.

/
AVICENNA'S COMMENTARY
ONTHE
POETICS OF ARISTOTLE
A Critica/ Study witb an Annotated Translation oJ tbe Text
¿__A. V'~ ;1Bo---Jó3? .
BY

ISMAIL M. DAHIYAT
~

M.A., Ph.D.

LEIDEN
E.J.BRIL~
t974Y
 CHAPTER TWO

[POETICS, I-III]

On the Universal Ends and Universal

I mitation in Poetry 1
r. Now let us try to express that part of the First Teaching [i.e.,

1 Following Chapter I, which serves as a brief introduction, Avicenna

proceeds to " express," as he modestly states, what he could understand from

a treatise that bases its tenets on Greek poetry with which he was not familiar.
This chapter of the Commentary covers the first three chapters of the Poetics
(I-III), com bining summary wi th interpretation as is the case with A vicenna' s
general method throughout his Commentary. As its title indicates, this
chapter is devoted to a consideration of imitation and of poetry as a species
of imitation from a deductive and generic ("universal" ) viewpoint. Avicenna's
grouping of the first three chapters of the Poetics into one chapter is certainly
a valid interpretative judgement which is borne out by the fact that they do
forma coherent sub-unit dealing essentially with "universal" principies about
imitation in general and the poetic art as imitation.
The three aspects of imitation which serve as differentiae among the various
"imitative activities" are its means or m edia, "objects," and manner or mode
of presentation. The first differentia, nainely, the means of imitation, include
three things which are common, separately or in combination, to poetry,
music and dance. These are tone (laf¡n), speech ("when it is imaginative and
imitative") and measure (wazn). It is evident in the Commentary that each
of these three terms has two levels of meaning: one general and the other
rparticular to each art. For example, measure (wazn) means rhythm in
general but with reference to poetry it is rhythm expressed metrically (i.e.,
poetic meter).
The second differentia of imitation, as A vicenna interprets it, is the teleo-
logical function of imitation. In general, imitation has an ultimate rhetorical
bent, for every thing, noble or ignoble, is imitated either to be made better or
worse. There are, however, three possible ends of imitation: amelioration
(taf¡s'in) which Avicenna equates "in general terms" with encomium (madf¡,
lit. "praise"), depreciation (taqb'if¡) which is generally satire (dhamm), and
correspondence (mujiibaqah), i.e., the representation of action "merely as it
is" and "neither for amelioration nor depreciation." This latter "category"
is, however, considered as potentially prepared towards either encomium or
satire. There is a basic premiss which Avicenna stresses in his interpretation
and which underlies many of his views: Greek poetry was not devoted to the
imitation of persons (dhawiit) but to the irrÍitation of actj 0 ns for an undeniably
rhetorical and ethical purpose: "to induce or prevent action." Avicenna
concurs with Aristotle's notion that the " objects" of imitation are either
noble or base. He does, however, place a marked emphasis on the ethical and
rhetorical aims of imitation: amelioration of noble deeds and virtues, and
depreciation of ignoble ones.
A discussion of the third differentia of imitation (the manner) is missing in
70 AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE COMMENTARY

the Poetics] 1 which we are able to understand, since it mostly

includes discussions of poems and descriptions peculiar and known
to them [i.e., the Greeks]. Their acquaintance with such matters
makes explanation and exposition unnecessary. As we have said, 2
they hada fixed number of poetic kinds with definite themes-each
having its particular measure. For each kind, they had certain
conventions peculiar to them, just as the Arabs have conventions,
e.g., the description of deserted habitation, the erotic motif, the
depiction of landscape, and the like. 3 This should be taken for
granted.
I.
z. As [Aristotle] said, let us now speak of poetry, its kinds and
the characteristic of each kind; the principie of excellence in making
likenesses and poetic fictions, i.e., imaginative utterances; and the
exposition of the parts of each kind-quantitatively arÍd qualitative-
ly.4
Avicenna's Commentary. Instead of a discussion of the manner of imitation
in terms of the mode of presentation there is a reference to "mann er" in a
totally different sense: in terms of similitude, substitution (i.e., "metaphor"),
or the combination of both. There is no doubt that Aristotle is speaking
about the manner in which the poet presents his material and not about
whether similitude or metaphor is more predominant.
In fairness to Avicenna, it should be emphasized that there are indications.
in the text which show that it is not his intention to "interpret" Aristotle in
this way. On the one hand, the "place" at which Avicenna makes his trope-
oriented remarks is the very beginning of his Commentary proper, preceding
the discussion of the "means" of imitation ; Aristotle's cryptic statement
occurs at the beginning of Chapter III of the Poetics. On the other hand, and
judging from Abu Bishr Matta's translation, the remarks were utterly in-
comprehensible in their translated form. Avicenna, therefore, may have
replaced them, as he sometimes does, by his own v ersion of the "manner"
of imitation in non-dramatic, non-narrative poetry. Thus, at the very end of
Chapter II, he states that "The manners of imitation are three: similitud e,
m etaphor and the combination [of both); the ends are three: amelioration,
depreciation and correspondence."
1 The "First Teaching" refers to the Aristotelian Corpus; "that part"

refers to the Poetics.

2 See a,bove, I. 16.
3 The traditional Arab poem (qa$'idah) is exemplified by the seven "odes"

which were composed by sorne of the majar pre-Islamic Arabic poets and
hung in al-ka'bah, the sacred shrine in Mecca. The "conventions" that
Avicenna is referring to were structural elements in the arrangement of such
poems and conventional motifs that the poet used for his own purposes. See
J. A. Arberry, The Seven Odes: The First Chapter in Arabic Literature.
London, 1957.
4 At first glance this statement may seem to be intended as a summary of
 POETICS, I-III 7I
3· W e say: every likeness and fiction is either by way of similitude,
or by taking the thing notas it is but by way of substitution, i.e.,
metaphor-or, still, by the combination of both. 1 Imitation, which
is natural to man, is giving the likeness of a thing, not the thing
itself, such as when the natural animal is imitated by means of a
form that seems natural. In a like manner, sorne men imitate the
emotions of others, and sorne imitate one another. 2 Sorne of that
[i.e., imitation] proceeds from art, sorne follow practice. 3 Also, sorne
of that is by action,4 sorne by speech. 5
4· Poetry is one of the [arts] which imitate by three things: (i)
melodious tone, because it has an unquestionable effect on the soul,
and, furthermore, every theme has its proper tone in accordance
with its eloquence or "softness," or intermediacy, and by means of
that effect, the soul itself becomes imitative of sorrow, anger, or
the like; (ii) speech itself, when it is imaginative and imitative; and
(iii) measure, sorne meters being light, others grave.
5· These three may be combined or they may be used separately.
Measure and imaginative speech may be used alone. 6 Similarly, a
melody composed of harmonious tone and rhythm may be found in
flutes and lyres; a single melody which has no rhythm in it may be
found in woodwind instruments which, when properly set, are not
fingered. Rhythm without tone may be found in dancing; dancing,
the opening paragraph of the Poetics, but the trope-oriented Avicenna gives
mythos ("plot") an interpretation befitting his views on poetry (non-dramatic,
non-narrative) as expressed in the First Chapter. Two terms are used in a
complementary manner- likeness and poetic fiction (mathal wa khuriifah
shi'riyyah). In the following paragraph he now explains what "every likeness
and fiction" means to him, and how this relates to the generic concept of
imitation.
1 Two Arabic words are used to explain what "substitution" (tabdil) is:

isti'iirah ("comparison") and majiiz ("transfer"). Both express the varieties

of "metaphor" in Arabic as it differs from similitude-the explicit juxta-
position of two things as in asimile.
2 Three "species" of imitation can be deduced from these cryptic remarks:

a likeness may be (1) a poetic one (by the use of similitude, metaphor or both),
(z) a visual one by giving the "form" or "picture" ($urah) of something as in
painting and sculpture, and (3) a dramatic one as when "sorne men imitate
the emotions (afi,wiil) of others."
3 The word 'iidah ("practice" also means "habit," "custom."
4
The Arabic word isfi'l: "action," "deed," or perhaps "acting."
5 I.e., poetic language that combines "imaginative representation" and

measure (II. 5-6).

6 These are evidently the two basic means of poetry, which is not accom-

panied by music. See next paragraph: "Indeed, poetry excels by combining

both imaginative speech and measure."
72 AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE COMMENTARY

however, is better performed when accompanied by the proper

tone-it makes [a stronger] effect on the soul.
6. [Verbal composition] 1 may be imaginative utterances in prose,
or it may be in verse, but non-imaginative, being plain and artless.
However, poetry excels by combining both imaginative speech and
measure. Thus, the versified writings of a number of philosophers,
including Socrates, were connected either with the [ele]giac tri-
meter 2 which is made up of fourteen syllables, or with the meter
that is made up of sixteen syllables, or others. And also those
writings which resemble poetry but are not really poetic, such as
the versified writings of Empedocles in natural science: these share
nothing with poetry except the meter. Empedocles and Homer
share nothing except meter: what Empedocles wrote in verse is
natural science, and what Homer composed in verse is poetry. Thus,
Empedocles' writings are not poetry, nor is a discourse that does
not have one measure but rather a different measure for each part-
that is not poetry, either. 3
7· Sorne people recite [poetry], singing it with a rhythmical

1 The subject of this sentence is not clear; it consists in an implied "it,"

which I hav e interpreted, on the basis of the context, as "verbal composition."

Avicenna insists that poetry be both "imaginative" and "in verse." On the
basis of this view, he interprets Aristotle as distinguishing three types of
"verbal composition": (r) imaginative prose, (z) n on-imaginative verse
confused with poetry because it is metrical, but not truly poetic since it
lacks one of the essentials of poetry, namely, being imaginative (emotive and
mimetic) , and (3) true poetry which "combines both im aginative speech and
measure." Cf. Seymour M. Pitcher, " 'Epic, as I Here Define It,' " AJP, 55
(1944), 340-353.
2 Cf. Margoliouth (Analecta, p. 8r): trimetrum elegiacum.
3 The general consensus of modern scholars of the Poetics is, of course,

opposite to what Avicenna is here ascribing to Aristotle on the basis of his

(Avicenna's) own insistence on the importa nce of measure (meter) to poetry.
This is also consistent whit his earlier assumption that the Greeks had one
particular meter for each kind of poem (l. r6 & II. r ). To mix more than one
meter in the same poem is tantamount to putting the principies of natural
science in verse-to be a versifier nota poet. Avicenna was perhaps misled by
Aristotle's statement about Empedocles and' thought that it "equally"
applied to a "discourse" that has "a different measure for each part." Abu
Bishr Matta's translation states: "also if a man made the imitation ((¡.ikii.yah
wa tashbih) by mixing all the meters, as was the practice of Chaeremon-
whose Centaur was like a rhapsody in all meters-we may have to call him a
poet" (p. 33). Avicenna is, however, not alone in assuming a rigid adherence
to the uniform use of one meter in each poem nor in interpreting Aristotle in
this way (see D. L. Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the R enaissance, New York,
rg63; a detailed discussion of this point is included in Else, pp. 54 ff.).
 POETICS, I-III 73

tone. 1 Such was the poetry they called Dithyrambic, which, 1

suppose, was a type of poetry in which the virtuous in general were
lauded, not a particular person or group; [the line] consisted of
twenty-four syllables. Such, too, was the poetry used by the law-
givers to describe the terrible end of evil souls: it seems to have been
called Didactic.
8. The same was also done in Tragedy, i.e., the praise meant for
a living or dead person. They used to sing it in a momentous and
excellent way, starting with the mention of noble deeds and
commendable traits which were attributed to an individual. If he
died, they would add to the length of the poem orto its tone certain
notes portraying elegy and lamentation. 2
g. Comedy (a type of poetry in which invective is mixed with
ridicule 3 and irony and which is directed at an individual) is,
however, different from tragedy in that tragedy may properly
combine all the means of imitation including tone and verse, 4 but in
comedy melodious intonation is improper because melody and
ridicule are incompatible.

1 After the apparent digression of paragraph 6, the discussion seems to

return to the means of imítation that were stated in paragraph 5, and applied
to a distinction among "the imitative activities." Four types of poetic
composition are listed as examples of the combined use of all the means of
imitation. Aristotle's relatively brief statement (Poetics, I. ro, 1449b 23-29) is,
however, expanded by Avicenna's attempt to "explain" what the four
genres supposedly mean. He takes us back to Chapter I of his Commentary
(I. r6) for a brief "definition" of each genre. These "definitions" (7-9), which
are evidently meant as footnotes, are ultimately derived from the spurious
sources mentioned in the treatise by a l-Farabi. Avicenna's procedure here is
a clear example of how Chapter I influences his interpretative attempts and of
how he tries to bring into his Commentary whatever was available to him
that seemed to bear on the Poetics. We will see later in the Commentary how
his knowledge of Aristotle's other works is brought in for the purpose of
interpretation with relatively more valid results. There are no such "defini-
tions" in the Arabic translation of Abu Bishr Matta which reads: "And there
are sorne who use all those which were mentioned; as for example, by tone
(la!m), sweet voice and meters: the poetic art of the dithyramb, of the nome
(namüs), of·encomium (tragedy) and also of satire (comedy); they differ in
that sorne use all (of these) with the whole, and sorne with the part" (p. 33).
2 The reference is perhaps to the kommos (Poetics, XII). An example of a

tragedy with a substantial kommos ("lament") would be Aeschylus' Persians.

3 The word "ridicule" (!anz) is unde~stood by Avicenna as combining

both spite and mockery (al-Khi!íibah, p. 231).

4 The Arabic word na?m ("verse") is distinct from shi'r ("poetry") in

that it refers to metrical speech in general and which mayor may not possess
the primary poetic characteristic that Avicenna designates as "imaginative
representation."
74 AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE COMMENTARY

II.
ro. The aim of every imitation is either amelioration or deprecia-
tion,1 for a thing is imitated either to be made better or worse.
Greek poetry was generally intended for imitating actions and
emotions, and nothing else. The Greeks did not primarily occupy
themselves with the imitation of persons, as did the Arabs.
II. The Arabs used to compose poetry for two purposes: (i) to
affect the soul by presenting a given matter that moves it in the
direction of an action or emotion; and (ii) for pleasure alone-every-
thing was imitated for the pleasure of its imitation. On the other
hand, the Greeks intended, by means of speech, to induce or prevent
action. Sometimes, they did this by means of oratory, sometimes by
means of poetry. Thus, poetic imitation, as they practiced it, was
confined to actions and emotions-and to persons in so far as they
have those actions and emotions.2
1 The two terms "amelioration" (taf¡sin) and "depreciation (taqbif¡) are

essentially rhetorical, stressing the ends of imitation more than the "agents"
represented. Accordingly, it is action itself or characters in action that
constitute the "objects" ( = the subject matter) of Greek poetry. This
premiss is repeatedly emphasized and serves as the basis of the distinction
between Arabic and Greek poetry that follows. Since every action is either
noble or base sorne poets imitate noble action to make it even nobler (taf¡sin),
others imitate base action to make it even baser (taqbif¡), and still others are
more concerned with the "pleasure of imitating itself" and thus imitate
an action "merely as it is" (mujabaqah).
2 Although this distinction is tinged with sorne vagueness and hesitation

dueto the fact that Avicenna knew at first hand only one side of the compari-
son (i.e., Arabic poetry), it is certainly insightful and probably not far from
the truth. The distinction, which brings to mind the broader one between
the Classic and the Romantic or the objective and the subjective, coñsists in
two main points~ne related to the purpose of poetry and the other to its
subject-matter or content (of course both are integrally related to the
"manner"). According to this distinction, Arabic poetry is emotive and
subjective and its end is basically pleasure and wonder; Greek poetry, on the
other hand, is purposive and more objective since its end is ethical and
"practical" ("to induce or prevent action" ). Accordingly, the "objects" of
Arabic poetry are the "persons" (dhawat ), i.e., it is concerned with the
expression of the poet's own emotion or impressions; Greek poetry is con-
cerned with actions and emotions, and with "persons" only in so far as they
serve as agents for the representation of these (cf. Poetics, VI. 9, 1450a Ij-I9)·
Such a differentiation, I believe, is valid in so far as it accentuates a general
difference between the poetry of two cultures without ignoring exceptions and
finer details.
F. Gabrieli has a harsher judgement on Avicenna's attempted distinction
(and a rather· distorted view of Arabic poetry): "In this distinction, which is
stated in a vague and imperfect manner tinged with confusion and mis-
understanding, there is in nuce awareness or at least an outline of the great
 POETICS, I-III 75

rz. Every action is either base or noble. Sinee they [the Greeks]
practieed the imitation of aetions, sorne proeeeded to imitate them
for pure similitude,l neither for amelioration nor depreeiation.
Every imitation and similitude, however, was implieitly prepared to-
wards amelioration or depreeiation, or, in general terms, towards
eneomium or inveetive. 2 Their praetiee was [similar to] that of the
painters who painted the angel in a beautiful form and Satan in an
ugly form. The same holds for those painters who tried to portray
the emotions, too. For example, the Manieheans, when trying to
portray the emotion of anger or merey, give anger an ugly form and
merey, a beautiful form. 3 Sorne Greek poets aimed at the imitation
of an aetion, portraying a mere eorrespondenee, without ameliora-
tion or depreeiation.
13. It is then apparent that the eategories of imitation are these
three: depreeitation, amelioration and eorrespondenee. The means
[of imitation] are not plain tones and measures nor plain rhythm,
but speeeh. Correspondenee is a fixed eategory whieh may be
deflected towards baseness or towards nobleness, and thus beeome
an intended imitation. For example, if one likens the desire of an
contrast between Greek poetry, especially if seen through Aristotle's eyes, and
Arabic oriental poetry: the first is mythical, narrative, dramatic, excluding
from its schemata the lyrical and the subjective, and the poet who speaks in
the first person; the second, on the contrary, is devoid of the epic and the
drama, and totally restricted to expressing feelings and images ... In [Arabic
poetry] the dhawiit, the persons as such, occupy the primary place; not only
that, but in most cases the poet is the only persona, speaking of himself.
Consequently, it is not wrong to think that if one can judge according to the
schemata and not according to the concrete reality of poetry which defies
every schema, the poor monochord of the Bedouin [sic] muse which can
hardly express itself except through subjective lyricism will appear closer
to the modero conception of art than the splendid multiform of the Greek
muse" (see his article, "Estetica e Poesía Araba Nell'interpretazione della
Poetica Aristotelica presso Avecena e Averroe," RSO, 13 [1929-1930],
291-331, p. 302).
1 This is the third kind of imitation. In the following paragraph (13)

Avicenna designates this kind as "correspondence" (mufiibaqah), which is

deflectable towards either amelioration (encomium) or depreciation (satire).
2 These two, encomium (mad!t) and satire (dhamm) , are apparently the

main categories and the most "primitive" divisions of poetic composition;

this is also Aristotle's view (Poetics, IV, 7, 1448b 24-27).
3 As a general practice Avicenna omits Aristotle's examples; only in this

context (and in commenting on Aristotle's famed distinction between

''history" and poetry) does he introduce his own examples. Avicenna perhaps
could not have found a better example than the one he gives when referring
to the Manicheans to explain his view of the dichotomy between invective
and encomium; this applies to poetry as well asto painting.
76 AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE COMMENTARY

irascible soul to the lion's leaping, then this would be a correspon-

dence that can be deflected towards either of the two extremes.
One could say "the leaping of the outrageous lion" or "the leaping
of the daring lion"-the first is intended for invective, the second
for encomium. 1 Correspondence may be transformed into either
amelioration or depreciation by having something imparted to
it-this is the method ofHomer. 2 If left as it is it would be mere
correspondence.
nr.a
I4. These three imitations are according to the three manners
mentioned above--some Greek poets made mere likenesses; sorne,
like Homer, mostly imitated noble deeds alone; and others imitated
both, i.e., noble and ignoble deeds. He [Aristotle] then mentioned
sorne conventions they had. These are then the categories of imita-
tion as such and what it is meant for. The manners of imitation a~e
three: similitude, metaphor, and the combination [of both]; the
ends are three: amelioration, depreciation, and correspondence. 4

1
A similar notion, which could be the sour:ce of paragraph 13 as a whole,
is exp1essed by Aristotle with reference to "the sources of encomia and invec-
tive" and to how "counselling becomes encomium by a change of the phrase."
See Rhetoric, I. ix, 1367b 36.
2 To Avicenna, Homer is the encomiastic poet par excellence. His references

to Homer are not to be understood as based on more than Aristotle's venera-

tion and r epeated references to the poet. Not only did Homer "mostly
imitate noble deed" and praise them, but he also followed the "method" of
encomiastic poetry as Avicenna rather inadequately explains it in this
paragraph (13).
3 The essential topic in the third chapter of Aristotle's Poetics is his brief

discussion of the manner of imitation. No comparable treatment of this

matter is to be found in Avicenna's statements, unless one can assume that
A vicenna intended the three "manners" of figurative composition (similitude,
substitution, and the combination of both) asan "interpretation" of Aristot-
le's opening statement of Poetics, III. In view of the fact that Avicenna
attempts to be inclusive in his summ.a rizing and interpretative task, and in
view of his trope-oriented and rhetorical approach to the treatise, it is entirely
possible that he was not able to make out more than he does with Aristotle's
cryptic and controversial remarks, and that he did intend his version of the
"manner" of imitation as an interpretation of Aristotle's statement.
4
Cf. Margoliouth (A nalecta, p. 84): "Imitationes tres sunt, Comparatio,
Translatio, Ambarum coniunctio; Fines tres, Omatio, Elevatio, Congruentia."