CONTENT

TOPIC PAGE

INTRODUCTION 2–5

CHAPTER 1 : FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICAL 6 - 18

CONSIDERATIONS FOR ANIMALS

 Animal welfare
 In favour of animal moral consideration
 Animal Sentience
 Utilitarian perspective: minimising harm

CHAPTER 2 : ETHICAL HORIZONS 19 - 35

 Personhood in animal rights

 Kantian Perspective
 What each major religions says about
Animal rights
 Modern Animal rights movement

CONCLUSION 36 – 37

BIBLIOGRAPHY 38

1
 INTRODUCTION
The animal kingdom consists of human beings and all other non – human
animals including birds, frogs, reptiles, insects etc. and even the micro –
organism. Both human beings and non – human animals are the important
members of the creation. The human beings are rational animals, and because of
the reasoning ability, human beings occupy the highest place. Animals are
sentient beings Capable of experiencing pain, suffering and joy. They have
rights to not be harmed, captured, taken away from their habitat, abused,
confined or killed for human purposes. Animal rights is a philosophy that
emphasises the moral importance of non-human animals. It is based on the
belief that animals are sentient beings who deserve to be treated with respect
and compassion. Animal rights activist argue that animals should not be used for
food, clothing, entertainment or scientific research. They also believe that
animals should be free to live in their natural habitats and should not be kept in
captivity.

One point is cleared that the killing of a non-human animals doesn’t carry
serious consideration like the killing of a human being. The killing of a human
being is a crime and one subjected to serious punishment for Such an act. Why
is not the killing of a non-human animal subjected to punishment? an answer to
this question requires to see whether any of the non-human animals are persons.
It sounds a bit odd to call any non-human animals as a person. Any extension of
the idea of ‘Person’ to non-human animals requires an inquiry into whether they
are rational and self-conscious beings, aware of their past and future. Though
non-human animals generally are not rational and conscious yet some of them
are conscious. The chimpanzees, gorillas etc. for instance, as Peter singer
informs, if trained with sign language, can communicate like human beings
without vocal cords. It can also be seen that many social animals have some
means of communication with one another, maybe through their buzzes, sounds,
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voices etc. that to an extent reflect a sort of awareness or consciousness in them.
The domestic pets can be very much seen to exhibit this feature. Though not all,
yet some non-human animals, because of the features seen in them , maybe
considered to have some special value . This value gives them the right to life
and that their lives need to be protected , or in simple terms , they should not be
killed. If human beings are persons , then some non human animals are also
persons . Taking the lives of this non human person is serious as taking the life
of a human being. But anyhow the seriousness that lie in killing a non human
person cannot be overlooked or neglected. It has its own prime value and
importance .

POSING THE QUESTION OF ANIMAL RIGHTS :

Whether animals have rights ? On this question , there is a great amount

of debate . While certain thinkers deny rights to animals, some others express
their strong commitment to ensure rights to animals . Let us see both these
positions under two heads :

a) Animals have no rights

b) Animals have rights

A ) ANIMALS HAVE NO RIGHTS :

All those thinkers who deny rights to animals argue from two different
standpoints . Firstly, rights are derived from the capacity to reason , but animals
have no such capacity and it is hence that the humans alone and not the animals
have rights . Secondly, the notions of ‘ right’ and ‘duty’ apply only to human
beings. Rights and duties are complementary to one another . All those who
claim to have rights have also certain duties to perform . But animals have no
duty and hence there lies no claim for animals to have rights. No doubt ,
animals have a great contribution to the human society. Initially animals are
hunted for food. Their skins and bones were used for making clothes and tools
3
respectively. Later on, they were domesticated and used in various human
purposes. They are now used extensively as subjects in research. The thinkers
who deny rights to animals express that there is nothing wrong in killing
animals for food and other purposes including research. They feel it is quite
natural for the higher ordered animal to be dominant over the lower ones. The
human beings having the faculty of reason have a great control over all non –
humans. Rationality differentiates human beings from all other animals. Let us
take an example, it is sometimes observed that animals eat away their own
siblings to meet their hunger. This points at the non-moral status of animals ,
including the higher ordered animals like chimpanzees , gorillas etc. which
directly or indirectly justifies the denial of rights to them .

B ) ANIMAL HAVE RIGHTS:

There are a number of thinkers and activists who have been deeply
involved in pioneering the cause of animals rights since long . They are much
against the cruel treatment to animals . They make it clear that certain things are
morally wrong in our dealings with animals and our morality lies in the fair
treatment to animals .

The advocate of animal rights put forth the following –

i. There should be no breeding and killing of animals for food , medicine

etc.
ii. No experiments should be conducted on animals since the animals have
to undergo a lot of suffering or even death during experimentation.
iii. The animals should not be subjected to hard labour since that gives them
a lot of pain.
iv. There should be a total ban on hunting of animals.
v. The animals should not be used as the objects of entertainment. Some
animals are trained to do certain acts which are not specific to them . In
this training , the animals are subjected to a lot of torture .

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vi. The animals need to be allowed to move in their own natural
environments . They should not be made captive in zoos and circuses.

Peter singer , for instance , makes the use of Utilitarianism as the basis or
foundation or ground to arguing that animals have rights. For him, the interests
of all beings , both humans and animals , deserve equal consideration . The urge
to live is as profound in an insect or worm as that in a human being . Everyone’s
life is dear to himself/herself and animals , even the lower ordered ones are not
exception to this. Since man is the highest in the creation, he has some duties
towards animals .The animals have rights but no duties. However, every
creature has a natural role and responsibility , though unconsciously , in this
creation. The creation has a purpose and all creatures in it have a natural role
and there is no way on the part of human beings to deny their existence and so
also their rights . For Peter singer, whatever may be the nature of animals , all
animals are equal in terms of their interest. Further, a creature or being has
rights if and only if it has interest. Peter singer’s main line of argument lies in
asserting that suffering is intrinsically bad. Since the animals like human beings
do not like to suffer , they should also be not subjected to suffering. Animal
experimentation , factory farming etc. bring about a lot of suffering to animals
and hence are intrinsically bad .

5
 CHAPTER – 1

FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

FOR ANIMALS
The foundation of ethical considerations for animals involves establishing
principles and guidelines that prioritize the well-being, rights, and ethical
treatment of animals. This foundation may include recognizing their sentience,
considering their rights, and applying ethical frameworks, such as utilitarian
perspectives, to guide decisions and actions related to animal welfare.

ANIMAL WELFARE :

Animal welfare has received a considerable amount of attention in recent

years and remains an important issue in animal agriculture. But what is it? How
we treat and care for animals? While it is true that the manner in which we treat
animals does affect their welfare, animal welfare is not defined as the treatment
an animal receives. Rather, animal welfare refers to how an animal is coping
with its environment and living conditions. Animal welfare can vary from poor
to good, along a continuum. This means that animal welfare is not absolute, but
can vary and range along a scale. Animal welfare changes over time, and in
some cases from moment to moment. To understand what animal welfare is, it is
helpful to examine some definitions. In 1986, Dr. Donald Broom defined animal
welfare as the ability of an animal to cope with its environment and living
conditions. Since then, organizations such as The American Veterinary Medical
Association (AVMA, 2017) and World Organization for Animal Health (OIE,
2020) have incorporated this explanation into their definitions of Animal
welfare. Most people who have a basic understanding of animal welfare are
familiar with the Five Freedoms

1. Freedom from hunger and thirst.

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 2. Freedom from discomfort.
3. Freedom from pain, injury or disease.

4. Freedom to express normal behaviour.

5. Freedom from fear and distress. (FAWC, 1979).

The Five freedoms is a framework that is central to animal welfare. The Five
Freedoms were developed by The Farm Animal Welfare Council in the United
Kingdom, following the release of an investigation by the Brambell Committee
into the conditions in which farm animals were kept. The Five Freedoms have
been incorporated into definitions of animal welfare and continue to be widely
used by Organizations and people who formally evaluate or audit animal
welfare. An explanation about animal welfare certification and auditing
programs is provided in the extension bulletin by Weimer et al. (2018).Another
important framework for explaining and evaluating animal welfare came from
Dr. Fraser, Weary, Pajor and Milligan in 1997. They contended that animal
welfare includes three important Concepts:

1) An animal’s feelings or emotions; Also called affective state,

2) An animal’s ability to perform natural behaviour, and

3) An animal’s health and biological functioning.

These ideas have also been incorporated into the AVMA and OIE definitions of
animal welfare. Animal welfare is about how the animal is doing, And how the
animal is perceiving its environment. How an animal perceives and reacts to its
environment is not the easiest thing to measure. This is where animal welfare
science comes in. To effectively evaluate or measure animal welfare, all Three
concepts (behaviour, affective state and health and biological functioning) need
to be considered. Animal welfare scientists can examine different aspects of the
animal itself, using animal-based measures, and the animal’s environment, using
Resource-based measures, to assess the animal’s welfare. Resource-based
measures (e.g., the number of drinkers or feeders available per animal) Focus on
7
how to design facilities and equipment for housing animals and are indirect
measures of Animal welfare . Resource-Based measures do not provide any
information about how an animal is actually coping with its environment. In
contrast, An animal’s ability to cope with its environment depends on several
factors, including neural and brain mechanisms, and physiological and
behavioural mechanisms. These mechanisms are animal-based measures that
can be studied, measured and quantified. Animal-based measures (e.g.,
behaviour or body condition) assess animal welfare in terms of the
consequences or outcome for the animal and directly measure the animal’s
actual welfare status . Therefore, animal-based measures have become
increasingly important in assessments and audits of animal welfare .

THE IMPORTANCE OF ANIMAL WELFARE :

Animals are used for a variety of things. Why should Society be

concerned about their welfare in the First place? One argument is that humans
have a moral obligation to care for animals because many domesticated animals
and animals in captivity depend on humans for their survival. Humans have
relied on animals (non-human animals) for survival and have used animals for
different purposes for Thousands of years. Today, animals continue to be bred
and used for various purposes, such as food, medicine, research, companions,
service animals and pets, to name a few. Many people will argue that it is only
right that humans care for animals .For animals that are used to produce food,
animal welfare is linked with animal health and productivity, in some cases. If
an animal’s welfare is poor, the Animal will not grow as well or produce as
well. For example, an animal that is sick or injured is not going to grow at the
same rate as a healthy animal. However, it is important to note that an animal
that is productive and growing is not necessarily in a good state of welfare.
Animals can continue to be productive and grow even if their welfare is poor.
For example, laying hens have been selectively bred to be very efficient at
producing eggs, and a hen will Continue to lay an egg almost every day even if

8
it is injured. Animals that are sick or injured can pose Food safety risks. The
disease can pose a risk to Humans as other animals. People’s concern over
animal welfare continues to increase. The increased interest in animal welfare in
recent years is reflected in the number of laws that have been passed pertaining
to animal agriculture. A recent study found that concern for animal welfare
among U.S. residents is higher for dairy cattle than for turkeys and chickens .
Concern for animal welfare depends on several factors, such as gender and
whether People own pets, among other factors. Today, animal welfare remains
an important topic in animal agriculture, and it is important to understand what
it means, so that people can make informed decisions when voting on
legislation and buying Products at the grocery store. The choices people Make
affect the animals, farmers producing the Animal products, and consumers of
animal products.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANIMAL WELFARE AND ANIMAL

RIGHTS :

It is very easy to find information about animal welfare on the internet, but
there is a lot of Confusion about animal welfare. Often, what is perceived as
animal welfare has more to do with Animal rights, the ethical view that deals
with how Animals ought to be treated, whether animals should be used by
human’s, and under which circumstances animals should be used by humans.
Animal welfare can be evaluated scientifically, whereas animal rights is an
ethical view and cannot Be evaluated in the same scientific sense. Animal
Welfare can be evaluated scientifically using animal-based and resource-based
measures that include Animal behaviour, biology, physiology, and access to
Resources.

IN FAVOUR OF ANIMAL MORAL CONSIDERATION :

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 Over recent centuries, humans have made significant progress in our
moral views. Gradually, we have expanded our moral sphere. However, most
people today would still not consider the moral status of most nonhuman
animals to be significant enough to discourage us from eating them. Perhaps we
should be wondering: Are nonhuman animals the next oppressed group to be
ascribed moral worth—at least enough to consider their lives more valuable
than the utility or pleasure we get from eating them?

The view that only humans have moral value is an anthropocentric view.
Anthropocentrism is the idea that humans are the most, or only, important
beings in the universe; anthropocentrism interprets reality through a solely
human lens. An anthropocentric ethical view posits that human beings are the
only beings who have sufficient moral status to warrant rights or protections.
This type of view has been the prevailing one in Western society for a long time.
However, some recent ethical philosophers, such as Tom Regan and Peter
Singer, have started calling into question the idea that humans are the only
beings who deserve such moral status. They acknowledge that humans are
different from nonhuman animals in many ways, but argue that those
differences are not relevant in determining whether or not an animal has moral
worth. Rather, what is important in this regard are the similarities between
humans and nonhuman animals. These similarities, such as the capacity to feel
pleasure and pain, are what are relevant in determining moral worth, according
to these philosophers. As such, these philosophers argue that humans’
differences from nonhuman animals do not justify human mistreatment of
nonhuman animals because such differences do not take away from nonhuman
animals’ moral value, and, of course, any being with moral value should not be
caused unjust harm. These philosophers conclude that humans ought to expand
their sphere of compassion to include some, or all, nonhuman animals.

The term speciesism has recently become more widely used among
ethicists in favour of animal rights and welfare to describe the prejudice against
other beings based on their species. Most, if not all, humans display some level
10
of speciesism because we prioritize humans over nonhumans in our moral
considerations. According to some recent ethical philosophers, speciesism is a
form of prejudice on par with racism because both attempt to justify
discrimination based on characteristics that are irrelevant to determining moral
worth. Furthermore, it is said that there is no solid logic to favour the interests
of beings belonging to one’s own species over beings belonging to other
species. However, one need not accept the claim that speciesism is
discriminatory to believe that humans’ treatment of nonhuman animals is unjust.
One may still prioritize the interests of humans over nonhuman animals while
also recognizing that our use of animals is morally objectionable.

Animals deserve basic rights, just as humans deserve rights. According to

Tom Regan, an action is wrong if it treats a nonhuman animal as a mere means
to an end, rather than an end in itself, because this violates the animal’s right to
be valued for its inherent worth. If we accept Regan’s view, we must accept that
our use of animals in the animal agriculture industry is morally wrong because
it uses animals only as means to an end. A less absolutist position in favour of
animal moral consideration is offered by utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer.
Singer argues for animal moral consideration from a utilitarian perspective,
which holds that the amount of pleasure produced is the only measure of the
moral quality of any action. Singer believes that nonhuman animals do not
deserve rights in the way that humans do, but they are still morally valuable
because they have interests, and these interests are deserving of consideration.
Like Regan, Singer believes that the similarities between humans and
nonhuman animals are more important than our differences; he recognizes that
nonhuman animals do not have all of the same capabilities that humans have,
but that nonhuman animals are still able to feel pleasure and pain like we do,
and they have an interest in preferring pleasure over pain. Thus, they deserve to
be free from unnecessary pain inflicted by humans.

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ANIMAL SENTIENCE :

Animal sentience means that animals are sentient beings with thoughts,
feelings, and individual personalities. Our scientific research and evidence
irrefutably prove this. Animals have their own preferences, desires, and needs;
we humans may not always know what they are. But if we can use our
knowledge of animal sentience to monitor and measure their emotional states,
then we can seek to ensure that we avoid causing them pain and distress.

What is sentience ?

Sentience is the ability to feel a range of emotions and feelings, such as

pleasure, pain, joy, and fear. Some animals even experience complex emotions,
such as grief and empathy. Animals are sentient beings, and this means that their
feelings matter. The more we learn about the minds of animals, the harder it is
to justify the practices we use that cause them to suffer. It is also harder to
neglect that animals can and want to feel positive emotions and states too. They,
like us, want to feel good. They want to do things they enjoy; they want to exert
control over their own lives, have choices, play, feel satiated and comfortable,
solve problems, get excited, and seek the comfort of companions. These things
matter to animals, and they matter to us. Our understanding of animal sentience
still varies depending on the species, as some groups of animals, such as
mammals, have received far more attention than others.

We know that all vertebrate species are sentient and that although some
groups, such as birds, have evolved different brain structures to ours, they still
have what they need to process experiences and feel emotions. In fact, chickens
demonstrate empathy, and magpies appear to feel grief. Other groups of
animals, such as reptiles, amphibians, and fish, are often dismissed as cold-
blooded and incapable of feeling. This is simply not true. As vertebrates, they
possess the physiological and neurological requirements for conscious

12
experiences, and their behaviour indicates that not only can they feel, but that
their feelings matter. Beyond vertebrates, scientists are also uncovering more
about the subjective lives of invertebrates too. Research shows considerable
evidence for a wide range of cognitive abilities in insects, as well as evidence
for important sentience traits, including stress, pessimism and emotion.
Numerous studies have explored whether cephalopods, like octopuses and
squids, and decapod crustaceans, like crabs and lobsters, can feel important
states like pain and fear. The evidence is clear, these invertebrates may not have
the same anatomy and brain structures as we mammals do, but they are sentient,
and they can feel a range of emotions and experiences.

Animal sentience research :

People often disregard the importance of an animal’s feelings or dismiss

them as being subjective and too hard to understand or measure. Scientists now
have a whole range of tools to measure and understand the emotional lives of
animals, and these can be used to ensure that animals have the lives they
deserve. For example, we can tell a lot about how animals feel from their body
postures and behaviour. Neuroscience shows us how some species have
developed different brain structures for processing emotions like pain, fear, and
joy. The science of animal sentience is also uncovering the remarkable abilities
of different species. Scientists keep learning just how complex the emotional
lives of animals are. Understanding how animals can suffer and what emotions
they experience is instrumental in improving their welfare and the legislation
and practices affecting them. Policies and laws must consider animals as
individuals, whose needs and welfare need to be protected. Recognising animals
as sentient in legislation demonstrates that a country values the intrinsic value
and wellbeing of animals. It defines animals as feeling beings, who are capable
of pain and suffering, but also of positive states such as pleasure and joy. This
sets an important standard for how animals should be treated, shapes attitudes
and behaviours and sends a clear message to citizens. Enshrining sentience in

13
legislation takes a country one step closer to ensuring that animals have the
lives they deserve. The future of animal sentience science is exciting and
brilliant. Never has there been such enthusiasm and drive to learn about what
animals think and feel. World Animal Protection will continue to promote this
area of science and showcase the growing body of research that demonstrates
the diverse nature of the emotional lives of animals. In our work to end factory
farming, we will keep using the growing body of research on animal sentience
to show the world that intensive systems cannot meet the needs of these
complex, sentient beings who we farm in their trillions. As we continue to
campaign and work for wild animals, stakeholders will recognise the
importance of protecting sentient beings from the inhumane practices
commonly seen in the wildlife trade and entertainment industries.

UTILITARIAN PERSPECTIVE : MINIMISING HARM

Utilitarianism is a well-known ethical theory that considers the happiness

and suffering of every individual who can experience them. Utilitarian believe
that we should do whatever produces the greatest net balance of pleasure over
pain in the world, and that there is no reason not to include the pains and
pleasures of animals in the calculation. Utilitarianism supports the view that
animal welfare matters just as much as human welfare. Many utilitarian support
and oppose various practices in line with more mainstream concern over animal
welfare, such as:

 Not killing animals for food or other uses

 Not torturing animals for fun

Utilitarianism implies that all vertebrates and at least some invertebrates

morally matter. It also implies that large animals like elephants matter more on
average and that small animals like ants might matter more in total.
Utilitarianism opposes animal exploitation because it is a comparatively
14
inefficient way of getting pleasure over pain. However, there are many
examples of animal cruelty to which this apparent inefficiency does not
obviously apply.

PETER SINGER’S UTILITARIAN THEORY:

Peter Singer is an act utilitarian who believes that it is the consequences

of the contemplated act that matter, and not the consequences of following a
more generalized rule. There are, of course, differing views of which
consequences are relevant. For classical utilitarian, such as Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill, pleasure alone was intrinsically valuable and pain alone was
intrinsically not valuable. Singer, however, claims to subscribe to a modified
form of utilitarianism, known as “preference” or “interest” utilitarianism, which
provides that what is intrinsically valuable is what “furthers the interests of
those affected.” Those interests include the desires and preferences of those who
are affected. Pleasure and pain matter because they are part of what humans and
nonhumans desire or prefer or seek to avoid. Those interests include the desires
and preferences of those who are affected. Pleasure and pain matter because
they are part of what humans and nonhumans desire or prefer or seek to avoid.
In Animal Liberation, Singer argues that in assessing the consequences of our
actions, it is necessary to take the interests of animals seriously and to weigh
any adverse affect on those interests from human actions as part of the
consequences of those actions. Humans have failed to do this, Singer argues,
because of a species bias, or speciesism, that results in a systematic devaluation
of animal interests. Singer claims that speciesism is no more morally defensible
than racism, sexism, or other forms of discrimination that arbitrarily exclude
humans from the scope of moral concern. When people seek to justify the
horrific ways animals are treated, they invariably point to supposed animal
“defects,” such as the inability of animals to use human language or to reason as
intricately as do humans. But there are severely retarded humans who cannot
speak or reason (or, at least, can do so no better than many nonhumans), and

15
most of us would be appalled if those humans were used in experiments, or for
food or clothing. Singer maintains that the only way to justify our present level
of animal exploitation is to maintain that species differences alone justify that
exploitation. But that is no different, Singer argues, from saying that differences
in race or sex alone justify the differential treatment of otherwise similarly
situated persons. Singer’s approach is clearly more favourable toward animals
than classical animal welfare, which accorded little weight to animal interests. It
is important, however, to understand that Singer’s theory is not a theory of
animal rights. For Singer, the rightness or wrongness of conduct is determined
by consequences, and not by any appeal to right. If violating a right holder’s
right in a particular case will produce more desirable consequences than
respecting that right, then Singer is committed to violating the right. For
example, Singer opposes most animal experimentation, only because he thinks
that most animal experiments produce benefits that are insufficient to justify the
animal suffering that results. But he does not--and cannot—oppose all animal
experimentation because if a particular animal use would, for example, lead
directly to a cure for a disease that affected many humans, Singer would be
committed to approving that animal use. Indeed, Singer has acknowledged that
under some circumstances, it would be permissible to use no consenting humans
in experiments if the benefits for all affected outweighed the detriment to the
humans used in the experiment.

Singer’s theory does not concern rights since Singer does not believe that
animals or humans have rights. Indeed, Singer himself refers to his theory as
one of “animal liberation” and states that claims of right are “irrelevant.” “The
language of rights is a convenient political shorthand. It is even more valuable
in the era of thirty-second TV news clips.” It is easy to understand why Singer
rejects rights in light of his view that only the consequences (understood in
terms of the preference satisfaction of those affected) of acts matter. A right is
generally regarded as “a moral trump card that cannot be disputed.” A right
serves as a type of protection that cannot be sacrificed even if the consequences
16
of doing so would be very desirable. Rights, or at least most rights, are not
thought to be absolute, but at least some rights provide strong prima facie
protection and cannot be compromised without the most compelling reasons.
For example, overall social happiness might be increased if I were used without
my consent in an experiment, the goal and likely outcome of which would result
in a cure for cancer. Nevertheless, I have a moral and legal right not to have my
interests in my life or liberty traded away in order to secure that admittedly
desirable result. I do not plan to discuss the various criticisms made of Singer’s
theory; however, there is one aspect of his utilitarianism that requires comment.
There is no doubt that: 1) Singer regards most animal experimentation as
without merit; 2) he would eliminate factory farming; and 3) we ought, for the
most part, to be vegetarians because although it may be morally permissible to
eat animals, as a practical matter, the circumstances surrounding their rearing
and killing will morally preclude eating them. These views, however, are based
on Singer’s empirical assessments of the consequences of particular acts in light
of his theory that individual acts ought to further the interests or preferences of
those affected. Like all such empirical assessments, the consequences of the acts
may be evaluated differently by different people. For example, Singer thinks
that the negative consequences for the animals involved in factory farming
outweigh the benefits, but as Regan points out, “the animal industry is big
business,” and although “It is uncertain exactly how many people are involved
in it, directly or indirectly, the number must easily run into the many tens of
thousands.” Those involved in animal agriculture “have a stake in the animal
industry as rudimentary and important as having a job, feeding a family, or
laying aside money for their children’s education or their own retirement.”

Peter Singer argues that animals should be considered in a utilitarian

view because they are capable of suffering and enjoyment. He argues that all
beings capable of suffering should be worthy of equal consideration. Singer’s
argument against eating meat is based on the utilitarian principle that ethical
actions are those which reduce the total amount of suffering in the world. He
17
argues that we should adopt a moral principle of equal consideration of
interests, that applies regardless of species. Singer also advocates for
“Preference Utilitarianism,” which states that an action contrary to the
preference of any being is wrong. For example, killing a person is worse than
killing some other beings, “since persons are highly future oriented in their
preferences”. Singer’s argument against harming animals is based on respecting
their right to have their suffering counted equally with that of humans.

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 CHAPTER – 2

ETHICAL HORIZONS

“Ethical Horizons” suggests exploring the ethical landscape or

boundaries, indicating a broad and comprehensive examination of ethical
considerations within the specified context. In the context of a chapter name, it
suggests an exploration of the diverse ethical elements and their implications,
such as personhood, Kant’s animal rights theory, the role of religion in animals
rights and modern animal rights movement.

PERSONHOOD IN ANIMAL RIGHTS :

Our treatment of nonhuman animals reflects a distinction that we make

between humans, whom we regard as persons, and nonhumans, whom we
regard as things. Although we may regard some animals as having certain
“interests,” we regard all of those interests to be tradable and dependent on our
judgment that the sacrifice of the interests will benefit us. This trade is generally
permissible even when the animal interest involved is significant and the human
interest is admittedly trivial, as is the case of the use of animals for
“entertainment” purposes such as pigeon shoots, rodeos, or circuses. Animals
are not persons in either moral theory or under the law; they are property in that
they exist solely as means to human ends. They have no interests that cannot be
sacrificed, even when the “benefit” to be gained by humans is mere amusement
at the cost of great pain or death to the animal. That is precisely what it means
to be property. “Persons” are precisely those beings who have interests that
cannot be traded merely for consequential reasons alone. Some of these persons,
such as corporations, are de jure persons in that their personhood exists solely
because they are creations of a legal system. But what is common to every
19
person is that persons have at least some interests, although not necessarily all
the same interests, that are protected (by moral theory or law or both) even if
trading away those interests will produce consequences that are deemed to be
desirable. All “persons” must have at least one interest that is protected from
being sacrificed merely for consequential purposes; the interest in continued
existence, without which all other interests would be meaningless. This is
Shue’s concept of the basic right of physical security.

Animal rights theory generally seeks to move at least some nonhumans

from the “thing” side of the “person/thing” dualism over to the “person” side.
There are at least two reasons in support of this move. First, those who support
animal exploitation argue that animals are qualitatively different from humans
and so animals can be kept on the “thing” side of the “person/thing” dualism;
animal rights advocates argue that there is no such distinction because at least
some nonhumans will possess the supposedly “exclusive” characteristic. Nor is
it enough to argue that species difference alone is morally relevant; after all, to
rely on species alone as morally relevant is to assume a distinction that needs to
be proved by those who hold such a view. And, it is morally indistinguishable
from using race, sex, sexual orientation, or ability to determine membership in
the moral community of persons. In other words, there is no reason to exclude
animals from a progressive concept of personhood.

Second, is another related, more “positive” reason to view animals as

persons. Although there will undoubtedly be borderline cases, it is clear that at
least some animals possess the characteristics that we normally associate with
personhood. For example, in The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues
that theoretical and empirical considerations indicate that at least some animals
(normal mammals of at least one-year of age) possess beliefs, desires, memory,
perception, intention, self-consciousness, and a sense of the future. The
attribution of at least several of these mental states reveals that it is perfectly
sensible to regard certain nonhumans as psychophysical individuals who “fare

20
well or ill during the course of their life, and the life of some animals is, on
balance, experientially better than the life of others.” Because animals have
desires, beliefs, and the ability to act in pursuit of their goals, they may also be
said to have preference autonomy, an important characteristic for the attribution
of rights. A common misconception is that animal advocates argue that animals
should have the same rights as humans. As far as I am aware, no rights advocate
maintains this view. Moreover, the criticism itself indicates a fundamental
confusion about rights theory. In many ways, animal rights theory is about the
inclusion of nonhumans on the “person” side of the “person/thing” dualism.
This matter of inclusion is to be distinguished from the matter of the scope of
any rights that animals may have once we move them from one side to the
other. I have elsewhere used the example of human slavery to illustrate this
point. Although human slaves in the United States were regarded under the law
as “persons” for purposes of criminal liability, they were, for virtually all other
purposes, both de jure and de facto “things.” This status as a “thing” is a logical
consequence of the institution of human slavery which treated all slave interests
—including Shue’s basic right of physical security—as tradable as long as there
were perceived benefits for slave-owners. Slaves had no rights of association,
slave families were routinely broken up, and slaves could be killed or tortured
for what was essentially the pleasure or amusement of slave owners.

To include slaves in the class of persons—moving them from the “thing”

side of the “person/thing” dualism to the “person” side—is not necessarily to
say anything about the scope of particular rights that the liberated slaves may
have had. Indeed, the move entailed the exclusion of only one sort of
exploitation: the institutionalized commoditization of human beings in which
their basic right of physical security, the prerequisite for their having rights at
all, was violated by others for consequential reasons. Other considerations
governed the scope of rights that these “new” persons may have had. For

21
example, the abolition of human slavery only began, and did not end, a
discussion about what additional rights—other than the right not to be slaves—
should be accorded to former slaves.

Similarly, when we move at least some nonhumans from the “thing” side
over to the “person” side, we have said nothing about the scope of rights that
they will have. All we have done—through the inclusion of animals on the
“person” side—is to recognize that species alone is an insufficient justification
for treating nonhumans as “things.” Species may be significant when we
determine the scope of rights. For example, it would be absurd to discuss the
rights of animals to drive or to vote or the right of an animal to get a scholarship
to attend college. But the inability of nonhumans to adhere to rules of the road,
choose intelligently among political rivals, or do calculus are all irrelevant to
the basic notion of personhood. After all, we accept that some adult humans will
be unable to perform basic functions but we still do not place them on the
“thing” side of the “person/thing” distinction. We may very legitimately award
a math scholarship to Jane rather than Simon based on Jane’s superior
mathematical ability. As long as Simon has had a fair opportunity to develop his
mathematical abilities, using Jane’s “intelligence” as a criterion for determining
the distribution of the particular resource in question (educational benefits) is
fair. But Jane’s greater intelligence does not justify Jane treating Simon as her
slave or otherwise placing Simon on the “thing” side of the equation.

There is, however, one sense in which including animals as members of

the class of “persons” is very different from including additional humans within
that class. If we acknowledge that Simon is not a “thing,” the protection we
have given Simon is at the same time quite significant (after all, the basic right
to physical security is a prerequisite to all other rights), but also the bare
minimum needed to distinguish Simon from being a thing. Saying that Simon is
included in the class of persons says nothing about the scope of rights that he
may have other than to say that we will protect Simon’s right to be a person in

22
that we will at least recognize de jure that Simon’s basic right to physical
security will be protected from being traded away for consequential reasons. If,
however, we recognize that animals are not “things,” (that their basic right to
physical security cannot be sacrificed merely because we think the
consequences justify the sacrifice), then we can no longer justify the
institutionalized exploitation of animals for food, experiments, clothing, or
entertainment. These forms of institutionalized exploitation necessarily assume
that animals are things whose interests are contingent on human desires. Once
we recognize that animals are not “things,” we can no longer justify the use of
animals in experiments any more than we could justify the use of humans. We
have at least de jure ruled out the institutional use of coerced humans in
biomedical experiments. And, although many people will tolerate the payment
of low wages to workers, few would similarly tolerate human slavery.

A primary result of according personhood status to at least some

nonhumans would be to require the abolition of institutionalized animal
exploitation. Once we recognize that animals are no longer “things,” then we
can no longer treat them as beings whose fundamental interests in their own
lives may be sacrificed because we enjoy the taste of meat, or because we enjoy
shooting pigeons, or because we enjoy the feel or look of fur or leather. That is,
according personhood status to animals does not mean that we simply get more
serious about whether a particular form of slaughter to produce meat is more
“humane,” or that we take animal interests more seriously in determining
whether a particular experiment involving animals is “necessary.” It means that
we accept that the use of animals for food or science or entertainment or
clothing represent forms of institutionalized exploitation that are logically
inconsistent with the personhood of animals.

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KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE :

Kant’s ethics, notoriously, assigns fundamental value to rational beings,

where “rational” is understood in an unusually demanding sense. One might
wonder whether even members of the species Homo sapiens possess the
relevant kind of rationality, which, for Kant, seems to require an in
compatibilist form of free will. Even if Homo sapiens qualifies, non-human
animals seem clearly outside the scope of moral obligation. Fundamental worth,
for Kant, goes with autonomy and moral agency. Non-human animals are not
autonomous in the relevant sense, and they are not moral agents, so they have
no fundamental worth. There is no room, within Kant’s ethics, for a category of
being to which we owe moral obligations even though it is not itself
autonomous or bound by moral obligations. Suppose, for example, you torture a
dog. You have not, in Kant’s view, violated any obligations you owe to the dog.
You have done the dog no wrong. A dog is not the sort of thing that can be
wronged. The problem here is not that the framework has yielded a one-off
counterintuitive result. The problem is that, once you see that the framework (at
least at first glance) regards animal suffering as morally irrelevant, the
framework as a whole appears callous, inhumane, uninterested in the
psychological side of suffering. It looks as though the theory doesn’t care about
suffering at all except in so far as it impairs the rational agency of the sufferer.
It is, it seems, an ethical theory for the heartless. Kant himself grapples with this
problem in the Metaphysics of Morals although he does not, I think, appreciate
its gravity. He offers a partial solution: we may not owe obligations to animals,
but we can have obligations in regard to animals that we owe to ourselves. The
idea is that, in torturing animals, killing them inhumanely, hunting them for
sport or treating them without gratitude, one acts without due respect for one’s
own humanity. Why? Because mistreating animals dulls one’s “shared feeling
of their suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition
that is very serviceable to morality in one’s relations with other human beings”

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 Kant’s position is not simply that in mistreating animals I make myself
more likely to wrong other people. It is rather that, in mistreating animals, I
violate a duty I owe to myself by weakening my disposition for “shared
feeling”, or empathy. From the formula of humanity (discussed in more detail in
the next section), I have a duty to cultivate morally good dispositions, and I
violate this duty if I erode dispositions that are “serviceable to morality”. This
has come to be known as the “indirect duty” view. Kant’s view is not as ghastly
as is sometimes claimed. for example, suggested that the Kantian view would
permit animal cruelty as long as the agent kept in mind a clear line between
humans and animals, so that torturing animals did not in fact produce any
“moral spill over” in the form of cruelty towards humans. Kant would reply
that, even if no actual “spill over” occurs, the agent has violated a duty to
himself by failing to cultivate a sense of empathy. If Kant’s psychological
assumptions were shown to be incorrect for at least some humans, those humans
would have no duties concerning animals. Consider, for example, people who
are incapable of developing empathy, and therefore cannot erode that capacity
by torturing an animal. It appears that, for Kant, they violate no duty by doing
so. We should love the animals we own and express gratitude towards them, yet
it is not clear that it is even possible to love sincerely, or to be grateful towards,
a creature you regard as incapable of making any moral claim on you.
According to Kant we are only permitted to slaughter animals painlessly; the
“violent and cruel treatment of animals” is forbidden. We are permitted to use
work animals as a source of power, but we must not use them beyond their
capacities.

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WHAT EACH MAJOR RELIGION SAYS ABOUT
ANIMAL RIGHTS :

Animal rights and religion overlap in more ways than are currently
spoken about or reported on. Here are what the most practiced religions say
regarding animals rights. The world’s major religions are Buddhism,
Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism. Each religion is practiced by
billions of people around the world and has sacred, ancient roots. Animals play
a role in each religion’s sacrifices, meals, and ceremonies. Each religion values
animals differently. While some people view animals as sacred based on the
religion they follow, others merely see them as a source for food. Additionally,
each religion has evolved over time and is practiced differently across cultures
and countries.

Buddhism :

Buddhism is known to be a religion that practices and promotes peace

for both human and non-human animals. Some even argue that Buddhism
supports animal welfare because compassion for all living beings is highly
integrated in the beliefs of Buddhism. Just as Christianity and Judaism have the
Ten Commandments, Buddhism has the Five Precepts. The First Precept, do not
kill or harm others, is highly debated over as it relates to animal suffering. Who
was the Buddha referring to when using “others” in the First Precept? Should
this precept only apply to humans? Or should it apply to all sentient beings? All
Buddhists seek to be in line with the teachings of the Buddha, but there are
different interpretations of this religion around the world. It is common for
Buddhists to follow a plant-based diet, however, not all do. The Mahayana
tradition is more strictly vegetarian than other Buddhist traditions. In the Lank
Avatara Sutra, the Buddha is quoted saying, “I have not permitted meat eating
by anyone. I do not permit it. I will not permit it.” His reasoning is stated in the
same scripture: “If meat is not eaten by anybody for any reason, there will be no

26
destroyer of life.” Many modern-day Buddhists argue that eating meat from
supermarkets or restaurants is considered ethical as the animals were not killed
specifically for them to eat, a stipulation the Buddha required of monks begging
for food. In the teachings of Buddhism, the act of eating meat and killing
animals for meat are seen as separate, thus making meat eating acceptable in the
eyes of many Buddhists. If they are merely scavenging at the supermarket to
ensure meat does not go to waste, not actively taking the life of an animal,
Buddhists see this as rational. Of course, many do not agree with this
perspective.

The Buddha said In the Dhammapada:

“All beings tremble before danger. All fear death. When you consider
this, you will not kill or cause someone else to kill. All beings fear before
danger. Life is dear to all.”

Compassion is sought after by all who practice Buddhism. Therefore,

Buddhists try to do as little harm as possible to animals, avoid any jobs in
connection with the killing of animals, respect animals and humans equally, and
believe that both humans and non-human animals are capable of reaching
Nirvana, the highest state of well-being.

Christianity :

Christianity is practiced by billions of people, and is the most popular

religion in the Americas, Europe, and the southern half of Africa. Animal rights
and welfare are heavily debated over by Christians, especially in the United
States and England.

Genesis 1:26 to 28
27
 “Then God said, Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our
likeness; let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the
air, and over the cattle, over all the earth and over every creeping thing that
creeps on the earth. So God created man in His own image; in the image of
God He created him; male and female He created them. Then God blessed
them, and God said to them, be fruitful and multiply; fill the earth and subdue
it; have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over
every living thing that moves on the earth.”

In Peter Singer’s 1975 novel, “Animal Liberation,” he claims that the

Bible’s teaching about man’s dominion was an “impediment to animals rights.”
Many traditional Christians believe that God put animals on Earth to be used by
humans for food, entertainment, companionship, and clothes. Conversely, many
Christians believe animals should be treated with kindness. And as humans,
they should avoid harming animals because it is sinful. Likewise, they believe
that all of God’s creatures – human and non-human – are sentient and capable
of pain and suffering. And while this belief is not mainstream for all Christians,
it does reveal that Christians interpret man’s dominion differently. Christian
vegetarianism is becoming more popular as people learn where their food
comes from. Christian vegetarians align biblical values with their eating, as they
do not want to take part in cruelty toward animals. According to The Christian
Vegetarian Association, “those who consume the products of factory farms are
sponsoring violence.” Christianity is based on one God, and Christians believe
in serving their God in everything they do, including eating. Many believe that
animals were put on Earth by God to serve man, while others believe animals
are sentient, intelligent beings who deserve to be treated with respect.

Hinduism :

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 Hinduism is a compilation of many traditions and philosophies, not just
one organized religion. It embraces many different religious ideas and is
sometimes referred to as a way of life instead of a religion. Due to the mixture
of religious ideas, there is not one single Hindu view on animal rights, much
like other religions. Hindu teachings hold the belief that all living creatures have
a soul, and that they are a part of the supreme soul. Therefore, all living
creatures – both human and non-human – are respected similar to Buddhist
traditions. While Hinduism calls for proper and respectful treatment of all living
beings, animals are sacrificed in religious ceremonies. A great deal of
importance is placed on how the animals are treated leading up to the sacrifice,
as the proper treatment of animals is considered as a Hindu moves toward
salvation, their ultimate goal. According to the BBC, “Ahimsa is often
translated simply as non-violence, but its implications are far wider; it is more
than not doing violence, it is more than an attitude, it is a whole way of life.”
Killing animals is viewed as a violation of ahimsa that causes bad karma,
therefore many follow vegetarian diets. Cows in particular are greatly revered
by Hindus because the cow is associated with Aditi, the mother of all gods in
Hindu scriptures. Additionally, cows provide more than they take.

“The cow, they say, produces five things— milk, cheese, butter (or ghee),
urine and dung. The first three are eaten and used in worship of the Hindu
gods, while the last two can be used in religious devotion or in penance or
burned for fuel.”

In India, where 80 percent of the population practices Hinduism, the act

of killing a cow is banned due to how sacred they are. Hindus do not eat any
beef products. With the overall premise to be kind to all creatures with a soul,
Hinduism holds animal rights to a high degree, although animals are sacrificed
for religious purposes.

Islam :

29
 Muslims believe that animals exist for the benefit of human beings, but
also that they should be treated with kindness and compassion.

The Qur’an explicitly states that animals can and should be used by
humans: “It is God who provided for you all manner of livestock, that you may
ride on some of them and from some you may derive your food. And other uses
in them for you to satisfy your heart’s desires. It is on them, as on ships, that
you make your journeys.”

And while Islamic teachings call for the use of animals, any cruelty
toward an animal is considered a sin, and killing an animal – except for food –
is forbidden. Muhammad stated in the hadith that mercy towards animals will
be rewarded, animals are like humans in how they should be treated, and mental
cruelty is forbidden, among other instructions on how to properly treat animals.
Islamic teachings do not allow Muslims to consume pork, meat from an animal
that was not properly slaughtered, blood, the meat of an animal that died from
electrocution, strangulation or blunt force, or any food contaminated by the
above. While most Muslims do eat meat, there are strict guidelines as to how
the animal is slaughtered to be considered halal and not haram. Ritual slaughter
that is halal consists of the following: “Muslims slaughter their livestock by
slitting the animal’s throat in a swift and merciful manner, reciting “In the
name of God, God is Most Great” (Quran 6:118–121). The animal should not
suffer in any way, and should not see the blade before slaughter. The knife must
be razor sharp and free from any blood of a previous slaughter. All of the
animal’s blood must be drained before consumption. Meat prepared in this
manner is called zabihah, or simply, halal meat.”

Judaism :

Judaism places a large amount of stress on the proper treatment of

animals because they are seen as a part of God’s creation. The Jewish tradition
clearly states that it is forbidden to be cruel to animals. Humans must avoid
tsa’ar ba’alei chayim – causing pain to any living creature. While Christianity
30
and Judaism hold similarities in the values and beliefs of the religion, Judaism
holds animal welfare to a higher standard. While animal rights are important to
Jews, Judaism also teaches that it is okay to harm or kill animals if that is what
one needs to do to fulfil an essential human need. It is stated early in the Torah
that people take priority over animals when God gives man the ability to control
all non-human animals. Observant Jews only eat meat that comes from an
approved slaughter process, called shechita. Much like the process in Islamic
tradition to render meat halal, animal rights activists find shechita to be
egregiously cruel to animals, while Jews believe the opposite.

“Since the desire of procuring good food necessitates the slaying of

animals, the Torah commands that the death of the animal should be the
easiest. It is not allowed to torment the animal by cutting the throat in a clumsy
manner, by piercing it, or by cutting off a limb while the animal is still alive.”

Major religions around the world believe, to varying degrees, that animals
should be treated with compassion and respect. In the countries and cultures
where these religions are practiced, and animals are to be treated with respect,
animals are still used as a food source and sacrificed for religious purposes.

THE MODERN ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT :

The fundamental principle of the modern animal rights movement is that

many nonhuman animals have basic interests that deserve recognition,
consideration, and protection. In the view of animal rights advocates, these
basic interests give the animals that have them both moral and legal rights. It
has been said that the modern animal rights movement is the first social reform
movement initiated by philosophers. The Australian philosopher Peter Singer
31
and the American philosopher Tom Regan deserve special mention, not just
because their work has been influential but because they represent two major
currents of philosophical thought regarding the moral rights of animals. Singer,
whose book Animal Liberation (1975) is considered one of the movement’s
foundational documents, argues that the interests of humans and the interests of
animals should be given equal consideration. A utilitarian, Singer holds that
actions are morally right to the extent that they maximize pleasure or minimize
pain; the key consideration is whether an animal is sentient and can therefore
suffer pain or experience pleasure. This point was emphasized by the founder of
modern utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, who wrote of animals, “The question is
not, Can they reason?, nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?” Given that
animals can suffer, Singer argues that humans have a moral obligation to
minimize or avoid causing such suffering, just as they have an obligation to
minimize or avoid causing the suffering of other humans. Regan, who is not a
utilitarian, argues that at least some animals have basic moral rights because
they possess the same advanced cognitive abilities that justify the attribution of
basic moral rights to humans. By virtue of these abilities, these animals have not
just instrumental but inherent value. In Regan’s words, they are “the subject of a
life.”

Regan, Singer, and other philosophical proponents of animal rights have

encountered resistance. Some religious authors argue that animals are not as
deserving of moral consideration as humans are because only humans possess
an immortal soul. Others claim, as did the Stoics, that because animals are
irrational, humans have no duties toward them. Still others locate the morally
relevant difference between humans and animals in the ability to talk, the
possession of free will, or membership in a moral community (a community
whose members are capable of acting morally or immorally). The problem with
these counterarguments is that, with the exception of the theological argument
—which cannot be demonstrated—none differentiates all humans from all
animals. While philosophers catalysed the modern animal rights movement,
32
they were soon joined by physicians, writers, scientists, academics, lawyers,
theologians, psychologists, nurses, veterinarians, and other professionals, who
worked within their own fields to promote animal rights. Many professional
organizations were established to educate colleagues and the general public
regarding the exploitation of animals.

At the beginning of the 21st century, lawsuits in the interests of nonhuman

animals, sometimes with nonhuman animals named as plaintiffs, became
common. Given the key positions that lawyers hold in the creation of public
policy and the protection of rights, their increasing interest in animal rights and
animal-protection issues was significant. Dozens of law schools in Europe, the
United States, and elsewhere offered courses in animal law and animal rights;
the Animal Legal Defence Fund had created an even greater number of law-
student chapters in the United States; and at least three legal journals—Animal
Law, Journal of Animal Law, and Journal of Animal Law and Ethics—had been
established. Legal scholars were devising and evaluating theories by which
nonhuman animals would possess basic legal rights, often for the same reasons
as humans do and on the basis of the same legal principles and values. These
arguments were powerfully assisted by increasingly sophisticated scientific
investigations into the cognitive, emotional, and social capacities of animals and
by advances in genetics, neuroscience, physiology, linguistics, psychology,
evolution, and ethology, many of which have demonstrated that humans and
animals share a broad range of behaviours, capacities, and genetic material.

Meanwhile, the increasingly systemic and brutal abuses of animals in

modern society—by the billions on factory farms and by the tens of millions in
biomedical-research laboratories—spawned thousands of animal rights groups.
Some consisted of a mere handful of people interested in local, and more
traditional, animal-protection issues, such as animal shelters that care for stray
dogs and cats. Others became large national and international organizations,
33
such as PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) and the Humane
Society of the United States, which in the early 21 st century had millions of
members and a multimillion-dollar annual budget. In all their manifestations,
animal rights groups began to inundate legislatures with demands for regulation
and reform.

Slaves, human and nonhuman, may be indirectly protected through laws

intended to protect others. But they remain invisible to civil law, for they have
no rights to protect directly until their legal personhood is recognized. This
recognition can occur in a variety of ways. British slavery was abolished by
judicial decision in the 18th century, and slavery in the British colonies was
ended by statute early in the 19 th century. By constitutional amendment, the
United States ended slavery three decades later. Legal personhood for some
animals may be obtained through any of these routes.

In 2013 the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed petitions in three trial
courts in the state of New York demanding that common law writs of habeas
corpus be issued on behalf of four captive chimpanzees—Tommy, Kiko,
Hercules, and Leo. The petitions implicitly asked that the courts recognize that
chimpanzees are legal persons who possess the fundamental legal right to
bodily liberty. After all three petitions were denied, the cases moved to the New
York state appellate courts, where two of the petitions (on behalf of Tommy and
Kiko) were rejected on differing grounds and the third (on behalf of Hercules
and Leo) was thrown out for lack of the right to appeal. The NhRP then
indicated its intention to appeal Tommy’s and Kiko’s cases to New York’s
highest court, the Court of Appeals, and to refile Hercules and Leo’s petition in
another jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the organization prepared to file additional
lawsuits on behalf of other chimpanzees and elephants.

34
 CONCLUSION

The conclusion synthesizes the key findings from the previous chapters
and offers a balanced reflection on the question of whether animals have rights.
It considers the intersection of ethical principles, legal frameworks, and societal
attitudes, providing insights into potential pathways for a more compassionate
and equitable relationship between humans and animals.

In the first chapter, Animal welfare emphasizes the Importance of ethical

treatment, responsible stewardship, and the need for policies that promote the
35
well-being of animals. Striking a balance between human interests and animal
rights is crucial for creating a harmonious coexistence. Advocacy, education,
and ethical choices contribute to a society that values and protects the welfare of
animals. The moral status of animals warrants serious consideration, given their
capacity for suffering, complex cognitive abilities, and social connections.
Ethical frameworks should evolve to acknowledge and address the moral
implications of our interactions with animals, promoting compassion, and
responsible stewardship. To conclude, the accumulating evidence supporting
animal sentience emphasizes the ethical importance of recognizing their
capacity for subjective experiences. Acknowledging and respecting animal
sentience is fundamental to promoting compassionate treatment and informed
decision-making in our interactions with the diverse species that share our
planet. The utilitarian perspective, which seeks to maximize overall well-being
and minimize suffering, provides a pragmatic framework for ethical decision-
making. By weighing the consequences of actions and prioritizing the greatest
good for the greatest number, utilitarianism offers a consequentialist approach
that can guide ethical considerations in various contexts, although it may pose
challenges in balancing competing interests and addressing individual rights.

In the second chapter, the concept of personhood plays a pivotal role in

discussions about animal rights. While traditional notions of personhood have
been anthropocentric, there is a growing recognition of the inherent value and
moral consideration due to non-human animals. Expanding our understanding
of personhood to encompass certain animals challenges ethical frameworks,
calling for a re-evaluation of rights and responsibilities to ensure fair and
compassionate treatment across species boundaries. The religious perspective
on animal rights varies across different belief systems. Some religions
emphasize stewardship and compassionate treatment of animals, recognizing
their intrinsic value. Others may view animals as resources for human use,
guided by specific teachings or traditions. The diversity of religious views
highlights the complexity of integrating faith-based values into discussions on
36
animal rights, necessitating thoughtful dialogue and consideration of various
interpretations within religious communities. The modern animal rights
movement represents a significant societal shift towards recognizing the
intrinsic value of animals and advocating for their ethical treatment. With roots
in ethical philosophy, science, and compassion, the movement seeks to
challenge exploitative practices, promote welfare, and advance legal protections
for animals. As it continues to evolve, the movement reflects a growing
awareness of our moral responsibilities towards non-human beings and strives
to create a more compassionate and ethically informed relationship between
humans and animals.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Peter Albert David Singer , 1975 , “ Animal liberation”.

 Tom Regan , 1983 , “ The case for animal rights”

 “ In Defence of Animals: The Second Wave” By Peter Singer .

 “ Ethics, Humans and Other Animals: An Introduction with Readings”

By Rosalind Hursthouse .

37
 “Why we love dogs , Eat pigs and wear cows : An introduction to

Carnism” By Melanie Joy .

 In Favour of Animal moral Consideration

https://www.newrootsinstitute.org

 Animal sentience https://www.worldanimalprotection.org

 Animal rights theory and Utilitarianism

https://www.animallaw.info

 Kantian ethics and the animals turn https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

 The place of animal in Kantian ethics https://www.link.springer.con

 The modern animal rights movement https://www.britannica.com

 Ethics of eating meat https://en.m.wikipedia.org

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