Dembroff - Beyond Binary

Philosophers’
Imprint volume 20, no. 9

april 2020
We want to know what gender is. But metaphysical approaches
to this question have focused on the binary gender kinds men
and women. By overlooking those who identify outside of the
binary—the group I call ‘genderqueer’—we are left without
tools for understanding these new and quickly growing gender
identifications. This metaphysical gap in turn creates a concep-
BEYOND BINARY: tual lacuna that contributes to systematic misunderstanding of

genderqueer persons. In this paper, I argue that to better under-
stand genderqueer identities, we must recognize a new type of
GENDERQUEER AS gender kind: critical gender kinds, or kinds whose members collec-
tively destabilize one or more pieces of dominant gender ideol-
ogy. After developing a model of critical gender kinds, I suggest
CRITICAL GENDER
that genderqueer is best modeled as a critical gender kind that
destabilizes the ‘binary axis’, or the piece of dominant gender
ideology that says that the only possible genders are the binary,
discrete, exclusive, and exhaustive kinds men and women.
KIND 1. Introduction
Dissatisfaction with strict binary gender systems is nothing new.1 Nor
is the creation of language, modes of expression, or body modifications
aimed at transgressing this binary. What is new is the proliferation of
widespread and legitimized conversations surrounding this dissatis-
Robin Dembroff faction.2 Just in the last ten years, web searches for ‘genderqueer’ and
‘nonbinary’ have grown by a magnitude of at least ten times.3 Merriam-
Webster’s dictionary added both terms, the Associated Press Stylebook
Yale University embraces ‘they’ as a singular gender neutral pronoun, and highly vis-
ible popular publications such as Teen Vogue and The New York Times
have run articles exploring the concept of identifying outside the gen-
© 2007, Philosophers’ Imprint
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License 1. Many cultures do not have dominant binary gender systems, such as the
<www.philosophersimprint.org/020009/> Bugis of Indonesia and Native American Great Plains tribes.
2. See, e.g., White et al. (2018, 244) for empirical evidence supporting this
claim.
3. Data source: Google Trends (www.google.com/trends).
robin dembroff Beyond Binary
der binary.4 Facebook offers its over 2.4 billion users more than fifty label? These questions are metaphysically significant, but the theories
terms to self-describe their genders. In 2007, Oregon became the first on offer provide no answers.
state to offer nonbinary gender markers on government identification, Second, without the resources for understanding nonbinary gender
with ever more municipalities and states following suit.5 In sum, and identities, we sustain a conceptual lacuna surrounding nonbinary per-
to quote the singer Miley Cyrus, who identitifies as genderfluid, “[Non- sons. This lacuna does not only reflect a gap in philosophical under-
binary identity] is not a trend. It’s just that now it’s acceptable to dis- standing; it contributes to a hermeneutical injustice that arises from
cuss it”.6 the failure to spread and charitably analyze the concepts and practices
Despite this ever growing public awareness, nonbinary gender iden- underlying nonbinary classifications.9 In the wake of this conceptual
tities have been an afterthought within philosophy of gender, and es- silence, misunderstandings (both blatant and subtle) arise in droves—
pecially metaphysical discussions of gender.7 The central phenomenon misunderstandings that undermine recognition and respect of nonbi-
under consideration has been the binary genders men and women.8 Nar- nary persons.10
rowing the target phenomenon in this way generates two problems— These two problems can be ameliorated by an account of gen-
one metaphysical and the other political. derqueer as what I call a ‘critical gender kind’, or a kind whose members
First, by overlooking nonbinary identities, existing metaphysical ap- collectively destabilize one or more elements of dominant gender ideol-
proaches to gender are insufficient for capturing persons who reject ogy. Genderqueer, on my proposed model, is a category whose members
(exclusive) categorization as either men or women (see §3). This cre- collectively destabilize the binary axis, or the idea that the only possi-
ates a gap of metaphysical explanation and understanding. For exam- ble genders are the exclusive and exhaustive kinds men and women.11
ple, what is the relationship between gender neutral language and be- Moreover, they do so based on felt or desired gender categorization
ing nonbinary? Or between androgyny and being nonbinary? What (if that conflicts with this binary. I unpack this proposal in §4.
anything) unifies the vast variety of nonbinary identifications? Is there My model has many implications, and no doubt will inspire as
anything more to being nonbinary than calling oneself by a nonbinary many worries. Like most philosophical theories, mine is probably
wrong. But I believe it is closer to the truth than analytic philosophers
have come so far, if only because we have had little to say about non-
4. “genderqueer” & “nonbinary” (2018), Sopelsa (2017), Papisova (2016),
Greenberg (2017).
5. As of the time of writing, there are sixteen states offering nonbinary gender 9. Hermeneutical injustice, as defined in Fricker (2007, 1), occurs “when a gap
markers, plus New York City and the District of Columbia. in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage
6. Quoted in Steinmetz (2017). when it comes to making sense of their social experiences’.’ More extended
7. See, e.g., Haslanger (2012),Jenkins (2016), Sveindottír (2011), and Barnes notions of hermeneutical injustice are explored in Medina (2012) and Appiah
(forthcoming). Even discussions of gender that purport to be trans inclusive (1994), which include cases (such as white ignorance) when a gap in the col-
typically overlook the experiences and concepts underlying genderqueer iden- lective interpretive resources regarding an oppressed group perpetuates the
tity. See, e.g., Bettcher (2009, 2013), Jenkins (2016), Briggs & George (2016), and social disadvantage of that group. I take it that the lacuna at issue concerning
McKitrick (2015). This is especially striking given that 29% of respondents to nonbinary kinds manifests in both ways.
the 2015 United States Transgender Survey self-identified as genderqueer. See 10. Using Fraser’s (1998) account, this might be understood in terms of access
James et al. (2016, 44). Philosophy is not alone in this oversight. See Salamon to participatory parity, or the conditions needed to interact with others as peers
(2010, 95) for a similar criticism of Women’s Studies. in social and political settings.
8. Though see Dembroff & Wodak (2018) and Dembroff (2018) as exceptions. 11. I use the word ‘model’ intentionally. Following Paul (2012), I endorse a
Note that, throughout this paper, I use italics to mark social kinds, and use method of metaphysics focused on building theoretical models for certain ex-
single quotes to mark terms, e.g., genderqueer and ‘genderqueer’. planatory purposes, rather than constructing (real) definitions.
philosophers’ imprint -2- vol. 20, no. 9 (april 2020)

binary identifications. What’s more, it is clear that this theorizing is My analysis relies heavily on personal testimony from genderqueer
overdue: Even empirical social research on trans identities frequently persons. This is not only because there is a scant amount of academic
lumps together trans binary and genderqueer persons, making it dif- research about genderqueer persons, but also because I share the fa-
ficult to use this data to explain why, for example, genderqueer per- miliar feminist commitment to begin theorizing from the perspective
sons overall face heightened discrimination and psychological distress of the marginalized. That said, I distinguish between two kinds of tes-
compared to trans binary persons, and also differ with respect to at- timony. The first concerns genderqueer individuals’ intuitions about
titudes toward medical interventions such as hormone therapy.12 If paradigm or uncontested examples of persons who do not identify ex-
I am right—or even close to it—this heterogeneity should come as clusively as men or as women. The second concerns these individuals’
no surprise, since genderqueer conjoins persons who are extremely di- views about metaphysical questions concerning what, more generally,
verse across self-understanding and gender presentation (among other it means to be genderqueer. I rely on the first kind of testimony and
things). not the second. Substantive metaphysical questions about genderqueer
deserve careful analysis in just the same way that women and men
2. Terminology & Methodology have been given careful metaphysical analysis. In this, I follow Bettcher
‘Genderqueer’ was first coined in the 1990s by trans activist Riki (2014) in relying on persons’ first-person authority over their own gen-
Wilchins in an attempt to describe those who were both queer with der, while simultaneously allowing for substantive disagreement about
respect to their sexuality and “the kind of gendertrash society rejected” the underlying metaphysics. My central concern, in other words, is
with respect to their gender intelligibility in public spaces.13 Since then, locating general concepts that helpfully frame genderqueer identity—
use has shifted away from mere description and toward identity: In in particular, the concepts that structure commonality among the lan-
particular, it often functions as an umbrella term for a range of gen- guage, aesthetic expressions, values, and actions found among those
der identities outside of the binary.14 I will use the term in keeping who (within contemporary Western societies) identify as neither solely
with this recent shift, but my primary concern is not with articulating male nor female.
the true meaning of ‘genderqueer’, but rather with modeling a gender Notably, I am not primarily concerned with how genderqueer per-
phenomenon that has been ignored in analytic philosophy.15 sons are understood within dominant contexts, which typically have
either no understanding or a distorted understanding of nonbinary
persons. Rather, I focus on the practices and concepts surrounding
12. See Rimes et al. (2019), Galupo et al. (2018, 5), Bradford et al. (2018, 8), and
Warren et al. (2016). Following Heyes (2003), cf. Stryker (1994), I use ‘trans’ genderqueer within trans-friendly communities, and especially by gen-
to refer to the “multiple forms of sex and gender crossing and mixing that are derqueer persons themselves. Here, I again follow Bettcher (2013, 235),
taken by their practitioners to be significant life projects”. I use ‘trans binary’ to
who argues that assuming dominant gender meanings and concepts
refer to persons who are trans but identify exclusively within the male/female
binary. is a “bad place” to start feminist theorizing, as it “effectively yield[s]
13. Wilchins (2017), 80. political ground from the very beginning”.
14. Ibid.
15. Here I sympathize with Kusalik’s (2010, 56) lack of “fascination” with the Finally, and relatedly, throughout this paper, I refer to genderqueer
semantics of ‘genderqueer’. That said, I also agree with Cohen (2005, 34) that as a gender kind. My reader might wonder why I do so: Why take
social identities are “important to one’s survival”, and think that, for this rea-
son, it is important to provide substantive models of groups associated with genderqueer to be a gender kind, rather than some other sort of social
particular identity labels. kind? I cannot offer a complete argument for my answer here. The

abbreviated argument, however, is that—along with Elizabeth Barnes wise gender non-conforming. In contrast, internalist approaches focus
(forthcoming)—I do not think that we should approach the meta- on articulating more concretely what it means to identify with a partic-
physics of gender by looking for kinds that correspond one-to-one with ular gender. On these accounts, someone’s gender is determined not
the gender terms we use to describe individuals (e.g., ‘woman’, ‘man’). by how they are perceived by others, but rather by whatever internal
The terminological taxonomy of gender classification need not, and I features (e.g., self-understanding, behavioral dispositions) constitute
think does not, align with the most useful metaphysical taxonomy of their gender identity.17
gender kinds. Rather, I approach the project of metaphysical inquiry I argue that neither an externalist nor internalist approach will pro-
into gender kinds as the project of inquiring into the kinds that rein- vide a satisfactory account of genderqueer. Both misclassify paradigm
force or resist hierarchical, male-dominant social systems. Genderqueer, cases of genderqueer (and non-genderqueer) individuals. Examining
as I’ll argue in what follows, is one such kind. For this reason, while I closely why this is the case is instructive. Not only will it clear the
incorporate testimony from those who do use the label ‘genderqueer’, ground for my own proposal, but it also provides an opportunity to
I do not take it that the kind I call genderqueer is one that contains all examine these paradigm cases, as well as genderqueer persons’ testi-
and only those who identify themselves using the label ‘genderqueer’. mony concerning their own identities. Such testimony illuminates both
My focus, rather, is on using this testimony and other evidence to get why externalist and internalist approaches fall short, as well as why
a clearer picture of what, if anything, best characterizes the group of genderqueer is helpfully understood as a critical gender kind.
persons who do not exclusively identify as men or as women.
3.1 An Externalist Approach
3. First Attempts External theories of gender, sometimes also called social position
Within popular culture, most proposed definitions of genderqueer fall theories—focus on gender as a social structure that advantages or dis-
into one of two camps. On one approach, someone is genderqueer be- advantages individuals according to the collective norms, expectations,
cause they have certain external features—typically, because they are and stereotypes surrounding the features that an individual is per-
androgynous, gender fluid, or otherwise violate gender norms. On an- ceived to have. Externalist theories have been proposed or defended
other approach, someone is genderqueer because of a particular inter- by Haslanger (2012), Barnes (forthcoming), Witt (2011), and Sveinsdot-
nal feature—namely, self-identification—leaving open what, exactly, it tír (2011), among others.18 There are many potential ways to spell out
might mean to identify outside of the binary.
It is instructive to note that most available metaphysical analyses 17. As Barnes (forthcoming) notes, while these are the main approaches, some
of gender also take one of these two approaches.16 On externalist ap- theories fall outside this taxonomy, such as Stoljar (2011), Briggs & George (2-
16), and Bach (2012).
proaches, someone’s gender is determined by social factors that are
18. Theodore Bach (2012) defends a view of gender on which genders are “nat-
external to them: for example, being perceived as androgynous or other- ural kinds with historical essences”—a view that is difficult to place within the
external/internalist taxonomy. On Bach’s view, to be, e.g., a woman is to be
molded by conscious and unconscious social mechanisms into a reproduction
16. I here focus on constructionist accounts of gender, setting aside biological of historical exemplars of women so as to perform the social function corre-
essentialism. Even if one is a biological essentialist, though, it is hopefully ob- sponding to women. On Bach’s view, then, someone might be a trans man and
vious that this approach will not suffice to analyze genderqueer. While some yet—according to Bach’s analysis—be “construed as a woman” (260). Moreover,
intersex persons are genderqueer, being intersex is neither sufficient nor neces- given that man and woman are the only kinds into which one can be socialized
sary for being genderqueer. See, e.g., Weiss (2018). (within Western cultures), all genderqueer persons (who have been socialized

what external social factors determine an individual’s gender. For my ten associated with nonbinary persons also break gender norms, such
purposes, the details of various externalist accounts are not centrally as using gender neutral pronouns or refusing classification as either
important. What is important, rather, is to see a trend among all of ‘straight’ or ‘gay’.23 With these considerations, it might seem that the
them: namely, that membership in a given gender kind is based solely best way to analyze genderqueer will be something like the following:
on factors that are external to any given individual—e.g., social roles,
Genderqueer (externalist): Genderqueer is the category of per-
perception, or treatment.19
sons who either
In light of this, what would be the best externalist approach to gen-
(i) are reliably perceived as attempting to not exclusively adopt
derqueer? Whatever it is, it must highlight only features that are external
either a feminized or masculinized gender expression;
to genderqueer persons, while also capturing paradigm cases of those
or
identifying outside the binary, as these persons are understood within
(ii) cannot be reliably coded as having either a male or female
trans-friendly communities.
body.24
The most common—and, I think, plausible—externalist approach to
genderqueer focuses on someone’s perceived relation to gender norms In other words, on this proposal, someone is genderqueer in a con-
and roles, and especially to masculine and feminine gender presen- text just in case they are perceived as transgressing binary norms of
tation. Indeed, a brief foray into popular media might suggest that gender expression—for example, by adopting a gender fluid or agen-
someone is genderqueer because they “[do] things that are outside of der aesthetic—or their body is perceived as androgynous, where this is
the norm of their actual or perceived gender identity”, or because they understood as one’s body being unreadable as male or female.
“express a combination of masculinity and femininity, or neither, in Despite the many merits of this approach, I think it falls short of a
their gender expression”.20 A similar idea is echoed by popular arti- successful account of genderqueer. Examining why sheds light on why,
cles, books, and visual media that equivocate between or constantly as- I think, any externalist approach will be dissatisfactory. While many
sociate being nonbinary with androgyny or gender non-conformity.21 genderqueer persons do meet the above proposed condition, two fur-
Admittedly, this thinking is reinforced by the observation that many ther things are true. First, these persons often describe their androg-
genderqueer persons fit this description: It is common for persons who yny or rejection of traditional gender aesthetic norms as an expression
identify outside the binary to adopt an aesthetic that defies gender
expectations—often, one that is androgynous or is fluid between mas-
23. For more evidence on the connection between trans identifications and vi-
culine and feminine elements.22 Add to this that other behaviors of- olating heteronormative gender expectations and roles, see Diamond & Butter-
worth (2008) and Green (2004). See also Nagoshi et al. (2012, 405), in which
participants took their sexual orientation to be “dynamically related” to their
as either women or men) will not be represented within Bach’s analysis. gender identity, suggesting that being nonbinary often rules out, for these per-
19. I here flag an observation that, within the majority of philosophical theories sons, being either ‘straight’ or ‘gay’.
of gender, a question about kind constitution (e.g., What constitutes the kinds 24. These descriptions bear similarity to Barnes’s (forthcoming) description of
women and men?) is assumed to deflate into a question about membership con- the ‘gender outlier’ and ‘gender confounder’. Barnes, who is sympathetic to
ditions (e.g., What are the membership conditions for the kinds women and Sally Haslanger’s (2012) picture on which gender is a hierarchical system that
men?). As I discuss in §4, I think this assumption is false. socially positions persons in different ways based on their perceived features,
20. See Clements (2017) and the entry for “Genderqueer” on Wikipedia. describes gender outliers and confounders as those who are systematically sub-
21. See, e.g., Dowling (2017), Ferguson (2017), and Petrow (2016). ordinated due to being perceived (respectively) as attempting to switch be-
22. See the Instagram hashtag “#thisiswhatnblookslike”. tween binary gender roles or as androgynous.

but not the totality of being genderqueer, emphasizing in addition These statements and many others suggest that genderqueer’s exten-
an affective or political orientation toward the gender binary. When sion reaches only to those who are perceived to fall outside of binary
asked to describe their experience of being genderqueer, in fact, there gender roles or to have an androgynous presentation.
is repeated and explicit rejection of the idea that being genderqueer is Complementing this point is a second observation: namely, that the
solely based on gender presentation or on others’ perceptions. In their externalist approach would also overextend. Many individuals who do
article, “This Is What Gender-Nonbinary People Look Like”, trans ac- not identify as and would not be considered genderqueer either defy
tivist Meridith Talusan asked genderqueer persons to describe their binary gender roles or are perceived as androgynous.28 Butch lesbians,
experience of identifying outside of the gender binary. While answers queens, cross-dressing men and women, trans men and women who
varied in their details, a common theme emerged: The category gen- do not blend as cisgender, and the variety of men and women whose
derqueer is not reducible to a group of persons who are perceived in a bodies and presentations are androgynous are but a few examples of
particular way. One interviewee, Rowan Keeney, put this bluntly: this. As Lori Watson, examining shared experiences between gender
nonconforming persons, trans and not, writes:
My expression and my socialization falls on the femme side, but
being nonbinary is not about what is perceived of me. Nonbinary is Trans women and I share an especially acute problem: we both
the liberation from the need to make myself smaller to fit into want our gender to be seen as a way of being a woman...who
preconceived ideas of who and what I am.25 doesn’t have to offer up her bona fides to the world anytime
someone is confused, perplexed or unsettled when they perceive
Keeney’s point is independently reiterated by other genderqueer
our gender and sex as incongruous or ambiguous.29
persons, who express that “there is no one way to be nonbinary”, that
“name, pronouns, and presentation does not define [a nonbinary in- In short, genderqueer persons do not have a monopoly on being
dividual’s] gender”, and that genderqueer persons “have all types of perceived as violating gender roles, much less on androgyny: Plenty
gender presentations”, “identify as feminine and masculine to differ- of non-genderqueer men and women share in this experience.30
ent degrees”, and “don’t need to look or act or be a certain way to While taking genderqueer as non-reducible to any particular social
be nonbinary”.26 Suzannah Weiss, a writer for Teen Vogue who identi- perceptions may seem initially odd, it comes into better focus when
fies as both genderqueer and a woman, is particularly explicit on this we take seriously that being genderqueer is not so much about reject-
point: ing femininity and masculinity de re, but rather rejecting the idea that
concepts of femininity and masculinity are always appropriate for in-
Many people seem to believe you need an androgynous style
terpreting or evaluating an individual’s affect, behavior, or aesthetic.31
to be non-binary, creating the assumption that I and other non-
binary people who wear women’s clothes must be women...but
28. For empirical discussion, see Bradford, et al. (2018).
you can’t tell how someone identifies based on what they look 29. Watson (2015).
like...27 30. A further, normative worry arises for taking genderqueer in terms of androg-
yny in particular: For many body sizes and shapes, androgyny is difficult if
not impossible to access. Persons in this position would be simply barred from
25. Talusan (2017), emphasis added. access to genderqueer.
26. Talusan (2017), Weiss (2018). 31. See, e.g., Weiss (2018), who writes that being genderqueer, for them, means
27. Weiss (2018). “reject[ing] the whole concept of gender”.

That is, according to genderqueer persons, being genderqueer need an internalist approach, or an approach on which genderqueer is un-
not be about refusing clothing, behaviors, speech, affect, or roles that derstood as a group of persons with particular psychological features,
typically would be read as feminine, masculine, or any combination of has more promise. In favor of this approach, it at least appears to
the two. Rather, it often concerns rejecting the binary at a conceptual align nicely with what is by far the most common popular definition
level—that is, rejecting the idea that their way of being in the world of being genderqueer as identifying as genderqueer.35 If we assume
should always be understood via the binary and oppositional concepts ‘identification’ is best understood as a wholly internal feature—i.e., a
of ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’.32 In an interview with The Washington psychological state that an individual can be in without any external
Post, 18-year-old Kelsey Beckham, who identifies as nonbinary, states: manifestations—then an internalist approach to genderqueer would be
on the right track. I’ll propose in §4 that we should prefer a differ-
I don’t want to be a girl wearing boy’s clothes, nor do I want to
ent, political model of genderqueer. But let’s examine the merits of an
be a girl who presents as a boy... I just want to be a person who
internalist account.
is recognized as a person. That’s how I’m most comfortable. I’m
The first and most important question for an internalist approach
just a person wearing people clothes...33
to genderqueer is what internal features we are referring to when we
The bold assertion of being “just a person wearing people clothes” talk about ‘gender identity’. Since the concept of gender identity–and
strikes at the heart of any attempt to analyze genderqueer solely in terms in particular, genderqueer identity–is used to determine the extension
of external perceptions. Genderqueer persons differ widely with re- of genderqueer, it is crucial to understand what genderqueer identity
spect to their assigned sex, perceived sex, and whether or not they would amount to. What’s more, as Jenkins (2018) points out, the most
function within traditionally masculinized or feminized gender roles. common ‘folk’ definition of gender identity–“a sense of oneself as a
If anything holds them in common with respect to gender presentation, man, woman, or some other gender”–does not appear promising. Jenk-
it is only a general rejection of having their presentation interpreted ins writes:
through a binary lens.34 But I will get to this in §4.
[M]any people who use the language of gender identity
hold...the view that gender terms such as ‘man’ and ‘woman’
3.2 An Internalist Approach
ought to be understood in terms of gender identity: [e.g....] ...to
If looking only to external features will not provide an adequate anal-
be a woman is to identify as a woman (or, to have a female gen-
ysis of genderqueer, what about looking to internal features? Perhaps
der identity)... The combination of this view with the folk defini-
tion of gender identity gives rise to a circularity: someone who
32. For example, Weiss (2018) quotes Kelley Cantrell as saying, “I wish that
people wouldn’t automatically use she/her pronouns just because of how I asks what it means to say that a certain person ‘has a female
present... They need to stop gendering people’s presentations”. As Naomi Sche- gender identity’ will be told that it means that that person has
man pointed out to me, the plea to end gendering based on presentation is
important, as it reveals a political stance that—intentionally or not—has impli- a sense of herself ‘as a woman’—but if the questioner then asks
cations for everyone’s gender.
33. Hesse (2014), my emphasis.
34. See also “Gender Can Be Both Liberating And Stifling At The Same Time”, 35. The language of ‘gender identity’ as a determiner of one’s gender—and, in
a video by Howell (2018), in which one interviewee comments, “Just because particular, of being genderqueer, is standard within trans-friendly contexts. See
I put on lipstick doesn’t mean I am one thing or the other, because someone Weiss (2018) and Talusan (2017), as well as genderqueer networking platforms
decided a piece of paint ‘belonged’ to a gender”. such as http://genderqueer.me or http://beyondthebinary.co.uk.

what a ‘woman’ is, they will be told that a woman is ‘a person McKitrick, Jenkins’s (2016, 2018) account of gender identity empha-
with a female gender identity’.36 sizes an individual’s relationship to external gender norms. Jenkins
proposes a ‘norm relevance’ account, on which an individual’s gen-
Jenkins’s point about ‘woman’ similarly applies to ‘genderqueer’.
der identity is determined by what gender-specific norms they experi-
The combination of two popular notions—that being genderqueer is
ence as relevant to them.40 That is, for example, someone has a female
identifying as genderqueer, and identifying as genderqueer is being
gender identity—and so is a woman—on this account if they experi-
genderqueer—leaves us in a hopeless and unhelpful circularity. What-
ence norms associated with women in their social context as relevant
ever it means to identify as genderqueer–if indeed this is the basis for
to them. Moreover, norm relevance can take on a variety of forms. A
understanding the category genderqueer, must be something substan-
female gender identity for one person may amount to feeling like oth-
tive.
ers should refer to her with feminine pronouns and a certain name,
Within analytic philosophy, a few internalist proposals have
whereas for someone else, it may amount to having the sense that her
emerged with more substantive notions of gender identity.37 At first,
physical features ought to be a certain way—e.g., ought to include a
this substantive internalism might seem to worryingly essentialize gen-
vulva, and not a penis.41
der by pointing to a mysterious, innate sense of one’s own gender that
Gender identities, on both approaches, have personal and social ele-
exists independently of external social factors. But in fact, philosoph-
ments: They are personal insofar as they concern internal dispositions
ical accounts of gender identity avoid this worry: Gender identity, on
or senses of norm relevance, but social insofar as these dispositions or
these accounts, is internal, but it is based on internal ways of relating to
senses must relate to norms or behaviors that are externally, socially as-
societies’ gender norms, structures, and interpretive guides.38 One one
sociated with a certain gender group.42 Both McKitrick’s and Jenkins’s
approach, defended by Jennifer McKitrick (2015), someone’s gender
approaches could be applied to ‘genderqueer identity’. In fact, Jenk-
in a given context is determined by their behavioral dispositions, given
ins explicitly proposes one such application: someone is genderqueer
how those behaviors—if manifested—would be socially interpreted. In
iff they do not consider the norms socially associated with men, nor
a given context, McKitrick argues, someone who is disposed to behave
the norms socially associated with women, to be relevant to them.43
in ways that others would take to be indicative of a woman, has a
To illustrate, Jenkins uses the example of a building that contains only
woman’s gender identity (and so, is a woman) in that context.39 Like
men’s and women’s toilets. Someone who is nonbinary, because they
36. Jenkins (2018, 714).

37. On Bettcher’s (2009, 2013) view, a person’s gender is based on existential in ways B1...Bn in situations S1...Sn to be G”. (McKitrick 2015, 2581).
self-identification, which I understood as based on who one “takes themself to 40. Jenkins (2018).
be, really”, and is bound up with one’s “reasons for acting”. Depending on the 41. Jenkins (2016, 413).
interpretation of Bettcher’s view, it either runs into many of the same concerns 42. Jenkins (2016, 412). Jenkins here follows Haslanger, and understands gen-
I raise for McKitrick’s (2015) and Jenkins’s (2016) accounts when applied to gender groups on an externalist account.
derqueer, or else is a view related to, but more individualistic and less political 43. Jenkins uses the term ‘nonbinary’ rather than genderqueer, and more for-
than, the positive account I offer in §4. mally puts this idea as follows: “S has a nonbinary gender identity iff S’s in-
38. See, e.g., McKitrick (2015, 2580) for an explicit rejection of the essentialism ternal ‘map’ is neither formed so as to guide someone marked as a woman
worry. through the social or material realities that are, in that context, characteristic of
39. The precise formulation of this idea is as follows: “x is gender G iff x has women as a class nor formed to guide someone classed as a man through the
(sufficiently many, sufficiently strong) dispositions D1...Dn to behave in ways social or material realities that are, in that context, characteristic of men as a
B1...Bn in situations S1...Sn, and the relevant social group considers behaving class.” (Jenkins 2016, 411, fn 40). See also Jenkins (2018).

do not consider the norms governing social spaces for either men or to the binary, but in a way that leaves someone attempting to navi-
women as relevant to them, may “have all toilets marked as uncomfort- gate these structure no choice but to pick a side. Moreover, because all
able places fraught with stress and danger”.44 (or nearly all) genderqueer persons were socialized as either men or
The first thing to notice is that Jenkins’s norm relevancy approach women, and often are perceived as men or women, only self-applying
to male and female gender identity differs dramatically from the ap- the norms of “a person wearing people clothes” is not possible. Gen-
proach to nonbinary gender identity. So long as someone considers derqueer persons who wish to navigate the world at all, much less
some of the female-coded (or male-coded) norms as relevant to them, safely, have no option but to see binary-norms as more or less relevant
they have a female (or male) gender identity.45 After all, the number to them.46
of men and women who take all of the norms associated with men or Weiss (2018) captures this sentiment when explaining their decision
women as relevant to them is likely few and far between. But notice to identify both as non-binary and as a woman.
that this feature is taken to immediately constrain the proposed defini-
I personally identify as a non-binary woman... [T]o me, this iden-
tion of nonbinary (or, in my terms, genderqueer) identities: according
tity acknowledges both that I don’t have an innate identification
to Jenkins, it cannot simply be the case that nonbinary persons do not
with any gender and that I’ve been socialized as a woman.47
take some or even most of the binary-coded norms as relevant to them.
Rather, they must take none of those norms as relevant to them. Here, Weiss is not alone. In the same article, they interview 24-year-old
the definition begins to generate a serious worry. Rey Noble, who also identifies as nonbinary and as a woman. Accord-
Genderqueer persons frequently maintain, if only out of necessity, ing to Noble, this is to “acknowledge that she loves her female-coded
a sense of what binary-coded norms are relevant for them in spaces body but doesn’t always feel it accurately represents her”.48 Similarly,
where there is no alternative to these norms. One initial place to see Laurie Penny, a UK-based journalist, articulates having distinct but
this is in the dual identities of some genderqueer persons; that is, those compatible reasons for identifying as genderqueer and as a woman.
who do not exclusively identify as a man or as a woman, but who claim “My identity is more complex than simply female or male," Penny
both a genderqueer as well as male and/or female identity. Testimony writes, “but...I am a woman politically, because that’s how people see
suggests that one common motivation for this dual identification is a me and that’s how the state treats me”.49
recognition of the inescapability of binary norms: The gender norms Weiss’s, Noble’s, and Penny’s testimonies speak to the inescapable
applied by the state and other persons impact one’s ability to move relevance of gender norms. At this point, someone might suggest that
through the world. In our current society, saturated in exclusive, bi- genderqueer identity perhaps is marked by a feeling of discomfort or in-
nary divisions, there is no possibility of never taking gender norms to authenticity with (complying with) those norms. But this dramatically
be relevant to oneself. Public spaces, such as toilets and locker rooms, over-generates: Many non-genderqueer men or women also feel dis-
legal institutions, social clubs, language, and marketing, to name but comfort and inauthenticity regarding the gender norms that they are
a few places, are heavily gendered, and gendered not only according
46. Andler (2017) raises similar worries for Jenkins’s account of gender identity.
44. Jenkins (2018). Emphasis in original. 47. Weiss (2018).
45. Jenkins thinks that someone could have, for this reason, more than one 48. Ibid.
gender identity in a given context. 49. Penny (2015).

socially coerced to obey.50 cretely conceptualized as ‘male’, ‘female’, ‘neither’, or ‘both”’.52 Inso-
In addition to over-generating, though, it also under-generates. far as Jenkins takes the neither approach, then, the approach does not
There is an additional reason why we should be skeptical of the idea align with genderqueer individuals’ descriptions of their own internal
that genderqueer persons do not take any gender norms to be relevant states.53
to themselves: Some people locate their genderqueer identity in their Setting aside a norm-relevancy approach to genderqueer identity,
fluidity between different gender categories. More specifically, this tes- then, what about a dispositional approach? Why not think that being
timony suggests that some genderqueer individuals experience vari- genderqueer is less about what norms one considers relevant to one-
ous gender-specific norms as relevant or apt in different contexts. For self, but rather about what one is internally disposed to do—e.g., use
example, in Galupo, et al’s (2018) study of genderqueer persons, many gender neutral pronouns, assert “I am genderqueer”, and so on? Such
participants described their gender in ways that include, but are not an approach might amount to something along the following lines:
bound by only one of the binary options:
S is genderqueer in a context C iff S is sufficiently disposed to
My gender changes. Sometimes I am female, sometimes I behave in C in ways that would (in trans-friendly contexts) mark
am a boy, sometimes I am both, and sometimes I am neither. S as genderqueer.54
(genderfluid)
What might the behaviors be? On one interpretation, the relevant
behaviors for being genderqueer would be different in content, but not
Sometimes I feel like I am completely a man. Sometimes I feel
in kind from those for being men and women. That is, the behavioral
like I am mostly a man, with some woman/agender mixed in.
dispositions relevant to being genderqueer would include dispositions
(demiguy)
toward things like “modes of dress, posture and mannerisms, produc-
tive and leisure time activities, styles of communication and social in-
I can switch in between a variety of genders (man, woman, an-
teraction”.55 But, as we already saw in §3.1, no such external behaviors
drogyne, agender, third gender, polygender, etc.) day by day.
decidedly mark someone as genderqueer.
(genderfluid)51
Given this, the scope of relevant behaviors is significantly con-
In short, genderqueer persons sometimes do identify as women strained. In fact, it seems that the only behaviors that would decidedly
and/or men, in Jenkins’s sense. In fact, Galupo et al explicitly observe mark someone as genderqueer in a trans-friendly context is them (sin-
that “[genderqueer] participants’ gender identit[ies] could not be dis- cerely) saying so.56 On this account then, someone is genderqueer so
52. Ibid., 18.

50. Recall that Jenkins (2018, 729) suggests that a nonbinary person would 53. Ibid.
uniquely feel that gender-marked toilets are “uncomfortable places fraught 54. This proposal is an adaption from McKitrick (2015), who does not em-
with stress and danger”. Notice this would also be true for a gender non- phasize trans-friendly contexts or discuss genderqueer persons. Without this
conforming woman or man, an androgynous woman or man, or perhaps even emphasis, the proposal would, for reasons that are hopefully clear, be even
a gender conforming woman or man who dislikes being in gender-marked further off target: In dominant context, no behaviors would mark someone as
spaces. genderqueer, because this category is not recognized in those contexts.
51. Galupo et al. (2018, 12). Participants’ preferred gender labels are in paren- 55. McKitrick (2015), 2581.
theses. 56. Although not framed dispositionally, a similar idea is floated by Riki
philosophers’ imprint - 10 - vol. 20, no. 9 (april 2020)

long as they are sufficiently disposed to assert that they do not exclu- cial costs. First, it seems likely that, in such a scenario, many persons
sively identify as a man or a woman: e.g., ‘I am genderqueer’, ‘I am who currently and comfortably identify exclusively within the binary
nonbinary’, ‘I am gender fluid’.57 might begin to assert other, nonbinary identities.58 That is, if being non-
Here, two further worries arise. The first concerns the manifestation binary were completely socially accepted, such that no difficulties or
conditions for these dispositions. I suspect that much of the motivation prejudices faced those resisting binary categorization, why think that
for adopting a dispositionalist account of genderqueer identity is gain- those who, under actual conditions, do not consider themselves nonbi-
ing the ability to count persons as genderqueer even when these dispo- nary, would continue to do so? Regardless of which way we go, then,
sitions are masked or counteracted by social costs, such as the threat it seems this view gets the extension of genderqueer wrong even by its
of bullying, discrimination, being fired, assaulted, or simply misun- own lights: It will either exclude those with a low risk tolerance, or
derstood. Rather than seeing someone as genderqueer only in contexts extend the category to persons who in fact take themselves to have a
where they in fact say so, a dispositionalist approach allows us to count binary identity, but who might think otherwise in lieu of social reper-
as genderqueer anyone who would—under certain conditions—assert cussions.
that they are genderqueer. Someone who is prevented from openly The second, and I think even more important worry for this dispo-
asserting a genderqueer identity due social costs, then, can still be gen- sitional account is that it metaphysically trivializes being genderqueer.
derqueer. Regardless of the manifestation conditions for a dispositional account,
With this in mind, the thought goes, we should privilege how that we’ve seen that the most plausible behaviors that, when manifested,
person would be, were it less-or-not-at-all socially costly to be gen- would be socially considered determinative of being genderqueer are
derqueer. From here, we arrive at the idea that someone is genderqueer assertions that one is genderqueer. But in that case, being genderqueer
just in case, were the social costs sufficiently low, they would assert that amounts to nothing more than a linguistic construction: There is noth-
they do not identify exclusively as a man or a woman. But what are ing substantively different between someone who is and someone who
these conditions? If they are ones where some social costs remain, then is not genderqueer. The only difference is that one, but not the other,
it would seem to prevent those with low risk tolerance from being gen- is disposed to use certain terms to describe themself. On this disposi-
derqueer: Some people who might be willing to assert a genderqueer tional account, no difference other than this is necessary (or sufficient)
identity under no social costs might be unwilling to do so even in the for being genderqueer. It is hard to see, for this reason, what the con-
face of small or infrequent costs. So leaving any social costs in the man- tent of such terms might be, or what might be the difference between
ifestation conditions means that only some people, but not others, can ‘sincere’ and ‘non-sincere’ assertion of identity. ‘Genderqueer’, ‘nonbi-
have a genderqueer identity. nary’, ‘agender’, etc. seem reduced to empty (or at least opaque) labels.
Suppose, then, the manifestation conditions are ones with no so- It may turn out, in the end, that genderqueer identity amounts to
nothing more than self-describing using certain terms. But if possible,
we should—and I think can—do better. To that end, I turn now to a
Wilchins (2017, 101): “With nonbinary people, it is the identifying act of say-
ing one is ‘nonbinary’...which is central to identity”. new proposal: genderqueer as a critical gender kind.
57. I leave open that assertion occurs in many ways, including writing, sign
language, etc. Many nonbinary youth depend on social media, such as Twitter,
Facebook, or YouTube, to communicate their gender identification. See Singh 58. The same point holds for the scenario with very low social costs, but is
(2013, 698). more obvious when all costs are removed.

4. A New Approach: Critical Gender Kinds tions. Primarily, though, it is because my central target for analysis is
What explains being genderqueer? Is asserting one’s preferred gender the kind genderqueer, and not the individual property being genderqueer.
label sufficient? Is it necessary? Is gender non-conformity or androg- I should pause here to make clear a background methodological
yny sufficient, even if not necessary? These questions are complicated commitment. It is common to conflate the project of analyzing a gender
by the fact that, as we’ve seen, purely external factors are insufficient kind with the project of analyzing its membership conditions—indeed,
for understanding genderqueer, and appealing instead to gender iden- they are treated as one within existing externalist and internalist mod-
tity only pushes us to ask what might constitute a genderqueer iden- els of gender kinds.60 I think this is a metaphysical error. It is already
tity. While it is tempting to think of this identity in terms of wholly well recognized that explanatory individualism, or the theory that the
internal features, such as a sense of norm relevance or a disposition explanation for a social kind or phenomenon reduces to facts about
to claim membership in a category, we’ve seen why these approaches individuals, is typically not an apt way to approach social ontology.61
fall short. So what could the difference between genderqueer and non- Just as an analysis of Christianity would be different than an analysis of
genderqueer persons amount to? what it takes for an individual to be a Christian, so too, an analysis of
The solution, I suggest, lies in understanding the category gen- genderqueer is distinct from (though, of course, related to) an analysis
derqueer not in terms of external or internal features of individuals, of what it takes for an individual to be genderqueer. To the extent that
but rather in terms of features of a collective—in particular, features I am interested in individuals, it is in service of understanding how, as
that combine both external (political) and internal (motivational) com- a collective, these individuals resist the gender binary.
ponents. I suggest that genderqueer is best understood as a category What is the best way to understand a gender kind of this sort? I
whose members collectively destabilize the idea that men and women propose that, to do so, we must recognize a new type of gender kind:
are discrete, exclusive, and exhaustive gender categories, and do so a critical gender kind.
because of members’ felt or desired gender categorization outside this Critical Gender Kinds: For a given kind X, X is a critical gen-
exclusive and exhaustive binary.59 der kind relative to a given society iff X’s members collectively
Importantly, I do not assume that genderqueer persons will be suc- destabilize one or more core elements of the dominant gender
cessful in destabilizing this axis. Nor do I assume that each member of ideology in that society.62
genderqueer destabilizes this axis, much less do so in a way that is intel-
ligible to others. For an individual to be genderqueer, on my view, only 60. A more general assumption of this sort frequently appears within meta-
requires that they take part in a collective resistance. While I say more physics more broadly. For example, metaphysical account of persons or causa-
about this below, I will not try to give precise conditions for what this tion typically offer only an account of what it takes for something to be an
instance of a person or of causation. I reserve judgment, here, as to the merits
taking part requires. In part, this is because I think there are no such of this assumption in other areas of metaphysics.
precise conditions; certainly, there are not context-independent condi- 61. See, e.g., Epstein (2009) and Haslanger (2016).
62. By ‘society’, I roughly mean communities of persons with shared clusters
of beliefs, concepts, and attitudes that give rise to concrete social practices and
structures. These clusters facilitate social interaction; they make it possible to
59. Here I disagree with Halperin (1995, 62), who argues that while identities “interpret and organize information and coordinate action, thought, and affect”
like ‘queer’ create solidarity outside of heteronormativity, it must be “an iden- (Haslanger 2016, 126). They also can be individuated with more or less fine
tity without an essence.” A collective function of ideological destabilization can grain. By ‘dominant gender ideology’, I mean the beliefs, concepts, and atti-
(but need not) provide an essence for such identities. tudes toward gender that have the most social power within a society, and that

Note that this definition leaves open the source of this destabiliza- More can and should be said about principled destabilizing. But
tion. I take it that collective destabilizing can be motivated or caused in because my account of genderqueer relies on the notion of existential
many ways. For our current purpose of analyzing genderqueer, I want to destabilizing, I’ve described the phenomenon of principled destabiliz-
specifically highlight at least two importantly distinct, but compatible ing primarily for the purpose of contrast. Unlike its sibling, existential
modes of destabilizing: principled and existential. We can understand destabilizing stems from one’s felt or desired place with respect to gen-
these as follows: der roles, embodiment, or categorization—typically, one that is deviant
given the practices, norms, and structures that arise from and sustain
Principled Destabilizing: Principled destabilizing of dominant
dominant gender ideology.
gender ideology is destabilizing that stems from or otherwise
To more sharply distinguish between these modes of destabilizing,
expresses individuals’ social or political commitments regarding
suppose you meet two persons who use the gender neutral pronouns
gender norms, practices, and structures.
‘they/them’. One does not consider themself nonbinary in any sense,
but uses these pronouns because they are committed to making En-
Existential Destabilizing: Existential destabilizing of dominant
glish more hospitable for nonbinary persons.63 The other uses these
gender ideology is destabilizing that stems from or otherwise
pronouns because they consider themself genderqueer, and so take
expresses individuals’ felt or desired gender roles, embodiment,
both ‘she’ and ‘he’ to misdescribe their claimed gender categorization.
and/or categorization.
In this case, it may be that both persons take part in principled destabi-
Principled destabilizing is a common practice, shared among a va- lizing of the dominant belief that everyone is either a man or a woman.
riety of activists, allies, and members of gender and sexual minority But only the second person takes part in existential destabilizing of
groups. For example, those who speak out against sexist, transphobic, this belief. And this is because the second, but not the first, engages
or heteronormative practices, and do so from their commitment to gen- in the relevant behavior—here, use of gender neutral pronouns—due
der or sexual equality, engage in principled destabilizing of dominant to their felt or desired categorization outside of the gender binary. In
gender ideology. Attending Take Back the Night or gay pride marches, line with this example, I propose that the key mark of existential desta-
voting for politicians who support trans rights, donating to organi- bilizing is its source: namely, subjectively felt or desired gender role,
zations that advocate for women’s reproductive rights, using gender- embodiment, or categorization. And I propose that the mark of exis-
neutral pronouns, or having a gender non-conforming aesthetic are tential destabilizing in the case of genderqueer is felt or desired gender
just a few examples of principled actions that are open to everyone. categorization specifically.64
Many engage in these actions not (or not only) because of their own The distinction between principled and existential resistance helps
felt or desired gender role, embodiment, or categorization, but (also) us articulate the difference between allies and members of gender
because they have values and beliefs that commit them to resist domi-
nant gender norms, practices, and structures. These persons are, in my
63. See Dembroff & Wodak (2018) for further argument on this point.
view, jointly engaged in principled destabilizing. 64. Of course, this is compatible with the observation that many of the mem-
bers of this kind also engage in existential destabilizing due to felt or desired
embodiment or roles. However, I here take seriously the claim—made by many
impose (often unreflectively) their shared epistemic, conceptual, and affective genderqueer persons—that there are not particular embodiments or social roles
systems onto less powerful communities. that belong to genderqueer.

kinds such as genderqueer and trans: While both resist dominant gen- basis adopts hegemonic masculine roles and embobdiment (relational
der ideology, members of these kinds resist (at least in part) due to felt to his class, race, etc.) takes part in existential restabilizing of the dom-
or desired gender categorization that deviates from dominant expecta- inant idea that men ought to behave and appear according to hege-
tions, norms, and assumptions. That is, who they take or desire them- monic masculine norms. In contrast, someone who considers themself
selves to be is itself incompatible with or otherwise does not conform a woman but uses slurs to describe gay or effeminate men, and does
to the categorization imposed on them by persons operating under so on the basis of beliefs about how men ought to behave, takes part
dominant gender ideology. Importantly, though, this is not a purely in principled restabilizing of this dominant idea.66
internalistic notion of genderqueer: an internal relationship to gender To be clear: in my view, individuals can and do belong to both crit-
categories is only one piece of the characterization. In addition to this ical and non-critical gender kinds. The critical/non-critical distinction
internal relationship, and because of it, members of genderqueer engage is not intended as another binary into which individuals can be ex-
in collective and existential destabilizing. Moreover, by including ‘de- clusively sorted. In fact, I suspect it is unavoidable to belong to both
sired’ alongside ‘felt’, I hope to capture a broader range of phenomeno- types of kinds: We all belong to a variety of political gender kinds—
logical states with respect to gender categorization than those empha- critical and non-critical—as well as externalist and internalist gender
sized by Jenkins and McKitrick. This desire could be based on political kinds. My focus here is on genderqueer as a particular, critical gender
(or perhaps religious) motivations, in addition to an internal sense of kind. But my account does not preclude that members of genderqueer
gender authenticity, relevance, belonging, or dysphoria.65 simultaneously belong to many more gender kinds.
To be clear, critical gender kinds are not the only gender kinds Of course, saying that genderqueer is a critical gender kind is
whose members stand in political relationships to dominant gender nowhere near the level of specificity needed to understand this kind.
ideology. In my view, which I cannot fully defend here, all persons Even once we narrow our scope to so-called Western societies, we
stand in relationships—both principled and existential—to gender ide- find there are many critical gender kinds, and they can be identified
ology. When these relationships function to restabilize or maintain to various degrees of specificity, relative to how fine-grained one de-
dominant ideology, we can describe those who manifest them as be- scribes (an aspect of) the dominant gender ideology.67 To draw this
longing to non-critical gender kinds: out, and further motivate thinking of genderqueer as a critical gender
kind, let’s consider the gender ideology that dominates in Western so-
Non-Critical Gender Kinds: For a given kind X, X is a non-
cieties. Broadly speaking, a vast number of social groups resist this
critical gender kind relative to a given society iff X’s members
ideology: to name but a name, trans men, trans women, abortion rights
collectively restabilize one or more elements of the dominant
activists, butch dykes, drag queens, genderqueers, stay-at-home dads, female
gender ideology in that society.
powerlifters, tomboys, feminists, and on and on. That is, in both princi-
As above, we can divide restabilizing into both principled and ex-
istential modes. Someone who considers themself a man and on this 66. Insofar as this person’s behavior may also be motivated by her beliefs about
her own gender role with respect to (e.g.) encouraging male masculinity, she
may also thereby take part in existential restabilizing of this idea.
65. Thanks to Alicia Fowler for alerting me to the possibility of religiously mo- 67. Throughout this paper, I use ‘Western’ as an imperfect shorthand, while
tivated resistance to the binary axis. The example of religious principles moti- also recognizing that this term is flawed—see, e.g, Appiah (2016). If the reader
vating nonbinary category-claims is a good example of nested critical gender prefers to talk about, e.g., ‘the Global North’ or ‘postcolonial societies’, they
kinds. can substitute their preferred term.

pled and existential ways (among others), multiple groups resist nor-
mative, gendered social expectations regarding their bodies, gender
roles, or categorizations.
On one way of thinking about critical gender kinds, then, all of
these various and sundry groups might be classified together within
one kind:
Western Gender Defiers: Western gender defiers is a critical gen-

der kind, whose members collectively resist one or more ele- The binary axis: The genders men and women are binary,
ments of dominant gender ideology in Western societies. discrete, immutable, exclusive, and exhaustive.69
In at least two ways, this definition is not particularly illuminating.

The biological axis: Every person essentially has a biological
First, how might one go about deciding who does or does not count
sex that, by virtue of nature, grounds (metaphysically ex-
as a gender defier without a more detailed analysis of what composes
plains/defines) their gender. By their natures, men have a male
the dominant gender ideology in question? Second, with respect to
biological sex and women have a female biological sex.70
genderqueer, if genderqueer persons are a subset of gender defiers, this
does not illuminate what is unique to genderqueer. It seems that, in
The teleological axis: Someone’s gender, by virtue of nature,
order to give an analysis of genderqueer, we need a better idea of what
determines a range of social, psychological, and physical
aspect of dominant gender ideology genderqueer persons resist, as well
features—e.g., sexual desire, occupation, family role, attire,
as how they do so. All in all, more details are needed.
comportment, personality features—that they either must (are
To this end, I propose a more (but still not very) fine-grained pic-
determined to) or ought to have. Males naturally must or ought
ture of Western dominant gender ideology.68 On this picture, the ideol-
to have masculine features, females naturally must or ought to
ogy can be thought of as having four distinct, but interconnected and
have feminine features.
mutually reinforcing axes: the binary axis, the biological axis, the tele-
ological axis, and the hierarchical axis. While no one of these axes can
be fully understood apart from the others, for the sake of analysis we 69. The binary axis provides the conceptual framework that constrains and
conjoins the content of the biological and teleological axes. For this reason, it is
can somewhat artificially take each individually: a mistake to think that genderqueer persons reject the idea that most persons
have, e.g., penises or vaginas: In rejecting the binary axis, they are instead
challenging the conceptual framework underlying the biological, teleological,
and hierarchical axes. See Dembroff (2018).
70. In most (but not all) cases, biological sex is understood as a feature deter-
mined by or reducible to external genitalia. Notably, combined with the binary
axis, this axis erases persons born with genitalia that defies exclusive classifi-
cation as male or female. This is not a shortcoming with my description of the
axis; rather, my description accurately capture prevalent ideology that leads to
the erasure of these persons, as well as unnecessary medical interventions on
68. This picture significantly diverges from, but was inspired by a description children born with so-called “ambiguous genitalia”. See, e.g., Chase (1998) and
of “the postcolonial understanding of gender” in Tan (manuscript). Bettcher (2016).

specifically, I propose that its members destabilize the idea that they
The hierarchical axis: The biological and teleological features must belong to one of two discrete, exhaustive, and exclusive gender
that are natural for men (as men) are incompatible with and kinds (men/women): that is, binary kinds that do not overlap (dis-
more valuable than the features that are natural for women (as crete), account for all persons (exhaustive), and are such that one per-
women), and naturalness is more valuable than unnaturalness.71 son cannot belong to both kinds (exclusive). Moreover, these members
do so on the basis of a felt or desired gender categorization that is
All four axes together establish an ideology that exclusively divides
ontologically incompatible with the binary axis. We can put this more
bodies into two categories, polices these categories according to ideas
formally as follows:
of ‘natural’ biological and teleological features, and establishes a self-
perpetuating hierarchy between them. This hierarchy, unsurprisingly, Genderqueer: Genderqueer is a critical gender kind, such that its
primarily privileges whose who can and do conform to norms of “natu- members have a felt or desired gender categorization that con-
ral” men. Within this framework, we could spell out a variety of critical flicts with the binary axis, and on this basis collectively destabi-
gender kinds whose members collectively destabilize these axes.72 For lize this axis.74
example, those persons who consistently claim categorization other
On this proposed understanding of genderqueer, genderqueer per-
than the gender they were assigned based on their natal genitalia—
sons collectively and existentially destabilize the binary axis. That is,
a property typically considered sufficient for being trans—collectively
this collective destabilizing is rooted in genderqueer persons’ felt or de-
destabilize the biological axis. Similarly, butch lesbians, who defy so-
sired gender classifications that conflict with the binary axis. This point
cial expectations with respect to gender presentation and sexuality, col-
is important because it demarcates genderqueer as a kind such that in-
lectively destabilize the teleological assumption.73
ternal features (here, subjective relationship to gender categorization),
I propose that genderqueer is best understood as a critical gender
as well as external features (here, collective ideological destabilizing)
kind whose members collectively destabilize the binary axis. More
are required to adequately model this kind.
This dualistic feature brings a number of important implications.
71. First, here I follow, but make distinctions within, feminist theories on which First, it suggests that genderqueer cannot exist in contexts where per-
gender within Western contexts is “traditionally assumed to be based on a bi-
nary, mandatory system that attributes social characteristics to sexed anatomy, sons are so bereft of access to gender deviant presentations, concepts,
with humans categorized from birth as male vs female based on their exter- and language that they are unable to perform speech acts and behav-
nal genitalia” (Nagoshi, et al. 2012, 407, referencing Hausman (2001)). See Witt
(2011), Frye (1983), and Wittig (1992) among many, many others for further dis- iors that would collectively destabilize the binary axis.75 That is: I do
cussion. The ideas that masculinity and femininity are oppositional and hierar-
chical is further developed in Serano (2016, 100—113) under the labels “oppo-
sitional sexism” and “traditional sexism”. Second, note that other, intersecting 74. I do not mean to suggest that all genderqueer persons resist the binary
social identities–such as race, class, sexuality, and disability—often disqualify axis under this theoretical guise. Most often, they simply reject the idea that
or prevent persons from attaining these so-called “natural” features, rendering they must be neatly and permanently categorized as either a man or woman—
them “unnatural” and devalued. that they must comply with binary gender classification. This harkens to the
72. While various targets of destabilizing are compatible, some groups treat familiar feminist point that “the personal is political”: Even if a genderqueer
them as exclusive. For example, one anti-trans activist position is that desta- person does not conceptualize (e.g.) use of gender neutral pronouns as political
bilizing the social axis is incompatible with destabilizing the biological and in nature, it is, as is using gender-specific pronouns.
binary axes. 75. Relatedly, it suggests that genderqueer will not exist in a world so ignorant
73. See, e.g., Rich (1980) and Halberstam (1998). of nonbinary persons that they cannot post a destabilizing threat to the binary

not think genderqueer is adequately captured solely in terms of inter- Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, this dualistic analysis leaves
nal features, such as a dislike of being gendered within the binary, or space for variation within both the mental states accompanying felt
intentions to resist the binary axis. Genderqueer is not a merely psycho- or desired gender categorization outside of the binary, as well as the
logical phenomenon. For one thing, this would overextend genderqueer. destabilizing actions collectively undertaken by genderqueer persons.
No doubt, many people who would not consider themselves (or be The construction of binary gender kinds (men/women), the latitude in-
considered) genderqueer dislike being gendered within the binary, but dividuals have within them, and how individuals are socialized into
have resigned themselves to it or otherwise accepted it as part of their them, vary dramatically across intersections with other social identi-
lives. For another, this would remove the force of queer within gen- ties, such as race, class, and disability. For this reason, my model in-
derqueer. If being genderqueer were simply in the head, a world func- tentionally leaves open that within the group of genderqueer persons,
tioning smoothly according to the binary axis, with no material chal- one can (and I suspect will) find a vast range of concepts about and
lenges to this binary, could very well be a world full of genderqueer attitudes towards these binary kinds, as well as strategies for resisting
persons. This, to me, seems like a reductio: Resistance to gender bi- binary categorization.78
nary systems requires more than thought and affect. This point aligns What is essential to genderqueer, I’ve proposed, is found at the in-
with genderqueer persons’ description of being nonbinary as a way tersection of external and internal features. In particular, it is collec-
of “reject[ing] such [binary] systems that lead to harmful stereotypes tive, existential destabilizing of the binary axis. The actions making
and oppression” and “breaking down what it means to be a gendered up this destabilizing are many: Again, there is no one, much less one
person in the world”.76 Neither resistance nor breaking down others’ right way to be genderqueer. Many forms of resisting binary catego-
assumptions occur merely within the head.77 rization are possible. Some common strategies will be familiar: using
Second, it suggests that genderqueer does not exist simply by virtue gender neutral pronouns (and other terms, like the title ‘Mx.’), culti-
of there being a group of persons who adopt gender presentations, lan- vating gender non-conforming aesthetics, asserting nonbinary catego-
guage, or behaviors that resist the binary axis. As seen in §3.1, external rization (e.g., ‘I am agender’), queering personal relationships, defying
features are not sufficient for modeling genderqueer. Androgyny, use of sexual binaries, and what I’ll call ‘space switching’, or moving between
gender neutral pronouns, and so on, are features that are not univer- male and female gendered spaces. While, again, no single one of these
sal among genderqueer persons, and also are shared by many persons features is unique to or required in order to be genderqueer, they are
who identify within the binary. These features may well function to familiar tools that genderqueer persons use to resist the idea that they
destabilize the binary axis, even when manifested by binary-identified themselves must comply with binary categorization. What they share—
persons, but for this reason, destabilizing the binary axis is not the only and what is, I think, a constraint on what groups can aptly be called
feature of genderqueer. “destabilizing”—is that they violate what Kate Bornstein (1994) calls
the “gender rules”: the binary set of norms that are imposed and en-
forced (via social practices, material structures, and various forms of
axis. As evidenced by the fact that ‘There are only two genders!’ has become a
right-wing rallying cry, that world is not our world. gender policing) upon individuals according to the sexed interpreta-
76. Taluson (2017).
77. While I lack space to explore this here, this point suggests fruitful intersec-
tions between discussion of critical gender kinds and hermeneutical injustice,
as described in Fricker (2007). 78. Thanks to Jorge Meneses for pressing me on this point.

tion of their bodies.79 Violating these rules challenges or defies domi- gender play in sexual relationships).82 83
nant gender practices and structures. As these practices and structures 5. Eschewing sexuality binaries: Identifying one’s sexuality outside
are many, so too are the possible modes of destabilizing, which we of the ‘gay’, ‘straight’, or ‘bisexual’ taxonomy, which is based on a
again can expect to vary widely across intersectional contexts and in- binary gender system.84
dividuals. To name but a few: 6. Space switching: Fluidity between female and male coded material
spaces (e.g., using both men’s and women’s bathrooms, moving
1. Gender neutral pronouns: Communicating that one uses gender
between male and female friend groups).85
neutral pronouns (e.g., ze/zim/zis, they/them/theirs) rather than
a gender-specific pronoun (e.g., he/him/his, she/her/hers).80 This list is by no means exhaustive of the many ways in which gen-
2. Gender non-conforming aesthetics: Gender presentations that vi- derqueer people resist captivity within the gender binary.86 My pur-
olate cultural gendered expectations (e.g., cross-dressing, androg- pose is not to provide an exhaustive list of ways to be genderqueer,
yny).81 but rather to illustrate the dappled and diverse nature of genderqueer
3. Gender categorization assertions: Articulating one’s own sense of expression. While some of these expressions (e.g., assertion) will be
gender kind membership (e.g., ‘I am nonbinary’, ‘I am gender- more easily interpreted by others as resisting the binary axis, others
fluid’). (e.g., gender non-conformity) admit more ambiguity. Moreover, gen-
4. Queering personal relationships: Fluidity between or violation of
traditional gender roles within personal relationships (e.g., taking
82. Mo, a female-assigned genderqueer person describes this enactment of gen-
on certain traditional female parenting roles as well as male roles, derqueerness. “My feelings about my gender are not dependent on [how I am
perceived],” they say, “but are more tied in to how I identify with people (men
as much as women, and trans people of all kinds) and how I relate to my family
(as a husband and dad), etc.” Mo Interview (2018). (Mo’s last name has been
omitted to maintain anonymity.)
83. Any queering of sexual relationships is typically met with the strongest neg-
ative reaction from dominant culture. According to Murray Davis (1983), this
79. This approach, I think, nicely aligns with genderqueers shared sense of is because these gender violations directly challenge others’ pervasive reliance
ignoring and/or breaking gender rules. As one genderqueer person comments on binary sexual norms to organize their lives. Cited in Bornstein (1994, 72).
in Howell (2018): “I’m what people would be if gender rules didn’t really exist.” 84. Nagoshi et al. (2012) provides qualitative empirical data concerning the
80. And similarly for other gender neutral language—e.g., ‘human’ over ’man’ close relationship between gender and sexual identities. At one genderqueer
or ’woman’, ‘parent’ over ‘mother’ or ‘father’, or using a chosen, gender am- participant, AJ, reported, “I identify as queer, as my sexual identity... I don’t
biguous name over one’s birth name. The importance of generating gender neu- really see that there really is a binary. So I wouldn’t even say bisexual, because
tral language in the service of breaking down the binary axis cannot, I think, be that’s still acknowledging that there’s a binary system.” (417). For further em-
understated, given the close relationship between language and available con- pirical discussion, see Bradford et al. (2018, 5). See also Dembroff (2016) for
cepts. See, e.g., Wittig (1992, 55): “We must produce a political transformation philosophical discussion on the relationship between gender and sexual iden-
of the key concepts, that is of the concepts which are strategic for us. For there tity.
is another order of materiality, that of language, and language is worked upon 85. Like all of the above, space switching is a way of breaking and also fluidly
from within by these strategic concepts”. navigating binary gender rules: “[Fluidity across gender rules generates] the
81. Transgressive gender aesthetics are a long standing tradition of queering ability to freely and knowingly become one or many of a limitless number of
gender. Marjorie Garber (1992), for example, discusses transvestism as a way genders for any length of time, at any rate of change. Gender fluidity recognises
to create a crisis not only for the gender binary, but for the stability of gender no borders or rules of gender” (Bornstein 1994, 52).
categorization altogether. See also Chan (2017) for a discussion of bodybuilding 86. For empirical data on the various strategies toward genderqueer expression,
as a genderqueer aesthetic. see Richard et al. (2016).

derqueer persons will not adopt the same or perhaps any of these kinds in a given context with gender kinds across other contexts. We
expressions at all times or spaces. Someone who uses gender neutral also thereby have a framework for interpreting common claims to the
pronouns with friends may not do so at work. Someone who will as- tune of “nonbinary persons have always existed everywhere”. If we
sert a genderqueer identity in explicitly trans-inclusive groups may interpret ‘nonbinary’, in such a claim, as any group that challenges
not do so outside of these groups. Genderqueer persons enact their the binary axis, then we can look to any time or society to identify
identities in multiple ways because genderqueer does not present a new such persons. Alternatively, if we interpret it as concerning existential
set of gender norms; it seeks to disrupt existing gender norms. That destabilizing of the binary axis, then our search will be constrained to
is: Genderqueer persons are not aiming to maintain a grey, androgy- contexts where this axis is dominant, pointing to important differences
nous middle ground between ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’, ‘man’ and between genderqueer, as here defined, and categories such as waria.
‘woman’, but rather, to resist the cultural command to accept these Second, insofar as I have described genderqueer in terms of desta-
binary categories as the categories by which one must be identified, bilizing the binary axis, one might worry that being genderqueer, on
labeled, and evaluated. This point is further reinforced by qualitative my proposal, requires that an individual must—to some extent and
empirical research on genderqueer identities. Bradford et al (2018, 8) in some context—externalize resistance to this axis.87 No doubt, some
notes that while models of gender typically expect gender to be sta- will find this result unpalatable, for reasons discussed in §3.2. Many
ble and predictable, “having the agency to make decisions regarding people prefer to think of being genderqueer as something that can be
one’s body and identity may be an integral component of genderqueer wholly internal, such that someone could be entirely closeted and re-
identity development”—one that often results in a “process of experi- main genderqueer. This internalized approach is reified by common
mentation”. Again, though, my focus is on the collective, destabilizing narratives of “discovering” or “realizing” that one is genderqueer, as
effects of this resistance, rather than on the effect of any single individ- opposed to “choosing to be” or “becoming” genderqueer. At the same
ual’s expression of their felt or desired gender categorization. Given time, these narratives are counterbalanced by other, also common nar-
this, there is plenty of room underneath the umbrella of genderqueer ratives such as, “I [finally] get to be who I want to be”, or “I...try to
for a variety of expressions. get to a place where I can safely be myself.”88 One might worry that
In closing, I want to draw out two key upshots of the proposed view. my account precludes those in hostile environments with heavy costs
First, the category genderqueer is socially located. Because genderqueer, of defying gender rules from being genderqueer.
on my proposal, essentially involves destabilizing the binary axis, as In response, I first want to again emphasize that my project primar-
understood within Western gender ideology, it is largely constrained ily concerns the category genderqueer and not the individual property
to contexts where this ideology is dominant. This is because ‘destabiliz- of being genderqueer. It may well be that, while the category essentially
ing’, I take it, connotes at minimum a causal relationship. However, this concerns political resistance, external resistance is not required of each
is not to ignore a closely related kind—one whose members challenge, and every member of this category. Consider, for analogy, the category
via destabilizing or not—the binary axis. Such a category would unify
genderqueer with the variety of genders beyond male and female recog- 87. My proposal might, in this sense, be thought in the spirit of Butler’s (1990)
nized in other societies, such as Indonesia’s waria, Native American “symbolic interactionism”, or the idea that an individual’s gender is created
an sustained through “reflecting back images of the self as object” (Hird 2002,
two-spirit, and Samoan fa’afafine. In this, we have the tools for finding 585).
important similarities and points of solidarity between critical gender 88. Howell (2018), Brehob (2018).

L.A. Dodgers fans. Presumably, this category is only properly under- to read the situation as one in which someone is unjustly prevented
stood as a social phenomenon—a collective of people that support the from being genderqueer. Referring to “closeted” genderqueers—rather
Dodgers by attending games, buying merchandise, and so on. This, than people who are unwillingly forced into binary categorization—
however, does not mean that in order for an individual to belong to downplays both the power of social forces over our access to social
this category, they must engage in socially perceived fan-like behaviors. identities, as well as how oppressive that power can be. Someone who
Perhaps it is sufficient that they themselves are aware of their support is forced to comply with the binary axis is, by my lights, prevented by
for the Dodgers, even if they keep this a secret for fear of retribution an unjust social system from being genderqueer—the cost of resistance
from their San Francisco Giants-loving friends. is untenable. This is not merely a stifling of self-expression, but a sti-
To be honest, I myself am not convinced that internal states should fling of self-realization: If genderqueer is centrally about destabilizing
be considered sufficient for being genderqueer: I tentatively suggest the binary axis, oppressive social factors have the potential to prevent
this “way out” for those who demand that they must be. I myself lean its realization.91 In contexts where someone wants to resist binary cat-
toward the thought that some external expression is required for being egorization, but faces untenable costs of doing so, the central injustice
genderqueer, keeping in mind that expression is multiply realizable is not, I think, a lack of recognition. Rather, it is a lack of freedom with
and need not not gain uptake.89 Indeed, there are myriad ways that respect to one’s ability to resist gender categorization. Emily Brehob,
someone could express felt or desired categorization without incurring who identifies as intersex and nonbinary, describes being caught in
heavy social costs, even in hostile environments. While pronoun pins, such a situation:
cultivating androgyny, or simply asserting one’s identity are all clear
Now that I live in Texas, I find it more difficult, not less, to
ways of resisting binary categorization, nothing so loud is required by
walk the line of affirming my identity to myself while remain-
my proposal, which emphasizes collective over individual action. As
ing safe... I find myself reverting to the mean—growing my hair
one agender person put this, “[S]ometimes when we dress ourselves,
long, letting it slide when people call me a woman... Is my iden-
or when we find...moments of authenticity, they are acts of resistance
tity even real if I don’t express it... There’s something incred-
even when they’re small”.90 My proposal leaves these “small acts of
ibly powerful—revolutionary, even—about challenging some-
resistance” open to genderqueer persons, and does not require social
one’s understanding of gender with your very existence.92
uptake of any given individual’s expression, even if some degree of
social uptake of its members’ collective expressions is required for the Understanding genderqueer as a critical gender kind whose mem-
category’s existence. bers collectively destabilize the binary axis helps us understand the ex-
Social costs nevertheless could prevent someone from any external periences of persons like Brehob. Genderqueer is not simply in the head:
expression of felt or desired nonbinary identification. A common inter- It challenges dominant gender ideology with its “very existence”. To
pretation of this situation is that such a person is “truly” genderqueer, understand this gender kind, we needed a new model—one that cap-
and unjustly prevented from self-expression. In contrast, I am tempted tures the interplay between ideological destabilization and felt or de-
sired categorization. I’ve proposed one such model, and no doubt there
89. Dembroff & Saint-Croix (2019) refer to this combination of internalized and
externalized identity as “agential identity”, or the bridge between self- and
social-perception. 91. See Dembroff’s (forthcoming) discussion of “ontological oppression”.
90. Howell (2018) 92. Brehob (2018).

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Philosophers’

Imprint volume 20, no. 9

BEYOND BINARY: tual lacuna that contributes to systematic misunderstanding of

philosophers’ imprint -2- vol. 20, no. 9 (april 2020)

philosophers’ imprint -3- vol. 20, no. 9 (april 2020)

philosophers’ imprint -4- vol. 20, no. 9 (april 2020)

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36. Jenkins (2018, 714).

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52. Ibid., 18.

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Western Gender Defiers: Western gender defiers is a critical gen-

In at least two ways, this definition is not particularly illuminating.

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