CAPRi Working Paper No.

103 December 2011

CATALYZING COLLECTIVE ACTION TO ADDRESS NATURAL

RESOURCE CONFLICT
Lessons from Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake

Blake D. Ratner, WorldFish Center

Guy Halpern, WorldFish Center
Mam Kosal, WorldFish Center

CGIAR Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi)

C/- International Food Policy Research Institute, 2033 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006-1002 USA
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The CGIAR Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi) is an initiative of the
15 centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The initiative
promotes comparative research on the role of property rights and collective action institutions in
shaping the efficiency, sustainability, and equity of natural resource systems. CAPRi’s Secretariat is
hosted within the Environment and Production Technology Division (EPTD) of the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). CAPRi receives support from the Governments of Norway, Italy and
the World Bank.
CAPRi Working Papers contain preliminary material and research results. They are circulated prior to a
full peer review to stimulate discussion and critical comment. It is expected that most working papers
will eventually be published in some other form and that their content may also be revised.

Cite as:

Ratner, B.D., G. Halpern, and M. Kosal. Catalyzing Collective Action to Address Natural Resource
Conflict: Lessons from Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake. CAPRi Working Paper No.103. Washington, D.C.:
International Food Policy Research Institute. http://dx.doi.org/10.2499/CAPRiWP103.

Copyright © December 2011. International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved.
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ABSTRACT

This paper reports on outcomes and lessons learned from a 15-month initiative
aimed at strengthening collective action to address natural resource conflict in
Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake. Employing the Appreciation-Influence-Control (AIC)
model of participatory stakeholder engagement, the initiative aimed in particular to
build collective understanding of the sources of vulnerability in fisheries livelihoods
and to catalyze efforts to support resilience in this valuable and productive social-
ecological system. Outcomes include important shifts in fishery access rights and
resource management authority—notably the transfer of a large, commercial fishing
concession to community access, and the resolution of a boundary dispute involving
community fishery organizations in neighboring provinces. Motivated by such
successes in collaborative problem analysis and advocacy, the main national
grassroots network representing fishing communities have also modified its internal
governance and strategy of engagement to emphasize constructive links with
government and the formal NGO sector. The experience demonstrates the potential
of such an open-ended process of action research to enable collective action and
improve natural resource governance, even amidst ongoing resource conflict. We
conclude with a set of lessons learned to guide such efforts in practice.

Keywords: collective action, resource conflict, stakeholder collaboration,

governance, social-ecological resilience, Cambodia, fisheries
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The experience related in this paper represents a collective undertaking. The action
research team included: Kaing Khim, Ly Vuthy, Ouk Vibol, and Keo Sovatapheap
(Fisheries Administration); So Sovannarith, and Kim Sour (Cambodia Development
Resource Institute); and Om Chhim, Chheng Kim Heng, Ke Sothy, Keo Rotha, Hout
Han, and Long Sochet (Coalition of Cambodian Fishers), in addition to the authors,
Blake Ratner and Mam Kosal (WorldFish Center). The outcome evaluation team was
comprised of Mam Kosal, Guy Halpern, Eam Dyna, and Chea Seila, with guidance
from Mark Dubois on the Most Significant Change methodology. For guidance and
support on behalf of the Fisheries Administration, the team is indebted to H.E. Nao
Thuok, Fisheries Administration Director General. Carol Colfer, Eric Haglund, Jane
Pratt, Kaing Khim, and Lieng Sopha each provided helpful review comments on an
earlier draft. For guidance and feedback on the AIC approach, our thanks go to
William E. Smith. This work was made possible through a grant from the CGIAR
Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi).
Table of Contents

1. Introduction ............................................................................................. 1
2. The Aic Model ........................................................................................... 2
3. An Initiative To Strengthen Collective Action Around The Tonle Sap Lake ......... 4
4. Outcomes ................................................................................................. 8
5. Lessons .................................................................................................. 13
6. Conclusion .............................................................................................. 16
References .................................................................................................. 19
CATALYZING COLLECTIVE ACTION TO ADDRESS NATURAL
RESOURCE CONFLICT
Lessons from Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake
Blake D. Ratner1, Guy Halpern, and Mam Kosal

1. INTRODUCTION

Efforts to synthesize lessons from diverse experiences in community-based natural

resources management point to the importance of social capital and collaborative
partnerships, effective communications, participatory decisionmaking, and
mechanisms for conflict resolution linking actors across sectors and scales
(Armitage et al. 2008; Gruber 2010). Yet, many well-intentioned efforts in
community-based natural resource management are stymied by power
relationships and institutional obstacles that prevent desired outcomes, or make
them very difficult to achieve without the “shelter” of a project administration
structure and high levels of sustained financial investment. Especially challenging
are situations where poor local resource users are marginalized in social, political,
and economic terms, and where there is active conflict over resource access and
use, or a high risk of such conflict.
While there is broad agreement among development analysts that
“empowerment” of local resource users is key to achieving improvements in
resource management and governance under such circumstances, the conventional
development project approach is poorly suited to the task. The conventional project
approach focuses on things that can be controlled—inputs, activities, deliverables,
and outputs—and less on things that cannot be controlled but whose influence is
often much more significant in determining the long-term outcomes of an
intervention. In particular, many interventions fail to achieve their goals because of
power relations and institutional obstacles. Because of this, it is critical to focus
explicitly on how to achieve social and institutional change, even for initiatives
whose results are measured primarily in terms of technical changes in natural
resource management.
For these reasons, development practitioners need effective models of
organizing amid power imbalances and conflict to address the challenges of
governance in natural resources management. One such model is Appreciation-
Influence-Control (AIC), a framework for understanding stakeholder interactions
and organizing for social and institutional change, distinguished by its emphasis on
whole systems, open search for solutions, and explicit treatment of power. These
characteristics make the model especially well-suited to catalyzing collective action
to address shared challenges of natural resources management.
This paper reports on outcomes and lessons learned from a 15-month
initiative aimed at strengthening collective action to address natural resource
conflict in Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake. Employing the AIC model of participatory

1
Corresponding author is Program Leader, Governance at the WorldFish Center, and Visiting Sr.
Research Fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute. Email: B.Ratner@cgiar.org

1
stakeholder engagement, the initiative aimed in particular to build collective
understanding of the sources of vulnerability in fisheries livelihoods and to catalyze
efforts to support resilience in this valuable and productive social-ecological system.
A secondary aim was to document and reflect on the change process underway and
its outcomes. Documented outcomes include important shifts in fishery access
rights and resource management authority—notably the release of a large,
commercial fishing concession to access by local communities, and the resolution of
a boundary dispute involving community fishery organizations in neighboring
provinces. Motivated by such successes in collaborative problem analysis and
advocacy, the main national grassroots network representing fishing communities
have also modified its internal governance and strategy of engagement to
emphasize constructive links with government and the formal NGO sector. The
experience demonstrates the potential of such an open-ended process of action
research to enable collective action and improve natural resource governance, even
amid ongoing resource conflict. We conclude with a set of lessons learned to guide
such efforts in practice.

2. THE AIC MODEL

AIC is a whole-systems approach to stakeholder interaction, analysis, and

collaborative planning. Applicable in small as well as very large groups, the
approach entails developing a shared appreciation of the context for the issue at
hand, sharing experience with the aim of influencing others’ perspectives and
preferences for potential courses of action, and finally narrowing in on the particular
realm of actions within an individual’s or group’s control. By distinguishing factors
that can be appreciated, influenced, and controlled, the model makes explicit
recognition of the whole context for action and the power of different actors who
are either directly engaged or who have influence on the outcomes (Smith 2009).
Conceptually, this dynamic interaction is represented in three dimensions as nested
levels of power, organization, and purpose (see Figure 1). Critically, power is
conceived not as a zero-sum game (one’s gain is another’s loss) but as a realm that
can be expanded as different actors identify together with higher levels of common
purpose, and then organize to achieve goals aligned with that purpose.
The foundation for AIC as an organizing process in international development
emerged as a critique of the failures of the conventional project approach of the
World Bank, where a control-centered model derived from engineering had been
carried over into the field of rural development, effectively ignoring the dispersed
and contested dynamics of power (Smith, Thoolen, and Thoolen 1980). A crisis in
the energy sector in Colombia in 1985 provided the opportunity for the first large-
scale application of the AIC organizing process, and helped legitimize the notion of
stakeholder engagement to produce solutions that are contextualized within the
broader constraints and opportunities afforded by cultural, societal, and political
factors (World Bank 1996). The approach was later applied to community-driven
development planning in rural Thai villages, focused on women’s empowerment,
natural resource management, and reproductive health (MacNeil 1998), and was

2
replicated in diverse realms of Thai development planning from local to national
levels addressing rural and urban poverty (Furugganan and Lopez 2002).

Figure 1. The Appreciation-Influence-Control model: An overview.

Source: Smith (2009), reproduced with permission.

The AIC organizing process is not a methodology in the strict sense but
rather a framework for investigation and action when diverse actors and interests
are involved (MacNeil 1998). While the details of the process are meant to be
adapted to the particular context in which it is applied, generally it is a facilitated
process bringing together participants representing the whole range of
stakeholders, and calls for a purposeful focus on the three phases in sequence:
 Appreciation. What is the purpose that different actors are striving
towards? What are the elements of shared purpose? What is the current
reality? What are the factors that constrain or enable progress towards
that desired future? The appreciation phase is focused on increasing
awareness of the whole system, and the perspectives of all actors
involved. There is no judgment, critique, or debate; participants are asked
to share their insights without regard to status or position.
 Influence. What are the potential courses of action? What are the merits
and risks of alternative paths? What roles could each actor potentially
play in either advancing or blocking progress? The influence phase is
characterized by intense debate, and convergence and divergence in

3
 values are made explicit and explored; participants negotiate and aim to
influence one another.
 Control. What specific actions am I (or my group) ready to commit to in
service of a shared purpose? How will we gather the resources required,
monitor progress, and increase our capacity to achieve these goals? Who
else do we need to engage? The control phase focuses on developing a
plan of action, making explicit commitments, and taking first steps;
participants choose their commitments without coercion, motivated by
their appreciation of broader needs and possibilities.

These phases of the AIC process can be applied and repeated in a wide range
of contexts, from a single meeting, to a full day or multiday workshop, to a longer
term initiative. The basic principles can be made more or less explicit as the
situation demands. As was demonstrated in Thailand, the process is a flexible one,
which local organizers are able to adapt to new sectors and use to work across
multiple scales (Furugganan and Lopez 2002; Layanan 2004).
The three phases of the process can also be understood as efforts to exercise
three distinct “powers”: the power of appreciation (building a shared awareness of
the broader context, the opportunities, and constraints), the power of influence
(engaging in effective dialogue among diverse interest groups), and the power of
effective decisionmaking or "control” (making responsible commitments and
following through on these). One goal of the process is to have participants exercise
these three powers in roughly equal parts.
As illustrated in the AIC model (Figure 1), the three levels of power
correspond as well to three levels of organization. Critical here is the ability to shift
attention and effort from the individual or small group, to the realm of
multistakeholder interaction, to the “whole system” of social and ecological
relationships that affect the goals of an initiative. Precisely because so many
problems of natural resource management cannot be ”solved” at the level of the
farmer’s plot or the fishing household, the ability to foster collective action is
especially important (Knox, Meinzen-Dick, and Hazell 2002).

3. AN INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN COLLECTIVE ACTION AROUND THE

TONLE SAP LAKE

More than half of Cambodia's rural population depends on fish and aquatic
resources for some portion of their livelihood. Fish is also the leading source of
animal protein in the rural diet, and a vital source of nutrition in a country where 30
percent of children are undernourished. The Tonle Sap Lake, the largest lake in
Southeast Asia, is the heart of this remarkably productive fishery. Today the
resource is under threat from a combination of sources, including destructive
fishing practices, land use change, fishing beyond the natural capacity of the
system to regenerate, and dam development in the Mekong upstream. As the range
of competing uses of water and wetlands expands, as well as the numbers of
people seeking a livelihood from fishing, the most vulnerable risk being excluded
(So et al. 2011).

4
 In September 2009, the WorldFish Center and local partners launched an
action research project with a purpose to “strengthen the capacity of fishing
communities of the Tonle Sap Lake to engage in collective action beyond the local
scale, in support of governance arrangements that anticipate and manage
competing uses of aquatic resources equitably.” Specifically, it focused on the
collective capacity of an emerging grassroots network of fishing communities to
identify and articulate threats, negotiate with authorities to represent the common
interests of fishing communities, and collaborate with government and private
actors to resolve resource conflicts. The overall development aim was conceived as
social-ecological resilience, encompassing improved livelihood security, reduced
vulnerability, and sustained productivity of the fishery resource. The initiative was
financed primarily by the CGIAR Systemwide Program on Collective Action and
Property Rights (CAPRi) as part of a broader set of grants on the theme of securing
rural people’s access to natural resources.
Partners in the initiative employed the AIC approach to plan the overall
research and stakeholder engagement process, to structure and facilitate the
consultations, and to analyze emerging results collaboratively. The team organized
a series of local and provincial consultations in the five provinces that border the
Tonle Sap Lake, which engaged local stakeholders in assessing the character and
roots of resource conflicts in the lake and developing strategies to address these.
The substantive conclusions of this analysis—detailing the issues of destructive and
illegal fishing practices, clearing of flooded forests, competing land and water use,
and overlapping resource claims and boundary disputes—along with policy
recommendations, are reported separately in So et al. (2011). That paper also
details the governance constraints that have often obstructed efforts by different
actors to address these problems. These include poor coordination among
government agencies across sectors and across levels of administration, weak
accountability of authorities towards local constituencies, and ineffective
mechanisms of recourse through the courts or administrative channels.
The focus in the present paper is the process the action research team
employed, particularly its application of AIC, the outcomes of that process, and the
lessons learned with regards to catalyzing collective action to improve management
of contested resources. The initiative was distinguished from the outset by its
commitment to shared ownership and decisionmaking among a unique collection of
partners. The three domestic partners were the Coalition of Cambodian Fishers
(CCF), a grassroots network of fishing communities around the lake; the Fisheries
Administration (FiA), the key sectoral authority within government; and the
Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), the leading domestic policy
research institute. The WorldFish Center convened the parties to initiate the
collaboration, and supported the domestic partners to undertake the consultative
process.
Employing an action research approach (Whyte 1984), the partners agreed
that the goal was not only to study a problem, but also to work collaboratively with
local stakeholders in assessing both the underlying causes of the problem and
possibilities for cooperative action to address it. Indeed, the core purpose was
defined in terms of capacity for social and institutional change, with the functions of
research, learning, and communication of outcomes conceived as supporting that
core purpose.

5
 Following the AIC model (see Figure 1), the team worked to first articulate
the high-level statement of purpose in terms of ”ideals” of capacity for collective
action and improvements in governance, contributing to livelihood resilience and
resource sustainability. This high-level purpose became the premise for convening
diverse stakeholders, in that it provided elements that all could agree with, even if
they maintained important differences at the level of values, and more specific
goals relating to the multiple interests of individual groups. The dialogue events
then provided a process by which participants could work down this hierarchy—not
”resolving” differences but making them explicit and helping each group appreciate
those differences, then moving on to action commitments that support the shared
purpose.
Site selection followed a purposive approach (Patton 1990), based on the
following criteria:
 Representation of sites in the five provinces surrounding the lake. This
was to enable exchange of experiences and networking among
participants in the research process across provinces, a contributing factor
for more effective collective action at the lake basin scale.
 Prior research activities that provide a documented record of aquatic
resource-related conflicts and efforts to manage or resolve these conflicts.
This offered a dual advantage. First, the research team was able to work
from this documented record to probe and compare the evolution of
resource conflicts and conflict management efforts involving the case
study community. Second, one or more of the partner organizations had
an established set of relationships to build on, providing a basis of trust
that enables participants to quickly probe sensitive issues, and extend the
analysis from local to broader scales.
 Representation of a variety of conflicts with regards to resources in
dispute (fishing access, water use, land tenure) that impinge on fisheries
livelihoods, scale of conflict, and stakeholders involved. This enabled the
research team to address the main types of conflict currently affecting
Tonle Sap fisheries.
An overview map of the five local sites and key issues for each is provided in
Figure 2.
The action research process began with a series of local and provincial
consultations between October 2009 and January 2010. The local consultations
were convened in each of five case study communities, involving local fishers, fish
traders, community fishery members and leaders from the host village and
neighboring communities, police officers, commune council councilors or chiefs, and
fisheries officers, as well as in some cases environment officers, military police, and
district officials—a total of 172 participants in five local consultations. Each local
consultation was followed immediately (typically the next day) by a provincial
consultation, which provided an opportunity for select participants from the local
consultation to present outcomes and explore further solutions with the next level
of stakeholders, involving a broader range of provincial agencies, NGOs, provincial
police, gendarme commissioners, sector department heads and other senior
government staff—a total of 113 participants in five provincial consultations.

6
Figure 2. Local case study sites and key issues.

Source: So et al. (2011).

In addition to seeking a balanced representation of these various stakeholder

groups, the partners worked to achieve as much gender balance as possible.
Organizers took this into account in issuing invitations for participants, by explicitly
including representatives of women’s self-help and marketing groups as well as
women in leadership roles in community fisheries, village councils, and provincial
departments, and in NGOs and civil society networks. Facilitators helped draw out
women’s voices where needed during the dialogue events. The Deputy Director
General of the Fisheries Administration, Ms. Kaing Khim, also played a key role as
chair of two of the provincial workshops and overall leader of the Fisheries
Administration partnership in this initiative. Nevertheless, women’s participation
remained imbalanced, reflecting the broader gender disparity in leadership positions
from local to national levels.
A national consultation was held at the Fisheries Administration headquarters
in Phnom Penh in April 2010. The consultation was chaired by the Director General
of the FiA and included senior management from the FiA and other associated
government agencies, the Tonle Sap Basin Authority, the Cambodian National
Committee, NGO representatives, and participants from the five provincial
consultations. Core team members from FiA, CCF (the provincial coordinator from

7
each of the five provinces plus the national coordinator), CDRI, and WorldFish
participated in all the consultations and shared responsibility for facilitation.
An outcome evaluation exercise was launched in mid-October 2010, which
entailed revisiting the case study sites and conducting followup interviews on
events that had occurred in the intervening 8 to 12 months (depending on the site).
Participants at all levels had undertaken a range of followup actions in response to
the issues identified at the consultations, sometimes with the support of the FiA
and/or CCF, but without any direct assistance by the research partners (CDRI and
WorldFish). Apart from minor costs to compensate for the time and travel of CCF
partners, as well as travel and workshop costs for one followup meeting convened
by FiA, no additional CAPRi project funds were applied in support of the followup
actions.
The outcome evaluation process relied on the Most Significant Change
methodology (Davies and Dart 2005), using semistructured interviews to elicit
people’s perspectives on the changes occurring in their lives and in their local
context without prejudicing the answer in any one direction. In order to ensure a
degree of neutrality in assessing outcomes, the interview team was comprised of a
different set of researchers than those who took part in implementing the initiative,
apart from one, who provided a necessary bridge of introductions and continuity for
local stakeholders. The interviews were conducted with a wide variety of
stakeholders, some who participated in the original consultations and some who did
not. They included fishers, traders, police officers, village leaders, commune council
members and leaders, community fishery (CF) members and leaders, and NGO
representatives. Some of the interviews were conducted in small groups, while
others were conducted individually; in sum, 41 interviewees were included across
the five local sites. Additional interviews were conducted with the Deputy Director
General of FiA and the national coordinator of CCF. Evaluation team members
aimed to triangulate by verifying key information with interviewees representing
different sectors and perspectives, then conducted followup checks to confirm
findings and minimize errors in interpretation.

4. OUTCOMES

The three most significant outcomes of the initiative were each unanticipated,
though very much in line with its purpose. Two represent important shifts in fishery
access rights and resource management authority—notably the release of a large,
commercial fishing concession to access by local communities, and the resolution of
a boundary dispute involving community fishery organizations in neighboring
provinces. The third is a shift in institutional relationships, as CCF modified its
internal governance and strategy of engagement to emphasize constructive links
with government and the formal NGO sector in response to its successes in
collaborative problem analysis and advocacy. This section details each of these
main outcomes, followed by a summary of additional outcomes related to
stakeholder representation and accountability in decisionmaking over resource
access and use.

8
The release of fishing lot number 1
Villagers in Phat Sanday commune (Kompong Thom Province) have long voiced
concerns over Fishing Lot Number 1. The lot was operated since the 1980s as a
commercial concession administered by auction under the authority of the Ministry
of Agriculture, Forests, and Fisheries (MAFF). In 2001, amid a broader wave of
reform (Ratner 2006), a substantial portion of the lot was released to community
access. The remainder was converted in 2003 to a “research lot.” Despite the shift
in official status there was little change on the ground; commercial exploitation
continued and local villagers were excluded from fishing during the lot operating
season. In October 2010, however, in response to community mobilization, the lot
was terminated, and MAFF granted access and management rights to the local
communities. The newly released area, measuring 2,684 hectares, represents a
significant resource for local livelihoods (Phoeun Phean, Deputy Director,
Department of Fisheries Affairs, FiA).
Despite similar local complaints and conflicts in other sites around the lake
and along the Mekong and Tonle Sap rivers, this is the first fishing lot to have been
released to community control since the major reforms of 2000/2001, making it an
important outcome at both local and national levels. Indeed, in Phat Sanday as
well, locals had made earlier requests repeatedly for access to better fishing
grounds, including efforts to swap seasonally-flooded portions of their existing
community fishery zone for the more productive zone within the lot. The CF chief
had previously organized petitions and pressed the villagers’ case with delegations
of senior officials from Phnom Penh visiting the area.
What made the difference this time? Local interviewees point to a
convergence of factors.
“We don’t have many opportunities to raise these issues at the provincial
level,” says Long Sochet, the national CCF organizer, highlighting one of the turning
points in the process. The provincial consultation provided a constructive setting for
the local CF chief to present the community perspective to provincial officials, and
his words carried more weight when a cantonment fishery official who had
participated in the local consultation confirmed the concerns he raised. A fisheries
official from the inspectorate level then suggested a followup roundtable, which
explored the options in more depth and with other officials involved.2
“More active communication and engagement from senior officials helped
support the lot’s release,” reports Ung Meng, CF Chief in Phat Sanday. Emboldened
by the encouragement they received at the provincial level, local village leaders
decided to organize a new petition, endorsed by local authorities and with the
support of CCF. The petition was delivered to the National Assembly, and Nguom
Ngel, second deputy president of the National Assembly, responded by organizing a
visit to Phat Sanday, accompanied by the Minister of Agriculture and the Director
General of FiA. According to participants in the meeting, despite reluctance on the
part of MAFF to consider a release given that over half the surface area of fishing
lots had already been released to communities in the reforms of 2000/2001, Nguom
Ngel replied that “there’s nothing we can’t resolve.”

2
The Fisheries Administration is structured in tiers, with a national headquarters and – in
descending order – inspectorates (large national subregions), cantonments (one or more provinces),
divisions, and triages (the most local post).

9
 The President of the Senate subsequently backed the idea of a release, it was
debated internally at the highest levels of government, and the MAFF decision was
later announced by radio, to the joy and astonishment of villagers who had long
pressed for a change. For other communities on the Tonle Sap, this experience
demonstrates the possibilities for effective advocacy. It also helped strengthen the
community’s relations with government, and influenced the strategic thinking of
CCF about its role in relation to government.
“The government seems to understand the significance of fisheries better due
to [this initiative]” says Chheng Kim Heng, the CCF provincial organizer for
Kompong Thom.

A negotiated agreement to resolve a boundary dispute

One of the most challenging conflicts over resource access identified in the research
process concerned a disputed area claimed by CF organizations from Koh Chiveang
(near Prek Toal, in Battambang province) and Keo Por (in neighboring Siem Reap
province). The concerns emerged in both local consultations and provincial
consultations in the two provinces but could not be effectively addressed at that
level because the dispute crossed provincial boundaries. Following the national
consultation, FiA and CCF team members agreed that the boundary dispute was a
top priority for followup intervention, and worked together to organize a negotiation
on site. The negotiation involved CF members from both sides, the commune
chiefs, fisheries officers from the two provinces, the regional cantonment, and two
officials from the central FiA offices in Phnom Penh. Direct negotiations between the
local parties resulted in an agreement to designate the disputed area as a jointly
managed fishing ground, and established a joint management committee for the
purpose, with membership from both the Keo Por and Koh Chiveang community
fishery organizations.
Interviewees credit the open process of negotiation, which genuinely
explored alternative options to resolve the dispute, for building mutual awareness
and raising the level of trust among local stakeholders to a point where a jointly
implemented solution became feasible. Importantly, even though the agreement
has not yet been formalized by the Fisheries Administration, it has already been
implemented on the ground, with all key parties who took part in reaching the
agreement now taking steps to uphold it. Chhe Samnal, a CF executive in Prek Toal
reports a sharp drop in conflict among fishers over resources in the area since
implementation of the agreement.
While the convening role of FiA was essential, along with the institutional
support it provided to reach and enforce an agreement, the terms of the agreement
were locally defined. FiA officials had initially proposed designating the disputed
area a conservation zone.
“I pointed out that if you accept this solution, there will be no more fishing in
the zone, and people won’t be allowed to travel through the area either, which is an
important travel route” says Long Sochet, the national CCF coordinator. By
exploring the implications of various management options on all parties involved,
the stakeholders were able to arrive at a solution perceived by all sides as
legitimate, which would likely not have occurred in the case of a solution imposed

10
from above. Reflecting on the importance of building that shared understanding
among local stakeholders and working with government officials as partners, Long
Sochet notes that the CCF “…learned from advocacy efforts in Phat Sanday … to
settle differences in Prek Toal.”

A shift in strategy for the Coalition of Cambodian Fishers

The Coalition of Cambodian Fishers acts in a variety of roles: as an advocate for the
interests of fishing communities, as a conduit for capacity building, and as a vehicle
for information sharing between geographically disparate communities. As a result
of CCF’s involvement in the CAPRi initiative and bolstered in particular by the
outcomes described above, this grassroots network has shifted its strategy in
several important ways.
“We have learned from this experience . . . realizing how important it is to
bring people together at the village level, at the commune level, and then to take
these issues to discuss at the provincial level. We’ve seen how this can help those
above understand the problems that local people face,” explains Long Sochet, the
national coordinator of CCF. Having observed and practiced stakeholder facilitation
using the AIC approach, the core team members from CCF have worked to replicate
and adapt the process in other locales, especially where communities are
constrained by the fishing lots or face disputes over access to and management of
fisheries resources. They developed plans to expand this work in 2011, and are
seeking funding to support that expansion.
Second, CCF is conducting internal organizational changes aimed at
strengthening and formalizing its links with established NGOs and improving its
capacity to collaborate with and influence government. The network has recently
established a permanent board of representatives from national and local NGOs, in
order to coordinate action, share information, and advise the CCF on its strategy.
As a grassroots organization lacking the formal status of an NGO, CCF organizers
see formalizing these links as a route to extending their capacity for collective
action across different geographic regions and from local to national levels. Having
achieved an improved profile in the wake of its recent successes, CCF organizers
have since received invitations for the group’s participation in events and activities
addressing river protection, water management, advocacy, and human rights.
Third, CCF has deepened its commitment to supporting the very small-scale
efforts of community-based organizations (CBOs) that address immediate needs in
fishing communities. An important thrust in its evolving strategy is aimed at
building capacity at the CBO level for activities such as microcredit, women’s
groups, and fish processing and marketing. Drawing on its improved NGO links, the
network hopes to identify partners to assist with local livelihood development, build
connections to markets, and increase financial support for these small initiatives.
CCF leaders envision that the combination of effective support to CBOs and
improved links to NGOs and government will make it an increasingly effective voice
supporting the interests of poor villagers in fishing communities and conduit for
collective action at subnational and national scales.
CCF was inspired initially by the Assembly of the Poor in Thailand, which
helped catalyze a significant policy shift towards investments in rural development

11
and rural services by linking together a wide range of community-based
organizations and speaking with a shared voice (Missingham 2003). Its roots date
to 2004, when the first strands of the network began to form in the provinces
around the Tonle Sap Lake, and it subsequently expanded to include networks
along the Mekong River and coastal Cambodia as well. While CCF was frequently
vocal in its criticisms of government and had managed to attract media attention
through a protest stance, it achieved little measurable influence on actual policy
implementation in the past. While not relinquishing the option to protest, CCF
members point to the CAPRi initiative as demonstrating the value of a collaborative
approach when there is an opportunity to convene relevant stakeholders, and cite
improved links with FiA in particular as opening important new opportunities.

Additional outcomes
Interviewees cited a range of other positive changes during the outcome
evaluation, some of these clearly citing the CAPRi consultations as the primary or
contributing factor in the changes, others where the attribution is less clear or
direct. Though interviewees were asked to identify both positive and negative
changes, no negative outcomes attributed to the consultations or subsequent
efforts at collective action were reported. The only negative changes reported
concerned general livelihood issues, such as declining fish stocks or difficult rice
markets. Table 1 summarizes those additional outcomes that were deemed either
clearly attributable to the initiative or likely influenced by it; all are positive changes
from the perspective of community fishery members, the main “beneficiary group”
identified at the outset.
There were of course “losers” in this process as well, particularly the lot
operators who lost access and use rights to fishing grounds released to
communities. But compared to the broadly shared gains in income, food security,
and nutrition that are expected for local fishing families, as well as the associated
opportunities in processing, trade, and support services in the local economy, it is
easy to make the case that the change is in the public good. Indeed, the Prime
Minister made that very argument the following year (August 2011), when he
announced the suspension of all the remaining fishery concessions on the Tonle Sap
Lake. He explicitly acknowledged the political calculus involved in disappointing a
few commercial interests in favor of sustaining benefits more broadly shared among
the local population (Ratner 2011).

12
 Table 1. Summary of additional outcomes.

Type of Change
Type of
relationship
Improving Representation Strengthening Accountability

Within and Increased cooperation between Neighboring CFs have engaged in joint
between neighboring CFs with assistance patrols in order to combat illegal fishing and
villages from CCF (Ta Mol Leu) flooded forest harvesting (Ta Mol Leu)
Improved relations between Increased reporting of illegal activity, more
neighboring commune councils, as meetings between the commune council and
well as between the CF and local CF, more patrols by CF members, and more
villagers (Kg Khleang) effective collection of illegal fishing
equipment (Kg Khleang)
Increased interaction with neighboring
commune councils, resulting in better
protection of flooded forests (Kg Khleang)

Villages and Neighboring CFs in dialogue to CF is increasing engagement with NGOs to

NGOs or civil resolve dispute with assistance from raise awareness amongst villagers of laws
society CCF (Prek Toal) regarding natural resource management
networks NGOs operating in the area have (Phat Sanday)
been more open to input from local Villagers’ increased knowledge of the working
villagers (Anlong Raing) of NGOs in the area has helped obtain
support for the construction of a school and a
building for the CF, as well as seek support
for further projects (Anlong Raing)

Villages and Improved relations between the More open communication between villagers
local admin. police, the community and the and fisheries officers, resulting in better
military police (Anlong Raing) control of illegal fishing (Ta Mol Leu)
More effective collaboration between More CBOs formed to improve local
fisheries officers, environment livelihoods, and these CBOs are working
officers, and the CF, with more ad more with fisheries and environment officers
hoc meetings organized to deal with through joint training and workshops (Phat
emerging issues (Kg Khleang) Sanday)
Improved relationship between the CF and
the fisheries and environment officers, with
better responsiveness to reports of illegal
activities and calls for assistance in law
enforcement (Phat Sanday)

Source: Authors.
Note: Case study site noted in parentheses

5. LESSONS

What lessons can we draw from this initiative regarding the application of AIC, the
outcomes of that process, and the factors needed to catalyze collective action to
improve management of contested natural resources?
AIC can be an effective process to influence the stakeholder “action arena”
towards positive forms of collective action. Ratner et al. (2010) propose an
analytical framework for analysis of environmental resource conflict and resilience,

13
distinguishing context, collective action institutions, action arena, and outcomes. In
the terms of this framework, the Tonle Sap initiative employed AIC was a means of
influencing the action arena, by introducing a structured process of stakeholder
engagement that shifted the power dynamics typical of interactions among these
stakeholders, enabling new partnerships and patterns of interaction.
Collective action in defense of local livelihoods and resource access can
influence policy implementation and governance in unanticipated ways. The core
team at the outset agreed on objectives for the initiative that focused on
“improving collaboration between local civil society actors and government in
assessing the interests of fishing communities,” improving awareness “regarding
the factors that drive resource competition in Tonle Sap fisheries,” as well as
awareness of “the potential roles of different actors in addressing these . . .” Actual
outcomes achieved included these and much more, quite to the surprise of the
team members, given the modest resources, short time period, and relatively few
activities devoted to the undertaking. Indeed, the outcomes detailed above reflect
improvements in all three dimensions of natural resource governance: stakeholder
representation, distribution of authority, and mechanisms of accountability (Agrawal
and Ribot 1999; Ribot 2002; Ratner 2011).
The principles of the AIC process are more important than particular
techniques. In facilitating the stakeholder consultations at local, provincial, and
national levels, the core team drew on a wide range of tools and techniques. These
included small group exercises to visualize and communicate alternative futures
and describe present realities, network mapping to represent the relationships
among stakeholders and their relative influence, as well as visual depictions of the
factors and actors that could advance or deter progress towards shared goals. The
techniques were adapted over time with adjustments made to conform to shifting
circumstances, including a monsoon storm that threatened to disband the very first
local consultation. No matter the technique or the facilitator, however, the most
important interventions concerned efforts to reaffirm the purpose and the principles
at play, and sometimes these occurred outside the formal consultation process. For
example, this meant seeking representation from the ”whole system” even if people
felt this was uncomfortable, such as the decision to join community fishery
representatives and local government in a common dialogue at the Prek Toal site,
despite initial resistance on both sides. It also meant affirming the autonomy of
each participant to make decisions, which yields a more authentic commitment to
collective action than would be achieved through a ”coerced” gathering of
volunteers. These repeated efforts to reaffirm the core purpose and principles
meant nurturing the six conditions for transformation defined by Smith (2009), as
summarized in the Box 1, below.
Because AIC imposes unfamiliar roles on facilitators and participants alike, it
requires visible, high-level support and effective brokering. Though initially
skeptical, the Director General of FiA became convinced of the importance of the
initiative and provided a strong authorizing environment that signaled to the core
team and FiA staff at all levels that this initiative was a high priority. This support,
along with the persuasive energy of FiA team members and full use of their
connections, helped ensure participation of senior officials at the provincial level
and appropriate officers from a range of agencies at local level as well. In parallel,
CCF, with its national coordinator as champion of the initiative, employed its own

14
influence network to ensure appropriate participants engaged in the process from
civil society groups and NGOs. While the core team shared facilitation
responsibilities, a senior official at the appropriate level convened each
consultation, and was carefully briefed to help establish an atypical tone—one of
authentic joint exploration. At the national consultation, the Director General of FiA
played this role.

Box 1: Six conditions for transformation

1. Focus on a real, pressing need. People engaged because fisheries are central to
their livelihoods and they perceive these livelihoods at risk.

2. Organize around a purpose that transcends the interests of every stakeholder.

The organizing process focused on securing a livable future, expressed variously in
terms of strengthening social-ecological resilience, reducing conflict, and sustaining
livelihoods.

3. Ensure the whole system is represented in the process. Consultations included

the widest possible range of private, public, and civil society actors at each level,
and those who were not initially included were often engaged through followup
actions after participants determined they had an influential role in the problem or
solution at hand.

4. Provide equal opportunity for all to participate. While typical meetings are
dominated by the most senior officials (typically men), the consultation processes
improved the balance of voices through a purposive selection of participants
representing different groups (including attention to gender balance) and a
structure that required each to be heard.

5. Respect the autonomy of each participant. Participants worked hard, at the

appropriate phase in the process, to influence each other’s perspectives, but
facilitators made clear that commitments for action, in particular, are voluntary.

6. Structure the process to provide a way for participants to make use of all three
powers. While participants often arrive with the expectation that formal authority
(control) is the only power that matters, the process provided numerous
demonstrations of how the powers of influence and appreciation enable new
possibilities for collective action.

Source: Smith (2009), with CAPRi Tonle Sap examples added by the authors.

Outcomes of the process rely very heavily on the people involved. The
research team was formed on the basis of prior working relationships, for example,
between WorldFish researchers and Fisheries Administration, as well as CDRI. This
track record and trust was critical in making the case for inclusion of the CCF as a
core partner in the initiative. The existing relationships of key participants in the
dialogue workshops were also essential in influencing the eventual outcomes. The
community fishery leader in Phat Sanday, for example, had worked over many

15
years to help organize petitions requesting a release of Fishing Lot number 1. When
given the opportunity to speak before officials gathered at the provincial
consultation, he was able to gather support in a way that enabled subsequent
connections at higher levels.
Crisis can present an opportunity to reinforce purpose. The initiative met with
a series of crises that could have derailed the collaboration altogether. The first
crisis came at the outset, when the FiA Director General, frustrated with past public
statements by the CCF, declared he would not support the proposal to partner. The
second arose from an internal dispute within the project team concerning budget
allocation and decisionmaking authority. The last, and most serious, followed a
radio interview by the CCF national coordinator that angered the Director General
to the point that he was prepared to call off the national consultation. In each
instance, the effort to resolve the crisis proved a major step forward in achieving
the overall purpose, because it served to clarify the commitment to joint ownership
of the initiative. Rather than glossing over differences, these were made explicit;
the team worked to understand the root of each concern and the complementary
values this pointed towards, recognized the challenge and agreed to work to bridge
it.
Social reinforcement provides incentives for follow up, independent of any
project or formal monitoring structure. Typical rural development projects aim to
maximize the realm of control with detailed implementation plans, activities, and
objectives, an internal project management structure that absorbs significant
resources, and regular supervision and monitoring of local activities as an incentive
to implement according to plan. At great cost, the plans may be implemented,
though they are frequently delayed, unforeseen institutional obstacles and power
relationships often frustrate progress towards planned objectives, and once the
project is completed and resources stop flowing, activities often stop as well. In the
AIC process, because the locus of decisionmaking over strategies for the future and
the freedom to choose courses of action lie with the stakeholders involved, the
incentives are completely different. Having engaged in a difficult process together
to develop a shared appreciation of the whole context, influenced each other, and
made their individual or collective commitments public, each stakeholder has
incentives to follow through based not on external monitoring but on the social
reinforcement that comes from other actors who expect accountability for those
commitments.

6. CONCLUSION

The experience of this initiative in the Tonle Sap Lake demonstrates the potential of
AIC as an open-ended process of stakeholder engagement and action research to
enable collective action and improve natural resource governance, even amid
ongoing resource conflict. The outcomes are all the more encouraging given the
legacy of war and revolution in Cambodia that other research in the country has
identified as a significant barrier to re-establishing trust and fostering collective
action (Weingart and Kirk 2008). In this respect, the fisheries sector in Cambodia
has particular advantages. The legacy of forced collectivization is not as profound

16
as in the case of crop agriculture. There is, moreover, the positive legacy of past
successes in community mobilization a decade earlier that raised public awareness
about injustices in the commercial lot system and contributed to the fishery tenure
reforms of 2000/2001, an extensive transfer of fisheries access and management
authority from the commercial sector to communities (Ratner 2006). These reforms
not only significantly improved resource access for the poor but also helped foster a
sense of empowerment for many, a sense among fishing communities that it is
possible to envision an alternative future and work together to achieve it (Kurien,
So, and Mao 2006).
The experience has also shown that attributing outcomes to an organizing
process such as AIC is complex. When participants reflect upon and strategize
around solutions to some of the most intractable challenges they face, considering
the whole range of stakeholders involved, the stories they paint are necessarily fine
grained. As opposed to launching a relatively simple and discrete activity (such as
building a clinic or a school), actors who aim to improve institutional relationships,
negotiate resource conflicts, or influence policy decisions are engaging in dynamic
interactions with typically a long prior history and a complex array of actors
involved. Even after significant outcomes emerge, no one may have the “full story”
of just what happened and why, there may be competing versions, and some may
choose to downplay or highlight their influence with an eye to future relationships.
The Most Significant Change methodology adopted for outcome evaluation in
this initiative was appropriate given the uncertainty about the sorts of outcomes
that would emerge, and the interviews with participants and nonparticipants in the
original consultations provided a useful check on the observations made.
Nevertheless, devoting much more time to unraveling the complex web of
interactions and storylines at each site probably would have yielded a richer picture
of outcomes and the particular influence of the AIC process in relation to other
factors. In the case of this evaluation, despite significant follow up, over half of the
local outcomes that were deemed plausibly influenced by the initiative were
excluded because the team was unable to confirm the findings in the time available.
In future applications, an outcome evaluation process repeated at staged intervals
over a longer period could reveal more about the stakeholder dynamics and
processes of adaptation and learning as they unfold. A systematic effort to follow
individual interviews with group interviews to sort out differences in opinion or
interpretation could also enhance the consistency of findings.
The final question is what happens next? The outcomes documented in this
paper have all been valued as positive changes in the eyes of local stakeholders.
Yet the risks to fisheries livelihoods in the Tonle Sap basin remain high, as the
economic viability of small-scale fishing is put under pressure by increased
competition and declining catch per unit effort (Hap and Bhattarai 2009), and as
water resource infrastructure and land use changes threaten to further undermine
fisheries productivity. Will increases in community resource access translate into
improved conservation, more equitable distribution of fisheries resources and more
sustainable livelihoods for the most vulnerable? Will agreements for joint
management endure in practice? Will CCF’s newfound influence allow it to broker
new agreements in the interests of poor fishing communities, or will it face a
backlash from private commercial interests? We do not yet know the answers, so in
this sense the story we have documented is still unfolding.

17
 Yet, one year after the project reported here officially concluded, it is clear
that there are lasting influences. Most strikingly, in August 2011, ten months after
the release of Fishing Lot number 1, the Prime Minister announced the suspension
of all commercial lots on the Tonle Sap Lake. Civil society groups were buoyed by
the success in campaigning for the release of Fishing Lot number 1, and had
coordinated efforts in the intervening months to make the release of all commercial
lots their top priority. While a host of political factors no doubt contributed to the
policy shift, it is notable that the Prime Minister in his announcement reiterated
concerns that civil society organizers had made key features of their campaign:
irregularities in the allocation and administration of the fishing concessions, the
need to control illegal fishing, and a goal of increasing equity in the distribution of
benefits from the fisheries resource (CNV 2011).
Key civil society activists point to their experience with the CAPRi-supported
collaboration as an important learning experience for the approaches to dialogue
and influence that they continue to practice in work on fisheries at the lake basin
scale. The evidence of gains in community resource access, improved capacity for
collaboration in enforcing laws and local rules, and enhanced communication for
dispute resolution suggest positive steps in the governance context for social-
ecological resilience in the Tonle Sap Lake.
Much remains to be learned as well about how to sustain such efforts over
time, and to maintain the gains of multistakeholder collaboration as circumstances
change. The challenge of sustaining collaboration across scales is well documented
across many domains of natural resource management, for example with forests
(Colfer and Pfund 2011), and water resources (Lebel et al. 2005). The experiences
documented here suggest a strong case for continued efforts to apply and adapt
the AIC model in ways that a range of groups can incorporate into their own efforts
at social and institutional change beyond the confines of a particular development
project. As the approach is applied in other domains of natural resource
management and rural livelihood development, it will also be essential to document
and compare the lessons that emerge in order to improve the effectiveness of
investments in development aid and governance reform.

18
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 LIST OF CAPRi WORKING PAPERS
01 Property Rights, Collective Action and Technologies for Natural Resource Management: A
Conceptual Framework, by Anna Knox, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Peter Hazell, October 1998.
02 Assessing the Relationships between Property Rights and Technology Adoption in Smallholder
Agriculture: A Review of Issues and Empirical Methods, by Frank Place and Brent Swallow, April
2000.
03 Impact of Land Tenure and Socioeconomic Factors on Mountain Terrace Maintenance in Yemen,
by A. Aw-Hassan, M. Alsanabani and A. Bamatraf, July 2000.
04 Land Tenurial Systems and the Adoption of a Mucuna Planted Fallow in the Derived Savannas of
West Africa, by Victor M. Manyong and Victorin A. Houndékon, July 2000.
05 Collective Action in Space: Assessing How Collective Action Varies Across an African Landscape,
by Brent M. Swallow, Justine Wangila, Woudyalew Mulatu, Onyango Okello, and Nancy
McCarthy, July 2000.
06 Land Tenure and the Adoption of Agricultural Technology in Haiti, by Glenn R. Smucker, T.
Anderson White, and Michael Bannister, October 2000.
07 Collective Action in Ant Control, by Helle Munk Ravnborg, Ana Milena de la Cruz, María Del Pilar
Guerrero, and Olaf Westermann, October 2000.
08 CAPRi Technical Workshop on Watershed Management Institutions: A Summary Paper, by Anna
Knox and Subodh Gupta, October 2000.
09 The Role of Tenure in the Management of Trees at the Community Level: Theoretical and
Empirical Analyses from Uganda and Malawi, by Frank Place and Keijiro Otsuka November 2000.
10 Collective Action and the Intensification of Cattle-Feeding Techniques a Village Case Study in
Kenya‘s Coast Province, by Kimberly Swallow, November 2000.
11 Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution of Natural Resource Management: Exchange
of Knowledge and Implications for Policy, by Anna Knox and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, January 2001.
12 Land Dispute Resolution in Mozambique: Evidence and Institutions of Agroforestry Technology
Adoption, by John Unruh, January 2001.
13 Between Market Failure, Policy Failure, and .Community Failure.: Property Rights, Crop-
Livestock Conflicts and the Adoption of Sustainable Land Use Practices in the Dry Area of Sri
Lanka, by Regina Birner and Hasantha Gunaweera, March 2001.
14 Land Inheritance and Schooling in Matrilineal Societies: Evidence from Sumatra, by Agnes
Quisumbing and Keijuro Otsuka, May 2001.
15 Tribes, State, and Technology Adoption in Arid Land Management, Syria, by Rae, J, Arab, G.,
Nordblom, T., Jani, K., and Gintzburger, G., June 2001.
16 The Effects of Scales, Flows, and Filters on Property Rights and Collective Action in Watershed
Management, by Brent M. Swallow, Dennis P. Garrity, and Meine van Noordwijk, July 2001.
17 Evaluating Watershed Management Projects, by John Kerr and Kimberly Chung, August 2001.
18 Rethinking Rehabilitation: Socio-Ecology of Tanks and Water Harvesting in Rajasthan, North-
West India, by Tushaar Shah and K.V.Raju, September 2001.
19 User Participation in Watershed Management and Research, by Nancy Johnson, Helle Munk
Ravnborg, Olaf Westermann, and Kirsten Probst, September 2001.
20 Collective Action for Water Harvesting Irrigation in the Lerman-Chapala Basin, Mexico, by
Christopher A. Scott and Paul Silva-Ochoa, October 2001.
21 Land Redistribution, Tenure Insecurity, and Intensity of Production: A Study of Farm Households
in Southern Ethiopia, by Stein Holden and Hailu Yohannes, October 2001.
22 Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights, by Ruth Meinzen-Dick and Rajendra Pradhan,
January 2002.

21
23 International Conference on Policy and Institutional Options for the Management of Rangelands
in Dry Areas, by Tidiane Ngaido, Nancy McCarthy, and Monica Di Gregorio, January 2002.
24 Climatic Variability and Cooperation in Rangeland Management: A Case Study From Niger, by
Nancy McCarthy and Jean-Paul Vanderlinden, September 2002.
25 Assessing the Factors Underlying the Differences in Group Performance: Methodological Issues
and Empirical Findings from the Highlands of Central Kenya, by Frank Place, Gatarwa Kariuki,
Justine Wangila, Patti Kristjanson, Adolf Makauki, and Jessica Ndubi, November 2002.
26 The Importance of Social Capital in Colombian Rural Agro-Enterprises, by Nancy Johnson, Ruth
Suarez, and Mark Lundy, November 2002.
27 Cooperation, Collective Action and Natural Resources Management in Burkina Faso: A
Methodological Note, by Nancy McCarthy, Céline Dutilly-Diané, and Boureima Drabo, December
2002.
28 Understanding, Measuring and Utilizing Social Capital: Clarifying Concepts and Presenting a Field
Application from India, by Anirudh Krishna, January 2003.
29 In Pursuit Of Comparable Concepts and Data, about Collective Action, by Amy Poteete And Elinor
Ostrom, March 2003.
30 Methods of Consensus Building for Community Based Fisheries Management in Bangladesh and
the Mekong Delta, by Parvin Sultana and Paul Thompson, May 2003.
31 Formal and Informal Systems in Support of Farmer Management of Agrobiodiversity: Some
Policy Challenges to Consolidate Lessons Learned, by Marie Byström, March 2004.
32 What Do People Bring Into the Game: Experiments in the Field About Cooperation in the
Commons, by Juan-Camilo Cárdenas and Elinor Ostrom, June 2004.
33 Methods for Studying Collective Action in Rural Development, by Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Monica Di
Gregorio, and Nancy McCarthy, July 2004.
34 The Relationship between Collective Action and Intensification of Livestock Production: The Case
of Northeastern Burkina Faso, by Nancy McCarthy, August 2004.
35 The Transformation of Property Rights in Kenya‘s Maasailand: Triggers and Motivations by
Esther Mwangi, January 2005.
36 Farmers‘ Rights and Protection of Traditional Agricultural Knowledge, by Stephen B. Brush,
January 2005.
37 Between Conservationism, Eco-Populism and Developmentalism – Discourses in Biodiversity
Policy in Thailand and Indonesia, by Heidi Wittmer and Regina Birner, January 2005.
38 Collective Action for the Conservation of On-Farm Genetic Diversity in a Center of Crop
Diversity: An Assessment of the Role of Traditional Farmers‘ Networks, by Lone B. Badstue,
Mauricio R. Bellon, Julien Berthaud, Alejandro Ramírez, Dagoberto Flores, Xóchitl Juárez, and
Fabiola Ramírez, May 2005.
39 Institutional Innovations Towards Gender Equity in Agrobiodiversity Management: Collective
Action in Kerala, South India,, by Martina Aruna Padmanabhan, June 2005.
40 The Voracious Appetites of Public versus Private Property: A View of Intellectual Property and
Biodiversity from Legal Pluralism, by Melanie G. Wiber, July 2005.
41 Who Knows, Who Cares? Determinants of Enactment, Awareness and Compliance with
Community Natural Resource Management Bylaws in Uganda, by Ephraim Nkonya, John Pender,
Edward Kato, Samuel Mugarura, and James Muwonge, August 2005.
42 Localizing Demand and Supply of Environmental Services: Interactions with Property Rights,
Collective Action and the Welfare of the Poor, by Brent Swallow, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Meine
von Noordjwik, September 2005.

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43 Initiatives for Rural Development through Collective Action: The Case of Household Participation
in Group Activities in the Highlands of Central Kenya, By Gatarwa Kariuki and Frank Place,
September 2005.
44 Are There Customary Rights to Plants? An Inquiry among the Baganda (Uganda), with Special
Attention to Gender, by Patricia L. Howard and Gorettie Nabanoga, October 2005.
45 On Protecting Farmers‘ New Varieties: New Approaches to Rights on Collective Innovations in
Plant Genetic Resources by Rene Salazar, Niels P. Louwaars, and Bert Visser, January 2006.
46 Subdividing the Commons: The Politics of Property Rights Transformation in Kenya‘s Maasailand,
by Esther Mwangi, January 2006.
47 Biting the Bullet: How to Secure Access to Drylands Resources for Multiple Users, by Esther
Mwangi and Stephan Dohrn, January 2006.
48 Property Rights and the Management of Animal Genetic Resources, by Simon Anderson and
Roberta Centonze, February 2006.
49 From the Conservation of Genetic Diversity to the Promotion of Quality Foodstuff: Can the
French Model of =Appellation d‘Origine Contrôlée‘ be Exported? by Valérie Boisvert, April 006.
50 Facilitating Collective Action and Enhancing Local Knowledge: A Herbal Medicine Case Study in
Talaandig Communities, Philippines, by Herlina Hartanto and Cecil Valmores, April 2006.
51 Water, Women and Local Social Organization in the Western Kenya Highlands, by Elizabeth
Were, Brent Swallow, and Jessica Roy, July 2006.
52 The Many Meanings of Collective Action: Lessons on Enhancing Gender Inclusion and Equity in
Watershed Management, by Laura German, Hailemichael Taye, Sarah Charamila, Tesema
Tolera, and Joseph Tanui, July 2006.
53 Decentralization and Environmental Conservation: Gender Effects from Participation in Joint
Forest Management, by Arun Agrawal, Gautam Yadama, Raul Andrade, and Ajoy Bhattacharya,
July 2006.
54 Improving the Effectiveness of Collective Action: Sharing Experiences from Community Forestry
in Nepal, by Krishna P. Achyara and Popular Gentle, July 2006.
55 Groups, Networks, and Social Capital in the Philippine Communities, by Marie Godquin and
Agnes R. Quisumbing, October 2006.
56 Collective Action in Plant Genetic Resources Management: Gendered Rules of Reputation, Trust
and Reciprocity in Kerala, India, by Martina Aruna Padmanabhan, October 2006.
57 Gender and Local Floodplain Management Institutions--A case study from Bangladesh, by Parvin
Sultana and Paul Thompson, October 2006.
58 Gender Differences in Mobilization for Collective Action: Case Studies of Villages in Northern
Nigeria, by Saratu Abdulwahid, October 2006.
59 Gender, Social Capital and Information Exchange in Rural Uganda, by Enid Katungi, Svetlana
Edmeades, and Melinda Smale, October 2006.
60 Rural Institutions and Producer Organizations in Imperfect Markets: Experiences from Producer
Marketing Groups in Semi-Arid Eastern Kenya, by Bekele Shiferaw, Gideon Obare and Geoffrey
Muricho, November 2006.
61 Women‘s Collective Action and Sustainable Water Management: Case of SEWA‘s Water
Campaign in Gujarat, India, by Smita Mishra Panda, October 2006.
62 Could Payments for Environmental Services Improve Rangeland Management in Central Asia,
West Asia and North Africa? by Celine Dutilly-Diane, Nancy McCarthy, Francis Turkelboom,
Adriana Bruggeman, James Tiedemann, Kenneth Street and Gianluca Serra, January 2007.
63 Empowerment through Technology: Gender Dimensions of Social Capital Build-Up in
Maharashtra, India, by Ravula Padmaja and Cynthia Bantilan, February 2007.

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64 Gender and Collective Action: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis, by Lauren Pandolfelli, Ruth
Meinzen-Dick, and Stephan Dohrn, May 2007.
65 Gender, Wealth, and Participation in Community Groups in Meru Central District, Kenya, by
Kristin E. Davis and Martha Negash, May 2007.
66 Beyond Group Ranch Subdivision: Collective Action for Livestock Mobility, Ecological Viability,
and Livelihoods, by Shauna BurnSilver and Esther Mwangi, June 2007.
67 Farmer Organization, Collective Action and Market Access in Meso-America, by Jon Hellin, Mark
Lundy, and Madelon Meijer, October 2007.
68 Collective Action for Innovation and Small Farmer Market Access: The Papa Andina Experience,
by André Devaux, Claudio Velasco, Gastón López, Thomas Bernet, Miguel Ordinola, Hernán Pico,
Graham Thiele, and Douglas Horton, October 2007.
69 Collective Action and Marketing of Underutilized Plant Species: The Case of Minor Millets in Kolli
Hills, Tamil Nadu, India, by Guillaume P. Gruère, Latha Nagarajan, and E.D.I. Oliver King, M.S.
Swaminathan Research Foundation, October 2007.
70 The Role of Public–Private Partnerships and Collective Action in Ensuring Smallholder
Participation in High Value Fruit and Vegetable Supply Chains, by Clare Narrod, Devesh Roy,
Julius Okello, Belem Avendaño, and Karl Rich, October 2007.
71 Collective Action for Small-Scale Producers of Agricultural Biodiversity Products, by Froukje
Kruijssen, Menno Keizer, and Alessandra Giuliani, October, 2007.
72 Farmer Groups Enterprises and the Marketing of Staple Food Commodities in Africa, by Jonathan
Coulter, October 2007.
73 Linking Collective Action to Non-Timber Forest Product Market for Improved Local Livelihoods:
Challenges and Opportunities, by Heru Komarudin, Yuliana L. Siagian, and Ngakan Putu Oka,
December, 2007.
74 Collective Action Initiatives to Improve Marketing Performance: Lessons from Farmer Groups in
Tanzania, by James Barham and Clarence Chitemi, March 2008.
75 Sustaining Linkages to High Value Markets through Collective Action in Uganda: The Case of the
Nyabyumba Potato Farmers, by Elly Kaganzi, Shaun Ferris, James Barham, Annet Abenakyo,
Pascal Sanginga, and Jemimah Njuki, March 2008.
76 Fluctuating Fortunes of a Collective Enterprise: The Case of the Agroforestry Tree Seeds
Association of Lantapan (ATSAL) in the Philippines, by Delia Catacutan, Manuel Bertomeu,
Lyndon Arbes, Caroline Duque, and Novie Butra, May 2008.
77 Making Market Information Services Work Better for the Poor in Uganda, by Shaun Ferris,
Patrick Engoru, and Elly Kaganzi, May 2008.
78 Implications of Bulk Water Transfer on Local Water Management Institutions: A Case Study of
the Melamchi Water Supply Project in Nepal, by Dhruba Pant, Madhusudan Bhattarai, and
Govinda Basnet, May 2008.
79 Bridging, Linking and Bonding Social Capital in Collective Action: The Case of Kalahan Forest
Reserve in the Philippines, by Ganga Ram Dahal and Krishna Prasad Adhikari, May 2008.
80 Decentralization, Pro–poor Land Policies, and Democratic Governance, by Ruth Meinzen–Dick,
Monica Di Gregorio, and Stephan Dohrn, June 2008.
81 Property Rights, Collective Action, and Poverty: The Role of Institutions for Poverty Reduction,
by Monica Di Gregorio, Konrad Hagedorn, Michael Kirk, Benedikt Korf, Nancy McCarthy, Ruth
Meinzen–Dick, and Brent Swallow, June 2008.
82 Collective Action and Property Rights for Poverty Reduction: A Review of Methods and
Approaches, by Esther Mwangi and Helen Markelova, June 2008.
83 Collective action and vulnerability: Burial societies in rural Ethiopia, by Stefan Dercon, John
Hoddinott, Pramila Krishnan, and Tassew Woldehanna, June 2008.

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84 Collective Action and Vulnerability: Local and Migrant Networks in Bukidnon, Philippines, by
Agnes Quisumbing, Scott McNiven, and Marie Godquin, June 2008.
85 Community Watershed Management in Semi–Arid India: The State of Collective Action and its
Effects on Natural Resources and Rural Livelihoods, by Bekele Shiferaw, Tewodros Kebede, and
V. Ratna Reddy, June 2008.
86 Enabling Equitable Collective Action and Policy Change for Poverty Reduction and Improved
Natural Resource Management in the Eastern African Highlands, by Laura German, Waga
Mazengia, Wilberforce Tirwomwe, Shenkut Ayele, Joseph Tanui, Simon Nyangas, Leulseged
Begashaw, Hailemichael Taye, Zenebe Admassu, Mesfin Tsegaye, Francis Alinyo, Ashenafi
Mekonnen, Kassahun Aberra, Awadh Chemangei, William Cheptegei, Tessema Tolera, Zewude
Jote, and Kiflu Bedane, June 2008.
87 The Transformation of the Afar Commons in Ethiopia: State Coercion, Diversification, and
Property Rights Change among Pastoralists, by Bekele Hundie and Martina Padmanabhan, June
2008.
88 Unmaking the Commons: Collective Action, Property Rights, and Resource Appropriation among
(Agro–) Pastoralists in Eastern Ethiopia, by Fekadu Beyene and Benedikt Korf, June 2008.
89 Escaping Poverty Traps? Collective Action and Property Rights in Post–War Rural Cambodia, by
Anne Weingart and Michael Kirk, June 2008.
90 Collective Action to Secure Property Rights for the Poor – A Case Study in Jambi Province,
Indonesia, by Heru Komarudin, Yuliana Sigian, and Carol Colfer, June 2008.
91 Land Tenure in Ethiopia: Continuity and Change, Shifting Rulers, and the Quest For State
Control, by Wibke Crewett, Ayalneh Bogale, and Benedikt Korf. September 2008.
92 Forest Incomes after Uganda’s Forest Sector Reform: Are the Rural Poor Gaining? by Pamela
Jagger. December 2008.
93 Effectiveness of Bylaws in the management of natural resources: The West African Experience,
by Koffi Alinon, and Antoine Kalinganire. December 2008.
94 Everyday Forms of Collective Action in Bangladesh: Learning from Fifteen Cases, by Peter Davis.
January 2009.
95 Looking Beyond the Obvious: Uncovering the Features of Natural Resource Conflicts in Uganda,
by Ephraim Nkonya and Helen Markelova. December 2009.
96 Beyond the Bari: Gender, Groups and Social Relations in Rural Bangladesh, by Agnes R.
Quisumbing. December 2009.
97 Does Social Capital Build Women's Assets? The Long-Term Impacts of Group–Based and
Individual Dissemination of Agricultural Technology in Bangladesh, by Neha Kumar and Agnes R.
Quisumbing. July 2010.
98 Common-Pool Resources – A Challenge for Local Governance: Experimental Research in Eight
Villages in the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam, by Christine Werthmann, Anne
Weingart, and Michael Kirk. December 2010.
99 Gender, Assets, and Agricultural Development Programs: A Conceptual Framework, by Ruth
Meinzen-Dick, Nancy Johnson, Agnes Quisumbing, Jemimah Njuki, Julia Behrman, Deborah
Rubin, Amber Peterman, and Elizabeth Waithanji. November, 2011.
100 Resource Conflict, Collective Action, and Resilience: An Analytical Framework, by Blake D.
Ratner, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Candace May, and Eric Haglund. December, 2010.
101 Power, Inequality, and Water Governance: The Role of Third Party Involvement in Water-Related
Conflict and Cooperation, by Ligia Gomez and Helle Munk Ravnborg. December, 2011
102 Forest conflict in Asia and the role of collective action in its management, by Yurdi Yasmi, Lisa
Kelley, and Thomas Enters. December, 2011

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