ADM For Commercial Pilots

DoTiFwpM-86i42 AERONAUTICAL DECISION
Advanced System MAKING FOR

Design Service
Washington. D.C. 20591 COMMERCIAL PILOTS
Richard S. Jensen
Janeen Adrion
Prepared for:
Systems Control Technology, Inc.
161 1 North Kent Street, Suite 910
Arlington, Virginia 22209
By:
Aviation Research Associates
4351 Brauton Road
Columbus, Ohio 43220
July 1988
Final Report
This document is available to the public

through the National Technical Infomation
Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.
US.Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
Technical Report Documentation Page
1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.
DOTIFAAIPM-86/42
I
4. Title and Subtitle 1 5. Report Date

Aeronautical Decision Making For Commercial Pilots
7. Author (s) 8. Performing Organization Report No.
R. S. Jensen and J. Adrion II

9. Performing Organization Name and Address 1 10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)
Systems Control Technology, Inc.
1611 North Kent Street, Suite 910 11. Contract or Grant No.
Arlington, Virginia 22209 DTAF01-80-C-10080
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
U.S. Department of Transportation Final Report
Federal Aviation Administration
. 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 14. Sponsoring Agency Code
Washinaton. D.C. 20591 AAM-500, ADS-220
15. Supplementary Notes
AAM-500 Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences Division
ADS-220 Rotorcraft Technology Branch 7
I
16. Abstract
Aviation accident data indicate that the mapriiy of aircraft mishaps are due to judgement error. This training
manual is part of a project to develop materials and techniques to help improve pilot decision making.
Training programs using prototype versions of these materials have demonstrated substantial reductions
in pilot error rates. The result of such tests were statistically significant and ranged from approximately 10%
to 50% fewer mistakes.
This manual is designed to explain the risks associated with commercial flying activities, the underlying
behavioral causes of typical accidents, and the effects of stress on pilot decision making. It provides
a means for the individual pilot to develop an "Attitude Profile" through a self-assessment inventory and
provides detailed explanations of pre-flight and in-flight stress management techniques. The assumption is
that pilots receiving this training will develop a positive attitude toward safety and the ability to effectively
manage stress while recognizing and avoiding unnecessary risk.
This manual is one of a series on Aeronautical Decision Making prepared for the following pilot audiences:
(1) Student and Private (2) Commercial (3) Instrument (4) Instructor (5) Helicopter (6) Multi-Crew
17. Kev Words 1 18. Distribution Statement

~uman Factor Judgement
This document is available to the U.S. public
Human Performance Decision Making
through the National Technical Information
Aviation Safety Commercial Pilots Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.
Aviation Training ~rofessio'ndPilots
Pilot Error I
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 1 20. Security Classif. (of this page) ( 21. No. of Pages I 22. Price
Unclassified I Unclassified
1 65 I
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of this document is authorized
FOREWORD
This aeronautical decision making training manual for commercial

pilots is the second of three reports in the Professional Pilot Series.
The first in this series, Aeronautical Decision Making for Instrument
Pilots" contains introductory and other material necessary for the
completion of the judgment course and should be read first. Material
contained in that manual and not included here includes The Pilot
Decisional Attitude Questionnaire, Risk Analysis, and Stress Coping.
The chapters in this manual are numbered in sequence beginning with "10"
to indicate a continuation of the material from the first. The third
manual in this series focuses on aeronautical decision making for multi-
person crews referred to as Cockpit Resource Management.
This three-part Professional Pilot Series is the second half of a six

part series of manuals on aeronautical decision making which is the result
of ten years of research, development, testing, and evaluation of the
effectiveness of teaching pilot decision making. The first half, called
the "Basic Pilot Series," consists of training manuals developed for
student, instructor, and helicopter pilots.
The teaching technique used is to expose the student to flight

situations and ask for responses. Feedback about the responses is given
to help the student learn to make better decisions. In all cases,
situations are taken from real-world incidents or accidents. That is, all
scenarios have actually happened to someone in the aviation community. We
have used these sources because they are more likely to leave a lasting
impression than created stories.
The term "pilot error" is often used to describe an accident cause and
is an oversimplification, implying that the pilot intended to have an
accident. Pilots usually intend to fly safely, but they sometimes make
decisional errors. Their skill or luck is often sufficient to get them
out of situations resulting from poor judgment. The objective of this
manual is to teach commercial pilots the techniques to avoid situations
that require luck or skill greater than their capabilities. Good judgment
means avoiding situations that require superior skill to overcome.
The authors wish to thank the following sources for scenarios, in

part, because, until now, they have been responsible for most of our pilot
judgment training:
"I Learned about Flying from that," F l v i n ~

"Aftermath," F l v i n ~
"Never Again," AOPA Pilot
"Callback," ASRS
"Pilot's Logbook," Private Pilot
A ~ ~ r o a c hU.S.
, Navy
"Grampaw Petibone," Naval Aviation News
F l v i n ~Safety, U.S. Air Force
"A Flight I'll Never Forget," Plane and Pilot
"Selection of Judgment Incidents," ASRS
Pilot Error, Editors of Flying
"Arm Chair Aviator"
Weather Flying, Robert Buck
I l l u s i o n s , Richard Bach
"The Bush P i l o t Syndrome, " Michael Mitchell
Various accident report b r i e f s , NTSB
OSU P i l o t Judgment Survey
Personal contacts
Personal experience
Richard S . Jensen and Janeen Adrion
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
Chapter 10 . INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 11 . IDENTIFICATION AND PRACTICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Chapter 12 . ANTIDOTES FOR HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1
Chapter 13 . PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS ....................................... 35
Chapter 14 . ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Chapter 15 . REVIEW EXERCISES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
iii
Chapter 10: INTRODUCTION
Aeronautical knowledge, skill, and judgment have always been regarded

as the three basic faculties that pilots must possess. The requisite
knowledge and skills have been imparted in academic and flight training
programs and are evaluated as a part of the pilot certification process.
In contrast, judgment has sometimes been considered to be a trait that
pilots innately possess or an ability that is acquired as a byproduct of
the flying experience. Thus, as shown in Figure 1, the aviation industry
has extolled judgment as a "virtuen while ignoring it as a potential
training requirement. The advent of improved accident investigation
. -
technology, including the use of cockpit voice recorders, along with a
more systematic analysis of accident statistics, has produced a growing
recognition of the importance of pilot judgment errors. Furthermore, new
cockpit technology has tended to place even more importance on the pilot
.- as an information processor, decision maker, and manager. Recent studies
' have shown that good pilot judgment is not an innate ability but one that
can be learned when one is properly motivated and provided with the
appropriate material. This manual is part of a series that attempts to
provide the information needed to learn good pilot judgment.
Figure 1. Building blocks for aviation safety and effectiveness.

The commercial pilot, in particular, is faced with some of the most
difficult decisions in aviation today. As in all commercial enterprises,
the bottom line is to make money. Both pilots and flight operations
managers have decided that, in the larger sense, to make money is worth
, the risk that flying poses. Unfortunately, pilots flying for hire are
often faced with the need to balance financial reward with safety on a day
to day basis. In these situations they may be faced with pressures by
superiors, peers, and/or passengers who are more in tune with the
. financial or convenience side of the balance than with the safety side.
These people usually assume that the pilot will withstand their strong
pressure to press on to the destination if there were any "real" danger.
The pilot, conversely, wonders whether a decision against the wishes of
hisher superiors will cost hisher job.
Judgment Definition
Aeronautical decision making (ADM), which can be equated with pilot

judgment, is broadly defined as the mental process that pilots use in
formulating decisions. Judgment is present in all flying decisions that
involve uncertainty either in the information used or in the potential
outcome. When this process is broken down into its two components, good
-pilot judgment is defined as:
1. The ability to search for and establish the relevance of all

available information regarding a flying situation, to establish
alternative courses of action, and to determine expected outcomes
from each alternative.
2. The motivation to choose and authoritatively execute a suitable

course of action within the time frame permitted by the situation.
Where :
a. "Suitable" is an alternative consistent with societal norms.
b. "Action" includes no action, some action, or action to seek

more information.
The first component of the definition refers to intellectual abilities

or "headwork." It is "knowledge based" and relies upon the pilot's
capabilities to sense, store, retrieve, and integrate information. It is
purely rational, and if used alone, would allow problem solving in much
the same manner as a computer,
The second component in the definition, motivation is where the

decision is made, indicating that it can be affected, both, by motivation
and attitude. It implies that pilot decisions are sometimes based on
tendencies to use non-safety related information, such as job demands,
convenience, economics, commitment, emotion, etc., in choosing a course of
action.
Both components are essentiai to aviation safety. The intellectual

component is important because it causes the pilot to get the facts,
organize thoughts, and diagnose problems, not only in the air but on the
ground. The motivation component (usually referred to as "attitude") is
important because, when properly developed, it tends to make the pilot
cautious, critical, and conservative.
Motivations give us reasons for flying. Without them flight would not
be possible. Good judgment, on the other hand, requires the proper
development of attitudes, recognizing that they can inhibit or override
the intellectual component of judgment. Controlling such interference
requires the development of personal leadership styles that can overcome
influences and related pressures that lead to bad decisions.
The Wright brothers owe a great deal of their success to the fact that
they exercised good judgment at a time when many of their colleagues were
killing themselves by considering flight to be no more than a thrill or
adventure. Wilbur Wright remarked in 1901 that "Carelessness and
overconfidence are usually more dangerous than deliberately accepted
risks." The Wright brothers both knew and res~ectedthe risks involved in
flying. These are the two keys to good judgment.
A Note to Management
-
-
Service industries are the toughest of all businesses to operate.
Aviation is probably the most difficult of all service industries. The
difficulty is centered in the often conflicting requirements to maintain a
viable corporation, earn a living, keep the employees happy, satisfy the
requirements of all the government agencies (FAA, State, Airport
Authority, etc.), and serve the customers. Serving the customer is the
name of the game and management is often the buffer between all of the
opposing forces. How does decision making come into play from the
managers' standpoint? Educating your crews in aeronautical decision
making is well worth the time and effort invested. There is no doubt that
the benefits of such training will, over time, show up where it counts to
you - - on your bottom line.
In the meantime, your pilots and training personnel need your support
and cooperation to make the program a success. Decision making skills for
your pilots are a life and death subject. Open communication, the sharing
of new ideas and the willingness to discuss grievances are vital to
success in business. Your attitudes towards your employees will
.. contribute to the life of your business, as well as to the lives of your
pilots.
Air-Taxi Operations. Regulations concerning air-taxi operations were

created to accommodate generally smaller aircraft with less load
capability than air carrier operators. These regulations created a new
level of operation in air commerce. As operators/managers of air taxi
operations, you (and your staff/pilots) must adhere to the many
regulations regarding the qualification of pilots, certification of
aircraft, operations specifications, maintenance and record keeping
(paperwork). Managers of many air-taxi operations also double as director
of operations, chief pilot, director of training, etc. resulting in the
additional pressure of being both "one of you" and "one of them". In the
realm of aeronautical decision making, your influence can be (and is)
applied in many ways by your pilots.
Commuter Management. How many times must t h e up-and-coming commercial
p i l o t fend o f f the words " f l y t h a t a i r p l a n e , o r I ' l l f i n d someone who
w i l l ! " before he/she makes t h e mistake and does? The following accounting
of j u s t one such episode w i l l no doubt h i t home t o many who have been
working t o f i n d t h e i r p l a c e i n t h e a v i a t i o n i n d u s t r y . A s you read t h i s
s c e n a r i o , keep i n mind how t h e p r e s s u r e s from management a f f e c t your
decision making. The recommendations put f o r t h by t h e p i l o t i n t h i s
, s i t u a t i o n would no doubt be among t h e b e s t s o l u t i o n s .
The following s t o r y r e l a t e s t o a small t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t operated by

a commuter a i r l i n e i n F l o r i d a . The p i l o t ' s n a r r a t i v e i s q u i t e d e s c r i p t i v e
of t h e many g l i t c h e s we f i n d i n t h e system today.
After a s u c c e s s f u l c a r e e r with A i r C a r r i e r "A" ( a c a r r i e r t h a t

f a i l e d t o make i t f i n a n c i a l l y ) , I found myself i n d i r e need of a
job. The f i r s t opportunity was with Commuter "B". My t r a i n i n g
records were f a l s i f i e d and I was "turned l o o s e . " One of t h e
a i r c r a f t had a s i c k r i g h t engine, however t h e o t h e r p i l o t s ( a l l
inexperienced i n my opinion) were f l y i n g i t . I departed Miami
enroute t o S a r a s o t a IFR (Autopilot was i n o p e r a t i v e ) and had a
communication f a i l u r e a t 12,000 f e e t over LBU (due a p p a r e n t l y t o
having no s t a t i c wicks on the a i r c r a f t and/or o t h e r e f f e c t s of
precipitation). Communication was r e s t o r e d descending through
5000 f e e t . On f i n a l a t S a r a s o t a , t h e r i g h t engine q u i t . During
ensuing phone conversation with t h e b o s s , he begged me t o continue
and promised t h e engine would be r e p a i r e d t h a t n i g h t . I refused
t o c a r r y passengers, but s t u p i d l y succumbed t o f e r r y t h e a i r c r a f t
t o F t . Lauderdale. Descending i n t o F t . Lauderdale, t h e r i g h t
engine q u i t again.
A f t e r ground maintenance performed some form of a e r o n a u t i c a l

voodoo on t h e engine, I was supposed t o continue f l y i n g t r i p s i n
this aircraft. A f t e r an unsuccessful run-up, I returned t o t h e
hangar r e f u s i n g t o f l y t h e a i r c r a f t . Within t h e hour t h e "Hero"
of t h e operation ( h i s f i r s t f l y i n g job) was a i r b o r n e with
passengers. Several days l a t e r , I was f i r e d f o r r e f u s i n g t o f l y
another a i r c r a f t which had previously had 19 write-ups,, a l l of
which were signed o f f "ground checkednormal", none of which were
fixed. Three o t h e r p i l o t s q u i t s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r . The o t h e r
"more experienced" p i l o t s were replaced soon with more "time
builders."
These a r e not i s o l a t e d i n s t a n c e s , everyday was more of t h e

same. Noteworthy comments t o me were: "This i s n ' t t h e a i r l i n e s "
(even though they a r e o p e r a t i n g a s A i r C a r r i e r "X" and 75% of t h e
passengers b e l i e v e d they were on A i r C a r r i e r " X " ) . " I f you won't
f l y t h i s a i r p l a n e w e ' l l f i n d someone who w i l l " (They d i d ) . "If
you t h i n k t h i s i s bad, you should s e e so and so (from t h e p i l o t s ) .
The p i l o t summarized h i s f e e l i n g s about t h e s i t u a t i o n . "Yes, I am

b i t t e r about t h e demise of A i r C a r r i e r "A". Out of 13 c i v i l i a n f l y i n g
jobs t o d a t e , it was t h e only one t h a t attempted t o do t h i n g s by t h e book.
Maybe it would still be around if we had falsified training and "ground
checked normal."
His suggestions for a resolution to this situation were two-fold. One

was for more Government supervision to force compliance with the
Regulations. His second was to ask management to fly with the pilots on
every flight. Do you think that may change their behavior?
Owner/O~eratorManagement
Another example addresses the same type management issue. The pilot
had a disagreement with his employer (who owned the aircraft) just prior
to departing on a trip from Casper, Wyoming to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
As he described it, "I was not able to suppress my desires to be out of
this man's (his boss) reach any longer." He admits to flying the small
jet after consuming alcoholic beverages five hours before the flight and
to flying single pilot although the aircraft was not certified single
pilot. He attributed his disregard for the rules and good sense to lack
of rest resulting from the heavy flying schedule imposed upon him by the
boss over the previous week.
The pilot's recommendations included mandatory courses or seminars for

the owners of high performance and turbine aircraft on pilot stress, crew
rest, and accepting pilot judgment. He felt that this would aid corporate
pilots greatly by relieving a great deal of stress and tension. As it
stands, if the corporate pilot says, "no go" for a legitimate reason,
there is a good chance the ownerfioss will find another (probably less
experienced) pilot that will go. Unfortunately, the new pilot may
eventually become an accident report statistic, along with the boss.
You have no doubt encountered similar situations, and have dealt with
them in your own manner. Understanding management's point of view is not
difficult; but, is quite unfair, particularly, when it comes to piloting
an unsafe aircraft or making a trip in unsafe conditions, the decision-
making management person remains on the ground.
Pilots - Rules. Regs. Right and Wrong. Another aspect of the

"management push," in both commercial and air-taxi operations is flying
experience. Generally, you will be flying high performance aircraft and
most often multi-engine. However you managed to obtain the minimum
required hours (remember "no experience, no job," but how do you get the
experience?), you probably started your first commercial job as green as
could be. Now you are experienced and must face your own limitations as
well as those of your equipment, the weather and other factors. When
assigned a trip now, will you automatically go as expected? When did you
last or when did you ever admit that perhaps the situation was worse than
you thought you could tackle? How would your management react to your
request for a co-pilot in a particular single-pilot IFR operation? How
would they react to a "no-go" decision?
In learning to make better decisions regarding your aviation

endeavors, whether they are immediate (in-flight) or long-term career
decisions, take into consideration all of the factors that have been
discussed thus far. Minimums and standards for all anticipated situations
shou!.d be established before such situations arise. In the heat of a
situation, your motive component of judgment could be placed under greater
pressure than you can bear. Decisions made on the ground, will follow you
into the skies.
Commercial Bush Flvins. The pressures to compromise safety in "bush

flying" are well known to most astute in "hangar flying." Bush flying
illustrates to the extreme the pressures that we, as commercial pilots can
, face. Passengers unfamiliar with flying safety, particularly, those
"Macho" passengers who love to hunt and fish, are fond of playing on the
likewise, "Machon attitude of the pilot. The following untrue story (from
AOPA's Russ Lawton) illustrates:
A pilot flew into the bush to pick up some hunters who he had
left the week before and found that they had two moose to take
out. He said to them, "I told you, when I left that this airplane
will only carry one moose!" His macho passengers responded with,
"The pilot who flew us in last year flew out with two moose!" This
pilot, feeling responsible for the maintenance of the macho pilot
image said, "Ok, I'll give it a try." So he packed everything,
started the engine of his float plane, taxied around to stir up
the glassy water and opened the throttle for takeoff. He hung for
quite some time in the ground effect before gaining some altitude.
He barely cleared the tree tops at the water's edge before he
realized that he just could not beat the rise in the terrain. He
mushed it into the trees at full power about a mile from the edge
of the lake. Fortunately, none of his passengers was hurt. He
turned to his passengers and said, "I guess I just don't have what
the other pilot did to get out of here." One of them responded,
"Oh, you did very well. The last pilot only made it a half mile!"
A safety investigator in Alaska, Dr. Michael Mitchell, has made an

extensive study of the factors that may contribute to the high accident
rate in commercial operations in that state. He found that pilots are
often paid after successful completion of their flights and some have been
threatened with the loss of their jobs if they refuse to take a flight
that they think would be unsafe. This practice is so blatant that, in
some cases, the blame for an accident should be shared with the operators
and/or managers. Mitchell goes on to suggest four forms of action that
could be taken to reduce or eliminate these pressures on pilots:
1. Change the method of remuneration for the pilots.

2. Alter the training program to address the handling of such
pressures.
3. Consider the ability of pilots to resist such pressure as a part
of pilot evaluation.
4 . Transfer some of the negligence normally assigned to the pilot for
poor judgment to management or others causing undue pressure.
The thrust of this manual is on training to reduce the effect of such

pressure. However, you as a commercial pilot remain ultimately
responsible for recognizing such pressure and avoiding it, whether or not
your management is sensitive to your concerns for safety. The following
is a true story:
A pilot for a large university transportation service was
asked to make a flight to a large midwestern city. Drawing upon
his considerable experience and good judgment, he determined that
the weather was not sufficiently safe for such a trip for a
single-engine aircraft because there was moderate icing reported
in the clouds. His chief pilot, a personal friend of the
passengers who had persuaded them to fly instead of drive, was
angry with the pilot's decision to cancel the flight considering
that the passengers had already arrived at the airport. The chief
pilot himself hastily loaded the passengers into the aircraft and
took off on the original flight plan for the destination. Nearing
the destination uneventfully, he was asked to hold - an almost
routine occurrence at this busy airport with adverse weather.
It was at this point, that he realized that he had not fueled

the aircraft prior to takeoff and was quite uncertain about the
amount of fuel remaining. Not wanting to appear concerned however
(He had the "Right Stuff." ) , and feeling there is "always" more
fuel left than the gauges show, he sought no special handling
until the engine quit due to fuel starvation. Luckily, he managed
to crash-land the airplane in a field near a gravel quarry. He
came away unhurt, but one of his friends was'disabled for life.
This situation contains many hazardous attitudes fostered by economics

and personal commitment. The pilot who decided not to make the flight was
vindicated for his decision, but the price was very high! This accident
shows that managers need to be especially aware of the pressure that they
can place on pilots to make bad decisions.
Risk management in aeronautical decision making has been discussed in

detail in the instrument manual of this series. The manager, who is faced
with the decision as to just how hard to push that pilot to "go," becomes
a party to the risk management process. It is understandable from an
economic point of view that the "mail, checks, boss, passenger, whatever,
must get through." The question of "when is the success of the task not
worth the risk?", must be kept in mind during all decision making and
dispatching of aircraft and crew.
The DECIDE Model
One of the best ways to help yourself to make good aeronautical

decisions from the standpoint of the intellectual side of pilot judgment
is through the use of the DECIDE model. This method is described in
greater detail in the "Instrument" volume of this series. The steps in
the DECIDE process are:
1. DETECT - The decision maker detects the fact that change has
occurred.
2. ESTIMATE - The decision maker estimates the need to counter or

react to the change.
3. CHOOSE - The decision maker chooses a desirable outcome (in terms
of success) for the flight.
4. LDENTIFY - The decision maker identifies actions which could

successfully control the change.
5. DO - The decision maker takes action to adapt to the change.
6. EVALUATE - The decision maker evaluates the effect(s) of the

action countering the change.
The six elements of the DECIDE model represent a continuous loop

decision process which can be used to assist you in the decision making
process when you are faced with a change in your situation that may
require judgment. This model is primarily focused on the intellectual
component, but can have an impact on the motivational component of
judgment as well. If you will practice using this model in all decision
making, it will become very natural for you, and it will result in better
decisions under all types of uncertainty.
The remainder of this manual will address the motivation or attitude

component identified in the second half of the judgment definition. It
should be studied in conjunction with the results of the Attitude
Inventory taken in Chapter 4 of the instrument manual from this series.
Chapter 11
IDENTIFICATION AND PRACTICE:

Better Decision Making Through Practice
This chapter is designed to help you identify and understand the five
hazardous attitudes defined for you in the instrument manual of this
series and to see how they can influence your reaction to situations
requiring judgment. The example situations given here are concerned with
commercial operations. As you recall, the five hazardous attitudes are:
I ANTI-AUTHORITY "The Regs are for someone else."
I1 IMPULSIVITY "I must act now-there's no time."
111 INVULNERABILITY "It won't happen to me."
IV MACHO "I'll show you. I can do it."
V RESIGNATION "What' s the use?"
Refer back to the instrument manual of this series, Chapter 4, and review
the explanations of the hazardous attitudes. Once you have refreshed your
memory with the definitions, continue with this exercise.
Below you will find another series of true flying situations involving
numerous air-taxi and commercial pilots and managers. At the end of each
situation, you will be asked to select the alternative which best
illustrates the reactions of a pilot who has a particular hazardous
attitude or response pattern. After you select what you feel is the best
alternative, look immediately at the next page for the proper response.
This page will tell you if your answer is correct or incorrect. If you
answered correctly, go on to the next situation. If you answered
incorrectly, you will be told why. Then go back to the situation and
select another alternative.
KEEP SELECTING ALTERNATIVES UNTIL YOU SELECT THE CORRECT ONE. Do not
be concerned if you select a wrong alternative. You will learn something
from the feedback given to you. The lessons are deliberately repetitious
and thus, get easier as you proceed.
THE ANTI-AUTHORITY HAZARDOUS ATTITUDE
From the five choices following each situation, pick the ONE choice
that is the best example of an anti-authority hazardous attitude. Check
, your answers on the next page before continuing. REMEMBER--ifyou did not
choose the correct answer, select another until you choose the correct
one.
Situation 1:
During a training flight in a medium twin, the instructor pilot fails

the inboard engine while in a 60 degree steep turn. After a shaky
recovery you continue the training. Which of the following alternatives
' best illustrates the ANTI-AUTHORITY reaction?
a. You think to yourself, "if the Feds could see us now!"

b. You are sure the instructor pilot knew what he was doing.
c. You can make these airplanes can do a lot more than the
manual says.
d. Nothing has gone wrong in training before.
e. You need to get as much training as you can, as quickly as
possible.
A GOOD JUDGMENT THOUGHT . . . "Recognize and discuss any potentially

dangerous situations that occur during training."
Situation 2:
Your passengers have showed up almost an hour late. You are going to
an airport that requires a reservation. Which of the following
alternatives best illustrates the ANTI-AUTHORITY reaction?
a. If you hurry, you may still make it in time.

b. Those reservation rules don't apply to you.
c. You'll figure a way to get in, you always do.
d. You can't help it that your passengers were late.
e. They wouldn't keep me out.
A GOOD JUDGMENT THOUGHT. . . "The rules are for everyone."

RESPONSE LIST 1
THE ANTI-AUTHORITY HAZARDOUS ATTITUDE
Situation 1:
Alternative a: Correct. "The Regs are for someone else" attitude is

portrayed by this statement. You are thinking in an anti-authority
manner. Go on to Situation 2.
i
Alternative b: Here you are assuming someone else has the
responsibility for you. The is the resignation hazardous attitude. Go
. . back to Situation 1 and select another alternative.
Alternative c: No. This is the macho attitude, where you get to show
what you can do. Go back to Situation 1 and select another alternative.
Alternative d: This is the idea that nothing would happen to you,

which implies you are invulnerable. Go back to Situation 1 and select
another alternative.
Alternative e: Here you are saying that this possibility couldn't

happen to you, as if you are invulnerable. Go back to Situation 1 and
Situation 2:
Alternative a: The hazardous attitude of impulsivity is exhibited by

this statement. Go back to Situation 2 and select another alternative.
Alternative b: Absolutely. This is the anti-authority attitude

saying the "Regs are for someone else." Go on to the next hazardous
attitude.
Alternative c: No. This is the macho attitude where you show how you
can do it. Go back to Situation 2 and select another alternative.
Alternative d: Whenever you indicate that you have no control over

the situation, then you exhibit the "what's the use attitude" of
resignation. Go back to Situation 2 and select another alternative.
Alternative e: This kind of attitude shows that you feel

invulnerable. Go back to Situation 2 and select another alternative.
THE IMPULSIVITY HAZARDOUS ATTITUDE
that is the best example of an impulsivity hazardous attitude. Check your
. answers on the next page before continuing. REMEMBER - if you did not
one.
, - -1:
Situation
The owner of the jet you are to fly tonight, is anxious to get to his
destination to make a presentation at a convention. The tops of the level
V thunderstorms were reported to be 5,000 feet above your aircraft ' s
service ceiling. Which of the following alternatives best illustrates the -.
IMPULSIVITY reaction?
a. You are sure you can push the aircraft up over the tops. The
service ceiling is a conservative guess and you're light anyway.
b. You can't change the weather, so you might as well go.
c. You just have to show this guy you can get him there.
d. A little storm won't stop you.
e. You want to hurry and get going, before things get worse.
A GOOD JUDGMENT THOUGHT . . . "Base your decisions on fact, not fantasy."
Situation 2
The aircraft you are flying has just recently been in the shop to have
a new generator installed. The generator "hot" light comes on thirty
minutes into your three hour flight. Which of the following alternatives
best illustrates the IMPULSIVITY reaction?
a. It's probably just the indicator light, it is a new generator.

b. You immediately shut down that engine.
c. You figure it will be okay for a while and continue on to your
destination. Nothing can happen that you can't handle.
d. Well, they just fixed it and there is nothing you can do.
e. You really don't need two generators, the regulations are too
stringent.
A GOOD JUDGMENT THOUGHT . . . "Refer to your checklist in response to a

warning indication."
RESPONSE LIST 2
THE IMPULSIVITY HAZARDOUS ATTITUDE
Alternative a: No, this exhibits the anti-authority attitude by

disregarding the flight manual ' s recommendations. Go back to Situation 1
and select another alternative.
Alternative b: Once again you are resigning yourself to the fact that
you cannot control the situation (weather). Go back to Situation 1 and
Alternative c: You are being macho in your thinking when you want to
"show-offn your skills in this manner. Go back to Situation 1 and select
Alternative d: This kind of attitude reflects the hazardous thought

of invulnerability. Go back to Situation 1 and select another
alternative.
Alternative e: You're correct. This is an example of the impulsivity

hazardous attitude by "acting now, there's no time." Go on to Situation
2.
Situation 2:
Alternative a: You are using the invulnerability hazardous attitude

in this case as if nothing could happen to you. Go back to Situation 2
Alternative b: This is the correct answer. The impulsivity hazardous

attitude responds by acting now. Go on to the next hazardous attitude.
Alternative c: This macho attitude is saying, "I'll show you." Go

back to Situation 2 and select another alternative.
Alternative d: Putting the responsibility on someone else shows the

attribute of resignation. Go back to Situation 2 and select another
alternative.
Alternative e: No. This is the anti-authority attitude that the

"Regs are for someone else" and don't really apply to you. Go back to
Situation 2 and select another alternative.
THE INWLNERABILITY HAZARDOUS ATTITUDE
that is the best example of an Invulnerability Hazardous attitude. Check
your answers on the next page before continuing. REMEMBER - if you did
not choose the correct answer, select another until you choose the correct
one.
Situation 1:
You've made this approach at least 100 times, many times down to
minimums. The early morning ground fog these summer mornings presents
even a more challenging picture. As you reach the MDA, you peer through
the muck, straining to see that familiar scene. Just as the "TO/FROMM
indicator flips, you catch a glimpse of what you know must be the end of
the runway. You go for it. Which of the following alternatives best
illustrates the INVULNERABILITY reaction?
a. You've made this approach so many times, you could do it with your
eyes shut.
b. You know the minimums can be fudged, just a bit.
c. There's really nothing to this, all's well that ends well.
d. Land it now, there's no time to waste.
e. I hope luck is with me now, it's out of my control.
A GOOD JUDGMENT THOUGHT . . . "Make sure that the runway is in the eye of
the beholder."
Situation 2:
While pre-flighting the pressurization system, you discover that the

rate-control is inoperative. Knowing that you can manually control the
cabin pressure, you opt to disregard this discrepancy and depart on your
trip. You'll just have to handle the system yourself. Which of the
following alternatives best illustrates the INWLNERABILITY reaction?
a. It's too late to fix it now.

b. You can handle a little problem like this.
c. What is the worst that could happen?
d. You certainly didn't break it, it isn't your fault.
e. You barely need the pressurization at the filed altitude anyway,
you can hedge on the regs.
A GOOD JUDGMENT THOUGHT ..."Opt for operating systems,"

RESPONSE LIST 3
THE INVULNERABILITY HAZARDOUS ATTITUDE
Situation 1:
Alternative a: NO. This is the macho attitude. Go back to Situation

1 and select another alternative.
Alternative b: Thinking "the Regs are for someone else is the

hazardous thought of anti-authority. Go back to Situation 2 and select
Alternative c: Correct. "It won't happen to men is the attitude of

being invulnerable. Go on to Situation 2.
Alternative d: No. "I must act now-there's no time" is the hazardous

attitude of impulsivity. Go back to Situation 1 and select another
alternative.
- Alternative e: Figuring the situation is out of yo.ur control is

thinking in the resignation hazardous attitude mode. Go back to Situation
Situation 2:
Alternative a: This is the attribute of impulsivity, where "there is

no time." Go back to Situation 2 and select another alternative.
Alternative b: Wrong. This is the macho attitude showing through.

Go back to Situation 2 and select another alternative.
Alternative c: Right! Nothing bad is going to happen to you because

of your invulnerability. Go on to the next hazardous attitude.
Alternative d: No. This is the resignation syndrome, where someone

else is responsible. Go back to Situation 2 and select another
elternative.
Alternative e: This is denying the regulations in an anti-authority

pattern. Go back to Situation 2 and select another alternative.
THE MACHO HAZARDOUS ATTITUDE
that is the best example of a Macho Hazardous attitude. Check your
b answers on the next page before continuing. REMEMBER - if you did not
one.
Situation 1:
Your company's Part 135 operating certificate has just been suspended,
but you have several flights going out today. You decide to complete at
least the scheduled flights while taking care of the paperwork necessary .
to reinstate your Part 135 status. Which of the following alternatives
best illustrates the MACHO reaction?
a. There is really nothing you can do about the situation, so

business as usual.
b. You'll show them that your company can fly.
c. They may take your certificate, but they can't take your company.
d. Dispatch those flights fast, there's no time to waste.
e. Who needs a certificate anyway?
A GOOD JUDGMENT THOUGHT. . . " Play by the rules, or you may not play at
all."
Situation 2:
On an IFR flight plan you emerge from a cloud to find yourself within
300 feet of a helicopter. Which of the following alternatives best
illustrates the MACHO reaction?
a. You're not too concerned, everything will be alright.

b. You should fly a little closer, just to show him ...
c. It's not your responsibility to know he was there.
d. You quickly turn away and dive, to avoid a collision.
e. With events like this, why should you ever follow the rules?
A GOOD JUDGMENT THOUGHT ..."Fly defensively."

RESPONSE LIST 4
THE MACHO HAZARDOUS ATTITUDE
, Situation 1:
Alternative a: No, this is the resignation hazardous thought, where

the situation is out of your control. Go back to Situation 1 and select
, another alternative.
Alternative b: Correct. The macho attribute is one of "I'll show

you." Go on to the Situation 2.
Alternative c: This is the invulnerability attitude, where "it

wouldn't happen to me" is the theme. Go back to Situation 1 and select
Alternative d: The "hurry, there's no time" attitude is one of

impulsivity. Go back to situation 1 and select another alternative.
Alternative e: This is incorrect. Denying the rules is an attitude

of anti-authority. Go back to Situation 1 and select another alternative.
Situation 2:
Alternative a: No. This is the attitude that you have never had
problems before and it would never happen to you. Go back to Situation 2
Alternative b: That's it. Macho hazardous thoughts include "I'll

show you." Go on to the next hazardous attitude.
Alternative c: Taking for granted that you are not in control is the
hazardous attitude of resignation. Go back to Situation 2 and select
Alternative d: This is acting on impulse. "I must act now, there's

no time." Go back to Situation 2 and select another alternative.
Alternative e: An attitude that the rules do not have to be followed

shows the anti-authority hazardous thought pattern. Go back to Situation
THE RESIGNATION HAZARDOUS ATTITUDE
that is the best example of a Resignation hazardous attitude. Check yourn
, answers on the next page before continuing. REMEMBER - if you did not
chbose the correct answer, select another until you choose the correct
one.
: Situation 1:
Your co-pilot shows up for duty and his behavior is somewhat out of
the ordinary. You know he has had a cold and when questioned he said
maybe it was the antihistamine he took the night before. Although your
aircraft requires a crew of two, you decide to ignore your co-worker's
.
drowsiness and inattention. Which of the following alternatives best
illustrates the RESIGNATION reaction?
a. You could fly this jet by yourself anyway.

b. You two have flown together many times, and everything has always
worked out fine.
c. What else can you do? He was assigned this flight, too.
d. He might not be within the regs, but he says he's okay and that's
what counts.
e. There's really no time to call another co-pilot now.
Situation 2:
You are flying the local television broadcast crew to an away football
game of the hometown college. When the passengers show up, there is an
additional person a n d a thousand extra pounds of camera equipment which,
with the existing fuel load, puts you over the maximum gross weight for
takeoff. Which of the following alternatives best illustrates the
RESIGNATION reaction?
a. You can't wait around to de-fuel, they have to get there on time.
b. There is no way you would let them think vou had made a mistake.
c. There really isn't any problem, you'll burn it off soon enough.
d. Weight and balance is a formality forced on us by the government.
e. Well, nobody told you about the extra weight.
RESPONSE LIST 5
THE RESIGNATION HAZARDOUS ATTITUDE
Situation 1:
Alternative a: This "I can do it" attitude is one of the macho trait.
Alternative b: "Nothing could happen to you" is the invulnerability

attitude. Go back to Situation 1 and select another alternative.
Alternative c: Absolutely. When you feel as if it is out of your

control, you are exhibiting the resignation attitude. Go on to Situation
-. 2.
Alternative d: When the rules and regulations do not apply to you,

this is the anti-authority hazardous attitude. Go back to Situation 1 and
Alternative e: No. This is the "there's no time" component of the

impulsivity hazardous attitude. Go back to Situation 1 and select another
alternative.
Situation 2:
Alternative a: No. This is the "I must act now-there's no time"

hazardous attitude of-impulsivity. Go back to Situation 2 and select
Alternative b: When what other people think affects your judgment

lTke this, you are thinking in the macho attitude. Go back to Situation 2
Alternative c: The fact that you feel nothing bad will happen to you
is one of invulnerability. Go back to Situation 2 and select another
a1ternative .
a Alternative d: Ignoring the rules is the attitude of anti-authority.

Alternative e: . Yes. When the responsibility is assumed to be someone

else's, you are in the hazardous thinking pattern of resignation. Go on
to the next exercise.
Chapter 12
ANTIDOTES FOR HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES
From working with the five hazardous attitudes in the previous

chapter, you should be more aware of, and alert to, these attributes in
your own thinking. This is an important first step in eliminating them
from your decisions. This chapter also uses commercial flight operation
examples, to teach you ways to counteract the hazardous attitudes with
positive responses to each situation.
Since you cannot think about two things at the same time, one way to
keep from thinking in a hazardous manner is to consciously alter your
pattern of thought. By telling yourself something divergent from the
hazardous thought, you are, in effect, "taking an antidote" to counteract
that hazardous thought pattern. You remove a hazardous thought by
substituting the antidote or proper thought process. Thus, if you
discover yourself thinking, "It won't happen to me," mentally tell
yourself, "That is a hazardous attitude." Recognize the hazardous
attitude, correctly label it, and then say its antidote to yourself.
To do this, you must MEMORIZE THE ANTIDOTES for each of the hazardous
attitudes. Know them so well that they will automatically come to mind
when you need them.
THE FIVE ANTIDOTES
Hazardous Attitude Antidote
ANTI-AUTHORITY
"The Regs are for someone "Follow the rules. They are
else." usually right."
IMPULSIVITY
"I must act now, there's "Not so fast. Think first."
no time ."
INWLNERABILITY
"It won't happen to me." "It could happen to me. "
MACHO
"I'll show you. I can do it." "Taking chances is foolish."
RESIGNATION
"What' s the use?" "I'm not helpless, I can
make a difference."
HAZARDOUS ATTITUDE AND ANTIDOTE IDENTIFICATION EXERCISE
Each of the following scenarios is a description of a flight situation

and, more importantly, the thought pattern running through the pilot's
head. Each situation contains several examples of hazardous attitudes.
After reading the situation, identify as many hazardous attitudes as you
can. Underline and number each sentence that contains a hazardous
attitude. Then write the name of the hazardous attitude and the ANTIDOTE
in the space provided at the end of the page.
Check your responses with those identified in the key after you have
comwleted the scenario. Your responses should closely match the hazardous
attitude responses found in the key. Although some situations can be
interpreted in more than one way, your answers should agree with a
majority of the hazardous attitudes and you should be able to write the
antidotes WORD FOR WORD in your responses. q.
Situation 1
The young pilot is "building time" flying freight at night with the
hopes of someday getting on with one of the major airlines. He figures
that he will be so good after a year of this type of flying that he will
be able to by pass the commuters and proceed straight to his choice of
airlines. He is a college graduate with a degree in engineering, though
his grades were mediocre.
His nightly route takes him to five major ai'rports in the midwest.
This particular December night, the whole area has low ceilings and
moderate mixed icing forecast and reported. The aircraft he usually flies
is down for maintenance, so he is in a model that he has minimum time in.
This really is no concern for him as he knows he can fly it well,
regardless of the weather.
It is cold and windy on the ramp, with blowing snow. The pilot
:
performs a brief pre-flight and thinks to himself, "this is a much nicer

plane than the other, I'm sure everything is alright." He did notice some
slush build-up in the wheel wells, but didn't clean them out because they
would just get filled-up again anyway. There really isn't anything he can
do about the snow on the ramp and his cargo was arriving. He needs to get
moving.
Though the snow plows have been working round-the-clock,the wind is

such that the taxi-ways and runways are still snow covered. The blowing
snow makes it difficult to see. As he taxis out, he discovers the
defroster is inoperative. He thinks to himself, "boy, these guys should
take better care of this equipment."
He is cleared for takeoff and as he takes the active, he looks around

the cockpit for his flashlight. As he begins his takeoff roll, he
remembers he left it in the hanger. "Oh well," he thinks, "nothing is
going to happen to the electrical system,. It's a dumb rule to require a
flashlight on board, especially with reilundant electrical systems." He
proceeds into the clouds.
Sentence Hazardous Attitude Antidote
8
Key t o S i t u a t i o n 1
Compare your responses i n S i t u a t i o n 1 with those given

below. Remember, your responses may not be i d e n t i c a l t o those
i n t h i s key. S t i l l , you should have i d e n t i f i e d most of t h e
hazardous thoughts i n d i c a t e d .
Situation 1
The young p i l o t i s "building time" f l y i n g f r e i g h t a t n i g h t with the

hopes of someday g e t t i n g on with one of t h e major a i r l i n e s . He f i g u r e s
t h a t ( 1 ) he w i l l be so good a f t e r a year of t h i s type of f l v i n g t h a t he
w i l l be a b l e t o by pass t h e commuters and proceed s t r a i g- h t t o h i s choice
of a i r l i n e s . He i s a c o l l e g e graduate with a degree i n engineering,
though h i s grades were mediocre.
His n i g h t l y route takes him t o f i v e major a i r p o r t s i n t h e midwest.

' This p a r t i c u l a r December n i g h t , t h e whole a r e a has low c e i l i n g s and
moderate mixed i c i n g f o r e c a s t and r e p o r t e d . The a i r c r a f t he u s u a l l y f l i e s
i s down f o r maintenance, s o he i s i n a model t h a t he has minimum time i n .
(2) This r e a l l y i s no concern f o r him a s he knows he can f l y i t w e l l ,
r e g a r d l e s s of t h e weather.
I t is cold and windy on t h e ramp, with blowing snow. The p i l o t

performs a b r i e f p r e - f l i g h t and thinks t o h i m s e l f , ( 3 ) " t h i s i s a much
n i c e r plane than t h e o t h e r . I ' m s u r e everything- i s a l l r i g h t . I 1 He did
n o t i c e some s l u s h b u i l d - u p i n t h e wheel w e l l s , b u t d i d n ' t c l e a n them out
because they would j u s t g e t f i l l e d - u p again anyway. (4) There r e a l l y
i s n ' t anything he can do about t h e snow on t h e ramv and h i s cargo was
a r r i v i n g . (5) He needs t o Eet moving.
Though t h e snow plows have been working round-the-clock, t h e wind i s

such t h a t the taxi-ways and runways a r e s t i l l snow covered. The blowing
snow makes i t d i f f i c u l t t o s e e . As he t a x i s o u t , he discovers t h e
defroster is inoperative. He thinks t o h i m s e l f , (6) "boy. these guys
- -
should take b e t t e r c a r e of t h i s eauivment."
He i s c l e a r e d f o r takeoff and a s he takes t h e a c t i v e , he looks around

the cockpit f o r h i s f l a s h l i g h t . A s he begins h i s takeoff r o l l , he
remembers he l e f t it i n t h e hanger. "Oh w e l l , " he t h i n k s , (7) "nothing i s
p o i n- ~t o havven t o t h e e l e c t r i c a l svstem. ( 8 ) I t ' s a dumb r u l e t o r e q u i r e
a f l a s h l i g h t on board, e s v e c i a l l y with redundant e l e c t r i c a l systems." He
proceeds i n t o the clouds.
(1) Macho - "Taking chances i s fodJish. "

(2) Macho - "Taking chances i s f o o l i s h . "
(3) I n v u l n e r a b i l i t y - " I t could happen t o me. I'
(4) Resignation - " I ' m n o t h e l p l e s s , I can make a d i f f e r e n c e . "
(5) Impulsivity - "Not s o f a s t . Think f i r s t . "
(6) Resignation - "1'm n o t h e l p l e s s , I can make a d i f f e r e n c e . "
(7) I n v u l n e r a b i l i t y - " I t could happen t o me."
(8) Anti-Authority - "Follow t h e r u l e s , they a r e u s u a l l y r i g h t . "
Situation 2
The company has been c a l l e d t o t r a n s p o r t v i a h e l i c o p t e r a premature

baby i n an incubator from t h e h i l l s of West V i r g i n i a t o P i t t s b u r g h . The
i n f a n t needs t o a r r i v e i n P i t t s b u r g h w i t h i n the next 48 hours and t h e
company t h a t i s c a l l e d has t h e only a v a i l a b l e a i r c r a f t i n t h e a r e a . The
p i l o t s have been f l y i n g medical evacuation f l i g h t s f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s .
Upon c a l c u l a t i n g t h e performance needs and weight and balance f o r t h e

t r i p , the c o - p i l o t determines they w i l l be r i g h t a t maximum gross weight
f o r t a k e o f f , with minimum allowable f u e l . There is no f u e l a v a i l a b l e a t
the d e s t i n a t i o n a i r p o r t . He's not concerned however, because they've
gotten i n and out of t i g h t e r s i t u a t i o n s before.
The usual s p r i n g fog is f o r e c a s t f o r t h e a r e a . When t h e medical crew

a r r i v e s , t h e i r equipment i s loaded and t h e c o - p i l o t makes a f i n a l weather
check. When he t e l l s t h e c a p t a i n t h a t t h e f i e l d i s a t minimums, the
c a p t a i n r e p l i e s " w e l l , now's t h e time t o prove j u s t how good we r e a l l y
are." They depart i n VFR conditions but a s they near t h e d e s t i n a t i o n
a i r p o r t , a t h i c k fog l a y e r has indeed formed over the h i l l s . They can s e e
the tops of t h e h i l l s protruding through t h e fog, b u t the a i r p o r t i s i n
the v a l l e y . The c o - p i l o t looks a t t h e fog and t h i n k s "what's t h e u s e , we
c a n ' t change i t , " but t h e c a p t a i n decides t o go f o r i t .
There i s no c u r r e n t weather observation a v a i l a b l e on t h e f i e l d so they

w i l l attempt t h e VOR approach i n t o t h e f i e l d . The c a p t a i n i s f l y i n g ,
while the c o - p i l o t s t r a i n s t o see the runway environment. They j u s t have
t o g e t i n , t h e r e r e a l l y i s no time and not enough f u e l t o r e t u r n home.
They miss t h e approach b u t a s they pass over t h e top of t h e a i r p o r t , t h e
c o - p i l o t could a c t u a l l y s e e t h e ramp and t h e ambulance waiting. "Let's
t r y i t again" he s u g g e s t s , knowing t h a t they a r e already below l e g a l f u e l
requirements f o r t h e r e t u r n t r i p . He t e l l s himself t h a t those reserve
f u e l requirements d o n ' t r e a l l y apply i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n .
They attempt t h e approach again while t h e c a p t a i n t h i n k s , " I ' v e got t o

show them we can do i t . " He decides t o fudge j u s t a l i t t l e on t h e MDA;
t h e r e a r e no o b s t a c l e s indicated on t h e c h a r t . J u s t a t t h e MAP the
c o - p i l o t c a l l s t h e runway i n s i g h t and t h e c a p t a i n t h i n k s , " I ' v e got t o
a c t now and g e t t h i s t h i n g on the ground." A s they t a x i i n through the
fog, t h e c o - p i l o t comments, " s e e , we always g e t i n , with no t r o u b l e . "
Sentence Hazardous A t t i t u d e Antidote

10
Kev t o S i t u a t i o n 2
Compare your responses i n S i t u a t i o n 2 with those given

below. Remember, your responses may not be i d e n t i c a l t o those
i n t h i s key. S t i l l , you should have i d e n t i f i e d most of t h e
hazardous a t t i t u d e s i n d i c a t e d .
Situation 2
The company has been c a l l e d t o t r a n s p o r t v i a h e l i c o p t e r a premature

baby i n an incubator from the h i l l s of West V i r g i n i a t o P i t t s b u r g h . The
i n f a n t needs t o a r r i v e i n P i t t s b u r g h w i t h i n t h e next 48 hours and the
r company t h a t i s c a l l e d has t h e only a v a i l a b l e a i r c r a f t i n t h e a r e a . The
p i l o t s have been f l y i n g medical evacuation f l i g h t s f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s .
Upon c a l c u l a t i n g t h e performance needs and weight and balance f o r the

t r i p , t h e c o - p i l o t determines they w i l l be r i g h t a t maximum gross weight
f o r t a k e o f f , with minimum allowable f u e l . There i s no f u e l a v a i l a b l e a t
the d e s t i n a t i o n a i r p o r t . (1) He's n o t concerned however. because thev've
g o t t e n i n and out of t i g- h t e r s i t u a t i o n s b e f o r e .
-
The usual s p r i n g fog is f o r e c a s t f o r t h e a r e a . When t h e medical crew
a r r i v e s , t h e i r equipment is loaded and the co-p'ilot makes a f i n a l weather
check. When he t e l l s t h e c a p t a i n t h a t t h e f i e l d i s a t minimums, t h e
captain r e p l i e s (2) " w e l l , now's t h e time t o Drove i u s t how good we r e a l l y
-
are." They d e p a r t i n VFR conditions b u t a s they near t h e d e s t i n a t i o n
a i r p o r t , a t h i c k fog l a y e r has indeed formed over t h e h i l l s . They can see
the tops of t h e h i l l s protruding through t h e f o g , b u t t h e a i r p o r t i s i n
the v a l l e y . (3) The c o - p i l o t looks a t t h e fop- and t h i n k s "what's t h e u s e ,
we c a n ' t c h a n ~ ei t , " b u t ( 4 ) t h e c a ~ t a i ndecides t o go f o r i t .
There i s no c u r r e n t weather observation a v a i l a b l e on the f i e l d s o they

w i l l attempt t h e VOR approach i n t o t h e f i e l d . The c a p t a i n i s f l y i n g ,
while t h e c o - p i l o t s t r a i n s t o s e e the runway environment. (5) Thev i u s t
have t o pet i n . t h e r e r e a l l v i s no time and n o t e n o u ~ h f u e l t o r e t u r n
-
home. They miss t h e approach b u t a s they pass over t h e top of t h e
a i r p o r t , the c o - p i l o t could a c t u a l l y s e e t h e ramp and t h e ambulance
waiting. " L e t ' s t r y it again" he s u g g e s t s , knowing t h a t they a r e a l r e a d y
below l e g a l f u e l requirements f o r t h e r e t u r n t r i p . He t e l l s himself t h a t
( 6 ) those reserve f u e l reauirements d o n ' t r e a l l v avvlv i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n .
They attempt the approach again while t h e c a p t a i n t h i n k s , (7) " I ' v e

g o t t o show them we can do i t . " (8) He decides t o f u d- ~ ei u s t a l i t t l e on
the MDA; t h e r e a r e no o b s t a c l e s i n d i c a t e d on t h e c h a r t . J u s t a t t h e MAP
t h e c o - p i l o t c a l l s t h e runway i n s i g h t and t h e c a p t a i n t h i n k s , ( 9 ) " I ' v e
got t o a c t now and a- e t t h i s t h i n p- on t h e ground." A s they t a x i i n through
the fog, t h e c o - p i l o t comments, (10) " s e e . we always g e t i n . with no
trouble. "
(1) I n v u l n e r a b i l i t y - " I t could happen t o me."

(3) Resignation - "I'm n o t h e l p l e s s , I can make a d i f f e r e n c e . "
(5) Impulsivity - "Not s o f a s t . Think f i r s t . "
(6) Anti-Authority - "Follow the rules. They are usually right."
(7) Macho - "Taking chances is foolish."
(9) Impulsivity - "Not so fast. Think first."
(10) Invulnerability - "It could happen to me."
Situation 3
The mayor of the city has chartered an aircraft to take himself and
members of his staff to a nearby city where he is to present the key to
his city to a visiting dignitary. The passengers are to be picked-up in
Oakland and taken to a northern California city for this affair. Special
catering has been arranged and the most senior pilots from the company
have been scheduled for this important trip. 7
On the short hop to Oakland, the co-pilot experiences some minor

problems with the new EFIS system recently installed. He disregards the '
potential problems, however, figuring this is the best system around and
it will operate just fine. Besides, it is VFR and they really don't need
all those electronics anyway. They flew just fine without them in the
past. They arrive at Oakland with plenty of time to spare and await the
arrival of their passengers. The group arrives and are boarded.
On restart out of Oakland, one of the alternators trips off-line, but

comes back up after recycling. The captain figures there's nothing he can
do about it. It probably has something to do with the new electronics.
Shortly after take-off, the mayor's assistant buzzes the co-pilot to

inform him that the mayor has forgotten the key to the city and must go
back to get it. The co-pilot immediately asks ATC for clearance to return
to the airport and places a phone call to the mayors' office to have the
key brought to the airport. Although quite high for the approach the
captain accepts a straight-in approach thinking "we've got to get down and
I know I can make the first taxi-way as well. Just watch."
When they arrive back at the ramp, a messenger is waiting to meet them
with the key. Although it is a company policy to shut down all engines
when enplaning or deplaning, the captain opts to leave one running. They
are in a pinch for time.
The alternator went off-line again on restart, but the flight is

continued and they arrive in time for the mayor to make his presentation.
As the pilots wait for their passengers to return, they watch the sunset
and the clouds roll in over the ocean. The co-pilot queries the captain
as to what he thinks may be wrong with the alternator. The captain
replies, "Oh, it's just flaky, there's nothing we can do about it now.
Anyway, nothing's going to happen to it that we can't handle. Right,
buddy?"

4
pev to Situation 3
Compare your responses in Situation 3 with those given

below. Remember, your responses may not be identical to those
in this key. Still, you should have identified most of the
hazardous attitudes indicated.
Situation 3
The mayor of the city has chartered an aircraft to take himself and
members of his staff to a nearby city where he is to present the key to
his city to a visiting dignitary. The passengers are to be picked-up in
Oakland and taken to a northern California city for this affair. Special
catering has been arranged and the most senior pilots from the company
have been scheduled for this important trip.
On the short hop to Oakland, the co-pilot experiences some minor

' problems with the new EFIS system recently installed. (1) He disregards
the potential problems. however. figurine this is the best svstem around
and it will operate lust fine. (2) 1
don't need all those electronics anyway. They flew just fine without them
in the past. They arrive at Oakland with plenty of time to spare and
await the arrival of their passengers. The group arrives and are boarded.
On restart out of Oakland, one of the alternators trips off-line, but

comes back up after recycling. The captain figures (3) there's nothing he
can do about it. It probably has something to do with the new
electronics.
Shortly after take-off, the mayor's assistant buzzes the co-pilot to

inform him that the mayor has forgotten the key to the city and must go
back to get it. The co-pilot (4) Jmmediatelv asks ATC for clearance to
return to the airport and places a phone call to the mayors' office to
have the key brought to the airport. Although quite high for the approach
the captain accepts a straight-in approach thinking (5) "we've got to get
- and (6) I know I can make the first taxi-wav as well. Just watch."
down
When they arrive back at the ramp, a messenger is waiting to meet them
with the key. Although it is a company policy to shut down all engines
when enplaning or deplaning, (7) the captain opts to leave one running.
(8) Thev are in a inch for time.
The alternator went off-line again on restart, but the flight is

continued and they arrive in time for the mayor to make his presentation.
As the pilots wait for their passengers to return, they watch the sunset
and the clouds roll in over the ocean. The co-pilot queries the captain
as to what he thinks may be wrong with the alternator. The captain
replies, (9) "Oh. it's lust flakv. there's nothing - we can do about it now.
(10) Anvwav, nothina's aoine to h a ~ ~ eton it that we can't handle. Right,

buddy?

(3) Resignation - "I'm not helpless, I can make a difference."
( 6 ) Kacho - "Taking chances is foolish."
( 8 ) Impulsivity - "Not so fast. Think first."
(9) Resignation - "I'm not helpless, I can make a difference."
Situation 4
The scheduled trip from Miami to Atlanta is routine for this pilot.
The company he flies for is based in Miami, with an office in Atlanta. He
makes this trip at least once a week. The executives are scheduled to
depart at 4 p.m., but arrive an hour early. The aircraft has not been
refueled, but the pilot calculates there is enough to make the trip. He
is hedging on reserves, but those regulations are for folks that don't
know how to manage their fuel as well as he does. He really needs to get
going especially with the company executives waiting.
He decides to get updated weather enroute so he can save some time and
show the execs that he can handle any situation like a pro. A little
schedule change isn't going to get him rattl'ed. In his haste to get
loaded and airborne, the pilot failed to notice the luggage strap hanging
from the nose baggage compartment. He hustles to get the passengers on
board and calls for his clearance.
While taxiing out he muses to himself, "I always figure a way to get
things rolling, right,down to persuading the controllers to give me the
runway I want." The pilot has chosen the closest runway to the hanger and
although there is a hefty tailwind, he does this all of the time and he's
never had any problem.
When he is finally cleared for take-off and he "thinks" I would have

been cleared sooner if that trainee wasn't working tower frequency. Don't
they know we've got business to do?" On climb-out there is a rumbling
noise appearing to come from the nose of the aircraft. The pilot is not
q t l i t e sure what it is, but knows enough to return and land, immediately.
Bsck on the ground, he discovers the cargo strap and tells his passengers
how the line guys really messed-up. "What's the use" he mumbles as he
climbs back in the cockpit, "it's not my fault those guys can't load
luggage right."
Now he really has to do some fancy flying to impress these guys.

He'll check the weather later. It can't be too bad.

10
11
12
Kev to Situation 4
Compare your ~esponsesin Situation 4 with those given

below. Remember, your responses may not be identical to those
in d;Fs 4 . q . Still, y o - Jhould have identified most of the
hazardo~sattitudes ;nbi.xted.
Situation 4
The scheduled trip from Miami to Atlanta is routine for this pilot.
The company he flies for is based in Miami, with an office in Atlanta. He
makes this trip at least once a week. The executives are scheduled to
depart at 4 p.m., but arrive an hour early. The aircraft has not been
refueled, but the pilot calculates there is enough to make the trip. (1)
He is hedging on reserves. but those rep-dations are for folks that don't
know how to manage their fuel (2) as well as he does. (3) He really needs
to pet noing
- especiallv with the comvanv executives waiting.
He decides to get updated weather enroute (4) so he can save some time
and (5) show the execs that he can handle any situation like a pro. A
little schedule change isn't going to get him rattled. In his haste to
get loaded and airborne, the pilot failed to notice the luggage strap
hanging from the nose baggage compartment. He hustles to get the
passengers on board and calls for his clearance.
W'9ile taxiing out he muses to himself, (6) "I alwavs figure a wav to
pet t h i n ~ srolling, right down to persuading the controllers to give me
the runway I want." The pilot has chosen the closest runway to the hanger
and although there is a hefty tailwind, he does this all of the time and
(7) he's never had anv problem.
When he is finally cleared for take-off and he "thinks" I would have

been cleared sooner if that trainee wasn't working tower frequency. (8)
Don't they know we've not - business to do?" On climb-out there is a
rumbling noise appearing to come from the nose of the aircraft. The pilot
is not quite sure what it is, but knows (9) enough to return and land,
immediatelv. Back on the ground, he discovers the cargo strap and tells
his passengers how the line guys really messed-up. (10) "What's the use"
he mumbles as he climbs back in the cockpit. "it's not my fault those guys
can't load l u ~ n a ~right."
e
(11) Now he really has to do some fancy fly in^ to im~ressthese EUI??
-
(12) He'll check the weather later. It can't be too bad.
Anti-Authority - "Follow the rules. They are usually right."

Macho - "Taking chances is foolish."
Impulsivity - "Not so fast. Think first."
Invulnerability - "It could happen to me."
Resignation - "I'm not helpless, I can make a difference."
Chapter 13
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
There are a few additional factors concerning normal human behavior

that should be considered because they impact judgment and can, therefore,
have an important effect on aeronautical decision making. In addition,
there are several other flying phenomena with psychological implications
that are discussed in this chapter because of their known affect on
judgment .
Perception
The human mind tends to focus like a camera lens either consciously or
subconsciously. In so doing, part of the reality of a situation is
filtered out, thus, ignored or rejected. Psychologists use the term
perception to describe this process which tends to affect our judgment by
reducing the effectiveness of data that are available to us. Each of us
has a different perceptual makeup because our realm of experience is
different. We live by our o m particular view of a given situation.
For this reason, as pilots, it pays to check out:
From where did I get these 'filters'?
Are they valid in this situation?
How can I widen my perception to get a more complete view?
The following are well established facts concerning how we, as normal
humans, select what goes through our minds. This selection process is a
natural method by which our minds focus on what is most important for
human survival and happiness. It is not a new found process by any one
individual, but rather one which has been developed over centuries with
each of us having our own style of application resulting from our unique
experience. This process should, in no way, be construed as lazy or
negligent, but rather very natural to human existence.
Selective Exposure: we tend to go to places and put ourselves in

positions to see and hear what we want to hear or
agree strongly with.
Selective Attention: in any situation we tend to focus our attention on

those aspects of the scene which are of special
interest to us.
Selective Perception: we tend to see and hear anything which strong

beliefs cause us to expect.
Selective Rejection: we tend at times to fail to perceive things that

we do not wish to see or hear, or that offend our
beliefs.
Each of these four factors cause our data acquisition and processing
for decision making to be less than perfe-t. Therefore, as we consider
decisions, we must be aware of the fact that there may be sources of bias
and conflicting information that must be countered with careful
, examination of the relevant information from our own, and if available,
from other sources. In other words, if you are at all uncertain about the
way you are perceiving a situation, ask another knowledgeable person.
The 7rv G L +-he Situation. To further expand on this concept, Dr. Lee
--
Bolman of Her---aruUniversity has developed a theory of human behavior that
he calls the "Theory of the Situation." This theory states that we
operate (including making decisions), imperfectly, based on our own theory
or beliefs about the present situation. The following five factors are
important to this theory:
Values and beliefs : Abstract concepts, such as honesty, courage,

justice, etc. These are not directed at any one thing or person.
Attitudes: Viewpoints adopted in regard to organizations, people,

things, work groups. They produce a predisposition to act in some
way. They can be changed through training and persuasion.
Personality: Predispositions to behave in certain ways ingrained in us

from early years. These are very difficult to change.
Behavior: What we do or say in a situation - heavily influenced by our

attitudes. This provides the basis on which other people judge
our attitudes, competence, and leadership.
Esvoused theory: our values and beliefs together with logic produce
our view of what should happen in a particular situation. We can
check this theory by asking another person to give us his or her
belief +out it.
Theorv in use: what we actually do when placed in the situation. It

can only be checked by observation. It is influenced strongly by
prevailing attitudes towards the components of the situation.
There is often a difference between the espoused theory and the theory
in use. Extensive training should be undertaken to ensure that the two
are identical in crucial situations, e.g., emergency procedures.
Differences are much more prevalent in the human world because of
attitudes towards people and the powerful effect of selective perception.
Is the situation routine? When situations seem routine it means that

there appears to be no variety from any other flight, or at least viewed
through one person's, eyes everything is standard. This is, in truth, a
rare situation - people are different, circumstances are different, the
route is possibly different, the weather is different and always changing,
etc. These things can be reconciled when we realize it is the level of
generalization and depth of awareness of our views which condition our
reactions.
For example, two situations, if looked at with a global view, may
appear identical. However, if we take a deeper level observation or
inquiry, we may see several differences between them. Finally, if we take
a highly sensitive, and comprehensive view we may see that the two
situations are totally different.
The degree of control which we try to exercise in these two situations

will always depend upon:
* The amount of discipllne over our mind that we exercise to make

ourselves aware of the situation.
* Our ability to analyze the parts of each situation using available

tools to identify and think about what is happening.
* Our active use of these tools.
* Our ability to adapt our behavior and make appropriate use of the
awareness.
There is a natural human tendency to attempt to simplify our world as

much as possible by generalizing things, especially in relation to human
affairs, as our experience increases.
Other Psvcholonical Traps
There are a number of other psychological traps into which pilots have
been known to fall. These can generally be avoided or corrected by
adhering to the principles advocated earlier for combating hazardous
attitudes. For example, to the naive public, pilots often hold the
"Macho" image. One of the problems pilots have is that they feel it is
their duty to uphold that image. However, the fact is that a large
segment of the pilot population does not have this attribute. Even those
who do, can have it shattered quite easily by a noticeable failure or
error in flight. The much talked about "Right Stuff" is a fragile image
revealed in Allen Shepard's prayer on top of the Redstone rocket where he
said, "Please God, don't let me #### up." (From the movie, The Right
Stuff).
The fact is that there are numerous examples of incidents of poor

aeronautical decision making in which the pilot simply failed to take
charge in a situation where action was needed. These types of situations
are difficult to reveal in scenarios. They are best placed under the
hazardous decisional attitude, "Resignation". However, the explanation
offered for this attitude, "What's the use," fails to fully describe the
problem. The following discussion expands on this aspect of the
resignation attitude.
The tentative pilot. The following story illustrates a feeling most

pilots have faced at one time or another in their flying careers. A young
private pilot was "transitioning" to tailwheel airplanes from a tricycle
gear airplane in which he received his private certificate. Although he
had soloed the tailwheel airplane for some hours, he had not really
learned the proper deliberate control technique for making "wheel"
landings in a strong crosswind. He found himself needing to make a
crosswind landing on. the north runway at Elgin, IL with a moderate wind
from the west. As the airplane bounced down the runway, he had that
helpless feeling as the aircraft became quite out of control for some
% moments prior to and after the first two or three touchdowns. Luck was
with him that day because he bent no metal and recovered with a very
receptive attitude toward more dual instruction in crosswind landings.
In the sport of tennis, coaches often uses the word "tentative" to

describe this attitude. As in tennis, tentative decision making in pilots
can lead to disaster just as easily as the macho attitude. Although most
pilots become less tentative with increased flying experience, such
experience alone contains no absolute preventative, particularly when
their fragile egos have been shattered. It can also be the result of life
stress events, such as divorce or a death in the family. These events can
cause one to have "tunnel vision" which can obscure relevant information
that otherwise would clearly point to a problem. You must be aware of
this possibility and take special care to be deliberate in your decision
making when such feelings arise - whatever the source.
The lesson from this example is that a tentative attitude can lead to
-decisional errors in flying. The factors leading to these attitudes
result from insecurities present to some degree in all of us. Pilots must
learn to make command decisions through disciplined thinking to overcome
these insecurities when they are faced with making decisions in marginal
flying situations.
Get-there-itis. One of the most often mentioned factor (or excuse)

for flying into adverse weather or taking on challenges beyond one's
capability is known as "get-there-itis." Pilots on their way home from a
trip feel a very compelling pressure to ignore mounting flight adversity
to satisfy a need to get home or to a destination. The pressure may come
from within one's self or from commitments made to other people.
In the early 19801s, two young male flight students on a return trip
to Columbus at night, in a Cessna 172 landed in Wilmington, PA with a load
of ice. Witnesses, including a King Air pilot (who decided not to fly
because of the ice), a state patrolman, and local FBO persons saw them
attempting to remove the ice by banging on the wings with wooden sticks.
They were told by everyone that it would be foolhardy to takeoff into that
ice again. Nevertheless, they did. They reached 3,000 feet and could not
get through the ice. They crash-landed in trees on a hill top not far
from Wilmington. Luckily, they were unhurt and spent the night in the
plane until they were found by hunters the next day.
It is difficult to imagine the extent of the pressure of get-there-

itis that could cause them to make such a decision. However, it is real
and we must be prepared for it. The best way to counter get-there-itisis
to mentally remove yourself from the pressure and focus your thinking on
the safety factors in the flight. This may mean telling passengers that
the decision to proceed must be based on the environmental factors instead
of their needs.
Duck-under. On instrument approaches pilots experience a compelling
urge to descend, "just a little bit," below the approved minimum for the
approach in an attempt to get into the airport. This urge is especially
strong on second and third tries for an airport. THe pilot feels falsely
secure having an illusory feeling of being in a world of his own in the
clouds quite apart from the buildings, trees, and rocks that exist out
there as well. This is a case of denial of the existence of the real
situation. It is best combatted by fully realizing that the ground does
exist out there, probably within the clouds and not necessarily below the
clouds and that the regulations are there for your protection.
Scud running. VFR pilots are more likely to fall into the trap of
scud running than commercial/instrument pilots but even the most
experienced instrument pilots sometimes fall victim, either because their
equipment is VFR only or they don't want to go through the trouble of
filing IFR. Scud running is the practice of flying as low as necessary
over the ground to avoid the clouds. The danger is that the ceiling
and/or visibility may change for the worse at any moment. At the altitude
of most scud running, these changes may occur undetected by the pilot
which greatly increases the chance of running into the terrain. Pilots,
- who have an invulnerability attitude, may convince themselves that they
can make it through visually just by going a little lower or a little
slower, especially when present conditions are reported VFR at the weather
stations. They go about it ignoring the fact that the weather between
reporting stations may be well below what it is at the stations. There
may be pressures to get somewhere with less than IFR equipment on board.
Scud running is best countered through the realization (headwork) that you
are putting yourself at great risk when challenging unknown weather.
Continued VFR fli~htinto IMC conditions. This is the most frequent

cause of general aviation accidents. It is not as frequent in commercial
operations because more of these flights are made IFR. However, it does
happen. It is most likely to happen in conditions such as those mentioned
for scud running where there is a strong need to get somewhere in a less
than IFR equipped aircraft or the pilot fails to file IFR. It is a
symptom of invulnerability because the pilot believes that no one is
likely to be in the airspace where he is flying and he'll be visual again
momentarily. The drive to continue visually may be countered by realizing
that the practice is, literally, a game of Russian Roulette. The risks
are very high and the penalty for being wrong - fatal.
Fallinp behind the aircraft. Anyone can get into circumstances in

which they find themselves "behind the aircraft," but it is most likely to
occur as a result of lack of experience, especially, in the type of
aircraft being flown. The phenomenon consists of too many tasks to
complete in the apparent time allotted, perhaps, coupled with the failure
to understand or complete satisfactorily, one or more of the tasks. A
commercial pilot could fall behind his aircraft if a new piece of
avionics, such as RNAV or F'MS, is added and he depends on it without fully
understanding it. Another common time for commercial pilots to get behind
the aircraft is when encountering an emergency, e.g., an engine failure in
a multi-engine aircraft. Lack of recent experience may result in the
pilot being over stressed in the situation to the point of causing a
reduced capability to complete the basic tasks of navigation and flight
control. The best way to counter falling behind the aircraft is not to
accept flight tasks until you are thoroughly familiar with the equipinent
involved in all modes of operation including failures.
Loss of ~osition or situational awareness. Whole books have been

writtell on the problem of maintaining situational awareness. It is most
often associated with inexperienced pilots but can also happen to the most
compete-? commercial pilots. One particular time this may occur is while
on rar'nr X L +ors. An instrument pilot may not continue to maintain an
awarc.._ss cf hi; position with his navigation system because under radar
vectoring, the controller is doing that task for him. Pilots then get
into trouble when cleared for the approach and are asked to resume normal
navigation. Equipment failure can cause one to be drawn so deeply into
the solution of the problem that one forgets everything else about the
situation. This is exactly what happened in the L-1011 that crashed into
the Florida Everglades while the three-member crew were all engaged in the
repair of a gear light. Situational awareness is maintained through I
careful flight pla~ning,disciplined headwork, and vigilant monitoring of
the flight progress at all times.
Takeoff with less than minimum fuel. The practice of taking off with
less fuel than the regulations require is a case of an anti-authority
attitude. It may be caused by a hurried pilot not wanting to take the
time to refuel or one who has overloaded the aircraft and cannot fuel to
the level required plus reserve, and still get off the ground. It may be
a pilot who plans for a flight that is beyond the range of his aircraft
with proper reserves but he wants to make it non-stop. One can also run
low on fuel when the winds turn out to be different than forecast.
Finally, some pilots may elect not to take on "holding fuel" because they
can save money for the company. This invulnerability attitude then gets
them into trouble when they are asked to hold for weather or traffic at
their destination. One must realize that the regulations are written for
achievable circumstances. Minimum fuel requirements allow but a small
margin for error - perhaps in headwind calculation or traffic problems.
This practice indicates an invulnerability and an anti-authority attitude
problem and is correctable through proper understanding and respect for
the regulations as minimum criteria to maintain safety.
Flight outside the certified f l i-~ h tenvelope. Except for overloading

the aircraft, this is a fairly rare occurrence in commercial operations.
Some believe that one particular model business jet was falling out of the
sky because pilots were flying it outside of its acceptable flight
envelope. Again this is a case of an anti-authority attitude. Design
standards, operating limitations, and flying regulations are not aimed at
curbing use, but rather at enhancing safety.
Flving
- IFR below MEA. For unknbwn reasons, some pilots, when
encountering clouds enroute, do not climb to MEA and request an IFR
clearance. Instead, they continue toward their destination in the clouds,
below MEA, thinking that ATC will not have any other aircraft in the
airspace and there will be no other VFR pilots out there doing the same
thing. Like many of the other examples mentioned above, descent below MEA
is a case of the pilot believing that the margin provided by the
regulations is sufficient to permit some bending. The pilot must realize
again that the regulation limit is set for the best of circumstances and
assumes good pilot judgment. Pilots must who violate those limits face
very great risks. This is a combination of invulnerability and anti-
authority attitudes that should be addressed in judgment attitude
training.
Casual neglect of flight ~lanning. Experienced pilots often fall into

the trap of complacency concerning flight planning, preflight procedures,
and especially the use of checklists. Some may even think it is macho
(and therefore "professional" appearing) to just hop in the airplane and
go. However, this practice, which indicates an invulnerability attitude
is conducted at great risk. There are many factors that can change in
short periods of time. Assumptions about fuel state, aircraft state,
chart availability, and weather conditions may be incorrect. This is best
countered by judgment attitude training in the area of invulnerability.
Chapter 14
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
Flight
- Planning
Flight planning in the commercial and air-taxi business, as in all

aeronautical trips, involves much more than just planning the route and
phoning (or taking) the flight plan to the Flight Service Station
specialist. The successful result of each leg of each trip embarked upon
depends on a multitude of factors. A cursory look at the accident
statistics for Part 135 and other commercial operations, leads one to the
realization that a large proportion of accidents and incidents are, in
part, the result of "inadequate pre-flight planning."
. - The biggest culprit in the area of flight planning comes with
increased experience. Unfortunately, as the pilot becomes more familiar
with his aircraft and the operation, he often becomes more complacent.
Thorough weight and balance calculations, exact performance numbers and
complete weather briefings seem increasingly tedious and unnecessary as
ones' skills and familiarity with the system increases. Adequate time is
usually programmed into duty times for all of the above chores to be
completed in a professional manner. Unfortunately, some pilots believe
that the extra time is for coffee, cigarettes and other priority habits.
There are indeed some different circumstances that affect the

pre-flight preparation in the commercial aviation environment. When
flying for personal business, for pleasure or even when flight
instructing, the decisions as to whether to go, where to go, and when to
return are at the option of the pilot. In the commercial aviation
business, you are providing a transportation service, either for
individuals or cargo, from point A to point B. The wishes of the customer
play a major role in your decision making process.
These same customers are also in the position to make last minute
changes to your careful flight planning. It is not uncommon for example,
for the passengers to show up and weigh significantly more (rarely less)
than had been communicated when making the charter booking. When carrying
cargo, you will seldom know the exact weight of the load until it arrives
for loading. A series of tables and calculations for your mission worked
out ahead of time will help in these variable situations. If the total
weight of passengers &nd/or cargo does not allow flight within the limits
of the aircraft, it is your responsibility to handle the situation. It is
not an easy one, but the decision must be made and adhered to. Another
related situation is when your passengers show up for the flight
intoxicated. The FAR'S are explicit regarding this, and once again, you
are the decision maker in this difficult situation.
Another favorite practice of the charter or corporate customer is the

change of destination - - often mid-flight. You had carefully mapped out
the entire flight, only to have the customer (whom you are serving) change
hisher mind. If in your estimation the change can be handled safely and
efficiently, then you can comply. If not, other options need to be
investigated.
The practice of using standard routings in air-taxi operations affords
many pilots the luxury of having "ianncc'" flight plans filed with the
controlling facility which eliminates having to replan and file for each
flight when the same routes are routinely flown. A few precautions about
"canned" flight plans are in order. Occasionally, the routes are changed
by the controlling authority. If this become necessary, your company will
be notified. Make sure the communication patterns in your operation are
such that you, the pilot, will also be informed. Also, "canned" plans
may nct list "alternates", because you would only choose an alternate
after having been given the destination weather and that of the potential
alternates. It is your responsibility to add alternates to the plan when
they are required.
Pre-flight planning and pre-flighting the aircraft are items which, if -

performed properly can alleviate many problems before they occur.
Maintenance of the equipment is a major part of flight planning. A
minimum equipment list should not be by-passed for any reason. The idea 1
that, "it wouldn't happen to me" is a hazardous attitude.
In-fli~htDecision Making
Six nights a week, the Air-taxi pilot flew the same route (Ft. Wayne -
Chicago - Indianapolis - Pittsburgh - Ft. Wayne) carrying "hazardous
materials" used in medical diagnosis. The aircraft and cargo were
.authorized to land only at designated airports. The point had been made
many times that the pilot's career may end in paper work if he were to put
down at an unauthorized airport. The pilot was "haz-mat" qualified and
the aircraft was equipped to carry the radio-active materials.
A line of level V and VI thunderstorms lay on a north-south

orientation from chicago to Indianapolis. The materials that were picked
up in Chicago were time critical, having a useful life of only three hours
and a critical patient waiting for them. The single-pilot of the light
multi-engine aircraft had already navigated around the weather to the
north on his way from Ft. Wayne to Chicago. Now, the trick was to get
back around it to the south. Due to the weight of the cargo, minimum fuel
plus reserves was all the plane could carry.
As the pilot with his particularly "hot and heavy" load departed the
Chicago area, it was obvious that he would have to deviate around the
weather quite soon. He had decided to try to fly west around the storm
and then south and approach Indianapolis from the west. Deviations were
approved by Chicago Center, though it was mentioned by the controller that
several of the commuter airline flights enroute from Chicago to
Indianapolis were able to get around the heavier activity by going east
rather than west and then approaching Indianapolis from the east. Since
neither the aircraft's nor the controller's radar range covered far enough
to the southwest to see the backside of the squall line, the pilot decided
to take the already tested route hoping to out-run the weather.
After heading eastbound nearly 50 miles, it became obvious to the

pilot, both from his radar, his storm-scope, and listening to the
deviations of the other aircraft in the area, that there was more than one
line of thunderstorms. A second line had developed out in front of the
one he was trying to get around. His choices seemed to be either to punch
south between the lines or to continue further east around the newly
developed line. To make matters worse, he was then informed that the
Indianapolis airport, where he had to drop of some off his cargo and get
refueled, was closed due to a severe thunderstorm over the field with wind
gusts to 65 knots. The second line of storms (reported to be a solid
line) was now approximately 3 0 miles west of Dayton.
The weather in the entire midwest was deteriorating rapidly, fuel was
being burned, and the turbulence had increased from moderate to severe.
Fortunately, the cargo could not shift because it was packed tightly in
the cabin. The thought process this pilot was going through went
something like this :
"If I don't get headed south pretty soon, I won't have enough
fuel to make it at all. But, that storm scope looks like a laser
light show and the radar shows thunderstorms everywhere. I wonder
what really would happen to me if I had to put down at an
unauthorized airport?"
At this time (he is approximately 60 miles to the north-west of

Dayton), ATC inquires as to his intentions. The controller indicated that
he would soon have to amend his clearance.
Well, maybe I could have the controller try to call company

operations to see about landing at another airport, maybe Dayton.
I better tell him something pretty quick, he's got enough to do
without me sitting out here going nowhere!
Fuel, and time (the materials would need to be in Indianapolis within

the next hour) have now become critical, and the thinking process
increasingly complex.
I guess I'm just going to have to suffer the consequences and

put down until this weather breaks. Now, where do I go? Maybe a
small strip where no one would know. Yes, but there wouldn't be
any fuel this time of night. I guess I'm stuck going to Dayton.
This controller is going to think I'm a real jerk!
The pilot proceeded to land at Dayton. Five minutes after landing,

the airport was closed due to severe thunderstorms and high winds.
Indianapolis was still closed.
The above story is an example of "in-flight decision making." What is

the situation? How do we go about deciding if something needs to be done?
How do we select from among the alternatives actions? How do we decide
when to act? There have been numerous studies involving decision making
during actual flight. Most often the notion of a "critical in-flight
event" (CIFE) and the pilots' response to it is studied. The results of
these studies show pilots' reactions and decisions regarding these CIFE's
varies tremendously with training, experience and attitudes towards
aviation.
The key for the commercial pilot in making good decisions during
flight is based on good decisions on the ground. Refer back to the
section on flight planning, where many of the "problems" and answers to
them could be made prior to ever leaving the ground. Another "lifesaving"
technique used often in training is the game of "what if?" It is possible
to practice making certain decisions while still on the ground. This
gives the decision maker time (the aircraft is not moving), information
(an instructor pilot, or the reference material, or the bosses' answers)
. and the opportunity to make a poor decision and learn from it. In other
words, it offers a "safe" environment in which all of the options can be
explored.
"What if?" is not just an exercise in story telling, but rather the
serious practice in decision making. Even though you may not get all of
the answers on the ground, you will become better at knowing how to ask
yourself the questions.
Looking back at the above pilots' situation, it is interesting to note

how many of his questions could have been answered by "what if?" prior to
making this flight. Many of the hazardous attitudes exhibited in his
thinking process could have been eliminated by prior thought and planning.
Terrain Factors
When discussing the components affecting the decision making process

of the pilot, terrain, weather and other environmental factors are items
over which he has no control. Weather will be considered in detail in the
next section. The options you have are to observe, and react to what you
perceive.
There have been numerous studies and investigations of controlled

flight into terrain. Attempts are often made to blame such errors on the
Air Traffic Controller. But as you will see again in the next section, it
is your responsibility as the pilot in command, to know where you are and
where the obstacles are. If you often fly off-airway routes, you should
be curious about the surrounding terrain; information which is clearly
available on VFR sectional and WAC charts.
- and Analysis
Weather Predictinn
Decision making in the weather arena begins with the development of a

sound knowledge base concerning meteorological phenomena affecting
aviation and receiving a proper weather briefing. On particularly bad
days/nights for weather, it is well worth dropping by the Flight Service
Station (if at all possible in your locale). The added information gained
will help you in your decisions regarding go, no-go, routing, fuel load
and perhaps even determine the type of equipment you will fly if you have
a choice.
An example of a decision process regarding weather is told by a pilot

flying from Chicago's Midway to Cleveland's Burke Lakefront. As he tells
the story . . .
Dispatch d i d not advise me t h a t the weather observer ( a t BKL)
was on v a c a t i o n . Due t o o t h e r jobs the weather observer does a t
BKL, I can never f i n d him t o g e t c u r r e n t weather b e f o r e t a k e - o f f
a s prescribed by FAR P a r t 135. So we have an agreement t h a t he
w i l l c a l l me with t h e weather whenever i t i s IFR. On t h i s n i g h t ,
t h e r e had been no IFR c a l l and CLE, e i g h t miles away was V F R . So
I headed f o r Burke Lakefront VFR. Twenty minutes out from t h e
d e s t i n a t i o n , I c a l l e d on Unicom f o r weather and was t o l d t h e
weather man was on v a c a t i o n and t h e weather was poor - - about 900
overcast and 1 1 / 2 miles v i s i b i l i t y . There were nine a i r p l a n e s on
the ground a l l w a i t i n g f o r me (they had landed d e s p i t e t h e weather
and without t h e r e q u i r e d o b s e r v a t i o n ) . So, I f e l t pressured i n t o
quickly turning onto t h e approach o u t s i d e t h e FAF and g i v i n g i t a
try. I asked f o r and was granted a Contact approach t o s t a y
l e g a l , b u t I probably wasn't very s a f e because I was b a r e l y
c l e a r - o f - c l o u d s and 1 mile v i s i b i l i t y . I hope I won't l e t someone
e l s e ' s a c t i o n s influence me a g a i n .
I s t h i s s t a r t i n g t o sound f a m i l i a r ? I f you a r e n o t f a m i l i a r with the

area around t h i s p a r t i c u l a r a i r p o r t , t h e o b s t r u c t i o n environment i s worth
a look on an approach c h a r t .
The environment r e q u i r e s constant and concentrated watch, t h a t i s

weather i n g e n e r a l , b u t e s p e c i a l l y , t h e anomalies a s s o c i a t e d with
thunderstorms, i c i n g , f o g , and high winds. The more experience you have
i n making d e c i s i o n s regarding these f a c t o r s , t h e b e t t e r you w i l l be i n
making f u t u r e d e c i s i o n s . One p i t f a l l however, of t h e experienced a v i a t o r
i s i n thinking of " I made i t through one l i k e t h i s l a s t t i m e . . . " .
Recognizing those times which you would not and should not r e p e a t i s a key
t o making b e t t e r d e c i s i o n s given the same s i t u a t i o n i n t h e f u t u r e .
Your understanding of t h e l i m i t a t i o n s i n t h e p r e d i c t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s
i n any weather r e p o r t i n g w i l l g r e a t l y a i d i n a s s e s s i n g t h e r i s k s involved
i n a given f l i g h t . P r e d i c t i n g t h e weather i s not a n e x a c t s c i e n c e ,
although i t has become much b e t t e r oxwer t h e y e a r s . S t i l l , some p i l o t s
think t h a t t h e weather information received i s never r i g h t and t h i s can
l e a d t o e r r o r i n judgment a s w e l l . The following s t a t i s t i c s regarding t h e
p r o b a b i l i t y of a c o r r e c t f o r e c a s t w i l l help t o c l a r i f y what r e a l l y should
be expected.
General l i m i t a t i o n s of f o r e c a s t s c i e n c e . Forecast accuracy stems from

what i s known and wnht can be measured. These two l i m i t a t i o n s determine
t h e r e l i a b i l i t y f a c t o r of v a r i o u s weather s i t u a t i o n s , how much d e t a i l i s
a v a i l a b l e , and changes over time. An important p o i n t t o remember i s t h a t
f o r e c a s t accuracy decreases with t h e passage of time s i n c e f o r e c a s t
issuance. Since the f o r e c a s t e r must consider a complex combination of
many f a c t o r s , information on many of these f a c t o r s may be p a r t i a l l y o r
completely l a c k i n g .
Recent s t u d i e s of a v i a t i o n f o r e c a s t s i n d i c a t e the following:
1. Up t o 1 2 hours and even beyond, a f o r e c a s t of good weather

( c e i l i n g 3,000 f e e t o r more and v i s i b i l i t y 3 miles o r g r e a t e r ) i s
much more l i k e l y t o be c o r r e c t than a f o r e c a s t of c o n d i t i o n s below
1 , 0 0 0 f e e t o r below 1 m i l e .
2. However, f o r 3 t o 4 hours i n advance, t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t below

VF'R c o n d i t i o n s w i l l occur i s more t h a n 80 p e r c e n t c o r r e c t i f below
VF'R i s f o r e c a s t .
3. F o r e c a s t s of s i n g l e r e p o r t a b l e v a l u e s of c e i l i n g o r v i s i b i l i t y
i n s t e a d of a range of v a l u e s imply a n accuracy t h a t t h e p r e s e n t
f o r e c a s t i n g system does n o t p o s s e s s beyond t h e f i r s t 2 o r 3 hours
of t h e f o r e c a s t p e r i o d .
4. F o r e c a s t s of poor f l y i n g c o n d i t i o n s d u r i n g t h e f i r s t few hours of

t h e f o r e c a s t p e r i o d a r e most r e l i a b l e when t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t
weather system such a s a f r o n t , a t r o u g h , p r e c i p i t a t i o n , e t c . ,
which can be t r a c k e d and f o r e c a s t , a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s a g e n e r a l
tendency t o f o r e c a s t t o o l i t t l e bad weather i n such c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
5. The weather a s s o c i a t e d w i t h f a s b m o v i n g c o l d f r o n t s and s q u a l l

l i n e s i s t h e most d i f f i c u l t t o f o r e c a s t a c c u r a t e l y .
6. E r r o r s i n f o r e c a s t i n g the time of occurrence o f bad weather a r e

more p r e v a l e n t t h a n e r r o r s i n f o r e c a s t i n g whether i t w i l l occur o r
w i l l n o t occur w i t h i n a span of t i m e .
7. S u r f a c e v i s i b i l i t y i s more d i f f i c u l t t o f o r e c a s t t h a n c e i l i n g
height. V i s i b i l i t y i n snow i s t h e most d i f f i c u l t of a l l
v i s i b i l i t y forecasts. S k i l l i n t h e s e f o r e c a s t s l e a v e s much t o be
desired.
F o r e c a s t e r s CAN p r e d i c t t h e f o l l o w i n g a t l e a s t 75 p e r c e n t o f t h e t i m e :
1. The passage of fast-moving c o l d f r o n t s o r s q u a l l l i n e s w i t h i n p l u s

o r minus 2 h o u r s a s much a s 10 h o u r s i n advance.
2. The passage of warm f r o n t s o r slow-moving c o l d f r o n t s w i t h i n p l u s

o r minus 5 h o u r s up t o 12 h o u r s i n advance.
3. The r a p i d lowering o f c e i l i n g s below 1 , 0 0 0 f e e t i n pre-warm f r o n t

c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n p l u s o r minus 200 f e e t and w i t h i n p l u s o r minus
4 hours .
4. The o n s e t o f a thunderstorm 1 t o 2 h o u r s i n advance i f r a d a r i s

available.
5. The time r a i n o r snow w i l l b e g i n w i t h i n p l u s o r minus 5 hours
F o r e c a s t e r s CANNOT p r e d i c t t h e f o l l o w i n g w i t h an accuracy which

s a t i s f i e s present a v i a t i o n operational requirements:
1. The time f r e e z i n g r a i n w i l l b e g i n .
2. The l o c a t i o n and o c c u r r e n c e of s e v e r e o r extreme t u r b u l e n c e

The location and occurrence of heavy icing.
The location of the occurrence of a tornado.
Ceilings of 100 feet or zero before they exist.
The onset of thunderstorm which has not yet formed.
The position of a hurricane center to nearer than 80 miles for

more than 24 hours in advance.
The occurrence of ice fog.
Occurrences of both icing and turbulence are local in extent and

transient in character. Once a pilot receives a forecast of these
hazards, he usually plans his flight to avoid them. Because actual
passage of aircraft through the weather system is the only way to verify
these phenomena, they usually go unverified. With the present state of
the science, forecasts of icing and turbulence specify volumes of airspace
which are quite small when compared to the total volume used by aviation,
but relatively large compared to the localized extent of the hazards.
Existence of the hazards in these relatively large forecast volumes is
thought to be fairly accurate - occurring perhaps 50 to 75 percent of the
time, but intensity forecasts typically are less reliable.
One other important weather factor to deal with is windshear and the
even more well-known "microburst". Some aircraft manufacturers are
experimenting with a specially developed windshear indication device. The
display would be in conjunction with the airspeed indicator. The
information presented is computed from accelerometers constantly and
instantaneously measuring vertical and horizontal speed changes. This may
become a very worthwhile safety device in the future, but in the meantime
awareness of the potential dangers of windshear is essential if one is to
remain clear of extremely hazardous conditions.
Air Traffic Control
There is a glossary compiled by the U.S. Department of Transportation,

Federal Aviation Administration available to all pilots, aimed at
promoting a common understanding of the terms used in the Air Traffic
Control system. It includes those terms which are intended for
pilot/controller communications. This glossary is cross-referenced to the
"Lexicon," published by the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Commercial and Air-Taxi operators and pilots need to have a working
knowledge of these terms for both domestic and international flight.
The fine line between unnecessarily tying up the frequency and failing
to convey all of the necessary information is a critical pilot judgment
responsibility while sharing the air traffic control party-line.
Communication techniques vary from pilot-to-pilot and from company to
company, but the recommended procedures should be adhered to by all. The
recommended procedures and common phraseology are not an option,
especially during abnormal or emergency situations. Communicating to the
c o n t r o l l e r t h e n a t u r e of t h e s i t u a t i o n could v e r y w e l l determine whether
you have a s u c c e s s f u l o r u n s u c c e s s f u l outcome t o your f l i g h t .
Among t h e notori.ous examples of miscommunication w i t h t h e a i r t r a f f i c

c o n t r o l l e r s i s t h e f a t a l c r a s h of a L e a r j e t out of Palm S p r i n g s ,
C a l i f o r n i a a f t e r a mix-up w i t h t h e c o n t r o l l e r s which allowed them t o f l y
d i r e c t l y i n t o t h e s i d e s f a mountain. I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , t h e crew
r e a l i z e d they were headed f o r t r o u b l e , b u t assumed ATC was i n c o n t r o l of
the s i t u a t i o n . I f t h e r e i s e v e r any d o u b t , c l a r i f y t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s o r
req.aest a c l e a r a n c e change. There i s never any doubt a s t o who i s i n
c o n t r o l o f t h e a i r c r a f t and who i s u l t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t .
Another n o t o r i o u s a c c i d e n t involved an a i r l i n e r t h a t c r a s h e d i n 1
Georgia following a double flameout i n a s e v e r e thunderstorm. In this
s i t u a t i o n , ATC c o n t i n u e d t o work o t h e r t r a f f i c on t h e frequency. Though
t h e c o n t r o l l e r s were n o t t o blame, b e t t e r communication may have l e d t h e a
a i r c r a f t s a f e l y t o an a i r p o r t d i r e c t l y beneath them, i n s t e a d of t r y i n g t o
g l i d e t o an a i r p o r t 20 m i l e s away. The o v e r r i d i n g p o i n t remains t h a t t h e
p i l o t i n command i s u l t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e . This f a c t remains t r u e with
r e s p e c t t o ATC communications. I f the message i s n o t p e r f e c t l y c l e a r ,
t h e r e i s no shame i n "say a g a i n " .
Communication i n t h e Cockpit
"Cockpit r e s o u r c e management" (CW) i s a term t h a t has come i n t o p l a y

a s t h e equipment we f l y becomes more s o p h i s t i c a t e d , and t h e f l i g h t crew
becomes more o f a management team. As i n any " b u s i n e s s , " communication
between and w i t h i n t h e departments i s e s s e n t i a l i n producing t h e d e s i r e d
outcome f o r t h e company. Once a g a i n , communication t r a i n i n g and t h e
e l i m i n a t i o n o r minimization of problems i n t h i s a r e a needs t o be taken
c a r e o f p r i o r t o l e a v i n g t h e ground.
Company procedures manuals and o p e r a t i o n s s p e c i f i c a t i o n s g i v e d e t a i l e d

d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e l i n e s of a u t h o r i t y above, between and w i t h i n f l i g h t
crews. Discussion of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n and c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e
commuriication p a t t e r n s between a l l p i l o t s f l y i n g t o g e t h e r i s mandatory.
Otherwise t h e f o l l o w i n g example could become a f a t a l b a t t l e r e s u l t i n g from
a "power s t r u g g l e " i n t h e c o c k p i t a t a most inopportune t i m e . The
i n c i d e n t was observed by a company p i l o t r i d i n g jump-seat back t o h i s home
tom.
The weather was 400 and 1 / 2 a t CVG when t h e a i r c r a f t c a r r y i n g

cargo i n p l a s t i c bags d e p a r t e d a t 4 BPI. C h e c k l i s t s were n o t b e i n g
used d u r i n g t h e f l i g h t , s o i t was n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e b l e e d
a i r s w i t c h was s t i l l i n t h e "emergency" p o s i t i o n a s i t had been
used f o r d e - f o g on t h e way i n t o C V G . The t r a n s i e n t p i l o t ( a l s o
r a t e d a s a check-airman i n t h e a i r c r a f t ) was c e r t a i n t h a t t h e
i n o r d i n a t e l y loud r u s h of a i r would b r i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n t o t h e
a t t e n t i o n o f t h e crew. Not s o . S h o r t l y a f t e r becoming a i r b o r n e ,
t h e c a b i n temperature climbed high enough t o b e g i n m e l t i n g t h e
p l a s t i c l i n e r of t h e c a b i n a s w e l l a s t h e p l a s t i c bags around t h e
cargo.
Fumes began f i l l i n g -the c a b i n and t h e crew h a d s t i l l n o t
r e c o g n i z e d a problem. A s t h e jet e n t e r e d t h e c l o u d s , t h e f i r s t
o f f i c e r s u d d e n l y became aware off t h e d i f f i c u l t y . Without s a y i n g
a n y t h i n g t o t h e c a p t a i n , ehe f i r s t o f f i c e r immediately d e c l a r e d a n
emergency. The d e p a r t u r e c o n e r o P l e r r e s p o n d e d r e q u e s t i n g t h e
n a t u r e o f t h e emergency and t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s . The f i r s t o f f i c e r
responded t h a t t h e y wanted Co r e t u r n t o l a n d a t CVG. The
c o n t r o l l e r i n s t r u c t e d them t o srlinab t o 2 , 7 0 0 f e e t and gave them a
vector.
During all. of lai is, t h e p i l o t s donned t h e i r oxygen masks a s

t h e fumes were u n b e a r a b l e . The p a s s e n g e r d i d n o t h a v e a c c e s s t o
oxygen. The c a p t a i n h a d c o n t i n u e d t o f l y t h e a i r c r a f t , though n o t
f o l l o w i n g ATCk i n s t r u c t i o n s . I n s r e a d , h e descended o u t o f t h e
c l o u d s and g o t on t h e r a d i o and s c a t e d t h a t h e was t h e c a p t a i n and
t h a t t h e y were n o t d e c l a r i n g an emergency, He r e p o r t e d t h e
a i r p o r t i n s i g h t and r e q u e s e e d t o c i r c l e and l a n d .
A f t e r t e r m i n a t f n g w i t h A T C , k h e c a p t a i n p r o c e e d e d Co b e r a t e
t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r r e g a r d i n g d e c l a r i n g a n emergency and n o t d o i n g
a s h e was t o l d . During t h e e n t i r e e p i s o d e , no a t t e m p t t o r e s o l v e
t h e s i t u a t i o n was i n i t i a t e d and o f c o u r s e t h e emergency p r o c e d u r e
c h e c k l i s t remained stowed i n i t s u n a v a i l a b l e p o s i t i o n .
T h i s may seem an extreme example o f poor communication t e c h n i q u e s i n

the cockpPt. Yet s i t u a t i o n s s i m i l a r . t o t h i s a r e q u i t e common. The
a v a i l a b i l i t y o f communications t r a i n i n g u s i n g r o l e - p l a y i n g and s m a l l - g r o u p
d i s c u s s i o n s may seem t o be u n n e c e s s a r y e x t r a t i m e s p e n t f o r t h e p i l o t s .
The b e n e f i e s , however, have b e e n documented i n f o r m a l r e s e a r c h r e s u l t i n g
i n t h e a d o p t i o n o f some t y p e of CWL t r a i n i n g i n most major a i r l i n e
cornpznies. The commercial and a i r - t a x i m u l t i - c r e w o p e r a t o r s w i l l no doubt
soon be s t a r t i n g o r c o n t r a c t i n g s i m i l a r programs f o r t h e i r p i l o t s .
Many ( a c t u a l l y m o s t ) commercial and a i r - E a x i p i l o t s have gone t h r o u g h

t h e p h a s e of f l y i n g a v a r i e t y o f d i f f e r e n t makes, models a n d i n d i v i d u a l
a i - r c r a f t . C o n t r a r y t o some l i n e s o f c h i n k i n g , a l l Cheyennes a r e n o t t h e
same, I t h a s been found t h a t l a c k o f f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h a s p e c i f i c a i r p l a n e
was o f t e n a c o n t r i b u t o r t o a v a r i e t y o f a i r c r a f t a c c i d e n t s . Faced w i t h
l e a r n i n g how t o b e f l e x i b l e , t h e r e a r e some p r a c t i c e s t h a t p i l o t s , f i n d i n g
t h e m s e l v e s i n t h i s sbtdation, cam u s e t o h e l p f a m i l i a r i z e t h e m s e l v e s w i t h
t h e equipment t h e y a r e ahour. t o f l y .
A L e a r j e e 2 5 B i s a % e a r j e t 25D i s a E e a r j e t 25D i s n o t - n e c e s s a r i l y
true. Nor i s a Baron i s a Baron i s a Baron. Each i n d i v i d u a l a i r c r a f t
w i l l have some d i f f e r e n c e s , T h i s i s t r u e f o r a l l makes a n d models of
~ . i r c r a f t you f l y . When you. are qua:l_ified and f l y i n g s e v e r a l makes and
models, t h i n g s c o u l d even g e t more c o n f u s i n g . L e t " even p u t you i n t h e
s i t u a t i o n of f l y i n g a d i f f e r e n t t y p e o f a i r c r a f t on d i f f e r e n t l e g s o f t h e
same t r i p . T h i s i s where b a s i c human e n g i n e e r i n g ( o r l a c k t h e r e o f ) needs
t o be overcome by p i l o t a w a r e n e s s .
~ i 1-Y. cn*:k,;rr i- ec~uipnlent is becoming more and ntore
As stated p r . i ~ \01i.5
< *
sophfsticateci, t r b rht- o r 1 : L.II!, iimlting factor in the safety of
operation being the p i l o l ~ . 'Throw into that a change of planes every now
, .
and then and thc ~ p . ~ i o rhas f - o contend with variety as well as
sophistication. Ui:: 2 aecidor:ir studtes identified the culprit,
"non-standard" r:oclcpii: d e s i . g r i , as a major contributor to "pilot error"
fatalities. Th1.s ?:eseau-t:h helped. i n ~nforcing some standardization
restrictions on the par.t: OF rxlar~~.ti~aci:rr~:eu's~But, a Baron is still not a
Baron is still not. a Darnr~
So, given this sii:rxa.l-.i.on, ihau opt-ions are available to the pilot to
help in making a good. trarisit:f.isn back and forth between different
aircraft? The best. advar~tage :TO give yourself while piloting several
makes and rnode.ls of a i i c r a f i : (nci. simultaneously of course) is to limit
the total types i f p o c n s s i - f e , esizablish proficiency requirements and
maintain them .Ln each - t y p e , and : ~ the e checklists. If you are not
comfortable at any poirit. i n txhe, raise your own minimums or take a
co -pilot even i f i r z - 7 i. r-equ.ired The time to evaluate your current
proficiency, thou&, i . s b e f o r e taxiing 0u.i: for take-off. It may just be a
matter of sitting i-s i-he aircrafti reviewing the manual and checklists and
"thought flyir-lg" a rni.r!..i.-fiight Ghile on the ground. In any case, make
sure you are comfnrr-.abieand confident about the equipment now, even if
you felt right at home \;?hen you :Flew it 6 months ago.
Numerous ether i-1.urnar; engineering factors affect your ability to

operate the aira:raFr a!-!d make derisions concerning the flight. Given the
aircraft you are ?.n F l y . , investigate personal equipment that can help
reduce your w o r k . : l o a d . ' % i s Ls especially important when flying single
pilot in I M C , Such lrerns vs~eld include a headset with a boom microphone
which would free r.rp your- "'mic" hand and enable responses to ATC more
promptly. As a side beneftt, certain headsets are noise attenuating which
protects your hearing capabilities and aids in lessening "noise" fatigue.
Also consider timers, ca:!culators, navigation computers, clipboards, pen
holders, sunglasses; and seat c.nshions to aid to reduce your workload
and/or make yorer work: enviil'omneni.more comfortable.
The pilot is wal.kd.r-lg ,atxi:. on the ramp to board her 1.5 mi~l.liondollar
aircraft - - carrying a p j . ? ? o w ! l ? ! S h e i 64 inches tall, but the seat and
rudder pedals in this yarrkcular aircraft (and several others that she has
flown) do nor adjust- tar enough to allow her full range of control of the
aircraft. This is not a .ilnic/ue situation for the shorter- pilot. Similar
discomforts also face .call cockpit crewmembers. Human comfort in the form
of a "Lazy-BoyvTrec~lizaerChair is n o i required, but the ability to perform
all flight duties adec~nate3.yas well as maintain physical comfort is
primary in the design [cf aircraf~seats. Of course, the manufacturers may
not be able to h a v e a :fi.exiblc enough design to accommodate all size
pilots. This is where ,cr~atrs~-e conlfori: comes in, and if that requires
additional seating ik should be used.
--
The "OptionqqF a c ~ z
As pilot Sen comrnan61., .'he ~ p i - i o r i i.s always yours, Whether it is to

go-around on landing, mi se; the approach, or divert to an alternate, the
option is yours. M a [ : -i_mpnw,tani-r u cecognize, is the option to say "no".
Sometimes in our quest. T a l . ~ ""Plea-vier, ir.on" w e lose sighe of that option.
1dh7-le.nyour situation ca1:l.s f u r a " " g n u or " n o - g o " decision, remember, it i s
not -the Company's X i a n L t . s , f h e a1.r.c:raf.i.Limits, or A T C k limits, but your
own l i m i t s that m a s t goveurl y'6rlJ.X' B K P S W ~ J - T Don't
~ l e t a bad decision be your
las-t one!
Chapter 15
REVIEW EXERCISES IN AERONAUTICAL DECISION MAKING
The following scenarios and exercises will give you the opportunity to
review your newly acquired aeronautical decision making abilities. Refer
back to the appropriate chapters (in this volume as well as in the
Instrument Volume) for necessary memory joggers if necessary prior to
completing the following section. Before beginning the scenario review,
check your recollection of the decision making material by filling in the
blanks below with the correct answers.
E. The four judgment factors are:
d. -
2. The five risk elements are:
e.
3. The five hazardous attitudes and an identifying comment are:

4. The antidotes to the hazar-ious attit71des are (in order fsoa 4
ebosye'. :
To check your answers, refer to the appropriate section of this manual

an3 the Instrument manual. If you could not repeat exactly the antidotes,
review them until you can. When you have finished the above exercises,
continue to the next section.
The following scenarios are developed from actual incidents. These

encounters will be expressed as the pilots related them. You will be
asked to identify the risks involved, the hazardous attitudes and the
appropriate antidotes to those attitudes. You will also be asked to
contribute additional comments as to the overall pilot, environment and
aircraft condition as they apply to the outcome of the flight.
Let's take a close-up listen to a pilot in a very common situation.

While moving "up-the-%adderH in the aviation world, pilots pass through
some sort of graduated advancement to bigger and more sophisticated
aircraft. There are several different pathways to the "big iron" that so
many pilots work toward, but a very common one is exemplified in the
scenarios to follow.
From Flinht Instructor to Commercial Pilot - The Move Up
The transition from flight instructor to passenger or cargo hauling

duties is one of the most difficult transition periods requiring the
highest piloting & decision making skills. Most flight instructors log
many hours in small, single-engine aircraft. Some instructors, of course
do obtain multi-engine ratings, but it is quite difficult to maintain
proficiency without actually instructing multi-engine students. Even as a
multi-engine flight instructor, the demands and decisions of the
commercial pilot are quite different and usually much more involved than
those of instruction. New equipment, new working hours, competition for
routes and upgrading and the demanding nature of servicing the customer
are pressures inherent to the new flight-instructor-turned-freight-pilot.
All of these factors combined wich routine considerations of flying can
create a temporarily unstable environment.
In the following example, carefully read the scenario first and then
answer the questions that follow. Your answers to these questions will be
discussed with you by your instructor.
Great! The v a j - v - e - r j u - s t . came i n t o d a y from the insurance
company and I car? ' i i n a l . l y :FLy t h e r u n t o n i g h t by myself. Good
t h i n g t h e company % s i.n a b a d way f o r p i l o t s . They had t o ask f o r
a w a i v e r to get. me .Insured wifh Less t h a n t h e r e q u i r e d hours
s t a t e d o n the p o l i c , y
About: t h e , :I really need t c i s t a r t making some b u c k s . Life a s

a s t a r v i n g flight i n s t r i m c t o r i s over'. I r e a l l y d o n ' t know where
t h e I n s u r a n c e c o m p a r ~ i e s go-ir t h e r i g h t fzo r e q u i r e s o many h u n d r e d s
and ehousands 05 kiouss j u , s i : .to be a b l e t o f l y t h e s e l i t t l e
airplanes. 1 "ve 'had p?-enty o f e x p e r i e n c e f l i g h t i n s t r u c t i n g and
t h a t s h o u l d s u r e c o u n t f o r s o m e t h i n g , HOW e l s e would I be a b l e t o
get the experience? There" -really n o e h i n g I c a n do a b o u t t h e
system. 1 s u r e a m g l a d h h e y c-li.dnUicask. t o a c t u a l l y l o o k a t my
logbook e n t r i e s .
Now I c a n get. o l u t t.:'klere and show them I a m a s g o o d , n o , t h a t

I'm b e t t e r t h a n t-he r e s i - . I s h o u l d move up q u i c k l y , a f t e r I g e t
t h e c h a n c e to show i-hen! my stcr.ff f o r a w h i l e . 1 r e a l l y can" w a i t
t o g e t my h a n d s on t.he h i g g e - i . e q u i p m e n t . Then I ' l l h a v e a r e a l
good c h a n c e a t che a : i . : l . . i n e s
The w e a t h e r . . . p r - e . t t y ',k-1a i-~o n i g h t . H o s t o f t h e guys have b e e n

p i c k i n g up node rat^ and sometimes s e v e r e i c e . I can't believe a l l
the i c e s t i l l . ha-ng:i.ng bin i f h e plane t h a t j u s t c a m e i n . Oh w e l l ,
l o o k o u t airways!
Discuss ion
I I n reading . ~ . h i s, : i l o t s V h o u g h e s on h i s n e w j o b , d i d you p e r c e i v e
any risks t h a t I-IF d i d net c o n s i d e r ?
2. Which h a z a r d o u s a t t i - i u d a s doantnate t h i s p i l o t s s t h i n k i n g ?
3 I n d i c a r e a c L e a s ~ rhree specific examples o f h a z a r d o u s ~ h o u g h t s ,

cn- M
a-ry)c
3 52
a k U
c u p
%hey finally a r r i v e d at r r h e % ~d e s t i n a t i o n a n d , o f c o u r s e , t h e
f l y i n g p i l o t had t o give him a s h o w wtr.h his 250 k n o t a p p r o a c h and
s h o r t f i e l d 4 a n d t n g rech.n!.que. 'Jyhe uwcornfsnrtab%e no s e a t p i l o t
t h o u g h t , "Haybe he i-horrgkt. h e i m p r e s s e d m e , b u t j u s t w a i t , I ' l l .
show him P "
Discussion
I. In a s s e s s i n g r ~ s k r C r'are lexaawpLe i n each of the following

areas :
3. What a r e t h e predomfnarsL knaza-rdous a t t i t u d e s showing in his

d e c i s i o n making partevns?
4. Identify three aarp.?9e:j.C s x a m ~ l . e s 'of hazardous chinking in this

example ~
5 . What are the antidotes for the above hazardous thoughts?
TI-< next two scenarios take a look at pilots who used the antidotes to
counter hazardous attitudes as they crept into their thinking. Ey
definition, these fligh~swere considered successful by the pilots, i.e.,
no damage to persons or property. On the other hand, management may have
considered them to be unsuccessful because the mission at hand was not
accomplished in a timely manner. As a final review, read the following
scenarios and answer the questions. Good luck in all of your aeronautical
endeavors and decision waking.
"Success - The Virtues of the Checklist"
My co-pilot and I had traveled 1,500 miles last week to pick

up one of our jets that had been in for maintenance only to find
out when we arrived that it wouldn't be ready for another week.
Today, we have been up since five this morning airlining from our
home base hack to the maintenance site. The paper work is done
and I started the pre-flight while my partner checked the weather.
I was mumbling to myself about how difficult it was to get

good service any more, We had to practically beg to get them to
finish our plane up so we could put it back in service. I climbed
into the cockpit to continue the pre-flight and picked up the
check-list to avoid sitting on it. It was open to the
"pre-flight" page and I happened to glance down. I had not
actually been following the written list on the exterior
Inspection.
What caught my eye was "Tow-bar.. . . . . . . .Stowed". The thought

went through my wind, that "no, it wouldn't happen to me." It was
at that point I thought "well, yes it could." So, I climbed back
out of the airplane and looked at the nose wheel. Removing the
tow-bar h thought how fortunate I was to have remembered what I
had learned in a course on pilot judgment.
Maybe someone else would have noticed, but I had taken

responsibility for the pre-flight check. Had that bar remained
intact while I attempted to taxi, it certainly would have damaged
the aircraft and/or resulted in a taxi accident. No doubt there
would also have been some damage to we from my boss!
Discussion
1. What potentially hazardous attitude is exhibited by this pilot?
2 . What is the antidote for this hazardous attitude?
G0
" T h a n k s t o a C o u r s e ~ nD e c i s i o n Making"
I ' d been d r i v i n g A z t e c ' s and Cessna 3 1 0 ' s most of t h e time on

my s h o r t hop from C Y I t o LUK. This p a r t i c u l a r n i g h t , though, I
was i n my o l d " b o a t , " a d i f f e r e n t t w i n . I t had a l r e a d y been a
h a r d month and once a g a i n 1 was backed up a g a i n s t d u t y and f l i g h t
time l i m i t s . I was s c h e d u l e d t o d e p a r t ( a s u s u a l ) a t 9 PM l o c a l
The weather was a s b a d , i f nor worse t h a n i t had been when I came

i n from F t . Wayne ow my e a r l i e r l e g . The w e a t h e r was a t minimums
everywhere, moderate t o s e v e r e i c e ( t h a t ' s f o r s u r e ) and my a l t e r n a t e
would have t o be S t . Louis b o t h going down and coming back.
Even though I had o n l y been a t t h e n i g h t - f r e i g h t s c e n e f o r

about n i n e months, 1 f e l t j u s t as c r u s t y a s t h e r e s t o f t h e g u y s .
I t seemed t o be a p a r t i c u l a r l y h a r d w i n t e r , b o t h on u s and on t h e
equipment. 1 was g l a d t o have an a i r p l a n e w i t h a n o p e r a b l e h e a t e r
tonight. ( I d i d my b e s r n o t t o complain, even though I ' d s p e n t
two weeks of n i g h t s f l y i n g an a i r c r a f t w i t h a h e a t e r t h a t worked
more o r l e s s - - mostly l e s s . )
Well, b u s i n e s s a s u s u a l . I would p i c k up my c a r g o a c r o s s t h e
f i e l d and b e on my way i n t o t h e c o l d , s l i m y , muck. I t was j u s t a
s h o r t hop, about two h o u r s t o t a l time u n t i l I s h o u l d be back and
on my way home. That i s of c o u r s e , i f t h e r e a r e no "emergency"
f l i g h t s t h a t need t o be d i s p a t c h e d when 1 g e t b a c k . A s much a s 1
needed t h e e x t r a money, I even s i l e n t l y hoped t h a t t o n i g h t I would
n o t be needed a f t e r I g o t b a c k .
The c u r r e n t w e a t h e r was s t i l l e x t r e m e l y d i s m a l . I g a t h e r e d my
n o n - s p e a k i n g c a r g o and was ow t h e r u n . I noticed the b a t t e r i e s
c h a r g i n g on r u n - u p and c o u l d n ? h e l p b u t remember a few o t h e r
Senecas 1 had flown w i t h l o w b a t t e r i e s behaving i n t h e same
manner. 1 b r i e f l y (very b r i e f l y ) considered n o t d e p a r t i n g , b u t I
knew we d i d n o t have a n o t h e r a i r c r a f t a v a i l a b l e a s a r e p l a c e m e n t .
So, I checked t h e g a u g e s , determined t h a t e v e r y t h i n g looked a l l
r i g h t a s l o n g a s t h e RPM's were u p , and I t a x i e d o u t .
As i n a l l s f a v i a t i o n , t h e r e i s a p e c k i n g o r d e r , and t h a t
holds t r u e f o r disparching of the a i r c r a f t involved i n f r e i g h t
operations. 1 ( b e i n g ehe s l i g h t l y c o m p e t i t i v e t y p e ) s m i l e d a s I
r e c e i v e d my c l e a r a n c e b e f o r e my l i t c l e L e a r j e t f r i e n d s who a r e
going t o b e a t me no m a t t e r , b u t e v e r y l i t t l e b i t h e l p s . I prided
myself on my t i m e s , f u e l - b u r n and a b i l i t y t o f i n d ways t o g e t
t h e r e , even when ehe odds seemed a g a i n s t me. I guess t h i s comes
with the t e r r i t o r y .
'd r e a l i z e d qui.c.kly on c'blmb-out t h e r e would be no h o u r s of

boredom t o n i g h t . Tlae wings n e a r l y doubled i n w i d t h a s t h e
f r e e z i n g r a i n / s l u s h ( u n f o r e c a s t and n o t r e p o r t e d ) found t h e i r home
s n my b i r d . "Oh, boy" which was my u s u a l comment when I ' m n o t
r e a l t h r i l l e d w i t h what I s e e . I passed through t h e f r e e z i n g
p r e c i p i t a t i o n on t o t h e j u s t p l a i n o l d , m o d e r a t e , mixed, i c i n g i n
c l o u d s (which were e v e r y w h e r e ) . The a u t o p i l o t on t h i s a i r c r a f t
was t i r e d , b u t I. p r e d o m i n a t e l y i~':!y myself anyway. I was t a k i n g
advantage of be L . 9 i r e c i . o i which seemed t o b e somewhat
sluggish.
So much f o r t h e m u a l L!-O-minufre t r f - p . Along w i t h e v e r y t h i n g

e l s e , t h e winds axof.;- fo:r:etcas.t was a - c c u r a t e ( t h a n k s anyway) and I
.. .
had 3 5 k n o t s on 'rhe nose. Oh ve.e.l at: I e a s t I ' d g e t b a c k home
quick.
What L w a s n ' i : c:ol.tnt;-:E!ag on w s s izhe n e x t e v e n t . After flying

t h e same r o u t e s f n r kumy w o i ~ t h s , X had come t o e x p e c t c e r t a i n
things. 1 was handed-.koft from CMH d e p a r t u r e , t o DAY a p p r o a c h ,
j u s t a s expected. Althnugh i.t :i.s b u s y as u s u a l a t t h a t t i m e o f
n i g h t , t h e c o n t r o 1 , l e r s rreeoqsaize my .vobce; one t h e y h e a r r o u t i n e l y
a n d , I %e b e e n t o 1 d , d:l.si:i.r~%-Y.-ve. 'over t h e r a d i o . % gave my f r i e n d
on DAY a p p r o a c h one u:f my u s u a l g r e e f . i n g s and c o n t i n u e d t r y i n g t o
f i g u r e o u t why the ff!..fght: direct07 a.nd VOR r e c e i v e r s seemed t o b e
a l i t t l e flaky.
I r e c e i v e d rat, r e s p u r l s e , a.:;) 1: t r i e d YAY a g a i n . I glanced a t

t h e DME t o s e e i f maybe 1. was sti1.l. out a ways and n o t i c e d i t was
not indicating. I a l s e n o r i c e ? C h e c o c k p i t l i g h t s seemed t o have
dimmed. With n o r e p : l y -From D A Y , 1 ireturned t o CMH approach and
relayed t h a t 1 could - ' a . DAY. I could h e a r another
t r a n s m i s s i o n , but. i t - W ~ C nc:r. for- m e . A t t h i s t i m e , I was
a p p r o x i m a t e l y half.-xiray -i-.G my d e s i : i n a t i o n , LUK. The i c i n g was
i n c r e a s i n g from moder.wi.c-: fcr se-ver-e and :I -laas a c u t e l y aware of t h e
chunks s l i n g i n g o F f :):ir:T-!c. p r o p ; m d ' b e a t i n g on t h e poor n o s e o f
the airplane.
'I was rnonitorPng bcbt%a DAY and C Y f amd h e a r d DAY c a l l me and

a s k me t o i d e n t 4f 1 was . < e c e i v i n g , '1 i d e n t e d , and a l s o a t t e m p t e d
t r a n s m i t t i n g , b u t soon rea:l.izerl t h a ~I was n o t b e i n g h e a r d . I
scanned a l l o f t h e g a u g e s , e s p e c i a l l : y t h e e l e c t r i c a l . The draw
was q u i t e h i g h with 31.1 o f t h e equipment o n , b u t t h e i n d i c a t i o n s
were n o r m a l . S o much f o r g a u g e s , While I h a d a l r e a d y s e t 7600 i n
t h e t r a n s p o n d e r , and watched as b o t h VOR r e c e i v e r s came up w i t h
flags. 1 h a d already- e u r n e d o f f t h e f l a k y f l i g h t d i r e c t o r and
c o n t i n u e d t o t u r n o f i ' everyEhS.ng e l e e r r f c a l t h a t I d i d n ' t n e e d . I
h a d a c l u e as t o what. was goPng o n and i t w a s a n o t h e r "Oh b o y , "
The emergency arher:k:l.:t.st on. my lap was e v a l u a t e d and c h e c k e d .

I had n o t had s complete e1.eci::rica.l f a i l u r e , b u t I w a s s u r e
pLannEng on i t . N o w " whe~:e ter go Iv. was a s if t h e c o n t r o l l e r
had read my- mind. We came up axid gave me t h e o p t i o n t o c o n t i n u e
t o LUK o r t o idewt ;.f 1 wanred t-c r e c u m eo CMH. 9 a l m o s t pushed
my f i n g e r through k h e i:.ransponde?r:. X knew how bad f t was a t CMH
b u t % tcould. be a n d h a d beer? :r:eport:ed w o r s e a t LUK. B e s i d e s , a t
L e a s t :I" have a trail. 1whd g o i n g home
A few t h o u g h t s p a ~ s s e d through m y mind a s 1 n e g o t i a t e d t h a t 180

degree t u r n back, .~ j .,.
% ... l.i my c a r g o was g o i n g t o b e l a t e .
S e c o n d l y , Z b mea'l1.y gr~il-tg t o i r e a x , i t : from t h e g u y s . They
p r o b a b l y would h a r e ar. l e a s t gone o i l T h i r d l y , 1 f e l t I knew t h e
a i r p l a n e s ' s y s t - e r w Eai ~ - 1 . v well. a n d p r e d i c t e d I had l i m i t e d
e l e c t r i c a l power- remainbng . This thought immediately p u t t h e
o t h e r two o u t of my m i n d f n i e h e t:i.me b e i n g . The o n l y other-
t h o u g h t 1 had a t t h i s .trine w a s h o w i u s e d t o p u t s o much emphasis
on what t h e o t h e r s w o d d sa:y car i:hietk: 9 u s e d t o worry a b o u t
l o s i n g my Q o b by making " d m b " m i s t a k e s . CHH was a t minimums when
I l e f t and I needed t o f o c u s my a e e e n r i o n on che t a s k s a t hand. I
had been t a u g h r how crncP, h a z a . r d c n ~ .thought p a t t e r n s s u c h a s
" I ' l l show them".
1 had t h e eiectrfca:n Load down to mi.nimum. 1 w o n ' t go i n t o

t r a d e s e c r e t s , bur_ I: r e a l l y mean down LO minimum. I d i d my b e s t
t o c o n t r o l t h e use of khe prop h e a r a s w e l l , b u t t h e v i b r a t i o n s o f
t h e p r o p s Loaded wi.th f.ee b r o u g h t or! more ""Oh b o y P s " t h a n d i d t h e
p r o s p e c t of t h e a p p r o a c ? ) 1:. w a s a b o u t t o make. 1 had a b o u t 1 5
m i n u t e s b e f o r e f i n d i n g oi.it j u s t what: L would h a v e t o work w i t h .
Up u n t i E now, X n e e d l e , b a l l and a i r s p e e d e d i t wieh r a d a r v e c t o r s
from t h e c o n t r o l l e v _ . . Me h a d p l a y e d t h e game o f 20 q u e s t i o n s t o
d e t e r m i n e t h e condit:ii~rl o f t h e a i - r c r a f t . (You know, t h e y n e v e r
a s k e d q u e s t i o n s on, t h e {ci;andii:ion of t h e p i l o t ) . He knew t h a t I
wasn? t h r i l l e d with t-he c2ndi.t-ion o f t h e n a v i g a t i o n and
e l e c t r i c a l system.
A t t h i s partic.ula.1 ttme :,f nigh!:, P o r t Columbus i s a v e r y b u s y

airport. Dozens of a i l x r a f t converge e h e r e t o swap c a r g o ( a n d a
few s t o r i e s ) and t h e n chey a r e on t - h e i r way. 1 would b e a r r i v i n g
r i g h t i n t h e rniddle ci-l all! :>f t h j s . AS 1 was corning back i n , I
h e a r d one o f my b u d d i ~ e s. w h o f l i e s an PKJ-3 a s k t h e c o n t r o l l e r i f h e
c o u l d b e of a s s i s t a n c e , and. i f st:), he would be s t a n d i n g b y . I
made a mental n n r e t:t)ank hi-nl Lalser, b u t I c o u l d n ' t t h i n k o f
much h e c o u l d d o . H o l d m e of my F:iash'!ighes, maybe?
I went back ovei- i:he emergency c h e c k l i s t , which was t h o r o u g h ,

but not helpful. wy rni.nd aBI of t h e " w h a t - i f s " 1
i: .ran t--;E-t~:ou.gP~
c o u l d t h i n k o f and &he d e c i s i o n s and a c t i o n s I c o u l d t a k e . By t h e
t i m e I was g i v e n a d e s c e n t , I feLr w a s r e a d y f o r w h a t e v e r was
next. I f u l l y e x p e c t e d -<:oLose whatever. b a t t e r y power was s t i l l
there. With m y t r u s t.y l f.t-L%e f l a s h l i g h t s l u n g a r o u n d my neck
r e a d y t o be p l a c e d firmly bermeen my t e e e h , % m u t t e r e d j u s t a few
more "Oh b o y ' s . "
Whew i t came t.l.me t o fj-y i h e a p p r o a c h , I t u r n e d o n one n a v

rece-Lver and j u s . t hoped < h e r e iaas enough j u i c e f o r i t t o o p e r a t e
f o r a n o t h e r f i v e minui:es. 1 f e l t E o r t r m a t e t h a t I was coming i n t o
a n a i r p o r t tha"r_f knew s o weY.1 .snd was f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e
approaches. A t c h i s poir~:i::, arry o the!. a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s t o d e a l
w i t h ma.y have o v e ~ l o a d e ~my d "Oh 'bc~y'" capacity. Somewhere i n t h e
.. .
bowels s f t h o s e 'ba.i-i:ery ( . : a b . l s , enorrgta j u i c e poured o u t t o a f f o r d
me t h e l u x u r y o f .C;:P.yi~ij,qt h e LI,S I o c d l f . z e r w i t h some h e l p from an
intermittent g%idesloye S i n c e t h e gear was e l e c t r i c , I used t h e
emergency, f r e e . .fa:I.:Y, %ear ,?):PPY~c;i OTI
200 feet and RVR of 1800. I wasn't going to admit it was less.
Just as the wheels touched the rnow alla ice covered surface of RWY
10R, the aircraft went dark. I kept my eyes on those friendly
white lights and looked to the tower for light gun signals. It
was futile. From where I was, I could not see the tower, nor, I
surmised, could they see me.
I taxied slowly to the ramp knowing I could not be seen. I

pa;ked in a remote corner and as I climbed out into the freezing
drizzle, one of the Learjet pilots came over saying the tower
wondered if I was on the ground. I asked to use his radio and
called Ground Control. Besides my thanks for all of their
assistance, all I could say was "Oh boy!"
Upon reviewing the whole flight, I silently thanked the

individuals who had spent some time with me discussing how pilots
make decisions and how we assess the risks involved in our
occupation. Maybe my management did not consider that particular
flight a success, but I did. I brought the aircraft back with no
damage to person or property and hopefully without incurring
additional risk to anyone involved. The fact that no maintenance
was available at LUK played a small part in my justification to
return to CMH. The more I learned about the mistakes that pilots
make without mechanical difficulty involved, the more determined I
was to manage the aircraft systems to the best of my decision
making ability.
Discussion
1 . What hazardous attitudes does the pilot show in this scenario?
2. What is one aspect of exploring alternatives using the "what-if"

method that is different when in the situation than when
simulating it on the ground?
3. How do you feel an awareness of the hazardous attitudes affects a

pilots actual decision making practice?
4. List three specific examples of hazardous attitudes in this
scenario :
e. -
5. L i s t t h e a n t i d o t e s t o t h e above h a z a r d o u s t h o u g h t s :

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DoTiFwpM-86i42 AERONAUTICAL DECISION

Advanced System MAKING FOR

This document is available to the public

4. Title and Subtitle 1 5. Report Date

7. Author (s) 8. Performing Organization Report No.

R. S. Jensen and J. Adrion II

17. Kev Words 1 18. Distribution Statement

This aeronautical decision making training manual for commercial

This three-part Professional Pilot Series is the second half of a six

The teaching technique used is to expose the student to flight

The authors wish to thank the following sources for scenarios, in

"I Learned about Flying from that," F l v i n ~

Chapter 11 . IDENTIFICATION AND PRACTICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chapter 12 . ANTIDOTES FOR HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1

Chapter 13 . PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS ....................................... 35

Chapter 14 . ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Chapter 15 . REVIEW EXERCISES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Aeronautical knowledge, skill, and judgment have always been regarded

Figure 1. Building blocks for aviation safety and effectiveness.

Aeronautical decision making (ADM), which can be equated with pilot

1. The ability to search for and establish the relevance of all

2. The motivation to choose and authoritatively execute a suitable

a. "Suitable" is an alternative consistent with societal norms.

b. "Action" includes no action, some action, or action to seek

The first component of the definition refers to intellectual abilities

The second component in the definition, motivation is where the

Both components are essentiai to aviation safety. The intellectual

Air-Taxi Operations. Regulations concerning air-taxi operations were

The following s t o r y r e l a t e s t o a small t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t operated by

After a s u c c e s s f u l c a r e e r with A i r C a r r i e r "A" ( a c a r r i e r t h a t

A f t e r ground maintenance performed some form of a e r o n a u t i c a l

These a r e not i s o l a t e d i n s t a n c e s , everyday was more of t h e

The p i l o t summarized h i s f e e l i n g s about t h e s i t u a t i o n . "Yes, I am

His suggestions for a resolution to this situation were two-fold. One

The pilot's recommendations included mandatory courses or seminars for

Pilots - Rules. Regs. Right and Wrong. Another aspect of the

In learning to make better decisions regarding your aviation

Commercial Bush Flvins. The pressures to compromise safety in "bush

A safety investigator in Alaska, Dr. Michael Mitchell, has made an

1. Change the method of remuneration for the pilots.

The thrust of this manual is on training to reduce the effect of such

It was at this point, that he realized that he had not fueled

This situation contains many hazardous attitudes fostered by economics

Risk management in aeronautical decision making has been discussed in

The DECIDE Model

One of the best ways to help yourself to make good aeronautical

2. ESTIMATE - The decision maker estimates the need to counter or

4. LDENTIFY - The decision maker identifies actions which could

5. DO - The decision maker takes action to adapt to the change.

6. EVALUATE - The decision maker evaluates the effect(s) of the

The six elements of the DECIDE model represent a continuous loop

The remainder of this manual will address the motivation or attitude

IDENTIFICATION AND PRACTICE:

I ANTI-AUTHORITY "The Regs are for someone else."

I1 IMPULSIVITY "I must act now-there's no time."

111 INVULNERABILITY "It won't happen to me."

IV MACHO "I'll show you. I can do it."

V RESIGNATION "What' s the use?"

During a training flight in a medium twin, the instructor pilot fails