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    (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1

    Syllabus

    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is


    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

    Syllabus

    PATEL ET AL. v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR


    THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

    No. 20–979. Argued December 6, 2021—Decided May 16, 2022


    In 2007, Pankajkumar Patel, who had entered the United States illegally
    with his wife Jyotsnaben in the 1990s, applied to United States Citi-
    zenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for discretionary adjust-
    ment of status under 8 U. S. C. §1255, which would have made Patel
    and his wife lawful permanent residents. Because USCIS was aware
    that Patel had previously checked a box on a Georgia driver’s license
    application falsely stating that he was a United States citizen, it de-
    nied Patel’s application for failure to satisfy the threshold requirement
    that the noncitizen be statutorily admissible for permanent residence.
    §1255(i)(2)(A); see also §1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (rendering inadmissible a
    noncitizen “who falsely represents . . . himself or herself to be a citizen
    of the United States for any purpose or benefit under” state or federal
    law).
    Years later, the Government initiated removal proceedings against
    Patel and his wife due to their illegal entry. Patel sought relief from
    removal by renewing his adjustment of status request. Patel argued
    before an Immigration Judge that he had mistakenly checked the “cit-
    izen” box on the state application and thus lacked the subjective intent
    necessary to violate the federal statute. The Immigration Judge disa-
    greed, denied Patel’s application for adjustment of status, and ordered
    that Patel and his wife be removed from the country. The Board of
    Immigration Appeals dismissed Patel’s appeal.
    Patel petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review, where a panel of
    that court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his claim. Fed-
    eral law prohibits judicial review of “any judgment regarding the
    granting of relief” under §1255. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). But see
    §1252(a)(2)(D) (exception where the judgment concerns “constitutional
    claims” or “questions of law”). The panel reasoned that the factual
    2 PATEL v. GARLAND

    Syllabus

    determinations of which Patel sought review—whether he had testi-


    fied credibly and whether he had subjectively intended to misrepresent
    himself as a citizen—each qualified as an unreviewable judgment. On
    rehearing, the en banc court agreed with the panel. This Court
    granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict as to the scope of
    §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
    Held: Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of dis-
    cretionary-relief proceedings under §1255 and the other provisions
    enumerated in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Pp. 6–17.
    (a) This case largely turns on the scope of the word “judgment” as
    used in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). In support of the judgment below, Court-
    appointed amicus defines it as any authoritative decision—encompass-
    ing any and all decisions relating to the granting or denying of discre-
    tionary relief. By contrast, the Government argues that it refers ex-
    clusively to a decision requiring the use of discretion, which the factual
    findings in this case are not. Patel agrees that “judgment” implies an
    exercise of discretion but interprets the qualifying phrase “regarding
    the granting of relief” as focusing the jurisdictional bar on only the
    Immigration Judge’s ultimate decision whether to grant relief. Every-
    thing else, he says, is reviewable. Pp. 6–14.
    (1) Only amicus’ definition fits the text and context of
    §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). “ [T]he word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning.” Babb
    v. Wilkie, 589 U. S. ___, ___, n. 2 (some internal quotation marks omit-
    ted). As applied here, “any” means a judgment “ ‘of whatever kind’ ”
    under §1255 and the other enumerated provisions. United States v.
    Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5. The word “regarding” has a similarly “broad-
    ening effect.” Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U. S. ___,
    ___. Thus, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) encompasses not just “the granting of re-
    lief” but also any judgment relating to the granting of relief. Amicus’
    reading is reinforced by Congress’ later addition of §1252(a)(2)(D),
    which preserves review of legal and constitutional questions but
    makes no mention of preserving review of questions of fact. Moreover,
    this Court has already relied on subparagraph (D) to all but settle that
    judicial review of factfinding is unavailable. See Guerrero-Lasprilla v.
    Barr, 589 U. S. ___; Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ___ (2020). Pp. 8–10.
    (2) The Government’s and Patel’s interpretations read like elabo-
    rate efforts to avoid the text’s most natural meaning. The Government
    cites dictionary definitions such as “the mental or intellectual process
    of forming an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing” as
    indicating that “judgment” refers exclusively to a discretionary deci-
    sion, which it describes as one that is “subjective or evaluative.” Brief
    for Respondent 12. The factual findings in this case, it says, do not fit
    that description. The Government is wrong about both text and con-
    text. A “judgment” does not necessarily involve discretion, nor does

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