretend
to have, and who therefore, declare that freedom is impossible. It would no doubt be a
contradiction to say that in its causality the will is entirely separated from all the laws of
the sensible world. But the contradiction disappears, if we say, that behind phenomena
there are things in themselves, which, though they are hidden from us, are the condition of
phenomena; and that the laws of action of things in themselves naturally are not the same
as the laws under which their phenomenal manifestations stand.
While, therefore, it is true that we cannot comprehend the practical unconditioned necessity
of the moral imperative, it is also true that we can comprehend its incomprehensibility; and
this is all that can fairly be demanded of a philosophy which seeks to reach the principles
which determine the limits of human reason.

Immanuel Kant. From “The Metaphysics of Morals.” Readings in Philosophy. Ed. Albert Edwin Avey.
Columbus, OH: R.G. Adams and Company, 1921.

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