University of Mindanao - College of Legal Education

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Case Digests

PART I

GENERAL MATTERS

I. Jurisdiction

a. Definition - what is jurisdiction?

b. How is jurisdiction acquired?
i. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
ii. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

Case Title Citation Assigned to Done

Garcia v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 170122 & ABELA, Wom Lib

171381

iii. Territorial jurisdiction

Case title Citation Assigned to Done

People v. Mercado G.R. No. 45471 & AMIGO, Alissa Mae

45472

c. How is jurisdiction determined?

Case Title Citation Assigned to Done

Avecilla v. People G.R. No. 46370 ARADANAS, Sittie Akima

Cudia v. CA G.R. No. 110315 ASLOR, Normiel

d. Applicable law to determine jurisdiction

Case Title Citation Assigned to Done

People v. Lagon G.R. No. 45815 AUDIENCIA, BJ

e. Waiver of Objection
i. Person of accused, waivable
ii. Subject matter and territorial, not waivable
f. Other principles
i. Principle of adherence of jurisdiction/continuing jurisdiction

Case Title Citation Assigned to Done

Mendoza v. COMELEC G.R. No. 188308 AURELIO, Fatima

EXP: Palana v. People G.R. No. 149995 BENABAYE, Sheena Mae

ii. Dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds

Case Title Citation Assigned to Done

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy G.R. No. L-21450 BESIN, Jiezel Mae

II. Requisites for exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction

Case Title Citation Assigned to Done

Antiporda v. G.R. No. 133289 BLAH, Wafirah

Garchitorena

III. Jurisdiction of the courts

a. MTC/MeTC/MCTC
b. RTC
c. Sandiganbayan

Case Title Citation Assigned to Done

People v. Magallanes G.R. No. 118013-14 CANEDO, Karina

People v. Cawaling G.R. No. 117970 COLAMA, Charles Arnie

d. Military Courts

IV. When injunction may be issued to restrain criminal procedure

Case Title Citation Assigned to Done

Brocka v. Enrile G.R. No. 69683-65 DELA CRUZ, Melody

Domingo v. G.R. No. 109376 FREDELUCES, Danessa

Sandiganbayan Faith

Hernandez v. Albano G.R. No. L-19272 GANADOS, Roldan

POST YOUR DIGESTS HERE. (please follow this format)

GARCIA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

October 12, 2009 GR 170122 ABELA, WOM LIB

KEYWORD: service of summon, jurisdiction over the person, voluntary appearance

FACTS: To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of
PhP 143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner
Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had
allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB), pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 1379,3 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on
October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those properties. It was followed by the
filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture case, docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time
to recover funds and properties amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55.

Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB
charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an
Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the value of the property and funds
plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99

ISSUE/S: The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down to
the question of jurisdiction and may thusly be couched into whether the Fourth Division
of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner—and her three sons for
that matter—considering that, first, vis-à-vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196
(Forfeiture II), summons against her have been ineffectively or improperly served

RULING: There is merit in petitioner’s contention.1 a

Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the
requirements of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:

SEC. 7. Substituted service.—If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time
as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.

It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by
its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and
proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a
person.22

In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served
personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention
Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed
that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner
and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such
substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,23 we broke down the requirements to be:

(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted
service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or
there is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time
being "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably
prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires
that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,]
to the other party."24 Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show
several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2)
different dates.

(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of
Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service.

(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion

residing at defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of
defendant’s office or regular place of business.

From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of

summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj.
Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a
valid substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not
strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at petitioner’s house or
residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the
latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons
was made.

The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party
voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief.25 In
the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning
improper service of summons since the improvident service of summons in both
forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary
appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various pleadings filed by
petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot subscribe to
the Republic’s views.

Special Appearance to Question a Court’s Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary Appearance

The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
provides:

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action

shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance. (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have
appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearance—the first
sentence of the above-quoted rule—means is that the voluntary appearance of the
defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived
his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.

The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show
that she voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following
pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to
admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture
case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in
Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial
reconsideration.

The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner
solely for special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB
over her person and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of valid service of
summons through improvident substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and
Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her motions for
reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for
damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and
defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the
forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules
on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB
constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.

Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals26 applies to the instant
case. Said case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance
before the court––challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to
dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds––is not tantamount to estoppel or a
waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not
constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before
the SB to cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they
deemed to have waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being
no valid substituted services of summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of petitioner and her children. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject
forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and
void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default must be set aside
and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For the forfeiture
case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons
or alias summons on the petitioner and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction
over their persons.

DOCTRINES: It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to
be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode
authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires
jurisdiction over a person.

Special appearance before the court––challenging its jurisdiction over the person
through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds––is not
tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his
person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court.
 PEOPLE V MERCADO

JUNE 15, 1938 G.R. No. 45471 & 45472 AMIGO, ALISSA MAE

KEYWORD/S: theft of the carabaos

FACTS:

This is an appeal by the prosecution from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga whereby said court declared itself without jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and decide two criminal cases pending before it, for theft of large cattle, against the
appellee Francisco Mercado, on the ground that, although the stolen animals were
afterwards brought by the appellee to the municipality of Candaba, Pampanga, where
they were found in his possession, said crimes had taken place and had been committed
in the municipality of Gapan, of the Province of Nueva Ecija.

The informations which gave rise to the criminal cases above-mentioned are of the
following tenor:

"That on or about the 21st day of June, 1936, in the municipality of Candaba,
Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court,
the above named accused, Francisco Mercado, with intent of gain, did, then and
there, voluntarily, maliciously, illegally and criminally, take, steal, and carry away
two male carabaos both belonging to Pedro A. Ladores, worth sixty pesos (P60)
each, and to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of P120. The
commission of the crime having been commenced at Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and
consummated at the municipality of Candaba, Pampanga, and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner."

"That on or about the 21st day of June, 1936, in the municipality of Candaba,
Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court,
the above named accused, Francisco Mercado, with intent of gain, but without the
use of violence upon persons nor force upon things, did, then and there,
voluntarily, maliciously, illegally and criminally take, steal, and carry away a male
carabao valued at ninety pesos (P90), owned by Leon Ladores, without his
knowledge and consent, and to his damage and prejudice in the said sum of P90.
The commission of the crime having been commenced at Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and
completed at the municipality of Candaba, Pampanga."

The foregoing information was filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga in the Court of
First Instance of said province after receiving the report of the preliminary inquiries
made, upon complaint, by the justice of the peace court of Candaba, Pampanga, where
the cases originated. The appellee waived his right to a preliminary investigation and
asked that the two cases be remanded to the Court of First Instance for trial and final
judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Pampanga has jurisdiction to try and decide
the two cases in question, it being alleged in the informations by which they were
commenced that the accused stole the carabaos described therein in Gapan, in the
Province of Nueva Ecija, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, in order to bring
them, as he in fact did afterwards, to Candaba, Pampanga, where they were found in his
possession?

RULING:

No. The lower court upheld the negative, being of the opinion that the appellee
committed the two thefts in question no in the Province of Pampanga over which its
jurisdiction is exclusive of the Province of Nueva Ecija, but in the latter province.

In criminal proceedings, the rule is that one cannot be held to answer for any crime
committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed. Said rule is based
on the legal provision which prescribes the essential requisites of a good complaint or
information, one of which is the allegation that the crime was committed within the
jurisdiction of the court where the complaint or information is filed and that said court
has authority to try it. (Sec. 6, General Orders, No. 58.) As was said in the case of United
States vs. Cunanan (26 Phil., 3760, the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance of the
Philippine Islands, in criminal cases, is limited to certain well-defined territory, so that
they cannot take jurisdiction of persons charged with an offense alleged to have been
committed outside of that limited territory.

In conclusion, we are of the opinion and so hold that the sole court possessing
jurisdiction over the cases against the appellee for the theft of the carabaos in question
is not that of Pampanga, but that of Nueva Ecija in which they should have been and
must be instituted.

DOCTRINE:
The essential requisites of a good complaint or information, one of which is the
allegation that the crime was committed within the jurisdiction of the court where the
complaint or information is filed and that said court has authority to try it. (Sec. 6,
General Orders, No. 58.)
How is jurisdiction determined?
Avecilla v. People

June 2, 1992 G.R. No. 46370 Akima Aradanas

KEYWORDS: qualified theft; registered letter/mail matter

FACTS:

Antonio Avecilla, a messenger of Litton Knitting Mills, was charged before the CFI of Rizal with
the crime of theft. On or about the 16th day of November, 1971, in the municipality of
Mandaluyong, accused-petitioner, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away one Registered Letter number 247341, delivery number 3752, valued at $400.00
belonging to one Lourdes Rodriguez de Lacson. In the Mandaluyong Post Office, Avecilla
introduced a woman pretending to be Mrs. Lacson who signed the control book. As a result,
petitioner was able to take the letter with the bank draft of $400.00 which Mrs. Lacson never
received.

The trial court found Avecilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple theft. Petitioner appealed
to the CA, which promulgated a decision finding him guilty of qualified theft instead of simple
theft. The motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner elevated the case to the
Supreme Court by way of the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-petitioner should be charged with the crime of qualified theft, instead of
simple theft.

RULING:

YES.

Petitioner bewails the vagueness of the information which resulted in his "bewilderment" as to
what precisely he had allegedly stolen for a registered letter per se cannot be worth $500.00 (as
alleged in the information). He notes that the information does not state that the registered letter
contained a check. Moreover, he avers, the essential elements of theft, whether simple or
qualified, had not been substantiated by the facts proven.

The averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and
determine the court before which the case must be tried. What controls is not the designation of
the offense but the description thereof as alleged in the information. The information reveals that
it contains all the essential elements of the crime of theft, to wit: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon
things.

While it is true that petitioner could not have been "bewildered" as to the nature of the charge
against him had the information been more accurately crafted, it nonetheless contains all the
elements of the crime of theft. Thus, it is alleged therein that petitioner, with the aid of and in
conspiracy with an unidentified woman, willfully took away Registered Letter No. 24341
belonging to Lourdes Rodriguez de Lacson to her damage and prejudice. Although intent to
gain is not explicitly alleged in the information, it may be presumed from the allegation that the
said mail matter was unlawfully taken.

The allegation that the subject of the taking is a registered letter categorizes the theft as a
qualified rather than a simple one. This is clear from the provision of Art. 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, which states that qualified theft is committed if the property stolen is mail matter. In
this regard, petitioner’s contention that not all registered letters are mail matters is incorrect.
Under Sec. 1945 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, first class mail matter includes
letters.

Petitioner may be convicted of a crime and sentenced to the corresponding penalty as long as
the facts alleged in the information and proved at the trial constitute the crime for which he is
convicted although different from the crime designated and charged in the information.

DOCTRINES:

● The averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted

and determine the court before which the case must be tried. What controls is not the
designation of the offense but the description thereof as alleged in the information.
● Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is
circumstantial, the intent to gain or animus lucrandi is the usual motive to be presumed
from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.
(intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking)
● The allegations in the complaint against petitioner had been established beyond
reasonable doubt at the trial. In this regard, it should be pointed out that absolute
certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law as basis for conviction of any criminal
charge, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to
constitute the offense. Moral certainty convinces and satisfies the reason and
conscience that a crime has indeed been committed.
 Cudia vs. CA

January 16, 1998 GR. 45815 ASLOR, Normiel

KEYWORD:
● Illegal possession of Firearms and Ammunition

FACTS:
Renato Cudia was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the crime of Illegal Possession
of Firearms and Ammunition. He was brought to Angeles City where a preliminary investigation
was conducted and as a result, the City Prosecutor filed an Information against him.

The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. Upon his
arraignment, Cudia pleaded not guilty. The court called the attention of the parties and contrary
to the information, Renatio Cudia had committed the offense in Mabalacat and not in Angeles
City. Thus, the judge ordered that the case should be assigned to a court involving crimes
committed outside Angeles City.

Consequently, it was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. However, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga filed an information charging Renato Cudio with the same
crime and it was likewise assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC which resulted into
two Information filed with the same crime. This prompted the City Prosecutor to file a Motion to
Dismiss/ Withdraw the Information which the trial court granted.

Cudia filed a Motion to Quash the criminal case on the ground that his continued
prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had
been arraigned in the first criminal case, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition
would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. CA
affirmed that there was no double jeopardy on the ground that the petitioner could not have
been convicted under the first information as the same was defective.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the city prosecutor of Angeles city
did not have the authority to file the first information.

RULING:

No. It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed
before it must be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its
jurisdiction.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned.
 Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the
Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Written large
in lawbooks is the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative
policy of any trial court.

It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the
first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is
beyond his jurisdiction.

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who
should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of
Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot
be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone
authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.

Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City
Prosecutor in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed
out by the Court of Appeals, petitioners plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash
may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a
long line of uniform decisions, questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among
other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein
petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in
the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so
defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority
to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioners
subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a
defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.
 Mendoza v. Comelec

October 15, 2009 G.R. No. 188308 Aurelio, Fatima

Subject case: Power under the Philippine Constitution of the respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in the handling of a provincial election contest, and the claimed due
process rights of a party to the contest.

Petitioner: Joselito R. Mendoza, proclaimed winning candidate and assumed the office of
Governor
Respondents: COMELEC and Roberto M. Pagdanganan

Doctrines: Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character,

particularly with respect to election contests, Commission on Elections is not a tribunal
within the judicial branch of government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the
constitutional sense hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of
administration and enforcement, is quasi-judicial.

Election Protests; Election Contests; Since the contested proceedings at the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (“contested proceedings”) are no longer part of the adversarial aspects of the
election contest, they did not require notice of hearing and the participation of the
parties—what took place at the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) were the internal deliberations
of the Commission on Elections, as a quasi-judicial body, in the course of appreciating the
evidence presented and deciding the provincial election contest on the merits.

Facts:
Petitioner Mendoza and respondent Pagdanganan ran for Bulacan Governor of the in the May
2007 elections. Mendoza was proclaimed Governor. Pagdanganan timely filed an election
protest with the COMELEC. Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-protested
precincts was conducted at COMELECs office in Intamuros.

Both parties took part in the proceedings, i.e., offered evidences. The case was then
submitted for resolution. The COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including
those involved in the provincial election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).
Mendoza filed to dismiss further proceedings. But this motion was dismissed by COMELEC
2nd Division.

Mendoza argues that the proceedings before the COMELEC in election protests are judicial in
nature and character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due process specifically,(a) opportunity
to be heard and (b) that judgment be rendered only after lawful hearing apply. He claims that
without notice to him of the proceedings, the due process element of the right to have
judgment only after lawful hearing is absent.

Mendoza asserts that an important element of due process is that the judicial body should
have jurisdiction over the property that is the subject matter of the proceedings Private
respondent Pagdanganan argues that the proceeding referred to by Mendoza was
COMELECs decision-making process. Public respondent COMELEC further argues that in the
absence of a specific rule on whether it can conduct appreciation of ballots outside its
premises or official custody, the issue boils down to one of discretion the authority of the
COMELEC to control as it deems fit the processes or incidents of a pending election protest.

Issues:
1. Whether or not COMELEC exercises judicial power.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC violated due process by
conducting proceedings without giving due notice to the
petitioner.
3. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
amounting to an excess of jurisdiction in appreciating ballots
which are not in its official custody and are outside its own
premises, authority and control.

Ruling:

1. No. Judicial power in our country is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it
is a constitutional body, other than a court, vested with authority to decide election contests.

Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character, COMELEC is not a
tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a court exercising judicial power
in the constitutional sense.

Hence, its adjudicative function is quasi-judicial. Under these terms, the COMELEC under our
governmental structure is a constitutional administrative agency and its powers are
essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election laws), quasi-judicial (to
exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and city officials
and appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other lower ranking officials), and
quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the promulgation of its
rules of procedure).

2. No. Petitioner does not dispute that he fully participated in the proceedings of the election
protest until the case was deemed submitted for resolution; he had representation at the
revision of the ballots, duly presented his evidence, and summed up his case through a
memorandum.

These various phases of the proceedings constitute the hearing proper of the election
contest and the COMELEC has more than satisfied the opportunity to be heard. The petitioner
stood head-to-head with the respondent in an adversarial contest where both sides were
given their respective rights to speak, make their presentations, and controvert each others
submission, subject only to established COMELEC rules of procedures.
Under these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither
one can complain of any denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
3. No. The COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election contest, as the
petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and other
election materials to the SET.

The Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over election protests involving
provincial officials. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter, i.e., the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties. After its
jurisdiction attached, this jurisdiction cannot be ousted by subsequent events such as the
temporary transfer of evidence and material records of the proceedings to another tribunal
exercising its own jurisdiction over another election contest pursuant to the Constitution.
This is the rule of adherence of jurisdiction.

Thus, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over provincial election contest exists side by side
with the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, with each tribunal being supreme in
their respective areas of concern (the Senate election contests for the SET, and the regional,
provincial and city election contests for the COMELEC), and with neither one being higher
than the other in terms of precedence so that the jurisdiction of one must yield to the other.
The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party of the steps it is taking in the
course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial election contest.

People v. Lagon
 May 18, 1990 G.R No. 45815 Audiencia, BJ

KEYWORD: Estafa

FACTS:

On July 7, 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City
docked as criminal case no. 7632, charging respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa
under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that
the accused allegedly issued a check in the amount of Php 4,232.80 as payment for goods and
merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check,
which subsequently bounced.

However, the city court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court’s authority to impose.

The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the
law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of
the commission of the crime. At the time of the commission of the crime in April 1975.
Jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the city court. However, by the time the
criminal information was filed. Paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the RPC had already been
amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased, which the
penalty was way beyond the city court’s authority to impose.

Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the City Court has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

NO, the city court has no jurisdiction over the case. It is settled doctrine that jurisdiction of a
court in criminal law matters is determined by the law in effect at the time of the commencement
of the criminal action and not the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense
charged.

Under Sec 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, “municipal judges in the capitals of provinces
and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the CFI to try parties
charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which penalties provided do not
exceed prision correccional or fines no exceeding P6,000 or both.”

At the time of the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty under Art 315 of the
RPC was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional it is minimum period,
falling well within the jurisdiction of the City Court. But when the information was filed, PD 818
had increased the imposable penalty to prision mayor in its medium period.
 The real question raised by the petitioner is whether the said doctrine disregards the rule
against retroactivity of penal laws. It has been repeatedly held that in criminal prosecutions,
jurisdiction is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial but by the
extent of the penalty which the law imposes. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the Court in which
the information is filed, it is retained regardless of whether the evidence proves a lesser offense
which carries a penalty that would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court.

In the instant case, should the information be refiled with the RTC, the court may not
impose a more onerous penalty upon Lagon. Although the RTC retains subject-matter
jurisdiction to try and decide the refiled case under PD 818, given the date of the commission of
the crime (before effectivity of PD 818), the lower penalty provided in Art 315 (otherwise within
the jurisdiction of the City Court) should be imposed.

DOCTRINES:

● It is settled doctrine that jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is determined by

the law in effect at the time of the commencement of the criminal action and not the law
in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged.

Palana v. People

September 28, 2007 G.R. No. 149995 Sheena Mae Benabaye

KEYWORDS:

FACTS:

Sometime in September 1987, petitioner and his wife borrowed money from Alex B. Carlos. To
secure the payment of the loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount in
favor of the complainant. However, when the check was presented for payment, it was
dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding,
petitioner failed to make good the said dishonored check.

On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioner’s non-apprehension despite the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest. On June 27, 1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled and
set aside after petitioner posted the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23, 1997 a Decision
finding petitioner guilty as charged,

Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s
decision in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

YES.

The Supreme Court held that Petitioner’s argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not
the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without
merit.

It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action and not during the arraignment of the accused. The
Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At
that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129

Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more
than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed ₱200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is ₱200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial
Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Metropolitan Trial Court could not
acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for offenses
punishable with a fine of not more than ₱4,000.00.

The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691 on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the
Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioner’s case. Where a court has already obtained
and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final
determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the
effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its enactment. Indeed, R.A. No.
7691 contains retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that have not yet
reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be
construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided
by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.

The jurisdiction of the RTC over the case attached upon the commencement of the action by the
filing of the Information and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning
the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in
nature

Other Principles

Dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds

 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy

April 15, 1968 G.R. No. L-21450 Jiezel Mae Besin

KEYWORDS: Surety; RA No. 296 otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948

FACTS:

Spouses Serafin and Felicitas commenced a civil case against spouses Sibonghanoy to recover
from them a sum of P1, 908.00 with legal interest. A writ of attachment was issued by the court
against the defendants’ properties but the same was soon dissolved. After trial, the court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and after the same had become final and executory,
the court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ being unsatisfied, the
plaintiffs moved for the issuance of the writ of execution against the Surety’s bond.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued
without summary hearing. This was denied by the RTC. The Surety appealed in the CA, which
was denied. This time, the surety just asked for an extension in order for them to file the motion
for reconsideration. But instead of filing for a motion for reconsideration, it filed a motion to
dismiss saying that by virtue of R.A. 296 which is the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948,
section 88 of which placed within the exclusive original jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
action where the value of the subject matter does not exceed P2,000.00. The Court of First
Instance therefore has no jurisdiction over the case. The question of jurisdiction was filed by the
Surety only 15 years from the time the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:

NO.

The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by
law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case,
the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts
and circumstances of the present case, a party may be barred by laches from invoking this plea
for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case. A party
cannot invoke a court’s jurisdiction and later on deny it to escape a penalty.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.

o Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.

o The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike
the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape
penalty. Upon this same principle is what we said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution
of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963, supra, to the effect that we frown upon the
“undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

o The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July
31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits.

o It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it
finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on
its part, we would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings in the present case
since it commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
DOCTRINE:

A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction. The question whether the court had jurisdiction, either of the subject
matter of the action or of the parties, was not important in such cases because the party
is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated
— obviously for reasons of public policy.

III. Requisites for exercise of criminal jurisdiction

 ANTIPORDA, JR. v. GARCHITORENA

December 23, 1999 G.R. No. 133289 BLAH, Wafirah

KEYWORD:

● Kidnapping with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle

● Amended Information
● reinvestigation

FACTS:

The four (4) accused, Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr. (Antiporda), Eliterio Rubiaco (Rubiaco),
Victor Gascon (Gascon) and Ceasar Talla (Talla) were charged with the crime of kidnapping
Elmer Ramos (Ramos). It was filed in the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. It was alleged in
the Information, dated September 18, 1997, that the abovementioned accused kidnapped and
carried Ramos away from his residence in Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan on September 1,
1995, with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle.

On November 10, 1997, the Court issued an order giving the prosecution by Prosecutor
Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili thirty (30) days within which to submit the amendment to the
Information. It was alleged in the order that there were inadequacies in the allegations in the
Information for which she would beg leave to amend the same.

The prosecution complied with the order and file and Amended Information, which was
admitted by the Sandiganbayan in a resolution. In the amended Information, it indicated that
Antiporda exercised his official duties and took advantage of his position being the Municipal
Mayor of Benguey, Cagayan and conspired with the Brgy Captain of San Lorenzo, Benguey,
Cagayan Juan Gallardo (now deceased). It also indicated the position of Rubiaco as a barangay
councilman in San Lorenzo, that Rubiaco, Gascon, and Talla used firemans, resorted to force
violence and intimidation to commit such a felonious act, and that they subsequently brought
and detained Ramos illegally at the residence of Antiporda for more than five (5) days.

The Accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation of the case
be conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred.

The prosecution recommended the denial of the accused’s motion through an order. The
order was approved by the Ombudsman (OMB) Aniano Desierto.

The accused thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in
Abeyance and/or Recall Warrant of Arrest Issued. However, it was denied in open court on the
ground that there was nothing in the Amended Information that was added to the original
Information so that the accused could not claim a right to be heard separately in an investigation
in the Amended Information. Additionally, the Court ruled that the accused are not in a position
to be heard on this matter since none of the accused have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Court.

Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash the Amended Information for lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Said motion was ignored by the Sandiganbayan on the
grounds of failure to submit themselves to the Court.

MR was filed by the accused alleging that the filing of the Motion to Quash and the
appearance of their counsel during the scheduled hearing amounted to their voluntary
appearance and invested the court with jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan denied the MR.

This made the accused filed for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction and/or TRO to restrain the respondent Justices of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan from further proceedings and from enforcing the warrants for the arrest of the
accused or to maintain the status quo until further order from the SC.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
● They argued that the Sandiganyan had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
because the original information did not allege that Antiporda took advantage of his
position as mayor of Buguey, Cagayan to order the kidnapping of Ramos.
● They also questioned the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over their
case yet they insisted that said court acquired jurisdiction over their motion to quash.
● They prayed that a reinvestigation be made in view of the Amended information

ISSUE/S:
1. WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.
2. WON the reinvestigation is necessary.

RULING:
1. NO. the original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the
offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed
that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.

HOWEVER, the accused are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in the filing of the MR and reinvestigation in the same court. They
challenged the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for
Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected.
Hence, the court held that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of
estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the
Information.

2. NO. a reinvestigation is proper only if the accused’s substantial rights would be impaired.
In the case at bar, the Court did not find that the rights of the accused would be unduly
 prejudiced if the Amended Information is filed without a reinvestigation. The
amendments made in the Information merely describe the public positions held by the
accused and stated where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped.

It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it

is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial
of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof,and it does not place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no
cogent nor compellingreason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.

As an aside, an offense is considered committed in relation to office when it is intimately

connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions.

DOCTRINES:
● In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
● The Sandiganbayan exercises not only civil but also criminal jurisdiction.
● Criminal jurisdiction, as defined in the case of People v. Mariano, is necessarily the
authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it.
● Requirements wherein a court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case:
○ The offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of;
○ The offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction; and
○ The person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for
trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court.
● The voluntary appearance of the accused at the pre-suspension hearing amounted to
his submission to the court’s jurisdiction even it no warrant of arrest has yet been issued.
● A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction.
● A reinvestigation is proper only if the accused’s substantial rights would be impaired.
● Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides thus: “Section 14.
Amendment.—The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during
the trial asto all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court,when the
same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused. x x x x x x x x x”
● Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended byP.D. No. 1861 provides for the
jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan: “Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise:“(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: x x x “(2) Other offenses
or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)years, or a fine of P6,000.00.
Provided, however, That offenses felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court,Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

PEOPLE VS MAGALLANES

October 11, 1995. G.R. Nos. 118013-14. CAÑEDO, Karina

KEYWORD:

Proper jurisdiction, jurisdiction determined by allegation, public officers, Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

On 13 January 1994, two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed with the
RTC of Bacolod City against fourteen persons, five of whom are members of the PNP. Each of
the accused pleaded guilty upon arraignment.On 24 June 1994, the private prosecutors moved
for the transmittal of the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan on the ground that,
pursuant to our decision of 11 March 1994 in Republic of the Philippines vs. Asuncion, 4 the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged were committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.

In its order of 15 August 1994, 6 the trial court, thru the respondent Judge, ruled that the
Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the subject cases because the information does
not state that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
Citing People vs. Montilla, 7 it held that the allegation in the informations that the accused PNP
officers took advantage of their office in the commission of the offense charged is merely an
allegation of an aggravating circumstance. It further stated that a public office is not a
constituent element of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is said offense intimately
connected with the office. It then denied the motion for transfer of the records to the
Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of the case should continue. It then denied the motion
for transfer of the records to the Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of the case should
continue.

On 5 December 1994, the prosecution, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
with us a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order challenging the refusal of the respondent Judge to transfer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan.

The petitioner submits that the crimes charged in the subject cases were connected with public
office because the accused PNP officers, together with the civilian agents, arrested the two
swindling suspects in the course of the performance of their duty and not out of personal motive,
and if they demanded from the two suspects the production of the money of the Dumancas
spouses and later killed the two; they did so in the course of the investigation conducted by
them as policemen. The petitioner further asserts that the allegations in the informations reading
"taking advantage of his position as Station Commander of the Philippine National Police" and
"taking advantage of their respective positions" presuppose the exercise of the functions
attached to the office of the accused PNP officers and are sufficient to show that the offenses
charged were committed in relation to their office.

ISSUES:
1. WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case?
2. WON the offense was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers?

HELD:

1. The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. When the informations in the cases were filed, the law governing
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was P.D. 1861, which provides that the Sandiganbayan
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving: 1) violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act; 2) offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, where
the penalty prescribed is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years, or a
fine of P 6,000.00. If the penalty for the offense charged does not exceed imprisonment of six
(6) years or a fine of P6,000.00, it shall be tried by the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court or the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

2. It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or

information, and not by the result of evidence after trial.

The informations in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated
the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely
allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00,
abducted, kidnapped, and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they
shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these
allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.

The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of their respective
positions" incorporated in the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the
definition of "offenses committed in relation to public office." In Montilla vs. Hilario, such an
allegation was considered merely as an allegation of an aggravating circumstance, and not as
one that qualifies the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Also, in Bartolome vs. People of the Philippines, despite the allegation that the accused public
officers committed the crime of falsification of official document by "taking advantage of their
official positions," this Court held that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case
because "[t]he information [did] not allege that there was an intimate connection between the
discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense."

Accordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with the
discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not of the Sandiganbayan as insisted by the petitioner.
Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its jurisdiction over cases involving violations of
R.A. 3019, as amended in R.A. 1379 because it only retains jurisdiction on cases enumerated in
subsection (a) when the public officers rank is classified as Grade “27” or higher. In the case at
bar, none of the PNP officers involved occupy a position classified as Grade “27” or higher.

Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which was already acquired before the
subsequent enactment of R.A. 7975 which limited the Sandiganbayan‟s jurisdiction to officers
whose rank is Grade“27” or higher. Jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent
legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the
case is finally terminated. Hence, cases already under the jurisdiction of the courts at the time of
the enactment of R.A. 7975 are only referred to the proper courts if trial has not yet begun at
that time.

DOCTRINE:

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the
result of evidence after trial. Lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with
the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court and not of the Sandiganbayan.

People vs Cawaling

July 28, 1998 G.R. No. 117970 Colama, Charles

KEYWORD: exclusive jurisdiction of Trial Courts; jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

FACTS:
Vicente Elisan and his elder brother Ronie Elisan, the victim, were drinking tuba at Kitchenette
of co-accused police officer Fontamillas in San Jose, Romblon. As they went home to their
sister’s house, policemen Fontamillas & Cajilo blocked their way, so the they ran towards the
ricefields. Mayor Cawaling of Municipality of San Jose, Romblon and the four (4) policemen,
namely, Cajilo, Fontamillas, Tumbagahan and delos Santos, and the mayor's brother-in-law, ran
towards them. Ronie Elisan rose up by kneeling and raising his two hands. All the six (6)
accused approached him with their flashlights and shot him
Mayor Cawaling contends that as town chief then empowered with supervisory authority over
the local police. He usually did this as routine since Romblon was then plagued with political
assassinations. As they passed on Kitchenette, they initially dismissing Ronnie Ilisan's
statement as hollow swagger of an intoxicated person, Cawaling and the two policemen
proceeded on their way. A few moments later, they heard a gunshot and shouting, "pulis,
tabang". When they finally reached, Policemen fired two warning shots in the air for Ronnie but
Ronnie responded by firing on them. At that instance, Policemen counter-fired at Ronnie Ilisan
hitting him.

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT

Finding the prosecution and their testimonies credible, the court convicted the accused. The
killing was qualified to murder because of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength (that absorbed treachery because the attack was not sudden).

Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction
over the criminal case. They insist that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had
jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the appellants, as they were public officers at the
time of the killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office.

ISSUE:
W/N the trial court correctly assumed its jurisdiction towards the case instead of
Sandiganbayan.

RULING:
Supreme Court do not agree to the contention of the appellants that Sandiganbayan shall
assumed the jurisdiction over the present case.
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the absence of
any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was
necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not the
Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
The jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and criminal cases was laid down in BP 129, the
relevant portion of which is quoted hereunder:
“Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter”

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of
the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the
case by any subsequent events. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, when: (1) there is
an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions
pending before its enactment. However, these were not applicable in the case at bar.

PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, lists two requisites that must concur before the
Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed
by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or higher than a fine
of six thousand pesos (P6,000)

Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide
whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when
the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case,
in which event the penalty is increased.

But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not
from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the
crime.

DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the absence of
any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was
necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not the
Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

Brocka vs Enrile

December 10, 1990 G.R. No. 69863-65 Melody dela Cruz

KEYWORD: prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to Sedition

FACTS:

Petitioners were arrested by elements of the Northern Police District following the forcible
and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by
the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged
with Illegal Assembly.

Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly
and for whom no bail was recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail of
P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent
petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held.

However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al.
remained in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Action (PDA)
allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985. Neither the original, duplicate original
nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them.

Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged with Inciting to Sedition without prior notice to
their counsel. The original information filed recommended no bail.

Consequently, they were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then
President F. E. Marcos.

Hence, this petition.

Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient
bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the second offense of
inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the same act of attending and
participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while there may be a complex
crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into
two offenses and filing two information therefor, further, that they will be placed in double
jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to Sedition may lawfully be
enjoined.

HELD:

YES. We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second
offense of inciting to sedition.

Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by
injunction, preliminary or final.
There are however exceptions, among which are:

a.To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

b.When necessary, for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or

multiplicity of actions;

c. When there is a pre judicial question in which is sub judice

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

f. When the double jeopardy is clearly apparent

G. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

I. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;

j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
the ground has been denied.

Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners.

We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of
criminal charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying
provisional release until such time that charges were filed, and where a sham preliminary
investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be
enjoined.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY

ENJOINED from proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

January 20, 2000 G.R. No. 109376 Faith Fredeluces

FACTS:
In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, petitioner Panfilo O. Domingo seeks to nullify the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to quash the information against him for
violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

PNB filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan against former President Ferdinand Marcos; Rodolfo
M. Cuenca, then president of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP); and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., former Deputy Presidential Assistant.

Domingo as past President of PNB, was subpoenaed, but the same was not served upon
petitioner since he was no longer connected with PNB. Without giving petitioner a chance to
seek a reconsideration/review of the resolution, Prosecutor Baldos filed directly with the
Sandiganbayan an information. The information alleged that petitioner, being the president of
PNB, while in the performance of his official functions and with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, conspired with his co-accused in giving favorable loan accommodations to CDCP by
facilitating the passage of PNB Board Resolution No. 144 which caused undue injury and
prejudice to PNB in the amount of US$ 29 Million. A petition for reinvestigation, treated as
motion for reconsideration, was filed by petition. The same was denied as well as his motion to
quash the information. The motion was grounded on prescription and that the facts alleged
therein did not constitute an offense.

Hence , the instant petition.

ISSUES:

W/N the information should be quashed.

W/N an injunction may be issued to restrain criminal procedure.

RULING: NO. NO.

As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the
information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should
be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted. In the case at bar, the facts alleged in the information constitute a
violation of RA 3019, so the motion to quash is without merit.

Domingo cannot validly claim that he was denied due process of law considering that one of the
principal reasons for the delay was precisely to afford him the opportunity to submit his
counter-affidavit since the first subpoena was returned unserved. The delay, if any, was actually
more beneficial, rather than prejudicial, to the petitioner in that it was intended to afford him the
opportunity to refute the charges made against him.
It is also worthy to note at this point the long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or
prohibition will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public
interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the
protection of society. The writ may issue only in specified cases, among which are to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and
to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. Such exceptions do not obtain in this
case.

Hernandez v Albano

January 25, 1967 G.R. No. L-19272 Ganados, Roldan

Facts:

A complaint lodged with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, by respondent Delfin Albano
against petitioner Jaime Hernandez, then the Secretary of Finance and Presiding Officer of the
Monetary Board of the Central Bank — for violation of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code,
Commonwealth Act 6261 or Republic Act 265. The complaint revolves around petitioner's
alleged shareholdings in the University of the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva
Caceres, DMG inc., and University of Nueva Caceres and the claim that said corporations
obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during
petitioner's incumbency as presiding officer thereof.

At the joint investigation of the foregoing charges before respondent Carlos C. Gonzales, the
investigating Fiscal, complainant moved to exclude therefrom the alleged violation of Article 216
of the Revised Penal Code because the applicability of this statute was in issue of Solidum, et
al. vs. Hernandez, L-16570, at the time pending before the Court, but which had since been
resolved by us — February 28, 1963 — adversely to Hernandez. Fiscal Gonzales granted the
motion.

Then, petitioner sought the dismissal of the remaining charges upon the averment that (a)
violation of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution, punishable under
Commonwealth Act 626, should be prosecuted at the domicile of the private enterprises affected
there by; and that (b) violation of Section 13 of Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature.
Dismissal was denied; reconsideration thereof failed.
To restrain the respondent Fiscals from continuing the investigation, petitioner went to the Court
of First Instance of Manila on certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction.

His claim is that — except for his holdings in Manila's University of the East — the Manila
Fiscals are powerless to investigate him. His reason is that the essence of the crime is his
possession of prohibited interests in corporations domiciled in Naga City (Rural Bank of Nueva
Caceres, University of Nueva Caceres and Bicol Electric Co.,) and in Mandaluyong, Rizal (DMG
Inc.); and that the place where the crime is to be prosecuted is "the situs of such shares."

Issue:

Whether the prosecuting arm of the City of Manila should be restrained from proceeding with
the investigation of the charges levelled against the petitioner.

Held:

No. By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants are empowered to
investigate crimes committed within the city's territorial jurisdiction. Not a mere privilege, it is the
sworn duty of a Fiscal to conduct an investigation of a criminal charge filed with his office. The
power to investigate postulates the other obligation on the part of the Fiscal to
investigate promptly and file the case of as speedily. Public interest — the protection of
society — so demands. Agreeably to the foregoing, a rule — now of long standing and
frequent application — was formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be
blocked by court prohibition or injunction. Really, if at every turn investigation of a crime will
be halted by a court order, the administration of criminal justice will meet with an undue setback.
Indeed, the investigative power of the Fiscal may suffer such a tremendous shrinkage that it
may end up in hollow sound rather than as a part and parcel of the machinery of criminal justice.

We are not to be understood, however, as saying that the heavy hand of a prosecutor may not
be shackled — under all circumstances. The rule is not an invariable one. Extreme cases
may, and actually do, exist where relief in equity may be availed of to stop a purported
enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of
justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional, or was "held invalid."

In the case at bar, the charges are not directed against the corporations. Not mere ownership of
or title to shares is involved. Possession of prohibited interests is but one of the essential
components of the offense. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that petitioner was
head of a department — Secretary of Finance. So also, the fact that while head of department
and chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested in the corporations
aforesaid which so the dollar allocations, and that he had to act officially, in his dual capacity, not
in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his office.

Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or an essential
ingredient thereof, took place, it stands to reason to say that the Manila under the facts obtained
here, have jurisdiction to investigate the violation complained of.