Brown v.

Board of Education (1954)

In this milestone decision, the Supreme Court ruled
that separating children in public schools on the
basis of race was unconstitutional. It signaled the
end of legalized racial segregation in the schools of
the United States, overruling the "separate but
equal" principle set forth in the 1896 Plessy
Plessy v.
Ferguson
Ferguson case.
On May 17, 1954, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Earl
Warren delivered the unanimous ruling in the landmark
civil rights case Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas. State-sanctioned segregation of public schools
was a violation of the 14th amendment and was
therefore unconstitutional. This historic decision
marked the end of the "separate but equal" precedent
set by the Supreme Court nearly 60 years earlier in Citation: Brown v. Board of Education of
Plessy v. Ferguson and served as a catalyst for the Topeka, Opinion; May 17, 1954; Records
expanding civil rights movement during the decade of of the Supreme Court of the United
States; Record Group 267; National
the 1950s. Archives.
View All Pages in the National Archives
Arguments were to be heard during the next term to Catalog
determine just how the ruling would be imposed. Just View Transcript
over one year later, on May 31, 1955, Warren read the
Court's unanimous decision, now referred to as Brown
II, instructing the states to begin desegregation plans "with all deliberate speed."
Despite two unanimous decisions and careful, if vague, wording, there was considerable
resistance to the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education. In addition to the
obvious disapproving segregationists were some constitutional scholars who felt that the
decision went against legal tradition by relying heavily on data supplied by social scientists
rather than precedent or established law. Supporters of judicial restraint believed the Court had
overstepped its constitutional powers by essentially writing new law.

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 However, minority groups and members of the civil rights movement were buoyed by
the Brown decision even without specific directions for implementation. Proponents of judicial
activism believed the Supreme Court had appropriately used its position to adapt the basis of
the Constitution to address new problems in new times. The Warren Court stayed this course
for the next 15 years, deciding cases that significantly a!ected not only race relations, but also
the administration of criminal justice, the operation of the political process, and the separation
of church and state.

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Transcript

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (USSC+)
Argued December 9, 1952
Reargued December 8, 1953
Decided May 17, 1954

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 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF KANSAS*

Syllabus
Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a
State solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting
or requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment -
- even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors of
white and Negro schools may be equal.
(a) The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive as to
its intended e!ect on public education.
(b) The question presented in these cases must be determined not
on the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the full development
of public education and its present place in American life
throughout the Nation.
(c) Where a State has undertaken to provide an opportunity for an
education in its public schools, such an opportunity is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.
(d) Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of
race deprives children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities, even though the physical facilities and other
"tangible" factors may be equal.
(e) The "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, has no place in the field of public
education.
(f) The cases are restored to the docket for further argument on
specified questions relating to the forms of the decrees.

Opinion

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 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on di!erent facts and
di!erent local conditions, but a common legal question justifies
their consideration together in this consolidated opinion.
In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal
representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission
to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis.
In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools
attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting
segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to
deprive the plainti!s of the equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the
Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to
the plainti!s on the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine
announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. Under
that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are
provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities
be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware
adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plainti!s be
admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the
Negro schools.
The plainti!s contend that segregated public schools are not
"equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are
deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the
obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took
jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and
reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded
by the Court.
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered
exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress,
ratification by the states, then-existing practices in racial
segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the
Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince

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 us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to
resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are
inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War
Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal
distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United
States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to
both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them
to have the most limited e!ect. What others in Congress and the
state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any
degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the
Amendment's history with respect to segregated schools is the
status of public education at that time. In the South, the
movement toward free common schools, supported by general
taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was
largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was
almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In
fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some
states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved
outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as well as in the
business and professional world. It is true that public school
education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in
the North, but the e!ect of the Amendment on Northern States was
generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North,
the conditions of public education did not approximate those
existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded
schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three
months a year in many states, and compulsory school attendance
was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that
there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment relating to its intended e!ect on public education.
In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth
Amendment, decided shortly a"er its adoption, the Court
interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations
against the Negro race. The doctrine of "separate but equal" did
not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of

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 Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but
transportation. American courts have since labored with the
doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six
cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of
public education. In Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175
U.S. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, the validity of the
doctrine itself was not challenged. In more recent cases, all on the
graduate school level, inequality was found in that specific benefits
enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the
same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637. In
none of these cases was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to
grant relief to the Negro plainti!. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra,
the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether
Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here,
unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro
and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being
equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and
salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors. Our decision,
therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible
factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the
cases. We must look instead to the e!ect of segregation itself on
public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to
1868, when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when
Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education
in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be
determined if segregation in public schools deprives these
plainti!s of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our

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 recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of
children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though
the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal,
deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school
for Negroes could not provide them equal educational
opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities
which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for
greatness in a law school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white
graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to
intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in
general, to learn his profession." Such considerations apply with
added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate
them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may a!ect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone. The e!ect of this separation on their
educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the
Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule
against the Negro plainti!s:

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 Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental e!ect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group. A sense of inferiority a!ects the motivation of a child to
learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of
negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they
would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by
modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to
this finding is rejected.
We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plainti!s and
others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought
are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion
whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability
of this decision, and because of the great variety of local
conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents
problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the
consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to
the primary question -- the constitutionality of segregation in
public education. We have now announced that such segregation
is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may
have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the
cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested
to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously
propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term The
Attorney General of the United States is again invited to participate.

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 The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting
segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as
amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and
submission of briefs by October 1, 1954.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South
Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8,
1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County, Virginia, et al. , on appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, argued December 10,
1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953, and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v.
Belton et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware,
argued December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.

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