REsponse to Oil Spills

JAPAN P& I CLUB Vol.
52 November 2021
P&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

The Japan Ship Owners’Mutual Protection & Indemnity Association Loss Prevention and Ship Inspection Department
Response to
Oil Spills
Contents
§1 Introduction 2
§2 Countermeasures for Maritime Accidents 3
2‒1 C
ountermeasures for Maritime Accidents (For Each Maritime Accident
Including Those Between Ship and Shore)… …………………………………… 3
2-2 Immediate Launch of Land Support Team… …………………………………… 7
§3 Oil Spill Response 12
3-1 Oil Spill Progression Timeline…………………………………………………… 13
3-2 Oil Spill Spreading Factor………………………………………………………… 19
3‒3 Spreading Preventive Measures………………………………………………… 21
3‒4 Classification of Oil Spills………………………………………………………… 25
3‒5 Oil Types…………………………………………………………………………… 26
3‒6 Oil Recovery Materials…………………………………………………………… 29
3-7 Oil Treatment Agents……………………………………………………………… 33
3‒8 Oil Spill Response………………………………………………………………… 36
3‒9 Oil Spill from a Vessel with a Hole Rupture…………………………………… 40

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§4 Case Study of Oil Spillage Accidents 41

4‒1 Oceangoing Vessel Case………………………………………………………… 41
4‒1‒1 Accident Overview……………………………………………………………… 41
4‒1‒2 Accident Treatment Expense… ……………………………………………… 42
4‒1‒3 What Caused the Accident?… ……………………………………………… 44
4‒1‒4 Accident Cause………………………………………………………………… 48
4‒1‒5 Recurrence Preventive Measures… ………………………………………… 55
4‒2 Coastal Vessel Cases… ………………………………………………………… 58
4‒2‒1 Accident Overview……………………………………………………………… 58
4‒2‒2 Accident Treatment Expense………………………………………………… 59
4‒2‒3 Extent of Damage……………………………………………………………… 60
4‒2‒4 What Caused the Accident?… ……………………………………………… 61
4‒2‒5 Accident Cause………………………………………………………………… 65
4‒2‒6 Recurrence Preventive Measures… ………………………………………… 69
§5 Conclusion 72
References… …………………………………………………………………………… 74
Acknowledgement of Provided References and Materials… ……………………… 74
P.40 Answer to Quiz… ………………………………………………………………… 75

Attachment 1: Oil Recovery Procedure by Oil Type………………………………… 81
Attachment 2: Flowchart of Oil Spill Response (Example) … …………………… 82
Attachment 3: R
esponse Framework to Major Oil Pollution Incidents in Japan
(Organisation Chart)… ……………………………………………… 83
Attachment 4： Oil Spill Report Form: Sample… …………………………………… 84
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§1 Introduction
Image 1 : Imange of Oil Spill Accident
When it comes to oil spills, certain readers may remember the M/V Exxon Valdez incident
which occurred in Alaska. On 23 March 1989, the M/V Exxon Valdez grounded in Alaska,
North America, spilling 10.8 million gallons (approximately 41,000 KL) of crude oil. It is
considered to be one of the largest human-induced environmental incidents to have ever
occurred at sea.
Since then, tankers have been regulated with dedicated ballast tanks and double bottoms,
and the number of spills of loaded oil have been greatly reduced. However, we receive
reports of oil spills every year, and the number of oil spillage accidents show no sign of
significant decline. In this guide we will discuss the prevention of oil spills and how to
deal with them appropriately.
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§2 Countermeasures for Maritime

Accidents
2-1 Countermeasures for Maritime Accidents

(For Each Maritime Accident Including Those Between
Ship and Shore)
The following is a summary of the common responses to all maritime accidents and not
just oil spills. It goes without saying that it is important to do everything possible to pre-
vent maritime accidents from occurring. However, in the unfortunate event of a maritime
accident, the following two factors can have a significant impact on the safety of the crew,
cargo and the hull of the vessel, as well as the expenses involved in dealing with the acci-
dent.
Image 2: Oil Spill Due to Collision
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● Suitability of initial measures

● Skilful handling of the accident afterwards
The main difference between a maritime accident and a road traffic accident or a fire ac-
cident on land is that on land, the relevant people can arrive on the site immediately,
whereas with a maritime accident, the Vessel (Master) has to take care of the situation and
avoid any detriment to the shipowner from the moment of the accident until the assistance
of the company's Land Support Team, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and private organisa-
tions have been arranged.
However, in the event of a major accident, such as a collision, fire or oil spillage accident,
the Vessel may be in a state of confusion, and most probably very busy dealing with the
immediate aftermath of the accident. In such cases, it is often difficult for the Vessel to
keep a record of the situation and the details that need to be ascertained in order to ensure
the smooth processing of the accident.
In addition, with today's communication methods such as email and Inmarsat, communi-
cation between ship and shore is much faster than in the past. However, if the Supporting
Team on Land (department) has to contact the Vessel repeatedly in order to obtain infor-
mation on the situation, this may not only result in inaccurate information, but may also
cause further confusion between the Vessel and the department on land.
In the immediate aftermath of a maritime accident, the Master, Chief Engineer (C/E),
Navigation Officer, Engineer and Supporting Team on Land are all in a state of turmoil.
The initial response is of the utmost importance in order to minimise the damage and fa-
cilitate the subsequent smooth processing of the accident. In order to achieve this, the
Vessel conducts regular drills on board to simulate various accidents, and an emergency
support response team is also formed on shore for joint training between ship and shore.
However, as mentioned above, when a lot of information is exchanged between ship and
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shore via Inmarsat, there are often cases that information does not get conveyed accurate-
ly due to mutual misunderstandings and assumptions.
In order to avoid this, each company has its own ISM code and SMS manual (Safety
Management System), which specify how to deal with each type of maritime accident.
It is essential that these trainings and the procedure manuals that have been so carefully
created get to be utilized in accordance with the procedures. In other words, in order to
avoid wasting time when checking the situation between ship and shore, it is necessary to
establish in advance an efficient way of dealing with accidents, for example by using
checklists and other forms such as reports. This is a good opportunity to review the rele-
vant parts of the Safety Management System. Key points to be reviewed are as follows:
① Review of check list and reports
In order to eliminate redundant work and to communicate with an accurate and efficient
exchange of information, it will be recommended to set up a report form based system
between ship and shore by each type of accident. Using checklists and other documents
as reports can be an option.
② The following should be noted when reporting to government

authorities
▶ Report all actual facts concisely.

▶ Do not report unconfirmed, speculative or extraneous information, or declare
that the information is inaccurate.
▶ If you have to report about something uncertain, use flexible vocabulary such
as "approximately" or "about" (this makes it easier to correct the report if you
get more accurate information later).
▶ It can be easy to make changes to your report while bearing government au-
thorities in mind, however, even if you do not intend to do so, you are not al-
lowed to report on anything that deliberately distorts or underestimates the
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facts. It is important to remember that misrepresentation of the facts “brings

nothing but harm”.
③ Paperwork to be done later
When an accident occurs, a number of document exchanges between ship and shore
take place. Also, in the event of reviewing the original paper by picking it out from
the accumulated papers to check with the contents of a previously sent document, as
a result, the order of the documents is often lost or confused at a later date. In order
to avoid this situation, the following are recommendable.
▶ Be sure to add the date and time on all incoming and outgoing documents (pref-
erably with a reference number).
▶ The original documents are to be accumulated in separate received/outgoing
document boxes and sorted later.
In the case that you need a document that has already been sent for any reason,
make a photocopy of it on the spot and return it immediately to its original place.
Do not add notes to the original document as an afterthought. In the case that
additionally revised documents are to be added to accumulated docs, a new re-
vised date and time and reference number are to be added for them to be accumu-
lated in the original document box.
Accumulated docs
To be photocopied Date and time

/Ref.
Date and time
/Ref.
COPY
In the case that additionally

revised documents are to be
added to accumulated docs,
Original received docs / a new revised date and ref.
copies (inc. outgoing) number are to be added.
Figure 1: Document Storage Box
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2-2 Immediate Launch of Land Support Team
Once you have received "contact regarding the occurrence of an accident, in the first in-
stance", you need to launch an emergency support response team (the Land Support
Team) promptly. Records (time, actions, who did it, etc.) will also start from that point.
The launching of the Land Support Team will have been developed in accordance with the
Safety Management System of each company. In the case of launching the Land Support
Team, the main points to be considered are as follows:
① Notification to coastal nation authorities
▶ When receiving contact in the first instance, it is to be confirmed as to whether

the report originates from the Vessel or from the supporting team on land. If the
Vessel has already reported the accident, confirm the details of the report (to
whom, when and by what means).
▶ According to the above, in the event of a report being made by the Vessel, the
Land Support Team should instruct the Vessel as to the "nature of the report, to
whom it is being reported, and by what method, etc.". It will be better to avoid
using VHF radio communications, if possible.
② Notifying the insurance company（Hull & Machinery Insurance and P&I

Insurance)
In most cases, it is a telephone call from the Vessel to the Superintendent (SI) in the first
instance. Afterwards, the party on land will convene the supporting team, which may take
some time to assemble if it is during a day off or at night. In the meantime, the Vessel uses
an emergency checklist to begin assessing the situation and collecting information. Once
the checklist is available, Hull & Machinery Insurance and P&I Insurance may be con-
tacted.
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Hull & Machinery Insurance and P&I Insurance have information on various past cases,
so we believe that it is better to consult with them directly.
The items of the checklist above should cover what you are going to confirm, but make
sure it includes the following points:
▶ Date, time and point accident occurs
▶ Accident type
▶ The status and situation of the other ship, if any
▶ Possibility of accident involving people
③ Nominating the Shipowner’s agency
Nominating a local Shipowner's agency at the earliest possible opportunity will help to
facilitate any further arrangements. If possible, it is advisable to have the charterer's agent
act as the Shipowner's agent. If different agents are selected, there is a possibility of infor-
mation between them being confused. In particular, depending on the type of operation,
because fuel oil is the property of the charterer, close communication is desirable.
Also, as soon as possible, two representatives from the shipowner or ship management
company should be sent to the Vessel: one should be stationed at the ship's agent to act as
a liaison officer, while the other attend the ship.
④ Arrangement of various surveyors
The appointment of a third party is necessary as disputes are likely to arise at a later date
over the extent of the damage, the cost of ship repairs, the extent of the damage caused by
the oil spill or the burden of responsibility. It should be noted that the term "surveyor" can
be used to refer to any of the following types of surveyor:
（1） Hull Damage: arrangement via Hull & Machinery Insurance
（2） Response to Cargo Damage or Oil Pollution: arrangement via P&I Insurance
（3） Classification Survey (not required if there is no problem with performance
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capability): arrangement via shipowner or ship management company

（4） Under Water Inspection Survey, if necessary: arrangement via Hull & Machin-
ery Insurance.
This is needed in case of damage below the surface of the hull.
（5）Joint Survey
In the event of a damage accident, the interests of both parties involved in the
accident and the victim are represented in a joint survey arrangement as de-
scribed above.
In this case, a surveyor arranged by both parties may attend the site and mutu-
ally check the extent of the damage (width and depth).
Hull & Machinery Insurance and P&I Insurance are familiar with this type of survey ar-
rangement. If in any doubt utilize the insurance companies to make the arrangements.
⑤ Notify Vessel of arrangement status
Following an accident, a number of interested parties and the media visit the Vessel. In
some cases, the personnel on duty at the time of the accident, including the Master, may
be interviewed in the offices of the authorities.
It is necessary to inform the vessel of the progress of the arrangements, the list of visitors
and know how to deal with them in order to not be at a disadvantage in the aftermath.
The Vessel will verify the identity of the visitor and the purpose for which he or she has
come on board, and will decide if the candidate is to be allowed to get on board to inves-
tigate the damage and answer questions. However, there is a limit to what the Master can
do on his own, so as mentioned above, it is advisable to have a member of the Supporting
Team on Land (e.g. SI) on board as soon as possible.
In addition, the Master needs to inform the crew members that the Master (or SI) is the
only person who can respond to them, and that the rest of the crew members should not
tell anyone what is going on. A brief summary of these is shown in Figure 2.
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Supporting Team on Land The Vessel The Vessel
Create a list of Check the visitor’s Visitors not on the list

visitors and report identification are not allowed on
board, except for
it to the vessel at the gangway government authorities
Figure 2: Managing Visitors on Board
Particularly, the following must be thoroughly taken into account:
① Response to government authorities
Respond immediately. Crew members other than the Master will also be inter-
viewed, the findings of which are to be reported to the Supporting Team on Land.
② Response to Vessel's related parties
To be fully cooperative with any investigation by the Vessel's officials, including the
Attorney, Surveyor and P&I and Hull Insurance representatives.
③ Response to other parties related to the Vessel
If there is a request for disclosure of records, consult with the company or insurer to
decide how to respond, rather than relying on the captain's judgment. If forced to do
so (permission granted), only show the situation. Do not give any comments or
opinions (especially disapproving ones).
④ Letter of Guarantee or Letter of Undertaking
If there is a need for a submission, prepare in consultation with the insurance com-
pany.
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⑤ Preparation of a sea [marine] protest and confirmation and

instructions to be included in the Log Book
▶ The sea [marine] protest and the Log Book are understood to be irrevocable
oaths. It must be carefully prepared and completed, fully recognising the impor-
tance of documentary evidence.
▶ The contents of the Chief Engineer's Log Book, Bell Book and checklists should
be consistent. Only main points should be recorded in the Log Book.
Naturally, false statements are strictly prohibited. This may have irreversible
consequences. It is also recommendable to have a lawyer prepare a draft via the
insurance company.
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§3 Oil Spill Response
In Chapter 2, “2-1 Countermeasures for Maritime Accidents”, it was explained that an

accurate record be kept of the “situation and the details that need to be ascertained” and
that “the initial response is of the utmost importance”. In particular, in the event of an oil
spillage accident occurring, the following issues should be considered when assessing the
situation.
① Type and property of oil spill
② T he location of the spill (e.g. from a hull hole rupture or

deck overflow) and the condition of the spilt site (e.g. the
surrounding environment, particularly in fishing facilities
where the impact of marine contamination is significant)
③ Oil spill spread
④ Amount of oil spill spread
By assessing the situation and conditions as quickly as possible, a response is decided

upon and removal measures implemented on site. In particular, some types of oil spill can
produce toxic gases which can be harmful to residents of a coastal area. In the event of
such types of oil spill, it may be necessary to give priority to oil removal measures, in-
cluding the evacuation of the area, if necessary, in order to control the oil spill.
When an oil spill occurs at sea, it is almost impossible to take measures to control it using
only the removal and recovery materials equipped on a vessel. Therefore, in order to pre-
vent spreading, it is also advisable to request the assistance of an organisation specialising
in removal operations which will help minimise damage and loss. This chapter describes
the four situations that need to be identified.
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3-1 Oil Spill Progression Timeline
Most spilled oil will naturally dissipate either through evaporation, dissolution or disper-
sion. However, some oils will evaporate within a few hours like gasolene, whereas others
like light and medium crude oil can take 2-10 days to dissipate from the surface of the sea.
Although other oils like the C-type heavy oil used as fuel for ships or crude oils with a
high wax content can remain on the sea surface for many hours, they also naturally dissi-
pate after some time.
＝ Natural Processes ＝
Figure 15 illustrates natural processes. Any oil type can be reduced to its natural form
over time by natural processes.
Evaporation
Oil
Spreading & drifting
Water-in-oil
Sea emulsification
Water-in-oil
emulsification
Dissolution Oil-in-water
dispersion
Oil-in-water emulsion
Water-in-oil emulsion
Sedimentation
Biodegradation Photo-
oxidation
Figure 3: Oil Spill Progression Timeline

“Umi” & “Nagisa” Foundation
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① Spreading
From the outset of any spill, it is vital to fully understand the spreading process. The driv-
ing force for this initial flow is the weight of the oil. A large volume of oil spilling instan-
taneously will spread much more rapidly than a slow spill.
In the initial stage, oil spreads in one large flow, however the speed of that flow depends
on the viscosity of the oil. High viscosity oils will spread slowly, whereas an oil spill
which is below pour point temperature (Note 1) will hardly spread at all. However, the
initial flow will begin to break up after a few hours and start to form narrow bands accord-
ing to the forces of the wind and tide.
Note 1: Pour point:
The pouring point of oil is measured in ℃. Pour point represents the temperature below
which oil ceases to flow, rather it takes on the fundamental properties of a solid.
② Evaporation
The rate of evaporation and the speed at which it occurs depend upon the volatility of the
oil. Oils with a low boiling point such as gasolene or kerosene will evaporate quickly and
will have often entirely evaporated after only a few hours. On the other hand, oils with a
high boiling point such as heavy crude oil or C-type heavy oil evaporate very little if at
all.
As the surface area of the slick increases, the light compounds of the oil will rapidly evap-
orate. The rate and size of initial spreading directly effect the amount of evaporation.
Furthermore, when highly volatile oils like gasolene (boiling point 35~180℃, flash point
-40℃) spread in an enclosed sea area, there is a risk of fire/explosion when the evaporat-
ed oil mixes with the air.
It is often possible to ignite large oil flows which have just begun to spread. However,
once the volatile compounds of the oil have evaporated the remaining slick is thin and
together with the cooling effect of the sea water, it becomes increasingly difficult to main-
tain any kind of combustion, even with the use of wicker material.
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③ Oil-in-water dispersion
Waves and turbulence at the sea surface can cause some or all of a slick to break up into
fragments and droplets of varying sizes. Some of the smaller droplets of oil will remain
suspended (like solid particles floating in a liquid) in the sea water while the larger ones
will tend to rise back to the surface and reform with any droplets which remained at the
surface. This reformed slick will then spread out to form a very thin film. The smaller
suspended droplets encourage other natural processes such as biodegradation (the break-
ing down of chemical compounds into inorganic compounds through the actions of bac-
teria, fungi and other life forms).
It is interesting to note that given enough time microplastics may also biodegrade, but the
process is extremely slow and they remain undegraded for a very long time causing a
marine pollution problem which has recently come under much scrutiny.
④ Water-in-oil emulsification
The term “emulsion” refers to a state in which two liquids, which normally don't mix (like
oil and water), become combined. For example, oil and vinegar, which normally don't
mix, can be temporarily combined after vigorous shaking. This state is referred to as
“emulsion”.
As the oil slick spreads over the sea, the film transforms from thick to thin and during this
time the various distilled fractions of petroleum gas and petrol (gasolene) evaporate. Fi-
nally, only the non-volatile compounds remain and these are buffeted by waves to form an
“emulsion”. This emulsion consists of the following two types.
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Oil-in-water emulsion Water-in-oil emulsion
Hydrophilic part
Hydrophobic part
Figure 4: Emulsion Diagram
i Oil in Water
Oil particles in water. It is reduced to seawater by digestion and oxidative decom-

position by bacteria.
ii Water in Oil
This is an oil containing water (seawater). When an emulsion is formed, the volume
increases by a factor of three or four times and the viscosity increases by several
stages. If the asphaltene content is especially high, it can lead to “Chocolate
Mousse”, a stable tar-like oil mass that is extremely difficult to process, or “Tar-
balls”, which can take years or even decades to break down. Therefore, removal
measures must be performed before the oil spill becomes an emulsion.
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Photograph 1: Emulsion (Chocolate Mousse)
Photograph 2: Emulsion (Tarball)
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Oil Spill Progression Timeline

0 Hours 1 10 100 1,000 10,000
Day Week Month Year
Evaporation
Dissolution
Photo-oxidation
Biodegradation
Sedimentation
Water-in-oil Unstable Stable

emulsification emulsion “mousse”
Oil-in-water
dispersion
Spreading
Figure 5: Oil Spill Progression Timeline (modified with data from the ITOPF)
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3-2 Oil Spill Spreading Factor
Spilt oil is spread by gravity (the weight of the oil) acting on the oil in the initial stage and
then by the surface tension of the oil. These spreads are short in duration and limited in
extent. In fact, however, it is affected by the following external forces, which cause it to
spread intermittently, forming long, narrow strips or masses of oil in an irregular shape
rather than a circle.
＝ External Forces: Spreading Factors ＝
① Wind
The floating oil spill is influenced by wind and leeway currents and is carried away by
weathering at a speed of approximately 3% of the wind speed.
② Ocean current
The strength (speed) and direction of the ocean current will carry it away.
③ Tidal current
When considering ocean currents, it is also necessary to take into account tidal currents.
④ Waves and Undulations (Swells)
As for spreading, the effects of waves and undulations (swells) are difficult to calculate,
but these facilitate the emulsification of oil.
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＝ Direction of Spilled Oil Flow: Vector Calculation ＝
Figure 6 is a method of measuring the direction and speed of spilled oil flow by vector
calculation.
Wind speed @ 20 knots

(approx. 10.2m/sec.)
3%
100%
Ocean current
(approx. 2 knots) (approx. 1.03m/sec.)
Figure 6: Direction and Speed of Spilled Oil Flow

(Document modified from the Marine Disaster Prevention Center (MDPC))
Using vectors, by calculating the data of the direction of flow of the ocean current (100%)
and the wind speed of the prevailing wind (3%), the direction and speed of the oil spill can
be determined.
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3-3 Spreading Preventive Measures
The best way to minimise the damage caused by an oil spillage accident is to prevent the
spread of the spilled oil. However, the Vessel has a limited supply of oil recovery materi-
als, which are unlikely to be able to contain the spread of an oil spill. Therefore, the
sooner oil recovery materials are made available, the less damage and loss is likely to
occur. ITOPF has seven resource bases in Japan. (See Figure 7.）
Domestic resource bases established by Infrastructure

(tentative translation) and Oil Spill Response Department,
Petroleum Association of Japan
No. 5-branch, Wakkanai

(Wakkanai, Hokkaido)
No. 5, Hokkaido
(Muroran, Hokkaido)
No. 4, Sea of Japan
(Niigata, Niigata)
No.1, Tokyo Bay

Storage status of the resource bases in Japan:
(Ichihara, Chiba)
The Japan Association of Marine Safety (JAMS)
Journal (2017 Spring Edition No. 572)
No. 2, Seto Inland Sea

(Kurashiki, Okayama)
No. 3, Ise Bay No. 6, Okinawa

(Yokkaichi, Mie) (Uruma, Okinawa)
Figure 7: Bases of Petroleum Association of Japan (Partly Modified with Data from the ITOPF)
The MDPC has also set up resource bases in various parts of Japan. (See Figure 8.) The
roles and activities of the MDPC are as follows: (Taken from the MDPC homepage.)
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1. Purpose
In conjunction with the implementation of countermeasures to deal with the outbreak of
maritime disasters and the containment of any escalation thereof (hereinafter collectively
referred to as “maritime disaster prevention”), the MDPC also provides the necessary
vessels, equipment and materials for such eventualities as well as the organisation of any
necessary training programmes. Through international cooperation on maritime disaster
prevention, the MDPC aims to contribute to the protection of human life and property.
2. Activities
(1) Implementation of measures to clean up any oil spills and recovery of any costs in-
curred therein, in accordance with directives from the Japan Coast Guard Comman-
dant.
(2) Implementation of measures to clean up any oil spills, extinguish fires and/or prevent
the spread of fire or any other maritime disaster, on behalf of shipowners or any other
party.
(3) Ensuring that oil recovery vessels, oil recovery equipment, oil booms etc., or any oth-
er vessels or equipment deemed necessary to prevent a maritime disaster are made
available to shipowners or any other party.
(4) Provision of the training required to implement maritime disaster prevention measures.
(5) Ensuring that the results of any research into the equipment, materials, and skills re-
quired for maritime disaster prevention are made available to shipowners or any other
party.
(6) Gathering, collating and ensuring that any relevant information pertaining to maritime
disaster prevention is made available.
(7) Provision of advice and guidance on maritime disaster prevention on behalf of ship-
owners or any other party.
(8) Provision of advice and guidance on maritime disaster prevention in overseas coun-
tries. Provision of maritime disaster prevention training to overseas trainees, and con-
tribution to international cooperation on maritime disaster prevention.
(9) Manufacturing and retail of the materials and equipment necessary for maritime disas-
ter prevention, publication and retail of printed material regarding maritime disaster
prevention, and conduction of any other incidental business arising from the previous-
ly mentioned activities above.
(10) Any of the previously mentioned activities above apply in a similar fashion to rivers,
lakes etc.
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MDPC's Accident Response System and Base Map of Materials,

Equipment and Experts for Maritime Disaster Prevention (2021 FY)
In addition to the three bases such as the Headquarters (Yokohama), West Japan Branch
(Kobe) and Kyushu Branch (Kitakyushu), five representative offices have been established in
Tomakomai, Chiba, Yokkaichi, Mizushima and Iwakuni to ensure the efficient and effective
implementation of standby operations during normal times, and to establish a rapid and
accurate accident response system on a nationwide scale by utilizing the contractual disaster
prevention system (tentative translation).
● Contractual disaster prevention measures ● Organization ● MDPC Training

(implemented by 166 companies) ・Headquarters (Yokohama) Department
・West Japan Branch (Kobe) Training Department
● Base for materials, equipment and experts for
・Kyushu Branch (Kitakyushu) in Yokosuka
maritime disaster prevention in designated
・Representative offices in
areas (44 bases) (HNS (Hazardous Noxious
Tomakomai, Chiba, Yokkaichi,
Substance) response: 32 bases out of the above) Mizushima and Iwakuni
Deployment of oil recovery equipment etc.

Oil prevention and degreasing materials and equipment for oil discharge
HNS equipment
Assignment of HNS disaster prevention experts
MDPC Disaster Response Depots Wakkanai
(Kawasaki, Sakaisenboku and Kitakyushu)
MDSS Implementation Districts (26)

(Remarks: "Keihin region" consists of Yokohama and Kawasaki,
Tomakomai
and Imabari and Matsuyama are one area)
Training Department (Yokosuka) Muroran

Hakodate
Head office West Japan branch (Kobe)
(Yokohama) Mutsuogawara
Kyushu branch (Kitakyushu) Hachinohe
Akita Kuji
Iwakuni Fushikitoyama
★West of Japan
Kobe Niigata
Tokuyama
★Kyushu Branch
Mizushima Fukui Sendai
Kitakyushu Ube
Himeji
Osaka Onahama
Kitakyushu Kashima
Fuku
yama Kawasaki
Sasebo Hakata
Kamigoto Irago Chiba(N)/(S)

Nagasaki
Wakayama Yokosuka
Imabari Shimizu
Kushikino Oita Sakaide ★MPDC Hd Qyarter
Kiire Yokkaichi Nagoya
Matsuyama
Okinawa
Kagoshima
Figure 8: MDPC’s Base Map (From MDPC Website)
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Following an oil spill and on behalf of a Shipowner or any other party acting as the prin-
cipal polluter, the Maritime Disaster Prevention Center (MDPC) will respond to any mar-
itime accident.
Marine Pollution and Marine Disaster Prevention law requires that owners of tankers
which have a gross tonnage in excess of 150 tonnes, which are navigating through appli-
cable sea areas (*1), and are carrying specified oils such as crude oil or heavy oil, should
have secured availability of specialised oil removal materials (oil booms, oil absorbents,
oil dispersants etc.). The same law also requires that owners of specified oil tankers with
a gross tonnage in excess of 5,000 tonnes which are navigating through specified sea areas
(*2) have also secured the availability of oil recovery equipment. Furthermore, there are
similar legal obligations for tankers with a gross tonnage in excess of 150 tonnes and
which are carrying oil other than specified oil or hazardous and noxious substances
(HNS), to similarly secure availability of oil removal equipment and personnel with the
necessary expertise. On behalf of the shipowner, the MDPC issues certification (HNS
Certificate and Specified Oil Certificate) to legally verify that vessels have secured avail-
ability of the proper oil removal equipment. The certification further guarantees that in the
event of any oil or HNS spillage and upon request from the shipowner or ship's Master,
the MDPC will provide an “Emergency Response Service” which will respond swiftly to
clean up the contaminated area.
However, vessels without the proper certification or any other separate standby agreement
with the MDPC, must first conclude a separate contract before any response can be made.
*1: Applicable sea area refers to specified sea areas, any port falling under the Act on Port Regulations,
and Kagoshima Bay. (Pertaining to sections (6) and (9) of Article 33 of the ordinance for enforce-
ment, and sections (3) and (4) of Article 39 of the Marine Pollution and Disaster Prevention Law.)
*2: Specified sea areas refers to Tokyo Bay, Ise Bay and the Seto Inland Sea. (Pertaining to sections (6)
and (9) of Article 33 of the ordinance for enforcement, and sections (3) and (4) of Article 39 of the
Marine Pollution and Disaster Prevention Law.)
Whilst there are other private oil recovery services available, there have been cases of oil
spill incidents where valuable time has been lost in making the decision about which oil
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recovery operator to choose. Time which has led to the spreading of the spill and an esca-
lation of the scale of the disaster. Costs are imperative in any recovery operation, and
prompt decision making use of the nearest available recovery agency or operator can ul-
timately lead to a reduction of those costs.
3-4 Classification of Oil Spills
Oil spills from a vessel can be classified as shown in Figure 9. These are roughly catego-
rized into two classifications: “cargo oil spills” from tankers and “fuel oil, lubricants and
sludge spills” from all vessels including tankers.
Collision and
grounding, etc.
Spillage due to
damage in cargo
Cracks due to
holds Spills following
age deterioration,
tank ballasting
etc.
Tanker Cargo oil spills
Mishandling or
equipment failure
Spillage of contaminated
water due to cargo hold cleaning
Illegal discharge
Oil spill from vessel
Damage to fuel and lubricating

oil tanks due to collision, grounding, etc.
Spillage of fuel or
lubricating oil
Spillage during Mishandling or
All vessels bunkering equipment failure
including
tankers
Mishandling or equipment failure
Sludge spill
Illegal discharge
Figure 9: Classification of Oil Spills
25
Secondary disasters such as collisions and groundings can result in spills of fuel or cargo
oil, but the majority of accidents involve spills of fuel or lubricating oil due to operation-
al errors during bunkering.
3-5 Oil Types
Figure 10 illustrates oil types refined from crude oil.

Crude oil is divided by a method of separation and concentration of the mixture according
to its components, using the difference in boiling point. Crude oil is heated and separated
in a 50m high pressurised distillation column, where the lower boiling point substances
(gas, naphtha etc.) are extracted from the top fraction and the higher boiling point sub-
stances (heavy oil etc.) are extracted from the bottom. It then undergoes a secondary
treatment, including the removal of sulphur, to become a product.
Liquid Petroleum Gas (LP Gas) is refined first, followed by petrol and naphtha, jet fuel and
paraffin, light oil, and finally residual oil, heavy oil and asphalt. (Figure 10 and Table 1.)
Liquefied
Low
Petroleum Gas
(LPG)
30℃～180℃
Petrol
Naphtha
Viscosity
170℃～250℃
Jet fuel
Paraffin
240℃～350℃ Light oil 90％
Residual oil 10%
Light oil
A-type fuel oil
Heavy
More than 350℃
oil
Residual oil
Crude oil C-type fuel oil
High
・Heavy oil
・Asphalt Light oil 10%
Distillation equipment Residual oil 90%
Figure 10: Oil Types

Source: Official website of Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd.
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JAPAN P& I CLUB
Oil type Purpose Points to note and response methods
A-type fuel oil For vessels, factories, etc. When a light petroleum oil is spilled at sea, it evaporates
relatively quickly due to wind waves. However, in winter
Light oil For vessels and vehicles
and/or in port, the speed of evaporation is slower and
Paraffin Mainly for heating persistence is higher which requires early recovery.
Lubricants Engines, etc. As this almost never evaporates, the basic principle is to
surround it with string of flags-type oil absorbents which
Hydraulic oil Oil hydraulic equipment
are then wrung to recover the oil.
High viscosity index oil that hardly evaporates mixes with
Large vessels, factories, seawater to form an emulsion. This becomes hydrous
C-type fuel oil
thermal power plants, etc. and highly viscous, and expands to three times its volume
whereby it can be physically recovered.
For cars and sport fishing Highly flammable, evacuate and escape on the leeward
Petrol
boats side.
Refined in an oil refinery
Carried by large tankers. Be cautious as it is flammable
Crude oil Crude oil-fired thermal
and toxic depending on the oil type.
power plants
Table 1: Purpose by Oil Type

(Modified from the management manual from "Umi" & "Nagisa" Foundation)
The method of recovery in the event of a spill varies greatly depending on the oil types
and the location of the spill (in port or outside of port). These recovery methods are listed
in the table (Table 2). For a full list please see Attachment 1.
It is difficult to recover petrol and liquefied gas, which has a low boiling point temperature
and high volatility, because it takes a long time to evaporate, also, at the same time there
is the possibility of fire, explosion and toxic gases being generated which means that
evacuation measures must be taken to ensure that human life is not affected.
A-type fuel oil, which is used for marine fuel, has a low viscosity and therefore spreads to
form a thin oil film. Therefore, the recovery operation must be completed before the oil
spreads over a large area. On the other hand, the higher viscosity C-type fuel oil spreads
more slowly than A-type fuel oil, but is more highly likely to emulsify, making recovery
a longer process. To prevent this, the oil must be recovered before it has a chance to
spread.
27
Point
Preventive Necessary Damage
oil spill Oil type Procedure Remarks
objective materials expected
occurs
A-type fuel Recovery/ Oil fence boom and Port closure, spoilage Spreads to form a
A, B
oil spreading absorbent boom of water intakes, etc. thin oil film
Oil fence boom,
Use of absorbents
C-type fuel absorbent boom, Port closure, spoilage
Recovery A, B, C for high viscous oils,
oil and powerful of water intakes, etc.
emulsions
suction trucks
Use of absorbents
Oil fence boom and for high viscous
Emulsion Recovery A, B
absorbent boom oils, or snares (see
In port photograph)
Monitoring and Powder gelling Fire, explosions and Preventing the spread
Petrol
evacuation agent loss of life of secondary damage
Always consult an
Investigation
Instructions Powder gelling Differ depending on expert as treatment
Chemicals and
from expert agent type of chemical will vary depending
confirmation
on type
Liquefied Monitoring and Fire, explosions and
LNG and LPG
gas evacuation loss of life
Oil fence boom, Destruction of
A-type fuel Recovery/ absorbent boom, oil fisheries, tourism,
A, B, D
oil dispersion recovery vessels and and the natural
oil treatment agents environment
C-type fuel Recovery/ absorbent boom fisheries, tourism,
A, B, D
oil dispersion and oil treatment and the natural
agents environment
absorbent boom fisheries, tourism,
and oil recovery and the natural
system environment
Preventing the
Outside
Monitoring and Fire, explosions and spread of secondary
of port Petrol
evacuation loss of life damage, natural
evaporation
Destruction of fisheries,
Oil fence boom, oil
tourism, and the Initially there is a
Recovery/ recovery vessels
Crude oil A, B, D natural environment; crude gas hazard,
dispersion and oil recovery
fire, explosions and then emulsions form
system
loss of life
Always consult an
Investigation
Instructions Differ depending on expert as treatment
Chemicals and
from expert type of chemical will vary depending
confirmation
on type
Liquefied Monitoring and Fire, explosions and
LNG and LPG
gas evacuation loss of life
Procedure A
: In the case of large quantities, oil is to be recovered with oil fence booms and then recovered by an oil recovery vessel or
powerful suction trucks, etc. Or, the oil can be absorbed using an oil absorbent. For small quantities, use oil absorbent.
B
: For small quantities, the oil is to be surrounded by an absorbent boom (oil fence, string of flags-type, rolls, etc.) and
then wrung and recovered by suction.
C: In the case of large quantities, oil is to be collected with oil fence booms and then recovered by powerful suction trucks.
D: Direct spraying and dispersal with oil treatment agents (for vessel and aircraft).
Table 2: Oil Recovery Procedure by Oil Type

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3-6 Oil Recovery Materials
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism has deployed Water Surface
Cleaning and Oil Recovery Vessels etc. to Regional Development Bureaus, and some
private companies and organisations also have these oil recovery vessels. However, these
vessels are usually engaged in dredging operations and it is difficult for them rush to the
site immediately when an oil spill occurs.
Photograph 3: W
ater Surface Cleaning and Oil Recovery Vessel, Beikurin (Bay-clean)
Source: website of the Chiba Port Office, Regional Development Bureau,
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Therefore, in the immediate aftermath of an oil spill, it is essential to control the spread of
the spill as soon as possible and to begin recovery operations. However, this can only be
done by human intervention.
Here are some of the materials that can be used for this purpose.
29
= Oil Snare =
The literal translation of Oil Snare is “Oil Trap”. The Oil Snare is an oil recovery materi-
al developed by Parker Systems in Virginia, USA specifically for high viscosity oil. Due
to the unique shape of the oil adsorbent, oil gets trapped inside its thin looped tassels,
which can capture the high viscosity of C-type fuel oil that cannot be recovered by other
conventional oil adsorbents. For the past 25 years, it has been utilized in major tanker
spills around the world and is highly regarded as an essential oil recovery material for the
recovery of high-viscosity oil. An oil Snare is also used by the Japan Coast Guard in their
“Oil Removal Contingency Programme”. (Tentative translation). A 15m long rope with
30 oil snares, shipped in a plastic bag, each oil snare weighs 230 grams and can trap up to
14kg of oil. It is made of polypropylene and can be incinerated after use.
Photograph 4: Oil Snare

Source: Website of Anandenki Co., Ltd.
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JAPAN P& I CLUB
＝ Oil Absorbent Pad ＝
In the field, it is necessary to choose the oil removal equipment appropriate for the oil
spill. For less viscous oils such as A-type fuel, the use of oil absorbents such as oil absor-
bent pads (hereinafter referred to as mats) can be effective. These mats are manufactured
from polypropylene and vegetable fibres, the performance of which is defined by type
approval, but the use of materials without type approval is not an issue and the use of
non-approved materials is permitted. It absorbs more oil than water.
Photograph 5: Oil Absorbent Mat Photograph 6: Oil Absorbent Mat Usage Example
Source: Website of Mitsui Chemicals, Inc.
Photograph 7: Oil Absorbent Roll Image 3: Oil Absorbent Roll

(Modified from Documents Created by
“Umi” & “Nagisa” Foundation)
31
＝ Oil Fence Boom ＝
An oil fence is a floating structure, also known as a boom, which is stretched over a body
of water to prevent oil from spreading in the event of a spillage. Except for special types
such as “floating” oil fence booms, they are standardised so that they can be connected to
oil fence booms of different manufacturers; there are two types in the Japanese standard:
Type A and Type B. This material is used to control the spread of spilled oil and their main
purpose is to collect, attract, enclose and prevent oil spread. It is not used as a stand-alone
product, but in conjunction with materials and machinery to recover the oil. This is possi-
ble when the sea is calm, but if the wind, ocean current or waves exceed a certain limit,
the oil can leak from the bottom or spill over the top and become uncontrollable.
Photograph 8: Oil Fence Boom Extension in Use

(From a Manual Created by “Umi” & “Nagisa” Foundation)
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JAPAN P& I CLUB
Extension rope
Anchor buoy Workboat

Engineer
Oil
Anchor
Oil absorbent
Figure 11: Oil Fence Boom Extension in Use
3-7 Oil Treatment Agents
An oil treatment agent is defined as a substance which when sprayed onto and mixed into
floating oil at the sea surface, will cause the oil to rapidly emulsify and disperse into fine
particles. This ultimately results in preventing the oil from sinking to the seabed, and en-
ables the sea to naturally attenuate more easily. Furthermore, such agents also have a low
toxicity towards marine life.
Previously, such agents were mistakenly referred to as “neutralizing agents” which
wrongly suggested that they somehow chemically transformed the oil into a different
substance.
However, as the opening definition states, oil treatment agents are rather chemical agents
which atomize the oil, dispersing it over the nearby sea surface. This increases the surface
area and encourages natural attenuation through the actions of microorganisms and oxy-
gen. The effect of this atomization also means that the oil does not sink, and both the
33
level of toxicity to which coastal and marine life is exposed and the amount of oiling
damage to seabirds can be contained. (Taken from the Fire and Disaster Management
Agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications webstie.) Oil treatment
agents do not make the oil disappear, nor do they neutralize and chemically transform the
oil into a different substance.
＝ Types of Oil Treatment Agents ＝
The two types of solvent are shown below. These solvents are further classified according
to their percentage content of surfactant. Thus, 10-15% content is referred to as low con-
centrate, 15-20% as medium concentrate, and 35-60% as high concentrate.
1) Hydrocarbon type
This includes both 1st and 2nd generation types. The 1st generation type is an aromatic
solvent of high toxicity. The 2nd generation type (Type 1) is paraffin-based. In terms of
surfactant content, the 2nd generation type ranges from a low to medium concentrate. It
is this 2nd generation type which is currently in commercial use in Japan.
2) Concentrated type (concentrate)
The concentrated type (Type 2) and self-mixing type (Type 3) are known as 3rd genera-
tion oil treatment agents. They are either alcohol or glycol based. These types contain a
high ratio of surfactant.
＝ Efficacy and Application Methods of Oil Treatment Agents ＝
When the viscosity of the oil slick is high, oil treatment agents have little effect since they
slip off the surface of the oil before the solvents can disperse within. As a general rule, the
agents remain effective on oils with a relative viscosity of less than 2,000cSt. However,
this effectiveness drastically reduces when that viscosity is exceeded, and within viscosi-
ty levels of 5,000 - 10,000cSt all efficacy is lost. In short, oil treatment agents are not
suitable for use with high viscosity emulsion oils or those oils with a pouring point in
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JAPAN P& I CLUB
excess of the ambient temperature. Furthermore, it may at first seem that the oil can be
dispersed at the outset of the spill, however the volatile compounds quickly begin to evap-
orate and due to the effects of natural weathering, viscosity increases making any disper-
sion impossible within a short period of time.
Therefore, whilst the efficacy of any oil treatment agent also depends on the prevailing
weather and sea conditions, wherever possible it is best to apply these agents one or two
days before viscosity becomes high. The main methods of application are by a workboat
or aerial spraying by plane.
＝ Toxicity ＝
Compared to the 1st generation oil treatment agents, the toxicity of recent agents has de-
creased. However, there still remains much debate as to their method of use. Furthermore,
there is variation in local and national attitudes towards the use of oil treatment agents. In
particular, the use of oil treatment agents runs the risk of introducing new marine pollut-
ants into the sea, leading to an increase of localised hydrocarbon concentrations. The ef-
fect of this on marine life is a cause for concern. It is therefore vital that there is a consen-
sus of opinion between local authorities, fishery officials etc., regarding the use of any oil
treatment agents.
35
3-8 Oil Spill Response
Figure 12 is a flowchart of an oil spill response. (Please see Attached 2 for details)
Flowchart of Oil Spill Response (Example)
Oil spillage accident occurs
Department issues alert
Fire, explosion, personal injury/fatality or sinking
Confirm possibility of First response

Start recording
secondary disaster measures
Collision accident
Accident report notification
Other The
vessels Vessel
Confirmation Confirmation Shipowner and Japan Coast Guard

of rescue of rescue needs ship management (JCG) Navigation
(personal injury/fatality
needs
or hull damage)
company Safety Division
To be decided at the meeting as to whether the

Vessel or the company is to report the spill to the
Japan Coast Guard (Coast Guard department).
Decision on Various Collection and

Abandon
port of arrangements preservation
ship
evacuation of records
Paperwork and Contact P&I,

Dealing with
other instructions Hull Insurance
the news media
on the Vessel and relevant parties
Figure 12: Flowchart of Oil Spill Response (Example)
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JAPAN P& I CLUB
In the event of an overflow during bunkering, first of all, immediately stop
1
pumping oil from the supply vessel. Then, the Oil Removal Emergency
Department issues an alert. (Tentative translation.)
In accordance with the sharing roles of the Emergency Department, the
2
crew will start operation according to the Master's orders. Naturally, the
first priority is to check that there has been no injury to persons.
Start first response measures to stop overboard discharge. Looking at the oil
3
spill incidents reported to this Club, in some cases the scupper plugs were
not set and the oil spilled overboard from there. In other cases, there was a
failure to close or a loss of the spill combing plug in the vent pipe, which led
to an oil spill on deck and overboard via a scupper.
＝ Spill Prevention, Mitigation and Leak Closure Measures ＝
To follow are some of the initial emergency measures which aim to prevent and reduce
spills.
・ Decompression of the leaking tank and pipe
・ Closing of the relevant valves (and in some cases those for

gas biting), if necessary
・ In case of tank damage, transfer the remaining oil in the

leaking tank to another tank
・ Maintaining ship directional control by Ballast control
At the same time as the first response measures are taken, report the
4
accident to the Shipowner (or ship management company) and confirm
with the Shipowner (or ship management company) as to whether the
incident is to be reported to the authorities (the Regional Coast Guard
37
Headquarters in Japan) by the Vessel or by the Shipowner (or ship man-

agement company). Please note that it is important to remember that the
reporting of an accident is a battle with time so as to minimise the spread.
Moreover, the possibility of secondary disaster (fire, explosion, personal

5
injury/fatality or sinking) is to be confirmed. In the case of a collision, after
checking the status of the Vessel, the status of other ships should be
checked.
As mentioned in section 2-1 of Chapter 2, Countermeasures for Maritime

6
Accidents (For Each Maritime Accident Including Those Between Ship and
Shore), it is important to make an appointment with the local Shipowner's
agency, although the Shipowner (or ship-management company) is
responsible for arranging the recovery personnel.
Figure 13 shows the response framework of major oil pollution incidents in Japan (organ-
isation chart). (Modified with technical data from ITOPF: Please see Attached 3 for a full
list.)
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JAPAN P& I CLUB
Response Framework to
Major Oil Pollution Incidents in Japan (Organisation Chart)
Government
(Countermeasure headquarters)
Report Instructions
Report Japan Coast Guard Local coast

(JCG) guard office
Report and request for aid

Instructions
(No.1 duties)
Request and
Family of crew,
Interview
contract (No.2)
Marine Disaster Clean-up operation
News media, Prevention Center
Local authority, (MDPC)
Shipowners'
Association, Request for aid
etc. Rescue and
Request / disposal company
contract Request
for aid
Request for aid and towing
Shipowner and
ship management company Report and request, etc.
The Vessel
Report (Countermeasure headquarters
for maritime accidents) Instructions
Agency, Inspection
Contact Contact
Charterer and
Classification
Terminal Society
Contact
Repair
Contact
Hull & Machinery Investigation
Insurance
Contact Protection & Investigation

Indemnity Insurance
Contact and contract

Ship repair company
Request for inspection
Figure 13: Response Framework to Major Oil Pollution Incidents in Japan (Chart)
39
3-9 Oil Spill from a Vessel with a Hole Rupture
Pop quiz !
Ｑ
In the case of a collision accident etc., as shown in Figure 14,
and in the event of a hole rupture in any one part from ① to ④ ,
predict how much oil will be spilled. This is assuming no change in hull angle
inclination, trim or draft, and no effects from currents or waves. It is also
assumed that no fuel oil tank is actually connected to the double bottom and
tanks in the port and starboard sides.
① Hole rupture just above sea surface
② Hole rupture on sea surface
③ Hole rupture just below sea surface
④ Hole rupture to ship's bottom

Tanks are not arranged in this way in practice
Figure 14: Oil Spillage Differs According to Hole Rupture Location
As a hint of how to approach this, it may be helpful to distinguish between "instantaneous

oil spill", where the spilled oil flows out the moment the hole rupture occurs, and "contin-
uous oil spill", where the spilled oil flows out slowly afterwards. Answer can be found on
Page 75 .
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JAPAN P& I CLUB
§4 Case Study of Oil Spillage Accidents

Accident cases involving both oceangoing vessels and coastal vessels will be examined.
4-1 Oceangoing Vessel Case
＝ Date, Time and Point Accident Occurs ＝
Date and time accident occurs:

DD/MM/20YY
Point oil spill occurs: Unspecified
repair wet dock quay
Ship type: General cargo ship
approx. 19,000 G/T
Photograph 9: Hull Spoilage of Vessel After Accident
4-1-1 Accident Overview

The Vessel was in the process of bunkering when C-type fuel oil (HFO) spewed onto the deck
from the air ventilation of the Vessel's No.2 fuel tank, of which approximately 3 KL spilled
into the sea. Some of the oil spilled over the oil fence extended around the Vessel and spread
to the surroundings after the accident, causing damage to nearby bay and fishing facilities.
Photograph 10: Oil Slick Drifting in Coastal Areas Photograph 11: Damage to Fishing Facilities
41
4-1-2 Accident Treatment Expense

The following expenses have been incurred for accident treatment.
Oil spill recovery and clean-up expenses Approx. 129 million yen
Compensation for fisheries Approx. 46 million yen
Penalty（fine） Approx. 13 million yen
Attorney fee Approx. 20 million yen
Condition survey costs and others Approx. 7 million yen
Total approx. 215 million yen
Photograph 12: Fuel Oil Recovered from the Deck
Photograph 13: Photograph 14:

Recovery via Oil Adsorbent Recovery Work Using Oil Adsorbent
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Damage to Fishing Facilities 5 Days After Accident
DD/MM/20YY
Point accident occurs: 0.25km²
Dock yard quay
basin
500ｍ
Sea area shown in red (fishing facilities) Serious damage
Sea area shown in yellow (fishing facilities) Moderate damage
Sea area shown in green (fishing facilities) Unknown damage
Figure 15: Damage to Fishing Facilities 5 Days After Accident
Photograph 15: Fuel Oil Spilled on the Sea Photograph 16: Fuel Oil Washed Ashore against Seawall
43
4-1-3 What Caused the Accident?

The Vessel, had almost finished with dock repair work and was docked at the wet dock
quay. Scheduled to depart from dock on the evening of the 01.XX.20XX (Day 1), the
Vessel's bunkering plan was to receive 100 M/T of Low Sulphur Marine Gas Oil (LS-
MGO) into No.5 Center DO tank and 600 M/T of 380cSt C-type fuel oil into No.3 Center
and No.4 Center FO tanks as shown in Table 3.
Oil type Amount Receiving tank

LSMGO 100 M/T No.5C DO Tank
300 M/T No.3C FO Tank
HFO(380 cSt)
300 M/T No.4C FO Tank
Table 3: Planned Quantity for Bunkering
Table 4 illustrates the timeline of events leading up to the accident.
= Timeline of Events Leading up to the Accident =
Date Time Work undertaken
19:15 Bunker vessel B came alongside the Vessel. Briefing finished.
19:30 Connection of hose for bunkering A-type fuel oil
Started bunkering A-type fuel oil (LSMGO: Low Sulphur Marine Gas Oil)
20:30
Receiving tank: DO Tank No.5 C
Completed bunkering A-type fuel oil (LSMGO: Low Sulphur Marine Gas
Day 1 21:30
Oil)
Confirmed bunkered amount of A-type fuel oil

21:45
Disconnected A-type fuel oil hose and connected C-type fuel oil hose
C-type fuel oil (bunkering of 380 cSt started)

22:00
Receiving tank: FO Tank No.3 C
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JAPAN P& I CLUB
Chief Engineer: Emergency stop of oil supply ordered for Bunker vessel
01:25
B. Reported to Master.
01:30 Master: Issued alert to Oil Pollution Department
Master: Telephone called to SI, dock and agents to inform them of the oil
01:50
spill
Chief Engineer: Started transferring fuel oil from No.2C FO Tank to No.
Day 2 03:00
4C FO Tank
5 members of Marine Safety Agency (MSA) boarded to investigate
13:00 Instructed appointment of 2 SPROs
Then, the SPROs began recovering the spilled oil
Chief Engineer: Finished transferring fuel oil from No.2C FO tank to No.
15:00
4C FO tank
Day 3 PM Oil spill recovery and clean-up on deck completed
Table 4: Timeline of Events Leading up to the Accident
At approximately 19:15 on 01/MM/20YY, after a bunker barge (hereinafter referred to as

“barge”) came alongside the starboard side of the Vessel and a briefing with the Master of
the barge and confirmation of the amount of fuel that the barge was holding was finished,
at approximately 19:30, the connection of hose for bunkering was made, and from 20:30,
LSMGO (Low Sulphur Marine Gas Oil) 100 M/T started to be received into No.5C DO
tank. At 21:30, bunkering of LSMDO was completed. Later, at around 21:45, while the
amount of LSMGO received by the Vessel was confirmed the bunker hose was replaced
with one designed for 380cSt C-type fuel oil.
The original Bunkering Plan was to first bunker the No.3C FO tank with 300 M/T and
then accept the remaining 300 M/T into the No.4C FO tank.
At 22:00 C-type fuel oil started being bunkered at a slow rate of transfer to begin with.
After confirming that there were no leaks from the pipeline, the amount of oil transferred
was increased to around 130KT/h.
45
At approximately 01:25 on 02/MM/20YY, 3 hours and 25 minutes after the start of bun-
kering, Ordinary Seaman (OS) on deck patrol reported fuel oil leaking from the Air Vent
of No.2C FO Tank which was not to be bunkered.
The Chief Engineer immediately requested the barge to make an emergency stop of oil
supply and reported the oil leak to the Master who was in the captain’s cabin.
At approximately 01:30, the Master issued an alert to the Oil Pollution Department, and
at around 01:50, telephone called the Super Intendant (SI), the person in charge of the
Vessel at dock and agents to inform them of the oil spill.
After issuing an alert to the Oil Pollution Department, crew members started recovering
the fuel oil spilled on the deck and, simultaneously confirmed that it had spilled over-
board. Also, from approximately 03:00, because the No.2C FO tank was full, the C/E
started transferring a portion of the fuel oil from No.2C FO Tank to No. 4C FO Tank.
At approximately 13:00 on the same day, 5 members of the Marine Safety Agency (MSA
which is equivalent to the JCG or Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
in Japan) boarded. In addition to confirming the spill and commencing questioning of the
crew, two SPROs (Ship Pollution Response Organisations) were appointed to recover the
fuel oil spilled overboard and clean the seawall and fishing facilities.
On Day 3 PM, recovery and cleaning up of the fuel oil spilled on deck was completed, but
it took approximately one more month for the oil that had washed ashore and onto fishing
facilities to be completed.
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JAPAN P& I CLUB
＝ Estimated Amount of Overboard Discharge ＝
The fuel oil that spilled overboard was estimated to be approximately 3.0 KL; calculated
from the amount of residual oil before the start of bunkering, that of residual oil after the
stop of oil supply, that of overboard discharge recovered from the deck and the amount of
oil transfer declared by the barge. Please refer to Table 5 for details.
As bunkering started at 22:00 and the emergency stop was initiated 01:25, approximately
414.00 KL of fuel oil was pumped in the last 3 hours and 25 minutes. The estimated
pumping rate, calculated as a simple average without taking into account the slow pump-
ing rate immediately after start, was 121.17 m3/h. For the amount of spill, including the
spill on the deck, calculated in Table 5 is 44.00 m3 (column (C) of the table), divided by
the oil transfer speed, we obtain: no one noticed the spill for approximately 22 minutes,
after it had started through the air vent in tank No.2 C FO.
Estimation of Spillage
Unit: m3
Residual Oil Amount of Residual
Tank Extra Space Supply
FOT Amount before Oil after Pumping
Volume 1 - (BB)/(AA) Total
No. Bunkering Stoppage
(AA) % <(CC) － (BB)>
(BB) (CC)
2C 375.23 265.40 29.3% 329.37 63.97
3C 375.23 5.36 98.6% 251.02 245.66
4C 375.23 4.65 98.8% 65.02 60.37
Total 1,125.69 275.41 75.5% 645.41 (A) 370.00
Amount of oil transferred by bunker ship (B) 414.00
Total oil outflow <(B) - (A)> (C) 44.00
Amount of oil collected from the deck of the Vessel (approx.) (D) 4.00
Amount of oil spilled and recovered in the Vessel's ballast tanks (approx.) (E) 37.00
Amount of estimated overboard discharge <(C) - (D) - (E)> 3.00
Oil transfer speed (414.00 m3 ÷ 3 hours 25 mins.) 121.17 m3/h
Table 5: Calculation of Estimated Overboard Discharge
47
4-1-4 Accident Cause
＝ Direct Cause ＝
The direct cause was that the filling valve of the No.2C FO tank, which had not been
scheduled to be bunkered, was not “fully closed” for some reason, but was slightly open,
so that fuel from that tank entered the No.2C FO tank and overflowed through the air vent.
In addition, the direct cause of the fuel oil spill overboard was, as mentioned above, ac-
cording to calculations following the accident, a delay in noticing the spill from the air
ventilation (no one noticed it for 22 minutes after the start of the spill) and a failure to
make an emergency stop in time.
Photograph 17: No.2 C FO Tank Air Vent.
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＝ Why Was the“Receiving Tank Main Valve (Filling Valve)”of

No. 2C FO Tank Open When It Was Not to Be Refilled? ＝
According to the Chief Engineer of the vessel, the reason why No.2C FO Tank filling
valve was open was as follows.
・ After the last refill of No.2C FO tank, the filling valve was confirmed
as being closed.
・ The fuel warm-up steam pipeline equipped above the filling valve
of each fuel tank in the engine room was repaired, including the
installation of insulation, as dock work.
・ Under normal circumstances, a stepladder should be used to carry

out repairs. The pipe work was carried out using a stepladder
scaffolding, but the subsequent work of fitting the insulation only was
simple enough for a dock worker, who was not in charge of the pipe
work, who climbed over the Filling Valve of No.2 FO Tank by putting
his foot on it.
・ It is assumed that the closed valve was opened at that time.
Installation of thermal insulation
No.2C FO Tank Filling Valve
Photograph 18: Insulation Installation
49
Reconstruction by the Vessel's crew
No.2C FO Tank Filling Valve
Photograph 19: Reason Why No.2C FO Tank Filling Valve Opened
＝ Accident Cause from the Perspective of Human Error ＝
After an accident, we review it in terms of, “What would have happened had we..?”
(“what if” scenarios), which is referred to as hindsight bias (the tendency to think that
something was predictable after it has happened.) Acknowledging that there are prophe-
cies recorded after the event (wise after the event) meaning that it is easy to be critical
about anything after it has happened (psychological analysis), let’s analyse the causes of
the accident from the perspective of a chain of errors. Indirect causes include the follow-
ing.
① Human error factors related to the bunkering plan, including

assignment of personnel
(1)
Has there been sufficient safety and environmental awareness on the part of the
management (Master on the Vessel, Chief Engineer and/or the company's Opera-
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tions Manager)?
It took an estimated 22 minutes from the start of the oil spill for it to be discovered.
The OS (Ordinary Seaman), who were not directly involved in the bunkering
work, were on deck patrol, but was every crew member on board aware of the
potential significant marine pollution that could be caused by an oil leak?
(2) Had the bunkering plans and procedures been properly developed in advance?
(e.g. bunker line, personnel assignment etc.)
In the analysis of the accident this time, it was not possible to examine the bunker-
ing plan or the personnel assignment list, so we can only speculate. However,
considering that it happened late at night, there was probably an insufficient num-
ber of deck officers on duty or deck patrols being conducted.
(3) Did all personnel involved in the operation have an adequate understanding of the
bunkering plan in the meeting prior to carrying out the work?
▶ Did they understand the bunkering procedures and the condition of the bun-
ker lines? Would both the Master and C/O also have been present at the
engine department meeting in case of an emergency?
▶ Was it predetermined who would be in charge of which valve changeover

and when?
▶ Due to the bunkering work being carried out at night, it is assumed that no
other work was to be done, but had there been a conflict with other work that
arose, was the personnel assignment adequate?
▶ Was the deck OS on patrol briefed on which fuel tanks were to be bun-

kered?
(4)
Why did they start bunkering work with one valve open for No.3 C, even though
No.3 C and No.4 C FO tanks were receiving tanks? (Reasons given below; see
“General procedures when receiving the same type of fuel into more than two
tanks.”). Are there any factors in the procedure for opening or closing the relevant
valves that could cause errors?
51
② Human error regarding status monitoring during bunkering work
The following four factors inviting human error have been introduced in several Loss
Prevention Bulletins. In this guide, we will formulate an analysis applying these to the 12
Human Characteristics (Figure 16).
＝ Causes Which Invite Human Error ＝
1. C
ommon characteristics of highly skilled technicians
2. 12 Human Characteristics
3. Four Psychological Factors
4. Human brain capacity and optical illusions
Twelve human characteristics

1 uman beings sometimes make
H 7 Human beings are sometimes in a hurry
mistakes 8 uman beings sometimes become
H
2 Human beings are sometimes careless emotional
3 Human beings sometimes forget 9 uman beings sometimes make
H
4 uman beings sometimes do not notice
H assumptions
5 uman beings have moments of
H 10 Human beings are sometimes lazy
inattention 11 Human beings sometimes panic
6 H
uman beings sometimes are able to see 12 uman beings sometimes transgress
H
or think about only one thing at a time when no one is looking
Figure 16: 12 Human Characteristics
(1) Did the person in charge keep checking all FO tank levels and continue to monitor
tank level changes? If not, ② Human beings are sometimes careless, ③ Human
beings sometimes forget and ⑩ Human beings are sometimes lazy in Figure 16
will be applicable.
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(2) Had sounding measuring tape been used for level checking periodically as well as
remote liquid level gauges?
④ Human beings sometimes do not notice, ⑥ Human beings are sometimes only
able to see or think about one thing at a time, ⑨ Human beings sometimes make
assumptions, and ⑩ Human beings are sometimes lazy are applicable.
(3) Is the indicated oil transfer rate (121 m3 /h) adequate?
Because we have not been able to examine the diameter of the pipes in the Vessel's
bunkering lines, we cannot judge whether the oil transfer speed was reasonable or
not, but the author would like to know whether the person in charge was in a hurry
to get the job done as quickly as possible. ⑦ Human beings are sometimes in a
hurry will be applicable.
(4) Had crew on duty checked the venting of all fuel tanks for air escape? ③ Human
beings sometimes forget, ④ Human beings sometimes do not notice, and ⑩ Hu-
man beings are sometimes lazy will apply.
Photograph 20: Tank Sounding
③ General procedures when receiving the same type of fuel into more
than two tanks
The author surveyed the relevant procedures for receiving the same type of fuel in multi-
ple tanks by more than two shipping companes in the form of interviews. This was sum-
marised as follows:
53
(1) Check that all valves in the bunkering line are fully closed
In order to avoid such situations shown in the case this time, the FO and DO settling
tanks should be filled at least one or two hours before the start of bunkering, and then,
all valves in the fuel pipeline should be turned to “all closed” at once and checked.
(2) Lineup
According to the bunkering plan, Almost all companies used the "Line Up Form",
opening the valves required for the receiving operation. The last valve to be opened
should be the gate valve which is connected to the bunker hose.
(3) Topping off procedures

After the start of bunkering work, the valve opening angle and the oil transfer rate
from the barge are decreased as each tank level is reached, and the valves of the tanks
which have reached their levels are closed. A reasonable procedure for the order of
topping off is to start with the FO tanks farthest from the manifold in turn. On the
contrary, we received many comments that opening and closing the valves in the
middle of the process can be dangerous.
（4）Inflow check
Immediately after the start of bunkering, all FO/DO tanks should be sounded, and
not just the receiving tanks.
Also, check the air flow from all FO/DO tank air ventilations.
Sounding intervals were approximately 50/50, with some companies setting the
standard and others leaving it to the Vessel. In general, most companies assigned a
full engine department crew to each tank immediately after the start of sounding,
and took frequent soundings, then once the amount of oil to be pumped reached a
steady state, shifted from a full crew to a watchkeeping arrangement. Also, some
companies ask the O/S on duty to check the air flow from the air ventilations.
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4-1-5 Recurrence Preventive Measures

① Recurrence Preventive Measures submitted by Ship Management
Company
Once the oil spill on deck had been recovered, the ship management company for the
Vessel developed the following preventive measures.
・ Periodical sounding during bunkering
・ Reinforcement of additional deck inspections
・ Periodical verification of FO Filling Valve
・ Verification of FO Filling Valve every time prior to bunkering
・ Conduct drills against oil spills periodically
Since then, the author heard that more specific recurrence preventive measures have been
developed and not only incorporated into the SMS manuals, but that the accident summa-
ry has also been shared with other ships concerned.
② Preventive measures considered from the perspective of

technological factors and human error
In addition to the above-mentioned preventive measures taken by ship management com-

panies, we have also considered preventive measures from the perspective of technologi-
cal factors and human error.
(a) Design of appropriate bunkering plan

⃝Planning that allows for sufficient capacity of the receiving tank and appropriate
flow rate (m3/h)
⃝The maximum capacity of each fuel tank was generally between 85% and 90%,
with a maximum of 93%, although each shipping company had different standards.
The amount of oil to be pumped per hour was basically at the ship's discretion,
because the diameter of the fuel pipes on each vessel was different.
55
⃝Responsibility for bunkering operations (line changeover, work content and lay-
out), and other specific details such as who will do what and when (timing) are to
be included in the bunkering plan.
⃝In principle, the bunkering plan should be developed in such a way that the tank
valves are not switched. If it is unavoidable, another operator (preferably an engi-
neer) should double-check the plan.
(b) Briefing prior to carrying out of work

⃝Confirmation of the target liquid level of the receiving tank and the operation of the
pipelines, valves, etc.
⃝Checking of work assignments (not only of the operator but also that of the man-
ager).
(c) Thorough lineup

Regardless of whether multiple tanks are bunkered or not, basically, it is important to
check that all relevant valves are “fully closed” before bunkering, and then to ensure
thorough lineup work such as opening the necessary valves which would prevent
accidental inflow into a tank that was not intended.
(d) Periodic tank level checks using sounding measuring tape

Do not rely solely on the display of the liquid level gauge, even if a console has been
installed. As explained in the previous section, soundings of all fuel tanks should also
be periodically carried out to ensure that there is no inflow into tanks that are not
planned for bunkering.
(e) Appropriate response to irregularities and crew training

⃝N
ot only the responsible operator for the bunkering operation (Chief Engineer),
but also should the operator who was previously assigned and following the plan
be changed at short notice for any reason, the manager must ensure that both the
operators concerned and all other personnel be re-made aware of the change of
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operators and the work to be carried out. If this requires a change in work proce-
dure, it is necessary to consider stopping the bunkering at once.
⃝ It is also necessary to educate and train the engineers and engine department crew
by holding workshops on the daily work procedure manuals. In particular, in the
event of crew change, a study session should be held.
(f) Aspects that the deck department should be aware of during

bunkering
There is a tendency to regard bunkering work as the Engine Department’s work, with
only the Master and Chief Officer (C/O) taking part in the briefing, with deck crew
and the Duty Officer who will actually be patrolling on deck being left in the dark.
The deck officers and the deck crew should also be briefed on the bunkering work
and given clear instructions. For example, the engine department may be over-
whelmed with sounding work, so it is necessary to have the patrolling deck crew
check the air flow from the air vent on a regular basis and report to the Chief Engineer
via the duty officer. It is also necessary to establish an information sharing system.
57
4-2 Coastal Vessel Case
＝ Date, Time and Point Accident Occurs ＝
Date and time accident occurs:

01/MM/20YY
Point accident occurs:
Unspecified port in Japan
Ship type:
General cargo ship of 499 G/T
Photograph 21: Similar Kind of Vessel
(Not Related to the Actual Accident)
4-2-1 Accident Overview

During bunkering operations on board the Vessel, C-type fuel oil spilled from the com-
mon air vent of the Vessel's fuel oil tanks onto the deck, of which approximately 300 litres
spilled into the sea. Some of the oil spilled over the oil fence boom extended around the
Vessel after the accident. It was washed ashore on a nearby quay. No damage was caused
to the fishing facilities.
Photograph 22: Seawall Spoilage by Oil Washed Ashore
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4-2-2 Accident Treatment Expense

The following expenses have been incurred for accident treatment.
Oil spill recovery expenses Approx. 9.3 million yen

Clean-up expenses for the seawall etc. Approx. 9.4 million yen
Condition survey costs and others Approx. 3.4 million yen
Total approx. 22.1 million yen
Photograph 23: Seawall Scupper Spoilage Caused by Oil Leakage
Photograph 24: Recovery Work Using Oil Adsorbent
59
4-2-3 Extent of Damage

Most of the spilled oil was recovered by the evening of the day of the accident, but some
was spread by the current. Later, the oil reached a seawall and the inside of a quay apron
within a radius of approx. 3 km. It took 16 days to spread the oil and clean up the damaged
seawall, resulting in a loss of almost the same amount as that of the first day's recovery
service fee. Fortunately, fishing facilities were not damaged.
Photograph 25: Agitation Process
Photograph 26: Spilled Oil on Sea Surface Photograph 27: Quay Wall Spoilage
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4-2-4 What Caused the Accident?

At approximately 07:00 on 01/MM/20YY, the Vessel was docked at a public quay in an
unspecified port of Japan on the port side for discharging. Then at approximately 09:00
the barge came alongside the starboard side of the Vessel and started bunkering work with
55 KL of C-type fuel oil at 09:10. Later, at approximately 09:50, the starboard No.1 FO
(on the starboard side) tank overflowed and the spilled oil flowed into the “overflow tank
(capacity 500 L)”, which was also full. Eventually, 2,450 L of fuel oil spilled on deck via
common air ventilation.
Later on, when calculating the oil transfer speed, it showed that there was a continuous
spill from the air ventilation onto the deck for approximately 2 minutes and 40 seconds.
Because the deck scuppers were inadequately set, approximately 300 litres of the oil
spilled overboard.
＝ Planned Quantity for Bunkering ＝
The planned amount for bunkering is shown in Table 6: a total of 55 KL of C-type fuel oil.
The planned quantity for bunkering in No.1 FO Tank (on the port side) was 27 KL of
C-type fuel oil first, followed by the remaining 28 KL in No.1 FO Tank (on the starboard
side). After the bunkering of C-type fuel oil was completed, the tank was to receive 15 KL
of A-type fuel oil.
Planned Quantity for Bunkering
Oil type Amount Receiving tank Remarks
No.2 DO Tank(P) Amount to be received for

A-type fuel oil 15 KL
No.2 DO Tank(S) each tank is unknown
27 KL No.1 FO Tank(P)
C-type fuel oil
28 KL No.1 FO Tank(S)
Table 6: Planned Quantity for Bunkering
61
Table 7 shows the timeline of events leading up to the accident.
＝ Timeline of Events Leading up to the Accident ＝

09:00 The bunker barge came alongside the starboard side of the Vessel.
09:10 Started pumping FO (C-type fuel oil). Started receiving into No.1 FO Tank (P).
Received a message from bunker barge that pumping of 27 KL of oil was
complete.
It was planned that 27 KL be received in No.1 FO Tank (P), but approximately
8 KL of FO flowed into No.1 FO Tank (S) as the filling valve was slightly
09:30 open.
Closed filling valve No.1 FO Tank (P) and opened filling valve No.1 FO Tank
(S). At this point, as No.1 FO Tank (S) contained 19 KL of FO, there was only
26 KL of extra space remaining. A further 28 KL was added to that, so a
total of 2 KL overflowed.
Received a message from bunker barge that pumping of 55 KL of FO (C-type
fuel oil) was complete.
09:50
Received a report from the duty officer that there was a leak on deck.
Day 1
The department issued an alert and started recovering oil spillage on deck.
10:10 Started pumping DO (A-type fuel oil).
Confirmed that it had spilled overboard. And notified it to the coast guard
headquarters.
10:20
Started pumping DO (A-type fuel oil); received 10 KL of bunkering oil until
stoppage, instead of the planned 15 KL).
The first oil recovery workboat arrived at the site and started recovery
12:00
work.
Coast Guard officers boarded to start interviewing related parties about
the spill.
13:00 Workboat arranged by the Fire Department arrived at the site. Instructed
by the Coast Guard to recover as much spillage as possible; to then move
on to the agitation process.
19:00 After sunset, when it was dark, recovery work was complete.
An oil recovery vessel and a patrol boat from the Coast Guard Headquarters
06:00 arrived at the site. As the oil spill was found to be 200m in circumference,
Day 2
the agitation process was started. Another two workboats were added.
19:00 Completed agitation work
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06:00 Started clean-up of drifted oil spill left behind on surrounding quays
Day 3 Completed the above work; recovery and clean-up work was now
19:00
complete.
Following a report that drifted oil spill remained on the surrounding quays,
08:00
the clean-up operation was restarted.
Day 4
Also, as a thin oil film was observed on the sea surface, the workboat
17:00
agitation process was restarted.
Continued cleaning work on the surrounding quays where the oil spill had
08:00
drifted with it being left behind.
Day 5
Also, as a thin oil film was observed on the sea surface, the workboat
17:00
agitation process was continued.
Continued cleaning work on the surrounding quays where the oil spill had
08:00
drifted with it being left behind.
Day 6
No more thin oil slick was found on the sea surface, and the agitation
17:00
process by the workboat was complete.
Continued cleaning work on the surrounding quays. Also, as the cleaning
work caused an oil slick on the sea surface, agitation work was arranged by
Days 6 ～ 16
a workboat.
Completed the operation on the 16th day following accident occurrence.
Table 7: Timeline of Events Leading up to the Accident
In the 40 minutes between 09:10 and 09:50, pumping of 55 KL of FO (C-type fuel oil)
was complete. Then, at 09:50, the C/E received a report from the duty officer that there
was a leak on deck and "Emergency Station" was issued by the Master. However, at
10:10, the C/E started pumping DO (A-type fuel oil) .
At the point when 10 KL of A-type fuel oil had been pumped, it was confirmed that C-type
fuel oil had spilled overboard, and the emergency stop for bunkering had been initiated
and the nearest Coast Guard Headquarters alerted. At 12:00, the first oil recovery work-
boat arrived at the site and started recovery work immediately.
Meanwhile, at 13:00, Coast Guard officers boarded to start investigating and interviewing
related parties about the spill. They were instructed to recover as much oil as possible and
to carry out agitation of any oil that had spread to the sea surface which could not be re-
covered.
63
The oil spill on the deck was recovered on the same day, but it had spread unexpectedly
over a large area of the sea surface, contaminating the seawall and quay and penetrating
deep into the quay apron, requiring about 16 days for cleaning and agitation processing.
＝ Estimated Amount of Overboard Discharge ＝
The total amount of fuel oil spilled overboard was estimated to be approximately 0.3 KL
(300 L), calculated from the amount of residual oil before bunkering started, another
amount of residual oil after bunkering stopped, the amount of overboard discharge col-
lected from the deck and amount of oil transfer declared by the barge. (Please see Table
63 for details.)
Unit：m3
Amount of
Residual Oil
Tank Extra Space Residual Oil Supply
Amount before
FOT No. Volume 1 - (BB)/(AA) after Pumping Total
Bunkering
(AA) % Stoppage ((CC) － (BB))
（BB)
（CC)
No.1 (P) 45.00 13.00 71.1% 32.00 19.00
No.1 (S) 45.00 11.00 75.6% 45.00 34.00
Total 90.00 24.00 73.3% 76.55 (A) 53.00
Amount of oil transferred by bunker ship (B) 55.00
Total oil outflow <(B) - (A)> (C) 2.00
Amount of residual oil in Over Flow Tank (D) 0.50

Total of amount of oil collected from the deck and amount of oil
(E) 1.20
remaining in the oil drip tray
Amount of estimated overboard discharge <(C)-(D)-(E)> 0.30
Oil transfer speed（55 m3 ÷ 40 mins.） 82.50 m3 /h
Table 8: Calculation of Spillage Overboard Discharge
According to the bunkering plan, the Vessel was to receive 40 KL (89% full) on her port
side and 39 KL (87% full) on her starboard side in FO tanks at a volume capacity of 45m3
at the end of bunkering, which shows that the plan itself was reasonable.
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4-2-5 Accident Cause
＝ Direct Cause ＝
The original plan was to receive 27 KL of C-type fuel oil in No.1 FO Tank (on the port
side) and then switch the valve to receive the remaining 28 KL in No.1 FO Tank (on the
starboard side). However, the filling valve on the starboard side was open and approxi-
mately 8 KL that was supposed to go into the port tank went into the starboard tank.
Without noticing this error, when a further 28 KL was added to that (into the starboard
side tank), it overflowed. Figure 17 illustrates this pipeline.
Air vent and oil drip tray

L×W×H
Gate Valve
40cm×45cm×40cm
(Port) = 72 L
(Starb'd)
Upper Deck
No.2 DO Tank No.2 FO Tank No.2 DO Tank No.1 FO Tank

Filling Valve(P) Filling Valve(S) Filling Valve(P) Filling Valve(S)
Engine Room
Over Flow Tank
(500 L)
No.1 FO Tank(P)
As this Filling Valve
No.2 DO Tank(P)
45 m³ Approx.20 KL was not closed, 8 KL
20 m³
flowed into No.1 FO
Residual Oil 13 KL Tank (S), which was
not planned.
29% Full
Approx.28 KL
No.2 DO Tank(S) No.1 FO Tank(S)
20 m³ 45 m³ Approx.8 KL
Unplanned filling oil
Residual Oil 11KL

4% Full
Double Bottom
Figure 17: Pipeline for Bunkering and Arrangement of Tanks
65
▶ At 09:10, C-type fuel oil bunkering started and the No.1 FO Tank (P) with 13 KL of
residual oil started receiving 27 KL as originally planned.
▶ However, as Filling Valve of No.1 FO Tank (P) was not fully closed, some of the
pumped C-type fuel oil (7-8 KL) flowed into No.1 FO Tank (S) with residual oil at 11
KL.
▶ At 09:30, the Chief Engineer received a report from the barge that 27 KL had been
pumped and assumed that the total amount of oil had been pumped to No.1 FO Tank
(P) as scheduled. So he did not carry out confirmation sounding. After opening the
filling valve of No.1 FO Tank (S) and closing the filling valve of No.1 FO Tank (P),
starting to receive the remaining 28KL.
However, at this point, No.1 FO Tank (S) contains a total of 19 KL of C-type fuel oil,
and if an additional 28 KL were to be loaded into the tank (the 45m3 capacity), it
would overflow by 2 KL.
▶ Of this overflow of 2 KL (2,000 L), 500 L remained in the overflow tank (500 L ca-
pacity), but ultimately 2,000 L spilled from the common air vent.
▶ The remaining 1,500 L on deck was eventually recovered, but 300 L via the scuppers
spilled overboard.
▶ At 09:50, the bunker barge reported to the Vessel that it has finished pumping 55 KL
as planned, but based on the oil transfer speed (82.5 m3/h), it takes about 1 minute and
27 seconds for 2,000 L to flow out, so we can estimate that the spill started around
09:48. For less than two minutes, it was assumed that no one noticed the leak.
＝ Why Was the No.1 FO Tank (S) Filling Valve, Which

Was Not Planned for Bunkering, Open? ＝
The Vessel's crew member testified: “I thought all the filling valves were closed after the last
bunkering work, so I don't know why they were slightly open.” (Tentative translation.)
It is unknown whether the closed valves were opened by vibration during navigation, or
whether the crew had made sure that they were closed after the last bunkering operation.
In addition, the valves were not tightened to prevent them from opening accidentally.
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＝ Accident Cause From the Perspective of Human Error ＝
As in Accident Case of Oceangoing Vessel, the analysis of “...must have...” or “...should

have...” is a hindsight bias assessment and therefore not an accident prevention measure.
However, as a result of the lack of these measures, a chain of human errors occurred,
which could not be broken, leading to an accident. Bearing this in mind, let’s consider the
causes of the accident by applying Figure 16: 12 Human Characteristics on page 52 to
see what human errors occurred.
(1) Soundings had not been conducted

If the crew had carried out soundings of all fuel tanks, including the overflow tank, it
would have been discovered that the first receiving tank did not contain the expected
amount of C-type fuel oil and that the No. 1 FO Tank (S) was inadvertently filled.
The chief engineer (C/E), who was in charge of the main liquid line for bunkering
work, testified that soundings had been carried out only before and after the start of
bunkering in the past, and that no regular soundings had been conducted during bun-
kering. Therefore, the barge report was taken into account even when bunkering mul-
tiple tanks. When comparing this with the 12 Human characteristics, ③ Human be-
ings sometimes forget, ⑨ Human beings sometimes make assumptions, and ⑩
Human beings are sometimes lazy will be applicable.
(2) Failure to take immediate action against the oil spill

At 09:50, the duty officer reported an oil leak on deck, but it was assumed that there
was no overboard spill, and continued bunkering A-type fuel oil. If the emergency
stop for bunkering had been initiated immediately, the spill overboard would not
have occurred. Human characteristics such as ① Human beings sometimes make
mistakes (i.e. emergency response procedures in this case), ② Human beings are
sometimes careless, ⑦ Human beings are sometimes in a hurry, and ⑨ Human be-
ings sometimes make assumptions will be applicable.
67
(3) Has there been sufficient safety and environmental awareness

on the part of the management (Master on the Vessel, Chief
Engineer and/or the company's Operations Manager)? Also, did
the crew members follow a bunkering plan and procedure
manual, or hold a briefing to confirm role assignment?
The estimated time needed to detect an oil spill is less than two minutes from the
start. It was not possible to find out how many crew members were on board, but it
appears that there was no clear role assignment between the duty officer and the
Master during the bunkering planning and actual bunkering. Human Characteristics
③ Human beings sometimes forget, ⑥ Human beings are sometimes only able to
see or think about one thing at a time, and ⑩ Human beings are sometimes lazy are
applicable.
(4) Scuppers were not secured appropriately

The oil spilled overboard was via the scuppers. With 2,450 L of fuel oil spilled on
deck, it may have gone over the gangway, but if the scuppers had been secured, the
amount of the spilled overboard could have been much less. Human characteristics
such as ④ Human beings sometimes do not notice and ⑤ Human beings have mo-
ments of inattention will be applicable.
(5) The bunkering valves were not checked to confirm if they were
fully closed prior to start of bunkering and lineup work had not
been completed. Also, why was it decided to top off the fuel
tanks one by one?
As a basic part of bunkering work, checking that the bunkering valves are closed
before starting work and subsequent lineup work had not been carried out. In the
case of the Vessel, the number of fuel oil tanks is four, even including the gate valve
on each side (total is 2), so that in total there are only six valves to be checked that
they are fully closed and two filling valves on the No. 1 FO Tank (P/S) to be opened.
Human characteristics such as ⑦ Human beings are sometimes in a hurry, and ⑩
68
JAPAN P& I CLUB
Human beings are sometimes lazy will be applicable.

As for receiving the same type of fuel in multiple tanks, in order to achieve a time-stag-
gered topping off procedure, the inflow rate must be regulated by adjusting the valve
openings, and soundings must be carried out periodically. In order to minimize time
and effort, it has become routine to rely solely on bunker barge reports regarding the
amount of oil to be pumped without further soundings, and when this has not caused
any accidents, it seems that this method would make life easier. Human characteristics
such as ③ Human beings sometimes forget, ⑨ Human beings sometimes make as-
sumptions, and ⑩ Human beings are sometimes lazy will be applicable.
（6）Did not a liquid level alarm of the Overflow Tank sound?

Some vessels' overflow tanks are equipped with “liquid level alarm devices” and oth-
ers are not, but in general most tanks are installed with liquid level alarm devices. It
was not possible to confirm whether or not the Vessel's overflow tank had this device
installed, but if it did the alarm did not sound, this could be due to poor maintenance,
human-caused cutting of the alarm or failure to test that the alarm was functioning
properly, ② Human beings are sometimes careless, ③ Human beings sometimes for-
get, and ⑤ Human beings have moments of inattention will be applied.
4-2-6 Recurrence Preventive Measures

The same six measures discussed in 4-1-5 “② Recurrence Preventive Measures consid-
ered from the perspective of technical factors and human error” are listed below. For de-
tails, please refer to the same section.
(a) Development of an appropriate bunkering plan

In the case of coastal vessels, this may be seen as a regular and frequent task, but it
is essential that the company's management is actively involved in the vessel's bun-
kering plan, rather than leaving it to the vessel.
69
(b) Briefing prior to carrying out of work

For this Vessel's size, even with around six or seven crew, it is important that time is
allotted for all crew to have a briefing prior to the carrying out of work.
(c) Thorough lineup

The basics are to be adhered to. By eliminating assumptions (e.g. other Filling
Valves should be closed), and encouraging crew to suspect they may be open, it will
become necessary to carry out checks.
(d) Periodic tank level checks using sounding measuring tape

Reports from remote liquid level gauges and bunker barges are not to be overly re-
lied upon, but thoroughly double-checked.
(e) Appropriate response to irregularities and crew training

Regarding the spillage this time, despite the fact that the duty officer had reported a
leakage, the pumping of DO (A-type fuel oil) was started. It is essential to be aware
that an oil spill will always lead to a marine pollution incident and that an emergen-
cy response will be necessary.
(f) A
spects that the deck department should be aware of during
bunkering
There may be few crew onboard, therefore, it is crucial that the role of each crew
member is checked.
＝ Technological Recurrence Prevention Countermeasures ＝
The common root cause of the spillage of both cases is that prior to bunkering, all valves
in the fuel system had not been checked to find out if they had been “closed”, and that the
sounding of tanks that had not been bunkered had not been carried out. Thus, to return to
basics, it is necessary to check the position of the valves.
70
JAPAN P& I CLUB
Receiving tank master valve：Filling Valve
Flow Meter
Figure 18: Technological Countermeasures (Flow Meter)
However, could it not be that where the Filling Valves of each fuel tank are lined up in the
engine room, a removable flow meter can be installed to visually check as to whether fuel
oil is flowing through the pipes? If it had been visible that fuel oil was flowing into an
unscheduled tank, the anomaly might have been noticed at that point.
More recently, a “collapsible oil spill prevention device” (Photograph 28) has been fitted
to air vents to allow air from the air vent to inflate balloons in the event of an unscheduled
influx of fuel oil into the tank. These are also available on the market and can be used as
necessary.
Photograph 28: Overflow Tank (Collapsible Fuel Oil Overflow Prevention Tank)
Provided by NATIONAL MARINE PLASTIC.CO,LTD.
71
§5 Conclusion
Just as was discussed in Chapter 1 (accident statistics for coastal and oceangoing vessels)
most oil spills reported to this Club are caused during bunkering operations. If an oil spill
occurs, regardless of amount spilled, be it small or large, treatment takes many man-hours
and incurs a tremendous amount of expense.
As we can see in the above accident case examples, the route cause is down to a chain of
human errors. To prevent this from leading to an accident, this chain must be broken. We
hope that it is understood that there are a number of opportunities that we can all take
advantage of.
In addition, although each company's ISM code and SMS manuals always incorporate
measures and procedures to prevent recurrence as shown in the above accident examples,
the failure of the crew to follow them in the accident analysis is almost always the appar-
ent cause. However, despite the fact that crew should also be well aware of this, there are
numerous examples that show that they failed to carry out their duties in accordance with
the operation manual.
Some cases may state that this is easily resolved through thorough crew training, but in
practice this is very difficult. However, since this must not be abandoned, repeated expla-
nations, guidance and training will be required, which should not only be left to the Ves-
sel's Master and Chief Engineer, but also require the active involvement of the company's
administration.
In the unfortunate event that oil is spilt overboard, in order to mitigate any damage as
much as is possible, keeping the area of spreading to an absolute minimum will be crucial.
Also, because it is almost impossible to stop the spread of oil spills at sea with the oil
treatment equipment available on board, the key is to start the recovery operation as soon
as possible. Although this was not introduced above as an example, there have been a few
cases where the cost of arranging a recovery service was a concern, which led to the ar-
72
JAPAN P& I CLUB
rangement of a more geographically remote recovery service, which delayed the start of
the recovery process and resulted in the spread of the spillage over a wide area, making it
more expensive than it should have been.
We believe that spills during bunkering operations are accidents that can be prevented by
sticking to the basics and by raising the safety and environmental awareness of the crew.
We hope that this Loss Prevention Bulletin can be of assistance in any way.
73
Acknowledgement of Provided References and

Materials
References
・General Marine Disaster Prevention Center (MDPC)
Training materials on marine pollution response course (Tentative translation)
・Petroleum Association of Japan

Technical data for removal of oil from the ITOPF
・“Umi” & “Nagisa” Foundation

"Revised Oil Removal Manual (March 2015 edition) (Tentative translation)
・The Japan Association of Marine Safety (JAMS) Journal (2017 Spring Edition No.
572)
・Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd.
Acknowledgement of Provided References and Materials

・Photograph 27: Oil Recovery and Water Surface Cleaning Ship, Beikurin (Bay-
clean) (From the website of the Chiba Port Office, Regional Development Bureau,
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism)
・Mitsui Chemicals, Inc.
・ANANDENKI CO., LTD
・NATIONAL MARINE PLASTIC.CO,LTD.
74
JAPAN P& I CLUB
P.40 Answer to Quiz
① Hole rupture just above sea surface
The oil loaded above the lower edge of the hole rupture (grey area) spills
momentarily.
Thereafter, a small amount of oil may be spilled due to the ship’s pitching
and rolling, but this will not be a continuous spill. However, it is ideal to
carry out shift and gas release of as much of the cargo oil as possible in
the tanks where a hole rupture has occurred, in case of spills or repairs
due to the ship's pitching and rolling or changing conditions. If other
cargo tanks are fully loaded or ship-to-ship cargo transfer is not possible,
as an emergency measure, shift it to other tanks in so far as oil will not
breach the tank.
Figure 19: Hole Rupture Just above Sea Surface
75
② Hole rupture on sea surface
Firstly, as in ①, the oil above the surface of the water spills momentarily.
Then, due to the relationship between the specific gravity of water and oil
(displacement), seawater infiltrates from the hole rupture and gradually
accumulates at the bottom of the tank, and the oil is pushed out because
of the inflow that it continues to flow out in turn and is replaced by
seawater up to the hole rupture.
In the event of grounding, the water level will be lowered by the change
in tidal current or, if Deballasting is carried out to reduce the draft, the oil
level will be raised above the water level by that amount. It is important to
understand that this will lead to a continuous oil spill.
Figure 20: Hole Rupture on Sea Surface
76
JAPAN P& I CLUB
③ Hole rupture just below sea surface
Firstly, as in ①, the oil above the surface of the water spills momentarily.
Then, similar to ②, due to the relationship between the specific gravity of
water and oil (displacement), seawater infiltrates from the hole rupture
and gradually accumulates at the bottom of the tank, and the oil is pushed
out because of the inflow that it continues to flow out in turn and is
replaced by seawater up to the hole rupture.
In the event of grounding, the water level will be loweredby the change
in tidal current or, if Deballasting is carried outto reduce the draft, the oil
level will be raised above the water level by that amount. It is important to
understand that this willlead to a continuous oil spill.
Figure 21: Hole Rupture Just below Sea Surface
77
④ Hole rupture to ship’s bottom
Similar to ①, the oil above the surface of the water spills momentarily.
Then, the spill will stop when the pressure of the oil at the bottom of the
tank is equal to the pressure at the bottom of the ship. Not only because
the specific gravity of oil is smaller than that of seawater, but because the
pressure from the surface of the water to the bottom of the ship is lower
than the water pressure at the bottom of the ship, the seawater floods
into the tank through the hole rupture.
（For example, if the draft is 10m and the specific gravity of theseawater is
1.025, the water pressure is 1.025kg/cm2. On the other hand, because the
specific gravity of C-type fuel oil is about 0.998, and the pressure at the
bottom of the ship is0.998 kg/cm2, seawater will enter through the hole
rupture, until this pressure difference is eliminated.）Similar to ③, if the
oil level rises above the surface of the water due to draft or discharging
quantity adjustments, the hole rupture in the ship's bottom will cause a
mixture of seawater and oil to spill. Care should be taken to avoid this.
Figure 22: Hole Rupture to Ship’s Bottom
78
JAPAN P& I CLUB
⑤ ole Rupture to ship’s bottom of a common

H
double-bottom fuel oil tank
Each company has its own ISM code, SMS manual (Safety Management
System) and internal regulations which determine the maximum amount
of fuel that can be accepted in a fuel oil tank, but generally in most cases, it
is between 85% and 90% of the tank capacity. This means that no more up
to the air ventilation can be filled with fuel. Figure: 23(1))
In the event of a hole rupture in a double bottom fuel tank, due to
groundings etc., the water pressure in the bottom of the tank will push
the fuel oil up to the level of the vent line, which will in turn be flooded by
seawater. Figure: 71(2)) However, the fuel in the tank is unlikely to spill.
Air Vent Air Vent
（1）（2）
Figure 23: Hole Rupture to Ship’s Bottom of a Common Double-Bottom Fuel Oil Tank
79
⑥ H
ole rupture to ship’s bottom due to internal pressure
on the tank
Currently, there are no tankers with a single hull, only those with double hulls.
However, suppose that a hole rupture is made in the bottom of the ship, in the case
of a tanker with a single hull as shown in Figure 72, and internal pressure is applied.
With a draught of 10m, the water pressure at the bottom of the ship is
1.025 kg/cm2. In the event of a hole rupture here, depending on the specific gravity
of the oil, the cargo oil will be pushed out until the pressure on the bottom of the
ship is equal to the water pressure.
Except in the ① event of a hole rupture just above sea surface, the residual oil in
the tank shall be shifted in order to prevent a continuous oil spill. However, even
if a transfer pump is used for fuel oil, or a cargo pump for tankers, the suction is
located close to the bottom of the tank. If the hole rupture is large, only flooded
seawater is sucked in, which makes it difficult to shift the oil. This will be time-
consuming, but requires a flexible response to the situation, such as using a
portable pump to suck up the oil from near the surface and shift it.
Increased internal pressures
10m
1.025kg/cm²
Figure 24: Hole Rupture to Ship’s Bottom of a Single Hull Tanker
Depending on the location of the hole rupture, it should be understood that different
measures need to be taken. It is important to assess the situation and conditions
properly and take the appropriate measures in accordance based on them.
80
Attachment 1: Oil Recovery Procedure by Oil Type
Point
Preventive Necessary Damage
oil spill Oil type Procedure Remarks
objective materials expected
occurs
Oil fence boom Port closure,
Recovery/ Spreads to form a
A-type fuel oil A, B and absorbent spoilage of water
spreading thin oil film
boom intakes, etc.
Oil fence boom,
Port closure, Use of absorbents
absorbent boom,
C-type fuel oil Recovery A, B, C spoilage of water for high viscous
and powerful
intakes, etc. oils, emulsions
suction trucks
Use of absorbents
Oil fence boom
for high viscous
Emulsion Recovery A, B and absorbent
oils, or snares (see
In port boom
photograph)
Preventing
Monitoring and Powder gelling Fire, explosions and
Petrol the spread of
evacuation agent loss of life
secondary damage
Always consult an
Investigation
Instructions Powder gelling Differ depending expert as treatment
Chemicals and
from expert agent on type of chemical will vary depending
confirmation
on type
Monitoring and Fire, explosions and
Liquefied gas LNG and LPG
evacuation loss of life
Oil fence boom,
Destruction of
absorbent boom,
Recovery/ fisheries, tourism,
A-type fuel oil A, B, D oil recovery
dispersion and the natural
vessels and oil
environment
treatment agents
Recovery/ absorbent boom fisheries, tourism,
C-type fuel oil A, B, D
dispersion and oil treatment and the natural
agents environment
absorbent boom fisheries, tourism,
and oil recovery and the natural
system environment
Preventing
Outside
Monitoring and Fire, explosions and the spread of
of port Petrol
evacuation loss of life secondary damage,
natural evaporation
Destruction of
Oil fence boom, oil fisheries, tourism, Initially there is a
Recovery/ recovery vessels and the natural crude gas hazard,
Crude oil A, B, D
dispersion and oil recovery environment; fire, then emulsions
system explosions and loss form
of life
Always consult an
Investigation
Instructions Differ depending expert as treatment
Chemicals and
from expert on type of chemical will vary depending
confirmation
on type
Monitoring and Fire, explosions and
Liquefied gas LNG and LPG
evacuation loss of life
Procedure A
: In the case of large quantities, oil is to be recovered with oil fence booms and then recovered by an oil
recovery vessel or powerful suction trucks, etc. Or, the oil can be absorbed using an oil absorbent. For
small quantities, use oil absorbent.
B
: For small quantities, the oil is to be surrounded by an absorbent boom (oil fence, string of flags-type, rolls,
etc.) and then wrung and recovered by suction.
C: In the case of large quantities, oil is to be collected with oil fence booms and then recovered by powerful
suction trucks.
D: Direct spraying and dispersal with oil treatment agents (for vessel and aircraft).
81
Attachment 2: Flowchart of Oil Spill Response (Example)
Flowchart of Oil Spill Response (Example)
Oil spillage accident occurs
Department issues alert
Fire, explosion, personal injury/fatality or sinking
Confirm possibility of First response

Start recording
secondary disaster measures
Collision accident
Accident report notification
Other The
vessels Vessel
Confirmation Confirmation Shipowner and Japan Coast Guard

of rescue of rescue needs ship management (JCG) Navigation
(personal injury/fatality
needs
or hull damage)
company Safety Division
To be decided at the meeting as to whether the

Vessel or the company is to report the spill to the
Japan Coast Guard (Coast Guard department).
Decision on Various Collection and

Abandon
port of arrangements preservation
ship
evacuation of records
Paperwork and Contact P&I,

Dealing with
other instructions Hull Insurance
the news media
on the Vessel and relevant parties
82
Attachment 3: R
esponse Framework to Major Oil Pollution Incidents in Japan
(Organisation Chart)
Response Framework to
Major Oil Pollution Incidents in Japan (Organisation Chart)
Government
(Countermeasure headquarters)
Report Instructions
Report Japan Coast Guard Local coast

(JCG) guard office
Report and request for aid

Instructions
(No.1 duties)
Request and
Family of crew,
Interview
contract (No.2)
Marine Disaster Clean-up operation
News media, Prevention Center
Local authority, (MDPC)
Shipowners'
Association, Request for aid
etc. Rescue and
Request / disposal company
contract Request
for aid
Request for aid and towing
Shipowner and
ship management company Report and request, etc.
The Vessel
Report (Countermeasure headquarters
for maritime accidents) Instructions
Agency, Inspection
Contact Contact
Charterer and
Classification
Terminal Society
Contact
Repair
Contact
Hull & Machinery Investigation
Insurance
Contact Protection & Investigation

Indemnity Insurance
Contact and contract

Ship repair company
Request for inspection
83
Attachment 4: Oil Spill Report Form: Sample
Ref. No.
To
Frm Name of Company Title Name Address
Report No. Date and Time JST/UTC
Oil Spill Report Form

1 Ship’s Name ＆ Port of Register Ship's Name Port of Register
2 Ship's Type & Gross Tonnage Ship's Type G/T
Name of Owner (Person in Person in Tel

3 Owner's Name Address
Charge), Address Charge E-Mail
Ship Tel
Name of Ship Management Co. Person in
4 Management Address
(Person in Charge), Address Charge E-Mail
Co.
Name of Master & Chief Chief Tel
5 Master Address
Engineer Engineer E-Mail
6 Date & Time of occurrence Date JST/UTC Time
Port/Berth No.
7 Place of occurrence Target Name Bearing/Distance
Lat./Long.
Presence or absence of Crew Yes / No Need for Rescue Yes / No

8
imminent risk Ship Yes / No Need for Rescue Yes / No
Ship's Draft
9 Fore Draft ｍ Aft. Draft ｍ
(Before accident)
10 Port of Departure/Next Port
Type of Spilled Oil
11
(Fuel/Lub. Oil/Cargo)
12 Cause of Oil Spill Collision / Grounding / Over flow at Bunlering / Cargo Oil Spill / Others（）
13 Outflow to the Sea Yes・No Is "Outflow to the sea ongoing ? Yes・No
14 Process leading to the overflow
15 Outflow point of the ship's hull

Outflow situation
16
(Size of hole and etc.)
17 Quantity of estimated overflow
（1）
18 Oil details （2）
（3）
Length Wind (Direction/Force)
Width Weather Wave height
19 Situation of overflow to the sea Direction & Sea Swell (Direction/Height)
Condition
Oil film Tidal situation
concentration (Direction/Speed)
Surrounding conditions (fishing

20
facilities, entertainment facilities, etc.)
Outflow prevention measures

21
taken
22 Need for external assistance Yes / No
23 Others
84
JAPAN P& I CLUB

Website www.piclub.or.jp/en/
Principal Office (Tokyo) 2-15-14, Nihonbashi-Ningyocho Chuo-ku, Tokyo 103-0013, Japan

Phone: 81-3-3662-7272 Fax: 81-3-3662-7107
Kobe Branch 6th Floor Shosen-Mitsui Bldg. 5, Kaigandori Chuo-ku, Kobe, Hyogo 650-0024,
Japan
Phone: 81-78-321-6886 Fax: 81-78-332-6519
Fukuoka Branch 3rd Floor Hakata-Ekimae Center Bldg., 1-14-16 Hakata Ekimae, Hakata-ku,
Fukuoka, Fukuoka 812-0011, Japan
Phone: 81-92-260-8945 Fax: 81-92-482-2500
Imabari Branch th Floor Imabari-Kitahoraicho Building, 2-2-1 Kitahoraicho, Imabari, Ehime
5
794-0028, Japan
Phone: 81-898-33-1117 Fax: 81-898-33-1251
Singapore Branch 80 Robinson Road #14-01 Singapore 068898
Phone: 65-6224-6451 Fax: 65-6224-1476
Japan P&I Club (UK) Services Ltd 5th Floor, 38 Lombard Street, London, U.K., EC3V 9BS
Phone: 44-20-7929-3633 Fax: 44-20-7929-7557
Edited by Loss Prevention and Ship Inspection Dept. Japan P&I Club

REsponse to Oil Spills

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JAPAN P& I CLUB Vol.

P&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

§2 Countermeasures for Maritime Accidents 3

Including Those Between Ship and Shore)… …………………………………… 3

2-2 Immediate Launch of Land Support Team… …………………………………… 7

§3 Oil Spill Response 12

3-1 Oil Spill Progression Timeline…………………………………………………… 13

3-2 Oil Spill Spreading Factor………………………………………………………… 19

3‒3 Spreading Preventive Measures………………………………………………… 21

3‒4 Classification of Oil Spills………………………………………………………… 25

3‒5 Oil Types…………………………………………………………………………… 26

3‒6 Oil Recovery Materials…………………………………………………………… 29

3-7 Oil Treatment Agents……………………………………………………………… 33

3‒8 Oil Spill Response………………………………………………………………… 36

3‒9 Oil Spill from a Vessel with a Hole Rupture…………………………………… 40

§4 Case Study of Oil Spillage Accidents 41

P.40 Answer to Quiz… ………………………………………………………………… 75

Image 1 : Imange of Oil Spill Accident

§2 Countermeasures for Maritime

2-1 Countermeasures for Maritime Accidents

Image 2: Oil Spill Due to Collision

● Suitability of initial measures

① Review of check list and reports

② The following should be noted when reporting to government

▶ Report all actual facts concisely.

facts. It is important to remember that misrepresentation of the facts “brings

③ Paperwork to be done later

To be photocopied Date and time

In the case that additionally

Figure 1: Document Storage Box

2-2 Immediate Launch of Land Support Team

① Notification to coastal nation authorities

▶ When receiving contact in the first instance, it is to be confirmed as to whether

② Notifying the insurance company（Hull & Machinery Insurance and P&I

③ Nominating the Shipowner’s agency

④ Arrangement of various surveyors

capability): arrangement via shipowner or ship management company

⑤ Notify Vessel of arrangement status

Supporting Team on Land The Vessel The Vessel

Create a list of Check the visitor’s Visitors not on the list

Figure 2: Managing Visitors on Board

Particularly, the following must be thoroughly taken into account:

① Response to government authorities

② Response to Vessel's related parties

③ Response to other parties related to the Vessel

④ Letter of Guarantee or Letter of Undertaking

⑤ Preparation of a sea [marine] protest and confirmation and

§3 Oil Spill Response

In Chapter 2, “2-1 Countermeasures for Maritime Accidents”, it was explained that an

① Type and property of oil spill

② T he location of the spill (e.g. from a hull hole rupture or

③ Oil spill spread

④ Amount of oil spill spread

By assessing the situation and conditions as quickly as possible, a response is decided

3-1 Oil Spill Progression Timeline

Figure 3: Oil Spill Progression Timeline

Oil-in-water emulsion Water-in-oil emulsion

Figure 4: Emulsion Diagram

Oil particles in water. It is reduced to seawater by digestion and oxidative decom-

Photograph 1: Emulsion (Chocolate Mousse)

② The following should be noted when reporting to government

▶ When receiving contact in the first instance, it is to be confirmed as to whether

② Notifying the insurance company（Hull & Machinery Insurance and P&I

⑤ Preparation of a sea [marine] protest and confirmation and

② T he location of the spill (e.g. from a hull hole rupture or

・ Closing of the relevant valves (and in some cases those for

・ In case of tank damage, transfer the remaining oil in the

Moreover, the possibility of secondary disaster (fire, explosion, personal

As mentioned in section 2-1 of Chapter 2, Countermeasures for Maritime