Joint Publication 3-40

T OF T H
EN E
TM HI
S W E' L L
DE

T
FE

AR
ND
AR
• DE P

MY
•
I CA
U NI

ER
TE

M
D

ST A
AT E S O F

Joint Countering Weapons of

Mass Destruction

27 November 2019
Validated on 14 July 2021
 PREFACE
1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, execute, and
assess military activities to counter weapons of mass destruction.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance
of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations
for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational
forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise
of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and
prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use
by the Armed Forces of the United States, in preparing and executing their plans and orders.
It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing
the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure
unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders
of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat
support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter;
however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service
publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in
coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current
and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance

i
Preface

or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures

ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States,
commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and
procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE
Lieutenant General, USMC
Director, Joint Force Development

ii JP 3-40
 SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-40
DATED 31 OCTOBER 2014

• This publication was validated without change on 14 July 2021.

• Updates and aligns the countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD)

doctrine for the joint force with major changes to Department of Defense
(DOD) policy, strategy, and planning guidance for CWMD.

• Highlights the DOD strategy for CWMD as the underpinning for CWMD
guidance.

• Introduces the weapons of mass destruction activity continuum.

• Introduces the operational framework for CWMD that consists of three

organizing principles (prevent, protect, and respond) carried out through
specialized activities (pathway defeat; weapons of mass destruction [WMD]
defeat; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN] response).

• Describes the organizing principles: prevent, protect, and respond.

• Defines the specialized activities: pathway defeat, WMD defeat, and CBRN
response.

• Describes the specialized tasks associated with each specialized activity and
organizing principle.

• Describes the role of the functional campaign plan for CWMD, integrating
DOD-wide efforts to prevent the use, acquisition, and proliferation of WMD;
prepare the joint force to respond to WMD crises; and assure allies and
partners.

• Describes the relationship between military organizations and functions to

other US Government departments and agencies and international partners.

iii
Summary of Changes

Intentionally Blank

iv JP 3-40
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

 General ....................................................................................................................... I-1

 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Strategy ................................ I-1
 Relationship to the Joint Functions............................................................................ I-6
 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Doctrine Relationship to
Other Doctrine ........................................................................................................... I-7

CHAPTER II
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

 General ......................................................................................................................II-1
 Weapons of Mass Destruction Activity Continuum .................................................II-1
 Weapons of Mass Destruction Supply and Demand Networks ................................II-4
 Weapons of Mass Destruction Actors of Concern ...................................................II-4
 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment...............................II-5
 Operational Framework ............................................................................................II-7

CHAPTER III
PLANNING

 General .................................................................................................................... III-1

 The Competition Continuum and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Across the Range of Military Operations ............................................................... III-1
 General Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Planning Guidance ................ III-4
 Campaign and Operational Design for Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Planning .............................................................................................. III-5
 Department of Defense Functional Campaign Plan Countering Weapons |
of Mass Destruction Integration ............................................................................. III-5
 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Approach for Planning ........ III-5
 Planning Considerations ......................................................................................... III-6

CHAPTER IV
EXECUTION

 General .................................................................................................................... IV-1

 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Activities and Tasks ........................... IV-1
 Foundational and Crosscutting Activities and Tasks.............................................. IV-2
 Organizing Principles and Specialized Activities and Tasks ................................. IV-5

v
Table of Contents

APPENDIX

A Organizational and Command Relationships ............................................ A-1

B Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal Considerations ......................B-1
C Weapon Characteristics ..............................................................................C-1
D Dual-Use Challenges ................................................................................. D-1
E Science and Technology............................................................................. E-1
F Points of Contact ........................................................................................ F-1
G References ................................................................................................. G-1
H Administrative Instructions ....................................................................... H-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-5

FIGURE

I-1 National Defense Strategic Approach ......................................................... I-4

II-1 Weapons of Mass Destruction Activity Continuum ..................................II-3
II-2 Weapons of Mass Destruction Development Framework..........................II-8
IV-1 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Activities and Tasks ............. IV-2
IV-2 Prevent (Pathway Defeat) Specialized Tasks ........................................... IV-5
IV-3 Protect (Weapons of Mass Destruction Defeat) Specialized Tasks ......... IV-7
IV-4 Respond (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response)
Specialized Tasks ................................................................................... IV-11
C-1 Agents with Significant Risks of Deliberate Misuse .................................C-4
C-2 Chemical Weapons Production ..................................................................C-5
D-1 Dual-Use Chemical/Biological Applications ............................................ D-1
D-2 Chemical Reactor Vessel .......................................................................... D-2
D-3 Chemical Storage Tanks............................................................................ D-3
D-4 Chemical Heat Exchanger ......................................................................... D-4
D-5 Chemical Distillation Column ................................................................... D-5
D-6 Chemical Filling Equipment ..................................................................... D-6
D-7 Chemical Valve ......................................................................................... D-7
D-8 Chemical Pressing Piping.......................................................................... D-9
D-9 Chemical Production Pumps ................................................................... D-10
D-10 Biological Production Fermenter ............................................................ D-11
D-11 Biological Production Fermenter ............................................................ D-12
D-12 Biological Production Filtration .............................................................. D-13
E-1 Science and Technology Trends ................................................................ E-2
E-2 Chemical and Biological Advancements ................................................... E-4

vi JP 3-40
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Outlines countering weapons of mass destruction policy and strategy

• Discusses countering weapons of mass destruction activities and operations

relation to the joint functions

• Describes the operational environment and operational framework

• Outlines a countering weapons of mass destruction strategic approach for

planning

• Examines how foundational and crosscutting activities and tasks, along with
specialized tasks within and across the countering weapons of mass
destruction organizing principles, logically group tasks to prevent or counter
specific weapons of mass destruction threats

Introduction

The US, its partners, and allies face an increasing weapons

of mass destruction (WMD) threat from actors of concern
who operate transregionally, conduct activities throughout
the operational environment (OE), and are
multifunctionally organized. Countering weapons of mass
destruction (CWMD) is a national security priority that
requires a coordinated, whole-of-government approach that
brings all instruments of national power to bear against
these actors and their WMD-related activities. The
Department of Defense (DOD) contributes to the United
States Government (USG) effort by providing joint forces
that plan and execute tasks to ensure the US, its forces, and
partners are neither coerced nor attacked with WMD.

WMD are chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

(CBRN) weapons capable of a high order of destruction or
causing mass casualties, excluding the means of
transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is
a separable and divisible part from the weapon.

Countering Weapons of The President provides policy and strategy for USG
Mass Destruction Policy departments and agencies to ensure unified effort in the
and Strategy 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of
America [short title: National Security Strategy (NSS)],
National

vii
Executive Summary

Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Terrorism, Presidential directives, and other plans and
orders.

DOD derives its national strategic direction primarily from

the President’s guidance in the NSS, presidential directives,
and other national strategic documents, in conjunction with
the National Security Council and the Homeland Security
Council. The (U) 2018 National Defense Strategy of the
United States of America: Sharpening the American
Military’s Competitive Edge [short title: National Defense
Strategy] is DOD policy that refines the strategic direction
of the NSS for DOD.

Relationship to the Joint CWMD activities and operations intersect all functional
Functions areas, domains, and combatant commands (CCMDs) and
require the integration and coordination of the joint
functions discussed in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint
Operations.

Countering Weapons of CBRN-related joint doctrine includes JP 3-11, Operations

Mass Destruction in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Doctrine Relationship to Environments, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological,
Other Doctrine Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

Operational Environment and Operational Framework

The evolution of the WMD threat has created new

challenges for joint force commanders (JFCs) beyond
dealing with adversary WMD use. The proliferation of
WMD is a transregional problem that routinely crosses
geographic CCMDs’ geographical boundaries. The
primary challenges facing the JFC encompass:
• The diversity of threat actors—expansion from
traditional state actors down to the possibility of a lone
actor with no particular affiliation.
• The emergence of novel WMD threats (i.e.,
nontraditional agents).
• The dual-use nature of much of the related technology
and expertise.
• The increasing complexity of the WMD continuum and
number of proliferation and procurement networks.

viii JP 3-40
 Executive Summary

Weapons of Mass Although the characteristics of the WMD continuum are

Destruction Activity continuously evolving, one constant remains—all actors
Continuum use pathways to develop or acquire WMD. These pathways
consist of networks or connections among individuals,
groups, and organizations that enable the development,
possession, and/or proliferation of WMD and related
capabilities. WMD pathways continuously adapt to keep
pace with changes in the OE. They are supported by a
complex array of actors and networks that take advantage
of permissive environments, accessibility of dual-use
technology, and available expertise to support WMD
development.

Though not necessarily sequential, the WMD activity

continuum covers the spectrum of WMD activities from
intent to use:
• Intent.
• Infrastructure.
• Expertise.
• Production.
• Weaponization.
• Delivery systems.

Weapons of Mass WMD networks are the connective tissue a state or non-state
Destruction Supply and actor uses to gain or transfer access to weapons, material,
Demand Networks technology, and expertise. These networks enable state and
non-state actors to acquire, develop, proliferate, or use
WMD. Licit and illicit organizations operating
transregionally may wittingly or unwittingly support the
proliferation and/or use of WMD through networks and add
to the complexity of mitigating the WMD threat.

Weapons of Mass Actors of concern consist of state and non-state actors that
Destruction Actors of carry out activities that, left unaddressed, pose a potential
Concern threat to the strategic objectives of the USG. In the WMD
context, an actor of concern poses a threat of developing,
acquiring, proliferating, or employing WMD; related
expertise; materials; technologies; and means of delivery.
These actors may also perceive destructive capabilities of
WMD as a highly desirable means to counter more
technologically advantaged nations and alliances.

ix
Executive Summary

Chemical, Biological, CBRN weapons may be used to attack US citizens,

Radiological, and Nuclear infrastructure, or vital interests; to target US power
Environment projection, sustainment, and force protection
vulnerabilities; to deny access to an area, limiting the ability
of the US to respond to urgent threats; or to undermine
support by key regional partners for US vital interests
through intimidation.

Operational Framework The operational framework for CWMD consists of three

organizing CWMD principles (prevent, protect, and
respond) carried out through specialized activities (pathway
defeat, WMD defeat, and CBRN response).

CWMD Organizing Principles. CWMD operations and

activities focus on pathway defeat and utilize prevent,
protect, and respond as CWMD organizing principles for
planning. The joint force conducts a wide range of CWMD
operations and activities against state and non-state actors
of concern to deter the conceptualization, development,
possession, proliferation, and use or threat of use and
mitigate the effects of WMD.

Planning

The Competition Competition Continuum. The competition continuum is

Continuum and the environment under which we conduct the range of
Countering Weapons of military operations. The dynamic and complex
Mass Destruction Across environment in which WMD acquisition and use occur
the Range of Military requires the integration of activities and operations across
Operations the competition continuum. The common aspect across the
continuum is an active campaigning mindset. Cooperation
and competition below armed conflict are, for practical
purposes, always occurring, so the presence or absence of
armed conflict is the only variable element. This
comprehensive framework requires the joint force to play a
more prominent role in areas regarded as outside the
military sphere and thus requiring integrated efforts with
USG partners. JFCs determine the most effective blend of
CWMD activities and operations throughout the
competition continuum to address unique challenges posed
by WMD. JFCs ensure these activities are best suited to
dissuade countries from developing WMD, deter use of
WMD by actors of concern that have developed a WMD
capability, and, if necessary, defeat any state or non-state
actor that uses or threatens the use of WMD.

x JP 3-40
 Executive Summary

General Countering Guidance for CWMD planning exists within national and
Weapons of Mass DOD-specific guidance documents. The development of
Destruction Planning CWMD plans and planning products serve to address
Guidance campaign, contingency, and support planning requirements
derived from strategic guidance. Specific planning
products support requirements described in Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint
Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).

Campaign and The geographic combatant commander’s operational

Operational Design for approach for CWMD should be consistent with the strategic
Countering Weapons of approach. The CWMD operational approach reflects the
Mass Destruction JFC’s visualization for creating desired effects. The
Planning approach provides the necessary foundation for detailed
planning, as well as related branch plans that may evolve.
During development of the operational approach, the
CCMD staff incorporates CWMD planning considerations.

Department of Defense The Department of Defense Strategy for Countering

Functional Campaign Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Functional
Plan Countering Weapons Campaign Plan for Countering Weapons of Mass
of Mass Destruction Destruction provides CCMDs, the Services, and combat
Integration support agencies with a common strategy and framework
to synchronize planning on a regional, transregional, and
global basis. It integrates DOD-wide efforts to prevent the
use, acquisition, and proliferation of WMD; prepare the
joint force to respond to WMD crises; and assure allies and
partners.

Countering Weapons of All plans, where appropriate, should support achievement

Mass Destruction of DOD’s strategic CWMD objectives, namely:
Strategic Approach for • Reduce incentives to pursue, possess, and employ WMD.
Planning
• Increase barriers to acquisition, proliferation, and
potential use of WMD.
• Manage WMD risks emanating from hostile, fragile, or
failed states and safe havens.
• Deny the effects of current and emerging WMD threats
through layered, integrated defenses.

Planning Considerations Strategic Implications. Commanders at every level need

to be aware of the strategic implications associated with any
WMD threat and adapt their CWMD planning efforts
accordingly. CWMD activities and operations occur at all
three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and

xi
Executive Summary

tactical—and any single action may have consequences at

all levels.

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational

Environment (JIPOE). JIPOE supports the JFC by
characterizing the OE that contains WMD as a system of
pathways, networks, relevant actors, resources, and extant
and potential capabilities, all interacting within the
competition continuum. This holistic characterization and
predictive analysis enables development of the operational
design elements and effective targeting.

Interagency Coordination. USG departments and

agencies planning and acting together create effects that
cannot be created by DOD alone due to differing
authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities. Various
CWMD missions often place DOD in a supporting role to
other USG departments or agencies.

Allies and Partner Nations. DOD CWMD efforts have a

greater likelihood of success if planned in cooperation with
allies and partner nations. CWMD shaping activities
planned and executed in cooperation with partners may
prevent or disrupt actors of concern acquisition,
development, or employment of WMD and alleviate the
need for more aggressive and costly action later.

Network Perspective. A JFC’s ability to characterize and

monitor proliferation networks and state WMD programs
as holistic systems is essential to affecting that system. One
of the primary challenges facing the JFC is the proliferation
of WMD technology and products.

Execution

DOD leverages foundational and crosscutting activities and

tasks to support specialized tasks that help prevent new
WMD threats or use of WMD, protect against extant
WMD, and respond to WMD use by managing and
mitigating the associated consequences. DOD coordinates
these CWMD efforts while incorporating them into broader
plans and activities.

Countering Weapons of The arrangement of foundational and crosscutting activities

Mass Destruction and tasks along with specialized tasks within and across the
Activities and Tasks organizing principles, serve as a method for logically
grouping tasks to prevent or counter specific WMD threats.

xii JP 3-40
 Executive Summary

To the extent possible, foundational and crosscutting tasks

are executed within the activities of: maintain and expand
technical expertise; cooperate with and support partners;
and understand the OE, threats, and vulnerabilities.
Specialized tasks are placed within the respective
organizing principles of prevent, protect, and respond.

Foundational and Foundational Activities and Tasks. Foundational

Crosscutting Activities and activities and tasks for countering WMD consist of:
Tasks • Maintain and Expand Technical Expertise. This
activity focuses on nurturing and sustaining the
intellectual capital provided by DOD and mission partner
CWMD experts.
• Cooperate with and Support Partners. JFCs should
plan to perform CWMD activities and tasks in full
cooperation with USG interagency partners in a variety
of departments and agencies, multinational partners, and
nongovernmental organizations.

Crosscutting Activity and Tasks

• Understand the Environment, Threats, and
Vulnerabilities. The JFC develops and maintains a
comprehensive understanding of the WMD actors and
materials that affect the OE.

Organizing Principles and The organizing principles (prevent, protect, and respond)
Specialized Activities and and associated specialized activities (pathway defeat,
Tasks WMD defeat, and CBRN response) serve as the operational
framework for CWMD. The specialized activities and
tasks are conducted to impede the development or
acquisition of new WMD threats; defeat, contain, or reduce
extant WMD capabilities; and minimize the effects of
CBRN use. Specialized tasks are not unique to a particular
organizing principle, but their effects may be greater when
conducted in relation to any one organizing principle.

• WMD Pathway Defeat. WMD pathway defeat and

related specialized tasks focus on the prevention of
development or acquisition of WMD, to include
conventional, cyberspace, and special operations.
Pathway defeat activities focus on actions to dissuade,
deter, delay, disrupt, destroy, divert, or otherwise
complicate conceptualization and development of
WMD. Though not exclusive, pathway defeat actions are

xiii
Executive Summary

often in support to or in close collaboration with

interagency partners.

• WMD Defeat. After acquisition or development of a

capability, WMD defeat efforts target the ability to
assemble, stockpile, deliver, transfer, or employ WMD.
This involves the JFC employing tailored capabilities to
neutralize or destroy weapons and agents; delivery
systems; and materials, facilities, and processes,
including the functional or structural defeat of hardened
targets.

• CBRN Response. CBRN response efforts minimize the

effect of CBRN use to the joint force and other mission-
critical personnel. Actions to manage consequences
support US and foreign civil authorities and their
populations by responding to a CBRN incident and
mitigating the hazards and effects of WMD use. Actions
to safeguard the force are completed during the conduct
of other CWMD activities, since those activities may
require the force to operate in an environment
contaminated by CBRN hazards or effects of WMD use.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides fundamental principles and

guidance to plan, execute, and assess military activities to
counter WMD.

xiv JP 3-40
 Executive Summary

Intentionally Blank

xv
 CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“The danger from hostile state and non-state actors who are trying to acquire
nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons is increasing.”

National Security Strategy

December 2017

1. General

a. The US, its partners, and allies face an increasing weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) threat from actors of concern who operate transregionally, conduct activities
throughout the operational environment (OE), and are multifunctionally organized.
Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) is a national security priority that
requires a coordinated, whole-of-government approach that brings all instruments of
national power to bear against these actors and their WMD-related activities. The
Department of Defense (DOD) contributes to the United States Government (USG) effort
by providing joint forces that plan and execute tasks to ensure the US, its forces, and its
partners are neither coerced nor attacked with WMD.

b. While various definitions of WMD and CWMD exist across the USG and
international communities, this joint publication (JP) describes WMD and CWMD
specifically to guide joint force understanding, campaigning, planning, execution, and
assessment of CWMD activities.

(1) WMD are chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons
capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, excluding the means of
transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part
from the weapon. WMD delivery systems are part of the WMD activities continuum and
are of concern to conducting CWMD operations even when they can be separated from the
WMD payload. However, while recognizing that CWMD activities may complement
DOD efforts to combat separable delivery systems, this JP does not prescribe doctrine to
combat delivery systems or conventional (non-CBRN) weapon threats where no explicit
WMD link exists.

For further information on countering delivery systems, see JP 3-01, Countering Air and
Missile Threats, and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

(2) CWMD is efforts to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession,

proliferation, use, and effects of WMD, related expertise, materials, technologies, and
means of delivery.

2. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Strategy

a. The President provides policy and strategy for USG departments and agencies to
ensure unified effort in the 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America

I-1
Chapter I

[short title: National Security Strategy (NSS)], National Strategy for Countering Weapons
of Mass Destruction Terrorism, presidential directives, and other plans and orders.

(1) NSS. The President establishes CWMD policy within the first pillar of the
2017 NSS (Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life).
It is characterized by counterproliferation (CP) and targeting terrorists that possess WMD.

(2) National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism.

The President provides broad lines of effort, strategic objectives, and desired end states in
the National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism. The
strategy emphasizes “global-burden-sharing” to counter terrorists with WMD.

(3) Presidential Directives. Presidential directives establish strategy and

framework and assign roles, responsibilities, and tasks to USG departments and agencies
to achieve unity of effort. Presidential directives providing direction for the CWMD
mission area include the following:

(a) Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-25, (U) Guidelines for US

Government Interagency Response to Terrorist Threats or Incidents in the US and
Overseas, provides a framework for the USG response to imminent terrorist threats or
incidents requiring a time-sensitive response, including crises involving WMD.

(b) PPD-33, (U) Detection and Early Warning of Nuclear Proliferation,

establishes interagency framework for the detection of nuclear proliferation to optimize US
capabilities, avoid duplication of efforts, address high-priority gaps, and ensure activities
are supportive of US national security objectives.

(c) PPD-42, (U) Preventing and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Proliferation, Terrorism, and Use, is a comprehensive document that addresses
proliferation, terrorism, and use of WMD and strengthening nonproliferation regimes and
provides a framework for civil nuclear cooperation and countering WMD threats. PPD-42
provides detailed guidance on nuclear threat reduction, technologies, and capabilities to
prevent and counter the proliferation and use of WMD, national technical nuclear forensics,
and countering WMD terrorism.

b. Secretary of Defense (SecDef). DOD derives its national strategic direction

primarily from the President’s guidance in the NSS, presidential directives, and other
national strategic documents, in conjunction with the National Security Council (NSC) and
the Homeland Security Council. SecDef’s (U) 2018 National Defense Strategy of the
United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge [short
title: National Defense Strategy (NDS)] is DOD policy that refines the strategic direction
of the NSS for DOD.

(1) 2018 NDS

(a) The NDS is derived from the NSS and is designed to sharpen the Armed
Forces of the United States’ competitive edge to compete, deter, and win. The strategy
recognizes the reemergence of great power competition and focuses on deterring

I-2 JP 3-40
 Introduction

aggression and coercion by great powers, rogue regimes, terrorists, and WMD threats. It
seeks to rebuild our military strength and establish competitive advantages in the face of
intensifying pressure from major challengers to ensure the US can sustain its current
advantages into the future.

(b) The NDS has 11 defense objectives. The CWMD mission area may be a
factor in all 11 of the objectives, one is specifically focused: dissuade, prevent, or deter
state adversaries and non-state actors (e.g., terrorists, violent extremist organizations,
criminals, scientists, businesses, facilitators, and their networks) from developing,
acquiring, proliferating, or using WMD.

(c) The NDS strategic approach is illustrated in Figure I-1. The central idea
is to achieve the defense objectives by expanding the competitive space through a more
lethal, rapidly innovating joint force and defense enterprise, combined with a robust, more
capable alliance and partnership network, and thereby generate the military advantage
needed to maintain favorable regional balances of power and increase US influence. This
strategic approach and ways provide the capabilities to compete, deter, and win in conflict
and reinforce all levels of national power from sustainable positions of military advantage.
Expanding the competitive space requires application of all instruments of national power.

(d) The NDS recognizes the threat of WMD as a major global trend. It notes
that rogue regimes continue to seek out or develop CBRN weapon capabilities—as well as
long-range missile capabilities—and, in some cases, proliferate these capabilities to malign
actors. Terrorists likewise continue to pursue WMD. Breakthroughs in chemistry continue
to perpetuate the threat of use of deadlier chemical agents such as fourth generation agents.
The spread of radiological sources and nuclear weapons technology and advanced
manufacturing technology remains a persistent problem. Advances in bioengineering are
increasing the potential, variety, and ease of access to biological weapons.

(e) The NDS simultaneity guidance envisions a joint force capable of

simultaneously operating and deterring adversaries’ and enemies’ capabilities and winning
any war. For the CWMD mission, this means day-to-day actions to degrade WMD threats,
and offensive operations during periods of competition below armed conflict or armed
conflict itself, to disrupt WMD threats to protect the homeland. Joint forces apply
simultaneous CWMD efforts across all layers of the global operating model: contact, blunt,
surge, and homeland defense (HD).

1. Contact Layer. Joint force CWMD capabilities are applied together

with allies and partners to expand the competitive space by countering WMD proliferation
by state and non-state actors and includes pathway defeat and, when required, WMD
defeat. See Chapter II, “Operational Environment and Operational Framework,” for
discussion of both pathway and WMD defeat. The contact layer may include joint force
support to nonproliferation efforts by USG departments and agencies charged with
managing and ensuring compliance with treaties, conventions, and other control measures.
Appendix A, “Organizational and Command Relationships,” describes USG departments
and agencies’ CWMD roles, organization, and responsibilities.

I-3
Chapter I

National Defense Strategic Approach

Generate United States Advantages

and
Adversaries Dilemmas

Expand
Competitive
Space

Revitalized
Alliances Creative
and Operating
Partnerships Concepts

Build a
Strengthen
Robust Allies and
More Military
Networks Lethal Advantage
Partners
Force

Accelerate
Cycle of
Interoperability Innovation

Reform the
Department

Greater
Performance
and Affordability

Figure I-1. National Defense Strategic Approach

2. Blunt Layer. Ready forces conduct operations to gather data to help

commanders determine if a situation or incident should be treated as a WMD event and to
support resolution efforts.

3. Surge Layer. War-winning forces apply mass to the fight, including

action against adversaries with nuclear capabilities.

4. HD Layer. Joint forces operate in the homeland and defend the

approaches to the homeland. They are capable of defending the homeland against WMD
through robust response to threats and incidents. These operations may include defense
support of civil authorities (DSCA) and/or HD activities and operations.

I-4 JP 3-40
 Introduction

(2) The Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass

Destruction (DODS-CWMD) emphasizes shaping the environment to dissuade actors
from pursuing WMD, early action through pathway defeat, and cooperating with partners
to achieve CWMD objectives. The strategy’s four objectives focus efforts for DOD
CWMD activities conducted in concert with other USG instruments of national power. For
more discussion, see Chapter III, “Planning,” paragraph 6, “Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Strategic Approach for Planning.” For more discussion on the means of DOD
CWMD, see Chapter IV, “Execution,” paragraph 2, “Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Activities and Tasks.”

(3) Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2060.02, DOD Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy, directs US forces to:

(a) Dissuade, deter, and defeat actors of concern and their networks that seek
to harm or coerce the US, its citizens, forces, and its allies and partner nations (PNs)
through the use or threat of use of WMD, while maintaining the ability to respond to and
mitigate the effects of WMD use.

(b) Implement a strategy for CWMD that supports national strategic

guidance and frameworks; support military force planning and doctrine to organize, train,
exercise, and equip the Services to counter WMD and prepare appropriate plans to address
the defensive aspects of CWMD.

(c) Prevent new WMD possession or WMD use and minimize WMD effects
by focusing efforts on the objectives outlined in the DODS-CWMD.

(d) Prepare DOD to support the objectives outlined in the DODS-CWMD by

ensuring effective CWMD capabilities, including maintaining and expanding technical
expertise.

(4) The (U) National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2018
(short title: National Military Strategy [NMS]).

(a) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides the joint force
with an overarching strategic framework to protect and advance US national interests
globally in the NMS. The 2018 NMS contains five mission areas, cited as ways for
employment of the joint force. The mission areas are to respond to threats, deter strategic
attack (and proliferation of WMD), deter conventional attack, assure allies and partners,
and compete below the level of armed conflict. The strategy informs the prioritization of
force employment, force development, and force design for the joint force.

(b) The CJCS also directs strategic planning, including development of a

functional campaign plan to counter WMD globally. The CJCS is the global integrator for
the campaign, while Commander, United States Special Operations Command
(CDRUSSOCOM), is the coordinating authority.

I-5
Chapter I

3. Relationship to the Joint Functions

a. CWMD activities and operations intersect all functional areas, domains, and
combatant commands (CCMDs) and require the integration and coordination of the joint
functions discussed in JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

(1) Command and Control (C2). Unity of command and unified action are
essential to CWMD. Acknowledging that not all required CWMD activity authorities are
resident in DOD, commanders and planners leverage the authorities, experience, access,
and capabilities of the interagency partners, allies, and PNs.

(2) Information. Information encompasses the management and application of

information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to influence relevant
actor perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and human and automated decision making
regarding the potential development, acquisition, proliferation, or use of WMD. Joint force
activities should consider messages that support WMD deterrence, making clear that the
cost of adversary action outweighs perceived benefits and that the joint force is prepared
to deny the adversary benefits they hope to gain through use of WMD. The overarching
theme to DOD efforts supporting CWMD messaging is that the US is committed to
identifying and holding fully responsible any actor of concern who willfully supports,
enables, or engages in WMD activities to target or threaten the US or our allies and
partners, and our aggregate defenses and any post-incident response will result in adversary
costs greatly exceeding any perceived benefits of using WMD.

(3) Intelligence. Intelligence support to CWMD is critical for commanders and

staffs to fully understand WMD in the OE. Intelligence identifies an adversary’s WMD
pathways and capabilities and will illuminate an adversary’s probable intentions, activities,
and vulnerabilities. It provides locations, characterization, and security status of toxic
industrial materials.

(4) Fires. Fires support CWMD operations, actions, and investments by

engaging targets associated with WMD pathways and, if necessary, can create effects on
WMD targets or delivery systems to prevent their imminent use. When planning CWMD
operations, actions, and investments in support of pathway defeat, WMD defeat, or during
combat, consider all available joint fires—including electronic attack and other capabilities
such as fires in and through cyberspace—along with their effects and associated risks.

(5) Movement and Maneuver. CWMD activities and operations can enhance
joint force movement and maneuver by limiting the adversary’s ability to deny freedom of
action with the use or threatened use of WMD. Specific CWMD activities may require
careful movement and maneuver considerations, especially when planned to take place in
denied areas. When possible, this function should posture and position conventional
forces, special operations forces (SOF), or specialized CBRN response capabilities where
they can most effectively prevent, protect against, or respond to WMD use.

(6) Protection. Protection focuses on conserving the joint force’s combat

capabilities through:

I-6 JP 3-40
 Introduction

(a) Active defensive measures to protect the joint force from a WMD attack.

(b) Passive defensive measures, including detectors and mission-oriented

protective posture/collective protection, which will enable friendly forces, systems, and
facilities to identify and continue to function in a contaminated environment and to
continue emergency management and CBRN response in order to reduce the loss of
personnel and capabilities due to WMD attacks or CBRN incidents. When directed, the
joint force commander’s (JFC’s) requirement to protect may extend beyond force
protection and encompass protection of US civilians; the forces, systems, and civil
infrastructure of PNs; and interagency partners.

(7) Sustainment. Sustainment refers to the provision of logistics and personnel

services necessary to maintain and execute CWMD operations and activities until mission
accomplishment. Sustainment support can be provisioned from military units or
commercial sources. Operational contract support is the process of planning for and
obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of
combatant commander (CCDR)-directed operations. Planners should consider CWMD-
and CBRN-related sustainment requirements, such as chemical defense equipment,
medical countermeasures, and CBRN defense materials required for protection, continuing
the fight, and remediation after CWMD activities.

For more information, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics; JP 4-02, Joint Health Services; and JP
4-10, Operational Contract Support.

4. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Doctrine Relationship to Other

Doctrine

CWMD doctrine applies across the scope of military activities and operations where
the potential for WMD threats exists. Other doctrinal publications addressing activities
and operations for which CWMD doctrine should be a planning and operational
consideration. Since CWMD activities are often linked with the potential for operations in
CBRN environments, the relationship with CBRN defense doctrine is important. CBRN
defense refers to the employment of capabilities that counter the entire range of CBRN
hazards. Specific CBRN-related joint doctrine includes JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

I-7
Chapter I

Intentionally Blank

I-8 JP 3-40
 CHAPTER II
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

“Actors of concern pose a threat of developing, acquiring, proliferating, or

employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related capabilities–
expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery. These activities
present a clear potential threat to the strategic objectives of the United States”

Department of Defense Strategy for Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 2014

1. General

a. This chapter provides a general overview of the WMD environment, which

comprises development pathways, proliferation and procurement networks, possession
and/or use of WMD, and actors of concern operating within the WMD continuum. This
chapter also introduces the operational framework as the foundation for specific CWMD
tasks, as well as planning and execution considerations addressed in follow-on chapters.

b. The global security environment is becoming more complex and threatened with
adversary pursuit of WMD, delivery systems, and related CBRN technologies which
challenges the joint force, international organizations, and PNs. The evolution of the
WMD threat has created new challenges for JFCs beyond dealing with adversary WMD
use. The proliferation of WMD is a transregional problem that routinely crosses
geographic CCMDs’ geographical boundaries. The primary challenges facing the JFC
encompass:

(1) The diversity of threat actors—expansion from traditional state actors down
to the possibility of a lone actor with no particular affiliation.

(2) The emergence of novel WMD threats (i.e., nontraditional agents [NTAs]).

(3) The dual-use nature of much of the related technology and expertise.

(4) The increasing complexity of the WMD continuum and number of

proliferation and procurement networks.

c. The scope and speed associated with WMD development activities juxtaposed with
the dispersed nature of CWMD activities across the USG require the JFC to coordinate
with interagency partners to enable their activities while leveraging PNs’ capabilities.
CWMD requires a strong partnership between the US, its allies, and other PNs to combine
their CWMD capabilities and to dissuade, deter, or defeat WMD adversaries and threats.

2. Weapons of Mass Destruction Activity Continuum

a. Overview

II-1
Chapter II

(1) Although the characteristics of the WMD continuum are continuously

evolving, one constant remains—all actors use pathways to develop or acquire WMD.
These pathways consist of networks or connections among individuals, groups, and
organizations that enable the development, possession, and/or proliferation of WMD and
related capabilities. WMD pathways continuously adapt to keep pace with changes in the
OE. They are supported by a complex array of actors and networks that take advantage of
permissive environments, accessibility of dual-use technology, and available expertise to
support WMD development.

(2) Supply and demand characteristics of the proliferation supporting pathways

are a combination of witting and unwitting participants that may or may not adhere to
existing proliferation norms and rules. The increasing number of suppliers and network
enablers available to those seeking to develop WMD increases the availability of the
necessary materials and knowledge to develop WMD and the means to deliver them. This
increase also creates greater challenges for those attempting to prevent proliferation.

(3) Innovation and the dual-use nature of technology, materials, and equipment
make identifying pathways and preventing WMD development difficult. Advanced
technology, materials, and equipment is available to anyone who can afford it and
ownership does not necessarily constitute illegal or nefarious intent. The procurement of
advanced technology can condense timelines which limits options to prevent WMD
development and increases the risk of surprise.

(4) Monitoring and controlling WMD pathways is essential in denying actors of

concern access to WMD technology, knowledge, materials, expertise, and weapons.
Globalization has enabled the creation of new, innovative, and sophisticated pathways that
facilitate development, procurement, and proliferation efforts. The evolution of new
pathways, combined with the spread of knowledge and ease of access to critical
components, makes WMD detection more difficult.

b. WMD Activities

(1) Though not necessarily sequential, the WMD activity continuum covers the
spectrum of WMD activities from intent to use (Figure II-1). A subset of this continuum
is those activities that are strictly associated with the development of a WMD capability.
These activities encompass intent, infrastructure, expertise, production, weaponization,
and delivery systems. Beyond the development pathways is the achievement of an initial
capability, qualitative and quantitative capability improvements, and potential WMD use.

(2) WMD development is not a linear process. Actors can conduct multiple
activities simultaneously to reduce the time needed to achieve a capability. Additionally,
procurement of advanced technologies can enable actors to bypass technological hurdles
inherent in WMD development. Actors can also circumvent WMD development entirely
by directly acquiring a weapons capability from another actor.

(a) Intent. Desire or decision to develop and/or acquire WMD. This

decision may be made by a small group of actors, organizations, or nation leaders. The

II-2 JP 3-40
 Operating Environment and Operational Framework

Weapons of Mass Destruction Activity Continuum

Intent

Infrastructure
Demand
Expertise Demand

Enhanced
WMD

Initial
Capability Use

Production Supply
Supply
Weaponization

Delivery Systems
Procurement/direct acquisition can occur at any point to circumvent the continuum.

Legend
WMD weapons of mass destruction

Figure II-1. Weapons of Mass Destruction Activity Continuum

likely compartmentalization and secrecy of such decisions can make it difficult to gather
intelligence to identify an actor’s intent.

(b) Infrastructure. Development and establishment of physical and

organizational infrastructure necessary to support WMD development. This includes
specialized facilities, equipment, raw materials, acquisition, and logistic networks, as well
as financial means to support them.

(c) Expertise. Development, procurement, or acquisition of technical

expertise required to build WMD. This includes building the knowledge base to support
all of the activities in the continuum.

(d) Production. Activities to produce components and materials necessary

to construct and maintain WMD. Production can include the use of civil infrastructure to
progress along the continuum without inciting international reaction.

(e) Weaponization. Activities to convert critical components,

chemical/biological agents, or radiological/fissile material into a weapons package.

(f) Delivery Systems. Development of mechanisms to mate CBRN weapon

packages with a system capable of delivering it to a specified target.

II-3
Chapter II

3. Weapons of Mass Destruction Supply and Demand Networks

a. WMD networks are the connective tissue a state or non-state actor uses to gain or
transfer access to weapons, material, technology, and expertise. These networks enable
state and non-state actors to acquire, develop, proliferate, or use WMD. Licit and illicit
organizations operating transregionally may wittingly or unwittingly support the
proliferation and/or use of WMD through networks and add to the complexity of mitigating
the WMD threat. Examples of existing networks include the use of front companies,
intermediaries, and shell corporations to procure sensitive items from the global market.
Networks may be limited in their duration and may be dissolved once their purposes are
achieved. The interconnectedness and sheer number of networks available to move
knowledge and materials globally complicates the ability to identify and interdict them.

b. Most WMD pathways take advantage of preexisting networks (both licit and illicit)
to facilitate the movement of people, material, information, infrastructure, and money. The
use of existing legitimate networks for nefarious purposes presents a challenge to the JFC.
Decisions to interdict, surveil, or disrupt a given network node or connective link may
create unintended consequences if not thoroughly analyzed. For example, if an established
transportation route is used to move WMD materials of concern, the JFC and PN officials
should develop interdiction plans that minimize the disruption of legitimate movement of
goods, while ensuring the means to stop the flow of WMD materials is in place. Potential
links between networks comprise material, people, information, infrastructure, money, and
lines of communication. Recognition and appreciation of these links, and their
interconnectivity, will guide the development of the means to illuminate, monitor, and, if
necessary, interdict, disrupt, or destroy them. This awareness is paramount for a pathway
defeat approach to CWMD.

c. States that have developed WMD, or were once recipients of WMD-related

technologies and materials, may begin to indigenously produce and export these same
technologies to other countries of proliferation concern. The ability and willingness of
these states to export WMD-related expertise, technologies, and materials to other states
outside of, or in noncompliance with, international nonproliferation rules are a serious
threat. Non-state actors (e.g., terrorists, violent extremist organizations, criminals,
scientists, businesses, facilitators) and their networks may be involved in the intentional or
unintentional proliferation of WMD-related technologies and materials. This compounds
the risks of acquisition of WMD by actors of concern.

For further information on networks, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

4. Weapons of Mass Destruction Actors of Concern

Actors of concern consist of state and non-state actors that carry out activities that, left
unaddressed, pose a potential threat to the strategic objectives of the USG. In the WMD
context, an actor of concern poses a threat of developing, acquiring, proliferating, or
employing WMD; related expertise; materials; technologies; and means of delivery. These
actors may also perceive destructive capabilities of WMD as a highly desirable means to
counter more technologically advantaged nations and alliances.

II-4 JP 3-40
 Operating Environment and Operational Framework

a. State Actors. States may view WMD possession as a source of strategic leverage,
international prestige, regional dominance, or deterrence. This may be accomplished
through the threat or actual use of WMD. For a state to employ WMD, it must possess one
or more weapons, a viable delivery capability, and the infrastructure necessary for C2 of
the weapon system. States lacking a conventional delivery capability or seeking to avoid
attribution may use asymmetric means or proxies (state or non-state) to deliver weapons.
JFCs use joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) to assess
an actor of concern’s capability to employ WMD. If state and regional instability increases
in or around WMD possessor states, full control of weapons or WMD materials of concern
may be jeopardized. JFCs should partner with other USG and multinational partners to
advocate for responsible stewardship.

For further information on JIPOE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment.

b. Non-State Actors. The WMD acquisition and development efforts of non-state

actors differ from traditional state programs in their organization, scale, and resourcing.
Many chemical and biological production facilities used by a non-state actor, such as
clandestine laboratories, can operate within a limited space (e.g., one-car garage), using
common, dual-use, or improvised equipment. Detecting and disrupting non-state actor
networks and small-scale production facilities is a significant challenge for the JFC. Non-
state actors can operate independently, with state actor support, or in tandem as enablers or
as proxies of state actors. Non-state actors are likely to employ WMD in an unconventional
manner as an improvised threat. This can include improvised CBRN weapons or using
CBRN material as enhancements to improvised explosive devices. Employment of
CWMD capabilities, such as weapons technical intelligence, facilitate understanding and
subsequent defeat of networks that support non-state actors in acquiring or developing
WMD.

5. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment

a. This section provides a general overview of the CBRN threat and effects of WMD
use. CBRN weapons may be used to attack US citizens, infrastructure, or vital interests;
to target US power projection, sustainment, and force protection vulnerabilities; to deny
access to an area, limiting the ability of the US to respond to urgent threats; or to undermine
support by key regional partners for US vital interests through intimidation.

(1) Chemical Agent Effects. Most chemical agents are extremely lethal and
rapidly produce mass casualties among unprotected personnel. The burden posed by
implementing protective measures and measures to mitigate the spread of contamination
will likely negatively affect operating tempo. Mass casualties could overwhelm medical
facilities or spread contamination denying continued use of those facilities. C2 assets can
become overwhelmed with managing effects of the chemical weapon attack, which would
adversely impact awareness of other activities. Additionally, contaminated ports and
airfields could hamper the flow of logistics, reduce sortie generation, and delay forward
movement.

II-5
Chapter II

(2) Biological Agent Effects. The effects of biological weapons on an operation

will depend on the type of operation, the number of casualties, the severity of incapacitation
of individual military personnel (i.e., Service members merely inconvenienced or
completely removed from the fight), the demand for medical personnel, the amount and
type of medical supplies required, equipment (from antibiotics to beds and ventilators) and
facilities to treat casualties, quarantine or monitoring of exposed but asymptomatic
personnel, the need for medical evacuation assets (e.g., vehicles, planes, escorting medical
attendants), and the infectiousness of the agent between humans. A biological attack can
range in operational decrement from that of a more limited impact to unit effectiveness due
to lost duty days (e.g., norovirus outbreak) to catastrophic for affected units (e.g.,
pneumonic plague). Depending on the agent, effects can be temporary or permanent for
those affected. Toxins are poisonous substances that may be produced synthetically, such
as commercial processes for microbial and fungal products. Technology for bulk
production of some toxins exist. Disease outbreaks must be aggressively addressed to save
lives, but it is also imperative to discern whether an outbreak is deliberate, accidental, or
naturally occurring. Forensics provide attribution to identify those responsible. Following
a disease outbreak, a case definition needs to be constructed to determine the number of
cases and the attack rate. If the attack rate deviates from the norm, an outbreak is more
likely. Potential epidemiological clues to a biological attack include highly unusual events
with large numbers of casualties, higher morbidity or mortality than expected for a given
disease, unprecedented antibiotic resistance for a given pathogen, uncommon disease in a
geographical area, point-source outbreak with shorter incubation time than usual (due to
an increased amount of inoculum), multiple disease outbreaks, lower attack rates in
protected individuals, dead animals, reverse spread (i.e., from humans to animals or disease
observation in animals and people concurrently), unusual disease manifestation (e.g.,
inhalation and cutaneous anthrax in multiple regions concurrently), downwind plume
pattern, and direct evidence.

(3) Radiological Effects. Radiological weapons include radiological dispersal

devices (RDDs) and radiological exposure devices (REDs). Radiological weapons are
considered a serious threat due to the availability of radiological sources. These sources
are used throughout the medical, research, and industrial communities with minimal
security precautions. Radiological weapons are not considered to be militarily useful for a
state but may be desirable for non-state actors and terrorist organizations wishing to inflict
psychological and economic damage.

(a) RDD. RDDs are improvised assemblies or processes, other than nuclear
explosive devices, designed to disseminate radioactive material to cause destruction,
damage, or injury. RDDs contaminate the environment with radioactive materials and
threaten populations with exposure. Their use may also result in area denial and costly
cleanup or decontamination. An RDD is a possible terrorist weapon given the prevalent
commercial use of radioactive source material and the relatively ease to disperse this
material using conventional explosives.

(b) RED. REDs are highly radioactive penetrating sources (gamma and/or
neutron) which are relatively easy to deploy and are placed in a location where people
could be exposed, injured, or killed.

II-6 JP 3-40
 Operating Environment and Operational Framework

For further guidance on improvised explosive devices, refer to JP 3-15.1, Counter-

Improvised Explosive Device Activities.

(4) Nuclear Weapons Effects. When detonated, a nuclear weapon will release
its energy as blast, electromagnetic pulse, thermal radiation, and nuclear radiation (alpha
and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons). The primary hazards for unshielded
personnel are blast, prompt radiation, and thermal radiation, which are dependent on the
size of the weapon, the proportion of energy released due to fission instead of fusion, the
height of the detonation, and atmospheric conditions. When the detonation occurs as an
air burst high enough that the fireball does not touch the ground, the fission products are
scattered widely from the point of detonation. When the detonation occurs under, at, or
near the surface, the fission products mix with surface materials, such as dirt and soil, and
settle in a pattern commonly known as fallout around the area of detonation in the direction
of the prevailing winds. This produces the preponderance of the radiation hazard and
casualties beyond the immediate point of detonation. The effects from a nuclear weapon
will extend hundreds of meters to hundreds of kilometers depending on the weapon
characteristics and method of delivery. These effects include electromagnetic pulse effects
that may vary based on weapon type and configuration, height of burst, and environmental
conditions, and other factors. These effects could damage or disrupt various electronic
systems impacting operations.

For further information on CBRN weapons and effects, see JP 3-11, Operations in
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

6. Operational Framework

a. Overview. The operational framework for CWMD (Figure II-2) consists of three
organizing CWMD principles (prevent, protect, and respond) carried out through
specialized activities (pathway defeat, WMD defeat, and CBRN response).

b. CWMD Organizing Principles. CWMD operations and activities focus on

pathway defeat and utilize prevent, protect, and respond as CWMD organizing principles
for planning. The joint force conducts a wide range of CWMD operations and activities
against state and non-state actors of concern to deter the conceptualization, development,
possession, proliferation, and use or threat of use and mitigate the effects of WMD.

(1) Prevent. This organizing principle consists of activities and operations to

dissuade states or non-states from pursuing the development or acquisition of WMD.
Prevent activities and operations also extend beyond the attainment of WMD capabilities,
disrupting proliferation from possessor state or non-state actors and deterring WMD use.
Examples of activities conducted in support of prevent include promoting treaty
compliance and control regimes; impeding the transfer of materials of concern; restricting
the supply of WMD-related capabilities; and conducting pathway defeat activities and
operations to dissuade, deter, delay, disrupt, destroy, deny, and assure. Such activities will
complicate access to scientific expertise and technologies, infrastructure, and materials of
concern. Prevent activities and operations are frequently conducted with other USG
departments and agencies, as well as PNs with capabilities and capacity to address WMD

II-7
Chapter II

Weapons of Mass Destruction Development Framework

Intent

Infrastructure
Demand
Expertise Demand

Enhanced
Initial
Capability WMD
Use

Production Supply
Supply
Weaponization

Delivery Systems

Strategic End
States No New WMD No WMD Use Minimize WMD
Effects
Organizing
Principles Prevent (Pathway Protect (WMD Respond (CBRN
(Specialized Defeat) Defeat) Response)
Activities)

Legend
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear WMD weapons of mass destruction

Figure II-2. Weapons of Mass Destruction Development Framework

threats and related missile systems. Prevent includes aspects of both nonproliferation and
CP. While nonproliferation is principally applied to prevent the acquisition or development
of WMD by state or non-state actors during the early WMD development stages, it may
also be employed in latter stages. CP applies to those actions taken to prevent proliferation,
stop or roll back current WMD programs, defeat delivery systems, and protect US interests
from the threat of or use of WMD. CP activities are principally applied after adversaries
develop WMD, but they can also be applied early on in the WMD development and
acquisition stages.

(2) Protect. This organizing principle consists of activities and operations to

protect the US and its interests from attack or coercion by WMD possessors. Concurrently,
the joint force conducts activities and operations to contain or reduce existing WMD
stockpiles. Protect activities and operations, below armed conflict, may include building a
layered and integrated WMD defense to disrupt WMD deployment and posturing forces to
respond to WMD attacks. Central to planning for and execution of WMD defeat activities
and operations are the ability to control, defeat, disable, and dispose of extant WMD
capabilities, to include related delivery systems. The joint force builds partner capacity
and conducts security cooperation (SC) to assist allies and PNs with CWMD activities in
their homeland or abroad.

II-8 JP 3-40
 Operating Environment and Operational Framework

(3) Respond. This organizing principle consists of activities to support

operations in a CBRN environment, to respond to or mitigate the effects of a WMD or
CBRN event, and to support USG efforts to attribute WMD attacks. Respond emphasizes
CBRN preparedness of personnel, capabilities, and forces to attribute, mitigation effects,
support and sustain operations during day-to-day activities. Leveraging USG capabilities
to respond to CBRN events such as WMD use or toxic industrial incidents is critical.
Building partner capacity to respond to such incidents is also essential and should influence
planning priorities at all levels. Ensuring strong working relationships exist between the
USG and PNs will help to minimize the effects of WMD or CBRN crises, demonstrate
resiliency, and contribute greatly to deterrence.

c. Specialized Activities. The JFC conducts the following specialized activities with
the ultimate end state of ensuring the US, allies, partners, and interests are neither coerced
nor attacked:

(1) Pathway Defeat. Pathway defeat activities and operations are designed to
prevent actors of concern from developing or acquiring WMD capabilities and to ensure
those who do not possess WMD do not obtain them. Pathway defeat comprise operations
and activities to delay, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise complicate networks, links, and nodes
that support the conceptualization, development, production, and proliferation of WMD.
Though pathway defeat efforts primarily focus on the prevention of WMD development,
activities and operations also include countering horizontal proliferation and/or
procurement once an initial capability has been attained. Chapters III, “Planning,” and IV,
“Execution,” expand on planning and executing considerations and specialized tasks for
preventing WMD acquisition or development. Designated USG departments and agencies
have primary responsibility for most CWMD efforts preceding WMD use. Therefore, the
JFC must closely work with other USG partners to learn about their activities, as well as
cooperate to fully understand the intricacies of pathways and associated networks to
effectively counter WMD development, proliferation, and/or procurement. By examining
WMD pathways through the lens of people, places, and things, it is possible to detect efforts
previously unidentified, emerging WMD actors and take action to complicate, disrupt, or
stop progress toward WMD development.

(2) WMD Defeat. WMD defeat activities focus on actions to contain and reduce
risks posed by extant WMD and/or stockpiles. Whether supporting the interagency or as a
lead, WMD defeat comprise operations and activities to contain, reduce, reverse,
neutralize, or destroy extant WMD and the ability to stockpile, transfer, or employ WMD.
These activities and operations may range from threat reduction cooperation while
operating in a permissive environment to the execution of lethal options. Chapters III,
“Planning,” and IV, “Execution,” expand on planning and executing considerations for
protecting against extant WMD capabilities and preparing for response, as well as
specialized tasks for CBRN response.

(3) CBRN Response. CBRN Response activities focus on actions taken to

defend, respond, and recover from WMD use if and when deterrence fails. The JFC
postures, prepares the force, and mitigates CBRN effects to operate and win in any given
environment. The JFC may also be called upon to support response efforts of allies and or

II-9
Chapter II

PNs, as well as provide defense support to US civil authorities and assist with forensic
attribution. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, expands
on planning and executing considerations, as well as specialized tasks for responding to
CBRN use.

For additional information on the specialized tasks, see Chapter IV, “Execution,”
paragraph 4, “Organizing Principles and Specialized Tasks."

d. Proactive actions can be taken at every stage of the WMD activity continuum to
successfully counter WMD development or proliferation, or use. CBRN defense activities
including reconnaissance and surveillance provide hazard awareness and understanding of
threats in order to posture forces. Furthermore, JFCs should bear in mind international
nonproliferation rules and dual-use technologies and capabilities may complicate CWMD
activities (e.g., Article IV of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [short
title: Nonproliferation Treaty {NPT}] acknowledges its signatories right to develop nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, which may also mask the development of fissile material for
warheads).

e. States with extant WMD capabilities may begin to indigenously produce and export
these same or related technologies to other actors of concern. The ability and willingness
of these states to export WMD-related technologies and materials to other states outside
of, or in noncompliance with, international nonproliferation rules are a serious threat.
Furthermore, a proliferation threat exists from non-state actors who proliferate WMD-
related technologies and materials, increasing the risks of terrorists acquiring WMD.
While difficult to detect, WMD proliferation that occurs outside of international controls
remains a JFC concern.

JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, expands on planning

and executing considerations, as well as specialized tasks for responding to CBRN use.

II-10 JP 3-40
 CHAPTER III
PLANNING

“Countering WMD [weapons of mass destruction] efforts often occur as part of

larger United States Government activities or military operations. Consequently,
they must be fully integrated into other plans and activities rather than isolated
as separate efforts.”

Department of Defense Strategy for Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction,
June 2014

1. General

Introduction. This chapter provides JFCs with information to assist them in the joint
planning process (JPP) to translate strategic CWMD guidance into operational designs and
corresponding plans that account for the transregional nature of the WMD problem set.
This chapter also discusses the many aspects of CWMD that should be integrated into joint
campaign, contingency, concept, and operation plans. Additionally, current planning
requires the integration of military CWMD planning with the other instruments of national
power to accomplish USG strategic objectives. Ultimately, across the entirety of the
CWMD mission, CWMD planning integrates WMD-specific knowledge, experience, and
capabilities into the JFC’s overall JPP.

2. The Competition Continuum and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Across the Range of Military Operations

a. Competition Continuum. The competition continuum is the environment under

which we conduct the range of military operations. The dynamic and complex
environment in which WMD acquisition and use occur requires the integration of activities
and operations across the competition continuum. The common aspect across the
continuum is an active campaigning mindset. Cooperation and competition below armed
conflict are, for practical purposes, always occurring, so the presence or absence of armed
conflict is the only variable element. This comprehensive framework requires the joint
force to play a more prominent role in areas regarded as outside the military sphere and
thus requiring integrated efforts with USG partners. JFCs determine the most effective
blend of CWMD activities and operations throughout the competition continuum to address
unique challenges posed by WMD. JFCs ensure these activities are best suited to dissuade
countries from developing WMD, deter use of WMD by actors of concern that have
developed a WMD capability, and, if necessary, defeat any state or non-state actor that uses
or threatens the use of WMD.

(1) Competition may also include, with SecDef approval, WMD defeat
operations against extant WMD capabilities in the hands of actors of concern. Competition
with a state actor does not preclude some cooperation with the same actor on other areas.
When properly executed, competition below armed conflict creates strategic opportunities
for the US and its partners.

III-1
Chapter III

(2) The joint force cooperates with existing and new partners to understand the
OE and develop their capabilities to conduct CWMD actions unilaterally or with the US
either regionally or transregionally. Cooperation may also include nonproliferation
activities to ensure compliance with treaties, conventions, and other control regimes.

b. Operations Across the Competition Continuum. JFCs conduct CWMD in a

wide variety of combat and non-combat situations across the competition continuum. The
competition continuum is augmented by the understanding that military activities and
operations take place along a continuum that spans from cooperation to competition below
the level of armed conflict to armed conflict. Military activities and operations involve
USG interorganizational support, as well as engagement with local CWMD forces and
governments; developing indigenous CWMD security capabilities; deterring WMD
threats; WMD crisis response operations; limited contingencies; and, when required,
CWMD operations in support of major operations and campaigns to counter WMD threats.
Furthermore, CWMD operations and activities along the competition continuum are not
arbitrarily binned into phases and may take place concurrently.

For more information on the competition continuum, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

(1) Major Operations and Campaigns. The President and SecDef may decide
to conduct major operations or campaigns involving large-scale combat to defeat a
significant WMD threat. Major operations and campaigns are characterized by the legal
use of violence to defeat another state’s military forces, as well as employment of other US
instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic. CWMD may be
the primary focus of a major operation or campaign or a subordinate objective. Operations,
activities, and investments below armed conflict and cooperation efforts may take place
while the joint force simultaneously executes major operations and campaigns.

(2) Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

(a) Crisis Response. The President and SecDef respond to imminent WMD
threats or actual WMD incidents by executing CJCS or CCMD CWMD crisis response
plans. CWMD crisis response operations, such as mitigating the effects of a CBRN
incident, may involve multiple threat locations. SecDef may deploy national forces to
address the situation and/or a CCMD may employ theater forces. Given the transregional
nature of the WMD environment, response plans often require an integrated approach and
collaboration between multiple CCMDs, PNs, and other mission partners.

For further guidance on military support to foreign CBRN response, refer to Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01, Defense Support for Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory, and JP 3-41,
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, for joint CBRN response.

(b) Domestic Response. Domestically, the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) is the lead federal agency for criminal investigations of all terrorist-related incidents
and threats, including those that involve nuclear/radioactive materials. The Department of

III-2 JP 3-40
 Planning

Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead for contingency response operations domestically
with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and Environmental Protection Agency.

For further guidance on military support to domestic CBRN response, refer to CJCSI
3125.01, Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)
Incidents in the Homeland. See JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Response, for joint CBRN response, and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities,
for guidance on DSCA.

(c) Limited Contingency Operations. In cases where there is time to

develop a contingency plan, the CCMD may employ CWMD forces in small-scale
operations, limited by duration and/or scope of the objective. Limited contingencies may
be conducted to achieve independent objectives as part of activities below armed conflict
or in support of major operations of extended duration involving sustained combat to
protect US interests, prevent attack, further conflict, or engage adversaries. CWMD
limited contingencies may take the form of intelligence operations to illuminate a WMD
proliferation network determined to be a threat to the US, strikes, or raids to neutralize or
reduce the threats and other operations as directed by SecDef.

For more guidance on joint operations and planning, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and
JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

(3) Military Engagement, SC, and Deterrence Activities. The primary

purpose of CWMD military engagement and SC activities is to enable PNs to build
indigenous capabilities that deter WMD threats and incidents, as well as conduct
operational preparation of the environment (OPE) to a desired set of conditions to facilitate
stability and future operations, as well as to support CWMD planning. Intelligence
operations and OPE include activities to understand the OE, information exchange and
intelligence sharing, development of PN and friendly military capabilities, identification
and development of infrastructure and logistics capabilities, interagency coordination, and
other efforts to ensure access to critical regions across the globe.

(a) Military Engagement. CWMD military engagement is a noncombat

activity conducted by CWMD staff representatives and forces conducting CWMD
operations. The objective of military engagement is to build trust and confidence, share
information, coordinate mutual activities, maintain influence, build defense relationships,
and develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational
operations.

(b) SC. SC in support of CWMD is a noncombat activity involving

interaction with foreign forces and the building of relationships promoting US CWMD
interests, developing PN CWMD capabilities and capacities for self-defense and
multinational operations, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access
to critical regions around the world. SC activities may advance US CWMD interests and
efforts.

III-3
Chapter III

(c) Deterrence Activities. Deterrence activities are conducted in an effort

to prevent WMD proliferation and/or use by presenting a credible US and/or PN response
through specific counteractions that would deny the effects an enemy intends to create by
using WMD. Effective deterrence may also call into question the utility of an adversary’s
intent to develop, maintain, or use WMD. Military force may be necessary to compel an
enemy to stop using WMD and to reestablish deterrence. Ideally, effective deterrence
influences an adversary’s decision-making processes without the need for military action.
Military engagement, SC, force posturing and forward deployment, information
integration, and demonstration of fielded CWMD capabilities all contribute to deter use of
WMD. Deterrence in one region may cause actors in another area to reconsider their intent
to proliferate or deliver WMD.

3. General Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Planning Guidance

a. Guidance for CWMD planning exists within national and DOD-specific guidance
documents (addressed in Chapter I, “Introduction”). The development of CWMD plans
and planning products serve to address campaign, contingency, and support planning
requirements derived from strategic guidance. Specific planning products support
requirements described in CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)
[short title: JSCP].

b. The JSCP contains a number of CWMD planning requirements, to include a JSCP-

directed, CWMD-specific functional campaign plan (Functional Campaign Plan for
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction [FCP-CWMD]); CWMD portions of global and
regional campaign plans, which are produced by CCMDs and promulgated through the
JSCP; either JSCP- or command-directed contingency plans with CWMD supporting
annexes or appendices; existing contingency plans, concept plans concept plans, or
operations plans; and CWMD-specified plans for existing execute orders.

(1) In addition, regional planning requirements are addressed through geographic

combatant commander (GCC) guidance to develop plans focusing on military engagement;
SC; deterrence; and other noncombat, understand, shape, and preventive activities through
the development of theater-specific plans such as a combatant command campaign plan
(CCP) or regional campaign plan. Regional CWMD planning can either be written into
stand-alone plans or incorporated into a CCP.

(2) Supporting CCMDs reinforce the planning efforts of supported commands to

address transregional planning concerns in their assigned global campaign plans and
integrated contingency plans. The GCC may direct the development of a contingency plan
to respond to WMD aggression, instability, or failure of a possessor state and other WMD-
related threats by crisis response, limited contingencies, or major operations.

For further information on detailed general planning considerations and process

descriptions of the JPP, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

III-4 JP 3-40
 Planning

4. Campaign and Operational Design for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Planning

Once the JFC and staff have reviewed and analyzed the strategic guidance for CWMD-
related campaign plans, and the FCP-CWMD, together with the OE, they articulate current
and desired conditions relevant to CWMD. Understanding the underlying factors
associated with existing conditions enables planners to identify and describe complex
WMD problems and issues. Once problems and issues have been thoroughly identified,
the CCMD staff develops their operational approach to describe the commander’s vision
of where and how resources and effort can be applied to create effects toward the
achievement of objectives. The GCC’s operational approach for CWMD should be
consistent with the strategic approach. The CWMD operational approach reflects the JFC’s
visualization for creating desired effects. The approach provides the necessary foundation
for detailed planning, as well as related branch plans that may evolve. During development
of the operational approach, the CCMD staff incorporates CWMD planning considerations
outlined later in this chapter.

5. Department of Defense Functional Campaign Plan Countering Weapons of Mass

Destruction Integration

The DODS-CWMD and the FCP-CWMD provides CCMDs, the Services, and combat
support agencies (CSAs) with a common strategy and framework to synchronize planning
on a regional, transregional, and global basis. It integrates DOD-wide efforts to prevent
the use, acquisition, and proliferation of WMD; prepare the joint force to respond to WMD
crises; and assure allies and partners. While conducting campaign and contingency
planning, CCMDs should integrate FCP-CWMD objectives and tasks. CCMDs may either
integrate their CWMD planning with respective campaign plans or develop a stand-alone
CWMD support plan. All plans should be coordinated with relevant USG departments and
agencies, allies, and PNs.

6. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Approach for Planning

a. All plans, where appropriate, should support achievement of DOD’s strategic

CWMD objectives, namely:

(1) Reduce incentives to pursue, possess, and employ WMD.

(2) Increase barriers to acquisition, proliferation, and potential use of WMD.

(3) Manage WMD risks emanating from hostile, fragile, or failed states and safe
havens.

(4) Deny the effects of current and emerging WMD threats through layered,
integrated defenses.

b. CCMD planning also accounts for regional, as well as the transregional and global,
implications of CWMD-related efforts. In response to the broader NDS guidance and more
specific JSCP requirements, CCMDs prepare, coordinate, and include activities and

III-5
Chapter III

operations within their respective campaign plans to support global campaign plans. In
this manner, transregional planning efforts achieve common regional and global CWMD
objectives. GCCs should maintain awareness of CWMD operations and activities
occurring outside their area of responsibility (AOR) to avoid negatively impacting or being
impacted by other CCDRs’ decisions and/or activities. Additionally, Services and CSAs
resource the majority of strategic CWMD programs and activities. Therefore, CCMDs
should coordinate their plans with these organizations to ensure alignment with current
resources and capability development.

7. Planning Considerations

a. Strategic Implications. Commanders at every level need to be aware of the

strategic implications associated with any WMD threat and adapt their CWMD planning
efforts accordingly. CWMD activities and operations occur at all three levels of warfare—
strategic, operational, and tactical—and any single action may have consequences at all
levels. Nowhere is this more evident than in joint operations involving WMD, where
action or inaction at the tactical level can have profound strategic repercussions. The
transregional nature of the threat and spectrum of the WMD continuum requires JFCs fully
understand the OE, foster civil-military dialogue, align military and nonmilitary activities,
employ an integrated approach, and continually assess and adapt planning.

b. JIPOE. JIPOE supports the JFC by characterizing the OE that contains WMD as
a system of pathways, networks, relevant actors, resources, and extant and potential
capabilities, all interacting within the competition continuum. This holistic
characterization and predictive analysis enables development of the operational design
elements and effective targeting. Additionally, analysis of potential transformational
events, such as the rise of new actors of concern and the impact of technology
breakthroughs, facilitates national-level determination of end states, objectives, and
priorities.

(1) Understanding the OE. Progress in the effort to counter WMD depends on
understanding the environment as it is, recognizing the change desired, identifying
activities to bring about that change, assessing whether that change has occurred, and
determining whether the change is a result of those activities or some external factor.
Assessing the conditions in the OE will determine where DOD resources and efforts should
be focused on a more acceptable set of conditions (e.g., responsible state behavior). This
understanding provides planners and operators a better appreciation of the actor of concern
and ultimately support preparation of the environment activities for any possible CWMD
operation.

(2) Understanding Baseline Conditions. As part of the JIPOE process, JFCs

develop an understanding of baseline conditions within the OEs. Establishing baseline
conditions is essential to creating effects, achieving objectives, and measuring progress
toward attaining end states. Analysis of baseline conditions enables the JFC to identify
where desired change is possible and to assess whether change has occurred. Baseline
conditions are critical to identifying anomalies that may indicate the presence of a WMD
threat. Many WMD threats may not be readily apparent without an understanding of

III-6 JP 3-40
 Planning

historical conditions. For instance, identifying biological anomalies that are indicators of
WMD usage requires an understanding of current and historical disease patterns, since
many potential biological weapons are the intentional use of naturally occurring pathogens.
Another consideration is the toxic industrial materials that may be manufactured, stored,
and/or transported within the OE that may cause WMD-like effects.

For further guidance on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment.

c. Interagency Coordination. USG departments and agencies planning and acting

together create effects that cannot be created by DOD alone due to differing authorities,
responsibilities, and capabilities. Various CWMD missions often place DOD in a
supporting role to other USG departments or agencies. CCMDs consider command
relationships, integration of resources, and coordination and synchronization of activities
as they develop any CWMD-related plans.

d. Allies and PNs. DOD CWMD efforts have a greater likelihood of success if
planned in cooperation with allies and PNs. CWMD shaping activities planned and
executed in cooperation with partners may prevent or disrupt actors of concern acquisition,
development, or employment of WMD and alleviate the need for more aggressive and
costly action later. In addition, collaborative action is effective at building partner
capabilities and creating stronger security relationships with allies and international
partners, which reduces impact on joint force resources and enhance the GCC’s ability to
respond to all types of crises.

e. Network Perspective. A JFC’s ability to characterize and monitor proliferation

networks and state WMD programs as holistic systems is essential to affecting that system.
One of the primary challenges facing the JFC is the proliferation of WMD technology and
products. The JFC strives to understand the continuous and complex interaction of
friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral networks.

For further guidance on threat networks, refer to JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

III-7
Chapter III

Intentionally Blank

III-8 JP 3-40
 CHAPTER IV
EXECUTION

“Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

1. General

Introduction. This chapter describes CWMD specialized tasks, as well as

foundational and crosscutting activities and tasks. It also articulates the critical role DOD,
joint forces, allies, and partners play in the successful execution of CWMD tasks.
Depending on the mission and OE, joint forces may also need to execute actions beyond
those discussed in this chapter.

a. Enabling and specialized tasks and associated capabilities are guided by DOD
CWMD strategic end states and priority objectives, as shown in Chapter I, “Introduction.”
CWMD activities and tasks are part of the range of military operations that take place
within the competition continuum. In this context, commanders ensure their forces counter
the threatened or actual use of WMD by actors of concern in their operational areas and
within in all OEs.

b. DOD leverages foundational and crosscutting activities and tasks (as illustrated in
Figure IV-1) to support specialized tasks that help prevent new WMD threats or use of
WMD, protect against extant WMD, and respond to WMD use by managing and mitigating
the associated consequences. DOD coordinates these CWMD efforts while incorporating
them into broader plans and activities.

2. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Activities and Tasks

a. The arrangement of foundational and crosscutting activities and tasks along with
specialized tasks within and across the organizing principles, serve as a method for
logically grouping tasks to prevent or counter specific WMD threats. To the extent
possible, foundational and crosscutting tasks are executed within the activities of: maintain
and expand technical expertise; cooperate with and support partners; and understand the
OE, threats, and vulnerabilities. Specialized tasks are placed within the respective
organizing principles of prevent, protect, and respond (Figure IV-1). While CWMD tasks
may be conducted individually or in conjunction with other operations, collectively they
support JFC operations.

b. The joint force leverages specialized and non-CWMD-specific activities and tasks
to achieve CWMD objectives. JFCs conduct a range of activities and tasks to advance
DOD CWMD efforts or support other USG requirements. These efforts utilize DOD
capabilities, such as ballistic missile defense; interagency capabilities, such as materials
analysis conducted by national laboratories; and PN capabilities, such as port security.
Execution of tasks bolsters common threat awareness and advances CWMD self-
sufficiency and military and civilian preparedness. The JFC and staff need to understand

IV-1
Chapter IV

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Activities and Tasks

Organizing Prevent Protect Respond

Principles

Specialized
Activities WMD Pathway Defeat WMD Defeat CBRN Response

Dissuade, deter, delay, Control (isolate, divert, Attribute, mitigate,

disrupt, destroy, deny, intercept, secure, seize) sustain, support
assure
Defeat (neutralize,
destroy)
Specialized
Tasks Disable (exploit,
degrade)
Dispose (reduce,
redirect, dismantle,
monitor)

Foundational Activities and Tasks:

 Maintain and expand technical expertise (recruit, develop, retain).
 Cooperate with support partners (partner, coordinate).

Crosscutting Activity and Tasks:

 Understand the environment, threats, and vulnerabilities (locate, identify,
characterize, assess, predict).

Legend
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear WMD weapons of mass destruction

Figure IV-1. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Activities and Tasks

the nonlinear and often concurrent nature of military activities that span across the
competition continuum.

3. Foundational and Crosscutting Activities and Tasks

a. Foundational Activities and Tasks. As depicted in Figure IV-1, foundational

activities and tasks for countering WMD consist of:

(1) Maintain and Expand Technical Expertise. This activity focuses on

nurturing and sustaining the intellectual capital provided by DOD and mission partner
CWMD experts. This knowledge and skill sets provide the necessary expertise for
CWMD-related planning, research and development, programing, exercising, system
integration, analysis, reachback, mission execution, and assessments. Maintaining
expertise requires long-term commitment to recruiting, developing, and retaining high-
quality personnel.

IV-2 JP 3-40
 Execution

(2) Cooperate with and Support Partners. JFCs should plan to perform
CWMD activities and tasks in full cooperation with USG interagency partners in a variety
of departments and agencies, multinational partners, and nongovernmental organizations.
In concert with the NDS, this activity recognizes the by, with, and through method as an
imperative to attaining strategic CWMD end states. This activity promotes common threat
awareness, builds CWMD self-sufficiency, improves military interoperability, enhances
military and civilian preparedness, enhances deterrence, and, in some cases, facilitates
security of dual-use and CBRN materials. The JFC will coordinate with partners to ensure
tasks associated with this activity are successfully conducted within military engagement,
SC, cooperative threat reduction (CTR), and deterrence operations and activities across the
competition continuum. The JFC should seek to strengthen existing partner relationships
and support programs to build the foundation for future partnering opportunities. When
conducting this activity, CCMDs coordinate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) and Department of State (DOS) to make contact with international counterparts in
PNs. JFCs need to include partners in planning and execution processes as early as
possible. CCMDs can then leverage existing activities, such as multinational training and
exercises, to strengthen relationships and improve regional capabilities and capacity to
achieve CWMD objectives.

For more information on exercises, see CJCS Guide 3500.01, (U) Chairman’s Guidance
for Training and Exercise Support to Global Integration.

(a) Partner Task. CCDRs maintain partnerships and seek new relationships
to build partner capacity in key areas that support CWMD across the competition
continuum. Domestic and foreign security partnerships support the collective capability to
deter, prevent, respond to, and defeat WMD threats and manage the effects of an attack.
These integration activities may require a coordinated international military response to
support nonproliferation efforts assigned by treaties, agreements, sanctions, and export
control regimes and frameworks and national, international, and host nation (HN)
programs.

(b) Coordinate Task. Promote and improve common threat awareness,

interoperability, and response preparedness. Actions that support this task include
operational planning with partners and SC efforts that synchronize CP activities such as
interdiction.

b. Crosscutting Activity and Tasks

Understand the Environment, Threats, and Vulnerabilities. The JFC

develops and maintains a comprehensive understanding of the WMD actors and materials
that affect the OE. To accomplish this, the JFC needs to locate, identify, characterize,
assess, and predict threats against US and partner vulnerabilities. Capabilities that support
these tasks include detection; modeling; identity intelligence; detailed operational
planning; and analysis of materials, precursors, and agents related to WMD proliferation,
development, or use. The JFC may use a combination of forces and capabilities such as
surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence analysts, interagency experts, conventional
forces, and SOF in support of this activity. This activity is an iterative process undertaken

IV-3
Chapter IV

continually throughout the planning process and during execution of operations and
activities.

(a) Locate Task. The JFC uses SOF and intelligence collection assets to
locate WMD-associated system nodes and program elements, to include production
facilities, storage/stockpile sites, and key program personnel. Developing robust
information sharing relationships, particularly related to identity data, is an essential
component to this task.

(b) Identify Task. Once a WMD-related element and capability is located,

the JFC’s intelligence staff, in coordination with mission partners, scopes, categorizes, and
prioritizes the posed threat. Confirmation of a threat will lead to further analysis to
characterize and then assess specific elements of the program more effectively in follow-
on tasks. During conflict, initial identification of CBRN materials will most likely be
performed by conventional forces. Prior to execution, conventional forces should be made
aware of the types of facilities, material, and munitions they may encounter so personnel
protective equipment, security, and reporting are properly prepared.

(c) Characterize Task. The JFC gains an understanding of an actor of

concern’s WMD program by mapping its individual components, internal linkages, and
external associations through a variety of intelligence collection and analysis capabilities.
This understanding must include the types of weapons and the materials, technology, and
expertise associated with all aspects of an actor of concern’s WMD capability. The JFC
staff uses characterization to inform assessment, attribution, and predictive analysis.
During and after conflict, characterization occurs when the joint force has access to and
can fully examine WMD facilities, stockpiles, weapons, and/or personnel. Understanding
gained through this process conducted by specifically trained and designated forces,
combined with subsequent definitive analyses at internationally recognized laboratories,
provides overall characterization of a WMD program’s size, scope, and type. Specialized,
technical capabilities are used to construct a common operational picture presenting current
information on the actors of concern, friendly forces, neutral elements, the environment,
and geospatial information.

(d) Assess Task. Analysis conducted in conjunction with larger DOD,

civilian, USG, and international partners helps the JFC determine the threat posed by an
actor of concern’s WMD program. This includes an assessment by the JFC staff of US and
PN vulnerabilities in relation to a specific actor’s WMD capability and the overall OE. The
JFC may use hazard estimation, measurement, and modeling systems, as well as
multinational exercises, to assess the level of threat that an actor of concern’s WMD poses
to US and friendly forces.

(e) Predict Task. Specialized, technical capabilities forecast changes to

actors of concern, friendly forces, neutral elements, the environment, and geospatial
information. JFCs use modeling, diagnostics, intelligence, and analysis capabilities to
understand the current environment, detect anomalies, and continually assess the WMD
threat and related networks to extrapolate possible future threats.

IV-4 JP 3-40
 Execution

4. Organizing Principles and Specialized Activities and Tasks

a. The organizing principles (prevent, protect, and respond) and associated

specialized activities (pathway defeat, WMD defeat and CBRN response) serve as the
operational framework for CWMD. The specialized tasks are conducted to impede the
development or acquisition of new WMD threats; defeat, contain, or reduce extant WMD
capabilities; and minimize the effects of CBRN use. Specialized tasks are not unique to a
particular organizing principle, but their effects may be greater when conducted in relation
to any one organizing principle (see Figures IV-2 through IV-4). The DODS-CWMD
emphasizes early action through pathway defeat to dissuade actors from pursuing WMD
and cooperating with partners to achieve countering WMD objectives.

(1) Specialized Activity 1: WMD Pathway Defeat. WMD pathway defeat and
related specialized tasks focus on the prevention of development or acquisition of WMD,
to include conventional, cyberspace, and special operations. As illustrated in Figure IV-2,
pathway defeat activities have the greatest impact on the prevent organizing principle and
focus on actions to dissuade, deter, delay, disrupt, destroy, divert, or otherwise complicate
conceptualization and development of WMD. Though not exclusive, pathway defeat
actions are often in support to or in close collaboration with interagency partners.

(a) Dissuade and Deter. JFCs conduct efforts to persuade or convince

potential actors of the futility or overwhelming cost of developing, acquiring, proliferating,
or using WMD. These actions, which are employed early in the pathway defeat continuum,
are intended to prevent potential actors of concern from making adverse geopolitical

Prevent (Pathway Defeat) Specialized Tasks

Organizing Prevent Protect Respond

Principles

Greatest Effect Partial Effect Marginal Effect

(Preferred) (Secondary) (Tertiary)

Dissuade
Deter
Delay
Specialized Disrupt
Tasks
Destroy
Deny
Assure

Figure IV-2. Prevent (Pathway Defeat) Specialized Tasks

IV-5
Chapter IV

choices but may also serve to persuade known actors of concern from challenging global
norms. Ideally, these pre-development activities may preclude the need to directly employ
offensive capabilities against actors of concern.

1. Dissuade Task. This task involves joint force efforts and resources
to prevent actors of concern from development ideation, acquisition, proliferation, or
maintaining WMD capabilities.

2. Deter Task. This task involves joint force efforts and resources to
prevent the use of WMD by actors of concern by creating a credible threat of unacceptable
consequences resulting from WMD use and the belief that the costs of WMD use outweigh
the potential benefits.

(b) Delay Task. The JFC conducts efforts to slow down an actor of
concern’s development, acquisition, proliferation, or use of WMD. These efforts may
include capabilities employed directly against the actor of concern or in support of another
lead agency to create lethal and/or nonlethal effects. This can include direct action against
specific nodes in a WMD network or program such as production facilities, computer
networks, and transportation or financial nodes. Efforts to delay adversaries may also
include financial sanctions, legal actions, or restriction of travel (e.g., national watch list).

(c) Disrupt Task. The JFC may choose to interrupt an actor of concern’s
development or acquisition of a WMD capability by preventing access to critical
components. This may be done with direct action interdicting material en route.
Disruption is particularly well suited for targeting key nodes in an actor of concern’s
network, such as transportation, leadership, logistics, or financial nodes.

(d) Deny Task. Early in the WMD continuum, the JFC frustrates and
ultimately negates all paths to an actor of concern’s acquisition or development ambitions.
Though less effective and more costly and difficult, denying WMD proliferation, further
qualitative or quantitative improvements, and WMD use may also take place in the protect-
WMD defeat activity.

(e) Assure Task. The joint force reassures friends and partners through
force posture and the use of cooperative security agreements to extend deterrence,
particularly nuclear forces, for their protection. This reassurance serves to dissuade states
from developing their own deterrent WMD capabilities.

(2) Specialized Activity 2: WMD Defeat. After acquisition or development of

a capability, WMD defeat efforts target the ability to assemble, stockpile, deliver, transfer,
or employ WMD. This involves the JFC employing tailored capabilities to neutralize or
destroy weapons and agents; delivery systems; and materials, facilities, and processes,
including the functional or structural defeat of hardened targets. WMD defeat activities
have the greatest impact on the protect organizing principle. This activity is sub-divided
in four major groupings: control, defeat, disable, and dispose. Figure IV-3 lists major
groupings and specialized tasks associated with WMD defeat, which has the greatest
impact on the protect organizing principle.

IV-6 JP 3-40
 Execution

Protect (Weapons of Mass Destruction Defeat) Specialized Tasks

Organizing
Principles Prevent Protect Respond

Groups and
Partial Effect (Secondary) Greatest Effect Partial Effect (Secondary)
(Preferred)
Specialized Tasks Marginal Effect (Tertiary) Marginal Effect (Tertiary)

Control Isolate
Divert
Intercept
Seize
Secure

Defeat Destroy
Neutralize

Disable Exploit
Degrade

Dispose Reduce
Redirect
Dismantle
Monitor

Figure IV-3. Protect (Weapons of Mass Destruction Defeat) Specialized Tasks

(a) Control WMD Threats. The joint force isolates, diverts, intercepts,
seizes, and secures WMD, including related technology, materials, expertise, and means of
delivery to prevent access to or movement of the actor of concern’s program elements.
Control may be executed throughout the competition continuum. It routinely relies on
capabilities that are not specialized for CWMD but are nonetheless essential to CWMD
success.

1. Isolate Task. The joint force isolates and denies access to critical
WMD program components to impede actors of concern from furthering WMD
acquisition, development, proliferation, or utilization. This task includes conducting
critical factors analyses of WMD programs to identify capabilities, requirements, and
vulnerabilities that can be acted upon. Isolation operations may require the coordination
of conventional forces and interagency and international partners, to include law
enforcement and specialized technical capabilities. Isolation of WMD critical components
may be necessary for follow-on CWMD activities and tasks.

IV-7
Chapter IV

2. Divert Task. This task involves efforts and resources to change the
intended course or destination of shipments of WMD, related technologies, materials,
expertise, and/or means of delivery, either willingly or by force. The JFC may use a
combination of operations to accomplish this task. In some cases, this may not require
employment of force; rather, a show of force, the demonstration of a US presence, or a
formal communication of USG concern will create the desired effect. For example,
diversion may result from activities such as cyberspace operations, maritime interception
operations, or formal diplomatic actions (demarche).

3. Intercept Task. Conventional forces and SOF may be necessary to

stop the movement or proliferation of CBRN materials, WMD components, means of
delivery, WMD-related personnel, or functional weapons. Such actions may require
boarding, search, and detection capabilities to secure and seize shipments. Intercept
operations will likely involve interagency or multinational partners. This task may involve
a combination of activities such as port inspections and checkpoints that would authorize
USG or international partner inspections. This may include US Navy personnel embarked
aboard USCG vessels to carry out necessary technical inspections.

For more information on maritime interdiction, see JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

4. Seize Task. The joint force uses offensive action to obtain control
and possession of WMD capabilities (e.g., a designated area, building, transport, materials,
or personnel) to deny an actor of concern’s access to WMD capabilities. Once a force
seizes a WMD-related objective, it secures the objective and prepares it for follow-on
actions such as exploitation and/or destruction.

5. Secure Task. The joint force establishes protective measures to

prevent unauthorized access to sites or removal of WMD-related technologies, materials,
or personnel. Security may be necessary to prevent use, proliferation, or looting of WMD
capabilities or to prevent compromising integrity of physical evidence. The requirement
to secure sites is a crucial mission-analysis consideration due to the potentially large force
requirements and the balance of competing JFC priorities. WMD master site lists prioritize
WMD-related sites for deconfliction and integration with other objectives.

(b) Defeat WMD Threats. The joint force neutralizes or destroys extant
WMD to ensure no WMD use. The preponderance of the scope and efforts take place
within WMD defeat activities and the protect organizing principle but, as with every
activity or task, aspects of it may bleed over into the prevention and response organizing
principles. Within the prevent organizing principle, the joint force may defeat an actor of
concern’s ability to develop, acquire, proliferate, or use WMD by neutralizing or
destroying nodes in the WMD network or program. Defeat may take place below the level
of armed conflict and in conflict as either a specialized action or as part of a larger
operation.

1. Destroy Task. The joint force destroys WMD capabilities so they

cannot perform their intended function without being entirely rebuilt. Such actions require
a significant amount of pre-strike planning and authorization prior to execution. Proper

IV-8 JP 3-40
 Execution

weaponeering and hazard modeling help the JFC employ the proper resources, understand
the potential consequences of execution, and minimize collateral damage. The JFC needs
to consider national and strategic objectives of such an operation or campaign before
deciding to destroy a WMD-related target. This task is also applicable to disabling WMD
threats.

2. Neutralize Task. The joint force utilizes a combination of

capabilities that create lethal and/or nonlethal effects to render actor of concern’s WMD
capabilities ineffective or unusable. Examples include making chemical and biological
agents and materials harmless or making delivery systems unusable. When assigning tasks
to neutralize WMD, commanders specify the actor of concern’s capability or material and
the duration it should be rendered ineffective or unusable. Forces (including specialized
units and equipment) required to neutralize a target vary according to the type and size of
the target and desired effects.

(c) Disable WMD Threats. The joint force exploits and degrades critical
and at-risk components of a WMD program. Critical components are those that pose an
immediate threat to friendly forces, while at-risk components are those components of a
WMD program that are at risk of loss or proliferation. The joint force disables WMD
program components to ensure these items are not used, lost, stolen, or proliferated. If
follow-on activities to complete WMD program dismantlement are required, the joint force
may transfer responsibility to another department or agency for final disposition. The joint
force must establish control of the specified WMD target before disablement can be
conducted.

1. Exploit Task. The joint force seeks to maximize the value of

intelligence gained from personnel, data, information, and materials obtained during
CWMD operations. Processing and exploitation of information, personnel, and/or materiel
found during the conduct of CWMD operations may be conducted at various locations in
conjunction with interagency and international partners, as required, to produce timely,
actionable intelligence.

For further guidance on processing and exploitation, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence,
and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

2. Degrade Task. The joint force seeks to erode an actor of concern’s

ability to develop, proliferate, or use WMD by disrupting functionality of WMD or related
capabilities. Degradation should ensure the actor of concern is not able to threaten friendly
forces for a period of time. Typically destruction and disposal of an actor’s WMD
capability are preferred to degradation, but factors such as time, resources, access, and
security may necessitate only the most critical, at-risk elements be degraded and/or
destroyed.

(d) Dispose of WMD Threats. The joint force conducts and/or supports a
systematic effort to rid an actor of concern of the remnants (e.g., program elements,
facilities, surplus, dual-use capacity, confiscated/seized cargo, equipment, delivery
systems) of a WMD program. Typically, the JFC sets conditions for disposition of an actor

IV-9
Chapter IV

of concern’s WMD program, but final disposition will probably require a larger USG or
international effort. This may include deliberate technical processes that reduce or
dismantle production methods, materials, stockpiles, and technical infrastructure;
establishment of protocols of reductions and compensation or agreements to return seized
cargo; the redirection of WMD, related technologies, materials, or an actor’s efforts and
expertise towards peaceful productive activities; and monitoring to ensure expertise or
program elements are not re-constituted or reused in any illicit capacity. Appendix B,
“Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal Considerations,” addresses treaties,
resolutions, control regimes, activities, and legal considerations, which JFCs account for
and which will shape the planning of operations and campaigns that deal with the WMD
threats or hazards.

1. Reduce Task. The joint force conducts and/or supports efforts to

diminish an actor of concern’s WMD program, improve the security of remaining
capabilities and critical components, reduce costs of sustaining the program elements, and
eliminate excess capacity or capability. Reduction programs and operations, such as
demilitarization of stockpiles, may be led by another USG department or agency, PN, or
international organization. CCMDs should coordinate activities to make certain they are
mutually supporting and do not conflict.

2. Redirect Task. The joint force conducts and/or supports repurposing

facilities, expertise, and material associated with an actor of concern’s WMD program
elements. Redirection of expertise includes retaining personnel with WMD expertise (e.g.,
scientists and engineers) for new, legitimate employment. This is especially acute when
program elements have a dual-use nature. Depending on the OE, the lead for this effort
will most likely have transitioned to another organization or PN. The JFC should be
prepared to provide support as directed.

3. Dismantle Task. The joint force conducts and/or supports the

process by which an actor of concern’s WMD facility, stockpile, or program is
systematically taken apart to a level that it can no longer operate for its intended purpose.
Depending on the operating environment, the lead for this effort may have already
transitioned to another organization or PN. The JFC should be prepared to provide support
as directed. If directed to execute this task, the JFC may require specialized capabilities
and will need to consider possible consequences of execution.

4. Monitor Task. The joint force conducts and/or supports continuous

review and inspection of programs, personnel, and facilities to ensure they are not
producing WMD and remnants of an actor of concern’s WMD program are not being
reconstituted or reused in any illicit capacity. The JFC and DOD will normally be
functioning in support of USG interagency and international partners. Depending on
information requirements, the JFC may conduct intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, or use other collection methods to support this task. Monitoring treaty
compliance is also addressed in Appendix B, “Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal
Considerations.”

IV-10 JP 3-40
 Execution

Respond (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response)

Specialized Tasks

Organizing
Principles Prevent Protect Respond

Specialized Marginal Effect Partial Effect Greatest Effect

Tasks (Tertiary) (Secondary) (Preferred)

Attribute

Mitigate

Sustain

Support

Figure IV-4. Respond (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response)

Specialized Tasks

(3) Specialized Activity 3: CBRN Response. CBRN response efforts minimize

the effect of CBRN use to the joint force and other mission-critical personnel. Figure IV-
4 lists the specialized tasks associated with CBRN response: attribute, mitigate, sustain,
and support, and as depicted in the figure, they have the greatest effect on the respond
organizing principle. Actions to manage consequences support US and foreign civil
authorities and their populations by responding to a CBRN incident and mitigating the
hazards and the effects of WMD use. Actions to safeguard the force are completed during
the conduct of other CWMD activities, since those activities may require the force to
operate in an environment contaminated by CBRN hazards or effects of WMD use. When
conducted on a small scale, tasks to safeguard the force may constitute part or all of a crisis
response or limited contingency operation. For major operations and campaigns, which
balance offensive, defensive, and stability operations, this activity supports the joint force’s
defensive and stability actions. Within the construct of such operations, the joint force
needs to be prepared for a variety of WMD situations, such as an inadvertent release,
release due to joint force action, or an actor of concern’s employment of CBRN materials.

For further guidance on DSCA, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.
For more information on safeguarding the force and managing consequences, see JP 3-
11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, and JP
3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, respectively.

For further guidance on domestic CBRN response, refer to CJCSI 3125.01, Defense
Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the
Homeland.

IV-11
Chapter IV

For further guidance on international CBRN response operations, refer to Department of

Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.21, DOD Support to International Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents, and CJCSI 3214.01, Defense Support for
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory.

b. Attribute Task. The joint force conducts and/or supports efforts to determine the
origin of the material or weapon, as well as the actor responsible for a CBRN event. The
process derives forensic conclusions from analysis of collected samples and information
from law enforcement and intelligence sources. Forensic-enabled intelligence collection,
processing, exploitation, and analysis capabilities support the identification of CBRN
sourcing and attribution. Joint forces directly support the attribution process through
intelligence (e.g., site exploitation), sample collection and transfer, and technical analysis.
These forces require training, certification, specialized equipment and expertise, and, in
some cases, the JFC requests unique authorities prior to execution. These forces are
identified early in the planning process. Attribution provides a dissuasion and deterrence
value if properly signaled to actors of concern but as a capability is focused on response
activities.

c. Mitigate Task. The joint force conducts efforts to lessen the effects of a CBRN
incident or WMD attack. This task focuses on minimizing or negating the vulnerability to,
and effects of, WMD attacks and CBRN incidents. These activities may support civil
authorities and foreign governments.

d. Sustain Task. The joint force conducts logistics and personnel efforts to maintain
and prolong the capability to respond to CBRN incidents. In reference to the joint force,
sustainment is the ability to support operations in a CBRN environment and conduct
recovery/reconstitution operations to regenerate unit combat readiness (e.g., detailed troop
decontamination, detailed equipment decontamination, medical activities, and rest and
relaxation). These activities may also support civil authorities and foreign governments.

e. Support Task. In many scenarios, DOD, and the JFC, will be directed to support
another USG department or agency (e.g., DHS or DOS) in the conduct of operations to
provide assistance to civil authorities when their own capabilities are insufficient to save
lives and maintain essential government services. In the event of a CBRN incident where
the HN does not have the capability to support the local population and DOS does not have
a presence, DOD may be directed by the President or SecDef to lead US operations. The
JFC should be aware of any standing agreement that may provide a means to deliver this
support as required.

IV-12 JP 3-40
 APPENDIX A
ORGANIZATIONAL AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. General

a. This appendix identifies the numerous USG organizations that have a role in
CWMD and highlights their various responsibilities, functions, and capabilities. While
this list is extensive, it is not all-inclusive. Conventional forces and SOF regularly conduct
operations and activities that contribute to CWMD efforts, either directly or indirectly.
Additionally, specially trained or designated forces used to conduct strategic deterrence;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; or counterterrorism (CT) missions also
contribute to CWMD mission success. This appendix highlights organizations with
specific CWMD authorities, responsibilities, or missions. However, when planning or
executing a CWMD operation, a JFC should leverage all of DOD’s and USG’s CWMD
capabilities.

b. Success in CWMD requires a coordinated, whole-of-government effort. DOD

recognizes that DOS is normally the USG lead agency for CWMD operations abroad, and
DOD has a supporting role during shaping activities. To formally coordinate with
interagency partners, CCMDs identify programs and activities of concern to the Joint Staff
(JS) and OSD. Using the National Security System coordination process, OSD facilitates
interaction among CCMDs and interagency partners. CCDRs use established relationships
to coordinate with interagency partners to increase their success in CWMD.

c. When planning or executing CWMD operations and activities, JFCs coordinate and
cooperate with not only other USG departments and agencies but also multinational
partners. With numerous stakeholders in the CWMD mission area, it is critical that unity
of effort is achieved and the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the numerous
organizations are understood by the JFC. JFCs should consider the capabilities and
responsibilities of the organizations in this chapter when determining command
relationships and coordinating interorganizational activities.

2. Department of Defense Organizations, Responsibilities, and Relationships

a. SecDef and the CJCS

(1) OSD. OSD develops, coordinates, and oversees implementation and

integration of DOD CWMD policy. OSD coordinates with interagency partners for the
transition or transfer of responsibility of CWMD operations from the Armed Forces of the
United States to and from other USG departments and agencies, international
organizations, or other nations, as appropriate. OSD coordinates with both DOS and the
JS to obtain international CWMD legal authorities, protocols, standards, and agreements;
multinational support for CWMD operations; and, when required, HN support. They
coordinate with DOS to notify the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
of discoveries or destruction of chemical weapons materials and former production
facilities. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is the international
organization tasked to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

A-1
Appendix A

Production, Stockpiling, and use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction [short
title: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)]. They coordinate with the National
Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) to enhance intelligence support regarding WMD
capabilities of all state and non-state actors. OSD coordinates with other USG departments
and agencies in support to the homeland in the conduct of DSCA operations, such as
domestic CBRN response or nuclear forensics. They also coordinate DOD processes and
procedures within the USG National Technical Nuclear Forensics interagency community.

For further information on roles and responsibilities for CWMD, refer to DODD 2060.02,
DOD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy.

(2) CJCS. The CJCS serves as the principal military advisor to the President,
NSC, and SecDef regarding CWMD activities. The CJCS approves the apportionment of
forces for planning. The CJCS also recommends assignment and allocation of forces to
the SecDef to execute the CWMD mission. The CJCS is designated as the global
integrator. Subject to the CJCS’s authority, direction, and control, the JS coordinates with
the CCMDs and Services to ensure CWMD operations are executed in compliance with
domestic, international, and foreign laws, policies, treaties, and agreements. The JS assists
with interagency support for CWMD operations and assists in planning and exercising
CWMD activities within the interagency process. They also coordinate and provide
intelligence support to the CCDRs for target identification and prioritization. When
required, after SecDef approval, the CJCS will publish appropriate execute orders for
CWMD activities.

For more information on the CJCS role as the global integrator, refer to CJCSI 3050.01,
(U) Implementing Global Integration.

b. CCMDs

(1) General. GCCs plan and execute CWMD missions within their AORs. They
develop CWMD strategy, policies, and campaign and contingency plans for their AORs;
determine CWMD mission shortfalls; identify CWMD mission resourcing requirements;
and incorporate CWMD activities into their operational plans. Functional CCMDs support
GCC CWMD activities as designated in CCPs, functional campaign plans, regional
campaign plans, contingency plans, or as directed by SecDef.

(2) United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

(a) CDRUSSOCOM serves as the DOD CWMD coordinating authority and,

where appropriate, provides mission advocacy to enable CCMD transregional CWMD
campaign activities to counter emerging and existing threats and disrupt WMD capability
development. As coordinating authority, CDRUSSOCOM leads CWMD plans
development; recommends changes in any area of the plan and resourcing, including
changes to strategic prioritization matrix; integrates assessments emphasizing or
deemphasizing areas based on the broader campaign objectives; sets priorities of all tasks
or objectives in the plan; assesses risk and mitigations for all tasks and objectives;
nominates strategic objectives; and develops decision support templates and aligns

A-2 JP 3-40
 Organizational and Command Relationships

campaign resources to support contingency plans. Additionally, CDRUSSOCOM

performs the following functions:

1. In collaboration with the CCMDs, the Defense Intelligence Agency

(DIA), and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), facilitates the development of
strategic-level JIPOE in support of the CWMD mission.

2. In coordination with the CCMDs, JS, DOD agencies, other USG

departments and agencies, and PNs, develops a CWMD assessment and transregional
synchronization process that supports shared understanding of WMD threats, coordinates
DOD campaign activities, and informs priorities and resource decisions.

3. In collaboration with the CCMDs, supports the conduct and

coordination of preparation of the environment/OPE to facilitate GCC campaign activities
to identify, disrupt, or interdict proliferation of illicit WMD material or dual- and multi-
use use technology.

4. In collaboration with DIA, the JS, the CCMDs, and DTRA, creates,
maintains, and manages a CWMD collaboration and dissemination dashboard. This
dashboard is a strategic visualization of DOD CWMD products and portals to support
CDRUSSOCOM’s CWMD coordinating authority. It displays transregional situational
awareness of WMD threats and DOD, interagency, and PN CWMD efforts. The dashboard
enables coordination and collaboration within, and external to, DOD to inform
CDRUSSOCOM, the JS, and SecDef decision making. It also assists CDRUSSOCOM in
executing advocacy, assessment, planning, and recommendation roles.

5. The USSOCOM CWMD Fusion Cell coordinates planning of a DOD

CWMD campaign; integrates intelligence priorities; assesses progress against WMD
networks and pathways; articulates gaps and advocates for capabilities to improve DOD
unity of effort; and supports the execution of CWMD operations, activities, and
investments to disrupt and defeat national, regional, and transregional WMD threats. The
Fusion Cell also provides planning assistance to CCMDs for CWMD-related campaigns,
contingency plans, and exercise activities through regionally aligned, yet transregionally
focused, planning support teams.

(b) USSOCOM has a Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 167,
responsibility to provide specialized forces developed, recruited, selected, trained,
organized, equipped, and capable of carrying out assigned missions, including the conduct
of the military activities and operations to counter WMD as directed in DODD 2062.02,
DOD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy, and DODD 5100.01,
Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components. USSOCOM
synchronizes the planning of special operations and provides SOF to support persistent,
networked, and distributed CCMD operations to deter adversary use of WMD and advance
national interests. USSOCOM provides DOD with unique capabilities: operational reach
as well as agile, scalable, and flexible options for military action across the breadth of
special operations core activities, the competition continuum, and geographic boundaries,
and seams. USSOCOM CWMD capabilities include its ability to provide tailored SOF

A-3
Appendix A

executing the special operations core activities, C2 for SOF, and planning capabilities for
SOF and DOD CWMD requirements.

(3) United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). Commander,

USNORTHCOM, exercises coordinating authority for planning of DOD efforts in support
of the USG response to pandemic influenza and infectious disease. Both USNORTHCOM
and United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) have specific
responsibilities related to DSCA that may include CBRN response operations to save lives
and minimize suffering.

(4) United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Commander,

USSTRATCOM, leads strategic deterrence planning, in coordination with other CCMDs,
and executes strategic deterrence operations as directed. USSTRATCOM employs tailored
nuclear, global strike, electronic warfare, missile defense, and intelligence capabilities to
deter strategic attack, assure allies, and, as directed, decisively respond if deterrence fails.

(5) United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Commander,

USCYBERCOM, plans and executes global cyberspace operations. USCYBERCOM
employs tailored cyberspace operations missions to deter adversaries, counter the
proliferation of WMDs, shape the OE, and, when required, defeat threats via effects in and
through cyberspace.

(6) United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

Commander, USTRANSCOM, exercises coordinating authority for joint deployment and
distribution enterprise operations and planning. USTRANSCOM provides common-user
and commercial air, land, and sea transportation; terminal management; aerial refueling;
and aero medical evacuation of patients, as required, to support the global deployment,
employment, sustainment, and redeployment of US forces in support of CWMD missions.
When requested by a federal agency and approved by SecDef, USTRANSCOM provides
transportation support to non-DOD organizations, such as movement of critical capabilities
or commodities or evacuation of personnel. The command advocates for policy and
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and
facilities requirements for returning CBRN-contaminated airlift and sealift platforms to
general use. In coordination with the geographic CCMDs, USTRANSCOM ensures
contingency plans address CBRN vulnerabilities of the entire supply chain.

c. Military Departments. The Services serve in the following roles in CWMD:

(1) Organize, train, equip, and otherwise prepare military forces to conduct
missions to counter WMD and their means of delivery in support of the JFC.

(2) Contribute to shaping an international environment hostile to proliferation

and strengthening deterrence through building partners’ CWMD-related capabilities and
capacities.

(3) Coordinate CWMD capability needs with the CJCS and advocate for military
capabilities to counter WMD.

A-4 JP 3-40
 Organizational and Command Relationships

(4) Maintain and expand CWMD technical expertise.

(5) Provide subject matter expertise to support CCMD requirements in the

CWMD mission area, as directed.

d. Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB). The CNGB formulates, develops, and
coordinates all policies, programs, and plans affecting CWMD assets within the National
Guard (NG). The CNGB synchronizes the alert and deployment of the NG CBRN response
enterprise with the state adjutant general via their National Guard joint force headquarters
state (NG JFHQ-State) and Commander, USNORTHCOM, for major or catastrophic
CBRN incidents within the US and its territories to support civil authorities in response to
CBRN incidents in order to save lives and minimize human suffering. NG CBRN
enterprise assets consist of military first responders comprised of WMD-civil support
teams; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives enhanced
response force packages; and homeland response forces.

For more information on DOD CBRN Response Enterprise assets, see JP 3-41, Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

e. CSAs

(1) DIA. The DIA Office of Science and Technology applies CWMD technical
expertise, scientific methods, and technical tradecraft across the full range of intelligence
operations in support of global technical collection, exploitation, and operations. The DIA
also develops a deep understanding of the following specialties: research and development,
technical collections, technical exploitation, and technical operations.

(2) DTRA. DTRA enables DOD, the USG, and international partners to counter
and deter WMD and improvised threat networks. Implied in this mission statement is the
strategic imperative to enable a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrence. Specific
DTRA capabilities and functions supporting the CCMDs include the following:

(a) In coordination with USSOCOM, provides planning to support CCMDs

for CWMD-related plans. Specifically, provides CWMD support to CCMDs with respect
to global, regional, and functional campaign, contingency, and component-level planning.

(b) Manages and oversees research, development, test, and evaluation to

counter the threat and use of WMD and assist in the development and integration of
capabilities to support DOD CWMD efforts and activities.

(c) Provides a continuous CBRN decision support capability and serves as

the technical hub for the National Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Technical
Reachback Enterprise. The National Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Technical
Reachback Enterprise provides planning, execution, and battle damage assessment for
military operations on WMD, CBRN, and toxic industrial chemical/toxic industrial
material facilities and events, including hard and deeply buried targets, collateral damage
estimation, and collateral effect analyses. The National Countering Weapons of Mass

A-5
Appendix A

Destruction Technical Reachback Enterprise also provides federal and civil authorities’
hazard assessment and response assistance and foreign CCMD response assistance.

(d) In coordination with CCMDs, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
and the JS, and under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment, implements the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
CTR, International Counterproliferation Program, and CBRN Preparedness Program to
build partnership capacity in coordination with CCMDs.

(e) Conducts arms-control treaty monitoring and on-site inspections in

support of DOD’s role in the verification of, and compliance with, WMD treaties and
agreements.

(f) Plans support to GCCs in identifying and prioritizing opportunities to

reduce or secure vulnerable nuclear weapons and chemical biological warfare stockpiles;
delivery systems; and materials of concern, including NTAs.

(g) Provides tactical radiological and nuclear search operations expertise and
equipment for overt and low-visibility search, spanning from a recovery or recapture of a
lost or stolen US weapon or interdiction of nuclear materials of concern. Also, conducts
field confirmatory analysis and characterization of CBRN materials of concern and
advises, trains, equips, assists, and provides exercise support to designated CCMD forces.

(3) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The NGA is a unique

combination of intelligence agency and CSA. It provides timely, relevant, accurate, and
actionable geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). The NGA serves an important role in
GEOINT support to CWMD activities.

3. United States Government Organizations, Responsibilities, and Relationships

a. General. CWMD requires unity of effort, which results in a coordinated response

of combined capabilities of the USG. Coordination between DOD and other USG
departments and agencies is critical to the success of CWMD operations against the global
WMD threat. Short of war, these CWMD efforts are normally led by a department or
agency other than DOD. In many cases, the JFC will be supporting another USG
department or agency and that organization may be supporting a PN or international
organization. SecDef is a statutory member of the NSC, while the CJCS serves in the role
of principal military advisor. The NSC Staff oversees lines of communications between
USG departments and agencies involved in CWMD activities to facilitate unity of effort.
This is intended to leverage all instruments of national power. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy and JS facilitate coordination between CCMDs and interagency partners
to meet defense planning requirements. Additionally, where appropriate, coordination
with interagency partners also occurs through a combination of military representatives to
country teams, geographic CCMDs’ joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs) or
similar elements, and established joint interagency task forces.

b. The majority of interagency CWMD programs and contributions occur as shaping

activities, which include ongoing operations and activities such as SC. Since there are a

A-6 JP 3-40
 Organizational and Command Relationships

number of different organizations within the USG that contribute to CWMD, it is important
to develop some level of mutual awareness of their roles and capabilities to identify
potential areas for cooperation. USG departments and agencies, and their CWMD-related
functions, are summarized in the following paragraphs.

(1) Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

(a) National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The NCTC is the primary

organization in the USG that integrates and analyzes intelligence pertaining to terrorism
and CT, including all intelligence related to terrorist use of WMD. The NCTC collocates
intelligence, military, law enforcement, and homeland security networks to facilitate
information sharing across USG departments and agencies. In addition to its information
sharing role, the NCTC provides an interagency planning function for CT activities and is
responsible for integrating all instruments of national power toward successful
implementation of the national CT strategy.

(b) NCPC. The NCPC works with the intelligence community to identify
critical gaps in WMD knowledge resulting from shortfalls in collection, analysis, or
exploitation and then develops solutions to reduce or close these gaps. The NCPC does
this by analyzing, integrating, and disseminating comprehensive, all-source WMD
proliferation intelligence; providing all-source intelligence support needed for the
execution of CP plans or activities; and performing independent WMD proliferation
analysis. It may also play a role in the nuclear attribution process by fusing law
enforcement and intelligence information with nuclear forensics conclusions provided by
national technical nuclear forensics center. The majority of the NCPC staff are detailed
from the intelligence community, as well as DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE)
national laboratories.

(2) DOS. DOS plays a crucial role in the overall USG effort to counter WMD.
DOS aims to build international consensus on arms control and nonproliferation based on
common concern and shared responsibility. The Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security leads interagency policy development on nonproliferation and
manages global US security policy, principally in the areas of nonproliferation, arms
control, regional security and defense relations, and arms transfers and security assistance.
Other specific responsibilities include directing and coordinating export control policies
and policies to prevent missile, nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons
proliferation. DOS CWMD responsibilities are primarily planned and executed via the
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC); the Bureau of International
Security and Nonproliferation (ISN); and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), all
of which report to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security.

(a) AVC. The AVC core missions concern arms control, verification, and
compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements
or commitments. The AVC advances national and international security through the
negotiation and implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements involving
WMD and their means of delivery. As the principal policy community representative to
the intelligence community, The AVC ensures US intelligence capabilities are effectively

A-7
Appendix A

acquired, maintained, and enhanced to collect, analyze, and disseminate precise and timely
information bearing upon matters of verification and compliance. These verification and
compliance reviews concern the nature and status of foreign governments’ WMD and
delivery system programs. The AVC also provides, through its Nuclear Risk Reduction
Center, information technology support and secure government-to-government
communications linkages with treaty partners.

(b) ISN. The ISN manages a broad range of US nonproliferation policies,

programs, agreements, and initiatives. The ISN leads DOS’s efforts to prevent the spread
of WMD—whether chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear—and their delivery
systems.

(c) PM. The PM provides policy direction in the areas of international

security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense
trade. The PM also facilitates coordination of CWMD efforts between DOS and DOD.

(d) International Security Advisory Board. The International Security

Advisory Board provides DOS with independent insight and advice on all aspects of arms
control, disarmament, international security, CWMD, and related aspects of public
diplomacy.

(3) DHS. DHS protects the US against threats to the homeland. The National
Response Framework, prepared by DHS, provides information on how USG departments
and agencies should work together to prepare for and respond to WMD events. The global
nuclear detection architecture is a framework for detecting (through technical and
nontechnical means), analyzing, and reporting on nuclear and other radioactive materials
that are out of regulatory control. DHS agencies, along with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) through the FBI, DOE, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of
Commerce (DOC), DOD, and the intelligence community, play a vital role in supporting
national CWMD efforts. Agencies within DHS that contribute to the CWMD mission
include:

(a) USCG. The USCG may play an integral role in WMD interdiction
operations by protecting US economic and security interests in maritime regions, including
international waters, US coastal regions, ports, and waterways. Additionally, the USCG’s
Title 14, USC, authorities allow them to perform law enforcement operations that DOD
forces are precluded from performing under the Posse Comitatus Act. USCG personnel
can be used to enforce all applicable US laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters
subject to US jurisdiction and retain their Title 14, USC, authority, when participating in
interdiction operations led by DOD while under DOD C2. Area commanders should
clearly lay out roles and responsibilities for USCG personnel prior to interdiction
operations.

(b) Customs and Border Protection (CBP). To prevent WMD smuggling,

CBP works through existing partnerships with customs and law enforcement agencies in
PNs to protect US borders and ports of entry and screen admissibility of persons, cargo,

A-8 JP 3-40
 Organizational and Command Relationships

and vessels arriving into US ports. CBP also supports a National Targeting Center and
operates the Container Security Initiative with DOE.

(c) CWMD Office. The mission of the CWMD Office is to counter attempts
by terrorists or other threat actors to carry out an attack against the US or its interests using
a WMD. The CWMD Office is a support component within DHS formed by consolidating
primarily the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and a majority of the Office of
Health Affairs, as well as other DHS elements. The goals of the CWMD Office are to
enhance the nation’s abilities to prevent terrorists and other threat actors from using WMD,
support operational partners in closing capability gaps along adversary pathways, and
invest in and develop innovative technologies to meet partner requirements and improve
operations. DNDO improves the nation’s ability to detect and report transportation of
nuclear or radiological material. Additionally, DNDO operates the National Technical
Nuclear Forensics Center, which has two primary missions. The first provides centralized
planning, integration, assessment, and stewardship of the nation’s nuclear forensics
capabilities to ensure a ready, robust, and enduring capability in coordination with other
USG departments and agencies who have assigned responsibilities for national technical
nuclear forensics. These include DOJ/FBI, who is the lead federal agency responsible for
the criminal investigation of terrorist events and the nuclear forensic investigation of
planned or actual attack; DOD; DOE; DOS; ODNI; and DHS. The second mission is to
advance the capability to perform nuclear forensics on nuclear and radiological materials
in a pre-detonation (intact) state.

(d) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA provides

support to our nation’s critical infrastructure in response to CBRN hazards through
comprehensive emergency management programs, including risk reduction, preparedness,
response, and recovery.

(e) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). One of ICE’s highest

priorities is to prevent illicit procurement networks, terrorist groups, and hostile nations
from illegally obtaining US military products; sensitive, dual-use technology; WMD; or
CBRN materials. The ICE homeland security investigation’s CP investigations program
oversees a broad range of investigative activities related to such violations. The CP
investigations program enforces US laws involving the export of military items and
controlled, dual-use goods, firearms, and ammunition, as well as exports to sanctioned or
embargoed nations.

(4) DOJ. The Attorney General has lead authority to investigate and prosecute
federal crimes, which includes the use or attempted use of WMD and the export or re-
export of strategic commodities and dual-use goods, software, or technologies. Much of
this investigation authority has been delegated to the FBI.

(a) FBI. The FBI is the lead federal agency for investigating WMD crimes.
It focuses its WMD-related activities to prevent the illicit acquisition of WMD and identify
and disrupt their attempted use. The preemptive focus of these efforts requires the FBI to
use its investigative and analytical capabilities to identify potential WMD suspects, targets,
and threats before an attack occurs. FBI WMD investigation and prevention efforts are

A-9
Appendix A

managed by the WMD Directorate within its National Security Branch. Comprising
primarily special agents, intelligence analysts, and program managers, the WMD
Directorate develops training for employees of the FBI; interagency partners; state and
local law enforcement organizations; and public health, industry, and academia partners.
The WMD Directorate also provides national-level WMD intelligence support to FBI field
divisions and to the larger intelligence community. At the local level, each field division
has a special agent who serves as the WMD coordinator responsible for coordinating the
FBI’s WMD-related activities.

(b) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA utilizes unique

capabilities with counterparts in the international law enforcement community and PNs to
locate, track, apprehend, and seize personnel, assets, and resources used to smuggle WMD.

(5) United States Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID’s

work advances US national security and economic prosperity, demonstrates American
generosity, and promotes a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience. USAID may
support a USG response to a CBRN incident in a foreign nation.

(6) Department of the Treasury. The Department of the Treasury is the primary
USG department responsible for economic and financial security of the US. It works with
USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, and international financial
institutions in support of national strategies to counter WMD proliferation; safeguards US
financial systems; and supports DOS programs to train and equip PNs customs agents.

(7) DOC. DOC develops and administers federal policy and programs affecting
the industrial and commercial segments of the national economy. DOC formulates US
export control policy to prevent WMD proliferation and control sensitive, dual-use
technology transfers.

(8) Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). DHHS protects the
health and safety of all Americans and provides essential human services. The key
CWMD-related organizations within DHHS are the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), and
the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

(a) CDC. The CDC provides a system of health surveillance to monitor and
prevent disease outbreaks (including bioterrorism), implements disease prevention
strategies, prevents and controls infectious and chronic diseases, and maintains national
health statistics. The CDC also provides for immunization services, environmental disease
prevention, and essential human services, including medical preparedness. The CDC exists
to fight disease, whether naturally occurring or due to accidental release or deliberate
attack.

(b) ATSDR. The ATSDR protects people from environmental hazards by

responding to natural and man-made disasters, working with communities in crisis from
environmental threats, supporting state and city public health programs to reduce or
eliminate hazardous substances in communities, and to reduce exposure to hazardous

A-10 JP 3-40
 Organizational and Command Relationships

substances. The ATSDR conducts epidemiological health studies in communities across

the country, maintains nationwide exposure and disease registries, and collects data from
chemical release incidents to support emergency response and prevention decisions.

(c) NIH. The NIH’s primary contribution to USG CWMD efforts is to assist
with the development of policies and regulations concerning dual-use research and
facilities. This is primarily done by the NIH’s Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA)
and the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). The NIH’s OBA
promotes science, safety, and ethics in biotechnology through the Dual-Use Research
Program, development of public policies, and the convening of the NSABB. The NSABB
is a federal advisory committee chartered to provide advice, guidance, and leadership
regarding biosecurity oversight of dual-use research, (i.e., biological research with
legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biological threat to public health
and/or national security).

(9) Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT establishes national

transportation policy. Its federal administration includes highways; urban mass transit;
railroads; aviation; and the safety of waterways, ports, highways, and oil and gas pipelines.

(10) DOE. DOE contributes to the future of the nation by ensuring energy
security; producing and maintaining the nation’s nuclear stockpile; promoting nuclear
nonproliferation; providing specialized nuclear and radiological emergency response;
assisting nuclear and radiological CT and CP efforts; and fostering fundamental science,
advanced computing, and technological innovation.

(a) DOE Watch. The Forrestal Watch Office provides the 24-hour single
point of contact for collecting, processing, and disseminating time-sensitive emergency
notifications. It performs initial notifications and coordinates management, logistics, and
mobilization actions during periods of national emergencies, natural and man-made
disasters, acts of terrorism, or other extraordinary situations requiring centralized
management notification and response.

(b) Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The Office of

Intelligence and Counterintelligence provides policy makers and the intelligence
community with scientifically based and technically sound intelligence analysis in the areas
of foreign nuclear programs, proliferation of nuclear materials to state and non-state actors,
nuclear and energy security, and emerging science and technology.

(c) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NNSA is a

semi-autonomous agency within DOE responsible for the management and security of the
nation’s nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. It also
responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the US and abroad. NNSA’s program
support is divided into several key program areas, including defense, nuclear
nonproliferation, naval reactors, emergency operations, infrastructure and environment,
nuclear security, management and administration, and the Office of the Administrator.
Each program area is focused on specific challenges:

A-11
Appendix A

1. Defense Programs. One of the primary missions of the NNSA is to

maintain and enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the US nuclear weapons
stockpile. The NNSA, through its Office of Defense Programs, ensures the US nuclear
arsenal meets national security requirements and continues to serve as a deterrent. In
partnership with DOD, NNSA’s defense programs provide the research, development,
secure transportation, and production activities necessary to support the US nuclear
weapons stockpile.

2. Nonproliferation. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

works closely with a wide range of international partners, key USG departments and
agencies, the US national laboratories, and the private sector to detect, secure, and dispose
of dangerous nuclear and radiological material and related WMD technology and expertise.

3. Emergency Response. The Office of Emergency Operations is the

USG’s primary capability for radiological and nuclear emergency response and for
providing security to the nation from the threat of nuclear terrorism. The Office of
Emergency Operations maintains a high level of readiness for protecting and serving the
US and its allies through the development, implementation, and coordination of programs
and systems designed to serve as a last line of defense in the event of a nuclear terrorist
incident or other types of radiological accident. This readiness level provides the USG
with quickly deployable, dedicated resources capable of responding rapidly and
comprehensively to nuclear or radiological incidents worldwide.

4. Nuclear Security. The Office of Defense Nuclear Security develops

and implements the security programs for the NNSA. In this capacity, Defense Nuclear
Security is the NNSA line management organization responsible for security direction and
program management with respect to prioritization of resources, program evaluation, and
funding allocation. Key management areas include security operations, resources,
engineering, and technical support to NNSA field elements and facilities.

5. CT and CP. The Office of Counterterrorism and

Counterproliferation provides expertise, practical tools, and technically informed policy
recommendations required to advance US nuclear CT and CP objectives. The office
executes a unique program of work focused solely on these missions, synchronizing their
support activities across the NNSA, coordinating DOE/NNSA-related policies, and
building partnerships with USG departments and agencies and key foreign governments
on these issues.

(11) Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission

regulates all US use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure adequate
protection of public health and safety, to promote the common defense and security, and
to protect the environment.

4. Command Relationships

a. General. CWMD operations can be global, transregional, or regional in scope.

The environment in which actors of concern and associated proliferation networks operate,

A-12 JP 3-40
 Organizational and Command Relationships

rather than geographic boundaries, defines the operational area. Operations against the
same actor may occur in several geographic AORs simultaneously. CWMD operations
that occur in more than one AOR will be coordinated between responsible CCDRs with
specific command relationships established by SecDef tasking orders or CCMD plans and
operation orders.

b. C2

(1) Day-to-Day Operations. Many critical CWMD operations and activities are
conducted during periods of normal day-to-day operations. These CWMD operations and
activities should be included in regional plans and supporting plans and integrated into
CCMD contingency plans for execution. The day-to-day integration of these activities
across the three CWMD lines of effort described in the Strategy for Countering Weapons
of Mass Destruction is an important part of CWMD. These efforts help shape an
environment that prevents an actor from obtaining or successfully employing WMD and
may prevent the necessity of responding to a WMD attack. C2 of day-to-day operations is
per existing CCMD C2 relationships established by the CCDR and commanders of
subordinate commands and forces.

(2) Contingency Operations. C2 arrangements for CWMD operations are

tailored for the requirements of each contingency and are determined by the supported
commander. The size and scope, as well as preplanned integration, of CWMD operations
determine the requirements for specific CWMD C2 functions. Small-scale or less complex
CWMD operations may not require formation of a separate C2 structure. A CCMD’s
preexisting command structure, with limited staff and technical augmentation, may suffice.
Increasing CWMD expertise within an existing standing joint force or component
headquarters (HQ) increases the unit’s capacity to address WMD aspects of the mission.
For a large-scale or more complex effort, CWMD operations may require formation of a
functional joint task force (JTF) for CWMD operations. The following discussion applies
to situations requiring additional CWMD emphasis, such as staff augmentation or
formation of a functional JTF.

(3) Functional JTF Considerations. SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified

commander, or an existing JTF commander can serve as the establishing authority for a
JTF to execute a specific CWMD mission or when CWMD operations require joint
resources on a significant scale.

(a) Subordinate Commands and Forces. Forces conducting CWMD

operations may be a combination of conventional forces and SOF, support organizations
from the Services, or CSAs, augmented by other USG departments and agencies or non-
US personnel.

(b) C2 Relationships. The JTF establishing authority also establishes the

command relationships between the JTF and other subordinate commands. Other specific
C2 relationships within the JTF are determined by the supported commander based on
mission requirements. Notional C2 relationships for a functional CWMD JTF include
establishing a separate JTF at the CCMD level, with the JTF commander reporting directly

A-13
Appendix A

to the CCDR; establishing the CWMD JTF under an existing JTF; or establishing a CWMD
task force under a component commander.

(c) Composition. A CWMD JTF HQ will generally combine DOD

functional and technical experts; be augmented by non-DOD personnel, as required; and
have real-time reachback to national-level technical experts. When formed, a CWMD JTF
HQ may draw personnel from portions of an existing standing joint force or subordinate
component; CWMD subject matter experts from other CCMDs; and/or the Services and
specialized joint activities, including a CSA such as DTRA.

(4) JTF HQ. At a minimum, and as required by the supported commander to

conduct a specific CWMD operation, the functional JTF HQ should be able to:

(a) Conduct the assigned CWMD mission and C2; coordinate operations of
assigned forces.

(b) Coordinate with US forces, other USG departments and agencies, foreign
governments, international organizations, and HNs.

(c) Provide overall assessment, analysis, and planning for CWMD

operations.

(d) Coordinate CWMD planning activities with other commands.

(e) Plan for JTF deployment, employment, and redeployment.

(f) Plan for transfer of responsibility of CWMD operations to or from the

CCDR and from or to other USG departments and agencies, international organizations,
and HNs, as appropriate.

(g) Plan to minimize or mitigate potential CWMD collateral effects.

(h) Maintain situational awareness of CWMD activities and operations, both

friendly and actors of concern.

(i) Recommend prioritization of CWMD resources and forces.

(j) Integrate into the supported CCMD’s C2 and coordination processes (e.g.,
joint targeting coordination board).

(5) JTF Staff Organization. When providing C2 directly for a small-scale

CWMD operation or overseeing a functional JTF for a large-scale CWMD operation, JFCs
should consider augmenting their staffs with CWMD expertise. This augmentation may
be from a Service component, a standing joint force HQ, subject matter experts resident at
the CCMD, a CSA, or individual augmentation. JFCs may require the following cross-
functional staff organizations to manage CWMD processes and tasks:

A-14 JP 3-40
 Organizational and Command Relationships

(a) CWMD Cell. A CWMD cell is formed to manage CWMD processes,

capabilities, and activities within a JFC’s HQ. The CWMD cell provides the JFC with
specialized, technical, subject matter expertise to support CWMD operations. The CWMD
cell collaborates with interagency and multinational partners as required, to develop
CWMD situational awareness and support the planning, coordination, and synchronization
of operations.

(b) CWMD Working Group. A CWMD working group is an enduring or

ad hoc organization within a CCMD HQ or JFC’s HQ focused on CWMD activities to
provide analysis to the commander. The working group consists of a core functional group,
such as CWMD cell members and other staff and component representatives, as required.

5. Interagency Coordination and Interorganizational Cooperation

a. Domestic. Domestic CWMD operations involve complex command relationships;

in most cases, DOD will act in a supporting role to another USG department or agency. In
conducting DSCA, to include CBRN response, a distinction is made between the different
chains of command for active DOD; Title 10, USC; federal forces providing support to
civil authorities; and for NG forces commanded by the state governor under Title 32, USC,
and state active duty. State and local governments are closest to those affected by incidents
and have a lead role in response and recovery. For a federal response to a CBRN incident,
DOD support is tailored to the scope and magnitude of the incident. DOD assets are
employed with a focus on response requirements beyond the resources of state and federal
civil authorities. A dual-status commander may be appointed to C2 both federal military
and state NG forces. The dual-status commander is supported by separate federal and state
NG chains of command and can be employed for DSCA events, including CBRN response.
USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM are the DOD-designated planning agent and the
supported commander for DSCA missions in their respective AORs.

For further guidance on C2 relationships, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters;
for further information, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

b. Interorganizational Cooperation. DOD will liaise and coordinate with other

agencies and civilian authorities. Interorganizational cooperation is a continuous process
that should be established and emphasized during planning, prior to the execution of
CWMD operations and activities. Coordination takes place at the strategic, operational,
and tactical levels. Whether coordination is conducted through the CCDR’s JIACG or
other means, such as an interagency planning cell or group at the CCMD or JTF levels, the
importance of interorganizational cooperation in the planning process cannot be overstated.

c. State and Local Coordination. In the case of a domestic CBRN incident, DOD
should determine what specialized national, international, or local assets are responding to
the incident. The CNGB facilitates the use of Air National Guard (ANG) and Army
National Guard (ARNG) forces and assets through the state adjutants general to conduct
CBRN response operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities in responding
to a domestic CBRN event. When directed by SecDef, the CNGB supports transition of
state active duty or Title 32, USC, NG forces to federalized Title 10, USC, status for DSCA

A-15
Appendix A

in coordination with individual states and the ANG and ARNG. At the state level, the NG
JFHQ-State will coordinate with state and local authorities to ensure the NG efforts are
synchronized with civil authorities. Once deployed to a supported state, the NG CBRN
response enterprise, (WMD-civil support team, CBRN and high-yield explosive enhanced
response force packages, and homeland response forces) will be controlled through the NG
JFHQ-State or, if designated, a dual-status commander. After the state has requested
federal assistance, the defense coordination officer will coordinate for the use of all Title
10, USC, portions of the CBRN response enterprise and conventional forces after a
validated request for assistance is approved by DOD. These processes should be practiced
during training events and exercises.

For further guidance on interorganizational cooperation, refer to JP 3-08,

Interorganizational Cooperation. For further guidance on CBRN response, refer to JP 3-
41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response. For further guidance on
dual-status command, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. For further
information on National Guard domestic operations, see Chief, National Guard Bureau
Instruction 3000.24, National Guard Bureau Domestic Operations, and Chief, National
Guard Bureau Manual 3510.25, National Guard Homeland Response Force and Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force
Package Procedures.

6. Multinational and Security Cooperation

a. Participation by multinational partners is critical to the successful prosecution of

CWMD efforts. DOD, in cooperation with multinational partners, plays a critical role in
building new coalitions, mechanisms, and international norms to counter actors of concern
that pose a threat of developing, acquiring, proliferating, or employing WMD, related
expertise, technologies, and materials. CCMDs are encouraged to conduct military-to-
military exchanges in areas such as tactics, techniques, and procedures; intelligence; and
technology.

b. US military operations are routinely conducted with forces of other nations within
the structure of an alliance or coalition. An adversary may employ CBRN weapons against
non-US forces, especially those with little or no defense against these weapons, in an effort
to weaken, divide, or destroy the multinational effort. When conducting combat
operations, the JFC should consider the capabilities and limitations of all available forces
to maximize their contributions and minimize their vulnerabilities. Peacetime activities
with multinational partners, particularly multinational and interagency training and
planning exercises focused on building their CWMD capabilities, provide means of
preparing for multinational combat operations in CBRN environments.

c. With very few exceptions, multinational operations will involve the use of HN
sovereign airspace and territory, bases or civilian airports, facilities, and personnel
(including non-USG and contracted civilian workers supporting US and multinational
forces). For CCDR campaign and contingency plans, HN considerations, including CBRN
defense, are the subject of significant peacetime planning in which operational, legal,
contractual, and personnel issues are addressed. CCDR coordination of HN support

A-16 JP 3-40
 Organizational and Command Relationships

activities will involve a number of interagency partners, as well as the US country team.
Particular emphasis is placed on early warning and detection; actions to prepare US and
indigenous military forces; and protection of threatened civilian populations, essential
infrastructures, and facilities. The CCDR should coordinate the development and
implementation of plans and exercises that are aligned with HN agreements for providing
assistance in the event of a CBRN incident, especially where those agreements may affect
US military response.

d. SC. SC encompasses US activities with foreign security establishments to build

relationships and develop friendly military capabilities to achieve US CWMD objectives.
SC activities can include, among other things, military-to-military contacts, exchanges,
security force assistance to develop foreign security force capability and capacity,
education, exercises, operational support, and defense institution building. DOD CWMD
SC activities should seek to improve PN capabilities and capacity to achieve the following:

(1) Develop SC initiatives to maintain and enhance situational awareness of

proliferation pathways and indicators of potential use.

(2) Develop SC initiatives to disrupt proliferation pathways and use.

(3) Develop prioritized SC initiatives that enable PNs to respond safely and
effectively to CBRN events.

For further guidance on SC, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

A-17
Appendix A

Intentionally Blank

A-18 JP 3-40
 APPENDIX B
TREATIES, RESOLUTIONS, ACTIVITIES, AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. General

This appendix provides a reference for staff officers assigned to CCMDs, JTFs, or
other major staff and operational elements responsible for CWMD planning and execution.
It addresses treaties, resolutions, control regimes, activities, and legal considerations which
JFCs account for and which will shape the planning of operations and campaigns that deal
with the WMD threats or hazards.

2. Treaties and Control Regimes

a. Overview. Treaties and control regimes are two tools that are used to implement
the NSS. They establish global norms against the proliferation of WMD precursors, dual-
use goods, weapons, and their means of delivery. Both provide international standards to
gauge and address the activities of potential proliferators. Joint forces will comply with
treaties to which the US is a party and may support building cooperation and arms control
and treaty monitoring activities. Several of the cornerstone treaties regarding WMD are
listed within this appendix. Joint forces also need to be aware of those treaties that the US
is not party to but may pose constraints or restraints, such as nuclear-weapon-free zones.
(See http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/ for text of treaties.)

b. Nuclear Policies and Agreements. The US has historically used two methods to
counter the threat and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The first is its overt strategic
deterrence policy laid out in the current Nuclear Posture Review. The second is its
nonproliferation policy, which is implemented through a network of formal arms control
treaties and agreements such as CTR programs and informal agreements like the PSI.
While the US is not party to all of these policies and agreements, and some are nonbinding,
they can affect joint force actions and the JFC should account for them. Significant
nuclear-related treaties, policies, and agreements include the START [New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty], the NPT, nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), various
United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) sanctions, and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group control lists. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile
Defense and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for CWMD represents DOD
interests on these and other CP and nonproliferation policy issues.

(1) The NPT. The NPT is the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons, as it prohibits non-nuclear-weapon state party from receiving,
manufacturing, and acquiring nuclear weapons and a nuclear-weapon state party from
transferring nuclear weapons, related materials, and technology. DOD supports US efforts
to promote full compliance by all parties to the treaty. In becoming party to the NPT,
nonnuclear weapon states pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for a pledge
by the nuclear weapon states (US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) not to
assist the development of nuclear weapons by any nonnuclear weapon states and to
facilitate “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and

B-1
Appendix B

technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” The nuclear weapon
states, defined as any state that tested a nuclear explosive before 1967, also agree to “pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” The NPT does not prohibit US
movement of nuclear WMD, devices, and/or associated materials to final disposition sites
in the US or another country authorized to store nuclear material.

(2) Nuclear Test Ban Treaties. Efforts to curtail nuclear weapon tests have been
made since the 1940s. Previous treaties have restricted nuclear testing as follows: the 1963
Limited Test Ban Treaty barred explosions in the atmosphere, in space, and under water;
the 1974 US-USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] Threshold Test Ban Treaty
banned underground nuclear weapons tests having an explosive force of more than 150
kilotons; and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed in 1976, extended the 150-
kiloton limit to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. While the CTBT was opened for
signature in 1996, it has not entered into force, leaving a ban on nuclear testing as the oldest
item on the arms control agenda—the CTBT would ban all nuclear explosions.

(3) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. Several regions of the world have treaties in

force between the states in those regions that ban those states from developing, possessing,
and using nuclear weapons, known as nuclear-weapon-free zones, including Latin America
(Treaty of Tlatelolco), Central Asia (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central
Asia), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), and Southeast
Asia (Treaty of Bangkok). The US is party to the protocols for the Treaty of Tlatelolco,
which obligates the US not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the states in
Latin American that are parties to Treaty of Tlatelolco.

c. Chemical Policies and Agreements

(1) Policies. DOD has developed an array of policy and implementation

guidance to ensure adherence to treaties, control regimes, and to forward global norms.
They ensure efforts to demilitarize stockpile weapons, current research, and development
of defensive measures are conducted in a manner that ensures safety and adherence to state
and national regulations and international obligations.

(2) CWC. The CWC seeks to eliminate, under international verification, an

entire category of WMD. The US is a party to this multilateral treaty, which prohibits the
development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, except for limited
research, development, test, and evaluation, and requires the destruction of existing
stockpiles and former chemical weapons production facilities under international
verification. Each signatory is allowed to operate one single small-scale facility to produce
small quantities of Schedule 1 toxic chemicals (i.e., chemical agents) for use in research
and development of defensive measures and for any other purpose not prohibited by the
CWC, and one additional facility to produce Schedule 1 toxic chemicals in even smaller
quantities for protective purposes only. The Army’s Combat Capabilities Development
Command Chemical Biological Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, operates
the single small-scale facility; and the Army's Chemical Defense Training Facility
Laboratory at the US Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear School at Fort

B-2 JP 3-40
 Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal Considerations

Leonard Wood, Missouri, operates the protective purpose facility. The CWC is
internationally implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
which verifies compliance with the treaty. The CWC, coupled with the activities of the
Australia Group, strives to limit transfer of dual-use technology that could be used to make
chemical weapons to states that are not states parties to the CWC. The CWC seeks to
eliminate, under OPCW [Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons]
verification, an entire category of WMD.

(3) The Australia Group. The Australia Group is an international organization

that aims to minimize the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon proliferation
and terrorism. Members commit to implementing effective export controls for items on
the Australia Group common control list and to provide adequate licensing and
enforcement. Participants meet annually to maintain the currency of the control list,
exchange information on proliferation threats, and explore best practices for export
controls and customs enforcement. Candidates for membership must be a manufacturer,
exporter, or trans-shipper of Australia Group controlled items; meet the group’s stated
nonproliferation credentials; and demonstrate a willingness to implement the regime’s
control guidelines and are admitted by a consensus decision.

d. Biological Policies and Agreements

(1) The National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats provides the basis
for US policy on countering biological threats. It is a presidential document with the
overarching goal to protect against the misuse of the life sciences to develop or use
biological agents to cause harm. The National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
identifies biological threat challenges; strategic objectives; and the roles and
responsibilities of the federal, state, and local governments; the private sector; individuals
and families; and international partners. Additionally, the National Strategy for
Biosurveillance emphasizes information sharing among USG departments and agencies to
identify biological threats. The National Biodefense Strategy is a USG coordinated effort
to protect the US and its citizens from biological threats.

(2) Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences. The dual-use research of concern
(DURC) policy establishes regular review of USG-funded research with certain high-
consequence pathogens and toxins with the potential to be deliberately misused. The
DURC policy is designed to mitigate risks and collect information for the oversight of
agents and toxins with the most significant potential for mass casualties or devastating
effects to the economy, critical infrastructure, or public confidence. The aim of the DURC
policy is to preserve the benefits of life sciences research and minimize the risk of misuse
of knowledge, information, products, or technologies provided by such research. The
DURC policy focuses on 14 pathogens and one toxin regulated by DHHS and US
Department of Agriculture Select Agent Program due to their potential to pose a severe
threat to human, animal, or plant health or to animal and plant products. The responsibility
for maintaining this policy falls to OBA, under the Office of Science Policy within NIH,
DHHS. The NSABB and the DURC policy help to align interagency partners’ situational
awareness of biological agents with the potential to be used as WMD.

B-3
Appendix B

(3) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
[short title: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)]. The BTWC established
the first multilateral treaty banning the development, production, or stockpiling of an entire
category of weapons. The BTWC prohibits parties from developing, producing, and
stockpiling biological agents and toxins in types and quantities that have no justification
for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. The BTWC does not prohibit the
biological agents or toxins themselves but rather certain purposes for which they may be
employed. Unlike the CWC, the BTWC does not contain a verification regime to ensure
signatories are complying with their obligations. To increase compliance and transparency,
State Parties agreed to the voluntary exchange of confidence-building measures “to prevent
or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts, and suspicions and in order to improve
international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities.” The confidence-
building measures consist of six measures, including exchange of data on research centers
and laboratories; national biological defense research and development programs and
outbreak of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins; encouragement
of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge; declaration of legislation,
regulations, and other measures; declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive
biological research; and development programs and declaration of vaccine production
facilities.

3. United Nations Security Council Resolutions

a. Overview. UNSCRs 1540, 1673, and 1810 require member states to “detect, deter,
prevent, and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the
illicit trafficking and brokering” of WMD and delivery systems to non-state actors.
Additional related UNSCRs apply to North Korea and Iran. It is important to understand
that UNSCRs are not US law, but the US has an international obligation under the United
Nations (UN) Charter to comply with them. The US must approve legislation, executive
orders, or regulations which support UNSCRs goals or use existing authorities that support
UNSCR enforcement in their current form.

b. UNSCR 1540. UNSCR 1540 requires member states to “criminalize proliferation,

enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders.” It also
requires states to enforce effective domestic controls over WMD and WMD-related
materials in production, use, storage, and transport; to maintain effective border controls;
and to develop national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, all of which
help interdiction efforts. The resolution does not, however, provide any enforcement
authority nor does it specifically mention interdiction. About two-thirds of all states have
reported to the UN on their efforts to strengthen defenses against WMD trafficking.
UNSCRs 1673, 1810, and 1977 extended the duration of the 1540 Committee, with the
2011 resolution extending the Committee’s mandate for 10 years.

4. International Activities

a. Overview. The US, along with its partners and allies, participates in a variety of
international activities to counter WMD, particularly to stop the proliferation of WMD and

B-4 JP 3-40
 Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal Considerations

the materiel, technology, and expertise necessary to create and sustain a WMD program.
These activities seek to strengthen international norms and common values and build
capacity through cooperation, information sharing, and exercises. The following list
highlights select relevant international activities but is not an all-inclusive listing.

b. The PSI. The PSI is a global effort to stop shipments of WMD, their delivery
systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles
identifies specific steps participants can take to effectively interdict WMD-related
shipments and prevent proliferation. The PSI Principles also recognize the value in
cooperative action and encourage participating nations to work together to apply
intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, military, and other capabilities to prevent
WMD-related transfers to state and non-state actors. A group of diplomatic, law
enforcement, legal, military, and intelligence experts from 21 PSI participating states form
an operational experts group. The operational experts group works on behalf of all PSI
partners and meets regularly to develop operational concepts, organize the interdiction
exercise program, share information about national legal authorities, and pursue
cooperation with key industry sectors. Participation in the PSI is voluntary. There is no
organizational HQ or secretariat. Support for the PSI is an acknowledgement of the need
for stronger measures to defeat proliferators through cooperation with other countries.

c. Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a multinational body

concerned with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of
materials that may support nuclear weapon development and by improving safeguards and
protection of existing materials. The US encourages adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers
Group’s guidelines, seeks to improve information sharing on nations of concern and
commodities sought by proliferators, and seeks to ensure Nuclear Suppliers Group control
lists are current and properly focused.

d. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR is an informal and

voluntary association of nations that share the goal of nonproliferation of unmanned
delivery systems capable of delivering WMD. The MTCR limits the transfer of long-range
(i.e., greater than 300 kilometers in range or 500 kilograms [kg] in payload) missiles and
associated technology. The MTCR rests on adherence to common export policy guidelines
applied to a common list of controlled items, making it more difficult for nations seeking
to acquire and produce unmanned means of WMD delivery.

e. GICNT. In July 2006, Russia and the US announced the creation of the GICNT
before the Group of Eight Summit in St. Petersburg, Russia. The mission of the GICNT is
to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism by
conducting multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures, and
interoperability of PNs. Like the PSI, this initiative is nonbinding and requires agreement
on a statement of principles. Thirteen nations—Australia, Canada, China, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Russia, and
the US—endorsed a Statement of Principles at the first meeting in October 2006. Today,
the GICNT is an international partnership of 88 nations and six international organizations
who are committed to working individually and collectively to implement a set of shared
nuclear security principles to improve accounting, control, and protection of nuclear and

B-5
Appendix B

radiological materials and facilities; develop capabilities to detect and halt illicit trafficking
of such materials; prevent terrorists/other non-state actors from acquiring nuclear
materials; put in place laws to counter nuclear terrorism-related activity; share information;
and develop a capability to respond and mitigate acts of nuclear terrorism. The US and
Russia serve as co-chairs of the GICNT, and Spain serves as coordinator of the
Implementation and Assessment Group. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the
European Union, the International Criminal Police Organization-International Police, and
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime have observer status. Without dues or a secretariat,
actions under the initiative will take legal guidance from the International Convention on
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Materials, and UNSCRs 1540 and 1373. GICNT PNs periodically hold
exercises and workshops to improve coordination and exchange best practices.

5. Interdiction Legal Considerations

a. Introduction. WMD interdiction encompasses operations directed towards

weaponized CBRN devices/warheads and delivery vehicles; dual-use items required to
produce weapons, their precursors, or related items; related technology; financial and
transportation intermediaries which facilitate trade in WMD; and individuals associated
with all of the above. JFCs account for the legal issues inherent in WMD interdiction
operations to fully comply with US law, treaties, and international agreements. Planners
should involve their respective general counsel or staff judge advocate (SJA) representative
early in the mission analysis and throughout execution to identify key issues and work to
resolve them (see JP 3-84, Legal Support). Additionally, allies and PNs may have differing
interpretations of rights and obligations under international law than the US. This will
require sensitivity, cooperation, and negotiation when operating in a multinational
environment.

For further guidance on legal support, see JP 3-84, Legal Support.

b. General Considerations. The international treaties and agreements discussed in

the previous section, in addition to specific UNSCRs, obligate member states to prevent
WMD proliferation. Treaties, US laws and regulations, and bilateral agreements also
identify, however, certain rights and obligations of states, ships, and aircraft related to
search and seizure in territorial and international waters and airspace. These issues include
state of belligerency; territorial rights; legal status of the target vessel, aircraft, or vehicle;
use of military forces; seizure of material and detention of persons; preservation of
evidence; and rules of engagement/rules for the use of force during interdiction. Use of
cyberspace operations to support WMD interdiction may pose additional legal concerns.
Where CCDRs believe they require additional legal authority to conduct WMD interdiction
activities, they should seek guidance from OSD and the JS.

(1) State of Belligerency. International law recognizes a difference in the rights

of states during armed conflict (state of belligerency). Belligerent states may seize and
condemn enemy vessels or vehicles; stop and search neutral vessels, aircraft, or vehicles
for contraband; and blockade enemy port(s) and airspace on both the high seas and within
the enemy’s territorial seas. This right does not extend to the territorial seas or airspace of

B-6 JP 3-40
 Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal Considerations

neutral states or to international straits. Less clear are circumstances where no declared
state of belligerency exists. This is the circumstance under which most WMD interdiction
activities will occur. Some interdiction authorities include flag-state consent, ship master’s
consent, or specific boarding authorities contained within the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that constitute customary international law. Article 51
of the UN Charter (right to self-defense) may provide some basis for action in this
circumstance. UNSCRs may also provide basis for action under certain circumstances.

(2) Territorial Rights. The authority to stop and inspect a ship, aircraft, or ground
vehicle resides with the nation in whose territory the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle is transiting.
The UNCLOS and Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation are cornerstone
territorial rights agreements. Although the US may not be a party to the UNCLOS, many
provisions of the treaty reflect customary norms, which give rise to rights and obligations
under international law.

(a) It is important to note that some military actions, such as hailing and
querying vessels on the high seas, can be supportive of USG CP objectives without being
classified as interference with ships otherwise conducting legitimate commerce.

(b) National Airspace. The requirement for a state to obtain diplomatic

clearance for state aircraft prior to entering or transiting another nation’s airspace (over its
territory or territorial waters) affects all aspects of planning and deployment. Overflight
constraints are to be complied with by all forces and are a key element in the planning
process. Under the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known
as the Chicago Convention, a state has the right to enforce its domestic laws and regulations
on aircraft transiting its national airspace, to include the airspace above its territorial
borders and waters, and to ensure the observance of any obligation of such state under a
multilateral international agreement. A state may deny access to its national airspace or
compel an aircraft entering its national airspace to land for inspection if suspected of
violating its laws or if it poses an imminent security risk. A state may also deny access to
its national airspace to aircraft contaminated by WMD. No state aircraft may fly over, or
land on, the territory of a foreign nation without prior diplomatic clearance.

1. PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles (Aircraft). The PSI calls

upon participant states to take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts, to the
extent permissible under their national legal authorities and international legal obligations,
to include:

a. At their own initiative or upon request and good cause shown by

another state, require aircraft transiting their airspace to land for inspection if reasonably
suspected of carrying WMD cargo to or from states or non-state actors, seize any such
cargo, and deny transit rights to aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargo.

b. Conduct aircraft inspections and seize WMD cargo at their

airfields or other facilities used for transshipment to/from states or non-state actors.

2. Interdiction in National Airspace

B-7
Appendix B

a. General principles

(1) The Chicago Convention, International Air Services

Transit Agreement, and other instruments of international air law attempt to strike a
balance between the legitimate safety and security interests of territorial states and the
economic and social benefits of unimpeded transit/overflight.

(2) Ultimately, every state has complete and exclusive

sovereignty over the airspace above its territory (Chicago Convention, Article 1).

b. State aircraft (e.g., military aircraft) require “authorization by

special agreement or otherwise” to overfly a foreign state (Chicago Convention, Article
3[c]). Usually this is accomplished through the diplomatic clearance process. Transit and
landing rights may be withdrawn at any time. As a matter of international custom and
practice, state aircraft are not subject to search or inspection in a foreign state.

c. Non-scheduled (e.g., charter) international civil flights are

granted right of overflight by the Chicago Convention without prior permission (Chicago
Convention, Article 5); however, the right is conditional. Overflown states have the right
to require landing (Chicago Convention, Article 5) as a condition of overflight and may
conduct an inspection of aircraft, may require prior notification and special permission for
overflight in the interests of safety (Chicago Convention, Article 5), expect that aircraft not
carry “munitions of war or implements of war” (defined nationally) without permission,
may prohibit the transit of other items (defined nationally), and expect aircraft to comply
with UNSCR obligating denial of overflight.

d. “Scheduled” international civil flights require special permission

to transit foreign airspace. For states that are parties to both the Chicago Convention and
International Air Services Transit Agreement, this permission is granted for non-stop
transit and non-traffic stops (International Air Services Transit Agreement, Article 1).
Additional bilateral/multilateral agreements apply for traffic stops (e.g., scheduled airline
passenger service). States have the right to deny transit or order landing for inspection of
a flight over its territory suspected of violating its laws or applicable UNSCRs and
international law or if the aircraft poses an imminent security risk.

3. National Registry of Civil Aircraft. States of registry maintain

international jurisdictional rights and legal obligations over their civil aircraft. Aircraft
have the nationality of the state in which they are registered. Under some circumstances,
UNSCRs may obligate states to prevent the use of their registered aircraft for WMD
proliferation (Iran UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, 1929; North Korea UNSCRs 1718, 1874,
2087, 2094). Once entered into force, the Beijing Convention (2010) will require states of
registry to establish jurisdiction and criminalize air transport of WMD and some
precursors.

a. Legal Status. The commercial maritime shipping and aviation

industries often involve multiple layers of nationality in ownership, operating company,
voyage contracting, leasing, flagging, and vessel’s master/captain. Each nation associated

B-8 JP 3-40
 Treaties, Resolutions, Activities, and Legal Considerations

with a specific transaction can be approached in some fashion to cooperate with WMD
interdiction efforts.

b. Flag State Consent. Unless a UNSCR expressly states otherwise,

the authority to stop and inspect a ship or civil aircraft in international waters or airspace
or authority to authorize a third-party nation to stop and inspect in international waters or
airspace, generally depends upon the “flag” registry of the ship or aircraft. The flag state
can be different from the owner or operator nationality, and the ship or aircraft is considered
under the jurisdiction of the laws and directives of competent authority of the flag state.
Generally, states have the right to stop and search any ship or aircraft in international waters
or airspace flagged (registered) by the state or authorize a third party to do the same. Under
the PSI, the US has negotiated a series of ship “boarding agreements” with certain other
participants. These agreements provide for US boarding of these states’ flagged ships
under specific circumstances and conditions. Planners should consult their command’s
political advisor and SJA on these specific agreements.

c. Master’s or Command Pilot’s Consent. The US holds that it may

board and carry out certain activities on ships otherwise immune if the master (captain) of
the ship provides consent. Although such boarding, while in international waters, is
technically limited to a visit only, the master may authorize a boarding party to examine
any portion of the ship. The master is, however, not obligated to provide extended
authorization unless directed by competent authority of the flag state. With respect to
aircraft in international airspace, the command pilot of a civil aircraft may consent to have
the aircraft diverted from its original destination to a designated airport so it can land and
be boarded for inspection. Some states do not necessarily concur with the US position.

d. Sovereign Immunity. Warships and military aircraft of a state

enjoy sovereign immunity. Coastal states may not stop and search warships but may direct
them to depart the coastal state’s territorial waters if the warship violates the right of
innocent passage.

e. Seizure of Material and Detention of Persons. Seizures and

detentions must have basis in international law, US law, or HN law. Specific cases and
circumstances are too numerous to be recounted here. It is critical to involve the SJA as
early as possible in the planning process to aid in determining requirements to support
seizures, detentions, and expedite disposition.

f. Disposition–Availability of Evidence and Chain of Custody. In

cases involving probable prosecution by the US or prosecuting state, agencies should take
measures and provide guidance to field units regarding preservation of relevant evidence
and establishing chain of custody. Preservation of the chain of custody is also essential to
support attribution.

g. In cases involving possible foreign prosecutions arising from US

interdictions and investigations, the interagency team should ascertain whether US
investigators intend to make available all unclassified and relevant evidence to their
counterparts in the prosecuting state for use by the prosecuting state in any hearings and

B-9
Appendix B

trials. This may include testimony, weapons, ammunition, imagery, small vessels, and
other physical evidence requiring special handling or storage.

h. The prosecuting state should consider its transport and storage

options (items are often located in third-party states or at-sea), as well as chain of custody
procedures it may wish to communicate to the US and other investigators. The prosecuting
state may wish to immediately coordinate with officials and investigators of other
concerned states to establish early chain of custody and collection and preservation of
evidence in ways that ensure admissibility in prosecuting state courts.

i. The US will, in appropriate circumstances, facilitate delivery of

statements from US military witnesses to the prosecuting state. All requests for such
personnel or their statements will normally be made to the cognizant US embassy for
forwarding to DOD, DHS (for the USCG), and DOJ. Consideration should be given to the
availability of witnesses and facilitating contact with (including travel of) potential
prosecuting state investigators while the witnesses remain available.

6. Domestic Legal Considerations

Accounting of legal considerations is also essential for domestic operations. For

CWMD-related DSCA activities, military forces could be requested and used to manage
the consequences of a CBRN incident. In a domestic setting, it is imperative that JFCs
understand the statutory and operational relationships among US states, territories, and
federal government. They must also understand the distinctive roles, responsibilities,
capabilities, and limitations of Titles 10, 14, 18, and 32, USC, and state active duty
personnel.

For more detailed information on domestic legal considerations, see JP 3-28, Defense
Support of Civil Authorities.

B-10 JP 3-40
 APPENDIX C
WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS

1. Purpose

This appendix provides an unclassified overview of CBRN weapons. A general

knowledge of CBRN weapon characteristics will aid the JFC in gaining an overall
situational awareness of diverse CBRN threats within the operational area and the
development of specific risk assessments to counter these threats.

2. Nuclear Weapons Materials Production

a. Mining, Milling, Refining, and Conversion. During mining and milling, uranium
ore is processed to isolate the uranium into concentrate called yellow cake. Uranium that
is too enriched for reactor fuel, medical use, or weapons development is converted into
UF6 [uranium hexaflouride]. This uranium is then reduced (converted) to metal, metal
oxide, or a metal-ceramic matrix for further fabrication into reactor fuel elements.

b. Uranium Enrichment. Isotope separation (enrichment) technologies are

processes that usually begin with natural uranium and result in enriched uranium and
depleted uranium. Enrichment seeks to isolate and collect the relatively small percentage
of the isotope uranium-235 (U-235), in natural uranium, which is suitable for fission
weapons. Highly enriched uranium contains 20 percent or more of U-235; low-enriched
uranium contains less than 20 percent U-235. Most power reactors require low-enriched
uranium containing between three to five percent U-235. Weapons-grade uranium will
contain 90 percent or more of U-235. Natural uranium can be used as fuel in certain types
of specially moderated reactors—a byproduct of energy production from that fuel is
plutonium-239 (Pu-239).

c. Plutonium Production. Plutonium, one of the two fissile elements used to fuel
nuclear explosives, is not found in significant quantities in nature. Plutonium can only be
made in sufficient quantities in a nuclear reactor. It is usually produced in a production
reactor. To achieve the high percentages of Pu-239 required for weapons-grade plutonium,
it must be produced specifically for this purpose. The uranium must spend several weeks
in the reactor core and then be removed. Production reactors are used to make plutonium
(and often tritium) efficiently. Production reactors can be graphite-moderated and either
air-, carbon dioxide-, or helium-cooled; some programs have also used heavy water
reactors. The longer a given sample of fuel is irradiated, the greater the build-up of
plutonium-240 (Pu-240), an isotope which decays by spontaneous fission and which should
be minimized in weapon plutonium. Consequently, plutonium production reactors are
usually designed to be refueled at specific intervals while operating (on-line refueling) so
relatively little Pu-240 is generated in the removed “spent” fuel. To be used in a nuclear
weapon, plutonium must be separated from the much larger mass of non-fissile material in
the irradiated fuel. Plutonium is removed from spent fuel by chemical separation; no
nuclear or physical separation (as for example in uranium enrichment) is needed. After
being separated chemically from the irradiated fuel and reduced to metal, the plutonium is
ready for machining and use in a nuclear explosive device. If the reactor involved uses

C-1
Appendix C

RESEARCH REACTORS

Most radioisotope production occurs in research reactors, with power

ranges from tens of kilowatts to several hundred megawatts, compared to
2,000 megawatts in commercial nuclear reactors. However, a few
commercial power reactors also function as radioisotope producers.

From the security viewpoint, it is worth noting that both reactor and
accelerator produced radioisotopes are usually processed in hot cells near
the production facility. The processing involves chemical preparation after
initial manufacture to produce a more pure form of the radioisotope for
commercial use. It also physically shapes the product into the desired form
(e.g., pellets or pencils).

SOURCE: “Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security

Risks”, Charles D. Ferguson, Tasheen Kazi, and Judith Perera. Occasional
Paper No. 11, Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Monterrey Institute of International Studies

thorium fuel, uranium-233 (U-233), also a fissile isotope, can be recovered in a process
similar to plutonium extraction.

For further guidance on enrichment, refer to The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

3. Radiological Weapons and Sources

a. Radiological Weapons Development Lifecycle. The lifecycle of radiological

weapons is derived in a similar manner as nuclear weapons. This pathway is more difficult
to characterize due to the prevalence of radioactive sources in everyday life.

b. RDD Candidate Materials. Radioactive materials that make the best candidates
for use in an RDD are those that are widely used in medicine, industry, and research. RDD
candidates should have an intermediate half-life—highly radioactive materials decay too
quickly to assemble and deliver as an RDD, while those with very long half-lives are not
radioactive enough to cause much damage. All of the candidate isotopes that pose the
greatest security risk for an RDD are produced in the nuclear fuel cycle and for industrial
applications of radiation.

For further guidance on the medical effects of radiological weapons, refer to Armed Forces
Radiobiology Research Institute; Medical Management of Radiological Casualties; or
Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 4-02.83/Marine Corps Reference Publication
(MCRP) 4-11.1B/Navy Tactical Reference Publication (NTRP) 4-02.21/Air Force Manual
(AFMAN) 44-161(Interservice [I]), Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological Casualties.

4. Biological Weapons and Sources

a. Biological Weapons Development Lifecycle. The lifecycle of a biological

weapon begins with the culturing of a specific organism with the virulence required. This

C-2 JP 3-40
 Weapon Characteristics

capability generally runs on a continuum from research, product scale-up, testing

production, weaponization, storage, deployment/employment, and demilitarization. These
stages can run in parallel as a capability is upgraded or circumvented as capability is
contracted, out-sourced, imported, or stolen. Additionally, production times may be
relatively short within the lifecycle as some bacteria can double in number every 20
minutes. Large stockpiles could be produced within a few years in a modest-sized
pharmaceutical plant before it is repurposed for another use.

b. Production. Fermenters may be employed to grow large amounts of certain

bacteria, but biological agents are not stored in bulk containers or in munitions. Biological
agents would most likely be stored in small quantities of a few milliliters in plastic
“cryovials” in liquid nitrogen canisters or in -80 degrees Celsius freezers in a containment
room or building, such as biosafety level 3-4 facilities with access control and exterior
security. Maintaining the capability does not depend on continued serviceability of the
agent as it can be kept in frozen storage until needed. When prepared for use, large volumes
of liquid nutritive media would be necessary to revive bacterial agents in incubators or
warm rooms, possibly in flasks on shaker platforms for extracellular bacteria or in tissue
culture for intracellular species. Virus preparation from the frozen state would require,
depending on the species, numerous live eggs in incubators or tissue cultures employing
commercially available cell lines, large amounts of liquid media, and numerous flasks to
expand the amount of agent for deployment.

c. Biological Agents. Biological agents (pathogens and toxins) pose a risk of

deliberate misuse with significant potential for mass casualties or devastating effects to the
economy, critical infrastructure, and public confidence (see Figure C-1). Many diseases
caused by weaponized biological agents present with nonspecific clinical signs that could
be difficult to diagnose and recognize as a biological attack.

For further guidance on the medical effects of biological weapons, refer to US Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases Pocket Reference Guide to Select
Biological Agents and Toxins; Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook;
or ATP 4-02.84/MCRP 4-11.1C/NTRP 4-02.23/AFMAN 44-156_Integrated Policy (IP),
Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Biological Warfare
Agent Casualties.

5. Chemical Weapons and Sources

a. Chemical Weapons Development Lifecycle (Figure C-2). The lifecycle of a

chemical weapon capability runs on a continuum from research through production,
weaponization, storage, deployment/employment, and demilitarization. Agents and
munitions that have exceeded their shelf life should be disposed of in a manner that
precludes their continuing to be a hazard (e.g., incineration or neutralization). These stages
can run in parallel as a capability is upgraded or circumvented as the capability is
franchised or imported. Research involves gathering and cultivating needed expertise and
validating production and weaponization processes. Production times are often relatively
short within the life-cycle. Large stockpiles can be produced within a few years in a

C-3
Appendix C

Agents with Significant Risks of Deliberate Misuse

Influenza viruses (avian, swine, etc.)

Ebola virus
Marburg virus
Viruses Variola major and minor viruses (Smallpox)
Alphaviruses (Eastern Equine Encephalitis, Venezuelan
Equine Encephalitis)
Foot-and-mouth disease virus (animal disease only)
Rinderpest virus (animal disease only)
Pathogens
Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax)
Burkholderia mallei (Glanders)
Burkholderia pseudomallei (Melioidosis)
Bacteria Francisella tularensis (Tularemia)
Yersinia pestis (Plague)
Coxiella burnetii (Q fever)
Brucella species (Brucellosis)
Rickettsia prowazekii (Epidemic typhus)

Clostridium botulinum neurotoxin

Ricin toxin
Toxins Abrin toxin
Staphylococcus enterotoxins

Exemplary list, not exhaustive of Pathogens and Toxins.

Figure C-1. Agents with Significant Risks of Deliberate Misuse

modest-sized chemical plant before it is re-purposed to another use. Agents are usually
stored in munitions or in bulk containers.

b. Maintaining the capability depends on continued serviceability of the munitions,

the agent, and the munitions filling equipment for agents stored in bulk. Deployment and
employment may involve specialized units qualified to handle agents and fill munitions.
The task of controlling chemical warfare agent identification is further complicated through
nations’ use of binary compounds. Binary compounds have significantly extended storage
life. Frequently, the agent must be reprocessed or replaced to maintain the usefulness of
the weapon. Eventually, agents and munitions will need to be demilitarized. Burial of
chemical warfare agents is not a permitted destruction method in accordance with the
CWC. Munitions buried prior to CWC entry into force may remain buried but, if
recovered, will be destroyed in accordance with an approved destruction method. Weapons
degraded beyond normal military usefulness can still pose significant hazards, especially
if proper control is lost. Agents and munitions that were disposed of through burial or

C-4 JP 3-40
 Weapon Characteristics

Chemical Weapons Production

Munitions Research
and Development

Precursor Production

Chemical Weapons
Weapons
Defense
Production and
Filling

Agent Research
and Agent Production
Development Employment
Stockpile and
Training

Chemical Associated
Weapons Production and
Administration Storage
Destruction and
Disposal

Figure C-2. Chemical Weapons Production

ocean dumping prior to the CWC should remain undisturbed, and if they pose an
environmental hazard, or are recovered, they should be destroyed in an approved manner
as any other munition or agent.

For further guidance on chemical weapons, refer to US Army Medical Research Institute
of Chemical Defense Field Management of Chemical Casualties; Medical Management of
Chemical Casualties Handbook; or ATP 4-02.85/MCRP 4-11.1A/NTRP 4-02.22/Air Force
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP)(Instruction) 3-2.69, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Chemical Warfare Agent Casualties and
Conventional Military Chemical Injuries.

C-5
Appendix C

Intentionally Blank

C-6 JP 3-40
 APPENDIX D
DUAL-USE CHALLENGES

1. General

JFCs should understand the implications associated with dual-use technologies,

materials, equipment, and expertise, which can provide the capability to develop WMD
(Figure D-1). Many CBRN-associated resources have a range of legitimate applications in
academia, industry, public health sector, and research. Even though they are normally used
for civilian purposes, they may be exploited for military or nefarious applications. These
dual-use items present actors of concern a means to covertly acquire or develop CBRN
weapon capabilities. The legitimate appearance of these activities and facilities
complicates the JFC’s ability to detect, track, and target these potential threats. The
Australia Group maintains an extensive collection of information related to potential
chemical/biological materials and equipment that may be clandestinely used to produce
chemical or biological weapons. The following is an excerpt from Australia Group
Common Control List Handbook, Volume I: Chemical Weapons-Related Common Control
Lists and describes some dual-use items of concern. For more information and access to
additional Australia Group products see: https://australiagroup.net/en/index.html.

a. Chemical Production Dual-Use Equipment

Dual-Use Chemical/Biological Applications

Chemicals Have Multiple Uses

CH3 C G

A T

C G

N
CI CI C G

A T
Nitrogen G C
...and anti-cancer drug (as a salt)
Mustard
Schedule 1A C G

A T

C G

C G

G C

A T

Cross-link
between
two quanine
bases

Figure D-1. Dual-Use Chemical/Biological Applications

D-1
Appendix D

(1) Reaction vessels, reactors, or agitators reaction vessels or reactors (Figure D-

2), with or without agitators, with total internal (geometric) volume greater than 0.1 cubic
meters (m³) (100 l) and less than 20 m³ (20000 l), where all surfaces that come in direct
contact with the chemical(s) being processed or contained are made from the following
materials:

(a) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

(b) Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by
weight.

(c) Fluoropolymers (polymeric or elastomeric materials with more than 35

percent fluorine by weight).

(d) Glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enameled coating).

(e) Tantalum or tantalum alloys.

(f) Titanium or titanium alloys.

(g) Zirconium or zirconium alloys.

Chemical Reactor Vessel

Figure D-2. Chemical Reactor Vessel

D-2 JP 3-40
 Dual-Use Challenges

(h) Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

(2) Prefabricated repair assemblies and their specially designed components,

that:

(a) Are designed for mechanical attachment to glass-lined reaction vessels

or reactors that meet the parameters above.

(b) Have metallic surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s)
being processed which are made from tantalum or tantalum alloys.

b. Storage Tanks, Containers or Receivers

(1) Storage tanks, containers or receivers (Figure D-3) with a total internal
(geometric) volume greater than 0.1 m³ (100 l) where all surfaces that come in direct
contact with the chemical(s) being processed or contained are made from the following
materials:

(a) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

(b) Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by
weight Fluoropolymers (polymeric or elastomeric materials with more than 35 percent
fluorine by weight).

(c) Glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enameled coating).

Chemical Storage Tanks

Figure D-3. Chemical Storage Tanks

D-3
Appendix D

(d) Tantalum or tantalum alloys.

(e) Titanium or titanium alloys.

(f) Zirconium or zirconium alloys.

(g) Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

(2) Prefabricated repair assemblies and their specially designed components,

that:

(a) Are designed for mechanical attachment to glass-lined storage tanks,

containers or receivers that meet the parameters above.

(b) Have metallic surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s)
being processed which are made from tantalum or tantalum alloys.

c. Heat Exchangers or Condensers and Distillation or Absorption Columns

(Figure D-4 and Figure D-5). Heat exchangers or condensers with a heat transfer surface
area of greater than 0.15 square meters, and less than 20 square meters, and tubes, plates,
coils, or blocks (cores) designed for such heat exchangers or condensers, where all surfaces
that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed are made from the
following materials:

Chemical Heat Exchanger

Figure D-4. Chemical Heat Exchanger

D-4 JP 3-40
 Dual-Use Challenges

Chemical Distillation Column

Figure D-5. Chemical Distillation Column

(1) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

(2) Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by weight.

(3) Fluoropolymers (polymeric or elastomeric materials with more than 35

percent fluorine by weight).

(4) Glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enameled coating).

(5) Graphite or carbon-graphite.

(6) Tantalum or tantalum alloys.

(7) Titanium or titanium alloys.

(8) Zirconium or zirconium alloys.

(9) Silicon carbide.

(10) Titanium carbide.

(11) Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

D-5
Appendix D

Technical note 1: Carbon-graphite is a composition consisting of

amorphous carbon and graphite, in which the graphite content is eight
percent or more by weight.

d. Filling Equipment (Figure D-6). Remotely operated filling equipment in which

all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed are made from
the following materials:

(1) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

(2) Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by weight.

e. Valves (Figure D-7)

(1) Valves, having both of the following:

(a) A nominal size greater than 1.0 centimeters (cm) (3/8 inch).

(b) All surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being
produced, processed, or contained are made from the materials of construction in technical
note 2.

Chemical Filling Equipment

Figure D-6. Chemical Filling Equipment

D-6 JP 3-40
 Dual-Use Challenges

Chemical Valve

Figure D-7. Chemical Valve

(2) Valves, not already identified in paragraph 6.a., having all of the following:

(a) A nominal size equal to or greater than 2.54 cm (1 inch) and equal to or
less than 10.16 cm (4 inch).

(b) Casings (valve bodies) or preformed casing liners.

(c) A closure element designed to be interchangeable.

(d) All surfaces of the casing (valve body) or preformed case liner that come
in direct contact with the chemical(s) being produced, processed, or contained are made
from the materials of construction in technical note 2.

(3) Components, as follows:

(a) Casings (valve bodies) designed for valves in paragraphs 6.a.or 6.b., in
which all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being produced,
processed, or contained are made from the materials of construction in technical note 2.

(b) Preformed casing liners designed for valves in paragraphs 6.a.or 6.b., in
which all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being produced,
processed, or contained are made from the materials of construction in technical note 2.

D-7
Appendix D

Technical note 2. Materials of construction for valves include any of the

following:

a. Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

b. Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by

weight.

c. Fluoropolymers (polymeric or elastomeric materials with more than 35

percent fluorine by weight.

d. Glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enameled coating).

e. Tantalum or tantalum alloys.

f. Titanium or titanium alloys.

g. Zirconium or zirconium alloys.

h. Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

i. Ceramic materials as follows:

(1) Silicon carbide with a purity of 80 percent or more by weight.

(2) Aluminum oxide (alumina) with a purity of 99.9 percent or more

by weight.

(3) Zirconium oxide (zirconia).

f. Multi-Walled Piping (Figure D-8). Multi-walled piping incorporating a leak

detection port, in which all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being
processed or contained are made from the following materials:

(1) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

(2) Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by weight.

(3) Fluoropolymers (polymeric or elastomeric materials with more than 35

percent fluorine by weight).

(4) Glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enameled coating).

(5) Graphite or carbon-graphite.

(6) Tantalum or tantalum alloys.

(7) Titanium or titanium alloys.

(8) Zirconium or zirconium alloys.

D-8 JP 3-40
 Dual-Use Challenges

Chemical Processing Piping

Figure D-8. Chemical Processing Piping

(9) Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

g. Pumps (Figure D-9). Multiple-seal and seal-less pumps with manufacturer’s

specified maximum flow-rate greater than 0.6 m3/hour, or vacuum pumps with
manufacturer’s specified maximum flow-rate greater than 5 m³/hour (under standard
temperature (273 Kelvin [0o Celsius]) and pressure [101.3 kilopascal] conditions), and
casings (pump bodies), preformed casing liners, impellers, rotors or jet pump nozzles
designed for such pumps, in which all surfaces that come into direct contact with the
chemical(s) being processed are made from any of the following materials:

(1) Nickel or alloys with more than 40 percent nickel by weight.

(2) Alloys with more than 25 percent nickel and 20 percent chromium by weight.

(3) Fluoropolymers (polymeric or elastomeric materials with more than 35

percent fluorine by weight).

(4) Glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enameled coating).

(5) Graphite or carbon-graphite.

(6) Tantalum or tantalum alloys.

(7) Titanium or titanium alloys.

D-9
Appendix D

Chemical Production Pumps

Figure D-9. Chemical Production Pumps

(8) Zirconium or zirconium alloys.

(9) Ceramics.

(10) Ferrosilicon (high silicon iron alloys).

(11) Niobium (columbium) or niobium alloys.

Technical note 3: The seals referred to in this control come into direct
contact with the chemical(s) being processed (or are designed to) and
provide a sealing function where a rotary or reciprocating drive shaft
passes through a pump body.

2. Biological Facilities and Equipment

a. Facilities. Containment facilities and related equipment as follows:

(1) Complete containment facilities that meet the criteria for the appropriate level
of biosafety.

(2) Containment as specified in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual.

(3) Equipment designed for fixed installation in containment facilities specified

in a., as follows:

D-10 JP 3-40
 Dual-Use Challenges

(a) Double-door pass-through decontamination autoclaves.

(b) Breathing air suit decontamination showers.

(c) Mechanical-seal or inflatable-seal walkthrough doors.

b. Equipment

(1) Fermenters (Figure D-10 and Figure D-11). Fermenters capable of cultivation
of microorganisms or of live cells for the production of viruses or toxins, without the
propagation of aerosols, having a total internal volume of 20 liters or greater. Components
designed for such fermenters, as follows:

(a) Cultivation chambers designed to be sterilized or disinfected in-situ.

(b) Cultivation chamber holding devices.

(c) Process control units capable of simultaneously monitoring and

controlling two or more fermentation system parameters (e.g., temperature, pH, nutrients,
agitation, dissolved oxygen, air flow, foam control). Fermenters include bioreactors
(including single-use [disposable] bioreactors), chemostats, and continuous-flow systems.

Biological Production Fermenter

Figure D-10. Biological Production Fermenter

D-11
Appendix D

Biological Production Fermenter

Figure D-11. Biological Production Fermenter

(2) Centrifugal Separators. Centrifugal separators capable of the continuous

separation of pathogenic microorganisms, without the propagation of aerosols, and having
all the following characteristics:

(a) One or more sealing joints within the steam containment area.

(b) A flow rate greater than 100 liters per hour.

(c) Components of polished stainless steel or titanium.

(d) Capable of in-situ steam sterilization in a closed state.

Technical note 4: Centrifugal separators include decanters.

(3) Cross (tangential) Flow Filtration Equipment (Figure D-12). Cross

(tangential) flow filtration equipment capable of separation of microorganisms, viruses,
toxins, or cell cultures having all the following characteristics:

(a) A total filtration area equal to or greater than one square meter.

(b) Having any of the following characteristics:

1. Capable of being sterilized or disinfected in-situ.

D-12 JP 3-40
 Dual-Use Challenges

Biological Production Filtration

Figure D-12. Biological Production Filtration

2. Using disposable or single-use filtration components.

(4) Freeze-Drying Equipment. Steam, gas, or vapor stabilizable freeze-drying

equipment with a condenser capacity of 10 kg of ice or greater in 24 hours and less than
1000 kg of ice in 24 hours.

(5) Spray-Drying Equipment. Spray drying equipment capable of drying toxins

or pathogenic microorganisms having all of the following characteristics:

(a) A water evaporation capacity of ≥ 0.4 kg/hour and ≤ 400 grams/hour.

(b) The ability to generate a typical mean product particle size of ≤10
micrometers with existing fittings or by minimal modification of the spray-dryer with
atomization nozzles enabling generation of the required particle size and capable of being
sterilized or disinfected in-situ.

(6) Protective and containment equipment as follows: protective full or half suits,
or hoods dependent upon a tethered external air supply and operating under positive
pressure.

D-13
Appendix D

Technical note 5: This does not control suits designed to be worn with
self-contained breathing apparatus. Biocontainment chambers,
isolators, or biological safety cabinets having all of the following
characteristics, for normal operation:

a. Fully enclosed workspace where the operator is separated from the

work by a physical barrier.

b. Able to operate at negative pressure.

c. Means to safely manipulate items in the workspace.

d. Supply and exhaust air to and from the workspace is HEPA [high-
efficiency particulate air]-filtered.

(7) Spraying or fogging systems and components. Complete spraying or fogging

systems, specially designed or modified for fitting to aircraft, lighter than air vehicles or
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), capable of delivering, from a liquid suspension, an
initial droplet volume median diameter (VMD) of less than 50 microns at a flow rate of
greater than two liters per minute. Spray booms or arrays of aerosol generating units,
specially designed or modified for fitting to aircraft, lighter than air vehicles or UAVs,
capable of delivering, from a liquid suspension, an initial droplet VMD of less than 50
microns at a flow rate of greater than two liters per minute.

(8) Nucleic Acid Assemblers and Synthesizers. Nucleic acid assemblers and
synthesizers, which are partly or entirely automated and designed to generate continuous
nucleic acids greater than 1.5 kilobases in length with error rates less than 5 percent in a
single run.

(9) Items for inclusion in Awareness Raising Guidelines. Experts propose that
the following items be included in awareness raising guidelines to industry:

(a) Equipment and technology (not specified elsewhere in the control list of
Dual-use Biological Equipment and Related Technology and Software) for the
encapsulation of live pathogenic microorganisms, viruses, and toxins, with a typical mean
product particle size of 10 micrometers or less.

(b) Fermenters of less than 20 liter capacity with special emphasis on

aggregate orders or designs for use in combined systems.

(c) Conventional or turbulent air-flow clean-air rooms and self-contained

fan-HEPA [high-efficiency particulate air] filter units that may be used for the appropriate
level of biosafety containment facilities.

3. Radiological Dual-Use Equipment

Radioactive materials are both legitimately and extensively used around the world.
These materials serve important roles in medicine, industry, research, and academia.

D-14 JP 3-40
 Dual-Use Challenges

Within an area of operation, JFC’s can expect to find numerous radioactive material
applications. Commanders should also recognize that nefarious actors may seek to acquire
these materials for bad intent. While the technical, security, and financial hurdles required
to make or acquire a nuclear weapon are monumental, common thieves may be able to steal
radioactive materials with relative ease. The following information is provided by the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and serves as an overview of common radioactive
material uses. For more information, see https://www.nrc.gov/

a. Diagnostic Medical Use. Use of nuclear materials in radioactive uptake, dilution,

excretion, imaging, or localization diagnostic clinical or research procedures for humans
and animals. The metabolic or physiological properties of radiolabeled drugs are used to
obtain medical information, and the radiation produced from sealed sources are used in
diagnostic devices to image body parts or determine tissue density. Diagnostic medical
use includes the use of certain portable imaging devices in dentistry and podiatry, as well
as bone mineral analysis devices in podiatry.

b. Therapeutic Medical Use. Use of nuclear materials to deliver palliative (pain

relieving) or therapeutic doses of radiation to specific tissues or body areas. Although most
therapeutic uses of radiation involve the treatment of cancer, therapeutic doses may also
be used to treat benign conditions such as the use of intervascular brachytherapy radiation
to treat clogged blood vessels (restenosis).

c. Medical Research Use. Research involving human subjects using byproduct

materials may only be performed if the licensee has a Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR), Part 35, medical use authorization. There are a wide variety of research uses of
nuclear materials in human subjects. They include the use of nuclear materials in well-
established nuclear medicine procedures to monitor a human research subject’s response
to a nonradioactive drug or device treatment, as well as clinical trials to determine the
safety or effectiveness of new radioactive drugs and devices. The particular medical
research use must conform with the requirements in Title 10, CFR, Part 35, and the
possession and medical use authorizations in the license.

d. Certain in Vitro Diagnostic Tests. Some medical facilities or private physicians

may only have regulated material in the form of prepackaged in vitro diagnostic test kits.
These facilities and physicians do not have “medical use” licenses because these materials
are not regulated pursuant to Title 10, CFR, Part 35. The amount of regulated materials
used in this form of in vitro diagnostic testing determines whether its use is authorized by
a specific license issued pursuant to Title 10, CFR, Part 30, or a general license pursuant
to 10 CFR, Part 31.11. See the general license uses page for those materials generally
licensed pursuant to Title 10, CFR, Part 31.11.

e. Industrial Radiography. Industrial radiography is the use of radiation to produce

an image of internal features on photographic film; it is used to inspect metal parts and
welds for defects.

f. Irradiators. Irradiators are devices or facilities that expose products to radiation

to sterilize them, such as spices and some foods, milk containers, and hospital supplies.

D-15
Appendix D

Self-shielded irradiators are constructed so there is no external beam during use and there
is “usually a small cabinet type device that is not built in.” Non-self-shielded irradiators
do not provide shielding from the radiation beam; therefore, additional shielding needs to
be provided and special radiation protection precautions need to be taken.

g. Well Logging. Well logging is a process used to determine whether a well drilled
deep into the ground has the potential to produce oil. This process uses byproduct or
special nuclear material tracer and sealed sources in connection with the exploration for
oil, gas, or minerals in wells.

h. Gauging Devices. Gauging devices are used to measure, monitor, and control the
thickness of sheet metal, textiles, paper napkins, newspaper, plastics, photographic film,
and other products as they are manufactured. No portable gauging devices (i.e., gauges
mounted in fixed locations) are designed for measurement or control of material density,
flow, level, thickness, or weight, and so forth. The gauges contain sealed sources that
radiate through the substance being measured to a readout or controlling device. Portable
gauging devices, such as moisture density gauges, are used at field locations. These gauges
contain a gamma-emitting sealed source, usually cesium-137, or a sealed neutron source,
usually americium-241 and beryllium.

i. Other Measuring Systems. Other measuring systems includes analytical systems

such as x-ray fluorescence analyzers, gas chromatographs used for quality control testing
in industrial processes, instrument calibrators, krypton leak detectors, and other “non-
gauge” measuring systems.

j. Research and Development. Research and development involves the possession

and use of radionuclides in industrial facilities for research and development.

k. Source Material. Source material licenses are issued for the possession and use
of refined uranium or thorium for fabrication, research, and manufacture of consumer
products such as ceramics and glassware, manufacture of refractories, uranium shielding,
analytical standards, military munitions, and other uses. A small number of these licenses
are issued to allow the use of uranium in subcritical assemblies.

l. Special Nuclear Material. Special nuclear material licenses are issued for the
possession and use of small quantities of Pu-239, U-235, and U-233 (less than 200 grams
total) for purposes such as biological and chemical testing; calibration of instruments;
neutron sources for use in industrial applications; power sources to generate heat or power
for remote weather stations and sensors, satellites, and other special applications; and
sealed sources in devices such as gauges.

D-16 JP 3-40
 APPENDIX E
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

“…artificial intelligence, 3D [three-dimensional] printing and synthetic biology will

bring profound changes to our everyday lives and benefits to millions of people.
However, their potential for misuse could also bring destruction. The nexus
between these emerging technologies and WMD [weapons of mass destruction]
needs close examination and action.”

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon 2016

1. General

Developments in science and technology have progressed at a blistering pace since the
end of World War II. New breakthroughs in science and technology are announced, and
each breakthrough in turn begets another breakthrough. While these scientific and
technological advancements have largely been applied to improve our quality of life, the
potential for misuse is of great concern. The following discussion is intended to highlight
a few areas of future science and technology development that have application to CWMD.

a. Technology Advancement Examples

(1) Advanced information communication technologies, artificial intelligence,

robotics and automation, cloud-based platforms, and Internet of things.

(2) Digital currencies, blockchain technology applications.

(3) Advanced materials and manufacturing.

(4) Biotechnologies at an inflection point—genetic testing and editing advances,

catalyzed by the new gene manipulation methods are turning science fiction into reality.

(5) Unconventional energy sources.

b. Science and Technology Pace

(1) Rapid technological advancements will increase the pace of change and create
new opportunities but will aggravate divisions between winners and losers.

(2) Automation and artificial intelligence threaten to change industries faster than
economies can adjust, potentially displacing workers and limiting poor country
development.

(3) Biotechnologies such as genome editing will revolutionize medicine and

other fields, while sharpening moral differences.

c. Figure E-1 shows examples of several science and technology trends.

E-1
Appendix E

2. Chemical Developments

As Figure E-2 shows, advancements in chemical and biological sciences have out-paced
treaty inspection regimes’ (e.g., BTWC and CWC) ability to keep up with the increase number
of chemical compounds and genetic sequences since these treaties were signed. The
development of fourth generation chemical agents has made protective measures more difficult.

3. Biological Developments

Synthetic Biological Production. Scientific advances over the past several decades
have accelerated the ability to engineer existing organisms and to potentially create novel
ones not found in nature. Synthetic biology, which collectively refers to concepts,
approaches, and tools that enable the modification or creation of biological organisms, is
being pursued overwhelmingly for beneficial purposes ranging from reducing the burden
of disease to improving agricultural yields to remediating pollution. Although the
contributions synthetic biology can make in these and other areas hold great promise, it is
also possible to imagine malicious uses that could threaten US citizens and military
personnel.

Science and Technology Trends

Science, Technology, and Engineering Trends and Conditions
 Applied metamaterials
 Exploitation of unique material properties at the nanoscale Multidisciplinary
 Fuels and batteries with increased energy density Scientific Research
 Biochemistry and biological engineering

 Additive manufacturing goes global

 Evolution of autonomous robotic systems The Significance of
Systems and
 Open source design
Systems integration
 Emergence of micro/nano-satellites and near-space capabilities

 Proliferation of advanced radio-frequency weapons Emerging Measure/

 Availability of nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse Countermeasure
 Robotics as force multiplier Competitive Spaces

 Regional command, control, and communications/intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance parity
Proliferated
 Exploitation of command, control, and
communications/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Information
vulnerabilities Technologies
 Advanced information analysis and exploitation

 Deployment of >100 kilowatt electrical lasers Emergence of New

 Breakthrough energy High-End, Capital-
 Hypersonics intensive Capabilities

Figure E-1. Science and Technology Trends

E-2 JP 3-40
 Science and Technology

Science and Technology Trends (continued)

Present Future (<25 Years)

l Energy (advanced fission, renewables, solar) l Energy (fusion, solar <$1 watt)
m hydraulic fracturing, photovoltaic efficiencies m ubiquitous 3rd generation SILEX (laser enrichment)
l Energy storage (advanced batteries, capacitors) m antimatter, LENR
l Communications (internet, wireless, reading brain l Energy Storage (flywheels, supercapacitors)
waves) l Communications (virtual reality/augmented reality,
l Information (artificial intelligence, big data, machine telepresence)
learning, quantum computing) l Information (DNA, general artificial intelligence/strong
l Robotics and autonomous systems (Predator, artificial intelligence, human machine interface, Moore’s
Reaper) Law extinction)
l Bionics (exoskeletons) l Robotics and autonomous systems (anthropomorphics)
l Biomedical (cloning, gene therapy, geneering, l Bionics (neural dust, powered combat armor)
neuroscience) l Biomedical (antisenescence, chimeras, optogenetics)
l Manufacturing (additive manufacturing/3D printing, l Manufacturing (nanoassembly)
growth, prefab skyscrapers)
l Propulsion/transport (single-stage-to-orbit)
l Propulsion/transport (hypersonics, magnetic
m Cannae, electromagnetic, and mach-effect thruster
levitation, quadcopters)
drives
l Materials (nanotechnology, metamaterials, high-
temperature superconductors) l Materials (room temperature superconductors)
l Civil Engineering (sky needles, bridges, tunnels) l Civil engineering (archologies, megastructures,
seabases)
l Positioning (Beidou, Galileo, GLONASS, GPS)
l Positioning (NAVIC)
l Space (nanosatellites, orbital habitats, reusable
launch) l Space (exomining, orbital manufacturing, manned Mars
2024)
m tensility structures
m propellantless propulsion, laboratory faster than light/
l Weapons (advanced chemical and biological, space warping
DEWs [laser, microwave], railguns)
l Weapons (DEWs [particle, plasma])

Legend
3D three-dimensional GPS Global Positioning System
DEW directed energy weapon LENR low energy nuclear reaction
DNA deoxyribonucleic acid NAVIC Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System
GLONASS Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Prefab prefabricated
Sputnikovaya Sistema or Global SILEX separation of isotopes by laser excitation
Navigation Satellite System

Figure E-1. Science and Technology Trends (continued)

For more information on Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology, see

https://www.nap.edu/read/24890/chapter/1.

4. Nuclear and Radiological Developments

a. Particle Beam Weaponry. A particle-beam weapon uses a high-energy beam of

atomic or subatomic particles to damage the target by disrupting its atomic and/or
molecular structure. A particle-beam weapon is a type of directed-energy weapon, which
directs energy in a particular and focused direction using particles with miniscule mass.
Some particle-beam weapons have potential practical applications (e.g., as an antiballistic
missile defense systems).

b. The critical nature of modern communications systems, and in particular satellite

technology, makes the threat of electromagnetic pulse weapons a great concern for commanders.
Advancements in this area are increasing rapidly with our peer and near-peer competitors.

E-3
Appendix E

Chemical and Biological Advancements

Monitoring Science
190
180
BWC CWC
170
Opened for Opened for
160 Signature Signature
150
Data Base Entries [in Millions]

140
130
120
110
100 Grows by
> 110 Million ~15,000/
90 day
Compounds and
80 Sequences since
70 CWC Schedules
60 Created in 1993
50
40
30
20
10
0
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Year
Legend

BWC Biological Weapons Convention CAS registry numbers (chemicals, oligomers)

CAS Chemical Abstracts Service
Genebank sequences (genes)
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

Figure E-2. Chemical and Biological Advancements

5. Nano-Technology

a. Science and technology has been focusing for many years on the miniaturization of
equipment, machines, and sub-components such as microchips. This trend will continue
as a benefit to friendly forces, yet also provide adversaries with increased capability.
Increasing science and technology advances in three-dimensional printing will also help
friendly forces, but adversaries will have a better ability to avoid detection of their
activities.

b. The previous discussion is designed to emphasize the importance of keeping up-to-

date with advancements in both science and technology. JFC’s are not expected to be
subject matter experts on all facets of technology, but the inclusion of science and
technology subject matter experts within a JTF will assist commanders with recognizing
the impacts of advancements in science and technology on future CWMD operations.

E-4 JP 3-40
 APPENDIX F
POINTS OF CONTACT

Joint Staff/J-7/Joint Doctrine Division

Website: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/
E-mail: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil
Phone number: 703-692-7273 (DSN 222)

Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor

Directorate for Strategy, Plans, and Policy
Deputy Directorate for Strategic Stability, CWMD Division
Phone: 703-693-3709
E-mail: js.pentagon.j5.list.dd-sts-cwmd-div-all@mail.mil

Lead Agent
USSOCOM J59-D
7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill, AFB, FL 33621
Phone: 813-826-6829
E-mail: J59-CDI-D@socom.mil

Office of Coordinating Responsibility

USSOCOM J5
USSOCOM CWMD-FC
7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill, AFB, FL 33621

F-1
Appendix F

Intentionally Blank

F-2 JP 3-40
 APPENDIX G
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-40 is based on the following primary references:

1. General

a. Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan.

b. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

c. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and

Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.

d. Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

e. Guidance for Employment of the Force.

f. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic

Incidents.

g. Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan.

h. National Biodefense Strategy.

i. (U) National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the
American Military’s Competitive Edge.

j. National Incident Management System.

k. (U) National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2018.

l. National Response Framework.

m. National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

n. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats.

o. National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

p. National Strategy for Homeland Security.

q. National Strategy for Strategic Interdiction.

r. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-17/HSPD-4, National Strategy to

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

s. NSPD-20, Counterproliferation Interdiction.

G-1
Appendix G

t. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62, (U) Protection Against Unconventional

Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas.

u. PPD-8, National Preparedness.

v. PPD-21, (U) Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.

w. The Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles.

x. Title 10, USC.

y. Title 14, USC.

z. Title 32, USC.

aa Title 50, USC.

bb. Unified Command Plan.

2. Department of Defense Publications

a. DODD 2060.02, DOD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy.

b. DODD S-2060.04, (U) DOD Support to the National Technical Nuclear Forensics
(NTNF) Program.

c. DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

d. DODD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major

Components.

e. DODD 5134.08, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and

Biological Defense Programs ASD[NCB]).

f. DODD 5205.14, DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy.

g. DODI 2000.21, DOD Support to International Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents.

h. DODI 3020.52, DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,

and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Preparedness Standards.

i. DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.

j. DODI 6055.17, DOD Emergency Management (EM) Program.

k. DODI 6200.03, Public Health Emergency Management Within the Department of

Defense.

G-2 JP 3-40
 References

l. DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 2030.01D, Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation and Compliance

Policy Guidance.

b. CJCSI 2110.01E, International Transfer of US Defense-Related Technology and

Munitions.

c. CJCSI 3100.01D, Joint Strategic Planning System.

d. CJCSI 3110.01K, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

e. CJCSI 3125.01D, Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and

Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland.

f. CJCSI 3214.01E, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and

Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory.

g. CJCSI 3261.01C, Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons.

h. CJCSI 3401.01E, Joint Combat Capability Assessment.

i. CJCSI 3500.01H, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States.

j. CJCSI 3520.02B, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Activity Program.

k. CJCSI 5113.03, (U) Counterproliferation Interdiction Policy.

l. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

m. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

n. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

o. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

p. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

q. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

r. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

s. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Environments.

t. JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

G-3
Appendix G

u JP 3-13, Information Operations.

v. JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Activities.

w. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

x. JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

y. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

z. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

aa. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

bb. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

cc. JP 3-80, Resource Management.

dd. JP 3-84, Legal Support.

ee. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

ff. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

gg. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

hh. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

ii. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

4. Multi-Service Publications

a. ATP 3-11.32/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 10-10E.8/Navy Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-11.37/AFTTP 3-2.46, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive
Defense.

b. ATP 3-11.36/MCRP 10-10E.1/NTTP 3-11.34/AFTTP 3-2.70, Multi-Service

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Planning.

c. ATP 3-11.41/MCRP 10-10E.6/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP 3-2.37, Multi-Service

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Consequence Management Operations.

d. ATP 4-02.7/MCRP 3-40A.6/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Support in a Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear Environment.

G-4 JP 3-40
 References

e. ATP 4-02.283/MCRP 3-40A.2/NTRP 4-02.21/AFMAN 44-161(I), Multi-Service

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological
Casualties.

f. ATP 4-02.84/MCRP 3-40A.3/NTRP 4-02.23/AFMAN 44-156_IP, Multi-Service

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent
Casualties.

g. ATP 4-02.285/MCRP 4-11.1A/NTRP 4-02.22/AFTTP (Instruction) 3-2.69, Multi-

Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties
and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries.

h. Field Manual (FM) 3-11/MCRP10.10E.3/Navy Warfare Publication 3-11/AFTTP

3-2.42, Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Operations.

i. FM 6-05/MCRP 3-30.4/NTTP 3-05.19/AFTTP 3-2.73/USSOCOM Publication 3-

33, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and
Special Operations Forces Integration Interoperability, and Interdependence.

j. Technical Manual 3-11.32/MCRP 10-10E.5/NTRP 3-11.25/AFTTP 3-2.56, Multi-

Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear Warning and Reporting and Hazard Prediction Procedures.

5. Army Publications

a. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations.

b. ADP 3-07, Stability.

c. ADP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

d. ADP 5-0, The Operations Process.

e. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Operations.

f. ADRP 3-07, Stability.

g. ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process.

h. FM 3-13, Information Operations.

6. Marine Corps Publication

Marine Corps Tactical Publication 10.10E, MAGTF Nuclear, Biological, and

Chemical Defensive Operations.

G-5
Appendix G

7. Navy Publication

Navy Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare.

8. Air Force Publications

a. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-0, Operations and Planning.

b. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-40, Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

Operations.

c. Air Force Instruction 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program.

d. AFMAN 10-2503, Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,

and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Environment.

e. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-25, Air Force Emergency Management
Program.

f. AFPD 10-26, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Enterprise.

9. Allied Publications

a. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Medical Publication

(AMedP)-6(C) Volume 1, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive
Operations (Nuclear).

b. NATO AMedP-6(C) Volume 2, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC

Defensive Operations (Biological).

c. NATO AMedP-6(C) Volume 3, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC

Defensive Operations (Chemical).

10. Other Sources

a. DIA and Joint IED Defeat Organization Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
Technical Exploitation Lexicon, 5th edition.

b. Defense Intelligence Agency, Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) Handbook.

G-6 JP 3-40
 APPENDIX H
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using
the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to:
js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content
(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is United States Special Operations Command.
The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategy, Plans, and
Policy (J-5).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community,
made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. John
Campbell, United States Special Operations Command; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Mr.
Giovanni Pindilli, Joint Staff J-5; Mr. Alan Armistead, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine
Analysis Division; and Lt Col Mark Newell, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.

c. The lead agent would like to acknowledge the efforts of the late Mr. Ernest “Lee”
Smith of USSOCOM J-53 in crafting this publication. Mr. Smith’s lifetime of dedication
to protecting America and its allies from the scourge of weapons of mass destruction has
made an incalculable contribution to the progress the nation has made in controlling the
world’s most dangerous weapons.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31

October 2014.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication,

please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to:
js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.

H-1
Appendix H

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons
learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative
resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness
of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine
development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become
institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are
routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the
development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil
(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be
IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview,
Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD
Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are
available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and
https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/generic.jsp (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at
http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and
Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-
Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member,

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-
ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally
reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support
agencies.

H-2 JP 3-40
 GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

ADP Army doctrine publication

ADRP Army doctrine reference publication
AFMAN Air Force manual
AFPD Air Force policy directive
AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AMedP Allied medical publication
ANG Air National Guard
AOR area of responsibility
ARNG Army National Guard
ATP Army techniques publication
ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(DHHS)
AVC Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance
(DOS)

BTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

C2 command and control

CBP Customs and Border Protection (DHS)
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR combatant commander
CCMD combatant command
CCP combatant command campaign plan
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (DHHS)
CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
cm centimeter(s)
CNGB Chief, National Guard Bureau
CP counterproliferation
CSA combat support agency
CT counterterrorism
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
CTR cooperative threat reduction
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
CWMD countering weapons of mass destruction

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (DOJ)

DHHS Department of Health and Human Services
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DHS)

GL-1
Glossary

DOC Department of Commerce

DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DODS-CWMD Department of Defense Strategy for Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction
DOE Department of Energy
DOJ Department of Justice
DOS Department of State
DOT Department of Transportation
DSCA defense support of civil authorities
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DURC dual-use research of concern

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)

FCP-CWMD Functional Campaign Plan for Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)
FM field manual (USA)

GCC geographic combatant commander

GEOINT geospatial intelligence
GICNT Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

HD homeland defense
HN host nation
HQ headquarters
HSPD homeland security Presidential directive

I interservice (USAF)
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS)
IP integrated policy (USAF)
ISN Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
(DOS)

JFC joint force commander

JIACG joint interagency coordination group
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment
JP joint publication
JPP joint planning process
JS Joint Staff
JTF joint task force

kg kilogram(s)

GL-2 JP 3-40
 Glossary

m³ cubic meter(s)
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCPC National Counterproliferation Center
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
NDS national defense strategy
NG National Guard
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NG JFHQ-State National Guard joint force headquarters-state
NIH National Institutes of Health (DHHS)
NMS national military strategy
NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE)
NPT Nonproliferation Treaty
NSABB National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NIH)
NSC National Security Council
NSPD national security Presidential directive
NSS national security strategy
NTA nontraditional agent
NTRP Navy tactical reference publication
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

OBA Office of Biotechnology Activities (NIH)

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OE operational environment
OPE operational preparation of the environment
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PM Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS)

PN partner nation
PPD Presidential policy directive
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative
Pu-239 plutonium-239
Pu-240 plutonium-240

RDD radiological dispersal device

RED radiological exposure device

SC security cooperation
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SJA staff judge advocate
SOF special operations forces

U-233 uranium-233
U-235 uranium-235

GL-3
Glossary

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSCR United Nations Security Council resolution
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USC United States Code
USCG United States Coast Guard
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command
USG United States Government
USINDOPACOM United States Indo-Pacific Command
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

VMD volume median diameter

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-4 JP 3-40
 PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response. In countering weapons of

mass destruction, the activities to attribute responsibility for an event, minimize
effects, sustain operations, and support follow on actions. Also called CBRN
response. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

countering weapons of mass destruction. Efforts against actors of concern to curtail the
conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons
of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery.
Also called CWMD. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-40)

counterproliferation. Those actions taken to reduce the risks posed by extant weapons of
mass destruction to the United States, allies, and partners. Also called CP. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-40)

nonproliferation. Actions to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by

dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material,
and expertise. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-40)

pathway defeat. Activities to dissuade, deter, delay, disrupt, destroy, deny, and assure to
complicate conceptualization, development, production, and proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

weapons of mass destruction. Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons

capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, excluding the means
of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible
part from the weapon. Also called WMD. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary)

weapons of mass destruction defeat. Activities designed to control, defeat, disable, and
dispose of extant weapons of mass destruction and the ability to stockpile, transfer, or
employ weapons of mass destruction. Also called WMD defeat. (Approved for
inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

weapons of mass destruction proliferation. None. (Approved for removal from the
DOD Dictionary.)

GL-5
Glossary

Intentionally Blank

GL-6 JP 3-40
 JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1

JOINT
DOCTRINE

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

COMMUNICATIONS
PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS SYSTEM

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-40 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:

STEP #4 - Maintenance STEP #1 - Initiation

l JP published and continuously l Joint doctrine development
assessed by users community (JDDC) submission to fill
l Formal assessment begins extant operational void
24-27 months following l Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-
publication end analysis
l Revision begins 3.5 years l Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
after publication validation
l Each JP revision is completed l Program directive (PD) development
no later than 5 years after and staffing/joint working group
signature l PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorship
l JS J-7 approves and releases PD to
lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant
Maintenance command, JS directorate)

Initiation
ENHANCED
JOINT JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
CAPABILITY PUBLICATION

Approval Development

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

l JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7 l LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first
l JS J-7 prepares publication for signature draft (FD)
l PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
l JSDS prepares JS staffing package
l FD comment matrix adjudication
l JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signature l JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
l Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrix
l FC joint working group