Impediments to Democracy in

Pakistan

Noor Fatima∗

Abstract
Military interventions remain a significant feature in the
politics of the developing world. This is particularly the case
in many countries of South Asia where domestic military
actions have interrupted the political and democratic
process. In the political discourse, democracy means “rule of
the people (demos)”. This doctrine requires a country to
have a fully developed political, economic and social system
in which the state is represented by an incumbent
government that enjoys its sovereignty through the will of
people. Through the long history of political development,
“democracy” has connotations frequently been coupled with
terms like “commonwealth” and “social contract”. Today,
despite the fact that most countries declare themselves to be
democracies, in practice they only pay it lip service. The real
spirit of democracy, called by Rousseau “the general will”,
is not being realized, especially in the underdeveloped
countries. There is a universal concern today about the
status of democracy. On the one hand, all the world forums
created in the West, including the United Nations, are
urging the developing countries to adopt democratic
systems. Yet on the other hand, it has become difficult for
the developing world to apply democracy in letter and
spirit. To think of a proper and sustainable democratic

∗ Acting Chairperson/ Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and

International Relations, International Islamic University, Islamabad.
116 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXIV, No.I, 2013

society will remain a dream for the people of Pakistan,

unless it is supported by socio-economic structure as its
base. One can learn from its development in Europe, but
in Pakistan there is a great disconnect between the two.
So although the country has gone through its
constitutional development and adopted a constitution, its
weak political structure and low level of economic
development allow the military to intervene in Pakistan’s
politics intermittently.
Introduction
The question of why democracy could not take root in
Pakistan has many dimensions. There is a popular and
general consensus that the most important element in
explaining the failure of democracy is the repeated military
intervention into domestic politics, as well as the ideological
environment of Pakistan. The basic reason, of course, lies in
the absence of a firm socio-economic structure, which in turn
leads to the weakness of the effective political institutions in
a society.1 Most of the social scientists discussing the failure
of democracy in Pakistan emphasize only secondary factors.
Thus Shuja Nawaz opines that the interaction of the military
and political leaders, along with their respective ambitions
and inclinations, accounts for some of the soldiers’
interventions.2
Military interventions that topple civilian regimes are not
uncommon in underdeveloped countries in Africa, Asia and
Latin America. But their techniques and justifications are not
monolithic. Sometimes military dictators will take refuge in
ideology to justify their takeovers, or raise the patriotic
slogan of rooting out corruption from the civilian
administration. Such charges of venality, mismanagement
and lawlessness, of course, simply highlight the institutional
weakness of a civilian government. On the ideological level

1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 13th ed.

(London: Yale University Press, 1977),196.
2 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within
(Karachi: Oxford University Press. 2008), 139.
Impediments to Democracy in Pakistan 117

of justification, one can cite the intervention of General

Pinochet which toppled the elected government of President
Allende of Chile. General Pinochet, supported by the United
States, made it a point to dislodge the recently elected,
radical-reformist (sometimes labeled as pro-Soviet)
administration in his country. In this context one might
include the demand in July 1977 of General Zia-ul-Haq for
the resignation of the democratic government of Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan. In other cases
the army has claimed to be more righteous and convinced
civilian governments to abdicate through a sheer show of
force. This happened in Pakistan in October 1999 when
General Pervez Musharraf demanded the departure of the
then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. This reflects the model of
the “praetorian” state. For, as Ilhan Niaz notes, Musharraf’s
stated objective was to establish a unity of command that
would enable the praetorian center to exercise direct control
at the local level, while circumventing the higher bureaucracy
as well as the provincial and national politicians and
assemblies.3
After a military takeover, the dictator usually introduces
his own system of government only after abrogating the
constitution, or placing it in abeyance. General Zia took
refuge in an ideology of Islam and Pakistan, and asked for
changes in the constitution and the laws of the land so that
they would accord with Shariah. Adherents of democracy
commonly think such arguments are mere excuses to justify
the unconstitutional steps taken by the military dictator, and
this suggests the hypothesis that a coup d’etat is less likely
to happen in countries whose higher socio-economic
development is supported by strong state institutions.
The theoretical foundation of such an assumption is that
military interventions are very much related to the socio-
economic conditions found in developing countries.
Moreover, a strong civilian government supported by political

3 Ilhan Niaz, The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan: 1947-2008

(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 150.
118 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXIV, No.I, 2013

institutions and democratic values are the indicators of the

level of political development in any society. Samuel
Huntington argues that the theory of political development
and decay stresses the importance of the institutionalization
of political organizations and procedures.4 Huntington
conceptualizes that where there is evidence of a weak
institutional framework, a vacuum of leadership exists and,
since army remains a contender for power and also has
leadership potential, it can easily take control. For him this is
a type of “Praetorian State” which is marked by the
politicization of the social structure due to absence of
political institutionalization. The military’s interventions in
Pakistan present just such a praetorian model. In this
respect, S.E. Finer, a pioneer in this field, has questioned
the role of the military in a society and asked: just what
degree of separation should there be between a civil
government and its army? He emphasises that a
government can be efficient enough to keep the civil-military
relationship in balance by ensuring that the need for
intervention by the armed forces in a society is minimal.5
For Finer, countries with minimal political cultures attract
persistent military interventions. Hassan Askari Rizvi, who
has also analysed the reasons and causes for military
interventions in Pakistan, seeks to explain how the
professional military establishment of pre-partition times
transformed itself into a national political actor. He also
refers to an institutional imbalance which is reinforced by two
inter-related trends in the political domain. One is the
process of political decay and degeneration which was set in
motion soon after independence. And the second is that the
bureaucracy and the military maintained a professional
disposition that is marked by hierarchy, discipline, and esprit
de corps. He believes that these developments accentuate
the institutional imbalance and have worked to the
disadvantage of civilian leaders. The result has been that a

4 Niaz, The Culture of Power and Governance, 150.

5 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1962). 271
Impediments to Democracy in Pakistan 119

weak and fragmented political structure has been unable to

sustain itself without support and cooperation from the
bureaucracy and the military. This has enabled the
bureaucracy and the military to enhance their role in policy-
making and management, and they began to dominate
politics.6
Veena Kukreja has attempted to study military
intervention by applying a theoretical framework to an
empirical study of civil-military relations in South Asian
countries, specifically Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. She
highlights that military interventions in Pakistan took place in
conditions of weak civil institutions, and so closely resembles
a praetorian model. But at the same time, in the case of
Bangladesh and Pakistan, the role of the military in politics is
less rigorously tied to a theory because military leaders have
resorted to the formula of legitimacy and consolidation. Her
proposition is borne out by the low level of political and
economic institutional stability, and the volatile socio-
economic environments of Pakistan and Bangladesh. And in
fact, a military intervention is a clear reflection of the
weakness of the political system and institutions which are
unable to respond to demands for political participation by
outsiders. Therefore, they end up succumbing to military
interventions.7 Likewise, as P.F. Gorman points out, military
interventions generally take place in countries of a lower
income status.8
Another theoretical approach focuses on the centrality of
the military. This suggests that where there are greater
resources and cohesion in a military establishment, there is
a greater likelihood of military intervention in politics.
Lawrence Mayer and John Burnett have developed a

6 Hasan Askari Rizivi, “The Military and Politics in Pakistan”, Journal of Asian
and African Studies, 26, no. 1-2 (1991): 27-42.
7 Veena Kukreja, Civil Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh
and India (New Dehli, Sage Publication, 1991).
8 P.F. Gorman, “Internal Defense and the Less Developed Countries”, in A.
Jordan (ed.) Issues of National Security in the 1970's (New York: Fredrick
A. Praeger Publishers, 1997), 126-150.
120 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXIV, No.I, 2013

concept of the “centrality” of the military within a state. In

their view the sectorial interests of the military, and its
parasitic nature as an institution, gives it centrality to the
state’s claim on the legitimate use of violence, and allows
the soldiers to dominate politics.9 J.C. Jenkins and A.S.
Kposowa, while agreeing with and endorsing these views,
add only that this occurs especially if the civilian institutions
are weak. Therefore, the stronger the military institutions are
in proportion to the national economy, the weaker will be the
institutions of civil society and politics.10 As Finer has pointed
out, a centralized chain of command and efficient
communications network make military officers a cohesive
group that enables them to organize effectively to seize
power.11
The Concept of Democracy and its Evaluation
The concept of democracy is very ancient. Generally, it
means arriving at a consensus in a gathering where either
all, or a group selected by all, is considered to represent the
whole of a society. In certain ancient social groups there
were a variety of such democratic practices, like the early
Punchiyat system of the Aryans or the citizen assemblies of
some Greek city states. The word “democracy” is derived
from the two Greek words demos (people) and kratos (rule),
and so means “rule of the people” or “the rule of the
majority”. Plato did not like it, and Aristotle ridiculed it by
calling it “mobocracy”, which means the rule of the crowd.
There are many definitions of democracy, but one of the
most popular and acceptable is Abraham Lincoln’s that it is
“government of the people, by the people, for the people”.12

9 Lawrence C. Mayer & John. H. Burnett, Politics in Industrial Societies: A

Comparative Perspective (New York: John Wile & Sons, 1977).
10 J.C. Jenkins & A.S. Kposowa, "The Political Origins of African Military
Coups", International Studies Quarterly, 36, no. 3 (1992): 271-291.
11 S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1988).
12 US President Abraham Lincoln, in the Gettysburg Address, delivered on
November 19, 1863, stored at the Library at Congress, placed at
www.virtualgettysburg.com/exhibit/lincoln/feature.htmlcited. Also cited in the
Impediments to Democracy in Pakistan 121

When democracy was practiced in the Greek city state

of Athens in fifth and fourth centuries BC, the population was
divided into two classes: free citizen and slaves. All the legal
rights were reserved for free citizens, and slaves (and
women) could not participate in the decision-making. Any
person not living his life according to the will of the people
could be ostracized. This was a formal exclusion from a
group for ten years from Athenian territory, through social
rejection. However, the psychology of ostracism goes much
further, and it has been defined as “...any behaviour in which
a group or individual excludes and ignores another group or
individual”.13 All the people of a particular locality would
gather for law-making, more often than not in the market
place. But to be selected as an office bearer, there were
conditions. For example, one had to own some property. If
we study the earlier practices of democracy in the West
European countries and the United States of America, this
same condition was also applicable there for casting a vote.
Yet the major difference between the modern democracy
and that practiced in ancient Athens is that voters now
seldom participate directly in the process of law-making.
Rather, they choose their representatives to speak on their
behalf in the legislative assembly, whereas in Athens the
citizens were part of the law-making process throughout the
year.
The British Heritage of Democratic Institutions
In the last days of their Empire the British introduced limited
democratic institutions and qualified universal suffrage. In
the subcontinent, including the area of present-day Pakistan,
before the British, a governor was appointed by the Mughal
emperor in Delhi and he ruled as a despot on the pattern of
the central government. In terms of the Western feudal
system, they operated as vassals, dependent on the

“The Collected Works of Theodore Parker: Discourses of slavery”, vol. V,

(London: Turboner and Co-Paternoster, 1863), 105.
13 Ilja Van Beest, Kipling D. Williams and Erik Van Dijk, "Cyber bomb: Effects
of being Ostracized from a Death Game", Group Processes & Intergroup
Relations, 14, no. 4 (2011): 581–96.
122 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXIV, No.I, 2013

goodwill of the king. This practice was later on adopted by

the Sikh rulers of Punjab as well. However, the leaders of
the All-India Muslim League, headed by Quaid-i-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, were mostly educated in secular
institutions created by the British, and only oriented to the art
of government as introduced by their British rulers. They
wanted to form a legislature, executive, and judiciary in the
traditional Western model. But the cultural trends of their
society were not conducive to immediately accommodating
the Western style of government. So many conflicts erupted
among various ideological, cultural and socio-economic
segments of a society which were not prepared to digest the
values of a Western democratic system. Although the
Western educated leaders of the various parties wanted to
adopt a Western secular order of democracy, Muslim
religious leaders, however, were not ready to accept
anything less than the full implementation of Shariah for
running day-to-day affairs in a future state of Pakistan.
For his part, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of
Pakistan, wanted to form a state in which the followers of
every religion would be free to practice their faith. In his
August 11, 194714 speech in the Constituent Assembly, he
made it clear that religion has nothing to do with the affairs of
state. The leaders of the new Pakistan were drawn mainly
from educated feudal class or the slariat (as Humza Alavi15
called the bureaucratic class). They all had various degrees
of personal commitment to Islam. To some, religion was a
private affair of every citizen on the basis of personal
behavior within a modern democratic state. To others it
represented a tradition, within the framework of which their
forefathers had ruled India. But there were also groups that
subscribed to Islam as a total way of life, and therefore
determined to establish Pakistan as a theocratic state.

14 Muhammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1980),

30.
15 Cited in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma, Imperialism and Revolution
in South Asia (Lahore: Peoples Publishing House, 1975), 146.
Impediments to Democracy in Pakistan 123

The Early Application of Democracy in Pakistan

Historically speaking, the task of giving a constitution to
Pakistan fell to Jinnah's lieutenant and the first prime
minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan. He was himself a
moderate who subscribed to the parliamentary and
democratic state along the lines envisaged by Jinnah in his
maiden speech to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on
August 11, 1947. But Liaquat Ali Khan was also conscious
that he possessed no local or regional power base, and had
no previous electoral constituency in the areas falling within
the new Pakistan. He therefore deemed it necessary to gain
support from the religious groups. Accordingly, he was
instrumental in passing the Objectives Resolution16 in the
Constituent Assembly on March 12, 1949. Later on, during
the Zial-ul-Haq’s regime, this resolution was moved from the
preamble to become an integral part of the Constitution of
Pakistan 1973. The Resolution begins with the words:
“Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah
Almighty alone” and it goes on to emphasize Islamic values.
Hindu members of the old Constituent Assembly protested.
They did so because Islamic states have traditionally
distinguished between the Muslims as full citizens, and the
dhimmis [Arabic: non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic state] or
nonbelievers who were denied certain rights and saddled
with certain additional obligations.17 Thus approval of the
Objectives Resolution can be considered a partial success
for the pro-Islamic forces. Indeed, according to A. K. Brohi it
became the cornerstone of Pakistan’s legal edifice.18
Meanwhile, the death of the Quaid-e-Azam in 1948 had
also triggered many controversies and power struggles
between various political groups. Gradually the old
bureaucracy of the British period, men who had worked

16 Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan in Search of Democracy: 1947-77 (Lahore: Afrasia

Publications, 1980), 34.
17 For details, Hamid Ali Khan, The Political and Constitutional History of
Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011).
18 A. K. Brohi, Fundamental Law of Pakistan (Karachi: Din Muhammad Press,
1958), 34.
124 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXIV, No.I, 2013

closely with the existing structure of the government, started

emerging as a dominant political force. The then Finance
Minister Ghulam Muhammad and his successor in 1951,
Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, being senior civil servants
themselves played the dominant role in pushing the
bureaucratic element onto the horizon of Pakistan’s
governance. Internal strife within various groups of the
Muslim League weakened the political party as a major force
and lowered its credit. This in-fighting within the league
resulted in the imposition of governor’s rule in the Punjab
and Sindh, and chaotic political instability in the Punjab grew
still worse during the early 1950’s. Ultimately, Governor
General Ghulam Muhammad was able to oust Nazimuddin
from the office of the Prime Minister. Keith Callard observed
that the price of this governor general’s coup was high.19
Three major conventions of Cabinet Government had been
destroyed or gravely weakened:
a. The tradition of the impartiality of the office of the governor
general had been demolished.
b. The conventions of cabinet parity and cabinet solidarity
had been disregarded.
c. The role of the legislature as the maker and sustainer of
the government had been impugned.
According to various observers, this action was directed
not only against the prime minister, but against the
Constituent Assembly as well. This was the first indirect
intrusion of non-democratic practices which are still
continued so that all dismissals made by civilians are backed
by the military, or dominated by bureaucrats, or both.20

19 Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (Oxford: Allen & Unwin, 1968),
137.
20 Zafar Iqbal Javed, “The Challenges to Political Stability in Pakistan”,
International Journal of Asian Social Sciences, 2, no.7 (Online Publication,
July 15, 2012): 1067-1073; Amélie Blom, “Pakistan: Coercion and Capital in
an ‘Insecurity State’”, The Paris Papers, (Paris: Institute d’études de l’Islam
et des Sociétés du Monde musulman, (ISmm/eHeSS), accessed from:
www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/153081/.../Paris_paper_1.pd; Tahir
Kamran, “Democracy and Governance in Pakistan”, South Asia
Partnership-Pakistan Papers, www.sappk.org/; Hassan Askari Rizvi,
Impediments to Democracy in Pakistan 125

This, then, was only the first such episode.

Subsequently, it was repeated in 1958 by Ayub Khan, in
1977 by General Zia-ul-Haq, and in 1999 by General Pervez
Musharraf. In all these cases, the failure of the civilian
governments can be ascribed to various factors and forces
working behind the scene. Therefore, on the basis of three
military coups in the past, it can be said that it is the so-
called “establishment” that is the major cause of the
destruction of democratic institutions in Pakistan.
Another point of view holds that feudalism, and in
particular religious fundamentalism, are the main causes of
the failure of democracy in Pakistan. This is because
conservative and traditionalist groups are consistently
aspiring to establish a government based on Shariah. Just
after the inception of Pakistan, on January 13, 1948, the
newly organized Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam passed a resolution
demanding the appointment of a leading Muslim Divine to
the office of Sheikh-ul Islam, with appropriate ministerial and
executive powers over the Qazi throughout the country.21
The Jamiat also took steps to organize public opinion
throughout Pakistan in favour of a purely Islamic
Constitution, and even worked out plans for organizing a
Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs which would remain immune
to the ordinary changes of government.22 This was the
pressure which led to approval of Objectives Resolution as
mentioned above, with its assertion of the Sovereignty of
God over, above and for all. Liaquat Ali Khan, the then prime
minister of Pakistan, declared that the state would not play a
part of the neutral observer. The state, therefore, would

“Democracy in Pakistan”, unpublished paper prepared for the project on

State of Democracy in South Asia as part of the Qualitative Assessment of
Democracy Lokniti (Programme of Comparative Democracy) Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies Delhi, available at: http://democracy-
asia.org/qa/pakistan/Hasan%20Askari.pdf
21 The daily Dawn, Karachi: January 14, 1948.
22 Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1968), 98.
126 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXIV, No.I, 2013

create conditions such as are conducive to the building up of

a truly Islamic society.23
Theocracy refers to a political system which deals with
the affairs of the state as governed and run by clergy in
accordance with the canons of the revealed books and
religious law. In case of Pakistan, a mullah or council of
mullahs should rule the state according to the Shariah. Its
partial application was implemented during the era of Zia-ul-
Haq (1977-88). Moulana Abul Hasnat Syed Muhammad
Ahmad Qadri, President Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan was
asked that if we were to have an Islamic state in Pakistan,
what would be the position of the Kafirs [Urdu: non-
believers]. Would they have a voice in the making of the
laws, the right to take part in administering the laws, and the
right to hold public office? He replied that their position would
be that of the dhimmis. They will have no voice in the making
of laws, no right to administer the laws, and no right to hold
the public offices.24 Keeping this historical perspective in
view, we can conclude that theocracy in its full sense was
never a part of rule of governance in Pakistan.
There is another explanation of the failure of democracy
in Pakistan presented by the group of social scientists led by
Hamza Alavi.25 They argue that in Pakistan the most
dominant feature of governance and rule has been the “over
developed state”. By this they mean that the civil and military
bureaucracies did not allow the traditional classes, such as
the feudal and capitalist, to take over the reins of the
government. Instead, they always treated the latter as mere
allies. Even theocrats were used to promote the interests of
the civil and military bureaucracy. And in reality, these types
of alliances can be distinctly seen during the rule of military
dictators like Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf.

23 The daily Dawn, March 08, 1949.

24 Munir, From Jinnah to Zia, 59-60.
25 Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rasheed, eds., Pakistan: The Roots of
Dictatorship. The Political Economy of a Praetorian State (London: Zed
Press, 1983), 42.
Impediments to Democracy in Pakistan 127

Civil-Military Conflict in Pakistan

All the military coups have justified the dissolution of the
parliament by claims that the country faced a constitutional,
political and economic crises intensified by corruption. In
each case, they claimed that the former prime minister had
dared to jeopardize highest constitutional office, national
integrity, prestige and honor of the country. Similarly most of
the federating units were not satisfied and protested against
the role of the federal government. People were complaining
about bad governance, corruption, the distortion of
hierarchal chain of commands, and the economy was about
to collapse and reaching a point of no return. Consequently,
the army claimed it had no choice but to act.
Whenever military took over the reins of the government,
they captured the important posts of governance and
introduced their senior retired and serving officers into the
civil bureaucracy. When referring to the Zia-ul-Haq tenure,
Omer Noman noted that the highly centralized authoritarian
rule and economic decline in this period led to regional class
disparities, and these led in turn to sense of deprivation
among the provinces.26 Such comments need not only be
confined to Zia-ul-Haq but are equally applicable to all the
military regimes in Pakistan. Subsequently, in an effort to
regularize the employment of ex-military men, a quota was
set for the enrolment of the retired officers in the various
government departments. However, the numbers continued
to increase gradually. It is said that more than 23 percent of
posts in corporate business and industry belong to the Army
Welfare Trust and Fauji Foundation.27 After consolidating
power in the industrial and administrative sectors, the
soldiers turned their guns towards the housing and
educational sectors. Now it is reported that the Defense
Housing Authority is the biggest land developing

26 Omar Noman, Pakistan: Political and Economic History since 1947

(London: Routledge, 1990), 32-33.
27 Aysha Siddiqa, The Politic of Military Economic Interest, An un-published
paper (2004), cited in Akbar Zaidi, “State Military and Social Transition”,
Economic and Business Weekly, December 5, 2005.
128 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXIV, No.I, 2013

organization and that it ranks with Bahria. This reflects the

Army’s efforts to acquire and hold in its custody all the
valuable lands from the civil area. Moreover, all three armed
forces have established their own universities and set out to
control major portions of the country’s primary and higher
educational systems.
Ideology of Pakistan and Religion
The word ideology has always been used in Pakistan as a
lethal weapon. It therefore becomes imperative to define
ideology in its true historical perspective, so that later on it
becomes easier to discuss the ideological weapons used by
the state apparatus. Before proceeding further here the
comments on this issue of K. K. Aziz are pertinent:
And above all social change hangs the sword of ideology…drawn
but undefined, cutting but unrecognizable, relentless but furtive…In
fact no one knows what the ideology is (or even what an ideology
is?) but everyone is warned against doing anything against it…This
hazy view of ideology disqualified it from acting as the governing
28
mechanism or the master switch of social change.
The term “ideology” was first coined by the French
scholar Antoine Destutt de Tracy in 1796.29 He used it to
designate the science of ideas, which he hoped to establish
along the lines laid down by Pierre Jean Cabanis as a
component and supplement to physiology. De Tracy’s
elements of ideology are aimed at covering a vast area and
encompassed a “history of the means of knowledge” divided
into three parts: the formation of ideas, or ideology properly
so called; the expression of ideas or grammar; and the
combination of ideas or logic. Its main part was to consist of
an application of these means of knowledge to the human
will, which would provide a theory of human action, a real
political economy.30

28 K. K. Aziz, Pakistan’s Political Culture: Essays in Historical and Social

Origins (Lahore: Vanguard, 2001), 401.
29 Antoine Louis Claude Destutt deTracy, A Treatise on Political Economy,
translated and edited by Thomas Jefferson (Georgetown: Joseph Milligan,
1817; reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1970), x.
30 Georges Labica, Marxism and the Status of Philosophy, (Sussex: The
Harvester Press, 1976), 288.
Impediments to Democracy in Pakistan 129

To simplify this definition in the modern sense of

Western knowledge, “ideology is a body of ideas used in
support of an economic, political or social theory or way of
thinking of a class, culture or individual”.31 This definition is
more or less the same in the Webster and Oxford
dictionaries. Put differently, in the narrow sense of the word,
an ideology comprises a system of attitudes and ideas. It is
an interpretation of the historical process that is used as a
justification of a particular social and state system, and
which with the utmost clarity expresses the interest of a
definite class, along with the fundamental features of all the
forms of the social consciousness of this class. In the
context of Pakistan, since independence Islam has played
the key role in the ideology of the young state. Though
Quaid-e-Azam was considered a secular man in all other
aspects of his life, he used the Islamic ideology as a political
strategy to attract the Muslim voters of North Western India.
So while liberals try to prove Quaid-e-Azam was a secular
leader of a Muslim state, Islamic fundamentalist try to prove
that his Two Nations Theory was based on his personal love
for Islam.
The second basic factor in the creation of the Islamic
ideology of Pakistan was the interpretation of the “Objectives
Resolution”, approved on March 12, 1949, nearly six months
after the death of Quaid-e-Azam. Having declared
sovereignty over the universe to be God’s alone, it goes on
to define Pakistan’s sovereignty as being based on “the
authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan
through its people for being exercised within the limit
prescribed by Him”. This is termed as “a sacred trust”. More
importantly, perhaps, is the fact that this first clause is
supported by two others that clearly outline Islamic
expectations concerning the role of religion in the new state.
These read:

31 D.I. Chesnokov, Historical Materialism (Moscow: Progress Publishers,

1969), 354.
130 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXIV, No.I, 2013

Where in the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance

and social justice, and as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully
observed.
Wherein the Muslim shall be enabled to order their lives in the
individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah.
As mentioned above, these declaratory “objectives”
suddenly assumed great significance when General Zia
incorporated the resolution of 1949 into the constitution of
Pakistan. Immediately after coming to power, Zia made it
abundantly clear in his public statements that without an
Islamic Ideology, the very existence of Pakistan would
become meaningless. In one of his interviews he said: “As
far as Pakistan is concerned, there is no doubt that it is [the]
fortress of Islam: the only individual country which came into
existence because of Islam, alone an example to the whole
world and from that point of view, it is not the fortress, the
bastion of Islam only in this particular part of the world”.32
Muslim scholars have expressed a variety of views on
ideology. One such is Dr. Fazalur Rehman who insists that
Pakistan was a non-ideological state. In his opinion, in the
communist and socialist countries ideology came into
existence before emergence of the State, but in the case of
Pakistan he said that the State was created without any
articulated ideology.33 The re-imposition of military rule
needed some legitimacy and ideological support, and a
campaign for the enforcement of the Laws of the Shariah
was a convenient way to obtain this. The military rulers also
gained the support of the landed aristocracy, as well as the
industrial and commercial interests, because in an Islamic
system their right to hold property was granted by religion.
Changing the country’s laws became the focal point of
President Zia’s initial stage of Islamization and within eight
month of his assumption of authority, he launched the first
phase of his reforms.

32 General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Interviewed by Foreign Media. vol. I

(March-December, 1977), (Islamabad: Ministry of Information): 127-128.
33 Fazlur Rehman, “Islam and the New Constitution of Pakistan”, Journal of
Asian and African Studies VII, no. 3-4 (July 1973): 201-202.
Impediments to Democracy in Pakistan 131

Accordingly, laws were introduced pertaining to adultery

and fornication, gambling and alcoholism, the introduction of
prayers, the provision of facilities for prayers in government
offices, the collection and distribution of zakat and ushr
[Arabic: Government tax on agricultural yield], the creation of
Shariah Courts, confirming that the certificates and degrees
issued by religious institutions as being considered as
equivalent to those issued by other universities and colleges,
and so equally acceptable for attaining jobs; the banning of
alcoholic drinks in government messes and at government
receptions; enforcing the duty to honour and respect the
ulema and religious leaders, the observation of Islamic
etiquettes during private and formal congregational
assemblies; measures aimed at cleaning up government
media departments such as radio, TV and the press, which
allegedly was supporting a secular vision, and which now
would have to project an Islamic and Pakistani viewpoint,
and lastly, the holding election on non-party basis. In
addition, Zia also gave the religious sects of his choice free
license to open madrassas. According to A. H. Nayyar, “The
Madrassas have, not surprisingly, become a source of hate-
filled propaganda against other Sects and the sectarian
divide has become sharper and more violent”.34 Traditionally,
madrassas were not in conflict with each other, but they now
were pushed into be political competitors.
The above laws were all enacted through the Martial
Law regulations, because, although the Constitution of 1973
was not abrogated, it had had been suspended for indefinite
period of time and the national and provincial assemblies
were inactive. President Zia chose the birthday of the Holy
Prophet (PBUH) to announce his first package of reforms.
He then explained that the process of the Islamization of

34 Cited in Saeed Shafqat ed., New Perspectives on Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 2007), 126.
132 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXIV, No.I, 2013

laws simply meant that men were being summoned to obey

the decrees of Allah Almighty.35
Most important, Zia created a nominated Majlish-e-
Shoora [Urdu: consultative body] consisting of 350 members
to replace the Parliament or National Assembly. Parliament
was stripped of all the usual legislative prerogatives
associated with legislating. To make the Majlish more
significant and to incorporate it into the legal system, the
ordinance also authorized for each court a bench of three
Muslim judges to constitute a Shariat Court. Appeals from
the Shariat Bench of the High Court were to be heard in the
Supreme Court, where the Shariat Appellant Bench, also
consisting of three judges was created. The Shariat benches
were empowered to listen to petitions put before them and,
in respect to existing laws, to decide on their conformity to
the Islamic injunctions. Their decisions, according to the law,
were final unless reversed by the Appellate Shariat Bench in
the Supreme Court. If we analyze the creation of the Shariat
Bench, their verdicts about Islamic laws were final. In this
way they had adopted the role of the legislature, whereas
basically it is the duty of a legislature to make laws. The
courts can only interpret the law. But the Shariat Benches
were required to amend laws which were tantamount to
making law. In this way they were adopting the role of both
legislative and of interpreting the law.
One may tend to agree with Hamza Alvi when he
presents the concept of the “over-developed state”. He says
that there is a wide-spread tendency on the part of regimes
and peripheral capitalist states (such as Pakistan) to acquire
an authoritarian character and proliferate military
dictatorships. Even the economically dominant classes, have
to be content with this situation. Although the administrative
arm of the state is deployed against them, it simultaneously
upholds their fundamental interests. In this case
progressives and even the dominant class cannot rule.

35 “Introduction of Hudood Laws in Pakistan”, as cited in Shoukat Ali,

Pakistan: A Religio-Political Study (Islamabad: National Institute of
Historical and Cultural Research, 1997), 241.
Impediments to Democracy in Pakistan 133

Instead one finds a very considerable accretion of powers of

control and regulation over the economically dominant
classes by civil and military bureaucracy. According to Alvi,
this is an over-development of the State.36 In this way the
fragile democracy in Pakistan correlates with the strong
military and weak democratic institutions.
Conclusion
This paper has outlined the genesis of democracy with its
ancient as well as modern definitions, and the differences
that developed over time. It links British history and traditions
of democratic institutions to the heritage, left to Pakistan
after 1947. Then it traces the factors behind the failure of
democracy in that country given its structural and ideological
weaknesses. The steps taken by adherents of theocracy in
the process of shaping the constitution have also been
discussed, as well as the failure of the forces of theocratic
advocacy to carve out their own place in the polity of
Pakistan. Discussing Islam and theocracy in the context of
ideology, this paper has argued that since the inception of
Pakistan, Islamist thought has played the key role in creating
the ideology of Pakistan. Pakistan has inherited institutional
imbalances since its birth: the state apparatus — both the
civil and military establishments — are much better
organized than are the democratic institutions in this country.
The political leaders of the newly independent state were
shaped by feudal values and were ambitious to gain political
power. As a result, no serious thought was given to creating
a strong base or political framework for Pakistan. The
military institution was growing stronger as time passed, and
it was also being supported indirectly by the civilian
government. This ensured a handsome share of the budget
was allocated to the defense and security establishments on
the grounds that the enemy stood on our eastern borders.
Yet the continuity of these institutional imbalances created
disadvantages for the civilian leaders and as a

36 Hamza Alvi, “The State in Crises”, in Gardezi and Rashid, Pakistan: The
Roots of Dictatorship, 42-43.
134 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXIV, No.I, 2013

consequence, the role of making policy was left more in the

hands of the military and bureaucracy than in those of the
civilian leaders and politicians. So in time, the military and
bureaucracy came to dominate the political system as well
as policy-making of this country.
The history of impediments to democracy shows that
there is a great lack of political consensus-building at the
operational level of the polity of Pakistan. It also reflects the
fact that the Pakistani political system has to have some
correlation with Islam, but that there remains a need to build
a stronger consensus on Islam and its practical influence on
the polity of the country. Whether there will be a need for a
state with its punitive measures, or there is a need of a
welfare state with egalitarian norms of Islam, still confronts
the political scientists and scholars in Pakistan.
The prevailing political, social and economic conditions
in the globalized world demand a moderate form of state
with a stronger political structure. Every type of
fundamentalism is marginalized gradually with the
developments in primitive societies which lead to radical
changes in the productive forces. Presently, a stronger
political system with greater political consensus is
particularly critical for Pakistan as there is low level of
tolerance for possible dissenting views. Moreover, this is the
only way to curb terrorism because in the absence of a
political consensus, it will generate still stronger violent
reactions. Unless the legitimacy of authoritarian rule is
questioned, the democratic values cannot prevail in this
country. Democratic values cannot flourish without a
democratic culture.