George Zimmerman v State of Florida Opinion 13-1233
George Zimmerman v State of Florida Opinion 13-1233
George Zimmerman v State of Florida Opinion 13-1233
GEORGE ZIMMERMAN,
Petitioner,
Respondents.
________________________________/
PER CURIAM.
court's order denying his request to take the deposition of attorney Benjamin L. Crump.
We conclude that Zimmerman was entitled to take a limited deposition of Crump to
surrounding the interview. We grant the writ because we would be unable to ascertain
the degree of harm resulting from the wrongful denial of this discovery in a plenary
appeal. See, e.g., Giacalone v. Helen Ellis Mem’l Hosp., 8 So. 3d 1232, 1234-35 (Fla.
2d DCA 2009) (although certiorari is rarely available to review orders denying discovery
because the harm can usually be remedied on appeal, relief by writ of certiorari is
appropriate when "there is no practical way to determine after judgment how the
In this high profile case, Zimmerman was charged by information on April 11,
2012, with second degree murder. The charges arose from an incident on February 26,
2012, in which Zimmerman fatally shot Trayvon Martin. During interviews with police,
because the individual is alleged to have been on the phone with Martin moments
before his death. Crump made a recording of the interview, but the recording is
incomplete and of very poor quality. Two members of the media were present with
Crump at the time he conducted the telephone interview of Witness 8, and portions of
the recorded interview were aired on national television the following day.
scheduled deposition, Crump filed a fifteen-page affidavit with the court and asked the
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Several witnesses have been publically identified only by assigned numbers to
protect their privacy due to the intense media attention this case has generated.
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court to accept the affidavit in lieu of being required to give a deposition. It was Crump's
that the affidavit would not be an adequate substitute for deposition testimony.
written order denying Zimmerman's request to depose Crump. In its order, the trial
court found that Crump was "an opposing counsel" and, pursuant to the test enunciated
in Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986), could only be
See also Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 830 (10th Cir. 1995) (deposition of an
opponent's counsel is improper where these three criteria are not met). The trial court
The trial court also found that Crump could not be compelled to disclose any
protected work product obtained by Crump in his capacity as an attorney for the Martin
We respectfully disagree with the trial court's analysis. First, the fact that Crump
represents Martin's family does not make him "an opposing counsel." As acknowledged
by Crump in his affidavit, he was not acting as a lawyer for the State or the defendant,
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nor could his interview of Witness 8 be found to constitute trial preparation in the
The Shelton test was intended to protect against the ills of deposing opposing
counsel in a pending case that could potentially lead to the disclosure of the attorney's
litigation strategy. Pamida, Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 281 F.3d 726, 730-31 (8th Cir.
2002). Because of a belief that the discovery process was being abused, the Shelton
test was erected as a barrier to protect trial attorneys from unnecessary depositions. Id.
However, the Shelton test does not apply where, as in the instant case, an attorney has
knowledge of facts relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and is merely advising
United States v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2002).
would not violate the work product privilege because any privilege that may have
existed was waived when Crump conducted the interview in the presence of two media
See Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
(work product privilege waived where disclosure of information is made in manner that
is "inconsistent with the maintenance of secrecy from the disclosing party's adversary").
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The information provided by Witness 8 is relevant to the determination of whether
Zimmerman is guilty of second degree murder (or a lesser included offense). Should
consistent with prior statements made by Witness 8 to Crump and whether such
testimony was in any way influenced by the manner in which the interview in question
was conducted.
Finally, although not a basis of the trial court's ruling, we reject any suggestion
that Crump's affidavit would serve as an adequate substitute for a deposition. See
Patrick v. State, 104 So. 3d 1046, 1057 (Fla. 2012) ("Cross-examination is the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.")
interview. Defense counsel may not inquire into Crump's mental impressions regarding
Witness 8, nor may counsel inquire as to the reasons why Crump conducted the
interview in the manner in which he did. Additionally, we believe the work product
privilege precludes defense counsel from making inquiry as to the reason(s) Crump
straight forward. We are confident that the trial judge will be able to take the steps
necessary to ensure the deposition is limited to the subject areas described above.