Group = 04

1. Haroon khan
2. Umar Khetab
3. Abdul Malik
4. Haseeb Ullah
The Militarization of the Pakistani State: An Exploration of the Socio-
Political Dynamics

In my analysis of the causes of military intervention in Pakistan, I argue

that the country’s political instability and the failure of its civilian
institutions have been central factors in allowing the military to assume
a dominant role in governance. From the very beginning, Pakistan's
political structure has been heavily influenced by a military-
bureaucratic oligarchy that has often eclipsed civilian leadership. This
pattern of civil-military relations stands in stark contrast to India, where
British colonial rule established norms of civilian control over the
military.
One of the most significant aspects of Pakistan's history is the repeated
military interventions. These interventions have occurred on four key
occasions: in October 1958, March 1969, July 1977, and October 1999,
with each instance justified on the grounds of national instability. The
first military coup, led by General Ayub Khan in 1958, marked a pivotal
moment when the military assumed control, claiming the need to rescue
the nation from chaos. This justification of military action has remained
consistent in subsequent takeovers, often framed as necessary to restore
order amid political and social disarray.
The roots of Pakistan's instability can be traced to a variety of pre-1958
factors. Ethnic and ideological divisions, combined with administrative
inefficiencies and regional conflicts, made governance increasingly
difficult. The Muslim League, despite being the central political force,
failed to institutionalize effectively, leading to a centralization of power
that undermined democratic processes. The repeated dissolution of
provincial and national governments created a fragmented political
landscape, where the military and bureaucracy maintained their
superior positions. This breakdown in political leadership made it
impossible for civilian governments to develop a functional and
participatory democracy, which eventually led to the military’s
increasing political influence.
I contend that the military’s intervention in politics was not simply a
reaction to external threats or crises; rather, it was a gradual process.
Initially, the military’s role was limited to maintaining law and order.
However, due to the lack of stable political mobilization and the failure
of civilian authorities to address pressing issues, the military began to
step into the political arena, becoming an active player in decision-
making. Over time, the military’s role expanded from supporting
governments to replacing them, culminating in overt military rule.
In evaluating the causes of repeated military intervention, I conclude
that there are no singular factors at play. The weaknesses of political
institutions, coupled with ethnic and ideological divisions and the
failure of civilian governance, provided a fertile ground for military
involvement. These factors, along with the inefficiency of political
leaders, have transformed Pakistan into a praetorian state — a state
where the military's power is not only dominant but also deeply
embedded in the political fabric.
Today, as Pakistan faces new challenges, such as the Talibanization of
the tribal areas, it is clear that the causes of military intervention
remain relevant. The country continues to stand at a historical
crossroads, grappling with the legacy of military dominance in its
political system. The persistence of these issues suggests that until there
is a significant overhaul of Pakistan’s political institutions and the
military’s role in governance, the cycle of military intervention is likely
to continue.
Untimily demise of Quaid e azam Muhammad ali jinah;
Pakistan, a newly-formed nation, faced significant challenges due to
ideological, ethnic, and administrative issues. The country’s unity was
largely driven by Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s leadership, which
emphasized democratic constitutionalism. However, Jinnah’s death in
September 1948 created a political vacuum, and his successor, Liaquat
Ali Khan, though courageous, lacked Jinnah’s authority. After Liaquat's
assassination in October 1951, Pakistan's political system began to
unravel. The bureaucratic elite seized power, and the parliamentary
democracy that Jinnah had envisioned began to collapse.
Jinnah had emphasized the supremacy of civilian government, but his
death, combined with the lack of a functioning constitution, allowed the
military and defense ministry to gain prominence. This shift in power
led to the military’s increasing influence in politics. The failure to
establish democratic institutions and the contrast with India’s stable
leadership under Nehru left Pakistan vulnerable. Ultimately, the
military filled the leadership gap, leading to the erosion of Pakistan's
democratic foundations.
Provincialism
The geographical separation of East and West Pakistan produced not
only administrative, physical but social, economic and political
problems as well. Distance made communication irregular and
expensive. Misunderstandings arose easily and were difficult to dispel.
Since the capital was in the West wing, East Pakistan felt neglected.
Differences in languages and cultures were obstacles in the way of
national integration. In a public speech in Dacca, on March 21, 1948,
the Quaid-i-Azam made an impassioned appeal for national
consolidation.10 He warned against the provincialism signaled by the
language controversy that raised its head in the East Bengal only a few
months after the establishment of Pakistan. The weight of the Quaid-i-
Azam’s authority suppressed agitation at the time, but the issue
remained alive. Some years later it assumed formidable proportions.
Finally, the controversy was settled when the 1956 constitution
recognized both Urdu and Bengali as the national languages of
Pakistan.11 The demand for maximum autonomy for East Pakistan was
unique in that it was not merely a demand for maintaining a cultural
identity. The fact of physical separation had always meant economic
separation at least in the sense that there was no easy and free mobility
of capital and labor. Historically speaking, the Punjabi-Bengali
controversy delayed, more than any other factor, the constitution-
making process in Pakistan. Geographical factors separated the two
wings of Pakistan by a distance of about one thousand miles. East
Pakistan presented a completely different picture. Its enormous
problems, on which the opposition thrived, were the result of historical
forces as well as post-Independence official policies. Among the major
problems was the under-representation of Bengalis in the services - a
legacy of pre-Independence days. The Bengalis had practically no
representation in the armed forces,primarily due to earlier British
theories of martial races, the imperial defence policy, and the physical
standards laid down for recruitment. Pakistan was an agricultural
country and poor. East Pakistan was economically worse off than West
Pakistan. The Pakistan Muslim League policies were purportedly
directed toward overall economic development, but focused on West-
Pakistan, which contributed to Bengali deprivation and alienation.
Rafique Afzal provides a vivid description of the events and personalities
of this period. He blames political leaders for promoting the politics of
non-consensus. He has argued that during this period it was the rivalry
between the Punjabi and Bengali political leaders and the factionalism
within the Muslim League that obstructed the development of party
politics and led to the decay of the party system.13 Mushtaq Ahmed also
concurs with this view and considers non-consensus among the political
leaders and factionalism within the Muslim League the principal causes
for the non-institutionalization of party politics.14 The Army watched
closely the ever-growing frustration of Bengalis with the system. The
Army was looking for a suitable opportunity to disrupt the
political process.
CONSTITUTION MAKING DILEMA
Constitution-making in Pakistan was delayed for nine years due to key
issues between East and West Pakistan. East Pakistan, with a larger
population, demanded greater provincial autonomy, while West
Pakistan favored a strong central government. The issue of
representation also played a major role, as East Pakistan wanted
universal adult franchise, which the West was unwilling to concede.
Additionally, there was a language controversy between Bengali in the
East and Urdu in the West, with debates over whether one or both
languages should be recognized as state languages.
The regional and political tensions grew after the death of Liaquat Ali
Khan, and the East Pakistanis felt neglected by the West. The West
controlled the military, bureaucracy, and resources, which led to
feelings of regionalism in East Pakistan. To address this imbalance, the
One Unit system was introduced in 1956, merging West Pakistan's
provinces into a single unit to counterbalance East Pakistan's
population and political influence.
Despite these conflicts, the 1956 Constitution was finally adopted,
establishing a federal structure with two units: East and West Pakistan.
The Constitution introduced a parliamentary government, with equal
representation for both regions. However, political instability continued,
and in October 1958, a military coup led by Ayub Khan abrogated the
Constitution, imposed martial law, and shifted Pakistan from a
bureaucratic state to a military regime.
EXTREME POLITICAL INTABILITY
After Pakistan’s independence, political instability was primarily caused
by a crisis in leadership. Following the death of Quaid-i-Azam and the
assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, the power shifted to the bureaucracy,
which, along with the military, began dominating Pakistan’s political
system. From 1951 to 1958, the country had seven Prime Ministers, but
the real power lay with the bureaucrats and the military. The rise of
bureaucrats Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza as Governor
Generals, with support from military figures like General Ayub Khan,
further solidified this power structure.
The political fragmentation, manipulation of rivalries, and undermining
of democratic norms created chaos. In 1954, when political leaders tried
to reduce the Governor General’s powers, the bureaucratic-military
alliance responded by dissolving the Constituent Assembly. During this
period, political instability was intense, with six Prime Ministers in just
two and a half years. Amid this turmoil, General Ayub Khan, who had
long harbored ambitions of military intervention, seized the opportunity
to impose martial law in 1958, leading to the resignation of Iskander
Mirza and the establishment of military rule under Ayub Khan.
FACTIONALISM: THE BREAKDOWN OF PML
The breakdown of the Muslim League (ML) played a crucial role in
Pakistan's early political instability. Despite its role in creating
Pakistan, the ML failed to evolve from a nationalist movement into a
functioning political party capable of leading the nation. The absence of
a solid political program and leadership after the death of Quaid-i-
Azam left the ML without direction. This failure led to internal
factionalism, personal rivalries, and a lack of contact with the masses.
As a result, the party lost its credibility, and the bureaucracy and
military gradually filled the power vacuum by default, as they were
better organized and could maintain governance.
The lack of a well-developed political party organization and the ML's
inability to mediate between the government and the people hindered
democracy. The country’s political process became fragmented, and
resources were unevenly distributed, especially between provinces like
Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan. Ultimately, the absence of strong
political parties led to the collapse of democracy, with military and
bureaucratic elites stepping in to take control, setting the stage for
military rule. This failure to establish a stable, democratic political
culture created a power vacuum, allowing non-democratic forces to
dominate Pakistan's political landscape
FAILURE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
After Jinnah's death, Pakistan’s political leadership failed to guide the
nation effectively. The second-line leadership was unable to translate
Jinnah's political achievements into a strong democratic system.
Factionalism, provincialism, and power struggles dominated the early
years of independence, with Pakistan having seven Prime Ministers and
eight cabinets from 1947 to 1958. Political instability was further
exacerbated by the lack of consensus within the Constituent Assembly,
which failed to draft a constitution despite years of deliberation.
The heads of state, Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza, repeatedly
interfered in politics, undermining democratic norms and exacerbating
instability. These leaders, driven by personal ambitions, lacked the
vision or competence to stabilize the country. The political decay
created a power vacuum that allowed the bureaucracy and military to
gain influence, ultimately paving the way for a military takeover.
Scholars like Rizvi and Sayeed argue that the lack of competent
leadership and organized political parties, combined with regional
divisions and feudal cleavages, led to the collapse of democratic
institutions and the rise of military rule in Pakistan.
INTERFERENCE HEAD OF THE STATE
In Pakistan's early years, the heads of state, Ghulam Muhammad and
Iskander Mirza, both former bureaucrats, repeatedly violated
democratic norms by interfering in political affairs. In a parliamentary
system, the head of state is supposed to be non-partisan and have a
nominal role, but both Ghulam Muhammad and Mirza actively
manipulated political processes, undermining the parliamentary system.
They used their connections in the bureaucracy and military to control
politics, frequently dissolving governments and undermining Prime
Ministers.
Ghulam Muhammad dismissed Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin in
1953, even though he had majority support, marking a "constitutional
coup." He also dissolved the first Constituent Assembly in 1954 after it
passed a bill limiting his powers. At the provincial level, the federal
government, under the influence of the head of state, interfered in local
politics, further destabilizing the country.
These political conditions weakened civilian governments and gave the
military significant influence. The military, particularly General Ayub
Khan, played a crucial role in shaping Pakistan's foreign and security
policies, including aligning with the U.S. in the 1950s. By 1958, the
political crisis culminated in Iskander Mirza declaring Martial Law and
appointing Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA),
marking the beginning of Pakistan's repeated military interventions and
the end of its fledgling parliamentary democracy.
ROLE OF JUDIXARY
The role of the judiciary in Pakistan has been critical but often
compromised, especially in the early years following independence. In a
democracy, the judiciary is supposed to protect the constitution and
safeguard citizens' fundamental rights, acting as a check on the
executive. However, in Pakistan, the higher judiciary became
subservient to the executive, failing to uphold democratic principles. A
key example is Chief Justice Munir's 1955 ruling in the Maulvi
Tamizuddin case, where he justified the arbitrary dissolution of the first
Constituent Assembly by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad,
invoking the "Doctrine of Necessity." This decision opened the door for
military and political adventurism in Pakistan. Similarly, when the
Constituent Assembly was dissolved again in 1954, the Sindh Chief
Court initially ruled in favor of the Assembly's legitimacy, but the
Federal Court, led by Justice Munir, invalidated this decision, siding
with the Governor-General. In 1958, Justice Munir also legitimized
General Ayub Khan's military coup by invoking the doctrine that a
"successful revolution is legal." This paved the way for military rule and
subsequent coups, highlighting the judiciary's failure to protect
democratic processes. The judiciary's failure to check the arbitrary
actions of the executive contributed to Pakistan's militarization and the
undermining of its parliamentary democracy.
THE PAKISTAN ARMY AND INDIA SYNDROME
The role of the judiciary in Pakistan has been critical but often
compromised, especially in the early years following independence. In a
democracy, the judiciary is supposed to protect the constitution and
safeguard citizens' fundamental rights, acting as a check on the
executive. However, in Pakistan, the higher judiciary became
subservient to the executive, failing to uphold democratic principles.
A key example is Chief Justice Munir's 1955 ruling in the Maulvi
Tamizuddin case, where he justified the arbitrary dissolution of the first
Constituent Assembly by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad,
invoking the "Doctrine of Necessity." This decision opened the door for
military and political adventurism in Pakistan. Similarly, when the
Constituent Assembly was dissolved again in 1954, the Sindh Chief
Court initially ruled in favor of the Assembly's legitimacy, but the
Federal Court, led by Justice Munir, invalidated this decision, siding
with the Governor-General.
In 1958, Justice Munir also legitimized General Ayub Khan's military
coup by invoking the doctrine that a "successful revolution is legal."
This paved the way for military rule and subsequent coups, highlighting
the judiciary's failure to protect democratic processes. The judiciary's
failure to check the arbitrary actions of the executive contributed to
Pakistan's militarization and the undermining of its parliamentary
democracy.
HOMOGENITY OF PAKISTAN ARMY
The Pakistan Army's dominance in the country’s politics is largely due
to its ethnic homogeneity, with most officers and ranks coming from
Punjab and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). This has
fostered strong internal cohesion and links with the civilian bureaucratic
elite, who share similar ethnic backgrounds. Only three Army Chiefs in
Pakistan's history have come from outside these regions, leading to
grievances in Sindh and Balochistan, where ethnic groups feel
underrepresented. This ethnic imbalance has reinforced perceptions of
Punjabi dominance, contributing to the military's political involvement
and interventions.
ABSENCE OF LAND REFORM
The absence of land reforms in Pakistan has hindered democratic
development, as large landholdings and feudalism are inherently
opposed to democratic principles. Landlords, who are the most powerful
and entrenched class in the country, dominate the rural vote and have
significant influence in the political, bureaucratic, and military spheres.
Despite several leaders, including Ayub Khan and Bhutto, not
implementing meaningful land reforms, this feudal class has maintained
control over the state. As a result, Pakistan has lacked a strong,
educated middle class, and political power has remained concentrated
in a civil-military-political oligarchy, resistant to change and reform.
INTERNATIONAL FACTOR
The international context, particularly the Cold War rivalry between the
U.S. and the USSR, played a significant role in shaping Pakistan's
political landscape. While India rejected U.S. alliances, Pakistan
embraced U.S.-led military pacts like SEATO and CENTO in the 1950s,
primarily due to security concerns regarding India. The U.S. found it
easier to deal with military rulers rather than elected political leaders,
which contributed to military intervention in Pakistan's politics. Over
the decades, U.S. support for military regimes, such as those led by
Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Musharraf, hindered the development of
democracy in Pakistan. The U.S. prioritized its strategic interests,
particularly countering communism and securing support during the
Afghan war, often overlooking democratic processes in Pakistan.
Conclusion
In short, Pakistan inherited the well established tradition of supremacy
of civil-polititical over military institution under British political theory.
Within a few years of her independence, Pakistan encountered the ever
growing influence of military into politics. Ultimately, unlike India,
Pakistan degenerated into a praetorian state with dreadful political,
social and economic fallouts. This process of militarization of Pakistan
owes its transformation to multiple variables as have been discussed. No
single factor can be cited as the sole cause; rather, a cluster of causes
led to the intervention of military into politics in Pakistan.