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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE FLORES y MONDRAGON

G.R. No. 137491. November 23, 2000

FACTS:

On October 11, 1996, at about four o’clock in the afternoon, at Sitio Tontonan, Barangay
Bal-os, Basay, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, the Mondragon willfully and unlawfully plant and cultivate Indian hemp or
Marijuana plants having a total weight of 230 grams, without authority of law.

When arraigned on 8 January 1999, Mondragon, in the presence and with the
assistance of his counsel, pleaded guilty to the crime charged. The trial court inquired into the
voluntariness of the plea and Mondragon’s comprehension thereof. The court, after finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and imposed a fine of five
hundred thousand pesos. The court considered his guilty plea as a mitigating circumstance and
noted the absence aggravating circumstances.

Mondragon filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that, according to Section 17 of

R.A. No. 7659, considering the quantity of marijuana involved, he should be sentenced to a
minimum of six months of arresto mayor to a maximum of two years and four months of prision
correccional. The trial court denied the motion, citing a lack of credit, prompting Mondragon to
appeal to a higher court. In his Appellant’s Brief, Mondragon alleges that: (1) the trial court
wrongly imposed reclusion perpetua, (2) it gravely erred in not adhering to the provisions of
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, and (3) it again gravely erred in imposing a 500,000
peso fine, considering the circumstances of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court gravely erred in not properly observing the provisions of
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

Yes. The Court held that Section 3 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in
this case and that Section 4, Rule 116 should instead be applied. Under Section 4, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court, when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may
receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed. However, such
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reception is within the discretion of the court. In this case, Mondragon did not plead to a capital
offense since the imposable penalty for the offense charged is only prison correccional under
the law and according to the current jurisprudence. It cannot then be said that the trial court
erred when it failed to require the prosecution to present evidence in order to have some basis
for the decision. At any rate, records will show that herein accused was asked in open court
searching questions by the trial judge to determine the voluntariness and the full comprehension
of his plea. Thus, the Court gravely erred in not properly observing the provisions of Section 3,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LIBERATO "DUKDUK" SOLAMILLO and JULIAN

SOLAMILLO

G.R. No. 123161. June 18, 2003

FACTS:

On March 2, 1994, appellants Liberato "Dukduk" and Julian Solamillo, along with
Edgardo Ebarle and Eddie "Angel" Trumata, were charged with complex crime of robbery with
homicide and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death. They were accused of assaulting
Alexander Guiroy, the proprietor of Liberty Bakery and Grocery, leading to his death. The
assailants took cash, a wristwatch, and a wallet from the victim, amounting to P23,000. Julian
Solamillo pleaded guilty during arraignment, while Liberato Solamillo and Edgardo Ebarle
pleaded not guilty.

The court discharged Ebarle as an accused to be a state witness, but he died before
testifying. Witness testimonies, including Aleli P. Guiroy, Dr. Teresita L. Dans, Emmanuel Guiroy,
SPO4 Pedro Oreta, and PO3 Celso Tan Sanchez, provided an account of the events. The
victim's daughter, Aleli, mentioned seeing the accused together on the day of the incident. The
next day, Alexander Guiroy was found dead in the bakery, with signs of robbery and multiple
wounds. Dr. Dans confirmed the cause of death as 21 incised wounds and other injuries.
Emmanuel Guiroy, the victim's brother, reported Edgardo Ebarle's arrest and his revelation
about the involvement of Eddie Trumata and appellants in the assault.

The defense presented a different version, claiming that Edgardo and Eddie were the
assailants, and Julian was told not to intervene and was threatened to kill him if he would do so.
Liberato was then arrested in Zamboanga City with the victim's belongings. Julian surrendered
later, claiming he pleaded guilty due to threats. The trial court found Liberato and Julian guilty of
robbery with homicide. The court imposed the death penalty, citing aggravating circumstances,
including commission by a band, evident premeditation, treachery, and deliberate cruelty.
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ISSUE:

Whether or not the plea should be disregarded.

RULING:

No. The Court ruled that the plea should not be disregarded. Under Section 5, Rule 116
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that "at any time before the
judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be
withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty." In this case, there is nothing in the records
to show that Julian filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty or that he, in any manner,
manifested unequivocally that he was withdrawing his plea. The testimony of Julian is not a
positive and categorical declaration that appellant Julian was withdrawing his plea of guilty.
Without any unequivocal act on his part, the trial court could not assume that he was
withdrawing his original plea. Even assuming that Julian made an improvident plea of guilty and
subsequently withdrew it, such fact does not operate to automatically exculpate him from
criminal liability. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilty are set aside only if such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence
to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained because then it is predicated not
merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged. Thus, the plea should not be disregarded.

ANTONIO GAMAS and FLORENCIO SOBRIO vs. JUDGE ORLANDO A. OCO

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1231. March 17, 2004

FACTS:

Antonio Gamas and Florencio Sobrio filed a complaint for grave misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law against Judge Orlando A. Oco, former Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato and SPO4 Willie Adulacion, a "police prosecutor" in the
MTC Polomolok.

The complainants were accused of theft and were involved in proceedings before a
respondent judge. They allege that respondent Adulacion persuaded them to plead guilty and
apply for probation to avoid imprisonment. Adulacion allegedly prepared a draft decision for the
judge, who signed it after reading it, and instructed the clerk to read and have the complainants
sign it. The complainants, under the impression that the document was part of a plea
agreement, signed it. However, they later discovered it was an order sentencing them to six
months and one day of imprisonment. The complainants, realizing the irregularity of the
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proceedings, sought legal help. As a result, the respondent judge vacated the order, citing that
the guilty pleas were improvident, and scheduled a re-arraignment for February 1997.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not complainants waived their right to counsel

2. Whether or not complainants were properly arraigned

RULINGS:

No. The court held that the complainants did not validly waive their right to counsel. Under
Section 1(c), Rule 115, and Section 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the accused has the right
to be assisted by counsel, and the court must ensure they are informed and provided counsel if
needed. In this case, the complainants were only mechanically informed of their right to counsel
without a proper explanation or an opportunity to have counsel appointed or retained. Hence,
there was no valid waiver of the right to counsel.

No. The court held that the complainants were not properly arraigned.Under Section 1 of Rule
116 of the Rules of Court, the arraignment must be conducted in accordance with specific
procedural requirements, including the presence of counsel and the provision of necessary
documents. In this case, the complainants were not afforded counsel, nor were they given a
copy of the Amended Complaint or the list of witnesses, hindering their ability to prepare and
exercise their rights fully. Hence, the complainants were not properly arraigned on October 3,
1996.

PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 154297-300. February 15, 2008

FACTS:

Former President Joseph Estrada and his son, Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, faced criminal
charges before the Sandiganbayan. The Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) was appointed as their
counsel de oficio after their legal representatives withdrew unexpectedly. On March 15 and 18,
2002, Chief Public Attorney Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta requested to be relieved, citing a
heavy workload and the Estradas' non-qualification for PAO’s services. This request was initially
denied. On May 8, she filed an Urgent Motion, which was granted on May 9. Later, eight PAO
lawyers also sought relief, which was denied, leaving two lawyers, Atty. Maximo B. Usita Jr. and
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Atty. Wilfredo C. Andres, as counsel. These two retained lawyers filed for their own relief, but
their petition was denied as well. Subsequently, PAO filed a petition for grave abuse of
discretion with the Supreme Court. While the petition was pending, both retained lawyers were
appointed as Assistant City Prosecutors in August 2002.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion by retaining

petitioners Usita and Andres as counsels de oficio for accused individuals who were not
indigent.

RULING:

No. The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
retaining petitioners Usita and Andres as counsels de oficio for the accused, despite the
accused not being indigent. The Court held that the Sandiganbayan acted within its discretion in
appointing PAO lawyers to ensure the accused's right to counsel was preserved, particularly as
the accused had refused to hire new counsel. Under Section 7, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the right to counsel is a constitutional guarantee. The court may appoint
counsel de oficio when the accused refuses or fails to secure legal representation, even if they
are not indigent, to safeguard their constitutional rights. In this case, the accused refused to hire
new counsel, and the Sandiganbayan appointed PAO lawyers to ensure the accused's right to
counsel was upheld. The Court emphasized that this was not an arbitrary decision, as the
Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with its duty to ensure the accused's right to a fair trial.
Furthermore, when the accused eventually engaged private counsel, the number of PAO
lawyers was reduced accordingly, but two remained to manage any potential issues with the
private counsel. Thus, the Court concluded that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its
discretion in retaining PAO lawyers as counsels de oficio and dismissed the petition as moot,
given that the cases had already been resolved.v