UNIVERSITY OF YANGON

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF US-JAPAN SECURITY

COOPERATION

THIS RESEARCH PROJECT IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY

OF YANGON IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT
FOR THE DEGREE OF

BACHELOR OF ARTS

IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND

POLITICAL SCIENCE

NAW PAW SHALOM SHEE

(4-IR-7)
MARCH, 2024
CONTENTS
1. LILST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………
2. CHAPTER 2: Opportunities and Challenges of US-Japan Security Cooperation
 Strengthening Bilateral Alliance
 Joint Military Exercises
 Okinawa Issues and relocation of military bases

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
JSDF - Japan Self-Defense Force
UN - United Nations
JGSDF - Japan Ground Self-Defense Force
JMSDF - Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
JASDF - Japan Air Self-Defense Force
SCC - Security Consultative Committee
TMD - Theater Missile Defense
 Chapter 2
Opportunities and Challenges of US-Japan Security Cooperation
With the strong bilateral security alliance, both the US and Japan fulfill the fundamental
interests, security and mutual gains and also share the common values of democracy,
capitalism and modernism. They are the corner stone of peace and stability for the Asia-
Pacific region and the world. But on the one hand, the two countries also faced challenges in
their security cooperation such as Okinawa issues and relocation of military bases.

2.1 Strengthening Bilateral Alliance

The US and Japan become allies since the end of World War II. The bilateral alliance
has been closed after the first decades of post-Cold War period by reaffirming their mutual
security relationship and growing defense cooperation in areas ranging from theater missile
defense (TMD) to regional contingency planning and intelligence sharing. There is no doubt
that the two alliance continues to serve the core interests, security and mutual gains of both
parties. For the US, being alliance with Japan provides important strategic role in East Asia to
contain communist influence and fosters political partnership with the world’s second largest
economy. For Japan, it guarantees regional stability, a nuclear umbrella, and alignment with
the world’s largest economic and political power. Support for the alliance is broader than
ever. There are fewer opponents to the bilateral alliance among the political elite in Tokyo
and Washington than at any point since the first bilateral security treaty went into effect in
1952. Public support for the bilateral security relationship also remains high in both countries.
The US-Japan relationship is important because both share the common values of democracy,
capitalism and modernism. They are the corner stone of peace and stability for the Asia-
Pacific region and the world.1
Under the terms of the alliance, Japan allows the United States to send troops to its
territory in exchange for the United States agreeing to defend Japan against attack by a third
country. The American occupation forces of General Douglas A. MacArthur carried out
extensive military, political, economic, and social reforms before the end of World War II.

1
“The History of Japan’s Post War Constitution”, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/japan-
constitution/japans-postwar-constitution.
American service personnel stationed in Japan are an important asset in maintaining regional
peace in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era. The number of American citizens
stationed in Japan is increased by the ability of American soldiers serving in Japan to bring
their families with them to the bases. However, the sharing of costs among allies has come
under fire after the Trump administration urged Japan and other countries to increase their
contributions. According to a 2019 Congressional Research Service assessment, the cost of
Japan’s host-nation support to the United States, which includes the land, labor, and utilities
required to station American personnel across the country, is estimated between US$ 1.7
billion and US$ 2.1 billion yearly. The US spends US$ 1.9 billion to US$ 2.5 billion
annually on base operations, military development, and housing costs in Japan. Nevertheless,
the exact amount that the United States and Japan contribute to the alliance is a debate,
because it varies depending on the costs that are taken into account in the balance. The Biden
administration sought to address the issue after the Trump administration demanded
Tokyo raise its tariffs four times. The Biden administration has decided to extend the
current agreement with Japan for another year, during which Tokyo will spend US$ 1.9
billion, although negotiations are still ongoing for a new five-year agreement. Many observers
believe that as Japan has strengthened its defense and increased integration with US forces,
the alliance has become more balanced. The largest bilateral mission in the history of the
alliance was the result of the coordinated response of the countries to the earthquake and
tsunami (2011) that hit the Tohoku region of Japan.
Japan’s relations with the other nations of East Asia are smoother, although deep
hostility toward Japan and suspicion of Japanese remilitarization are kept by many Asians
who remember the days of Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japanese
sensitivity to this suspicion provides a strong constraint against strengthening its military
posture. Throughout the Cold War, both Americans and Japanese argued that the two
countries shared similar values in their commitment to liberal democracy and to market-
oriented economic policies. After the Cold War, in the absence of a common Soviet threat,
those common values and institutions would become the main glue holding the two allies
together.1

1
“Francis Fukuyama”, the US-Japan Security Relationship after the Cold War, RAND’s National Defense
Research Institute, 1993.
 As a world superpower and a close ally of the United States, Japan is forced onto the
world stage, and its every action is watched and evaluated by the international community.
The security alliance of the United States and Japan is a pillar of regional and international
stability that must be preserved. A bilateral treaty on mutual cooperation and security remains
important even in the post-Cold War era. Upholding the US-Japan Security Treaty allows the
US to maintain military bases on Japanese soil, and this has three advantages. No East Asian
country is more helpful than Japan in supporting the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific
region, and Washington could maintain its military forces in Japan more cheaply than
anywhere else in the world, including the US mainland. The US troops in Japan have access
to about three dozen bases and facilities under Article 6 of the 1960 US-Japan Security
Treaty for the defense of Japan and the security of the Far East. The April 1996 Joint
Declaration emphasized cooperation in regional multilateral security forums as a key issue for
the United States and Japan in the coming century. Through joint military exercises, the
United States and Japan can align their strategic goals and increase mutual understanding of
each other's defense policies and priorities. This promotes closer cooperation and strengthens
the overall bilateral security relationship.
The Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) operate under a unique security framework due
to the close cooperation with the United States. While this partnership provides Japan with
significant benefits, it also presents several challenges. Since its establishment, the JSDF has
gradually developed and played a larger role in the US deterrent strategy through several
independent missions. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) performed as a
strategic counterbalance to the threat from the Soviet Union’s ground forces; the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) prepared to counter the Soviet Far Eastern Fleet
deployment into the open Pacific; and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) conducted
actual missions, such as aircraft intercept operations (scrambles) against territorial violations
by the Soviet Union’s air and naval forces.
Japan's security cooperation with the United States is a politically sensitive issue, and
public opinion is often divided over the presence of American military bases and the extent of
Japan's military involvement in global affairs. Balancing security cooperation requirements
and public opinion can be difficult for Japanese decision makers. Since 2011, SDF of Japan
has been working with partners around the world. In the 2010s, a rising China, Russia, and
North Korea formed the third security wave of the post-Cold War, and international power
politics began to move rapidly toward multi-polarization. As a result of these changes, the
Abe administration has initiated reforms to improve Japan’s national security, including
establishing the National Security Council of Japan in 2013 and publishing a new national
security strategy. In addition, the Abe government also changed the official interpretation of
Japan's constitution to allow collective self-defense, and passed the required law in 2015.
Combined cooperation between the US armed forces and the JSDF only requires efforts from
both sides.1
The Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) face several challenges in their security
cooperation with the United States, despite the strong alliance between the two countries.
Japan's constitution, particularly Article 9, renounces war as a sovereign right and prohibits
the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. This limits the extent to which
the JSDF can engage in military activities, including joint operations with the US. Japan faces
security threats and territorial disputes in the region, particularly with North Korea and China.
Balancing its security needs with the interests of the US while avoiding exacerbating tensions
in the region is a delicate task.
Security legislation in effect since 2016 opens up space for more expansive JSDF
logistical support for US military operations, bilateral planning, and exercises, as well as new
authorities that somewhat resemble collective security or CSD operations in peacetime,
including use of small arms during UN peacekeeping operations and protection of foreign
militaries engaged in activities contributing to Japan’s defense. The SDF constructed its first
permanent overseas post in Djibouti in 2011 as a symbol of Japan's growing global security
role. After China opened a base there in 2017, the SDF indicated plans to expand. Tokyo
declared in 2018 that it would allocate a record US$ 240 billion over five years for defense
spending. It includes promises to invest in unmanned systems and other cutting-edge
technologies, as well as buying cutting-edge weapons from the United States. Japan was ninth
in the world in terms of military spending in 2019, but compared to other countries, it spends
only 1 percent of its total income on the armed forces (or 0.25 percent).

1
Yoshikazu Watanabe, “THE U.S.–JAPAN ALLIANCE AND ROLES OF THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE
FORCES PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE”, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, January 30, 2017.
 In October 2021, the ruling LDP also promised to increase defense spending to two
percent of GDP, although it did not give a deadline. The Defense Department budget is
expected to rise for the ninth year in a row to about US$ 51 billion in the fiscal year that
begins in April 2021. Fears of a military confrontation have been fueled by China's
deployment of police vessels near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, encouraging the countries to
create a new alliance coordination mechanism under the Obama administration. Obama was
the first US president to declare these isolated islands covered by Article 5 of the Bilateral
Security Treaty, making it abundantly clear that any attempt to use force will result in a joint
response from the US and Japan. Similar remarks were made by presidents Donald J. Trump
and Joe Biden indicate that the United States saw the East China Sea conflict as a potential
flashpoint. Amid the increasingly severe security climate in the Indo-Pacific area, Japanese
Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s cabinet approved US$ 55.9 billion (7.95 trillion yen) in
defense spending on December 22 for the fiscal year 2024, which begins in April. Together
with the growth of Japanese power and increasing problems of trade have come American
demands that Japan begin to accept responsibility for the defense of its own islands and the
waters surrounding them.1

2.2 Joint Military Exercises between the JSDF and US forces

Cooperation between the JSDF and US forces could strengthen deterrence against
potential adversaries in the region. Expanded roles could include joint military exercises,
intelligence and coordinated responses to security threats. Holding joint military exercises
allows the armed forces of both countries to train together, which improves their ability to
work together. This ensures that they can effectively communicate, coordinate and operate
together in a variety of scenarios, improving their overall military effectiveness. During
exercises like Keen Sword, the JSDF and the US military can train together in realistic
scenarios in multiple operational areas, improving their crisis management capabilities. Keen
Sword, the latest in a series of joint and bilateral field exercises since 1986, aims to improve
the interoperability and combat readiness of the JSDF and US forces.
Keen Sword is a crucial opportunity to strengthen the strong alliance between the
United States and Japan and their shared ideals, while promoting ever closer cooperation. In
1
“Article 9 and the US-Japan Security Treaty”, Asia for Educators, Columbia University,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1950_usjapan.htm.
Okinawa Prefecture, military bases on the Japanese mainland and in neighboring territorial
waters, JSDF military personnel train alongside the US Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force
and Space Forces. In addition, additional units participating in the exercise will have foreign
observers from Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom monitoring the exercise. Joint
exercises have provided an opportunity for personnel from both countries to exchange
information, tactics and best practices. It helped develop skills and improved the professional
skills of the military personnel of both sides.
The US units taking part in Keen Sword are as follows: US Indo-Pacific Command,
US Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, US Army Pacific, Pacific Air
Forces, US Forces Japan (USFJ), US Army Japan, Commander, US Naval Forces Japan
(CNFJ), 7th Fleet, 5th Air Force, CTF 70/72/73/74/75/76, 613th Air Operations Center
(AOC), 374th Airlift Wing, 18th Wing, 35th Fighter Wing, III Marine Expeditionary Force
(III MEF), 3rd Marine Division (MARDIV), III MEF Information Group (MIG), 3rd Marine
Logistics Group, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 1st
Battalion, First Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 27th Special Operations Wing, 17th Special
Operations Squadron, Marine Aircraft Group 12, and the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force.1
Exercise Keen Sword 23, which started from 11th and end on 20th November, 2022,
enhanced regional security, stability, and prosperity through multilateral cooperation and
collaboration across the Indo-Pacific region. In response to North Korea’s Missile
demonstration in 2017, the United States and Japan decided to strengthen their ballistic
missile defenses. Improvements in early detection systems and the acquisition of 104 F-35
fighter jets are part of the modernization of Japan’s air defenses. In addition to space and
cyber operations, the US and Japanese militaries are working together to support maritime
stability in the region. US Indo-Pacific Command B-1 bombers and F-16 fighter jets
conducted a bilateral exercise with Japan Air Defense Force F-15 fighters over the Sea of
Japan on February 19, 2023. This exercise was conducted to demonstrate the rapid response
capability of the countries, high readiness of forces, close coordination, bilateral
interoperability and credible deterrence. The United States and Japan remain committed to
working together to ensure peace and security throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Defense

1
“Japan Self-Defense Forces and U.S. military begin biennial exercise Keen Sword 2023”, US Forces Japan,
Nov 9, 2022, https://www.usfj.mil/Media/Press-Releases/Article-View/Article/3215535/japan-self-defense-
forces-and- us-military-begin-biennial-exercise-keen-sword-20/.
officials in Tokyo said the two countries planned to complete the Glide Phase Interceptor
(GPI), a US$ 532 million joint development, in the early 2030s. On 18th August, when US
President Biden visited South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime
Minister Fumio Kishida at Camp David, both the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the
US Department of Defense (DoD) issued a statement.1
Yama Sakura is an annual bilateral command exercise that facilitates the sharing of
military knowledge and tactics while practicing imaginative skills for the defense of Japan. In
the fictitious defense scenario of the training simulation, Japanese and American forces had to
work together against a fictitious enemy. Yama Sakura exercise provides military leaders with
a controlled environment to practice coordination, planning and decision-making, which are
critical components of a joint and combined military operation.
Faced with threats such as the increasingly assertive maritime presence of the Chinese
Communist Party and the ballistic missile launches of North Korea, Yama Sakura emphasizes
the critical role of allied cooperation in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. With the
largest ever Yama Sakura exercise in 2023, trilateral military cooperation has begun a new
chapter. In December, more than 6,000 soldiers from the Australian Defense Force, the JSDF
and the US Army took part in the exercise Yama Sakura 85.
From 15th to 17th, February 2024, at Naval Base White Beach in Okinawa, Japan, the
US Navy’s West Coast Special Warfare Unit partnered with the Japanese Navy’s (JMSDF)
Special Boat Unit (SBU) to take action. cooperative training on navigation,
communications, radar and other subjects. The purpose of the joint exercise was to
improve interoperability and security plans in the Indo-Pacific region and to modernize the
alliance between American and Japanese forces. The presence of American forces in Japan
and the resources of the JSDF act as a deterrent against attacks or threats in the region. Close
cooperation between the two countries would surely improve the deterrence posture and
strengthen the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.

2.3 Okinawa Issues and relocation of military bases

1
Kosuke Takahashi, “Japan approves Record Defense Budget for fiscal year 2024”, Naval News, Dec 22, 2023,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/12/japan-approves-record-defense-budget-for-fiscal-year-2024/.
 The United States occupied the Japanese island of Okinawa on 1 st April 1945. It was
the largest amphibious assault in the Pacific during World War II. Okinawa is ideally located
to provide access to several countries in East and Southeast Asia. Okinawa was under US
military control for 27 years after World War II, so the return of Okinawa to Japanese
sovereignty should have marked the beginning of a more peaceful and prosperous
period.1 During the American occupation, the American army captured a large part of the flat
land of Okinawa, which was considered very useful. This forced local residents to build their
homes on the limited land surrounding these bases, leading to a socioeconomic structure
centered around the bases.
Okinawans have never willingly provided land for construction of the bases. 70.6
percent of the USFJ (US Forces Japan)’s exclusive land area in Japan is concentrated in
Okinawa, which is only 0.6 percent of Japan’s land area. The US military bases make up
fifteen percent of the land on the main island of Okinawa, home to more than ninety percent
of Okinawa’s population. Most of the US military bases in Okinawa are concentrated on flat
and very useful land in the central and southern urban areas of the main island of Okinawa. In
mainland Japan, about eighty-seven percent of the land on US military installations and sites
is owned by the government, while in Okinawa the ratio is about twenty-three percent. The
remaining seventy-seven percent belong to the county, municipalities and private individuals.
In addition, much of Okinawa's land is owned by private citizens.
Although most observers consider the Okinawa problem to be one of US military
bases, it is actually related to the colonial history of the Ryukyu Islands and the violation of
the rights of the indigenous Okinawans. 2 Okinawa hosts seventy-four percent of all US
military bases in Japan, although it is only 0.6 percent of Japan’s territory. The existence of
huge US military installations and territories negatively affects the lives and nature of
Japanese people in many ways. Aircraft noise in particular has a significant impact on the
health of nearby residents. The Japanese government will pay substantial compensation to
residents near Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma after a court ruled in favor of residents
who sought compensation. From the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 until the end of
1
Jon Mitchell, “What awaits Okinawa 40 years after reversion?”, The Japan Times, May 13, 2012,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2012/05/13/general/what-awaits-okinawa-40-years-after-reversion/.
2
Daisuke Minami, “The Okinawa Problem: the forgotten History of Japanese Colonialism and Ryukyuan
Indigeneity”, Rising Powers Initiative, https://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/publication/the-okinawa-
problem- the-forgotten-history-of-japanese-colonialism-and-ryukyuan-indigeneity/.
2015, there were 676 accidents involving aircraft. A total of 3,796 hectares of land were
burned in forest fires caused by ammunition exercises. Toxic substances were also found at
former military installations. The people of Okinawa continued to be unduly burdened by the
presence and operation of US military bases.1
Moreover, Okinawa continues to experience frequent incidents and accidents involving,
among others members of the US military and civilian components. Since Okinawa returned
to Japan in 1972, 5,896 crimes have been committed, including 574 heinous crimes. Many
Okinawans have called for the bases to be removed since three American soldiers raped a
twelve years old Okinawan girl in 1995. The US and Japanese governments initiated the
Special Actions for Okinawa (SACO) negotiations. The purpose of these talks was to
identify ways to reduce US military violations and to explore broader issues related to the US
military presence. The discussions outlined 27 measures for which the US government is
responsible to reduce the burden on Okinawa’s security relations. These measures include
land restoration, noise reduction and measures to transform education and questions
about sexual harassment and abuse by the military remain unresolved. Furthermore, in
April 2016, a despicable incident occurred again, where an on-base US civilian worker was
indicted on charges that he raped a twenty years old woman resulting in death, and abandoned
her body. Even after the rape, local pressure on the mainland shares Okinawa’s defense
burden. Ultimately, this meant moving some token aircraft from Okinawa to mainland Japan,
and moving field artillery exercises to five locations on mainland Japan, with training held
once a year in each area. Most units in Okinawa either stay where they are or move to
different parts of the island.
Although most Japanese support the US-Japan security alliance, according to
government statistics, they seem to do so almost as much as on the country’s main islands.
Japan is obligated under the Mutual Security Treaty to provide land for US military
installations. Where these bases are located in Japan is not specified and is purely a domestic
matter. The presence of US military bases in Japan can have environmental and social impacts
on local communities, including noise pollution, environmental degradation, and conflicts
over land use. Addressing these issues and security cooperation with the United States is an
ongoing challenge for both governments.
1
“US Military Bases Issues in Okinawa”, OKINAWA PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT, Washington D.C
office, https://dc-office.org/basedata.
 To reduce hostilities, the United States and Japan decided in 2006 to move Futenma to a
more sparsely populated area in Okinawa and station 8,000 marines in Guam. However, the
contract has not yet been signed. In early 2019, many local officials and citizens voted against
the expulsion plan and opposed the continuation of the Okinawa base. Long delays in
development and rising costs have hampered the project and put the move in doubt. A
controversial issue was particularly the relocation of Futenma Airport, located in a densely
populated area of Okinawa. Plans to move the base to Henoko Bay in northern Okinawa have
faced strong opposition from local residents and environmental activists who are concerned
about the impact on the marine environment. Despite local opposition, US forces were likely
to remain in Okinawa, depending on available options. Even though efforts have been made
to mitigate impacts on local communities and address environmental issues, challenges
remain in finding a mutually acceptable solution. At the UN Human Rights Conference in
Geneva in September 2023, Tamaki said that the accumulation of US military bases on
Okinawa is a threat to international peace. He also mentioned that the Japanese government is
forcibly filling valuable sea areas for new US military bases.1
Challenges of Changes in threat perception are not the only reason for Japan to
reappraise its role in the US-Japan security relationship. After the Cold War, when the United
States is a military and political superpower with economic feet of clay, Japan is an economic
superpower with the status of a political pygmy. The end of the Cold War and the uncertain
future of the new international order permeated the Japanese way of thinking. New goals were
discussed, including an assessment of the consequences of the lack of an independent national
security policy, a solution to Japan’s dependence on the United States, and full official
recognition by the government of Japan’s responsibility for aggression against its neighbors.
During the second world war, changes in Japan’s external environment are also difficult, as
the world order is changing from bipolar to unipolar or even multipolar. The post-Cold War
period was also featured international security threats, including a combination of aggressive
intent and military capabilities. Thus, Japan was more concerned with the unpredictability of
its own security environment than the current intentions or military capabilities of its
neighbors.

1
Huaxia, “Japan begins work for US base relocation in Okinawa despite local opposition”, Xinhuanet,
January 10, 2024, https://english.news.cn/20240110/3e6fbad3edd0440bbf9a65571d4f64a9/c.html.
 After the cold war, changes in domestic politics in most communist and ex-
communist countries and the subsequent breakdown of the clear distinction between East and
West made the political environment in Asia very volatile. Japan’s difficulty in responding its
changing security environment is the lack of Russian stability-in both domestic and foreign
affairs-which creates an uncertain security environment. After Russia, China is the Asian
country with the strongest military capability. According to China’s Territorial Waters Law
adopted in 1992, China claimed Japan’s Senkaku Islands in addition to the Spratly Islands.
Therefore, a stronger China became a competitor or even an adversary for Japan. The
military confrontation between North and South Korea has remained essentially unchanged
since the end of the Korean War, and the Korean Peninsula was a destabilizing factor in the
security of East Asia, including Japan. Although both North and South Koreans have bitter
memories for the Japanese colonial invasion, South Koreans developed strong economic ties
with the Japanese and learned to cooperate with them.
Japan has learned that the post-Cold War era is not free of armed conflicts, that Japan
is not ready to take a leading role in international political relations, and that the country
cannot achieve international importance through economic means alone. The Gulf War which
happened in the post-Cold War era also taught most Japanese to realize that changes in their
international role and in their domestic decision-making process must be made. The Japanese
have also realized that they have to take a more active role in the United Nations, which will
probably grow in importance in the post-cold war era. It will be difficult for Japan to achieve
a larger role because it does not have a permanent seat on the Security Council and because
Japan's peace constitution has been interpreted to prohibit sending Japanese troops
abroad.1-------------

Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be stated that the security alliance and close cooperation between Japan
and the United States increased deterrence and strengthened the defense position of both
countries. In the post-Cold War period, relations between the United States and Japan
improved, and Japan depended on the United States for its security. Security cooperation
between the two countries promoted regional stability by emphasizing respect for
1
Francis Fukuyama, “The US-Japan Security Relationship after the Cold War”, RAND’s National Defense
Research Institute, 1993.
international law, freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Both
countries played a key role in promoting a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific region. There
are many opportunities and challenges for Japan to build a security alliance with the United
States. The challenges of changing threat perceptions are not the only reason Japan has
reassessed its role in the US-Japan security relationship. With the challenges facing post-Cold
War Japan and the opportunities offered by security cooperation with the United States, the
bilateral security alliance between the United States and Japan will continue to strengthen.
Effective communication, mutual respect and shared commitment to common goals are the
key to overcoming obstacles and deepening collaboration between the two countries.

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