PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, execute, and
assess US military support for counterdrug operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance
of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations
for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational
forces , and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise
of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and
prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use
by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent
of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and
executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort
in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders
of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter;
however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service
publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in
coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current
and specific guidance . Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance
or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures
ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States,
commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and
procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

U..J~o~...LA
DANIEL J. O'DONOHUE
Lieutenant General, USMC
Director, Joint Force Development
Preface

Intentionally Blank

ii JP 3-07.4
 SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07.4
DATED 14 AUGUST 2013

• Updates the text to incorporate changes from Fiscal Year 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act.

• Expands discussion on existential threats within the strategic and operational

environments.

• Clarifies the roles of the National Guard Counterdrug Program-State and

National Guard Bureau J-32 [Counterdrug Division] in supporting federal law
enforcement agency requests.

• Establishes acronym for transnational organized crime (TOC) in this joint

publication (JP) and the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

• Replaces use of the acronym CTOC [countering transnational organized

crime] in the body and glossary of this JP with counter or countering TOC
when appropriate.

• Aligns scope of major drugs of abuse with those identified in the Controlled
Substances Act.

• Enhances the text to include discussions about the importance of network

engagement in planning counterdrug operations.

• Enhances discussion of Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement

Operations.

Updates discussion of geographic combatant command counterdrug

operations to reflect current theater campaign plans.

• Expands discussion on joint interagency task force command and control and
employment of assigned forces during maritime counterdrug operations.

• Enhances discussion of international organizations that support the

counterdrug effort.

iii
Summary of Changes

Intentionally Blank

lV JP 3-07.4
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... vi

CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW

• General ........................................................................................................................ I-1

• Background and History ............................................................................................. I -1
• Counterdrug Approaches ............................................................................................ I-3
• Statutory Limitations and Policy Guidance ................................................................ l-4
• Counterdrug Policy and Guidance ............................................................................ l-11
• The Threats ... ...... ............. ....................................... ..................................... ............. I-14

CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATIONAL AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

• Command Relationships ............................................................................................ 11-1

• Interagency Relationships .... ................................ ............................. ......................... 11-2

Section A. Roles and Responsibilities ......... ....... .... .. .. ...................... ....................... ........ II-2
• Department of Homeland Security ........ .......................... ..... ......... ......... ................... 11-2
• Department of Defense ................ ..... .... ......................... ..................... ....................... 11-3
• Department of Justice ................................................................................................ II-6
• Department of State ................................................................................................... II -6
• Department of the Treasury ....................................................................................... II -7

Section B. Domestic Counterdrug Organizations .............................. .......................... ... .II -7

• Generai ....................................................................................................................... II-7
• National Guard .... ...... .. .................................................................. ... .......................... II-8

CHAPTER III
PLANNING

Section A. General ......................................................................................................... III -1

• Strategic Context. ..................................................................................................... III -1
• Planning .......... ................. ............................... ................... ...................................... III-2
• Interagency and Multinational Considerations ........................................................ III-6

Section B. Department of Defense Support ................................................................... III-7

• Detection and Monitoring .......................... .... ............................................. ... .......... III-7
• Drug Interdiction Environments ........................................................ ... ................... III-8
• Support to Other Nations ....................................................................................... III-I 0
• Logistics Support ................................................................................................... III-13
• Communications .. .. ............................ ............................................ .. ... ................ ... 111-14
• Intelligence ............................................................................................................. III-15
• Planning Support to Law Enforcement Agencies .......................... ..... .. ... .............. III-20
• Logistics ................................................................................................................. III-21

v
Table of Contents

• Personnel ................................................................................................................ III-22

• Reconnaissance Support ................................. ........ ................................. ...... ........ III-24

CHAPTER IV
COMBATANT COMMAND COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

• United States Northern Command ............................ ................................... .... ....... . IV -1

• United States Indo-Pacific Command ........................................... ................ ........... IV-3
• United States Southern Command ........................................................................... IV -4
• United States Central Command ........................................ ................................ ...... IV -5
• United States European Command ............................................. .. ........................... IV-6
• United States Africa Command ... ... ............................... ............................. ............. IV-7
• United States Special Operations Command ... ... ....................... .............................. IV -7

APPENDIX

A International Organizations Supporting the Counterdrug Effort ............... A-1

B Requesting Department of Defense Support ....... ............ ............. .............. B-1
C Counterdrug Organizations ............................. ... ........................................ C-1
D Counterdrug Plans and Reports ......................... ..... ................................... D-1
E Intelligence Support Organizations ..... ....................................................... E-1
F Public Affairs ........................................................ ........................ ............. F-1
G Law Enforcement Detachments ................ .............. ............... ................. .. G-1
H Points of Contact ...... ... ....... ... ... ...................................... ... .... ........... ........ . H-1
J References ......................... ... .............. ......................................................... J-1
K Administrative Instructions .......................................... .. ........................... K-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initial isms .............................................. GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions ..................... ... .......... .............................. ............. GL-6

FIGURE

III-I The Joint Planning Process .......... ..... ................ ........... ............. .... ........... III-3
Ill-2 Counterdrug Intelligence Preparation for Operations Process ............... III-16
C-1 Counterdrug Organizations ......................... ................. ................. ............. C-1

Vl JP 3-07.4
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

• Discusses counterdrug approaches, statutory limitations and policy guidance,

counterdrug policy and guidance, and threats

• Outlines organizational and command relationships for counterdrug operations

• Discusses the context provided by strategic guidance and objectives to plan for
counterdrug operations using the Adaptive Planning and Execution enterprise
and the joint planning process

• Outlines combatant command counterdrug operations

Overview

The Department of Defense (DOD) supports federal, state,

and local (including territorial and tribal) law enforcement
agencies (LEAs) in their efforts to disrupt the transport
and transfer of illicit drugs and drug-related materials,
such as precursor chemicals, into the US . The Armed
Forces of the United States, as part of a whole-of-
government effort, also assists our partner nations (PNs)
in their counterdrug (CD) efforts. Illicit drug trafficking,
maritime smuggling, and the regional and global
movement of violent extremists are closely linked
financially, politically, and operationally.

Background and History The US role in CD initiatives has evolved from

independent actions to one of joint military and civilian
cooperation. In the past century, the US CD effort has
changed in response to the drug abuse and drug trafficking
problem. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
and its predecessor agencies have had primary federal-
level responsibility for enforcing US drug laws since
1914. However, significant expansion in illicit drug
activities has required additional federal, state, territorial,
tribal, and local agencies to join the CD effort.

Counterdrug Approaches Whether in the US , overseas, or in a declared theater of

conflict, the operational themes of a CD strategy are
generally the same and most often go together in tandem.
The two key themes are demand reduction and supply

vii
Executive Summary

reduction. In some cases, a third alternative, harm

reduction, is stressed.

Statutory Limitations and DOD is the lead federal agency (LF A) of the United States
Policy Guidance Government (USG) for detection and monitoring (D&M)
of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs and drug-
related materials, such as precursor chemicals, into the
US. DOD has the authority to provide support for CD
activities and activities to counter transnational organized
crime (TOC) of any state, local, tribal, territorial, or
foreign LEA. DOD may also conduct or support a program
or programs to provide training and equipment to national
security forces of one or more foreign countries for the
purpose of building the capacity of such forces to counter
illicit drug trafficking, conduct maritime or border
security operations, or counter TOC operations.

Counterdrug Policy and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
Guidance 3 710.01, DOD Counterdrug Support, establishes policies
and guidelines for international CD policy
implementation, criteria for approval of requests for
international support, department international CD
support, and approval procedures for departmental
international CD support. These policies and guidelines
will require staff judge advocate review to align with new
law and authorities outlined in Title 10, United States
Code (USC), Sections 284 and 333 .

The Threats The strategic environment is uncertain and complex and

evolves rapidly. It is fluid , with changing alliances,
partnerships, and national and transnational threats that
rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. These
factors significantly affect how CD operations are
conducted. The operational environment (OE) and the
threats it presents are increasingly transregional, multi-
domain, and multifunctional (TMM) in nature. CD
operations and TOC will increasingly operate in a TMM
environment, which cuts across combatant commands
(CCMDs) and throughout OEs.

Organizational and Command Relationships

Command Relationships The command relationships established for CD operations

will vary based on the operational areas in which they are
conducted. Considering most CD operations are in
support of either PNs or US LEAs, it is important to
remember that, even though command of US military

Vlll JP 3-07.4
 Executive Summary

forces will remain within DOD, the overall control of the

mission may be determined by other USG departments
and agencies and agreements with PN authorities. Two
primary considerations are integrated communications
and sufficient liaison to support operational coordination,
the effective sharing of information, and efficient use of
assets.

Interagency Relationships The Department of State (DOS) is the LF A for the

coordination of US international illicit drug supply
reduction strategies.

The DEA is the lead drug law enforcement agency

(OLEA) for coordinating all US and multinational
counterparts' efforts in conjunction with US elements.

For unified action, other USG departments and agencies

support to or from DOD assets should be coordinated
through the country team and/or the interagency task force
if representation is available .

Department of Homeland Homeland security and counterterrorism capabilities and

Security activities complement many of those used for international
drug control. The intelligence community, working with
foreign intelligence services and US and international
LEAs, provides capabilities for homeland security and
counterterrorism that also affect international CD efforts.

Department of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Performing the

role of global integrator, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff advises the President and Secretary of Defense on
ongoing operations and the allocation of forces between
CCMDs and provides strategic guidance to the combatant
commanders for the conduct of CD operations. Within the
Joint Staff, the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate] and
Joint Staff J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate]
perform key CD functions.

Combatant Commanders. Commander, United States

Indo-Pacific Command (CDRUSINDOPACOM);
Commander, United States Southern Command; and
Commander, United States Northern Command
(CDRUSNORTHCOM), have delegated authority to
approve certain types of domestic CD support, while all of
the geographic combatant commanders have delegated
authority to approve CD support outside of the US .

lX
Executive Summary

Additionally, the Military Departments (through the

Services); CDRUSINDOPACOM; and Commander,
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM),
are DOD force providers for supporting
CDRUSNORTHCOM CD operations. Details are provided
in CJCSI 3710.01, DOD CounterdrugSupport.

National Guard Counterdrug Program-State

(NGCDP-State). An NGCDP-State is established
throughout the 50 states, US territories, and the District of
Columbia. An NGCDP-State is closely tied to both the
Office of National Drug Control Policy and DOD
strategies.

Department of Justice DEA. The mission of the DEA is to enforce the controlled
substances laws and regulations of the US .

Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Federal Bureau of

Investigation's drug program targets major drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) through long-term investigations
aimed at dismantling major national and international
DTOs.

Department of State The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs has major policy and program
responsibilities. The US Agency for International
Development is an independent agency that takes policy
direction from Secretary of State and administers
nonmilitary assistance programs. US embassy country
teams are responsible for US CD activities within the host
nation, and the Bureau of International Information
Programs advances US foreign policy goals directly with
foreign audiences in suppmi of US embassies, consulates,
and missions abroad.

National Guard The National Guard Counterdrug Program is executed at

the state level under the control of the governor or
territorial government. Each state or territory's National
Guard (NG) joint force headquarters-state exercises
operational control of their CD activities and is
responsible for the oversight of the federally funded NG
support to civilian agencies .

Planning

Strategic Context Strategic guidance and objectives provide context and the
basis for the military's support and participation in CD

X JP 3-07.4
 Executive Summary

operations. The Office of the National Drug Control

Policy develops, and the President signs, the National
Drug Control Strategy, which provides broad, strategic
direction and establishes the administration' s CD strategy,
policy, objectives, and priorities. The US interdiction
coordinator develops the supporting National Interdiction
Command and Control Plan (NICCP), which outlines the
USG ' s strategy for drug interdiction and states specific
roles and responsibilities for relevant federal agencies that
execute that strategy. Other CO-related elements of
strategic guidance may be found in presidential directives,
the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and other
national department-level statements of CD policy.

Planning Within the context provided by strategic guidance and

objectives, joint planning for specific CD operations
occurs using two closely related, integrated, collaborative,
and adaptive processes: the Adaptive Planning and
Execution (APEX) enterprise and the joint planning
process (JPP). The combination of the APEX enterprise
and the JPP promotes coherent planning across all levels
of warfare and command echelons, whether the
requirement is for a limited, single-phase drug interdiction
operation or for a multiphase CD operation that requires a
variety of capabilities and participation by many agencies
and multinational partners.

Interagency and CD operations are inherently law enforcement in nature

Multinational and therefore involve interagency partners and/or PNs .
Considerations When authorized by law to support LEA CD operations,
DOD will normally support the USG lead agency for both
domestic and international CD operations. Military
planning should anticipate unified action with relevant
agencies and PNs. This helps effectively integrate
military capabilities, including forces and equipment that
support law enforcement activities of the other partners.

Detection and Monitoring D&M provides early notification to LEAs, enabling

interception and drug interdiction operations, and
facilitates searches for contraband, which may lead to drug
seizures and arrests. DOD, in consonance with the
NICCP, utilizes national task forces to conduct D&M
operations.

Drug Interdiction DOD's principal CD mission is D&M, and the desired end
Environments result of successful D&M is drug interdiction and
apprehension by LEAs. Drug interdiction can take place

xi
Executive Summary

in the air, at sea, or on land. These area interdictions often

include overlapping activities of interagency partners. CD
PNs participate in air, maritime, and land drug
interdiction. The differentiation of drug interdiction by
physical domain is to illustrate the type of assets used by
smugglers and those assets integrated by CD forces.

Support to Other Nations Illicit drug trafficking is a national security issue, and the
US supports the security, stability, and well-being of US
allies and other nations friendly to US interests. Assisting
PNs in this effort generally requires the full range of
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
instruments of US national power. Supporting other
nations' CD efforts is US policy and part of the US CD
strategy, as is helping build capabilities and capacity for
some PNs.

Planning Support to Law Providing planning support to US LEAs should take into
Enforcement Agencies account the following factors: background, mission, and
interagency planning.

Logistics DOD can make a substantial contribution in logistic

support of LEAs, including their international operations,
and with the assistance of DOS to foreign authorities when
required. Logistic support should be structured to achieve
unity of effort; visibility of requirements, resources, and
capabilities; and rapid and precise response. Logistic
support should be designed with the right capacity,
scalability, agility, control, and time-assurance qualities to
effectively support LEA authorities. For the most part,
costs incurred in DOD logistic support of LEAs are
reimbursable.

Reconnaissance Support DOD provides reconnaissance support to CD operations

in various ways. Aerial-based reconnaissance uses a
variety of sensors, such as forward-looking infrared, side-
looking airborne radar, photographic devices, and aerial
observers employed on rotary-wing aircraft, tilt-rotor
aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft, or unmanned aircraft systems.
Satellite imagery is also available.

Combatant Command Counterdrug Operations

United States Northern United States Northern Command's (USNORTHCOM's)

Command responsibilities include homeland defense and support of
civil authorities. Its CD mission is authorized under Title
10, USC, Section 124. USNORTHCOM supports D&M

xii JP 3-07.4
 Executive Summary

operations and operational support to DLEAs (e.g.,

training, transportation, and engineering support) and
other federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local agencies to
interdict and counter the flow of illicit drugs into the US.

United States Indo-Pacific The general mission of United States Indo-Pacific

Command Command (USINDOPACOM) is to maintain the security
of the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR),
shape the theater, and defend the US against attack
through the Pacific Ocean. The CD mission is to provide
intelligence and other CD support to PNs and US LEAs
and security cooperation and support to PNs within the
AOR and to provide DOD support to counter TOC, as
directed.

United States Southern United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

Command leverages rapid response capabilities, PN collaboration,
and regional cooperation within the AOR to support US
national security objectives, defend the southern
approaches of the US , and promote regional security and
stability. The main line of effort in the USSOUTHCOM
AOR is countering threat networks. The goal of the
approach is to ensure the friendly networks degrade threat
network capabilities and their operations and affect the
underlying conditions allowing them to flourish. The CD
program is a means to achieve countering threat networks
strategic objectives by supporting USG departments and
agencies and committed allies with operational support,
training, and equipment.

United States Central US Central Command directs and enables military

Command operations and activities with allies and partners to
increase regional security and stability in support of
enduring US interests.

United States European United States European Command (USEUCOM) prepares

Command ready forces, ensures strategic access, deters conflict,
enables the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
strengthens partnerships, and counters transnational
threats to protect and defend the US. Its CD role is to
support the USEUCOM CCMD campaign plan tasks that
counter transnational threats and support US law
enforcement operations that disrupt trafficking routes and
organizations that traverse the seams between AORs.

xiii
Executive Summary

United States Africa United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is

Command responsible for military relations with African nations; the
African Union; African regional security organizations;
and all DOD operations, exercises, and security
cooperation on the African continent, its island nations,
and surrounding waters. Working with PNs,
USAFRICOM disrupts and neutralizes transnational
threats, including smuggled drugs, weapons trafficking,
and illicit goods (such as wildlife and other natural
resource products). These transnational threats are aided
by porous borders, limited security capabilities to deter
smuggling, and various levels of corruption that combine
to allow illicit trafficking, piracy, and other maritime
crime to flourish .

United States Special USSOCOM's mission is to lead, plan, synchronize, and,

Operations Command as directed, execute global operations against terrorist
networks in coordination with the geographic CCMDs.
USSOCOM trains, organizes, equips, and provides
combat-ready special operations forces (SOF) to CCMDs.
When directed to support CD operations, SOF can operate
as pa11 of a joint-, interagency-, or multinational-led force .
SOF include elements from the US Army, Marine Corps,
Navy, and Air Force units, as well as civil affairs and
military information support units.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine to plan, execute, and

assess US military support for CD operations.

XIV JP 3-07.4
 CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW

"It shall be the policy of the United States to use all /awful means to combat
the drug demand and opioid crisis currently afflicting our country.... Heads of
executive departments and agencies shall exercise all appropriate emergency
authorities."

_____
,__
Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments,
Combatting the National Drug Demand and Opioid Crisis, October 26, 2017

1. General

a. Department of Defense (DOD) Support to Counterdrug (CD) Operations.

DOD supports federal, state, and local (including tenitorial and tribal) law enforcement
agencies (LEAs) in their efforts to disrupt the transport and transfer of illicit drugs and
drug-related materials, such as precursor chemicals, into the US . The Armed Forces of the
United States, as part of a whole-of-government effort, also assists our partner nations
(PNs) in their CD efforts . Illicit drug trafficking, maritime smuggling, and the regional
and global movement of violent extremists are closely linked financially, politically, and
operationally. The scope of illicit drug trafficking encompasses state and non-state illicit
drug trafficking. Current national intelligence estimates describe the extent of the problem
as a national security threat due to the rising power of transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) and their connection with violent extremist organizations (VEOs), msurgency
movements, and terrorist groups.

b. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global

Threats (DASD[CN&GT]) oversees DOD policies and activities using statutory CD
responsibilities and the President' s National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). Although
DOD manages only a small portion ofthe overall federal CD effort, DOD's responsibilities
encompass a broad anay of support activities. DOD policy supporting the NDCS
recognizes that illicit drug traffickers, insurgents, and terrorists use the same methods to
smuggle money, people, information, weapons, and substances. Often, illicit drug
traffickers and terrorists are one and the same. Looking beyond terrorism, the illicit drug
industry is fueling violence and corruption to levels which are overwhelming governments,
threatening the stability of countries, or creating ungoverned spaces.

2. Background and History

a. The US role in CD initiatives has evolved from independent actions to one of joint
military and civilian cooperation. In the past century, the US CD effort has changed in
response to the drug abuse and drug trafficking problem. The Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and its predecessor agencies have had primary federal -level
responsibility for enforcing US drug laws since 1914. However, significant expansion in
illicit drug activities has required additional federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local
agencies to join the CD effort.

1-1
Chapter I

b. National Task Forces. The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan
(NICCP) provides guidance to interagency centers focused on interdicting drug traffickers
and severing the connections between drug trafficking and terrorism. The NICCP
describes the area of operations (AO) for each of the three centers and explains that these
nationally designated centers ' areas of operations do not align with the geographic
combatant commanders ' (GCCs ') areas of responsibility (AORs). These centers are
designated "national" task forces and should be staffed by personnel from DOD, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice, and other United
States Government (USG) departments and agencies as required. The national task force
construct enables close coordination and cooperation among government departments and
agencies by staffing US and PN personnel to carry out drug interdiction missions. Other
USG departments and agencies, the Services, or organizations provide liaisons if they have
an interest in or could be affected by task force operations. Joint interagency task forces
(JIATFs) or joint task forces (JTFs) are typically DOD organizations that provide
operational- and tactical-level interagency coordination. They plan and conduct operations
to detect, monitor, disrupt, and dismantle illicit drug-related threats. The following are
considered USG national task forces under the NICCP:

(1) Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S). Commander, United

States Southern Command (CDRUSSOUTHCOM), exercises combatant command
(command authority) (COCOM) ofJIATF-S. JIATF-S executes detection and monitoring
(D&M) of illicit trafficking and facilitates international and interagency drug interdiction
to enable the disruption and dismantlement of illicit and converging threat networks in
support of national and hemispheric security.

(2) Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W). Commander, United

States Indo-Pacific Command (CDRUSINDOPACOM), exercises COCOM of JIATF-W.
JIATF-W is CDRUSINDOPACOM' s executive agent for DOD CD activities in the United
States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) AOR. JIATF-W conducts D&M
operations to combat drug-related transnational organized crime (TOC) and facilitate drug
interdiction through D&M and other means and conduct PN capacity-building programs
and information sharing initiatives. JIA TF-W coordinates with US and PN LEAs to ensure
successful hand-off of air and maritime targets to appropriate interdiction and apprehension
forces.

(3) Joint Task Force-East (JTF-E). JTF-E is a DHS JTF supported by

interagency partners, reporting directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The JTF-
E joint operations area (JOA), defined in DHS ' s Southern Border and Approaches
Campaign Plan (SBACP) as the "area of land, sea, and airspace which defines the primary
operational area for specific joint task forces ," includes Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands,
the coastline along the Gulf of Mexico and Florida (excluding the littorals within the Joint
Task Force-West [JTF-W] JOA), international waters of the Caribbean Sea and eastern
Pacific Ocean southward to the north coast of South America, the airspace spanning the
US territorial land and waters, and international airspace spanning the approaches.

(4) JTF-W. JTF-W is a DHS JTF supported by interagency partners, reporting

directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The JTF-W JOA includes the land border

I-2 JP 3-07.4
 Overview

with Mexico from California to the Gulf of Mexico and the land approaches to this border,
in the littorals in the Gulf of Mexico off Texas and Pacific Ocean off California, the
airspace spanning the US territorial land and waters, and international airspace spanning
the approaches.

(5) Joint Task Force-Investigations (JTF-1). JTF-I is a DHS JTF supported by

interagency partners, reporting directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The JTF-I
spans the entire SBACP JOA and beyond as necessary to achieve objectives. JTF-1 is a
functional JTF that is not limited to geographical boundaries but is based upon the function
or activities it integrates, coordinates, and supports; in this case, DHS investigations and
investigative activity related to or affecting the SBACP JOA. JTF-I integrates, coordinates,
and supports homeland security investigations and operations that involve or affect the US
southern border's security.

(6) Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N). JTF-N is tasked to support federal LEAs
in the identification and interdiction of suspected TCO activities conducted within and
along the approaches to the continental United States (CONUS). JTF-N provides support
within United States Northern Command's (USNORTHCOM's) AOR, which
encompasses the North American continent, the Bahamas and Turks Caicos Islands, Puerto
Rico, and the US Virgin Islands, including the air, land, and sea approaches.

c. Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC). As the nation' s only federal
agency law enforcement center tasked to coordinate drug interdiction operations in the
Western Hemisphere, AMOC ' s operations, which support DHS's JTF-W, JTF-E, and JTF-
1, are focused on the approaches to the US border, Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas and
criminal activity internal to the US. AMOC provides D&M, intelligence fusion, and drug
interdiction and apprehension support to US and PN law enforcement and other forces with
interdiction responsibilities and provides investigative activities in support of criminal
prosecutions. AMOC's sub-unit, the Caribbean Air and Marine Operations Center
(CAMOC), has operational responsibility in and around Puerto Rico and the US Virgin
Islands. The AMOC operational area includes, but is not limited to, all of CONUS and the
area extending 100 nautical miles (nm) outward from CONUS. The CAMOC operational
area includes, but is not limited to, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands and the area
extending 150 nm outward from Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.

3. Counterdrug Approaches

Whether in the US, overseas, or in a declared theater of conflict, the operational themes
of a CD strategy are generally the same and most often go together in tandem. The two
key themes are demand reduction and supply reduction. In some cases, a third alternative,
harm reduction, is stressed. This information is passed through the commander' s
communication synchronization process, in conjunction with law enforcement and
educational or medical institutions at local , state, or national levels (to include host nations
[HNs] or PNs).

a. Demand reduction deals with diminishing the population's desire and demand for
using drugs. While the most cost-effective measure, it can be hard to quantify success. It

1-3
Chapter I

targets vulnerable populations with key messages about the harm of drugs on the body,
how drug use might go against cultural or religious norms, or how it could limit the
possibility of employment. In many cases, the joint force commander (JFC) will be
operating across the conflict continuum in an environment where significant portions of
the population, and even HN security forces, are addicted to drugs. If not addressed, this
could stymie efforts to build effective security forces or a durable, safe, and secure
environment. The high rate of drug addiction in the Afghan population is an example of
how the desire and demand for drugs negatively affected the capability of some Afghan
security forces.

b. Supply reduction deals with any activity or program that is intended to reduce the
availability of illegal drugs in the US or abroad. This is the most costly measure, yet it will
generally not succeed as a standalone strategy; rather, it requires a mix of demand reduction
activities to complement its success. Activities could include interdicting drugs in transit
from the source to market; interdicting precursor chemicals used to process drugs into a
final product; or conducting eradication of plants used to make drugs, such as poppies for
opium/heroin or marijuana. Eradication can be done manually or by mechanical means,
such as aerial or ground sprayers. In many cases, eradication needs to consider how the
drug economy fits into the societal norms and other means of making a living. Crop
substitution programs can help ameliorate negative financial hardships to those who
depend on cultivation of those plants that are used for illegal means.

c. Harm reduction deals with activities that limit the harmful effects of drug use or
addiction. The history of harm reduction infers that, while it can bring down blood-borne
illnesses, it almost never reduces drug use or addiction and the crimes that are associated
with each. Activities could include clean needle exchange's to limit blood-borne illnesses
obtained by repeated use of syringes for intravenous drug use and Methadone treatment (or
other medicines) that reduces the craving for heroin and other drugs. Harm reduction
activities can also include instituting policies or laws that reduce the negative effects of
drug use or addiction, such as lenient incarceration rules for drug offenders. It is important
to note that some cultures view drug use as a positive element and might prefer to use harm
reduction activities instead of demand and supply reduction measures.

4. Statutory Limitations and Policy Guidance

a. General. DOD is the lead federal agency (LF A) of the USG for D&M of aerial
and maritime transit of illegal drugs and drug-related materials, such as precursor
chemicals, into the US. DOD has the authority to provide support for CD activities and
activities to counter TOC of any state, local, tribal, territorial, or foreign LEA. DOD may
also conduct or support a program or programs to provide training and equipment to
national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the
capacity of such forces to counter illicit drug trafficking, conduct maritime or border
security operations, or counter TOC operations.

For more information on DOD CD support activities, see Title I 0, United States Code
(USC) , Section 284 (support for counterdrug activities and activities to counter
transnational organized crime), Section 124 (detection and monitoring of aerial and

1-4 JP 3-07.4
 Overview

maritime transit of illegal drugs), and Section 333 (foreign security forces: authority to
build capacity).

b. The supported JFC requires all commanders tasked for CD and countering TOC
operations to have the requisite shared understanding of the authorities and statutory
limitations under which they are to be tasked, including standing rules of engagement
(ROE) and standing rules for the use of force (RUF) . The staff judge advocate (SJA) at
each level of command should review orders and authorities and so advise the commander
to ensure compliance with all statutory limitations, policy guidance, and other applicable
law.

c. DOD policy for CD and counter TOC support must be consistent with legal and
regulatory limitations imposed by law, including the following:

(I) Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)

(a) Title 18, USC, Section 1385, enacted in 1878, is a criminal statute, known
as the PCA, which prohibits the willful use ofthe United States Army (USA) or the United
States Air Force (USAF) in the enforcement of the laws of the US. However, in I98I ,
Congress passed Title 10, USC, Section 275 , which directed the Secretary of Defense
(SecDef) to extend the prohibition of direct participation in civilian law enforcement
activities, such as searches, seizures, arrests, or similar activities, to the United States
Marine Corps (USMC), United States Navy (USN), USA, and USAF. SecDef
subsequently prohibited these types of activities in Department of Defense Instruction
(DODI) 3025 .21 , Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. This issuance
also prohibits DOD from using military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals,
or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators, and other activities that
are fundamentally civilian law enforcement operations.

(b) The PCA or the PCA-like restrictions ofDODI3025 .2I apply to reserve
members of the USA, USN , USAF , or USMC who are on active duty, active duty for
training, or inactive duty training in a Title 10, USC, status. Members of the National
Guard (NG) are not subject to the PCA while performing operational support duties, active
duty for training, or inactive duty training in a Title 32, USC, status. Likewise, the PCA
and PCA-like restrictions ofDODI3025.21 do not apply toNG members acting in a state
active duty status. Finally, in accordance with Title 14, USC, the PCA and PCA-like
restrictions ofDODI 3025.2I do not apply to the United States Coast Guard (USCG).

(c) The PCA; DOD issuances; and Title 10, USC, Section 275 , do not
prohibit all military involvement with civilian LEAs. In fact, a considerable amount of
direct and indirect support is authorized under DODI 3025.21 and Title I 0, USC,
Sectionl24 and Sections 271-283.

(2) DODI 3025.21. Implementing policy upholds the PCA and states that the
prohibitions on direct civilian law enforcement assistance apply to all actions of DOD
personnel worldwide . However, this issuance also enumerates several permissible
instances of assistance to LEAs that does not violate the PCA or the restrictions found in

1-5
Chapter I

Title 10, USC, Section 275. Permissible direct assistance includes: actions taken for the
primary purpose offurthering a military or foreign affairs function of the US; investigations
and other actions related to the enforcement of the Uniform Code of Military Justice;
investigations and other actions that are likely to result in administrative proceedings by
DOD; investigations and other actions related to the commander's inherent authority to
maintain law and order on a military installation or facility; protection of classified military
information or equipment; protection of DOD personnel, equipment, and official guests of
DOD; and such other actions that are undertaken primarily for a military or foreign affairs
purpose.

(3) Title 10, USC, Section 124. Per Title 10, USC, Section 124, "The
Department of Defense shall serve as the single lead agency ofthe Federal Government for
the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United
States." DOD personnel are authorized to operate DOD equipment to intercept a vessel or
an aircraft detected outside the land area of the US to:

(a) Identify and communicate with that vessel or aircraft and

(b) Direct that vessel or aircraft to a location designated by appropriate

civilian officials. In cases in which a vessel or aircraft is detected outside the land area of
the US, DOD personnel may begin or continue pursuit of that vessel or aircraft over the
land area of the US or its commonwealths or territories.

(4) Title 10, USC, Sections 271-284. Additionally, Chapter 15 (Military Support
for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies) of Title 10, USC, Sections 271-284, allows DOD
to conduct a number of activities for LEAs, so long as they do not adversely impact the
military preparedness of the US. In accordance with Title 10, USC, Sections 271-284,
SecDefmay:

(a) Make available any equipment (including associated supplies or spare

parts) to any federal, state, or local civilian law enforcement official for law enforcement
purposes. Law regarding reimbursement for DOD support is covered in Title 10, USC,
Section 277.

(b) Make DOD personnel available to train LEAs on the operation and
maintenance of equipment made available under Title 10, USC, Section 273.

(c) Make military personnel available to operate equipment for the detection,
monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea traffic.

(d) Provide expert advice relevant to the purposes of Chapter 15, Title 10,
USC.

(e) Make DOD personnel available, under Title 10, USC, Sections 271 and
279, to:

1-6 JP 3-07.4
 Overview

.L Promptly provide relevant drug interdiction intelligence, discovered

during the normal course of military training or operations, to civilian LEA officials or the
USCG and

2. Ensure there are assigned USCG personnel trained in law

enforcement on board every appropriate surface naval vessel at sea in a drug interdiction
area who have powers under Title 14, USC, including the power to make arrests and to
carry out searches and seizures.

(5) Title 32, USC, Sections 112 and 502(f). SecDef may provide funds to a state
for the implementation of a drug interdiction program in accordance with Title 32, USC,
Section 112. Under this section, SecDef may grant funding to the governor of a state who
submits a drug interdiction and CD activities plan that satisfies certain statutory
requirements. Under regulations prescribed by SecDef, personnel of the NG of a state may,
in accordance with the state drug interdiction and CD activities plan, be ordered to perform
full -time NG duty under Title 32, USC, Section 502(£), for the purpose of carrying out drug
interdiction and CD activities. Section 502(£) of Title 32, USC, has been used to expand
the operational scope of the NG beyond its specified duties . PCA does not apply toNG
CD missions performed under Title 32, USC, Section 112, even though these units are
performing missions using federal funds and operating under federal fiscal oversight
because they are commanded and controlled by the state's governor through the adjutant
general.

(6) Foreign Assistance Act

(a) Title 22, USC, Section 2291(c)(l), states that no officer or employee of
the US may directly affect an arrest in any foreign country as part of any foreign police
action with respect to narcotics control efforts, notwithstanding any other provision of law.
Additional subparagraphs of Section 2291(c) also state an officer or employee ofthe USG,
with the approval of the US chief of mission (COM), may be present when foreign officers
are affecting an arrest or assist foreign officers who are affecting an arrest. An officer or
employee may take action to protect life or safety if exigent circumstances arise that are
unanticipated and which pose an immediate threat to US officers or employees, officers or
employees of a foreign government, or members of the public. Additionally, maritime law
enforcement personnel, with the consent of a foreign country, may conduct an arrest in the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters of that country. Finally, Title 22, USC, Section
2291 (c)(1 ), does not apply to the activities of the US Armed Forces in carrying out their
responsibilities under applicable status-of-forces agreements .

(b) Title 22, USC, Section 229l(a)(2), of the Foreign Assistance Act permits
the President to conclude agreements, including reciprocal maritime agreements, with
other countries to facilitate control of the production, processing, transportation, and
distribution of narcotics analgesics, including opium and its derivatives, other narcotic and
psychotropic drugs, and other controlled substances. Title 22, USC, Section 2291(b)(1),
states that, consistent with chapter one of the National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988,
the Secretary of State (SECST ATE) is responsible for coordinating all assistance provided

I-7
Chapter I

by the USG to support international efforts to combat illicit narcotics production or

trafficking.

(c) Generally, DOD may only obligate appropriated operation and

maintenance and procurement funds when the primary purpose is to benefit the US Armed
Forces directly under the following two exceptions: training or instruction offoreign forces
with the primary purpose of interoperability, safety, and/or familiarization and specific
appropriation or authorization from Congress for DOD to conduct foreign assistance.

(d) Under Title 22, USC, Section 2304(a)(2), the US may not provide foreign
assistance funds to foreign governments with a consistent pattern of gross human rights
violations. Finally, Title 22, USC, Section 2420, prohibits the use of the funds made
available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act to provide training or advice or provide
any financial support for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign
government or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign
government within the US or abroad.

(e) The Foreign Assistance Act and foreign operations appropnat10ns

provide legal authorities to the Department of State (DOS) Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to provide CD and anticrime assistance to
foreign partners. Many ofthese assistance programs are implemented in cooperation with
the US LEAs or other partners, such as courts or bar associations.

(7) Statutes Authorizing Interdepartmental Support

(a) The Economy Act of 1932, Title 31 , USC, Section 1535 , authorizes
interagency orders of goods or services if: amounts are available, the head of the ordering
agency or unit decides the order is in the best interest of the USG, the agency or unit to fill
the order is able to provide or get by contract the ordered goods or services, and the head
of the agency decides ordered goods or services cannot be provided by contract as
conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise. Under Title 31 , USC, Section 1536,
the servicing agency should credit monies received from the ordering agency to the
"appropriation or fund against which charges were made to fill the order."

(b) Title 10, USC, Section 277, requires a civilian LEA to which support is
provided under Chapter 15 of Title 10, USC, to reimburse DOD for that support. SecDef,
in accordance with DODI 3025 .21 , Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement
Agencies, may waive reimbursement if such support is provided in the normal course of
military training or operations or results in a benefit to the element of DOD or personnel
of the NG providing the support that is substantially equivalent to that which would
otherwise be obtained from military operations or training.

(8) National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and Appropriation Act.

The NOAA and appropriation act, passed each year to authorize or appropriate funds to
DOD, often contain provisions relating to the CD effort. These acts may also impose
generally applicable requirements, such as a prohibition on providing training, equipment,
or other support to persons or units that have committed a gross violation of human rights .

1-8 JP 3-07.4
 Overview

Money is allotted to the central transfer account each year for the execution of CD
activities. Absent specific legal authority, this money may not be used for any non-CD
purpose. Per Title 10, USC, Section 284, SecDef may provide support for CD activities or
activities to counter TOC of any other department or agency of the federal government or
of any state, local, tribal, or foreign LEA providing certain conditions are met to include the
following activities :

(a) The transportation of personnel of the US and foreign countries

(including per diem expenses associated with such transportation), and the transportation
of supplies and equipment, for the purpose of facilitating CD activities or activities to
counter TOC within or outside the US.

(b) The establishment (including unspecified minor military construction

projects) and operation of bases of operations or training facilities for the purpose of
facilitating CD activities or activities to counter TOC of DOD or any federal, state, local,
or tribal LEA within or outside the US or CD activities of a foreign LEA outside the US .

(c) CD- or counter TOC-related training of law enforcement personnel of the

USG and state, local, and tribal governments, including associated support expenses for
trainees and the provision of materials necessary to carry out such training.

(d) Construction of roads and fences and installation oflighting to block drug
smuggling corridors across international boundaries of the US.

(e) Establishment of command, control, communications, and computer

networks for improved integration of law enforcement, active military, and NG activities.

(f) Linguistic and intelligence analysis services.

(g) Aerial and ground reconnaissance.

(h) The detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air

and sea traffic within 25 miles of and outside the geographic boundaries of the US and
surface traffic outside the geographic boundary of the US and within the US not to exceed
25 miles of the boundary ifthe initial detection occurred outside ofthe boundary.

(i) The maintenance and repair of equipment that has been made available to
any department or agency of the USG or to any state, local, or tribal government by DOD
for the purposes of preserving the potential future utility of such equipment for DOD and
upgrading such equipment to ensure compatibility of that equipment with other equipment
used by DOD .

G) The maintenance, repair, or upgrading of equipment (including computer

software), other than equipment referred to in the preceding paragraph, for the purpose of
ensuring the equipment being maintained or repaired is compatible with equipment used
by DOD and upgrading such equipment to ensure the compatibility of that equipment with
equipment used by DOD .

1-9
Chapter I

For more information on DOD CD authorities, see Title 10, USC, Section 284.

(k) Conduct or support a program or programs to provide training and

equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose
of building capacity of such forces to conduct counter illicit drug trafficking operations,
counter TOC operations, and conduct maritime and border security operations.

For more information on DOD CD authorities for capacity building, see Title 10, USC,
Section 333.

(9) Fiscal Law. All funds must be used for the purpose for which they are
appropriated. Additionally, funds may also have specific limitations as to which CD
activities they can support. Failure to correctly apply fiscal law and principles to federal
activities can lead to the unauthorized expenditure of funds and potential criminal or
administrative sanctions against those responsible . After-the-fact audits by the
Government Accountability Office and other federal agencies are common.

(1 0) Collecting, Storing, and Disseminating Information About US Persons.

Executive Order (EO) 12333 , United States Intelligence Activities, as amended, regulates
the use of national intelligence assets. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5240.01,
DOD Intelligence Activities; Department of Defense Manual (DODM) 5240.01,
Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities; and DOD 5240.1-R,
Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United
States Persons, implement the provisions of EO 12333 and set forth the conditions under
which DOD can conduct intelligence activities, including when DOD intelligence assets
may collect and retain information on US persons. Within the limits of the law, DOD may
collect and retain information on US persons reasonably believed to be engaged in foreign
intelligence or terrorist activities, among other reasons set forth in DODM 5240.0 I and
DOD 5240.1-R. DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and
Organizations Not Affiliated with DOD, prohibits collecting, reporting, processing, or
storing information on individuals or organizations not affiliated with DOD and applies to
non-intelligence components of DOD. DODD 5200.27 contains further guidance on
limited circumstances that allows such activity where the information is essential to the
accomplishment of certain DOD missions. Because of the numerous legal restrictions
placed on the collection of intelligence against US persons, all intelligence activities must
be coordinated with the servicing SJA before execution.

(11) Presidential Determinations. To assist/share interdiction data with PNs

conducting CD aircraft drug interdiction operations requires a presidential determination.

(12) International Agreements. A number of international agreements exist

that affect CD operations, including status-of-forces agreements, multilateral conventions,
and bilateral agreements. The US is party to numerous bilateral agreements with
international partners that provide authorization to stop, board, and search vessels
suspected of illicit traffic; authorize pursuit and entry into the PN's territorial sea; or
provide streamlined communication procedures to quickly obtain such authorizations. The
USCG works to negotiate, conclude, and maintain agreements with the nations that make

1-10 JP 3-07.4
 Overview

up major transit and source zone countries, flag states of common noncommercial maritime
conveyances, and countries with whom partnership offers significant logistical benefits in
relation to maritime operations.

(13) Use of Force. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
3121 .01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US
Forces, provides guidance on ROE and RUF and for DOD operations worldwide. The
supported combatant commander (CCDR) may request supplemental ROE/RUF for a
given phase of an operation/activity based on JFC requirements. ROE/RUF are dynamic
and normally based on mission requirements, and they are typically approved by SecDef
and the CCDR. Specific guidance for CD support operations is shown in CJCSI 3121.01,
(U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.
The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-293), which
amended Title 14, USC, Section 637, authorizes persons in command of an authorized
vessel or aircraft operating in a drug interdiction area to use warning shots and disabling
fire against noncompliant vessels. A vessel or aircraft is authorized if it is a USCG vessel
or aircraft; it is a surface naval vessel or military aircraft on which one or more members
of the USCG are assigned pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 279; or it is any other vessel
or aircraft on government noncommercial service when the vessel or aircraft is under the
control of the USCG and at least one member of the USCG is assigned and conducting a
USCG mission on the vessel or aircraft. In 2005 , the USN and USCG signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) that defined responsibilities and relationships
regarding the employment of airborne use of force (AUF) from USN helicopters. The
intent of the MOU is to enable USN helicopter units to train to agreed tasks, conditions,
and standards and tactics, techniques, and procedures to support CD missions. To stop
noncompliant vessels with minimal risk of injury or loss of life, USN helicopters are
permitted to use AUF (warning shots and disabling fire) when a USCG AUF controller and
USCG precision marksman-aviation team are onboard the aircraft. When force is used
from either USN ships or rotary-wing aircraft under USCG tactical control (T ACON), the
use of warning shots and disabling fire is governed by current USCG policy. If force is
required, the use of nonlethal weapons is authorized and may be used to control a situation
and accomplish the mission or to provide self-defense of DOD forces, defense of non-DOD
persons in the vicinity if directly related to the assigned mission, or in defense of the
protected property, when doing so is reasonable under the circumstances.

5. Counterdrug Policy and Guidance

a. General. CJCSI 3710.01 , DOD Counterdrug Support, establishes policies and

guidelines for international CD policy implementation, criteria for approval of requests for
international support, department international CD support, and approval procedures for
departmental international CD support. These policies and guidelines will require SJA
review to align with new law and authorities outlined in Title 10, USC, Sections 284 and
333.

b. Delegation of Authority. SecDef has delegated authority to GCCs to approve

certain requests for DOD CD support. This authority only applies to DOD CD support
specifically requested by LEAs provided by or involving DOD personnel in connection

I- ll
Chapter I

with foreign and domestic CD missions, including training and associated technical and
administrative support. This guidance is provided in CJCSI 3710.01.

c. Specific CD Mission Categories. Title 10, USC, Section 284, outlines the type of
military support for CD activities provided to US and foreign LEAs. GCC-authorized CD
support specifically requested by LEAs includes the following and should be referenced
for numerous limitations and considerations and considerations based on CJCSI 3710.01
as applicable under current laws:

( 1) Maintenance and repair of loaned defense equipment to preserve the potential

future utility or to upgrade to ensure compatibility of that equipment.

(2) Transportation support. Such transportation requests must be coordinated

with the Attorney General and, if the transportation is to or from foreign locations,
SECSTATE. However, the GCC may not approve CD missions that involve direct tactical
support to ongoing LEA or foreign LEAs, imminent CD-related hostilities, or extradition
requests.

(3) Establish and/or operate bases or training facilities (includes engmeer

support).

(4) Domestic and foreign CD-related training of law enforcement personnel may
be conducted domestically and overseas, but the statutory authorities and limitation are
complex.

(5) Detect, monitor, and communicate the movement of air and sea traffic within
25 miles of and outside US borders.

(6) Detect, monitor, and communicate the movement of surface traffic detected
outside US borders for up to 25 miles within the US.

(7) Engineering support (roads, fences, and lights) at US borders. Military

engineering support is limited, as prescribed by US law (see Title I 0, USC, Section 284).

(8) Command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence network

support.

(9) Linguist support and intelligence and analyst support. This does not include
cryptologic support, real-time translation of oral or wire intercepts, direct participation in
interrogation activities, or the use of counterintelligence assets for CD purposes.
Intelligence analyst support may be provided to US ambassadors using theater assigned
forces when the DOD component general counsel concurs.

(I 0) Aerial reconnaissance support to include the use of radar and sensors,

unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), and aerial visual and photographic reconnaissance and
national overhead and aerial imagery, some of which may be limited or prohibited from
domestic use by statutes or DOD policy.

1-12 JP 3-07.4
 Overview

(11) Ground reconnaissance support, to include unattended ground sensors and

ground surveillance radar (GSR) . Initial detection and reporting of the presence or
movement of buildings, vehicles, vessels, or persons within surface areas is permitted.

(12) Diver support to inspect and report to LEAs any unusual physical hull
configurations. However, divers may not attempt entry or search or alter features detected.

(13) Tunnel detection support, so long as DOD personnel do not search, enter, or
otherwise participate directly in law enforcement operations.

(14) Use of military vessels for LEA operating bases by USCG personnel. All
other use of military vessels as a base of operations for LEAs requires SecDef s and the
Attorney General's approval.

(15) Technology demonstrations may be conducted in coordination with the

DOD Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office, per Title 10, USC, Section
280.

d. Approval Authority and Tasks

(1) Approval Authority. CJCSI 3710.01 , DOD Counterdrug Support, and the
current Global Force Management Allocation Plan provide instructions on authorized
types of DOD CD support to LEAs, other USG departments and agencies, and foreign
nations. They also promulgate SecDef delegation of authority to selected GCCs to approve
certain CD operational support missions and deploy assigned/attached forces . These
policies and guidelines will require SJA review to align with law and authorities outlined
in Title I 0, USC, Sections 284 and 333.

(2) Command Relationships

(a) Transfer of forces under the operational control of a supporting CCDR or

under command of a Service to a supported CCDR requires SecDef approval and a
deployment order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) .

(b) SecDef normally authorizes the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate],
in coordination with the Military Departments ' force providers; CDRUSINDOPACOM;
and Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), to
allocate forces to be attached under TACON to Commander, United States Northern
Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), and/or CDRUSSOUTHCOM to conduct approved
CD support to US LEAs.

(3) GCC CD Tasks. GCCs, subject to the limitations provided in DODD

5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities; DOOM 5240.01 , Procedures Governing the
Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities; DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the
Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons; DODI
3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies; and CJCSI 3710.01 ,
DOD Counterdrug Support, are authorized to:

1-13
Chapter I

(a) Plan and conduct D&M ofthe aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs
and drug-related materials, such as precursor chemicals, in support of the drug interdiction
continuum. GCCs are delegated the authority to conduct D&M under Title 10, USC,
Section 124, within their respective AORs with assigned forces , but using forces not
assigned to the GCC requires separate execution deployment orders.

(b) Provide assets to support drug interdiction agencies and task force CD
activities, with emphasis on those operations planned for execution in high intensity drug
trafficking areas.

(c) Plan, schedule, and provide direct support to LEAs and participating PNs.

(d) Conduct intelligence collection (consistent with the law) against illicit
drug trafficking originating in or transiting through their respective AORs to support
cueing of foreign and domestic LEAs.

(e) Collect (consistent with the law), process, and disseminate all-source,
drug-related intelligence.

(f) Incorporate law enforcement information into all-source drug-related

intelligence (consistent with the law) .

(g) Provide counterintelligence and operations security (OPSEC) support.

(h) Support programs concerning eradication of illicit drug crops and

disruption of other illicit drug production processes in source and transshipment countries
through bilateral and multilateral exercises, training, personnel exchanges, and security
assistance (SA) programs.

(i) Coordinate with other USG departments and agencies to suppress illicit
drug activities in production, processing, and transshipment countries.

U) Establish and maintain selected connectivity in the CD communications

system.

(k) Coordinate CD activities with USG departments and agencies and

cooperating PN s.

(I) Analyze intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs for support

of CD operations and conduct long-range planning. GCCs should identify areas with the
highest potential for CD success and identify to SecDef those areas requiring a higher
priority.

(m) Coordinate logistic support to US LEAs and agencies operating in PNs

as established in appropriate agreements.

(n) Coordinate with other USG agencies to support anti-money laundering

efforts to detect and interdict the financial flows facilitating the trade in illicit drugs.

1-14 JP 3-07.4
 Overview

6. The Threats

a. General. The strategic environment is uncertain and complex and evolves rapidly.
It is fluid, with changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that
rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. These factors significantly affect how CD
operations are conducted. The operational environment (OE) and the threats it presents are
increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional (TMM) in nature . CD
operations and TOC will increasingly operate in a TMM environment, which cuts across
combatant commands (CCMDs) and throughout OEs. Those who contribute to the
production, transport, sale, and use of illicit drugs and laundering of drug money present a
threat to the national security of the US . Illicit drug traffickers operate throughout the OE.
Their operations include cultivation, production, storage, shipment, transshipment,
electronic money transfers, and distribution of illicit drugs. The growing nexus of illicit
drug trafficking with TCOs, insurgent movements, VEOs, and other threat networks
increases the complexities of the threat. Characteristic actions of this adversary include :

(1) Moving illicit drugs and money through a distributed network vice a
concentrated funnel , which would increase potential loss.

(2) Unconstrained by law, custom, policy, or process.

(3) Evolving to exploit more sophisticated vessels, modes of conveyance, and

money laundering methods.

(4) Using multiple licit and illicit logistic supply chains.

(5) Actively and often aggressively collecting intelligence and exploiting ways
of countering detection by friendly assets.

(6) Exploiting delays, deception, and speed to operate at periods of low risk.

(7) Exploiting territorial zones to prevent D&M.

(8) Exploiting political and legal limitations in source and transit zone countries.

b. The majority of the drugs entering the US from the Western Hemisphere arrive via
land conveyance, but maritime and air modes are initially used to move drugs from the
source to different locations in the transit area where drugs can then be moved toward the
arrival zone in the US.

c. Drug Connections to Terrorism and Insurgencies

(l) Narcoterrorism can be described as either narcotics networks or traffickers

who use terrorism against civilians to advance their agenda or terrorists who use drug
money to further their cause (also known as "narco-driven terrorism").

(2) US security strategy recognizes that some of the billions of dollars generated
yearly by the global illicit drug trade goes toward funding VEOs. Sanctuaries may be

1-15
Chapter I

created by drug organizations, other criminals, terrorists, or insurgents. In some parts of

the world, such as Colombia and Afghanistan, connections between drug producers and
terrorists can be very significant. In other circumstances, connections between drug
criminals and terrorists may be "transactional," involving payment for specific goods and
services. Such transactions may provide weapons, false identities and travel documents,
money laundering and movement, armed protection, and intelligence and/or clandestine
communications. Drug organizations may, for example, seek to stop the government from
interfering in their drug operations through bribery and other corruption, and sometimes
that environment can be exploited by terrorists or insurgents . Because narcoterrorists seek
to ward off those who would impede their illicit drug activities, they also conduct attacks
that include assassinations, extortion, hijackings, bombings, and kidnappings directed
against judges, prosecutors, elected officials, and law enforcement agents. These attacks
allow drug criminals to operate with a reduced presence of law enforcement and
governance. Some insurgents have been known to force local populations into narcotics-
related farming to economically and psychologically separate the local population from the
government.

(3) Criminals also use drug money, routes, and methods to move people, -
weapons, money, and other commodities to conduct terrorist activities that are politically
or religiously motivated and have nothing to do with furthering drug trafficking. An
objective of the international effort against terrorism is to stop drug funding for terrorist
operations and insurgencies.

(4) Drug money is also used to fund insurgencies. Insurgencies have historically
utilized various forms of funding from state sponsors, diasporas, and illicit drug traffickers
or other criminal organizations. Recent examples of drug money in support of insurgent
activity include actions in Peru, Afghanistan, and select regions of South America and
Asia. Insurgencies are normally directed, supported, and sustained through networks of
key individuals, including the leadership, underground, and the auxiliary. Insurgencies
will link with financiers and, if appropriate, individuals who produce and smuggle illicit
drugs and precursor chemicals for making drugs. To counter a threat network, there must
be an understanding of the network, to include the network nodes of drug trade and
insurgents. Counterinsurgency forces , military, and law enforcement may be required to
conduct CD activities against an illicit drug network that is either part of the insurgency or
a separate, but supporting, faction. As in Afghanistan, CD operations may provide another
tool to remove threats from the operational area and disrupt, if not defeat, support from
drug money.

(5) Drug networks have a global reach, becoming transregional threat networks
which can operate and influence events and have impacts beyond the AOR of any joint
force. For example, revenue from drug smuggling in the United States Southern Command
(USSOUTHCOM) AOR may fund terrorist or insurgent groups in the United States Central
Command (USCENTCOM) AOR. JFCs should be aware of the transregionallinkages and
interdependencies of threat networks that may be operating in their operational areas and
incorporate them into planning.

1-16 JP 3-07.4
 Overview

( 6) As the linkages between drug trafficking networks and other threat networks
have grown, so has the prevalence of common enablers. Multiple or all threat networks in
an AOR may benefit from relatively permissive environments and/or utilize the same
enablers to facilitate their activities . Environments of lax law enforcement or corruption,
online trade, criminal finance document fraud (money laundering), countermeasures
against law enforcement, and violence and extortion may all support a variety of threat
networks beyond just drug trafficking. For the JFC, this means multiple authorities, or
different authorities, may be applied against enablers of multiple threat networks. This
could affect JFC planning and capabilities that could be employed to counter drug networks
or the capabilities of partners that may be employed .

d. Drugs

(1) Categories of Controlled Substances. The Controlled Substances Act

identifies five major categories of controlled substances as narcotics, depressants,
stimulants, hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids.

(2) Major Drugs of Abuse. The Controlled Substances Act (Title 21 , USC,
Section 812) identifies five schedules at the federal level (I-V) that are used to classify
drugs based upon their abuse potential, accepted medical application in the US, and safety
and potential for addiction. This, in turn, provides laws under which the manufacture,
importation, possession, use, and distribution of certain narcotics, stimulants, depressants,
hallucinogens, anabolic steroids, and other chemicals are regulated . In the US, the major
drugs of abuse are cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, opioids (including fentanyl),
marijuana, ecstasy (also known as MDMA [methylenedioxymethamphetamine]), and
synthetic analogs.

e. Components of a Drug Trafficking Network

(1) Growers and producers include those who grow the crops, ranging from
very small patches using simple farming methods to highly sophisticated cultivators with
tracts of hundreds of acres spread throughout a country.

(2) Smugglers represent that part of trafficking organizations that specialize in

shipping drugs. They transport drugs from one place to another by a variety of means (e.g.,
commercial passenger aircraft, cargo aircraft, commercial cargo ships, sailing vessels,
motor boats, self-propelled semi-submersibles, motor vehicles, animals, express package,
and people).

(3) Smuggler intelligence systems represent that part of trafficking

organizations or independent groups that specialize in providing traffickers with
operational intelligence and warning about enforcement capabilities, intentions, and
current activities to detect, sort, classify, track, and intercept smugglers.

(4) Couriers are individuals or groups who physically carry or transport a

quantity of drugs . They use a variety of drug transport methods such as swallowing them,
concealing drugs on person, concealing them in various body cavities, taping them to their
bodies, or hiding drugs in their luggage. Couriers usually work for the smugglers.

1-17
Chapter I

(5) Distributors are the wholesalers or middlemen. Distributors can also be

retailers. They either have direct contacts with one or more producers or with another
distributor. The distributor frequently arranges for the smugglers to move the drugs.

(6) Dealers are usually individuals on the streets commonly selling less than one
kilogram of drugs. Dealers work for the distributor and may have other dealers working
for them.

(7) Financiers are individuals who provide funds or resources to establish or

maintain a drug trafficking organization (DTO), normally without direct involvement in
trafficking operations.

(8) Kingpins are heads of international trafficking organizations (or parts of a

drug consortium or cartel) who are responsible for directing one or more phases of unlawful
production, transportation, wholesale distribution of bulk quantities of illicit drugs or
directing the financial operations. To qualify as a kingpin, the individual ' s role in all
aspects of that organization's drug trafficking is such that the neutralization of the kingpin
and his leadership would result in the collapse and the dismantling of the organization' s
infrastructure, resulting in a significant impact on the drug traffic in the US.

(9) Money launderers are those individuals involved in the exchange or

investment of money in such a way as to conceal the fact that it comes from an illicit source.
Various items of value such as precious metals or gems, bank drafts, cashier checks,
deposits, cryptocurrency, and transfers to foreign banks are a few of the items exchanged
for illicit cash.

( 10) Narcoterrorists are illicit drug traffickers that use terrorism against
civilians to further their agenda. Narco-driven terrorists are terrorists that use drug money
to further their cause.

(11) Insurgents are those in revolt against civil authority but who are not
recognized under international law as having the legal status of belligerents. Insurgents
may have entered into cooperative agreements with drug traffickers for mutual benefit.

( 12) Drug cartels are partnerships or associations of criminal groups formed to

undertake an illicit drug enterprise beyond the capabilities of any one member.

(13) TCOs are self-perpetuating associations of individuals and groups that

operate across national boundaries for the purpose of obtaining financial or material
benefits, wholly or in part by illegal means. TCOs protect their activities through a pattern
of corruption or violence, exploiting global commerce, and communication mechanisms.
TCOs may vary from hierarchies to clans, networks, and cells and may evolve to other
structures. TCOs impact citizen safety, subvert government institutions, destabilize
nations, and threaten US national security interests. They may participate in drug
trafficking and other illicit enterprises.

f. Characteristics of Drug Operations. The production, transportation, and

marketing of illegal substances are supported by systems similar in character but often

1-18 JP 3-07.4
 Overview

uniquely different for each type of drug because of geographical considerations, processing
requirements, and the weight and volume of the product itself. A common denominator of
the major drug industries is transportation, which, as previously mentioned, drug smugglers
use many types of to transport drugs. Certain trafficker profiles and common tactics and
techniques have been observed.

1-19
Chapter I

Intentionally Blank

1-20 JP 3-07.4
 CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATIONAL AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

"Reliable, secure, and synchronized information sharing among j oint forces,

multinational forces, and with non-Department of Defense agencies is
essential for effective command and control in today's network-enabled
environment. "

Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communications System

---------------------------------
1. Command Relationships

a. General. The command relationships established for CD operations will vary

based on the operational areas in which they are conducted. Considering most CD
operations are in support of either PNs or US LEAs, it is important to remember that, even
though command of US military forces will remain within DOD, the overall control ofthe
mission may be determined by other USG departments and agencies and agreements with
PN authorities. Two primary considerations are integrated communications and sufficient
liaison to support operational coordination, the effective sharing of information, and
efficient use of assets.

b. Command and Control (C2). Operational control of military forces conducting

CD operations is vested in the GCCs and may be delegated by the GCCs to subordinate
commanders.

c. DOD-LEA C2. Drug interdiction operations are the primary operations for which
DOD and LEA require that C2 systems are able to interface effectively with each other.
DOD D&M is a major contribution to drug interdiction, and military C2 is consequently
closely linked with LEA C2. The major organizations that provide C2 for aerial and
maritime drug interdiction are the AMOC, under DHS; JIATF-S, under the C2 of
CDRUSSOUTHCOM; and JIATF-W, under C2 CDRUSINDOPACOM. In maritime CD
operations, a JIA TF is normally assigned T ACON of USCG cutters and USN ships with
attached law enforcement detachment (LEDET). When the nature of the CD operation
transitions from D&M to law enforcement functions such as drug interdiction and
apprehension, the appropriate USCG operational commander assumes TACO~ over the
surface unit (and LEDET, if embarked). Regardless of command and/or support
relationship, DOD forces remain under military C2 (DOD or USCG) at all times (see
Appendix G, "Law Enforcement Detachments"). Specific C2 arrangements should be
determined during planning meetings and liaison sessions for specific CD operations. This
is an important portion of any CD operation ' s planning effort and should be thoroughly
understood by all forces involved in the operation.

d. US and PN C2. US and PN military forces and LEAs will often work under the
C2 of their respective national task forces. The US military, LEAs, and PNs command
their respective units and normally work in cooperation for unity of effort, rather than under
unity of command of one or the other. The degree of C2 that US forces could exercise over

II-1
Chapter II

PN forces (and vice versa) depends on the location, tactical situation, political environment,
and existing US-PN agreements .

e. JIATFs and JTFs. USSOUTHCOM and USINDOPACOM exercise day-to-day

operations through JIATFs that conduct D&M and other CD operations within their
respective operational areas . These task forces comprise federal , state, and local (including
tribal as applicable) LEAs and foreign liaison personnel. CDRUSNORTHCOM exercises
COCOM over JTF-N, the operational headquarters commander providing C2 of military
forces in support of drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs).

f. Transregional Coordination in Defense of the Homeland. USNORTHCOM

operates an Information Analysis Center at the US Embassy in Mexico City that includes
representation from USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM (JIATF-S), and
USINDOPACOM (JIATF-W). The Information Analysis Center coordinates with other
CCMDs, with US country teams in Mexico and other countries in the region, and with
Mexican law enforcement to counter all illicit trafficking that directly affects the homeland.

2. Interagency Relationships

a. DOS is the LF A for the coordination of US international illicit drug supply

reduction strategies. Through US ambassadors, DOS executes programs designed to
increase the PN's CD resolve and capabilities. The INL is the organization within DOS
responsible for developing and implementing international initiatives in support of the
NDCS.

b. DEA is the lead DLEA for coordinating all US and their multinational counterparts '
efforts in conjunction with US elements.

c. Other USG departments and agencies are also involved in CD-related operations
and activities. For unified action, other USG departments and agencies support to or from
DOD assets should be coordinated through the country team and/or the interagency task
force if representation is available.

d. GCCs are responsible for planning, training, and executing DOD CD operations
training within their AORs . The basis of this planning effort is the specific drug-related
threats in the AOR. Planners are expected to meld the objectives outlined in the DOD
Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy with the CCDR' s objectives as described in
the combatant command campaign plan (CCP) to develop a coherent plan to deal with the
threats in the theater. Extensive collaboration with embassies is required to adequately
address country-specific issues and to create a plan that is acceptable to both the PNs and
the various USG departments and agencies that are affected or will be involved in the
overall process. The importance of a cohesive and collaborative approach that takes into
account-as much as possible- the varying, and sometimes competing, interests of the
various players cannot be overstated.

II-2 JP 3-07.4
 Organizational and Command Relationships

SECTION A. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3. Department of Homeland Security

Homeland security and counterterrorism capabilities and activities complement many

of those used for international drug control. The intelligence community (I C), working
with foreign intelligence services and US and international LEAs, provides capabilities for
homeland security and counterterrorism that also affect international CD efforts.

a. US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP's mission is to safeguard

America's borders, thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and materials
while enhancing the nation' s global economic competitiveness through sustainment of
legitimate trade and travel. An important strategic objective is to counter terrorism and
transnational crime. Its traditional border enforcement missions are designed to prevent
illegal entry and immigration into the US and prevent the importation into the US of illegal
or prohibited substances and items such as illicit drugs and counterfeit merchandise. The
strategic goals of the US Border Patrol, the Office of Field Operations, and the Office of
Air and Marine Operations are to maintain control of the US border.

b. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE focuses on the enforcement

of immigration and customs law. Homeland security investigations within ICE conducts
transnational criminal investigations that protect the US against threats to its national
security, including smuggling of narcotics and associated activities, such as illegal
weapons; financial crime and export enforcement issues; cybercrime; immigration crime;
human rights violations; and human trafficking and smuggling.

c. USCG. The USCG is the LF A for maritime law enforcement and exercises federal
jurisdiction in US territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone, on the high seas, and (as
authorized by bilateral agreements) in PNs ' territorial waters. The USCG shares the lead
for drug interdiction within the US contiguous zone (within 24 nm) with CBP's Office of
Air and Marine Operations. When authorized, the USCG supports DOD with personnel as
subject matter experts in support of professional exchanges. USCG efforts support the
NDCS across all US regions and within all CCMD regions around the globe. Their overall
strategy is to employ a layered approach to maritime security by forward deploying cutters
and aircraft close to the source zone of contraband and near our maritime borders in the
US . In addition, subject to international agreements, the USCG may patrol or conduct
pursuit, entry, and boarding operations in the territorial waters of other countries. USN
and allied nation ships provide support to the USCG to enhance presence and to expand
drug interdiction opportunities by embarking LEDETs on these platforms.

4. Department of Defense

a. CJCS. Performing the role of global integrator, the CJCS advises the President
and SecDef on ongoing operations and the allocation of forces between CCMDs and
provides strategic guidance to the CCDRs for the conduct of CD operations. Based on the
National Defense Strategy, Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), and strategic
guidance statements from SecDef, the CJCS provides the National Military Strategy;

11-3
Chapter II

CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) (more commonly referred
to as the JSCP); strategic guidance statements; and planning orders as key products of the
Joint Strategic Planning System. Within the Joint Staff, the Joint Staff J-3 and Joint Staff
J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate] perform key CD functions .

(1) Joint Staff J-3

(a) Serves as the Joint Staff office of primary responsibility for all matters
associated with military support to the NDCS.

(b) Coordinates CJCS guidance on operational aspects for implementing the

DOD mission as lead agency for D&M.

(c) Serves as the coordinator for CD operational matters on all LEA requests
for military support.

(2) Joint Staff J-5. Joint Staff J-5 serves as the Joint Staff focal point and office
of primary responsibility for all matters associated with military support to the national
drug interdiction effort pursuant to the National Security Strategy, National Defense
Strategy, National Military Strategy, and NDCS. Specifically, the Joint Staff J-5:

(a) Reviews operations, plans, and procedures relating to DOD CD efforts

worldwide.

(b) Provides Joint Staff representation to interagency CD meetings and

coordination groups as required.

(c) Prepares CD strategy, planning guidance, and policy for operations,

organizational issues, political-military affairs, and international negotiations in
coordination with the CCMDs, the Services, Office of the Secretary ofDefense, other USG
departments and agencies, and international organizations.

(d) Collaborates with Joint Staff J-3 on policy and political-military aspects
of US policy and operations in CD efforts.

b. CCDRs. The Unified Command Plan establishes the missions and responsibilities
for CCDRs and establishes their geographic AORs and global responsibilities. SecDefhas
delegated authority to specific CCDRs to approve CD missions and to deploy assigned
forces. CDRUSINDOPACOM, CDRUSSOUTHCOM, and CDRUSNORTHCOM have
delegated authority to approve certain types of domestic CD support, while all of the GCCs
have delegated authority to approve CD support outside of the US. Additionally, the
Military Departments (through the Services), CDRUSINDOPACOM, and
CDRUSSOCOM are DOD force providers for supporting CDRUSNORTHCOM (e.g. ,
JTF-N) CD operations. Details are provided in CJCSI 3710.01 , DOD Counterdrug
Support.

c. National Guard Counterdrug Program-State (NGCDP-State). An NGCDP-

State is established throughout the 50 states, US territories, and the District of Columbia.

11-4 JP 3-07.4
 Organizational and Command Relationships

An NGCDP-State is closely tied to both the Office ofNational Drug Control Policy and
DOD strategies. An NGCDP-State is designed to employ available military capabilities to
assist LEAs in detecting, disrupting, interdicting, and curtailing illicit drug trafficking and
related TOC threats to national security. An NGCDP-State can employ NG personnel,
resources, expertise, and capabilities to LEAs and community-based organizations to
achieve the overall objective of reducing illicit drug use and abuse.

d. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) J-32 [Counterdrug Division] falls under the
NGB J-3/7 [Director of Domestic Operations and Force Development Directorate]. This
directorate provides operational policy and guidance for the employment and management
of NG resources, personnel, and equipment. NGB J-32 coordinates the submission of
governor CD plans for SecDef approval and prepares reports for the Chief, NGB ;
DASD(CN&GT); and Congress. National Guard joint force headquarters-state (NG JFHQ-
State) may accept missions from SecDef to support CCMD responses to domestic federal
agency support requests. Federal LEA requests for NG support will be routed to the Joint
Staff J-3 and DASD(CN&GT) for staffing and approval.

e. In accordance with DOD policy, the NG can support domestic law enforcement
activities within the US boundaries. State and local LEAs may direct their support requests
to the respective NG JFHQ-State representative for approval. Federal LEA requests should
be routed to the appropriate CCMD for staffing and support. If the CCMD does not have
the proper authorities or adequate assigned capabilities to support the federal LEA request,
the requirement is submitted to the Joint Staff J-3 for sourcing. The Joint Staff J-3
determines the best sourcing solution and submits the recommendation to DASD(CN&GT)
for approval. NG JFHQ-State may accept tasks and missions from the Joint Staff J-3 as
approved by DASD(CN&GT) to support domestic federal law enforcement activities within
US boundaries.

For more detailed information on NG CD operations, see Chief National Guard Bureau
Instruction (CNGBI) 3100.01, National Guard Counterdrug Support.

f. Narcotics and Transnational Crime Support Center is a joint DOD-LEA fusion

center, funded by DOD, to support LEAs in conducting complex investigations and
multinational operations with interagency and HN counterparts to counter TOC with an
illicit drug trafficking or terrorism nexus. The Narcotics and Transnational Crime Support
Center provides the framework for interorganizational coordination and collaboration in
support of LEA activities against those TCOs whose networks and activities pose the
greatest threat to US national and international security.

g. Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell (RNIFC). The RNIFC is a joint

DOD and law enforcement cell, funded through DOD, and subordinate to USCENTCOM.
RNIFC ' s primary responsibility is to analyze, fuse , develop, and disseminate all-source
military intelligence and LEA information to support CD and counter TOC activities in
Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa in support of DOD and LEA objectives.
The RNFIC works closely with the US Naval Forces, Central Command; the combined
maritime forces; and LEA partners to support maritime and land drug interdiction

11-5
Chapter II

operations. The RNIFC partners with other regional CD task forces and fusion cells to
coordinate and collaborate on a common intelligence picture.

h. Other DOD Organizations. While not categorized as CD organizations, a number

of DOD counterterrorism-related organizations develop and field technical capabilities
especially suited to CD missions and activities. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is
cognizant of dual-use devices for detection of both explosives and narcotics .

5. Department of Justice

a. DEA. The mission of the DEA is to enforce the controlled substances laws and
regulations of the US and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the US, or any
other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations
involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing
in or destined for illicit traffic in the US and to recommend and support nonenforcement
programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic
and international markets.

b. Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's drug

program targets major DTOs through long-term investigations aimed at dismantling major
national and international DTOs. Dismantlement means the targeted organization is
rendered permanently incapable of being involved in the distribution of illicit drugs, the
organization's leaders have been completely incapacitated, its financial base has been
thoroughly destroyed, and its drug-supply connection/network have been irreparably
disrupted.

6. Department of State

DOS contributes significantly to CD operations. The INL has major policy and
program responsibilities. The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) is an independent agency that takes policy direction from SECSTATE and
administers nonmilitary assistance programs. US embassy country teams are responsible
for US CD activities within the HN, and the Bureau oflnternational Information Programs
advances US foreign policy goals directly with foreign audiences in support of US
embassies, consulates, and missions abroad .

a. USAID. USAID is the US lead in civilian assistance policy and program

management. USAID provides inclusive development leadership and expertise across the
USG, working with the White House and DOS to frame and coordinate US nonmilitary
assistance to developing countries around the world. USAID programs that directly or
indirectly advance counternarcotics objectives may include alternative agricultural and
business development, consolidation of municipal and national government basic services
in ungoverned areas, community policing, rule of law capacity and institutional
strengthening, and more. USAID is a decentralized agency providing a mission in each
country in which it operates. Each mission is an autonomous procurement and accounting
station with the authority and flexibility to coordinate with the US country team on the
most appropriate counternarcotics role for civilian development assistance . US military

11-6 JP 3-07.4
 Organizational and Command Relationships

elements are required to notify USAID mission directors of US military civil action and
other assistance and programs in countries with a USAID mission. The USAID mission
director is the embassy ' s advisor on development policy and a member ofthe country team.

b. US Embassies. The COM heads the mission's country team of USG personnel.
The COM (normally the ambassador) represents the President but takes policy guidance
from SECSTATE. The COM is responsible for US CD activities within the HN but not
personnel or facilities under the command of a US military area commander. The
ambassador interprets US national drug policy and strategy and oversees its application.
The country team construct denotes the process of in-country, interdepartmental
coordination among key members of the diplomatic mission. The ambassador uses the
country team to assist in translating strategy or policy into operational direction for USG
departments and agencies cooperating with the HN . The deputy COM is often tasked as
the narcotics control coordinator to chair the country team meetings that concern CD
matters. The composition of a country team varies widely, depending on the desires of the
COM, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of the USG departments and
agencies present. Although US military commanders are not members of diplomatic
missions, they often participate in meetings and coordination sessions concerning CD and
SA matters that are in support ofthe HN.

7. Department of the Treasury

a. CD responsibilities of the department are carried out, in part, by the Internal

Revenue Service, which is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the
internal revenue Jaws and related statutes. Individuals owe taxes on all income, including
income from illicit drug-related activities. The attempt to launder illegal revenues through
legitimate businesses (without reporting the income), willfully attempting to conceal
income, or simply failing to pay taxes on reported income are all violations of the Internal
Revenue Code. This often gives the Internal Revenue Service jurisdiction in drug-related
cases.

b. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OF AC). The Department of the Treasury
established the OFAC and kingpin designations to improve the countering threat networks
(CTN) approach to transnational drug organizations and their supporting infrastructure.
OF AC administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy
and national security goals. OF AC implements programs against targeted foreign countries
and regimes; terrorists; international narcotics traffickers; proliferators ofweapons of mass
destruction; and other entities who threaten the national security, foreign policy, or
economy ofthe US. OFAC acts under presidential national emergency powers, as well as
authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze
assets under US jurisdiction. Many of the sanctions are based on United Nations and other
international mandates, are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied
governments. Although OF AC addresses more than CD networks, it is a powerful tool to
apply against TOC and illicit drug networks.

A matrix of domestic and international CD organizations can be found in Appendix C,

"Counterdrug Organizations. "

11-7
Chapter II

SECTION B. DOMESTIC COUNTERDRUG ORGANIZATIONS

8. General

There are two types of CD organizations: domestic and international. The domestic
type includes federal, state, and local organizations and exists to coordinate and focus the
efforts of all levels of government on the identification and investigation of drug
traffickers. International organizations involve US and PN CD elements that carry out
multinational operations focused on specific source and transit zones.

9. National Guard

The National Guard Counterdrug Program (NGCDP) is funded under Title 32, USC,
and administered nationally by NGB J-3/7. It is executed at the state level under the control
of the state governor or territorial government. Each state or territory' s NG JFHQ-State
exercises operational control of their CD activities and is responsib le for the oversight of
the federally funded NG support to civilian agencies. The NG JFHQ-State appoints a CD
coordinator in every state and territory who is responsible for overseeing the execution of
the state NO ' s CD supply drug interdiction and demand reduction missions in accordance
with applicable state law. The NGCDP provides skilled personnel, specialized equipment,
and facilities to support LEAs and community-based organizations in response to the
changing drug threat. The CD role is consistent with the NO's traditional state mission of
providing military support to civilian authorities and can include support to federal LEA,
CCMD, and combat support agency counternarcotics activities when those activities are
on-going in the state or territory and included in the state CD activities plan. The NG CD
support missions include:

a. Program Management. Plan and coordinate state CD supply and demand

reduction support, establish liaison with supported LEAs and other community
organizations, resource and manage personnel and equipment requirements for CD support
operations, and prepare operational or financial reports and briefings as required.

b. Technical Support

(1) Linguist Support. Transcription and/or translation of audio, video tapes,

seized documents, and other information media.

(2) Intelligence Analyst Support. Provides analytical support to LEAs through

the development of investigations for cases and prosecution. This mission focuses on four
core competencies: link analysis, document and media exploitation, financial analysis, and
case construction.

(3) Communications Support. Provide personnel to establish, operate, and

maintain communications stations, bases, and equipment in support of organization
communications or technical issues.

II-8 JP 3-07.4
 Organizational and Command Relationships

(4) Engineer Support. Provide engineer support to LEAs and community

organizations where the project has a CD nexus. This excludes operations concerning drug
laboratories or hazardous materials.

(5) Subsurface or Diver Support. Subsurface inspections of commercial vessel

hulls within US territorial waters or US maritime ports of entry (POEs) through the use of
side scan sonar or divers to detect alien devices or containers attached to the vessel hulls
or other underwater activities.

(6) Imagery/Map Production and Analysis. This mission assists agencies by

providing counternarcotics imagery and map production analysis. This includes the
utilization of various geographic information systems to analyze raw criminal information
and develop products.

c. General Support

(l) Domestic Cannabis Suppression and Eradication Operations Support.

This mission encompasses all efforts that lead up to, but excludes, the actual suppression
and/or eradication of illicit marijuana cultivation.

(2) Transportation Support. This mission provides transportation and

controlled deliveries (aerial, ground, or maritime) ofLEA personnel and equipment in LEA
custody or seized property or contraband as part of ongoing time-sensitive CD.

d. CD-Related Training and Training ofLEA/Military Personnel. Train military,

LEAs, community-based organizations, and educational and government institutions in
subjects and skills useful in the conduct of CD operations or in the operation of military
equipment used in CD operations

e. Reconnaissance and Observation

( 1) Surface Reconnaissance. Reconnoiter or perform area observation by land

or water to detect and document illicit drug activities that include, but are not limited to:
cultivated marijuana; suspected isolated drug trafficking airstrips; drug drop zones; drug
trafficking corridors; illicit drug laboratories; suspicious aircraft, watercraft, or motor
vehicles.

(2) Aerial Reconnaissance. Conduct reconnaissance and observation of

airspace, maritime, or surface areas (land and internal waterways of the US and US
territories) for illicit drug activities.

f. Civil Operations and Community Coalition Development. Provide unique

military skills to enhance community coalition efforts to reduce local drug and substance
abuse threats. Support can be direct or indirect to coalitions through local prevention
agencies, state agencies, and government organizations that support community coalitions
with a substance abuse prevention nexus.

II-9
Chapter II

For more detailed information onNG CD operations, see CNGBI 3100.01, National Guard
Counterdrug Support.

11-10 JP 3-07.4
 CHAPTER III
PLANNING

"Stable, friendly, and prosperous states in the Western Hemisphere enhance

our security and benefit our economy. Democratic states connected by
shared values and economic interests will reduce the violence, drug
trafficking, and illegal immigration that threaten our common security, and will
limit opportunities for adversaries to operate from areas of close proximity to
us."

National Security Strategy, May 201 0

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. Strategic Context

a. Strategic guidance and objectives provide context and the basis for the military' s
support and participation in CD operations. The Office of the National Drug Control Policy
develops, and the President signs, the NDCS, which provides broad, strategic direction and
establishes the administration's CD strategy, policy, objectives, and priorities. The US
interdiction coordinator develops the supporting NICCP, which outlines the USG's
strategy for drug interdiction and states specific roles and responsibilities for relevant
federal agencies that execute that strategy. Other CD-related elements of strategic
guidance may be found in presidential directives, the National Strategy for Homeland
Security, and other national department-level statements of CD policy. For DOD, SecDef
provides the National Defense Strategy, GEF, and other guidance statements, and the CJCS
provides strategic guidance for conducting CD operations to CCDRs in the National
Military Strategy, JSCP, and, when applicable, planning orders.

b. CCDRs plan based on strategic guidance, and GCCs develop their theater strategies
for supporting CD operations . GCCs typically include theater CD objectives in the ir CCPs
and in other plans that link US national strategy to operational-level activities . Some
CCDRs must deve lop operation plans (OPLANs) for specific CD-related contingencies as
required by the GEF, JSCP, and other directives. They will also identify and plan for CD
contingencies not specifically assigned by the President, SecDef, or CJCS.

c. Denying the funds generated by illicit DTOs is an effective strategy to counter

threat networks. Establishing an effective counter threat finance (CTF) strategy is one key
aspect to building a capability to disrupt criminal financial activities, which are critical to
supporting that threat network. Effective CTF strategies integrate multiple agencies with
their respective authorities and capabilities to synchronize their individual efforts to disrupt
threat networks. These coordinated efforts deny the threat actors the ability to freely
operate in poorly regulated financial environments or to exploit weaknesses in regulated
fin ancial systems. In the DOD Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy,
DASD(CN&GT) coordinates within DOD for the authority to train PN forces on CTF and
threat finance intelligence to establish and operate bases of operations or training facilities
and to provide fi nancial analysts, linguists, and other analytic services in support of CD or

111-1
Chapter III

counter TOC activities. CTF programs include providing information, trammg, and
advisory services that can enable the PN forces to prepare their plans for CTF and counter
TOC operations.

Refer to Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning,jor details on planning, especially the
application of guidance, and the development and review ofplans directed by the JSCP or
other issuances.

2. Planning

a. Within the context provided by strategic guidance and objectives, joint planning for
specific CD operations occurs using two closely related, integrated, collaborative, and
adaptive processes: the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) enterprise and the joint
planning process (JPP) . The combination of the APEX enterprise and the JPP promotes
coherent planning across all levels of warfare and command echelons, whether the
requirement is for a limited, single-phase drug interdiction operation or for a multiphase
CD operation that requires a variety of capabilities and participation by many agencies and
multinational partners.

b. The consolidated counterdrug database (CCDB) is a comprehensive database that

supports CD planning by capturing the details surrounding drug-related events submitted
and approved by CD agencies participating in the CCDB working group. Details include
where, when, and how individual drug trafficking events took place; the response of forces
to those events; the outcome of the event; and the type and quantity of drugs involved. It
is used as an analysis and planning tool. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) manages
the CCDB for all interagency partners and delegates oversight of specific drug modules to
other DOD organizations. JIA TF -S manages the cocaine module, which includes tracking
marijuana; JIA TF-W manages the amphetamine module, which includes tracking
precursor chemicals for methamphetamine production; and USCENTCOM manages the
heroin module. For example, in 2011, the Interdiction Committee chartered the CCDB
working group to document all known and suspected cocaine movement occurring
worldwide and the known and suspected movement of other illicit drugs trafficked in the
Western Hemisphere with a nexus to the US such as opiates and amphetamine-type
stimulants. The CCDB working group produces quarterly, classified reports that document
cocaine trafficking trends from source zones through arrival zones. These classified reports
are utilized in the planning process for drug interdiction and disruption operations.

c. Joint planning occurs within the APEX enterprise, which is the department-level
system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures. The APEX
enterprise formally integrates the planning activities of military organizations during the
initial planning and plan refinement that occurs both in peacetime and when faced with an
imminent crisis. While APEX enterprise activities span many organizational levels, the
focus is on the interaction, which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when,
where, and how to commit US military capabilities in response to a foreseen contingency
or an unforeseen crisis. The majority of APEX enterprise activities and products occur
prior to the point when the CJCS approves and issues an execute order, which initiates the
employment of military capabilities to accomplish a specific mission. When a military

III-2 JP 3-07.4
 Planning

organization planning for CD operations must meet specific APEX enterprise

requirements, it should refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM)
3122.01 , Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOP ES), Volume I, Planning
Policies and Procedures; CJCSM 3122.02, Joint Operation and Planning Execution
System (JOPES), Volume III, Time Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and
Deployment Execution; and CJCSM 3130.03 , Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)
Planning Formats and Guidance, for specific procedures and formats .

d. The JPP, as described in JP 5-0, Joint Planning, is a less formal but proven
analytical process that provides a methodical approach to planning at any organizational
level and at any point before and during joint operations. Most planning below the strategic
level for the employment of military capabilities in CD operations will occur using the JPP.
The focus of the JPP is on the interaction between an organization's commander, staff, the
commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, and supporting
commanders and their staffs. Although the ultimate product is an OPLAN or operation
order (OPORD) for a specific mission, the process is continuous throughout an operation.
Even during execution, the JPP produces plans and orders for future operations, as well as
fragmentary orders that drive immediate adjustments to the current operation. The JPP
provides an orderly framework for planning in general, particularly for organizations that
have no formal APEX requirements. The JPP consists of seven steps, depicted in Figure
III-1. Organizations that plan CD operations should refer to JP 5-0 for a detailed discussion
of JPP steps and associated products, such as mission statement, commander's intent, and
concept of operations (CONOPS).

e. Plan Review and Approval

The Joint Planning Process

Step 1 ! Initiation

Step 2 I Mission Analysis

Step 3 j Course of Action (COA) Development I
Step 4 j COA Analysis and Wargaming

Step 5 I COA Comparison

Step 6 I COA Approval
Step 7 I Plan or Order Development
Figure 111-1. The Joint Planning Process

III-3
 •

Chapter III

(1) A CCDR may direct the development of OPLANs for potential CD

contingencies that are not discussed in the JSCP, GEF, or other directives. These plans
require approval by the CCDR or a designated approval authority. There are five general
plan review criteria: adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance
with joint doctrine.

(2) Supporting commanders prepare plans that encompass their role in the CD
operation. The supported commander normally reviews and approves supporting plans.

(3) As part of the approval process, the servicing SJA reviews all OPLANs,
OPORDs, and other similar documents in accordance with DODD 2311.01 , DOD Law of
War Program.

f. Assessment. Planners should establish an assessment process or mechanisms early

in the planning process to ensure any necessary adjustments to the operation are supported
by assessment data. It is critical to determine the success of CD operations to make
adjustments to the conduct of operations. The assessment process should be included early
in the planning process. As an assessment measure of effectiveness (MOE) indicator for
illicit drug flows in their AOR, a GCC can measure the interagency and PN narcotics
removals from within their AOR quarterly and compare those to the historic flow estimates
developed using the consolidated CD database. This will result in a percent of flow that
was removed as a result of interagency and partner action and can be used to assess success
or failure in the CD mission.

(1) Early in the JPP, CD-related products from a continuous joint intelligence
preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) analytic process should be used to
initiate CD operation assessment planning, establish an OE baseline, and support mission
analysis. By understanding the CD-related current and desired conditions of the OE, the
CD operation assessment planners can develop measure of performance (MOP) indicators
for CD task accomplishment and MOE indicators for impact on the OE toward achieving
CD objectives. To be effective, these indicators should be relevant, observable, and
measurable. These intelligence requirements are incorporated for planners as priority
intelligence requirements, which the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) uses to
direct collection, as well as continuous JIPOE analysis and production to enable planners
to compare the present OE with the initial planning OE baseline. In this manner, relevant
and measurable indicators are determined during planning and revised, observed, and
analyzed during execution to assess progress or regression relative to desired effects
indicating success or failure of actions. When planning for the relevant effects, measures,
and indicators, it is important for the planner to think in terms of the entire OE and
capabilities of both friendly and enemy forces. By focusing on the relevant capabilities,
resources, and vulnerabilities, planners can build useful MOP and MOE indicators that
anticipate the likelihood of achieving objectives.

(2) Finally, planners must identify feedback mechanisms through which

reporting can be accomplished. Feedback is the tool through which the operation
communicates successful actions or the need to deviate/refocus assets to create the desired
effect.

III-4 JP 3-07.4
 Planning

g. Network Engagement in Planning. Network engagement are interactions with

friendly, neutral, and threat networks, conducted continuously and simultaneously at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels, to help achieve the commander's objectives
within an OE. Network engagement may provide a framework for JFCs to understand and
effectively counter drug-trafficking networks or other threat networks through partnering
with friendly networks and engaging neutral networks. To effectively counter threat
networks, the joint force must seek to support and link with friendly networks and engage
neutral networks through the building of mutual trust and cooperation through network
engagement. Network engagement consists of three components: partnering with friendly
networks, engaging neutral networks, and CTN to support the commander' s desired end
state.

(1) When planning to partner with friendly elements, the JFC should consider
building relationships with PNs to enact efforts in both demand reduction and supply
reductions efforts. Teaming with local HN educational elements can assist in demand
reduction, and partnering with HN law enforcement (by foreign internal defense [FID]) or
security cooperation) can help increase the effectiveness of supply reduction/interdictions
efforts. For CD operations, it is critical for the JFC to understand partner priorities and the
strengths and limits of friendly network members ' authorities and capabilities in engaging
neutral networks and CTN. The JFC may need to consider strategies to enable partners
who have authority to counter drug networks the JFC lacks but do not have sufficient
resources.

(2) When planning to engage the neutral population or networks, demand

reduction will often be the main effort. Public service announcements or information
activities can assist in preventing or curtailing the population from using illicit narcotics or
abusing licit narcotics. Neutral networks could include those individuals, groups, or
organizations that are not directly part of the trafficking networks but which enable or
potentially impact drug networks. This could be through doing business with drug
networks, either knowingly or with an unspoken or tacit understanding of their activities.
This might involve transportation networks that facilitate smuggling or other criminal
groups that provide services to drug networks. Other actors could be connected to drug
networks without their knowledge. This could involve commercial providers of goods or
services who are generally unaware of who the end users are but whose products
inadvertently enable drug networks. In a CD context, this could be commodities sold on
the open market, such as precursor chemicals, communications equipment, or weapons and
ammunition. Neutral networks would even include affected populations who may be able
to provide information or tips about local drug network activities. Engaging neutral
networks often involves applying information to turn neutral networks away from
supporting threat networks and/or toward supporting friendly networks.

(3) While the drug trafficking network would be the primary threat network, there
may also be related insurgent, terrorist, or other criminal threat networks. Drug networks
are composed of a variety of personnel, leadership, specialists, communications,
transportation, and other elements that are critical to their functioning. Further, as criminal
enterprises, they may obtain resources from a number of illicit activities. Network analysis
can be used to understand threat network relationships and interdependencies, as well as

III-5
Chapter III

network critical factors that can be targeted. In most circumstances outside of US combat
operations, the JFC does not directly act against drug networks but supports the actions of
HN security forces . When planning to counter threat networks, supply reduction will often
be the main effort. Supply reduction activities can include FID and security cooperation
in operations short of armed conflict. In traditional armed conflict, examples of supply
reduction could include efforts to train HN law enforcement to interdict illicit drugs,
precursors, illicit finances, and illicit crop spraying and border controls.

Refer to JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks, for more information on network

engagement, critical factors analysis, and targeting threat networks.

For more information on the JPP assessment, or planning in general, see JP 5-0, Joint
Planning.

3. Interagency and Multinational Considerations

a. CD operations are inherently law enforcement in nature and therefore involve

interagency partners and/or PNs. When authorized by law to support LEA CD operations,
DOD will normally support the USG lead agency for both domestic and international CD
operations. Military planning should anticipate unified action with relevant agencies and
PNs. This helps effectively integrate military capabilities, including forces and equipment
that support law enforcement activities of the other partners. Military planners should
understand unity of effort, because some of the agencies, PNs, and multinational
organizations that lead or might be involved in CD operations will have different goals,
capabilities, limitations (such as policy and resource restraints), standards, and operational
philosophies. Similarly, militaliy planners should understand and be able to articulate the
constraints placed on DOD in providing CD support. Despite these differences, the CD
planning for unified action must bring together the capabilities of disparate organizations
in the pursuit of national and theater CD objectives.

b. Early integration of the efforts of military, civilian agency, and multinational

planners in the planning process should facilitate the planning relationships required for
effective coordination and collaboration. Commanders supporting CD operations must
ensure interagency and multinational planners clearly understand military capabilities,
sustainment requirements, operational limitations, liaison, and legal considerations and that
military planners understand the nature of the interagency relationship and the limitations
on the types of support to provide. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination,
and mission accomplishment. A CCMD ' s joint interagency coordination group (JIACG),
or an equivalent organization, is an interagency staff group that can facilitate this process.
During joint operations, a JIACG provides the CCDR with an increased capability to
coordinate with other USG agencies and departments and may facilitate such coordination
for subordinate JFCs. The JIACG, an element of a CCDR' s staff, establishes regular,
timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational
planners. Composed ofUSG civilian and military experts assigned to CCDRs and tailored
to meet the CCDR's specific needs, the JIACG provides a CCDR with the capability to
collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments and
participate in all planning. JIACG members provide a collaborative conduit back to their

III-6 JP 3-07.4
 Planning

parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of nonmilitary
organizations.

c. Planners need to consider recovery and evacuation for those personnel who become
isolated, captured, or injured during CD operations. Personnel recovery (PR) and casualty
evacuation, especially in a COM-led environment, will require the synchronized
capabilities and authorities of interagency, DOD, multinational, and HN partners. PR and
casualty evacuation often require an immediate response; therefore, it behooves planners
to establish collaboration and planning procedures well in advance of an event occurring.

JP 5-0, Joint Planning, provides more information on interagency and multinational

considerations related to joint planning. Also refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational
Cooperation, and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for additional details regarding
considerations for coordination and collaboration among organizations and multinational
partners.

JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, provides afoundationfor understanding PR and developing

aPR plan. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, addresses issues relative to casualty evacuation.

SECTION B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT

4. Detection and Monitoring

D&M provides early notification to LEAs, enabling interception and drug interdiction
operations, and facilitates searches for contraband, which may lead to drug seizures and
arrests. DOD, in consonance with the NICCP, utilizes national task forces to conduct
D&M operations. Drug smugglers are innovative and continuously use the tactic of
misdirection with law enforcement and military CD forces, knowing they cannot be
everywhere at all times. Limited CD assets should be located to optimize D&M and the
potential for drug interdiction. Therefore, the cueing, detecting, identifying, and
monitoring become essential to successful D&M for drug interdiction.

a. Cueing. Whether over the expanse of open ocean sea lanes or airspace, or on
roadside checkpoints, some form of CD cueing is required. This cueing may be specific
intelligence "tipping" from myriad sources that enable D&M assets to be properly
positioned and ready to detect the target. Also, drug smugglers try to operate and be lost
among the populace and may use deceptions to overwhelm D&M capabilities. In addition
to the cueing assets, there must be sufficient capability to detect and identify the target so
that monitoring (tracking) is possible to an advantageous point or time of CD interdiction.
In many cases, human intelligence is a principle source of information to cue D&M efforts.

b. Detection. Whatever the manner of cueing, the target must be detected or cued by
pre-positioned D&M assets, whether fixed site, movable, or mobile. In the case of aerial
and some maritime targets transiting over water, there are a number of types of assets that
can affect initial detection: air assets such as airborne early warning or modified maritime
patrol aircraft, submarines, and surface patrol assets such as naval combatants and USCG
cutters or ground- or sea-based radars. In the case of land targets, cueing and detection

III-7
Chapter III

may be at the same point and time, or cueing leads to detection at a separate location such
as an airfield, roadside checkpoint, or border crossing.

c. Identification and Monitoring. Following initial detection, the target must then
be identified and monitored until it can be handed off to LEA or PN forces for interception.
When possible, a common operational picture (COP), created through the integration of
the data from various intelligence sources and sensor systems, is used for situational
awareness and decision making after cueing to continue the drug interdiction process.
Land targets may require increased support and coordination due to larger-scale, ground,
unit-type activities.

d. OPSEC. Smugglers, especially drug cartels, employ their own well-organized

security and intelligence systems and use various security measures and deceptions to
avoid detection and interception. They also rely on a form of human intelligence, some of
which is obtained through corruption and bribes and others through intimidation and fear
of extreme violence, including kidnapping and murder. DOD and LEAs should employ
OPSEC measures and military deception tactics at the operational and tactical levels to
disrupt smuggler/cartel intelligence gathering and increase the likelihood of successful
D&M and subsequent drug interdiction. PNs may have OPSEC challenges and require
assistance in safeguarding sensitive but unclassified material.

e. Operational Limitations and ROE/RUF. Per CJCSI 3 710.01 , DOD Counterdrug

Support, DOD personnel are not authorized to provide assistance to LEAs when CD-related
hostilities are imminent. Additionally, DODI 3025.21 , Defense Support of Civilian Law
Enforcement Agencies, states that DOD personnel should not directly participate in a search
or seizure, interdiction of vehicles or vessels, or the pursuit of individuals. However,
despite DOD personnel's compliance with these restrictions, there may be occasions when
they find themselves in complex situations such as supporting LEDET vessel boarding that
may necessitate the use of force. Additionally, similar precautions should be taken during
combined operations with a PN. There needs to be an informed, mutual understanding of
the governing policies, ROE/RUF (or PN equivalents) and other operational limitations for
the activities/operation for both the US and PN participants.

For additional discussion regarding operational limitations and application of ROE and
RUF, see JP 1-04, Legal Support for Military Operations, and JP 3-28, Defense Support
of Civil Authorities, respectively; for detailed ROEIRUF discussion, see CJCSI 3121.01,
(U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.

5. Drug Interdiction Environments

DOD's principal CD mission is D&M, and the desired end result of successful D&M
is drug interdiction and apprehension by LEAs. Drug interdiction can take place in the air,
at sea, or on land. These area interdictions often include overlapping activities of
interagency partners. CD PNs participate in air, maritime, and land drug interdiction. The
differentiation of drug interdiction by physical domain is to illustrate the type of assets used
by smugglers and those assets integrated by CD forces. For example, an air interception
would continue until the aircraft lands and is seized, or the contraband is air dropped, so

III-8 JP 3-07.4
 Planning

surface interception support (maritime or land) may also play a part in a drug interdiction
process.

a. Air Drug Interdiction. Drug smuggling by general aviation type aircraft (i.e. ,
private plane) is one means by which illicit drugs are brought directly into the US from a
source country. The principal objective of air drug interdiction operations is to deter drug
smuggling by seizing the drugs, aircraft, and the smugglers and to deny smugglers safe,
direct, and economical routes. Air drug interdiction activities in international airspace are
conducted by the USCG and CBP, as co-leads, with occasional assistance from other
agencies. DOD typically supports D&M for air drug interdiction with airborne and surface
sensors and tracking. For a specific mission, PN forces are typically integrated into the
combined air drug interdiction force structure of the participating national task forces. Of
note, US air drug interdiction does not include shooting down the suspect aircraft but rather
facilitating surface interception of the aircraft or its illicit cargo upon landing or ofthe illicit
cargo if airdropped.

b. Maritime CD Operations. Maritime CD interdiction may occur on both sea and

land, including the littorals. CBP is the lead agency for CD operations at US POEs and on
land between POEs. The USCG is the LF A for maritime drug interdiction operations on
the high seas and shares this responsibility within the exclusive economic zone outside of
24 nm and contiguous waters with CBP. USN and PN/multinational vessels, with
embarked LEDETs, provide assistance to the USCG when authorized. Maritime CD
operations focus efforts principally on deterring drug smuggling by identifying seaborne
smuggling routes ; detecting, monitoring, and boarding vessels; seizing contraband and
vessels; and detaining suspects. Over the years, maritime smuggling methods have grown
increasingly sophisticated to counter the improving enforcement efforts.

See Appendix G, "Law Enforcement Detachments, " for additional details.

c. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is managed through DOS and DOD. PSI is a
global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern. However, PSI is also used for narcotrafficking, since the means of delivery and
distribution networks are similar. CCDRs ' programs use the PSI activities for early
warning of sea and air interdiction, intercept, and search and seizures in support of
maritime operations. CCDRs in the JIACG activate the PSI activities in real time to
provide D&M coordination with DOS and PN. The USCG and USN assets are used for
maritime operations, boarding, and seizures; coordination with the PN is the same under
PSI.

For additional information regarding PSI, see CJCSI 3520.02, Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) Activity Program.

d. Land Drug Interdiction . Drug smuggling involves a land source and a land
destination, and land drug interdiction may include D&M through other domains and the
information environment. The primary objective of land drug interdiction is to seize illegal
drugs, drug-related money, illegal weapons and munitions, and chemicals as they enter or

111-9
Chapter III

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD SEIZURES, A HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE FOR 2017

In 2017, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) removed over 223 metric
tons of cocaine and 31,190 pounds of marijuana worth an estimated $6.6
billion in wholesale value, while detaining 708 suspected smugglers for
prosecution in the US or partner nations. Despite this success, the
Service's overall removal rate only rose slightly to 8.2%, below the target
of 11.5%. There was a 3% decrease in estimated noncommercial
maritime cocaine flow, from 2,833 MT [metric tons] in 2016 to 2, 738.4 MT
[2017]. Sustained high cocaine production factors include the
Colombian peace talks with various insurgent groups that resulted in a
reduction or cessation of eradication efforts in Colombia. However, an
increase in the quantity of intelligence reporting and information
captured generated better awareness of maritime flow of cocaine. At the
same time, maritime smuggling methods have grown increasingly
sophisticated to counter the improving enforcement efforts. The USCG
continues its increased commitment of ships, aviation use of force-
capable helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft to the Western
Hemisphere Transit Zone.

Source: USCG Annual Performance Report Fiscal Year 2017

leave the US. Apprehensions at POEs, along the border, and inside the US, including
clandestine smuggler landing and airdrop sites, are accomplished primarily by CBP. PNs
also conduct drug interdiction on land, including targeting airfields, illicit drug production
facilities, and transshipment sites, all of which may require D&M support.

e. CTF. Illicit drug trafficking networks are challenges for CTN. A key aspect for
countering illicit drug trafficking networks is to negate funding and logistics that support
them. CTF has emerged as a whole-of-government approach to disrupt and deplete the
funding of illicit drug traffickers and their supporting networks.

6. Support to Other Nations

a. General. Illicit drug trafficking is a national security issue, and the US supports
the security, stability, and well-being of US allies and other nations friendly to US interests.
Assisting PNs in this effort generally requires the full range of diplomatic, informational,
military, and economic instruments of US national power. Supporting other nations ' CD
efforts is US policy and part of the US CD strategy, as is helping build capabilities and
capacity for some PNs.

b. Types of Support. Some DOD CD efforts may also support US FID initiatives
when drug trafficking threatens a nation ' s security and stability. DOD assistance provided
for PN CD efforts may be provided through SA and joint and multinational exercises and
PN counter narcoterrorism training activities. Direct support (not involving US combat
operations) may involve US forces focused on civil-military operations (CMO) (primarily
the provision of services to a local populace), communications and intelligence

III-10 JP 3-07.4
 Planning

cooperation, or logistic support. CD initiatives to support other nations are discussed

below.

More information about US FID programs is available in JP 3-22, Foreign Internal

Defense.

c. SA Programs. As a subset of security cooperation, SA encompasses a group of

programs, authorized by law, through which DOD or commercial contractors provide
defense articles and services in support of national policies and objectives. SA programs
authorize the transfer of defense articles and services to international organizations and
friendly foreign governments via sales, grants, leases, or loans to help friendly nations and
allies deter and defend against aggression, promote the sharing of common defense
burdens, and help foster regional stability. SA includes such diverse efforts as the delivery
of defense weapon systems to foreign governments, US Service school training to
international students, US personnel advice to other governments on ways to improve their
internal defense capabilities, and US personnel guidance and assistance in establishing
infrastructures and economic bases to achieve and maintain regional stability. When the
US assists other nations in meeting their defense requirements, it contributes to its own
security. SA is funded and authorized by, and under the supervision and general direction
of, DOS. The military portion is administered by DOD under the direction of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency. GCCs have the responsibility for supporting certain SA programs
and conducting some security cooperation activities and planning FID operations for
nations in their AORs, and they interface directly into the SA process through the security
cooperation organization located in the PN. This action is coordinated with the US COM
(normally the ambassador) in the affected HN. GCCs are active in the SA process by
advising the security cooperation organization and by coordinating and monitoring
ongoing SA efforts in their AOR. SA support to PNs for CD operations include equipment,
services, and training, some of which may be governed by statutory limitations and
qualifications.

For more information on SA, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, and JP 3-22, Foreign
Internal Defense.

d. CMO. CMO are activities supporting military operations that embrace the
relationship between military forces, civilian authorities, and the indigenous population.
CMO contribute significantly to an HN's internal defense and development, generally
facilitate US operations abroad, and can enhance US CD activities with the PN. CMO
conducted by civil affairs (CA) forces and complemented by information-related activities,
especially military information support operations (MISO), should be used to create
positive effects for achieving objectives of CD operations. CMO may also support foreign
humanitarian assistance (FHA), humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), and military
civic action (MCA) in conjunction with CD operations.

For more information on CMO, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

III-11
Chapter III

e. Information Integration. The information function encompasses the management

and application of information to change or maintain relevant actor perceptions, attitudes,
and other elements that drive desired behaviors and to support human and automated
decision making. The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and
leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all
military operations. This function provides JFCs the ability to integrate the generation and
preservation of friendly information while leveraging the inherent informational aspects of
military activities to achieve the commander' s objectives and attain the end state.

For additional iriformation, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

f. MISO. MISO support achievement of US national and JFC objectives, DOS goals,
and any supported embassy' s mission performance plans. US MISO can be overt and, at
the same time, be tailored so that the emphasis is placed on PN capability and execution.
MISO, at a minimum, can provide information support and training in CD operations but
cannot develop programs or products that target US citizens either inside or outside the
US . DODI 0-3607.02, (U) Military Information Support Operations (MISO), tasks each
CCMD to implement a MISO program and identifies the approval procedures. MISO have
potential to support and enable US and PN CD operations abroad. CJCSI 3110.05, Military
Iriformation Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, also
provides broad MISO guidance . Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-approved MISO
programs, when combined with a SecDef-directed mission, provide the execution authority
for the conduct of missions. Additional guidance on objectives (by program), potential
target audiences, themes to stress and avoid, approval process, and means of dissemination
and attribution methods is provided. CCDRs are authorized to execute the above pre-
approved MISO programs in support of SecDef-approved missions or operations and
Unified Command Plan activities.

For more information on MISO, see JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

g. MCA. MCA programs help build a PN's infrastructure and strengthen its
governments while enhancing the legitimacy and popular support of the national
government and military. This is accomplished by using mostly indigenous military
personnel to conduct construction projects, support missions, and provide services useful
to the local population. These missions may involve US supervision and advice but will
always be conducted by the local military. MCA projects are designed to improve the PN
in areas such as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation,
communications, health, sanitation, and others that contribute to its economic and social
development. These programs are especially helpful where gaining public acceptance of
the PN' s military is important to the long-term success of CD operations.

For further detail on MCA, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign
Internal Defense.

h. FHA. FHA employs US military personnel to promote urgent, nonmilitary

objectives. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Peacekeeping and Humanitarian
Affairs) manages and approves all FHA programs for DOD. FHA can be included in the

III-12 JP 3-07.4
 Planning

CCDR' s overall FID plan, but it is most often provided in response to unforeseen disaster
situations. Properly coordinated and responsive FHA, incorporating active MISO and CA
activities, can be instrumental in bolstering a PN's internal defense and development,
especially when stability is threatened by an overpowering criminal drug organization.

i. HCA. HCA is assistance to a local populace authorized in accordance with Title

10, USC, Section 401, and DODI 2205 .02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)
Activities. Per Title 10, USC, Section 401 (e), HCA includes medical, surgical, dental, and
veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are underserved by medical,
surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training,
and technical assistance related to the care provided; well drilling and construction of basic
sanitation facilities; rudimentary construction of surface transportation systems; and
rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Under Title 10, USC, Section 401,
HCA may not be provided to any foreign country unless SECSTATE specifically approves
the provision of such assistance. Additionally, HCA activities should be distinguished
from similar types of projects that US forces may undertake to accomplish a military
operation and that result in incidental benefits to the local population. Coordination with
USAID and the HN is also very important to avoid duplicating efforts of social or economic
assistance by multiple USG departments or agencies.

7. Logistics Support

a. Types of Support. Host-nation support (HNS) to US forces is normally based on

agreements that commit a HN to provide specific support according to prescribed
conditions. Shortfalls in HNS may be overcome through additional sustainment efforts,
including contracted support, which can be a significant force multiplier to the joint force.
Types of support that can be provided include:

(1) Government Agency Support. HN government agencies that provide

services can directly or indirectly provide support. Support such as communications,
refueling, electrical supplies, security, and HN law enforcement similar to the CBP police
are some examples.

(2) HN Facilities. This could include the use of buildings and facilities for
headquarters, billeting, maintenance shops, or other activities.

b. Contracted Support. This could include supplies and services supporting

transportation, laundry, and hygiene requirements, as well as non-logistics support such as
communications services and linguists. Theater support contracts are awarded by
contracting officers in the operational area serving under the direct contracting authority of
the Service component or designated senior contracting official for the contingency
operation. During contingency operations, these contracts are normally executed under
expedited contracting authority and provide supplies, services, and minor construction
from commercial sources generally within the operational area. Theater support contracts
can range from small, local contracts for a single unit or operational, area-wide contracts
in support of the entire force. Also of importance, from the contractor management
perspective, is that local national personnel commonly make up the bulk of the theater

III-13
Chapter III

support contractor employees in operations outside the US . DOD contracting officers must
check the lists of entities and individuals subject to economic sanctions that are available
on OFAC ' s Website at http ://www.treas.gov/ofac and may not acquire from such entities
and individuals.

See JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support,jor further (riformation.

c. Factors to Consider in HNS. HNS may be appropriate in some CD operations.

However, extreme care should be exercised to avoid negative impacts on the local economy
and environment. Consultation with HN officials and the US COM is recommended to
ensure all pertinent information is provided to US forces present in the HN.
Counterintelligence concerns stemming from employment of local-hire domestics and
support personnel must be carefully weighed. Foreign personnel must also be vetted prior
to training to ensure no members of the training audience have violated human rights. Title
22, USC, Section 2304 (Leahy Amendment), prohibits the USG from providing funds to a
foreign country if DOS has credible evidence the foreign country or its agents have
engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights, unless SECSTATE determines and reports the government of such country is taking
effective measures to bring the responsible foreign security forces to justice. To comply
with the requirements of Title 22, USC, Section 2304, prior to training, foreign security
forces trainees must be vetted through the affected COM and DOS human rights
compliance mechanisms. Once a unit or a group of individuals has been identified to be
trained, a request for human rights vetting will be submitted to the appropriate country's
US embassy .

8. Communications

a. General. CD operations depend on a responsive communications system--one that

enables commanders, LEA directors, and their staffs to initiate, direct, monitor, and react to
drug interdiction operations. CD communication systems consist of the facilities, equipment,
procedures, and personnel essential for commanders or directors to plan, direct, and control
operations of forces pursuant to the mission. The purpose of these systems is to pass
information (commands, data, and reports) and intelligence to and from operational forces.

b. Communication Systems. No single suite of communication systems supports the

entire CD range of operations. Instead, CD communication systems architecture draws
from multiple agency systems that are integrated between commands and agencies to
facilitate the intelligence, operations, and administrative or logistic requirements of the
users. Secure communications should be used to the maximum extent possible in support
of CD operations. Employment of secure communication systems reduces the
effectiveness of drug traffickers in gaining intelligence resulting from monitoring CD
operations radio and telephone systems. Nonsecure communications provide drug
traffickers with invaluable tactical information that may enable them to evade or
circumvent D&M, as well as friendly forces.

c. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, contains approved doctrine for

communications system support and outlines the responsibilities of the Services, joint

III-14 JP 3-07.4
 Planning

commands, and DOD agencies, with respect to communications system support. In

addition, the Joint Staff J-6 [Command, Control, Communications, and Computers/Cyber
Directorate] sponsors publications for the intelligence communications architecture for the
CCMDs and JTFs to provide classified C2 information. The anti-drug network provides
an effective communications network for CD operations. A JFC, through the
communications system directorate of a joint staff, validates communications requirements.
For CD operations, Service components should establish a validated requirement for access
to the anti-drug network through their supported JFC.

9. Intelligence

CD operations require timely and focused intelligence to tactical forces involved in

D&M and LEA drug interdiction efforts and for supporting USG programs for developing
CD capabilities of PNs. Supported JFCs determine specific intelligence requirements for
their theaters and operational areas. CD operations require a different type of intelligence
than traditional military operations due to fundamentally different mission requirements.
Adversaries in CD operations are criminal enterprises with an organizational structure,
objectives, and tactics often distinct from nation state militaries. CD operations require
intelligence support products and assessments to be written for release to foster maximum
utility .

a. Intelligence Planning

(1) Counterdrug intelligence preparation for operations (CDIPO) is an

intellectual process of analysis and evaluation that is modified from traditional military
JIPOE. CDIPO identifies likely trafficking routes and the most efficient allocation of
scarce resources to detect, track, and apprehend drug traffickers. CDIPO is a cyclic, five-
step process consisting of operational area evaluation, terrain analysis, weather analysis,
threat evaluation, and threat integration, with all steps being performed continuously and
simultaneously. Figure III-2 depicts the CDIPO process.

For additional details regarding intelligence estimates and examples, refer to JP 2-01 .3,
Joint Intelligence Preparation ofthe Operational Environment.

(2) Operational Area Evaluation. Operational area evaluation involves the

assessment of the drug trafficking area with regard to the overall nature ofthe PN's relative
populations, friendly forces , threat, and the OE. This evaluation will assist the CDIPO
analyst in identifying what additional information and support will be required to complete
the CDIPO. In later steps of the process, terrain and weather within the area are evaluated
to determine how they will affect CD operations in general. Drug traffickers expected to
operate in the areas are then evaluated to assess their capabilities in relation to the terrain,
weather, and the mission of CD forces. The CD OE consists of the AO and the area of
interest (AOI). These are viewed in terms of width, depth, and time. The AO is the
geographic area where CD forces have been assigned both the authority and responsibility
to conduct CD operations. The AOI extends beyond the AO and consists of areas in which
information on smuggling may be developed or in which activity affecting the operation
may occur.

111-15
Chapter III

Counterdrug Intelligence Preparation for Operations Process

Analysis

Operational Area
Threat Evaluation
Evaluation

Threat
Integration

Weather Terrain
Analysis Analysis

Evaluation

Figure 111-2. Counterdrug Intelligence Preparation for Operations Process

(3) Terrain Analysis. Terrain analysis functions are performed to reduce the
uncertainty regarding the effects of terrain on drug trafficking activities. Determining how
the terrain will influence drug traffickers will assist the analyst in predicting where
smugglers will move. Terrain factors will affect each mode of travel used by the traffickers
differently. Therefore, each mode of transport must be independently evaluated. Terrain
analysis in CDIPO focuses on the drug trafficking aspects of the terrain.

(a) Observation. Observation involves the influence of the terrain on the

reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of both drug traffickers and CD forces. In
CDIPO, it refers to visual and electronic line of sight. Traffickers will attempt to exploit
the natural features of the terrain to minimize the effectiveness of visual observation and
that of communications and electronic monitoring equipment.

(b) Concealment. Concealment is protection from air and ground

observation. For drug traffickers, it is vital to avoid detection and drug interdiction. The
analyst determines the amount of concealment afforded by the terrain and vegetation and
considers observation from both the ground and air. Drug traffickers can be expected to

III-16 JP 3-07.4
 Planning

move where the vegetation and terrain offer the best concealment. Air traffickers use both
traditional and unconventional concealment techniques. Traditional techniques are used to
avoid detection. These include using high terrain to avoid ground-based radar detection
and changing course to break over-the-horizon radar lock. Conversely, unconventional
techniques are not used to avoid detection. Instead, these techniques are employed to blend
with legitimate air traffic and include switching tail numbers and filing flight plans or cargo
manifests with false routes or destinations.

(c) Obstacles. Obstacles are natural or man-made features that stop, impede,
or divert the movement of traffickers or CD forces. Obstacles are an important analytical
factor during terrain analysis. The analyst should determine the location of obstacles to
foot, horse, mule, vehicular, and air movement, as well as what effects removing,
overcoming, or bypassing these obstacles will have on trafficking operations.

(d) Key Terrain. Key terrain is an area that provides a marked advantage
to the controlling or occupying force. The most important aspect of the terrain to drug
traffickers will be locations that facilitate logistic support and security.

(e) A venue of Approach (AA). AAs are analyzed from the perspective of
both the drug traffickers and CD forces. An AA is an air or ground route of an attacking
force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. In CD operations,
AAs may be a trail in the jungle, a stream, river, the ocean, flight corridors, or routes the
drug traffickers use to transport their products in and out of a country. CDIPO assist in
identifying AAs while using terrain, weather, history, and other elements of the AO and
AOI. AAs are air, maritime, and ground routes available for trafficking or movement of
CD forces. The factors used to analyze AAs are based on terrain, intelligence, and
statistical history.

1. Trafficker terrain considerations include:

a. Alternate routes. Traffickers will seek alternate routes to

provide a range of options to avoid CD forces.

b. Escape routes. Traffickers will attempt to use routes that

provide rapid withdrawal from crossing or stash sites.

c. Security. Traffickers will select routes that offer them the

greatest security and freedom of action.

d. Crossing sites. Obstacles such as rivers and open areas with no

concealment constitute danger areas for traffickers.

2. Factors indicating possible trafficking activity include:

a. Evidence of electronic surveillance or communications

equipment. Traffickers routinely use electronic surveillance equipment to monitor law
enforcement activity. Communications equipment is also used to coordinate smuggling

III-17
Chapter III

operations. Trafficker use of surveillance and communications equipment correlates to

trafficking activity.

b. Visual signs of trafficking activity. Visual indicators of

smuggling include the discovery of abandoned or stashed loads, drug packing or
waterproofing debris, and vehicle or foot tracks crossing the border between POEs or in
other areas where legitimate traffic is unlikely.

c. Logistic support factors. As with any activity involving the

transport of personnel and materials, drug trafficking requires a system of logistic support.
Some of the logistic support factors that correlate to drug trafficking are:

ill Transportation networks, such as nvers, railroads, and

public and private roads to which the traffickers have access.

ill Known or suspected property (structures or land) controlled

by trafficking organizations that may facilitate the storage and movement of drug loads.

ill Known or suspected stash sites and staging areas for drug
shipments.

(4) Weather Analysis. Weather in an area is analyzed to determine its effect on

trafficking activity and CD operations. Analysis of terrain and weather together shows the
ease or difficulty of movement through an area.

(5) Threat Evaluation. An essential element to threat evaluation is the

development of a drug trafficker database. Database information should include
organizational structure, modes of operations, and personal data on known smugglers. A
completed database will provide a tool to assess trafficking organizations, their operating area,
capabilities, and operational trends or patterns. After analysis, this information transforms
into knowledge about the relative intensity of drug trafficking in specific areas, the amount of
support the traffickers receive from the local population, and potential areas for future activity.

(6) Threat Integration. Threat integration relates the drug traffickers' mode of
operation, established trends, and patterns to the terrain and weather to predict where and
when drug traffickers will move. During threat integration, the intelligence analyst
develops two important decision-making aids: the named area of interest (NAI) and the
drug trafficking event template.

(a) NAls are areas where drug trafficking is expected to occur. Activity or
lack of activity within an NAI will help confirm or deny a particular drug trafficking route.
NAis facilitate intelligence collection and analysis and help:

L Focus attention on areas where trafficking forces must appear if they

have selected a particular route.

2. Identify when and where drug traffickers will employ their

reconnaissance, surveillance, and counter-reconnaissance assets.

III-18 JP 3-07.4
 Planning

3. Frame drug trafficking significant events by time and location.

(b) Event templating analyzes significant drug trafficking activity and

expected smuggling events to provide indicators to the traffickers' intentions. By
recognizing what the traffickers can do, and comparing it with what they are doing,
predictions can be made about what they will do next. Event templating is critical to
proactive CD operations. The event templating process can be expanded to include actions
that traffickers might take to avoid CD forces. It can also be used to predict changes in
trafficking patterns and future operations. Event templating:

L Enables the intelligence collection manager to develop prectse,

prioritized collection requirements based on probable drug trafficking behavior.

2. Provides the basis for the final product of the CDIPO process, the
decision support template .

.;L Identifies those areas in the CD AO where significant events and

trafficking activities will occur and where drug interdiction targets will appear.

4. Identifies decision points where drug trafficking events require

decisions in support of drug interdiction and show the deadline for making those decisions.

b. Intelligence Estimate. The intelligence estimate is a written summary of the

terrain and weather analysis and enemy evaluation developed during the CDIPO. It
provides a narrative study of drug trafficker capabilities, limitations, and most likely
courses of action. While the CDIPO process and its products provide decision-making aids
for the CD force commander and guidance to the staff in preparing the joint OPLAN, the
intelligence estimate provides this essential information to the organizations and personnel
who will execute the plan. CDIPO is the mechanism for conducting the collection and
evaluation, collation, and analysis steps of the intelligence process; the estimate is the
primary means of accomplishing the dissemination of intelligence during joint CD
operation planning.

c. CD Intelligence Picture

(1) DOD, through its intelligence function, conducts D&M operations, and the
results are disseminated to interested LEAs and posted on appropriate DOD Websites. This
is done through several organizations, to include CCMDs, JIATFs, nationallC agencies,
USCG maritime intelligence fusion centers (MIFCs), CBP AMOC, and the DEA El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC), all providing an integrated, interagency approach to CD efforts
that has proven successful. Analysis is also produced and coordinated by DIA with other
IC agencies. DOD and other USG departments and agencies share intelligence and other
information on drug threats with foreign authorities through a variety of agreements and
mechanisms. USG departments and agencies also increasingly assist foreign countries in
building their capacity to collect, analyze, share, and exploit CD intelligence and other
information.

111-19
Chapter III

(2) Developing the intelligence picture within the AO itself is accomplished from
two perspectives. First, from a multinational and/or joint perspective, the CCMD J-2 is
responsible for developing the CD intelligence picture. For example, the USSOUTHCOM
J-2 would be responsible fqr developing the CD intelligence picture within the
USSOUTHCOM AOR. Secor{d, from an interagency perspective, the responsibilities lie
with the respective embassy country teams. The CD country teams could, for example,
include the DEA country attache, DOS INL representative, JIATF-S tactical analysis team
(TAT) (where assigned) to country team breakout, DOD CD personnel, and additional
interested or responsible agencies. The US country team would also provide analysis of
other countries' CD intentions and capabilities. In specific regions, JIA TFs were
established to approach the CD problem set from a regional perspective. JIATF-S is an
interagency task force with responsibilities, in part, for developing the CD intelligence
picture for the region between 27 degrees West and 120 degrees West, and 30 degrees
North and Antarctica. The JIATFs increasingly include foreign liaison officers for
developing the CD intelligence picture for Latin America. JIATF-W JOA mirrors the
USINDOPACOM AOR less the JIATF-S JOA in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, east of 120
degrees West.

For an example of how intelligence analysts would apply a systems visualization to a CD

scenario, see JP 2-01 .3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

d. CD Classification. There are specific requirements for marking information used

to support the CD mission. CJCSM 3701.01 , (U) Classification Guide for Counterdrug
Information, should be consulted for detailed, authoritative guidance. CJCSM 3701.01
provides instructions and guidance on the classification, protection, marking, and handling
of information involved in the joint CD program. Enclosures also provide guidance on
marking and classifying information pertaining to CD operations and guidance on marking
and classifying information considered to be derived from CD intelligence, as well as CD
operations. Use of CJCSM 3701.01 will limit the tendency to incorporate LEAs'
unclassified sensitive information into DOD products at classifications up to SECRET.
The DOD objective is to provide information and intelligence to LEAs at unclassified
levels, when possible. DOD components will not upgrade classification of LEA
information merely because it is included in a classified DOD intelligence product.

10. Planning Support to Law Enforcement Agencies

Providing planning support to US LEAs should take into account the following factors:

a. Background. The amount of experience senior law enforcement officials have

with military operations and procedures varies with each agency. Military planners should
consider the varied experiences of all personnel involved with planning the operation.

b. Mission. Different agencies have different legal mandates and thus areas of
emphasis and operating methods. Arresting suspects and seizing assets requires substantial
investment in time and resources but is only one step in a lengthy and complicated legal
process. Somewhat like post-combat CA and military police operations after a military
campaign, long-range planning must take into account the support requirements necessary

III-20 JP 3-07.4
 Planning

to capitalize on initial investigative successes in the field . An important factor in

understanding an agency' s mission, and why it operates the way it does, is the method by
which it defines its success. Definitions of success likely vary among agencies, affecting
their operating philosophies, and in some ways their operational goals, in the drug war.
However disparate their individual goals may appear, and while no single set of measures
of success is acceptable to all agencies, planners should seek those overarching objectives
that can be identified for unity of effort.

c. Interagency Planning. At the federal level, the agencies involved differ

significantly in how they organize to execute their missions. The military planner must
understand how the interagency partners ' organizational elements support the overall
mission. Some agencies have little experience in long-range planning, and that experience
may be spread among a number of offices. The senior management's focus may be on
operations at the expense of supporting activities (i.e., the intelligence, technical, logistic,
contracting, or administrative elements). DOD personnel assigned to planning with other
interagency partners (including LEAs) should be prepared to educate, and in turn be
educated by, their counterparts in a continuous give-and-take process. The military planner
typically understands the planning process, and the interagency partner has the operational
knowledge. Normally, this environment is routine during the planning effort, requiring
flexibility , diplomacy, and an ability to converse in the supported agency ' s lexicon, which
could include foreign language skills. There should be an adaptive spirit with a willingness
to tailor prior experience and methodology to that organization.

11. Logistics

DOD can make a substantial contribution in logistic support of LEAs, including their
international operations, and with the assistance of DOS to foreign authorities when
required . Logistic support should be structured to achieve unity of effort; visibility of
requirements, resources, and capabilities; and rapid and precise response. Logistic support
should be designed with the right capacity, scalability, agility, control, and time-assurance
qualities to effectively support LEA authorities. For the most part, costs incurred in DOD
logistic support of LEAs are reimbursable. Nonfederal LEAs should provide the
supporting activity with a fund advance based on the estimated cost of equipment and
services. The system used to account for the cost of DOD support to civilian LEAs need
not be different from existing data collection systems (e .g., Vehicle Interactive
Management System). For airlift services, the Transportation Working Capital Fund
accounting procedures apply.

a. Deployment and Distribution Support. Surface transportation assets are usually

wheeled vehicles of various types . Air transportation of LEA personnel, equipment, and
apprehended suspects is available and can be provided by aviation assets. When air
transportation to a drug apprehension site is required, the mission requires advance
approval by the US Attorney General. Further information on airlift support is available
in JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations. Maritime transportation of LEA personnel, supplies,
and equipment is available and may be provided by US Transportation Command, the
USN, or commercial shipping.

III-21
Chapter III

b. Maintenance Support. The use of DOD personnel to operate, maintain, or assist

in operating or maintaining equipment is limited to situations when the training of non-
DOD personnel would be infeasible or impractical from a cost or time perspective and
would not otherwise compromise national security or military preparedness. LEAs may
request DOD personnel to operate, maintain, or assist in operating or maintaining
equipment for their agencies. Such assistance may not involve DOD personnel in a direct
role in a LEA operation.

c. Operational Contract Support (OCS). OCS is the process of planning for and
obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint
operations. The US uses contracted support in military operations at various levels of scope
and scale. GCCs, subordinate commanders, and their staffs should be familiar with how
to plan for and integrate OCS during military operations.

See JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support,jor further information.

d. Engineering Support. Engineer support varies from advice on area denial to

general engineering operations. This support can be used to improve training facilities that
enhance law enforcement drug interdiction efficiency, as well as upgrade US border roads,
fencing, security lighting, and tunnel detection support that reduce the availability of illicit
drugs. The supported LEA should provide any required material and comply with legal,
environmental, and cultural documentation requirements.

JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, provides additional information on engineering

support.

e. Facilities Support. DOD may make base facilities available to federal, state, or
local LEAs. These include such facilities as buildings, training areas, ~nd firing ranges.
These facilities are generally needed either in conjunction with training being conducted
by the LEAs or by DOD forces providing training support to the requester(s).

f. Military Working Dog (MWD) Support. MWDs and their handlers can be
provided to conduct limited support to LEAs. The provisions of support are provided in
detail in DODD 5200.31, DOD Military Working Dog (MWD) Program. Requests to
utilize this detection capability will be requested through the DOD Military Working Dog
Program Manager. While MWDs detect, LEAs confirm and establish the chain of custody
of evidence or individual(s) if effecting an apprehension. The patrol drug detection dogs
may be operationally limited due priority operational requirements.

g. Threat Finance Intelligence Support. Threat finance intelligence are those DOD
intelligence activities, including those undertaken with other USG departments and
agencies and/or multinational partners, that involve the collection, processing, integration,
evaluation, analysis, interpretation, production, and dissemination of intelligence products
in support of DOD CTF activities and capabilities.

III-22 JP 3-07.4
 Planning

12. Personnel

a. General. DOD can provide a variety of skilled CD individuals, units, or special

operations forces (SOF) elements in support of PN and interagency CD efforts. This
section provides descriptions of many, but not necessarily all, types of support that may be
provided. Although several of the major restrictions concerning the use of DOD personnel
have been included with the description of each category, others may exist, and
consultation with legal personnel is imperative.

b. Personnel Support Categories

( 1) Eradication Support. Eradication is the physical removal of growing plants

(usually marijuana in the US and Canada), their growing mediums, and the associated
infrastructure (e.g. , watering systems) or the dismantling of drug laboratories. In the US,
LEA officers must conduct the eradication operations, searches, seizures, and arrests and
process evidence. The US military can only provide support and will not enter into the
chain of custody except in exigent circumstances. This support is normally only provided
by NG forces in a Title 32, USC, status in the US.

(2) Legal Support. SJAs may be contacted to provide liaison with US and
foreign government legal officials concerning military support to LEAs for CD operations.
The Department of Justice and the Department of the Treasury have primary responsibility
for prosecuting drug crimes and management of asset forfeitures, respectively.

(3) Accounting Support. Accounting specialists help keep track of the property
seized and assist criminal justice representatives in processing it.

(4) Diver Support. Divers from the USN, USA, USMC, other USG departments
and agencies, and some state agencies may assist LEAs for subsurface hull inspections.
Divers may visually inspect only and cannot attempt to enter, search, or alter features that
are detected .

(5) Linguist Support. This category includes translator and interpreter support.
DOD personnel are not permitted to conduct real-time translations of oral or wire intercepts
or to directly participate in interrogation activities.

(6) Liaison Officers to LEAs. DOD personnel have been assigned to positions
or billets within LEAs and other agencies to primarily perform liaison functions. They can
also assist these organizations in the training and planning functions, as appropriate.

(7) Criminal Investigative Support. This support assists LEAs in major case
development. DOD investigators contribute their criminal investigative skills to the
analysis of gathered, but not yet processed, evidence.

(8) Military Police Support. Military police personnel can assist with
supervising and coordinating activities for LEA activities such as temporary task forces .
Serving in such positions as operations officers, these personnel can serve as the link
between DOD and LEA elements.

III-23
Chapter III

(9) Intelligence Analysts. These personnel can receive and process incoming
reports from multiple sources in accordance with established LEA procedures. They would
assist in evaluating the information, analyzing trafficking group composition, disposition,
strengths, and weaknesses. They can also help evaluate current intelligence holdings and
identify intelligence gaps and additional requirements. Therefore, DOD personnel must
work closely with US LEA to properly pass intelligence when dealing with US entities.

13. Reconnaissance Support

a. DOD provides reconnaissance support to CD operations in various ways . Aerial-

based reconnaissance uses a variety of sensors, such as forward-looking infrared, side-
looking airborne radar, photographic devices, and aerial observers employed on rotary-
wing aircraft, tilt-rotor aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft, or UASs. Satellite imagery is also
available . Ground-based reconnaissance can reconnoiter an area (private land, abandoned
property, and public land) for cultivated drug plants, laboratories, or other drug operations.
This reconnaissance can be accomplished by using listening or observation posts, patrols,
GSR, or remote sensors. Maritime reconnaissance uses ships, submarines, and aircraft.

b. Domestic Use of UASs. Unless specifically provided for in policy, law, or other
guidance, SecDef approval is required for all domestic UAS operations (e.g., homeland
defense; defense support of civil authorities; CD ; and NG state support operations,
including DOD UAS operated by NG pers~mnel in Title 32, USC, or state active duty
status). Domestic use of UAS requires consultation with the Federal Aviation
Administration and must be consistent with applicable laws, regulations, and
memorandums of agreement (MOAs) concerning the operations of UAS in the National
Airspace System.

For more details regarding domestic use of UAS, refer to Deputy Secretary of Defense
Policy Memorandum 15-002, Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems.

c. Domestic Use of Satellite Imagery. Military use of satellite imagery collected

over the US , from either commercial or government platforms, requires a proper use
memorandum signed by an organization's certifying government official. The proper use
memorandum authorizes the use of imagery under legal and policy limitations derived from
EO 12333, United States Intelligence Activities (as amended), the National Security Act of
1947 (as amended), and other applicable law and policy directives (National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency [NGA] National System for Geospatial-Intelligence Interim
Instruction 1806, Domestic Imagery). Satellite imagery is capable of generating
panchromatic, multispectral, hyperspectral, and overhead persistent infrared images to
produce information on vegetation, bathymetry, and other indicators in the targeted area.

III-24 JP 3-07.4
 CHAPTER IV
COMBATANT COMMAND COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

"I made a promise to the American people to take action to keep drugs from
pouring into our country and to help those who have been so badly affected
by them. This is an epidemic that knows no boundaries and shows no mercy,
and we will show great compassion and resolve as we work together on this
important issue."

President Donald J. Trump, 29 March 2017

Signing of Executive Order establishing the President's Commission on
Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis

1. United States Northern Command

a. Missions. USNORTHCOM's responsibilities include homeland defense and

defense support of civil authorities. Its CD mission is authorized under Title 10, USC,
Section 124. USNORTHCOM supports D&M operations and operational support to
DLEAs (e.g., training, transportation, and engineering support) and other federal, state,
territorial, tribal, and local agencies to interdict and counter the flow of illicit drugs into
the US . USNORTHCOM also conducts security cooperation with PNs to stimulate
opposition to the illegal production, transit, and sale of drugs and build the CD capacity of
certain PNs. USNORTHCOM, through its components, coordinates the employment of
DOD forces (Active Component [AC] and Reserve Component [RC]) in a Title 10, USC,
status and NG in Title 32, USC, status in operational support of LEA activities within North
America and support the AMOC's CD D&M mission.

b. Threat. Smuggling drugs into and within USNORTHCOM' s AOR constitutes a

national security threat to the US. The southern border between Mexico and the US extends
from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific coast and is nearly 2,000 miles long. The northern
border between Canada and the US is even longer at 5,000 miles (land and water). The
Eastern Caribbean Corridor encompasses over 300,000 square miles. The Southwest
border is the principal corridor for moving illicit drugs by land into the US, although more
and more drugs are being smuggled in from Canada. Typical modes of ground
transportation through legitimate POEs include large loads in tractor-trailer trucks, smaller
loads in passenger vehicles, and people concealing drugs on their person. Drug trafficking
across borders also poses a substantial threat, as traffickers continue to search for open
points along the southwest or northern borders and employ novel methods, such as tunnels
and other underground facilities, to transport drugs across the border.

c. Operations. USNORTHCOM's CD objectives are designed to support OLEA

efforts to counter the flow of illicit drugs across US borders. Cooperation among nations
to oppose the illegal production, transport, and sale of drugs is emphasized. Fostering
interagency cooperation is integral to operations. USNORTHCOM provides CD D&M
assets and operational support to US LEAs, as well as to CD forces from PN s that are
combating drug production and export. USNORTHCOM's CONOPS is driven by mission,
threat, and force available. JTF-N is the operational headquarters for USNORTHCOM

IV-1
Chapter IV

responsible for the planning, coordination, and employment of DOD support to DLEAs to
counter transnational threats in the approaches and crossing the border to
CDRUSNORTHCOM' s AOR. JIATF-S , in consonance with the NICCP, is responsible
for D&M of air and maritime approaches to the US in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Eastern
Pacific south of the US/Mexico border. The objective of this military support to CD
operations is to assist LEAs in their mission to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit drug
trafficking. Capability is provided using support packages drawn from a variety of sources,
to include AC and RC forces. All military operations in the operational area are conducted
in support of a lead LEA.

(1) United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provides input to

USNORTHCOM's CD training plan in the form of training, C2, and liaison.

(2) North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is a bi-national

(US and Canada) organization. CDRUSNORTHCOM is normally designated the
commander ofNORAD. NORAD's general military mission is to provide aerospace and
maritime warning and aerospace control for North America. Its CD mission, based on a
1991 exchange of notes to the NORAD Agreement, is to include the surveillance and
monitoring of aircraft suspected of smuggling illicit drugs into North America. Because
the use of illicit drugs constitutes a long-term threat to North American society, the
governments of Canada and the US have directed military organizations to assist civilian
agencies in reducing the international flow of illicit drugs into both countries. In this
context, NORAD's objective is to stop undetected, unchallenged air trafficking of illicit
drugs into North America through D&M operations. These operations serve as a part of
NORAD's overall air sovereignty mission and are consistent with the NDCS. NORAD
coordinates information with the Federal Aviation Administration and the AMOC .

(3) Relationships With Other CD Agencies

(a) The Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations,

more commonly known as Shiprider, represent a cooperative approach to combating cross-
border crime on Canada and US shared waterways. The Integrated Cross-border Maritime
Law Enforcement Operations program was established in 2012 when the US signed a
framework agreement with Canada authorizing integrated cross-border operations to
prevent, detect, suppress, investigate, and prosecute criminal offenses or violations of law.
As it provides a legal mechanism for the cross-designation of US and Canadian law
enforcement officers, this agreement virtually erased the border as an impediment to law
enforcement officers from both nations, empowering them to enforce the laws of both
countries along the shared maritime border.

(b) Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (!BETs). Canada and the US

cooperate through 15 IBET geographical regions along the northern border. IBET
operational drug interdiction teams are composed of CBP, ICE, USCG, Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, and Canadian Border Services Agency and operate in 24 locations along
the Northern border, including four locations where Canadian and American intelligence
analysts are co-located. IBETs work in an integrated land, air, and marine environment

IV-2 JP 3-07.4
 Combatant Command Counterdrug Operations

within their authorities at and along the border and complement the authorities of other US
LEA. The Shiprider program is designed to be the maritime operational arm of the IBETs.

(c) Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs). US and Canada

integrated investigations occur in part through the 22 ICE-led BESTs. The three northern
border BESTs incorporate personnel from ICE; CBP; USCG; Canadian Border Services
Agency; Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and other key US and Canadian federal, state,
provincial, local, and tribal agencies. Their mission is to identify, investigate, disrupt, and
dismantle TCOs that pose significant threats to border security.

(d) EPIC is a DEA center that includes personnel from 15 federal agencies,
plus Canadian and Texas state law enforcement officials. It is a full-service intelligence
center, which provides information related to trafficking in illicit drugs, weapons, and
illegal aliens. EPIC provides operational-level data on foreign TCOs' trends and patterns,
drug seizure data, and related data on international drug smuggling into the US. EPIC is
one of the USG's principal tactical intelligence centers.

(e) CBP conducts aerial D&M operations of drug trafficking within the
USNORTHCOM AOR. It shares air drug interdiction operations within the AOR with the
USCG. AMOC coordinates the interception and apprehension of traffickers attempting to
enter the US.

(f) The Information Analysis Center, coordinating through the US Embassy

in Mexico City, facilitates information and intelligence exchange between US and PN
militaries and LEAs to disrupt and interdict illicit air, maritime, and land drug shipments
destined for the US.

2. United States Indo-Pacific Command

a. Missions. The general mission ofUSINDOPACOM is to maintain the security of

the USINDOPACOM AOR, shape the theater, and defend the US against attack through
the Pacific Ocean. The CD mission is to provide intelligence and other CD support to PNs
and US LEAs and security cooperation and support to PNs within the AOR and to provide
DOD support to counter TOC, as directed.

b. Threat. There are a number of transnational criminal threats in the

USINDOP ACOM AOR. The illicit diversion and trafficking of drug precursor chemicals
from China and India that support Mexican drug cartel production of methamphetamine
represents the most significant drug threat to the US from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
Amphetamine-type stimulants are the greatest threat to the region, and widespread
methamphetamine production and consumption are key sources of instability. Cocaine
trafficking from the Western Hemisphere into the AOR remains an LEA and public health
concern, particularly in countries with growing affluence . Heroin production, trafficking,
and consumption remains a primary drug of concern, patiicularly in South and Southeast
Asia. The diversion of Asian-sourced heroin precursors plays a critical role in the
production of Afghanistan heroin . The emergence of new drug-related TCOs from
Mexico, Eurasia, Iran, and African countries presents new security challenges for law

IV-3
Chapter IV

enforcement throughout the Indo-Asia, Pacific region. China' s production and distribution
of synthetic opioid analogs (fentanyl) continue to fuel the opioid epidemic in the US.

c. Operations. CD operations are integrated into the USINDOPACOM Theater

Campaign Order and coordinated with other component commands to counter transnational
threats to the US homeland and further stabilize the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. As
USINDOPACOM's lead agent for counternarcotics, JIATF-W counters the flow of illicit
drug precursor chemicals bound for the Western Hemisphere, interdicts illicit drugs
transiting throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and enhances the capacity of foreign
counterparts to combat narcotics trafficking in the AOR. JIATF-W carries out
USINDOPACOM CD operations through two lines of operation: disrupt the organization
and harden the environment.

3. United States Southern Command

a. Missions. USSOUTHCOM leverages rapid response capabilities, PN

collaboration, and regional cooperation within the AOR to support US national security
objectives, defend the southern approaches of the US , and promote regional security and
stability. The main line of effort in the USSOUTHCOM AOR is CTN. The goal of the
approach is to ensure the friendly networks degrade threat network capabilities and their
operations and affect the underlying conditions allowing them to flourish. The CD
program is a means to achieve CTN strategic objectives by supporting USG departments
and agencies and committed allies with operational support, training, and equipment.

b. Threat. The illicit flow of goods and people, and the violence and corruption they
fuel at home and abroad, are the visible manifestations of complex, adaptive, and
networked threats. Transregional and transnational threat networks are now the principal
threat to regional security and stability. These networks operate unconstrained by national
and geographic boundaries, unimpeded by rule of law, and fueled by enormous profits.
Their interests, influence, capabilities, and reach undercut US and PN interests globally.
They prey on weak institutions and exploit the interconnected nature of our modern
financial , transportation, and technological systems and the seams in our organizational
boundaries. Transregional and transnational threat networks extend beyond TCOs and
gangs to ideologically motivated VEOs. The drug trafficking transregional and
transnational threat networks in South and Central America have developed the production,
transportation, and distribution into an extremely well-organized business, which includes
the illegal commodities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and opiates. The main transportation
network is accomplished by land, sea, and air.

c. Operations. CTN operations, actions, and investments that are resourced by the
counternarcotics program fall into three main categories based on authority:

(1) D&M (Title 10, USC, Section 124). DOD is the designated LFA for D&M
of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the US.

(2) DOD Support to US and PN LEA CD and Counter TOC Operations (Title I 0,
USC, Section 284). DOD support may include maintenance, repair, and upgrade of certain

IV-4 JP 3-07.4
 Combatant Command Counterdrug Operations

equipment; transportation; establishment and operation of bases; training; detection;

monitoring; establishment of command, control, and communications networks; linguist
and intelligence analyst services; and aerial and ground reconnaissance.

(3) DOD Support for Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity (Title
10, USC, Section 333). DOD support to provide training and equipment to the national
security forces of a PN.

d. JIATF-S has the authority and responsibility to conduct CD operations in a JOA

covering portions of the USNORTHCOM AOR. JIATF-S is responsible for D&M of the
southern approaches to the US (less Mexico) to 100 nm from CONUS for aircraft and 12
nm for maritime traffic. This responsibility requires extensive sharing of an aerial and
maritime COP, as well as coordinated operations and hand-offs between USSOUTHCOM
and USNORTHCOM.

4. United States Central Command

a. Missions. USCENTCOM directs and enables military operations and activities

with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of enduring
US interests.

b. Threat. Afghanistan continues to dominate the global opiate supply by producing

the vast majority of the world's illicit opium. In 2017, an estimated 328,304 hectares of
poppy was cultivated in Afghanistan. This produced an estimated 9,000 metric tons of
opium, some of which was consumed locally, some stockpiled, some seized, but most was
processed into heroin. Over the past decade, the global trade in illicit Afghan opiates has
been one of the world ' s greatest transnational drug and crime threats and has funded both
terrorist networks and TCOs. Afghanistan's narcotics industry continues to hinder efforts
to establish security, governance, and a legitimate economy throughout the country.

c. Operations. The USCENTCOM CCP has a transition Afghanistan line of effort,

an associated military objective, and an interagency action for operations against narcotics-
funded insurgents as the foundation for USCENTCOM CD operational support.
USCENTCOM CD operational support is in concert with NDCS guidance and instructions
and SecDef CD directives and guidance. USCENTCOM, through its Security Cooperation
Division, Interagency Action Group ' s Counternarcotics Funding Division, and
USCENTCOM J-3 [Plans], coordinates for military-to-military training equipping and
building support to PN CD forces with each embassy and US country team to ensure
national CD strategies are employed in PNs to combat illicit narcotics trafficking, promote
regional stability, and build partner capacity to counter threats in their countries.
USCENTCOM operations include support to programs that build and sustain the
counternarcotics capabilities and capacities of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Central Asian
states, and other regional partners to confront drug-trafficking and other illicit threats, with
the goal of prosecuting cases through judicial systems. Additionally, USCENTCOM
operations support the integration of interagency and international lines of effort to respond
to the rising threat of drugs and other illicit trafficking; support intelligence and evidence-

IV-5
Chapter IV

driven operations; and support activities to CTF and TCOs, particularly those that direct
profits toward the funding of insurgent and terrorist networks and activities.

5. United States European Command

a. Mission. United States European Command (USEUCOM) prepares ready forces,

ensures strategic access, deters conflict, enables the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
strengthens partnerships, and counters transnational threats to protect and defend the US.
Its CD role is to support the USEUCOM CCP tasks that counter transnational threats and
support US law enforcement operations that disrupt trafficking routes and organizations
that traverse the seams between AORs.

b. Threat. The primary drug threats in the USEUCOM AOR are in the eastern
Mediterranean Ocean. Particularly noteworthy threats include the increase of cocaine flow
across the Atlantic from South America, an increase in the heroin flow from Afghanistan
through Turkey and the Balkans, and the use of locally/indigenously grown cannabis sales
to support terrorism. Drug use, seizures, and availability continue to increase. The illicit
drug trafficking situation continues to worsen as new routes are being developed, new
markets and production areas are formed , and borders become more porous. Additionally,
several known terrorist organizations use money raised from illicit drug trafficking, either
directly or indirectly, to fund their activities. A collateral threat is the growing amount of
official corruption within drug trafficking countries resulting in an increase in the
probability that these countries could become narco-states and adding to regional
instability.

c. Operations. CD missions employ the following objectives:

(1) Conduct CD and counterterrorism activities in priority narcotics areas while

building PN capacities to counter the threat.

(2) Develop CD and counterterrorism intelligence support plans for USEUCOM

AOR.

(3) Develop the capability to pass CD and counterterrorism information and

intelligence between USG departments and agencies and PNs.

(4) Increase support to US and PN DLEAs and PN military units with CD and
counterterrorism responsibilities. Develop and strengthen CCMD, interagency, and
international relationships to deconflict and complement CD and counterterrorism efforts
in USEUCOM's AOR.

d. USEUCOM, through its J-9 [Interagency Partnering Directorate ]/Joint Interagency

Counter Trafficking Center (Counternarcotics Division), coordinates for DOD-to-national
police training and equipping support for PN counternarcotics security forces , focusing on
the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, and Black Sea countries and their respective US
country teams, to ensure the US, USEUCOM, and the country teams integrated country
strategies are employed in PNs to combat illicit narcotics trafficking, promote regional
stability, and build partner capacity to counter threats in their countries.

IV-6 JP 3-07.4
 Combatant Command Counterdrug Operations

6. United States Africa Command

a. Missions. United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is responsible for

military relations with African nations; the African Union; African regional security
organizations; and all DOD operations, exercises, and security cooperation on the African
continent, its island nations, and surrounding waters. Working with PNs, USAFRICOM
disrupts and neutralizes transnational threats, including smuggled drugs, weapons
trafficking, and illicit goods (such as wildlife and other natural resource products) . These
transnational threats are aided by porous borders, limited security capabilities to deter
smuggling, and various levels of corruption that combine to allow illicit trafficking, piracy,
and other maritime crime to flourish.

b. Threats. Due to Africa' s geographic size and extensive coastline, the primary drug
threat in the USAFRICOM AOR is the illicit trafficking of drugs from South America
through West African countries. Traditionally, drug smuggling routes track through North
Africa, in conjunction with heroin trafficking from the Middle East that transits PNs in East
Africa. Many partners in Africa have porous borders, limited security capabilities to deter
smuggling and various levels of corruption that all combine to allow illicit trafficking,
piracy, and other maritime crime to flourish. TOC networks and/or VEOs exploit these
factors and receive revenue from the drugs, illicit goods (including wildlife and other
natural resource products sourced from the African interior), and weapons.

c. Operations. The USAFRICOM CCP identifies lines of effort and the desired
effects that provide the direction for CD operations. The USAFRICOM J-59
[Counternarcotics and Transnational Threats Program Division] designs, coordinates,
programs, and executes CD projects in support of the commander' s decisive effort to build
partner capacity and strengthening partnerships with law enforcement authorities on the
continent in support of these lines of effort. This is done primarily through the delivery of
security force assistance, through Title 10, USC, Section 333 , programs, which increase
the capability and capacity of African partners to counter illicit trafficking and address
maritime and land security challenges themselves. Working in conjunction with US LEAs,
building partner capacity projects are designed to assist PN police or military organizations
that have a counternarcotics or organized crime mission. USAFRICOM J-59 also provides
direct operational support to US and PN LEAs through Title 10, USC, Section 284, and
other programs to utilize available capability to detect, monitor, interdict, apprehend, and
prosecute illicit traffickers and TOC networks. In addition, USAFRICOM supports CTF
activities to help weak financial institutions in Africa "follow the money" from counter
illicit trafficking and TOC. The end state is that African states and regional organizations
are willing and able to address transnational threats and the desired effect is African
partners are able and do interdict illicit flows of arms, drugs, money, natural resources,
weapons of mass destruction material, and persons that pose a threat to regional stability
or fund TCO and/or YEO activities.

7. United States Special Operations Command

a. Mission. USSOCOM's mission is to lead, plan, synchronize, and, as directed,

execute global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with the geographic

IV-7
Chapter IV

CCMDs. USSOCOM trains, organizes, equips, and provides combat-ready SOF to

CCMDs. When directed to support CD operations, SOF can operate as part of a joint-,
interagency-, or multinational-led force. SOF include elements from USA, USMC, USN,
and USAF units, as well as CA and military information support units.

b. Threat. USSOCOM can support all CCMDs with CD mtsstons, so the

narcoterrorist threats in those AORs and other significant TCOs are part of the threat-
nexus. In some theaters, the threat-nexus includes significant transnational VEOs .

c. Operations. In support of CD operations, USSOCOM can provide training to

vetted PN LEA, security, or military forces. SOF also provides mobile training teams that
can be funded as security cooperation for PNs security forces or through other means for
LEA. Supporting CD and counter TOC operations and conducting counter threat
operations includes counter threat financing and CTN.

For more information on CTF and CTN, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

IV-8 JP 3-07.4
 APPENDIX A
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING
THE COUNTERDRUG EFFORT

1. General

The illicit drug trade is a worldwide problem of supply and demand. Continued
progress in reducing the demand for drugs in the US depends in part on reducing the supply
of drugs entering the country. International cooperation in systemically attacking the drug
problem depends upon a shared understanding that drug production, trafficking, and
consumption threaten the well-being of the entire community of nations. Accordingly, the
US works with other nations and international organizations to combat the illicit drug trade
at each segment to collectively reduce the threat to the national security of the US and its
PNs.

2. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation

a. Established in 1992, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement

Cooperation (Europol) is the European Union (EU) law enforcement organization that
handles criminal intelligence. Based in The Hague, The Netherlands, Europol's aim is to
improve the effectiveness and cooperation between the competent authorities of the 28 EU
member states and in other non-EU partner states such as Australia, Canada, the US , and
Norway in preventing and combating serious international organized crime and to support
the law enforcement activities of the member states.

b. Europol focuses on crimes where an organized structure is involved and two or

more member states are affected. Examples of crimes investigated by Europol include :

( 1) International drug trafficking.

(2) Organized fraud.

(3) Terrorism.

(4) Human trafficking.

(5) Counterfeiting of the Eurocurrency.

(6) Money laundering.

c. Europol maintains a liaison office in Washington, DC.

d. Europol has signed bilateral agreements with non-EU states and international
organizations.

A-1
Appendix A

3. Maritime Analysis and Operations Center-Narcotics

a. The Maritime Analysis and Operations Center-Narcotics (MAOC-N) is a British-

French initiative involving the following countries: Ireland, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands,
United Kingdom, France, and Portugal. Germany, Denmark, and Belgium have joined as
observers. The MAOC-N is headquartered in Lisbon, Portugal.

b. The mission of the MAOC-N is to enhance criminal intelligence collection, conduct

analysis, and coordinate police actions on the high seas with a view to intercepting vessels
carrying cocaine and cannabis.

c. The MAOC-N focuses on the following functional areas:

(I) Collect and analyze operational information to assist in determining best drug
interdiction outcomes in relation to illicit traffic by sea and air towards the Atlantic
European and Western Africa seaboard.

(2) Enhance intelligence through information sharing and intelligence exchange

with participants and, where appropriate, with Europol, which will store and analyze the
information.

(3) Coordinate the available means of the participants to facilitate boarding

operations aimed to suppress illicit trafficking by sea or by air.

4. The European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction

The European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction is the central
reference point for drug information in the EU. Set up in 1993, and based in Lisbon, its
role is to provide the EU and its member states with objective, reliable, and comparable
information on drugs and drug addiction. It is one of the EU' s decentralized agencies.

5. The World Customs Organization

Established in 1952 as the Customs Co-operation Council, and headquartered in

Brussels, Belgium, the World Customs Organization is an independent intergovernmental
body whose mission is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of customs
administrations. With over 180 member governments, it is the only intergovernmental,
worldwide organization dedicated to customs matters. To fulfill this mission, the World
Customs Organization:

a. Establishes, maintains, supports, and promotes international instruments for the

harmonization and uniform application of simplified and effective customs systems and
procedures governing the movement of commodities, people, and conveyances across
customs frontiers.

b. Reinforces members' efforts to secure compliance with their legislation, by

endeavoring to maximize the level of effectiveness of members' cooperation with each other

A-2 JP 3-07.4
 International Organizations Supporting the Counterdrug Effort

and with international organizations to combat customs and other transnational offenses such
as illicit drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, and terrorist financing .

c. Assists members in their efforts to meet the challenges of the modern business
environment and adapt to changing circumstances by promoting communication and
cooperation among members and other international organizations, by fostering integrity,
human resource development, transparency, improvements in the management and
working methods of customs administrations, and the sharing of best practices.

6. The International Criminal Police Organization

The International Criminal Police Organization-International Police (known as ICPO-

INTERPOL) is an international organization that facilitates international police
cooperation. The organization' s headquarters is in Lyon, France. It is the second largest
political organization after the United Nations in terms of international representation. Its
work focuses primarily on public safety and battling terrorism, crimes against humanity,
genocide, war crimes, organized crime, piracy, illicit traffic in works of art, illicit drug
production, drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering,
white collar crime, computer crime, intellectual property, and corruption.

7. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) mobilizes and promotes
regional and transnational cooperation to confront the drug menace. Specific efforts are
made to target the world ' s most vulnerable regions, where the convergence of drugs, crime,
corruption, and terrorism threatens regional and global security. UNODC works directly
with governments, international organizations, other United Nations entities, and civil
society to develop and implement programs that meet national and regional needs.
UNODC focuses on the following areas:

a. Countering TOC and illicit drug trafficking.

b. Prevention, treatment and reintegration, and alternative development.

c. Countering corruption.

d. Terrorism prevention.

e. Justice.

f. Research and trend analysis.

g. Policy support.

h. Technical cooperation and field support.

i. Provision of secretariat services and substantive support to the governing bodies

and the International Narcotic Control Board.

A-3
Appendix A

8. Southeast European Law Enforcement Center

The objective of the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC), within
the framework of cooperation among competent authorities, is to provide support for
member states and enhance coordination in preventing and combating crime, including
serious and organized crime, where such crime involves or appears to involve an element
of trans-border activity.

a. The member states include the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Republic of Bulgaria, Republic of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Hellenic Republic, Hungary, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Republic of
Serbia, and Republic of Turkey.

b. Tasks of SELEC. The new convention provides for SELEC to :

(1) Coordinate regional operations . and support investigations and cnme

prevention activities of the member states in trans-border cases.

(2) Provide the member states with the opportunity to exchange information and
criminal intelligence and offer operational assistance in a quick and timely manner.

(3) Collect, collate, analyze, process, and disseminate information and criminal
intelligence.

(4) Produce strategic analysis and threat assessments related to its objective.

(5) Establish, operate, and maintain a computerized information system, which

implies also to ensure the protection of personal data.

A-4 JP 3-07.4
 APPENDIXB
REQUESTING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT

1. General

For current procedures for requesting DOD support, both foreign and domestic, refer
to CJCSI 3710.01, DOD Counterdrug Support, and CNGBI 3100.01, National Guard
Counterdrug Support.

2. Domestic Counterdrug Support

a. Per CJCSI 3710.01 , approval authority for certain domestic DOD CD support has
been delegated to CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSSOUTHCOM, and
CDRUSINDOPACOM. NG CD support is authorized in accordance with the approved
state governor's CD plan.

b. Requests for DOD CD support to USG departments or agencies must come from
the department or agency with official responsibility for CD activities. Requests for
support to a state or local government must come from an appropriate official of the state
or local agency.

c. Supporting CCMDs and Services will approve the use of their assets in accordance
with DOD policy.

3. Foreign Counterdrug Support

a. Approval authority for certain CD support outside the US has been delegated to
GCCs. With certain specified restrictions, GCCs may conduct planning and coordinating
visits to US embassies, provide intelligence analyst support to COM and LEAs, provide
linguists, conduct training of foreign LEA personnel, and provide transportation support.

b. Requests for support to a foreign LEA must come from an appropriate official of a
department or agency of the USG, in coordination with SECSTATE, that has CD
responsibilities or responsibilities for countering TOC. Requests for assistance of foreign
governments must be coordinated with country teams and supported by the COM of the
PN. Supported requirements should be aligned with CCDR' s CCPs and the COM's
integrated country strategy. Concurrence by senior leadership ofthe PN CD organization
supported is vital to the ultimate success of any type of support. More broadly, it is
important to conduct an analysis on doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership
and education, personnel, and facilities of the capability of the PN to absorb, and ultimately
utilize, the provided support.

4. Types of Department of Defense Counterdrug Support

a. D&M. GCCs conduct D&M missions within their assigned AOR with theater
assigned forces. While not conducted at the request of federal, state, local, and foreign
LEAs, independent GCC D&M operations support CD enforcement efforts.

B-1
Appendix B

b. Support Requested by LEAs. Support provided to LEAs by or involving DOD

personnel in connection with CD missions includes the below categories. All of these
activities are subject to specific provisions of US law/DOD regulations, and some require
explicit approval by designated officials.

( 1) Equipment maintenance.

(2) Transportation support.

(3) PN capacity building, including establishment or operation of bases or

training facilities .

(4) CO-related training ofLEA personnel.

(5) Detecting, monitoring, and communicating the movement of air, sea, and
surface traffic detected outside US borders for up to 25 miles within US borders.

(6) Engineering support at US borders.

(7) Communication system and network support.

(8) Linguist support.

(9) Intelligence analyst support.

( 10) Information and intelligence sharing.

(11) Aerial and ground reconnaissance support.

(12) Tunnel detection support.

(13) Use of military vessels for LEA operating bases.

(14) Special operations and conventional CD training of foreign security forces

to counter illicit trafficking, counter TOC, conduct land border security, conduct D&M,
conduct interdiction, and defeat narcoterror'ism and narco-driven terrorism.

(15) MISO.

(16) Foreign CA community resiliency activities related to CD .

B-2 JP 3-07.4
 APPENDIXC
COUNTERDRUG ORGANIZATIONS

As depicted in Figure C-1, the following is a breakdown of CD organizations and their

notional capabilities.

Counterdrug Organizations
Education Intelligence
Community Research and
Criminal Drug Action; International Drug and Information
Organization Justice Treatment Workplace Initiatives Interdictions Development Man~ement
Executive Office of the
President
National Security p p p p p p p
Council
Office of National p p p M s s s
DruQ Control Policy
Department of A A A A L(3), M(3) s S(1), M(3)
Defense
Department of
Homeland Security
Customs and Border M A A M(4) A
Protection
US Coast Guard L( 1), M(2) A s L(4), L(5) M
US Coast Guard, A
Research and
Development
Immigration and M A A M(4) A
Customs
Enforcement
Secret Service s ' A A A A
Transportation s A A s
Security
Administration
Border Intelligence s
Fusion Section
Department of Justice
Drug Enforcement L(1), M(2) A M M L
Administration
Federal Bureau of L(1), M(2) A s s M
lnvestiQation
US Attorneys L(1), M(1) A L(2) s M
US Marshals Service s A s s A
Bureau of Prisons s A A A
US National Center s A M s s
Bureau
Department of s A A s M
Transportation,
Federal Aviation
Administration
Department of State
Bureau of A A L A A
International Narcotics
and Law
Enforcement
Figure C-1. Counterdrug Orgamzat1ons

C- 1
Appendix C

Counterdrug Organizations (cont.)

Education Intelligence
Community Research and
Criminal Drug Action; International Drug and Information
Organization Justice Treatment Workplace Initiatives Interdictions Development Management
US Agency for A A M
International
Development
Country teams A A M s s
US Information s s
Agency
Department of the
Treasury
Internal Revenue s A A s A
Service
Bureau of Alcohol, s A A s A
Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives
Department of A A s A
Agriculture, US Forest
Service
Department of the
Interior
Bureau of Indian A A A
Affairs
Bureau of Land A A A
Management
National Park Service A A s A
Department of A M M s A
Education
Department of Health L M A M A
and Human Services
Composite/Regionals
High Drug Trafficking M A s M s
Areas
Organized Crime M(1), M(2) A L(2) A M(2)
Drug Enforcement
Task Forces
Project North Star M(1) A M M s
State National Guard s A M s
International Counterdrug_ Organizations
!CPO-INTERPOL [International Criminal Police Organization-International Police]
Lyon, France
Focuses on illicit drugs, money launderinQ, and terrorism. Has a WashinQton, DC, office. httj)S://www.inter[Jol.int/
EUROPOL [European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation]
The Hague, Netherlands
Focuses on illicit drugs, money laundering , and terrorism. https://www.europol.europa.eu/
Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre-Narcotics
Lisbon, Portugal
Focuses on illicit drug suQRression on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe and West Africa.
World Customs Organization
Brussels, Belgium
Focuses on customs administration and enforcement for 169 member countries. http://www. wcoomd .org
F1gure C-1. Counterdrug Orgamzat1ons (Cont.)

C-2 JP 3-07.4
 Counterdrug Organizations

Counterdrug Organizations (cont.)

Legend
A ancillary role M major responsibilities
L lead agency M(1) major responsibilities, investigations
L{1) lead agency, investigations M(2) major responsibilities, prosecutions
L(2) lead agency, prosecutions M(3) major responsibilities, command, control, and communications
L(3) lead agency, detection and monitoring M(4) major responsibilities; border interdiction
L(4) shared lead agency, air interdiction P primary agency
L(5) lead agency, maritime interception S significant support role
L{6) lead agency, land interdiction S(1) significant support role, intelligence

Figure C-1. Counterdrug Organizations (Cont.)

C-3
Appendix C

Intentionally Blank

C-4 JP 3-07.4
 APPENDIXD
COUNTERDRUGPLANSANDREPORTS
The following is a guide to assist CD planners when developing plans in support of
CD operations.

Annex A Plan Format

B Reports

D-1
Appendix D

Intentionally Blank

D-2 JP 3-07.4
 ANNEX A TO APPENDIX D
PLAN FORMAT

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

Copy No.

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Date/Time Group of

Signature

COUNTERDRUG PLAN: (NUMBER or CODE NAME) References: Maps, charts, and

other relevant documents.

1. Situation

Briefly describe the situation that the plan addresses.

a. Strategic Guidance. Provide a summary of directives, letters of instructions,

memoranda, and strategic plans, including plans from higher authority, that apply to the
plan:

( 1) Relate the strategic direction to the local situation.

(2) List strategic objectives and tasks assigned.

(3 ) Constraints and restraints: List actions that are required or prohibited by

higher authority (ROE, RUF, legal, jurisdictional).

b. Criminal Forces (Threat). Provide a summary of intelligence data:

( 1) Composition, location, disposition, weapons or other armament, equipment

movements, and strengths of drug traffickers that could influence the strategic situation.

(2) Strategic concept. Describe the intentions of the criminal forces.

(3) Major objectives.

(4) Idiosyncrasies and operating patterns of key personalities and organizations.

(5) Operational and sustainment capabilities.

(6) Centers of gravity (describe the main source ofpower).

(7) Critical vulnerabilities.

D-A-1
Annex A to Appendix D

c. Friendly Forces. Identify and describe friendly LEAs or supporting military forces
that may directly affect the operation:

(1) Mission and intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting US forces.

(2) Mission and intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting foreign forces .

d. Assumptions. State the assumptions that are applicable to the plan as a whole.

e. Legal Considerations.

2. Mission

The mission statement should be a clear, concise statement of the task or tasks to be
accomplished by the friendly forces and the purpose of the operation. The mission
statement should be stated in terms of the "who, what, when, where, and why" of the
operation.

3. Execution

a. Overall Concept. State the broad concept (how) for the deployment, employment,
and sustainment of participating elements during the operation as a whole:

(1) Area organization (where will each organization operate).

(2) Objectives of the overall plan.

(3) Description of the phases or the major events of the plan (Examples: Phase I
Deploy, Phase II Execute, Phase III Redeploy) and the desired end states.

(4) Timing. Indicate the expected time periods of each phase. (Examples: Phase
I, D-Day, 0+45, or Phase I, March 29-May 15).

b. Phase I (Timing for Phase)

(1) Operational Concept. How participating organizations and supporting

activities accomplish the objectives of this phase. Include operational objectives and
detailed scheme of operations (actions) for the phase . Indicate lead and supporting LEAs
required to do the job. Consider the role of supporting DOD forces and PN LEAs.

(2) Tasks of LEAs and other units participating in this phase (list each
organization separately and list its tasks for this phase).

(3) Forces Held in Reserve. Location and composition. Explain any "be
prepared" missions.

(4) OPSEC. Identify critical information, analyze enemy capabilities, analyze

operational vulnerabilities, determine acceptable level of risk, and apply appropriate
OPSEC countermeasures. Ensure foreign LEAs are considered in the analysis of enemy

D-A-2 JP 3-07.4
 Plan Format

capabilities as a potential insider threat capability. Use the JIPOE process to produce
intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products.

(5) Deception. The purpose of deception is to induce enemy decision makers to

take operational or tactical actions that are favorable to friendly objectives and exploitable
by friendly forces. This paragraph should outline a concept of deception actions to induce
adversaries to derive the desired appreciation and a supporting OPSEC concept. Also list
intelligence, counterintelligence personnel, operational reports, and security monitoring
feedback requirements and indicate the tasks to execute the concept. Again, the presence
of foreign LEAs should be considered in crafting the deception plan.

(6) MISO. Describe any MISO that might support the objectives (outside the US
homeland) in relation to the CD plan. Include current, refined, and approved MISO
objectives (by program); potential target audiences; themes to stress and avoid; approval
process; means of dissemination; and attribution methods.

c. Phases II through Subsequent Phases. Cite information as stated in subparagraph

3b above for each of the subsequent phases. Provide a separate phase for each step that
may require a major reorganization of forces or another significant action.

d. Coordinating Instructions. General instructions applicable to two or more phases

or multiple elements of the organization should be stated here.

4. Administration and Logistics

Draft a brief, broad paragraph describing how supplies, services, and other support
will be provided. State the overall logistic objectives and priorities.

a. Phase I (Timing-same as Paragraph 3). Consider providing the following

information:

( 1) Logistic objectives and priorities for this phase of the plan.

(2) Supply aspects (include role of each LEA in providing supplies; consider any
foreign participating LEAs).

(3) Contracted support (i.e., OCS).

(4) Base development (develop a base from which to provide supplies and
services if required).

(5) Transportation. Include procedures for the detainment, security, and

transportation of vessels, aircraft, contraband, crewmembers, and other detainees captured
during the operation.

(6) Maintenance of equipment.

(7) Medical services.

D-A-3
Annex A to Appendix D

(8) Personnel management (common procedure for staffing, accounting,

reporting, and addressing other relevant issues).

(9) Administration (describe any administrative management procedures that

impact the plan).

b. Phases II through Subsequent Phases. Cite information stated in subparagraph

4a above for each subsequent phase.

5. Command and Communications

a. Command Relationships. If using a lead agency concept, state the lead agency
by phase. Give an overview of the command and coordination relationships for the entire
plan, or for each phase, as appropriate. Indicate any shifts of command or lead agency
contemplated during the plan, indicating the timing of the expected shift. These changes
should be consistent with the operational phasing in paragraph 3. Give the location of
commander and command posts. Provide information on succession procedures to be used
if the commander or lead agency is out of action.

b. Communications. Provide a brief but comprehensive communications plan. (The

communications plan may be contained in an annex.) Include the time zone or zones to be
used; rendezvous, recognition, and identification instructions; and plans for using radio,
telephone, and computer networks .

ANNEXES: As required

DISTRIBUTION :

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

D-A-4 JP 3-07.4
 ANNEX B TO APPENDIX D
REPORTS

1. General

Reports and reporting procedures standardize the flow of information needed to

manage the CD effort. This annex provides information concerning report types and
reporting procedures.

2. Types of Reports

a. Spot Reports. Spot (or law enforcement Alpha) reports inform designated
organizations of emergent activities as quickly as possible to facilitate decision making.
Information regarding a high interest vessel, its location, current physical description, and
activities are important to operational and tactical commanders to determine a proper and
efficient response based on a complete description of the on-scene situation. This is
information that cannot be held until the next regular summary report and should lead to
the generation of a spot report. Information contained in spot reports may be abbreviated
and included in summary reports.

b. Ad Hoc Reports. Less formal, nonroutine reports are sometimes generated for
quick tactical analytical or coordination purposes and may be sent by telephone, operator
notes, or recorded messages.

c. Serious Incident Reports. A serious incident report should be sent in the event of
the death or serious injury of a civilian or military participant in CD operations.

d. After Action Reports and Lessons Learned. CCMDs and other DOD
organizations involved in CD operations should collect, analyze, and identify key
observations, issues, and lessons learned and provide recommendations to improve
ongoing and future operations. After action reports and approved observations, issues, and
lessons learned should be submitted for inclusion in the Joint Lessons Learned Information
System in accordance with the provisions of CJCSI 3150.25, Joint Lessons Learned
Program.

3. Track of Interest Reporting Procedures

Within DOD, drug-related tracks of interest are entered into the Global Command and
Control System, using a naming convention that identifies them as such, and become part
ofthe COP. Regional coordinators (JIATF-S, JTF-N, or USNORTHCOM) assign the track
identifier. The track identifier does not change if the track of interest moves through
different regions.

D-B-1
Annex B to Appendix D

Intentionally Blank

D-B-2 JP 3-07.4
 APPENDIXE
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS

1. General

a. CD operations require a cooperative approach to intelligence. As the national drug

control effort has evolved, an increasing number of intelligence functions and activities
have been established to support CD operations. Existing drug intelligence capabilities
have been improved, and extensive DOD and foreign intelligence resources have been
brought to bear on the problem.

b. DOD components and many LEAs have internal intelligence components that are
structured and authorized to support their own missions and operations. There are also a
number of national, theater, and law enforcement intelligence analysis centers with CD
missions. Familiarity with these organizations is useful to understanding how intelligence
support is provided to operators, planners, and policymakers. The principal CD
intelligence organizations are described below.

2. National-Level Intelligence Organizations and Centers

a. NGA. NGA is a combat support agency, as well as a national intelligence

organization. NGA is the primary source for geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) analysis
and products at the national level. GEOINT is the exploitation and analysis of imagery
and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and
geographically referenced activities on the Earth. In addition to the GEOINT support
identified in JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations, NGA's mission supports
national and homeland security, defense policy and force structure, and advanced weapons
and systems development. Since NGA disseminates data and makes it available in
repositories, GEOINT-trained personnel throughout much of the IC, including military
intelligence personnel in the field, can access the data to develop their own GEOINT
analysis and products. NGA works with commercial imagery vendors to procure diverse,
unclassified imagery to better support its customers. This effort facilitates NGA's support
to and collaborative efforts with multinational partners, other IC agencies, DOD
organizations, and other civil and government entities.

b. The Crime and Narcotics Center was established by the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency to render analytical and operational support to the national CD effort.
Its mission is to collect and analyze information on international CD trafficking and
organized crime for policymakers and the law enforcement community. Strategic analysts
focus on long-term trends and keep US policymakers up to speed on fast-breaking events.
Targeting analysts use sophisticated tools to identify key individuals, organizations, trends,
and components in criminal organizations. Operational support specialists and program
managers provide fast-paced operational research, management, and support to colleagues
overseas. The Crime and Narcotics Center is located at Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

E- 1
Appendix E

c. DIA. DIA provides timely, objective, and cogent military intelligence to

warfighters, defense planners, and defense and national security policy makers.

(I) DIA's Counter-Narcotics Trafficking Office produces all-source

intelligence analysis on worldwide drug issues, including DTOs; drug flow trends; and CD
forces, policies, strategies, and performance. The office provides operational CD
intelligence support to DOD elements performing drug D&M missions and to federal LEAs
involved in drug interdiction operations. Other functional responsibilities include
monitoring and supervising the accomplishment of all CD intelligence requirements,
managing DOD support to the CD community's "Dragon Eye" document exploitation
program, coordinating interagency assessment of cocaine movement, and providing
functional oversight for CD collection management.

(2) US defense attache offices are located within most embassies worldwide.
The attaches within these offices provide valuable information on current IC collection
requirements, including CD requirements. They also serve as the US military liaisons to
their HN counterparts.

d. DHS. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) provides national-level

intelligence support to DHS, as well as to state, local, and tribal governments and the
private sector. The I&A also serves as the primary interface between state, local, and tribal
governments, in addition to interfacing with the private sector and the national IC . In
addition, the I&A provides direct intelligence support to the Border Security Initiative,
including CD intelligence.

e. National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office. The Director of National

Intelligence created the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office to advance
maritime intelligence integration, information sharing, and maritime domain awareness to
foster unity of effort for decision advantage that protects the US, its allies, and partners
against threats in or emanating from the global maritime domain.

f. Office of Naval Intelligence. The Transnational Threat Department provides fleet

and national decision makers with in-depth knowledge of the maritime domain and the
unique issues associated with it. Overlaying extensive maritime industry experience with
cutting-edge operational intelligence analytic capabilities, department analysts are the
community leaders in maritime counterproliferation, global maritime environment
awareness, and counternarcotics analysis. Analysis of maritime strategic trade,
infrastructure, cargo, and the Arctic environment enable decision making. Responsible for
maintaining the nation's databases on merchant shipping, the department supports the
USN, its partners, and the IC on all issues related to the positional data, physical
characteristics, and history of more than 100,000 merchant ships operating worldwide.

g. National Security Agency. National Security Agency provides intelligence,

secure communications, and cybersecurity advice to authorized military and drug LEAs .
The National Security Agency headquarters is located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

E-2 JP 3-07.4
 Intelligence Support Organizations

3. Theater Intelligence Centers

a. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center, Pacific is a joint military intelligence

center responsible for theater intelligence support within the VSINDOPACOM AOR. It
provides all-source operational intelligence to USINDOPACOM, its military Service
components, and JIATF-W. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center, Pacific is located at
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.

b. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center, South is a joint military intelligence

center, located in Miami, Florida, responsible for theater intelligence support within the
VSSOUTHCOM AOR. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center, South provides all-
source operational intelligence to USSOUTHCOM, its Service components, and JIATF-S.

c. Other unified and major commands involved with CD efforts will also leverage
their respective joint intelligence operation centers for intelligence support. This support
will be linked to the CD effort specific to the architecture in place for the command.

4. Joint and Interagency Support

a. The Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force Operation Panama
Express is a continuing criminal investigation of cocaine trafficking and transportation
organizations that operate out of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela in South
America; Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala in Central America;
and Jamaica in the Caribbean. The operation is divided into two task forces with distinct
responsibilities. Panama Express South focuses on maritime cocaine trafficking that
transits the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Panama Express North concentrates on cocaine
trafficking that transits the Caribbean Sea. Both of the Panama Express task forces provide
actionable information to the JIATF-S and the entire CD community.

b. USSOUTHCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USNORTHCOM oversee regional

JIATFs and JTFs that conduct CD operations within their respective AORs. Intelligence
directorates within each JIA TF and JTF are the focal points for tactical and operational
intelligence support for DOD and LEA CD operations within the AOR.

(I) JIATF-S (USSOUTHCOM). The JIATF-S J-2 maintains a 24-hour

intelligence watch in the joint operations command center, which provides real-time
tactical intelligence to both DOD- and LEA-deployed D&M assets. The JIATF-S J-2 also
operates an intelligence fusion center that provides indications and warning (predictive)
and targeting intelligence in support of DOD D&M and LEA drug interdiction operations
in the JIA TF -S JOA. JIA TF -S is located in Key West, Florida.

(2) JIATF-W (USINDOPACOM). The JIATF-W J-2 conducts strategic to

tactical intelligence activities to promote interagency intelligence fusion, PN capacity
development, and support to law enforcement. The JIATF-W J-2 operates an intelligence
fusion center that provides monitors, indications and warnings (predictive), and targeting
intelligence in support of DOD D&M and LEA interdiction operations. In addition, the J-
2 identifies DTO and TCO vulnerabilities to assist US LEAs in targeting them for
disruption and dismantlement. At the request of LEAs, JIA TF-W also deploys intelligence

E-3
Appendix E

analysis to support US and PN LEAs for extended periods to counter drug-related activity
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and the US. JIATF-W is located at Camp H.M. Smith,
Hawaii.

(3) JTF-N (USNORTHCOM) is tasked with supporting CD land operations in

North America. The JTF-N J-2 operates a joint tactical intelligence center that provides
all-source tactical and operational intelligence to LEA, DOD, and NG elements. JTF-N is
located at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas. USNORTHCOM provides personnel to support
Information Analysis Center at the US Embassy in Mexico City and other locations in
Mexico.

(4) TATs. As part of the COM's country team, where assigned, TATs are the
focal point of DOD CD intelligence support to the country team and PN CD forces. Their
mission is to support the US country team and PN CD operations by providing tactical
intelligence advice and assistance, targeting support, collection management, automated
data processing support (including database management), and signals intelligence advice
and assistance. TATs further assist the DEA by producing all-source intelligence analysis.
TATs provide a direct link between the CD team operating within the PN and the D&M
capability of DOD.

5. Law Enforcement Intelligence Organizations

a. DEA, Office of Intelligence. The DEA Office of Intelligence has both strategic
and tactical intelligence capability, providing direct analytical support to DEA enforcement
operations.

(I) DEA intelligence analysts are assigned to field division offices, selected
domestic offices, and several foreign offices. These personnel support investigations,
conduct strategic studies, and provide other intelligence services to DEA operations.

(2) EPIC. DEA established EPIC to provide operational and tactical drug
interdiction intelligence to the law enforcement community. Its primary mission is to
provide tactical operational intelligence to federal , state, and local LEAs in areas that relate
to trafficking in drugs, weapons, aliens, and counterterrorism efforts. Surveillance and
drug interdiction operations against drug shipments into the US are also supported by
EPIC. It has its own proprietary database, as well as access to a variety of other law
enforcement databases, thus functioning as a clearinghouse and conduit for law
enforcement information. Only accredited representatives of state police agencies can
access the EPIC database directly.

b. USCG. The USCG operates several intelligence centers that have CD missions.

(1) Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (CGICC). The CGICC

supports USCG CD programs with long-range, strategic, and operational intelligence
production. It is the USCG's principal intelligence liaison element with other national and
law enforcement intelligence centers and is collocated at the National Maritime
Intelligence Center in Suitland, Maryland.

E-4 JP 3-07.4
 Intelligence Support Organizations

(2) USCG Atlantic and Pacific Area Intelligence Staffs. These staffs provide
operational intelligence support to CD detection, monitoring, and drug interdiction
operations in their respective operational areas. They are located in Portsmouth, Virginia,
and Alameda, California.

(3) USCG Atlantic and Pacific Area MIFCs. The MIFCs collect and fuse
information and intelligence from multiple sources and provide timely, accurate, and
relevant intelligence to USCG operational and tactical commanders in suppmt of all
mission areas within their AOs. They complement the CGICC' s strategic focus and
support each USCG district intelligence officer, sector intelligence officer, and unit
command intelligence officers ' , or collateral duty intelligence officers' (CDIOs ' ) efforts,
with the ultimate goal to support the National Strategy for Homeland Security.

(4) USCG District Intelligence Staffs. Under the leadership of the district chief
of intelligence (also known as district intelligence officer), district intelligence staff
members perform all phases of the intelligence process but emphasize planning and
direction, analysis, and dissemination along with oversight of intelligence activities within
their district. District intelligence staffs interact directly with regional intelligence and law
enforcement elements and leverage national and regional interagency intelligence
capabilities to support law enforcement field activities. The district chief of intelligence is
the CGICC regional representative to coordinate and manage all intelligence activities
within their district, including USCG interaction with DHS l&A intelligence staff at state
and local fusion centers.

(5) USCG Sector Intelligence Staffs. Sector intelligence staff members perform
all phases of the intelligence process but particularly emphasize collection, analysis, and
dissemination. Sector intelligence staffs interact directly with local intelligence and law
enforcement elements and also leverage national and regional interagency intelligence
capabilities via the district intelligence staff. The sector intelligence staff capitalizes on
the USCG ' s unique maritime access to obtain information of potential intelligence value.
They draft and compile maritime-related intelligence collection requirements, collect on
them, and brief them to response, prevention, planning, and other sector personnel. In
addition, the staff members, as part of the law enforcement intelligence element, collect
information during law enforcement and regulatory activities, as well as through
conducting site exploitation.

(6) USCG CDIOs. CDIOs are the CGICC ' s direct representatives at units
without an assigned command intelligence officer and are responsible for all the
intelligence tasks within the command, with a primary focus on collection and
dissemination. CDIOs receive guidance and direction from the servicing district or sector
intelligence staff; however, they report directly to the commanding officer or officer-in-
charge, who is ultimately responsible for the unit' s intelligence efforts, for unit-specific
intelligence matters . The COlO ' s primary responsibility is to ensure the command and
crews have the intelligence products readily available to conduct operations at the unit level
and to facilitate the collection and reporting of information that may be of intelligence
value to that command and the CGICC.

E-5
Appendix E

(7) Coast Guard Counterintelligence Service (CGCIS). CGCIS serves as the

USCG' s full-spectrum counterintelligence and human intelligence organization. As part
of its mission, CGCIS counters the intelligence collection efforts of TCOs, as well as
leveraging their collection capabilities in support of USCG CD efforts. Headquartered in
Washington, DC, CGCIS has agents in each USCG district.

(8) Center for Interagency Maritime Intelligence. The Seventh USCG District
operates an intelligence center in its Miami, Florida, headquarters. It is manned by USCG
personnel with liaison personnel from several agencies including DOD, CBP, ICE, Florida
Department of Law Enforcement, and Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission. The Center for Interagency Maritime Intelligence serves as a fusion center
for current, all-source tactical law enforcement intelligence that is provided to the DOD
and LEA operational units.

c. DHS. DHS operates multiple intelligence centers that support CD missions.

(1) CBP Office oflntelligence and Investigative Liaison. The CBP Office of
Intelligence and Investigative Liaison is responsible for supporting the investigation and
inspection requirements of the agency and produces operational and tactical intelligence
that supports CBP drug interdiction and apprehension efforts .

(2) The DHS I&A's Border Intelligence Fusion Section (BIFS) provides US law
enforcement, border enforcement, and investigative agencies with multi-source
intelligence and law enforcement information to support investigations, drug interdictions,
and other law enforcement operations related to the Southwest border. BIFS is a joint,
collaborative effort of DHS, the Department of Justice, DOD, and partners in the IC and
as a multi-source/all-threats intelligence section at EPIC. BIFS accesses and analyzes
intelligence and information received by and developed at EPIC to produce a common
intelligence picture and COP.

E-6 JP 3-07.4
 APPENDIXF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. General

This appendix provides guidance for DOD public affairs (PA) support for CD
operations. As a matter of policy, and consistent with the security requirements necessary
to minimize operational risks, DOD PA efforts should keep DOD personnel and the public
informed about its CD mission. Well-coordinated command messages and effectively
executed PA plans minimize risks associated with the release of sensitive information or
misinformation about CD operations. Communication activities should be fully integrated
in command operational planning and execution processes, so there is consistency in intent
or effect between command actions and information disseminated about those actions .
While audiences and intent may at times differ, the LF A, through communication
synchronization, should ensure planning for PA is coordinated to make certain consistent
themes and messages are communicated that support the overall USG objectives.

2. Organization

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (A TSD [P A]) provides
overall PA guidance for CD operations and coordinates DOD PA actions affecting other
countries and international organizations. Close coordination must be maintained at all
levels with the US embassy concerned when operating in HNs. At the local and regional
level , CD JIATF or JTF public affairs offices (PAOs) (or their equivalents) coordinate PA
actions with the appropriate CCDR PAOs, which will in turn maintain contact with their
A TSD(P A) counterparts.

3. Guidance

The following guidance is provided for CD operations:

a. A TSD(P A) approves all invitations for news media to participate with operational
CD missions.

b. Requests received by Service component PA organizations should be referred to

the appropriate CCMD PAO to develop the request for approval consideration by
ATSD(PA).

c. For specific CD deployments requiring CJCS deployment orders, the supported

CCDR proposes specific PA guidance as part of the request for deployment order. Topics
to be covered include:

(1) Proposed public announcement of deployment.

(2) Proposed questions and answers.

(3) PA point of contact and phone number at all levels in the chain of command.

F-1
Appendix F

d. All PA actions will be in accordance with applicable DOD and CCDR directives,
unless specifically stated otherwise.

e. Specific units participating in CD operations should not be identified.

f. The agency or organization that actually accomplishes the seizure or arrest will
normally make the announcement of the investigation, seizure, or arrest. Such
announcements will indicate that the operation was a "coordinated federal effort" and will
list participation ofthe agencies, units, and organizations following coordination with each.
DOD components should not unilaterally make announcements of investigations, seizures,
or arrests. PA officers from the various agencies that make up the JIA TF and other federal
agency PA officers must make a concerted effort to work together and create joint
communications plans designed to keep the media and American public informed about
the current state of the CD mission . In the event of a conflict between lead agency and PA
doctrine, PA officers should defer to the policies of the designated "lead" agency or agency
that made the arrest and seizure.

g. Certain training mission activities may be covered by the media. Media requests
to cover training activities should be referred to the appropriate commander' s PAO. Prior
to coverage, the PAO should coordinate with other agencies involved and address any
existing security considerations.

h. Interviews with the media may be granted by the supported CCDR or a subordinate
JFC when the following criteria are met:

( 1) All interviews should be with the commander or his designated

representative.

(2) All interviews should be on the record.

(3) Interviewees should discuss information within their personal purviews and
expenence. The discussion of additional subjects should be in accordance with published
guidance.

(4) The PAO will coordinate with the OPSEC program manager to ensure the
information program addresses OPSEC and ground rules for the release of information.
Information given to media representatives must be consistent with national security and
OPSEC and must respect the privacy of the LEAs.

(5) The commander's PAO should be included in the planning and conduct of all
interviews.

(6) Interviewees should not answer hypothetical questions and should not
comment on matters pertaining to other US federal, state, and local organizations and
agencies or the military, police, or security forces of other nations.

F-2 JP 3-07.4
 Public Affairs

(7) A summary of controversial interview discussions and notification of

interview results that might require A TSD(PA) response should be provided through
appropriate command channels to ATSD(PA).

i. DOD components should not release information about investigations, seizures, or

arrests prior to the announcement by the agency or organization that actually made the
seizure or arrest. After the initial announcement, release of information will be coordinated
with A TSD(P A) through the chain of command.

j . Release of information concerning accidents and incidents involving DOD units

participating in CD operations should be coordinated through the supported CCDR's
JIA TF PA officer, and A TSD(P A).

k. Joint press conferences may be organized by federal, state, and local LEAs
following a drug seizure or arrest where DOD was involved . Criteria for participation in
such a press conference are the same as that for interviews listed in paragraph 3.h.

I. Internal release of information is subject to the same strict guidelines as material

being considered for public release . Moreover, if it is later decided to publicly release the
tape or tapes, they will first be cleared by the US attorney handling the case. Videotapes
are considered evidence by the US attorney.

F-3
Appendix F

Intentionally Blank

F-4 JP 3-07.4
 APPENDIXG
LAW ENFORCEMENT DETACHMENTS

1. General

USN ships contribute to D&M operations, as they are frequently in a position to

intercept maritime drug smugglers. Because DOD does not directly participate in maritime
law enforcement hoardings, USCG personnel are frequently embarked on USN and allied
ships as prescribed in Title 10 USC, Section 279.

2. Command Relationships

Existing MOAs between USN fleet commanders and Commander, USCG, Atlantic,
area govern LEDET procedures. Under these MOAs, the USN fleet commanders and the
USCG area commanders provide ships and cutters to operate under T ACON of JIA TFs in
support of their D&M mission. The USCG deploys LEDET aboard USN ships to perform
law enforcement activities. JIATF holds periodic scheduling conferences to match D&M
requirements and schedule USN ships with USCG LEDET and USCG cutters. JIA TFs to
which USN vessels and USCG cutters are allocated for D&M operation coordinate the shift
of TACON to the USCG when required for the conduct of drug interdiction and
apprehension. Boarding actions that involve LEAs are conducted in accordance with
USCG law enforcement procedures and policy, including use of force policy. USN visit,
board, search, and seizure personnel may augment a USCG boarding team under the
direction of the boarding officer and LEDET team leader. When carrying a LEDET, USN
ships display the USCG ensign when conducting law enforcement operations under
TACON ofthe USCG. The USCG ensign should be illuminated at night.

3. Availability of Ships

GCCs make USN ships available in support of USCG law enforcement operations.
These ships are categorized as either "specially designated" or "ships of opportunity."

a. Specially Designated. Specially designated (or dedicated) ships are under

TACON of the JIA TF in direct support of CD operations and shift to T ACON under the
USCG to conduct law enforcement interceptions and apprehensions.

b. Ships of Opportunity. USN ships of opportunity are not predesignated for CD

operations and are not under the control of a JIA TF or USCG command but are operating
in or transiting through possible drug trafficking areas. These ships may be diverted to
conduct D&M operations under the TACON of the JIA TF and then switch TACON to the
USCG for the drug interdiction and apprehension.

4. Assignments

A LEDET is normally an 8- to 10-person team assigned on a temporary basis to US or

foreign military vessels. The LEDET consists of a deployable team leader (DTL), who is
an E-7 through 0 -3 assigned to serve as the command maritime law enforcement advisor
for the host commanding officer, a boarding officer (E-4 or above), and boarding team

G-1
Appendix G

members. While assigned to a USN or allied ship, LEDET activities are governed by the
MOAs signed between the USCG and the respective USN fleet commander and allied
governments.

a. DTL. The DTL advises the USN commanding officer on USCG policies, maritime
law enforcement procedures, and monitoring and drug interdiction maneuvering and
should l?e considered the onboard authority on maritime law enforcement. During
hoardings, the DTL directs all searches and makes all enforcement decisions. The DTL
advises on which vessels to board, makes law enforcement decisions, coordinates USN
vessel support for the boarding party during boarding operations, provides guidance to the
boarding officer, and is responsible for all law enforcement message traffic. The DTL is
also a qualified boarding officer who possesses at least a SECRET clearance.

b. Boarding Officer. The duties of a LEDET boarding officer are the same as any
other USCG boarding officer. Boarding officers are responsible to the DTL for the safety
and conduct of the boarding party and will be guided by current USCG policies in
executing these responsibilities. The boarding officer is certified by their USCG
commanding officer who has at least a SECRET clearance.

c. Boarding Team Members. The remainder of the LEDET should consist of five
certified boarding team members.

d. Specialty Billets. Each LEDET should have at least one person designated as an
interpreter and at least two personnel qualified in accordance with current naval air training
operating procedures standardization requirements as helicopter special-mission
passengers (including 9D5 multiple egress Navy "Dunker" training). When USN AUF-
capable helicopters are embarked, each LEDET shall have at least one person qualified as
an AUF controller and one person qualified as a precision marksman-aviation.

More detailed guidance is found in the Commandant Instruction (COMDTINST)

Ml624 7.1, Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Manual, and Navy Warfare
Publication 3-07.4/COMDTINST Ml624 7.4, Counterdrug and Alien Migration
Interdiction Operations.

G-2 JP 3-07.4
 APPENDIXH
POINTS OF CONTACT

Joint Staff/J-7/Doctrine Division

Website: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/
E-mail: js.pentagon.j7.jedd-support@mail.mil
Phone Number: 1-703-692-7273 (DSN 222)

Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor/J35 Americas Cell

Phone Number: 1-757-836-8103 (DSN 836)
E-mail: js.norfolk.j3.list.j35s-all@mail.mil

United States Coast Guard (USCG)/J-7/Lead Agent

Phone Number: 1-202-372-1096
E-mail: hqs-dg-lst-cg-odo-1 @uscg.mil

United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM)

Phone Number: DSN 314-421-7032
E-mail: africom.stuttgart.acj37.list.j37-all@mail.mil

United States European Command (USEUCOM)

Phone Number: DSN 314-430-5624
E-mail: eucom.stuttgart.ecjc.list.jictc-cn@mail.mi l

United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

Phone Number: 305-437-1000 (DSN 567)
E-mail: southcom.miami.sc-net.list.ctoc-branch@mail.mil

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)

Phone Number: 1-719-554-6351
E-mail: n-ne. peterson.n-ncj 5 .mbx.j 5-cn-omb 1@mail .mi I

United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)

Phone Number: 1-808-477-8241 (DSN 477))
E-mail: pacom.hmsmith.jiatfw.mbx.cnoc-ctoc@mail.mil

National Guard Bureau (NGB)/J37

Phone Number: 1-703-607-3218
E-mail: ng.ncr.ngb-amg.list.nggb-j37@mail .mil

United States Army North (USARNORTH) G5

Phone Number: 1-210-221-2536
E-mail: usarmy .jbsa.amorth.list.g5-tpwg@mail.mil

H-1
AppendixH

United States Marine Corps (USMC) Combat Development Command

Phone Number: 1-703 -784-6642
E-mail: doctrine@usmc.mil

Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)

Phone Number: 757-341-4107 (DSN 341)
E-mail: nwdc_nrfk_fleet__pubs@navy.mil

H-2 JP 3-07.4
 APPENDIXJ
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-07.4 is based upon the following references:

1. General

a. National Drug Control Strategy.

b. National Security Presidential Directive-25 , International Drug Control Policy.

c. EO 12978, Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions with Significant

Narcotics Traffickers.

d. EO 12333 , United States Intelligence Activities.

e. National Interdiction Command and Control Plan.

f. Title I 0, USC .

g. Title 14, USC.

h. Title 18, USC .

1. Title 22, USC

j. Title 31 , USC, Sections 1535 and 1536 (Economy Act).

k. Title 32, USC .

1. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.

m. NGA National System for Geospatial-Intelligence Manual Feasibility Assessment

1806, Domestic Imagery, May 2011.

2. Department of Defense Publications

a. DODD 4500.09E, Transportation and Traffic Management.

b. DODD 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security

Cooperation .

c. DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and

Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense.

d. DODD 5200.31E, DOD Military Working Dog (MWD) Program.

e. DODD 5205.02E, DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program.

J-1
Appendix J

f. DODD 5205.14, DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy.

g. DODD 5230.09, Clearance of DOD Informationfor Public Release.

h. DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign

Governments and International Organizations.

1. DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities.

j. DODI 1000.17, Detail of DOD Personnel To Duty Outside the Department of

Defense.

k DODI 1304.23, Acquisition and Use of Criminal History Record Information for
Military Recruiting Purposes.

1. DODI 2000.12 , DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program.

m. DODI 2205 .02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities.

n. DOD! 3025.21, Defense Support of Civil Law Enforcement Agencies.

o. DOD! 0-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

p. DOD! 5210.02, Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data and Formerly

Restricted Data.

q. DODI 5240.04, Counterintelligence (CI) Investigations.

r. DODI 8523 .01, Communications Security (COMSEC) .

s. DODM 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview,

Classification, and Declassification.

t. DODM 5240.01, Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence

Activities.

u. DOD 5240.1 -R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence

Components that Affect United States Persons.

v. Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 15-002, Guidance for the

Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 311 0.05F, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan.

b. CJCSI 3121.01B, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rulesfor the Use of

Force for US Forces.

J-2 JP 3-07.4
 References

c. CJCSI 3150.25F, Joint Lessons Learned Program.

d. CJCSI 3210.06A, Irregular Warfare.

e. CJCSI 37IO.OIB , DOD Counterdrug Support.

f. CJCSI 3920.02B, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Activity Program.

g. CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System, Planning

Formats and Guidance.

h. CJCSM 3 701 .01 C, (U) Classification Guide for Counterdrug Information.

1. CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

J. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

k. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

I. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

m. JP 2-01 .2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations (U).

n. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

o. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

p. JP 3-05, Special Operations.

q. JP 3-08, Interorganzational Cooperation

r. JP 3- 13 .2, Military Information Support Operations.

s. JP 3-13, Information Operations

t. JP 3- 13.3, Operations Security.

u. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

v. JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations.

w. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

x. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

y. JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

z. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

aa. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

J-3
Appendix J

bb. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

cc. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

dd. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

ee. JP 4-01 , The Defense Transportation System.

ff. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

gg. JP 4- 10, Operational Contract Support.

hh. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

ii. JP 6-0, Jo int Communications System.

4. Service Publications

a. COMDTINST Ml6240 .1, Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) Administrative

and Operating Guidelines.

b. COMDTINST Ml6247.1 , Maritime Law Eriforcement Manual.

c. COMDTINST Ml6247.4/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-

07.4M, Maritime Counterdrug and Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations.

d. NTTP 3-07.11 M/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-93.3/Marine

Corps Interim Publication 3-33.04, Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations.

e. Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-02A, Marine Air, Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) Network Engagement Activities.

f. Army Techniques Publication 5-0.6, Network Engagement.

5. Other

CNGBI 3100.01 A, National Guard Counterdrug Support.

J-4 JP 3-07.4
 APPENDIXK
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the
Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jelljp_feedback_fom1.pdf
and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7 .mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address
content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the US Coast Guard Office of Counter
Terrorism & Defense Operations Policy (CG-ODO). The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for
this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community,
made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. Peter
Fejeran, US Coast Guard; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, LtCol Stanley Medykowski, Joint
Staff J-35; Joint Doctrine Analysis Division action officer, LtCol Brian Mullery, Joint Staff
J-7; and Joint Doctrine action officer, Lt Col Mark Newell, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine
Division.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations, 14 August 2013 .

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication,

please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jelljp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mai l it to :
j s.pentagon.j 7 .mbx.j edd -support@mail.mil .

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy . The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons
learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative
resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness

K-1
AppendixK

of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine
development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become
institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are
routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the
development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil
(NIPRNET) or http ://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be
lAW DOD Manual 5200.01 , Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview,
Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD
Iriformation Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are
available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at https://jdeis.js.milljdeis/index.jsp
(NIPRNET) and https ://jdeis.js.smil.milljdeis/index.jsp (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at
http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/ (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and
Joint Staff. Defense attaches may request classified JPs by sending written requests to
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-
Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member,

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-
ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally
reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support
agencies.

K-2 JP 3-07.4
 GLOSSARY
PART I-ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

AA avenue of approach
AC Active Component
AMOC Air and Marine Operations Center (DHS)
AO area of operations
AOI area of interest
AOR area of responsibility
APEX Adaptive Planning and Execution
ATSD(PA) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
AUF airborne use of force

BEST border enforcement security task force

BIFS Border Intelligence Fusion Section (DHS)

C2 command and control

CA civil affairs
CAMOC Caribbean Air and Marine Operations Center
CBP Customs and Border Protection (DHS)
CCDB consolidated counterdrug database
CCDR combatant commander
CCMD combatant command
CCP combatant command campaign plan
CD counterdrug
CDIO collateral duty intelligence officer
CD IPO counterdrug intelligence preparation for operations
CDRUSINDOP ACOM Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command
CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, United States Northern Command
CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CDRUSSOUTHCOM Commander, United States Southern Command
CGCIS Coast Guard Counterintelligence Service
CGICC Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMO civil-military operations
CNGBI Chief, National Guard Bureau instruction
COCOM combatant command (command authority)
COM chief of mission
COMDTINST Commandant instruction (USCG)
CONOPS concept of operations
CONUS continental United States
COP common operational picture
CTF counter threat finance
CTN countering threat networks

GL-1
Glossary

D&M detection and monitoring

DASD(CN&GT) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics and Global Threats
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (DOJ)
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DLEA drug law enforcement agency
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DODM Department of Defense manual
DOS Department of State
DTL deployable team leader
DTO drug trafficking organization

EO executive order
EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center
EU European Union
Europol European Union Agency for Law Enforcement
Cooperation

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance

FID foreign internal defense

GCC geographic combatant commander

GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force
GEOINT geospatial intelligence
GSR ground surveillance radar

HCA humanitarian and civic assistance

HN host nation
HNS host-nation support

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS)

IBET integrated border enforcement team
IC intelligence community
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS)
INL Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (DOS)

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

JFC joint force commander
JIACG joint interagency coordination group
JIATF joint interagency task force

GL-2 JP 3-07.4
 Glossary

JIATF-S Joint Interagency Task Force-South

JIATF-W Joint Interagency Task Force-West
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment
JOA joint operations area
JP joint publication
JPP joint planning process
JTF joint task force
JTF-E Joint Task Force-East (DHS)
JTF-I Joint Task Force-Investigations (DHS)
JTF-N Joint Task Force-North
JTF-W Joint Task Force-West (DHS)

LEA law enforcement agency

LEDET law enforcement detachment (USCG)
LFA lead federal agency

MAOC-N Maritime Analysis and Operations Center-Narcotics

MCA military civic action
MIFC maritime intelligence fusion center (USCG)
MISO military information support operations
MOA memorandum of agreement
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance
MOU memorandum of understanding
MWD military working dog

NAI named area of interest

NOAA national defense authorization act
NDCS National Drug Control Strategy
NG National Guard
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGB National Guard Bureau
NGCDP National Guard Counterdrug Program
NGCDP-State National Guard Counterdrug Program-state
NG JFHQ-State National Guard joint force headquarters-state
NICCP National Interdiction Command and Control Plan
nm nautical mile
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

ocs operational contract support

OE operational environment
OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control (Treasury)

GL-3
Glossary

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security

PA public affairs
PAO public affairs office
PCA Posse Comitatus Act
PN partner nation
POE port of entry
PR personnel recovery
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

RC Reserve Component
RNIFC Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell
(USCENTCOM)
ROE rules of engagement
RUF rules for the use of force

SA security assistance
SBACP Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Plan (DHS)
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE Secretary of State
SELEC Southeast European Law Enforcement Center
SJA staff judge advocate
SOF special operations forces

TACON tactical control

TAT tactical analysis team
TCO transnational criminal organization
TMM transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional
TOC transnational organized crime

UAS unmanned aircraft system

UNO DC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USAFRICOM United States Africa Command
USAID United States Agency for International Development
usc United States Code
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
USCG United States Coast Guard
USEUCOM United States European Command
USG United States Government
USINDOP ACOM United States Indo-Pacific Command
USMC United States Marine Corps

GL-4 JP 3-07.4
 Glossary

USN United States Navy

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command

VEO violent extremist organization

GL-5
 PART II-TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

arrival zone. In counterdrug operations, the area in or adjacent to the United States where
smuggling concludes and domestic distribution begins (by air, an airstrip; by sea, an
offload point on land or transfer to small boats). (Approved for incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary.)

controlled substance. A drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in

Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of the Controlled Substances Act. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

counterdrug. Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production,
trafficking, and use of illicit drugs. Also called CD. (Approved for incorporation into
the DOD Dictionary.)

counterdrug activities. Those measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail any
activity that is reasonably related to illicit drug trafficking. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-07.4)

counterdrug operational support. Support to host nations and drug law enforcement
agencies involving military personnel and their associated equipment, provided by the
geographic combatant commanders from forces assigned to them or made available to
them by the Services for this purpose. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)

counterdrug operations. Civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug
trafficking. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)

country team. The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body,
headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the
senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by
the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. Also called CT. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-07.4)

Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations. Support provided by the

Department of Defense to law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor, and counter
the production, trafficking, and use of illicit drugs. (Approved for incorporation into
the DOD Dictionary.)

drug interdiction. A continuum of events focused on interrupting illicit drugs smuggled

by air, sea, or land. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

narcoterrorism. Terrorism that is linked to illicit drug trafficking. (DOD Dictionary.

Source: JP 3-07.4)

Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force. The network of regional task
forces that coordinates federal law enforcement efforts to combat the national and
international organizations that cultivate, process, and distribute illicit drugs. Also
called OCDETF. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)

GL-6 JP 3-07.4
 Glossary

seizures. In counterdrug operations, includes drugs and conveyances seized by law

enforcement authorities and drug-related assets confiscated based on evidence that
they have been derived from or used in illicit narcotics activities. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

source zone. In counterdrug operations, an identified geographic area for growing and/or
the primary processing of the agricultural/synthetic components for illicit drugs, and
where the trafficking process begins. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

suspect. 1. In counterdrug operations, a track of interest where correlating information

actually ties the track of interest to alleged illicit drug operations. 2. An identity
applied to a track that is potentially hostile because of its characteristics, behavior,
origin, or nationality. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

tracking. Precise and continuous position-finding of targets by radar, optical , or other

means. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)

track of interest. In counterdrug operations, contacts that meet the initial identification
criteria applicable in the area where the contacts are detected. Also called TOI. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)

transit zone. In illicit trafficking, the path taken by smugglers between the source and the
arrival zones, and does not include distribution. (Approved for incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary.)

GL-7
Glossary

Intentionally Blank

GL-8 JP 3-07.4
 JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP2-0

INTELLIGENCE

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-07.4 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:

STEP #4 - Maintenance STEP #1 - Initiation

• JP published and continuously • Joint doctrine development
assessed by users community (JDDC) submission to fill
• Formal assessment begins extant operational void
24-27 months following • Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-
publication end analysis
• Revision begins 3.5 years • Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
after publication validation
• Each JP revision is completed • Program directive (PO) development
no later than 5 years after and staffing~oint working group
signature • PO includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorship
• JS J-7 approves and releases PO to
lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant
command , JS directorate)

• JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7 • LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first
• JS J-7 prepares publication for signature draft (FD)
• JSDS prepares JS staffing package • PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
• FD comment matrix adjudication
• JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signature • JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
• Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrix
• FC joint working group
 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION DIVISION
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

FEB 0 1 1020
Ref: 19-F-0782

Steven Aftergood
Federation of American Scientists
1112 16th Street NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Aftergood:

This is the final response to your February 15, 2019 Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA)
request, a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience. We received your request on
February 15,2019 and assigned it case number 19-F-0782. We ask that you use this number
when referring to your request.

The Joint Staff, a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), conducted
a search of their records systems and provided the enclosed documents, totaling 126 pages,
determined to be responsive to your request. These records are appropriate for release in their
entirety, without excision.

This constitutes a full grant of your request, and closes your case file in this office. There
are no assessable fees associated with this response.

If you have any questions or concerns about the foregoing or about the processing of your
request, please do not hesitate to contact Michael Coen at \1ichacl.e.cocn2.ci" a m~jl.mil or
(571) 372-0413.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:
As stated