France and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Mitterrand Policies, 1981-1992

Author(s): Pia Christina Wood

Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter, 1993), pp. 21-40
Published by: Middle East Institute
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 FRANCE AND THE ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: THE
MITTERRAND POLICIES, 1981-1992

Pia ChristinaWood

A RABleadersgenerallyviewedtheelectionof PresidentFranqoisMitterrand
in May 1981with some apprehension.Mitterrand'spersonal sympathiestoward
Israel were well known. He had visited the countryon numerousoccasions and,
through the Socialist International,had established particularlyclose relations
with members of the Israeli Labor Party. Furthermore,he stated that an active
French role in the region-which he wanted to pursue-was contingentupon an
improvementin Franco-Israelirelations.'
Since 1968,Frenchforeignpolicy in the MiddleEast hadincreasinglyfocused
on the strugglebetween Israel and the Palestiniansin the occupied territoriesof
the West Bankand Gaza Strip.PresidentCharlesde Gaullehadfirstwarnedof the
potentialproblemsof the Palestinianrefugees, and successive French presidents
regardedthe unsolved Israeli-Palestinianconflictnot only as a majorfactor in the
region's turmoil,but also as a threatto France's economic and political interests
in the region. Consequently, all French governments have sought to create
policies towardIsrael, the Palestiniansand the Palestine LiberationOrganization
(PLO),andthe overallpeace process that supportFrencheconomic, security, and
political interests.
Presidents Georges Pompidouand Valery Giscard d'Estaing had perceived
the advocacy of certain rightsfor the Palestinianpeople to be the best means of
supportingFrench interests, which included the protection of access to Middle
East oil, arms sales to the region, regional security through a just peace
settlement, and the maintenanceof French politicalinfluenceand independence.
1. See related remarks by Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson in Le Monde, May 28, 1981.
Pia Christina Wood is an assistant professor of political science at Old Dominion University. She
would like to thank the Old Dominion University Research Foundation for its generous support of the
project from which this article is drawn.

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * VOLUME 47, NO. 1, WINTER 1993

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22 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Although both presidents repeatedly declared their supportfor Israel's right to

exist, Pompidoualso supported"the legitimaterightsof the Palestinianpeople."
Giscardd'Estaing had called for a patrie, self-determinationfor the Palestinians,
and sponsored the EuropeanCommunity's(EC) 1980Venice Declaration.2
French policies under Pompidouand Giscard d'Estaing, however, antago-
nized both the United States andIsrael. The United States believed that European
"interference"mightundermineits own efforts, while Israel adamantlyopposed
any French participationbecause of its relationswith Arab countries. Thus, US
and Israelipolicies threatenedFrance'spoliticalobjectiveof playingan active role
in an area of the world deemed vital to French interests. French policy under
Mitterrandhas been a constant attempt to maintainFrench involvement in the
affairsof the region-particularly the Palestinian-Israeliconflict-despite the role
of the United States as the dominantoutside power.

OVERVIEW

Mitterrand'sinitialstrategywas to strikea balanceby strengtheningFrance's

relationshipswith Israel and the United States. To demonstrateFrance's shift in
policy, Mitterrandannouncedhis intentionto visit Israel, expressed supportfor
the Camp David peace process, and strongly criticized Giscard d'Estaing's
leadershipon the Venice Declaration.His strategywas to be two-pronged:first,
improve relations with Israel, and, second, support the US-sponsored peace
process while maintainingFrance's reputationas an independentplayer. In his
view, good relationswith Israelwould allow Franceto increaseits influencein the
region and supportFrench "grandeur"and rank. This improvementin relations
with Israel, however, was not to be accompaniedby a decrease in supportfor the
Palestinians. Instead, Mitterrandbelieved that the best way to protect French
interests was to give greater supportto both sides.
Mitterrand'sdisapprovalof the Venice Declarationhad been based on his
support for the Camp David accords. In his view, the declaration was too
ambitiousand underminedthe US approach.He felt the "step-by-step"approach
had a much better chance of success than an immediateglobal solution to the
crisis. In his view, a comprehensivepeace was desirable, but impossible in the
short term because too many players were unwillingto compromise.The end of
hostilities between Egypt and Israel, as demonstratedin the CampDavid treaty,

2. The declarationincludedthe followingmajorelements:the rightof all countriesto live in

peace; the rightof the Palestinianpeople (not refugees)to self-determination;the need for Israel to
withdrawfrom the occupiedterritoriesand to end its settlementpolicy; the need for all partiesto be
involved in the peace negotiations,includingthe PLO, "which will have to be associated with the
negotiations." For the full text, see European Political Cooperation (Bonn: Press and Information
Office, 1988),pp. 127-31.

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 FRANCE * 23

was, therefore, an importantfirst step in the right direction.3In addition,he felt

it was not the role of the Europeansor France to impose a solution based on the
principles laid out in the Venice Declaration,but instead to encourage negotia-
tions between the concerned parties.
Despite his early efforts to formulate a policy of "balance," by 1987
Mitterrandhad distancedFrancefromIsraelagainandplacedgreateremphasison
relationswith the PLO. His governmentbelieved that moderatePalestinians,led
by PLO chairmanYasir Arafat, were vital to any peace negotiations and that
championingtheir cause might open the door to a greater French voice in the
peace process. Contacts between the French governmentand Arafat increased
and, in 1989, Mitterrandreceived Arafatin Paris after the latter had renounced
terrorismand accepted UN resolutions242 and 338. The 1991PersianGulf War
complicated French policies because Arafat supportedIraqi president Saddam
Hussein, while France participatedin the multinationalcoalition that defeated
Iraq.In addition,the war galvanizedthe US pursuitof a negotiatedpeace between
the Palestiniansand Israelis, leading to the 1991 Madridconference and subse-
quent peace talks. With the dominant role of the United States, France and
Europe were once again excluded from playinginfluentialroles.
The Frenchgovernmenthad supportedearlierUS-led peace efforts,but at the
same time had continued to issue a variety of statements designed to balance
France's many interests. ForeignMinisterClaudeCheysson describedFrance as
an importantinterlocuteurbetween Israel and the Arabworldbecause of its good
relations with the differentsides. In addition, France was a solid partnerof the
United States, but certainlynot its ambassadorto the Middle East.4 To counter
the impressionthat Francehadjoined the US-Israelicamp, Mitterrandconstantly
emphasized France's absolute independence in foreign affairs and his strong
supportfor the rights of the Palestinians.'
In 1981, Cheysson severely weakened any possible EC role in the peace
process (and gained Israeliapproval)when he stated,"Therewill not be a French
project, there will not be a French initiativeas long as we are in office, nor will
there be a European project or a Europeaninitiative.''6 In contrast to Giscard
d'Estaing's emphasis on a comprehensive settlement and participationin the
peace process within an EC framework,the Mitterrandgovernmentthoughtthat
an independentnationalforeign policy would be a vehicle more likely to achieve
France's political objectives.

3. Francois Mitterrand, Ici et maintenant (Paris: Fayard, 1980), pp. 272-3. In 1981, Mitterrand
stated that he was the only head of a major political party in France to publicly support Camp David.
See interview with the New York Times, June 4, 1981.
4. La politique etrangere de la France, June 10, 1981, p. 28.
5. Le Monde, May 30, 1981.
6. Le Monde, December 9, 1981.

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24 mMIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

TROUBLEIN THEBALANCE

The difficultiesin followinga policy thatpurportedto be even-handedtoward

Arabstates and Israel quicklybecame evident. Strongsupportfor the Palestinians
and privilegedrelationswith Arafatand the PLO were key elements in France's
politique arabe. Mitterrandsupportedthe rightof the Palestiniansto a state and
the necessity for Israel both to discontinue the building of settlements and to
withdrawfrom the occupied territories.Contacts between high-rankingFrench
officials and PLO representativeswere frequent, and the PLO office in Paris
enjoyed official (but not embassy-level) recognition. By meeting with Arafat in
Beirut in 1981, Cheysson demonstrated France's concern for the Palestinian
cause, gave credibilityto the PLO, and acknowledgedthat the PLO represented
(albeit in France's view not solely) the Palestinian people. Furthermore, in
December 1981Cheysson declared that a Palestinianstate was inevitable.7
France's double friendshipwas not jeopardizedby the Palestinians,but by
the Israelis, whose actions served to frustratethe French policy of balance. In
early June 1981, Israeli jets bombed and completely destroyed Iraq's Osiraq
nuclearreactor, which was beingbuiltwith aid fromFrance. (A Frenchtechnician
was killed in the operation.)AlthoughFrancecondemnedthe raid, it did not wish
to alienate Israel to the extent that its goal of rapprochementwould be jeopar-
dized. For this reason, France refused to condemn Israel in the United Nations
and did not press for sanctions. It judged that the raid was importantenough to
postpone, but not to cancel, a plannedvisit to Israel by Mitterrand.
A numberof other disturbingevents followed the Osiraqraid. In late June
1981, the Israeli Labor Party, which Mitterrandsupported, was defeated by
Menachem Begin's incumbent Likud Party, which held a more intransigent
attitudeon the Palestinianissue. The bombingof Beirutby Israelijets on 18 June
and the Israeli annexationof the Golan Heights in December 1981served only to
further strain relations between France and Israel. France strongly condemned
both incidents, and once again Mitterrandpostponed his trip to Israel to
demonstratehis disapproval.He still refused, nevertheless, to abandonthe trip
altogether. Cheysson observed that "if one is interested in peace in the Middle
East ... it seems to us to be a strangeway to promotepeace to startwith breaking
with one of the two parties. ... "8 Mitterranddid, however, indicate his
disapproval of Israel's actions and at the same time reinforce France's good
relations with the Arabs and Palestiniansby strongly supportingthe Fahd Plan,
put forwardin August 1981;also, he chose SaudiArabiaratherthan Israel for his
first presidentialvisit abroad.9

7. Le Monde, December6-7, 1981.

8. La politique etrangere de la France, February20, 1982,p. 48.
9. The Fahd Plan consisted of eight points. Point seven stated that "all states in the region
shouldbe able to live in peace," which some interpretedas tacit recognitionof the state of Israel.

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 FRANCE* 25

In additionto the shift in French policy toward better relations with Israel,
Mitterrandsupportedthe US effortto create a multinationalforce to oversee the
evacuation of the Sinai accordingto the provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty. Participationby the WesternEuropeans,however, posed a number
of problems. On the one hand, Israelwas determinedthat Europeanparticipation
be on the basis of CampDavid and not on the basis of either the Fahd Plan or a
separateEuropeanpeace initiativeas providedfor in the Venice Declaration.On
the other hand, the Arabs were also criticalof any Europeanrole, which, in their
view, would legitimize CampDavid.
Initialcontactsbetween the United States and the Europeansdid not hold out
much promiseuntilMitterrandannouncedat the Williamsburg Summit,in October
1981, that France would be willingto participatein the multinationalforce to the
Sinai. After the European Political Cooperationmeeting in late October 1981,
Cheyssonannouncedthat both Franceand Italyhad agreedto participate.'0
Mitterrand'sacceptanceof a Frenchrole dovetailedwith his strategyto gain
influencein the regionby stressingrapprochementwith Israeland approvalfor the
step-by-step Camp David process. Equally importantwas France's desire to
supportEgypt, particularlyin the wake of the assassinationof PresidentAnwar
al-Sadat on October 6, 1981. For these reasons, France was willing to lobby
actively in the EC for participationin the multinationalforce despite general
opposition from the Palestiniansand the Arab world.
In March1982,Mitterrand'slong-awaitedtripto Israelfinallytook place. The
visit gave substance to France's objectives of improving the Franco-Israeli
relationshipand reassertingFrench influencein the region. Althoughfollowing a
different route from that of Giscard d'Estaing, who maintaineda "Gaullist"
distance from Israel and supported a role for the EC, Mitterrand'spolicy of
even-handednesswas based, nevertheless,on the same ambition:an independent
and active French role in the MiddleEast. Whenasked whetherhis visit signified
a changein Frenchforeignpolicy, Mitterrandrespondedthat "the changeis in my
presence . ... l
Despite the emotional appeal of the visit, however, Mitterrand'sfamous
address to the Knesset demonstratedhis adherenceto supportingboth parties to
the conflict. After reaffirmingthe necessity for the Arab states to recognize
Israel's right to exist, Mitterranddeclared, "Dialogue supposes that each party
can obtain its full legal rights, which for the Palestiniansas well as for the others
can, at the appropriatemoment, signifya state."12 AlthoughIsrael did not accept
the French view of the Palestinianquestion, Mitterrand'svisit was considered a
diplomaticvictory for both governments.

10. Le Monde, October 28, 1981.

11. La politique etrangere de la France, March 4, 1983, p. 62.
12. For the full text of his speech, see Frangois Mitterrand, Reflexions sur la politique
exterieure de la France (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1986), pp. 335-46.

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26 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

WARIN LEBANON, 1982-84

The newfound accord between Israel and France proved to be short-lived

when Israel launched its invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. Mitterrand'sinitial
condemnationof the attackwas not categorical,but as the extent of the invasion
became clear, and French interests in Lebanon appearedjeopardized, he hard-
ened his position. The new balance in France's policies, it seemed, was not only
detrimentalto Franco-Arabrelations, but also failed to provide France with any
influence over Israel. Tensions increased as Mitterrandcondemned "without
reserve" Israeli actions in Lebanon and opposed the convening of the European
Economic Community-IsraelCouncil of Cooperation.
Mitterrandfollowed these actions with statementsdesigned to demonstrate
his disapprobationof Israel: the West Bank must be the center for a future
Palestinianstate; Arafatwas welcome in Franceand an Arafat-Cheyssonmeeting
would be acceptable;and the killingoccurringin Beirutwas unacceptablejust as
had been the massacreat Oradourby the Germans.13Contactsbetween high-level
Frenchofficials,includingCheysson and PrimeMinisterPierreMauroy,and PLO
officials increased. In turn, Israeli prime ministerBegin categorized France as a
country where anti-Semitism was rampant and opposed the participationof
French forces in a proposed multinationalforce to evacuate Palestinianfighters
from Beirut.
Discussions aboutthe possibilityof sendingan internationalforce to Lebanon
began when the Israeli army first moved beyond its 40-kilometerself-declared
''security zone" and advancedto the outskirtsof Beirut, where it laid siege to the
city, effectively trapping PLO forces and others. Mitterrand, at this point,
undertookan active diplomaticrole designed to bringabout a peace settlement,
the withdrawalof all forces from Lebanon and the preservationof the country's
integrity,and the protectionof the PLO and Arafat.On 24 June, Franceproposed
a UN resolution that called for the simultaneouswithdrawalof both Israeli and
Palestinian forces from Beirut, a plan that would allow the Palestinianforces
trappedin the city to escape. Lebanese armedforces alongwith a UN force would
interpose themselves between the two sides, thus neutralizingthe city. The
United States vetoed the French proposalin the Security Council.
Undaunted, French and Egyptian officials at the United Nations worked
togetherto drafta Franco-Egyptianinitiativethat called for a simultaneousIsraeli
and Palestinianwithdrawal,the associationof the PLO with negotiations,and the
simultaneousand mutualrecognitionof all parties. Underthreatof a US veto, the
draft resolution was effectively tabled. Despite disagreementwith Washington,
Francerecognizedthat only the United States could convince the Israelisto allow

13. See statement on Oradour in interview with WAFA, the Palestinian press agency, cited in
Albert Bourgi and Pierre Weiss, Liban: La cinquieme guerre du Proche-Orient (Paris: Editions
Publisud, 1983), p. 118.

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 FRANCE * 27

Palestinianfightersto leave Beirut. For this reason, France supporteda plan by

US envoy Philip Habib that called for the creation of a multinationalforce to
oversee the evacuationof PLO forces. UnderUS pressure,Israelfinallyagreedto
French participation.Ultimately, the operationwas a success, and the French
governmentachieved two of its majorobjectives:participationin the operationto
supportits claim to greatpower status and the preservationof the moderatePLO
faction.
UnderlyingFrance's diplomaticactivity to protect the Palestinianforces and
the PLO was a distinctiveanalysis of theirrole. In the Frenchview, the moderate
faction of the PLO underArafat'sleadershipwas in dangerof annihilation,and,
if eliminated, the leadershipcould be taken over by radicalfactions that might
resort to terrorismrather than political dialogue. For this reason, the French
believed it was imperativeto protect the PLO in Beirut as a political force to
assure futurepeace negotiations.In addition,the preservationof Arafat's forces
would ensure a French link to the peace process and garnerapprovalfrom the
moderateArabgovernments.The same reasoningappliedlater in November 1983
when Arafat and his forces were surroundedby Syriantroops in Tripoli. In this
case, the United States finally agreed with France that the PLO be evacuated
under the UN flag with a French naval escort.
Although Mitterrand'sgovernmentbelieved it essential to participatein the
US-led multinationalforce to Lebanon, it also recognizedthat coordinationwith
the United States might undermineits claim to an independentforeign policy in
the region. As a result, France supportedcertainUS actions while also following
an aggressivelyindependentdiplomaticagendaand maintaininga well-publicized
distance from US policies with which it did not agree. For example, Mitterrand
gave lukewarm support to the September 1982 proposal of President Ronald
Reaganthat called for full autonomyfor the Palestiniansin five years but rejected
an independentstate. Because he was skepticalof the chances for its success and
disagreedwith Reagan's assessment of the PLO, Mitterrandonly said that "the
position of Ronald Reagan seems to be oriented in the direction that we have
defined."14 Israel rejectedthe ReaganPlan, and subsequentevents in Lebanon-
especially the massacre of hundredsof Palestiniancivilians at Sabraand Shatila
by Lebanese allies of Israel-pushed the plan onto the back burnerwhere it was
soon forgotten.
It was over the issue of the Palestinians and the PLO that the French
governmentmost ardently sought to distance itself from the United States and
Israel. Mitterrandrepeatedly stressed that France, the EC, and Egypt and the
other Arab nationsagreedthat the PLO must be preserved.This position was not
accepted by Israel nor, at least initially, by the United States. Mitterrandalso
unsuccessfully attemptedto convince the EC to declare the PLO "an essential
interlocuteur"for the Palestinians.Cheysson stated that "the Palestinianpeople

14. Le Monde, September4, 1982.

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28 mMIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

must have in the negotiationsa representativeto speak for them. This represen-
tative, in our view, is the PLO. This meansthat the PLO shouldnot be annihilated
and dishonored in the wake of the crushingmilitarydefeat that has just struck
it.' 15

Despite France's strong condemnationof the Israeli invasion, and active

diplomacyto save the PLO and finda peacefulsolutionto the conflict, Franco-US
cooperation angered many Arab and Palestinianfactions. It soon became clear
that France's strategy of emphasizing its own national diplomacy and being
selective in its cooperationwith the United States would not protect France from
Arab charges of Western imperialism.The extent to which Arab factions linked
the United States and France became apparent after the multinationalforce
returnedto Lebanon in response to the Sabraand Shatilamassacres.
Both presidents Mitterrandand Reagan had agreed that the multinational
forces should return. Unfortunatelyfor France, however, this led to the percep-
tion that it supportedthe ultimate aims of the US government-the control of
Lebanonby the Amin Gemayelgovernment.Francehadjoined the US-sponsored
force with very differentintentionsand perceptionsof the Lebanese crisis and the
future of the Palestinians.While the Reaganadministrationanalyzed the conflict
in East-West terms, France believed regionalrivalrieswere the most important
factors in the conflict. In the French view, peace could only be achieved through
a national reconciliationbetween the differentfactions. In addition, the French
governmentlinked the conflict in Lebanon to the Palestinianproblem, insisting
that one could not be solved without the other.
The first nine months of 1983were markedby active French diplomacy. A
parade of high-rankingFrench officialstraveled to Arab states and Israel, while
Mitterrandreceived numerousheads of state in Paris. Meetings also continued
with Arafatand the PLO; Cheysson had met with Arafatin Tunis in October 1982
and again in July 1983. Unfortunately,France's role as mediatorwas untenable.
Arafatrefused to accept UN resolution242, which impliedrecognitionof Israel,
and Prime MinisterBegin categoricallyrefused to consider any role for the PLO
in peace negotiations.
To maintain its distance from the United States, the French government
emphasized its supportfor Palestinianself-determination,the association of the
PLO with negotiations, the separateness of commands of the multinational
contingents, and its disapprovalof the 17 May Israeli-Lebaneseaccord of 1983.
Despite criticisms of US policy, however, France never explicitly disassociated
itself from the United States, and the obvious consultationtakingplace between
the two countries added to the perceptionof French backing of US diplomacy.
For example, during a visit to Paris by Secretary of State George Shultz,
Mitterranddeclared that "the question of the Middle East, includingLebanon,

15. La politique etrangere de la France, June 20, 1982, p. 190.

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 FRANCE * 29

was discussed in depth. The views of Parisand Washingtonappearvery close." 16

US-French cooperationseriouslyjeopardizedFrance's reputationas an indepen-
dent playerand antagonizedmanyArabs.17As a result, Frenchforces in Lebanon
increasinglybecame the targetof attacksby Lebanese militia.Fifty-eightFrench
paratrooperswere killed in the truck bombingsof October 1983.18
The multinationalforce deployment to Lebanon following the Sabra and
Shatila massacres proved to be a disaster for French foreign policy for two
reasons. First, it revealed the limits of Mitterrand'spolicy of "balance"; a
position of interlocuteurbased on championingthe Palestiniancause and becom-
ing Israel's best friendin WesternEuropewas simplynot possible. Francedid not
have the means to demandconcessions fromeitherthe Arabsor Israelis. Second,
France's fundamentalforeignpolicy goal of independencein the MiddleEast was
compromisedby its close cooperationwith the United States. The dilemmafor the
French government,however, was that if it did not participatein US-led actions,
it might be excluded from the region. By 1984, it became clear that France's
trade-offbetween an active presence and independencehad led to a majorforeign
policy disaster. In March, the French contingent of the multinationalforce
withdrewfrom Lebanon and Mitterrandbacked away from the United States to
restore France's independentreputationand to improverelations with the Arab
world.

THEPEACEPROCESS, 1984-87: STAGNATION

After the 1984 French withdrawalfrom Lebanon, Franco-US consultation

over Lebanon and the Arab-Israeliconflict diminished considerably; France
reasserted its independenceand the attentionof both countries was diverted to
other issues, includingterrorismand the Iran-IraqWar. Mitterrand'srefusal to
allow US planes to enter French airspace on their way to attack Libya in 1986
demonstrated his willingness to oppose US policies that he felt undermined
Frenchrelationswith the Arabworld. In addition,France, whose participationin
the multinationalforce gained it the antipathyof Syria and most of the Lebanese
factions, expended a great deal of energy on reestablishinggood relationsin the
Arabworld. Mitterrandwas determinednot to let his policy of balanceundermine
France's politiquearabe.

16. Le Monde, December 16, 1982.

17. Syria'sforeignminister,Abd al-HalimKhaddam,statedthat "the role of Francebeside the
Americansremindsus of the time when one practiced'la politiquede la canonniere.'" Le Monde,
September28, 1983.
18. See Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsback, The Multinational Force in Beirut,
1982-1984 (Miami:FloridaInternationalUniversityPress, 1991);JohnMacKinlay,The Peacekeepers:
An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israeli Interface (London:Unwin Hyman,
1989);RobinWright,Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (New York:Simon& Schuster,1985),
pp. 69-1 10.

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30 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

In July 1984, Mitterrandvisited King Hussein of Jordan and expressed a

preferencefor direct negotiationsbetween the partiesinvolved in the Arab-Israeli
conflict, but nevertheless also supportedthe king's appeal for an international
conference. In November, he traveled to Syria to meet with President Hafiz
al-Asad and restore a working relationship between the two countries. He
explainedthat "there were events thatfoundus on differentsides. So you have to
decide, do you talk or do you remainfrozen in hostility, that is what we have
done-establish a dialogue.... [T]othe extent that Syriacan contributeto ending
the Lebanese civil war, who can object."'9
Cordialrelations and numerousmeetings between French and PLO officials
continued. The link between Mitterrand'sgovernment and Arafat had been
mutuallybeneficial. France's privilegedties to a majorparty to the Arab-Israeli
conflictallowed it at least some diplomaticinfluence,particularlysince the United
States refusedto have any contact with the PLO. In addition,Arafaton numerous
occasions used his connections in the Arabworld to mediatebetween the French
government and Lebanese groups over French hostages in Lebanon.20Arafat
gained credibilityfrom the French government'swillingness to meet with PLO
membersand hoped that Francewould be able to influencethe United States and
thus, Israel.21
The Frencheffortto improverelationswith the Arabworld coincidedwith an
ameliorationof Franco-Israelities, which had sufferedas a result of the invasion
of Lebanon. Israeli elections held in 1984resulted in a Labor-lednationalunity
government. In the French view, Labor leader Shimon Peres held out the best
chance for peace because he accepted the land for peace principle.In December
1984, Peres traveled to Paris to meet Mitterrand,with whom he had developed
personalties throughthe Socialist International.It was the firstofficialvisit by an
Israeli leader to France in 20 years. Thereafter, the two leaders consulted
regularly,Peres believing that France could play a constructiverole in the peace
process.22
In Peres's two years as prime ministerin the nationalunity government,the
peace process proceeded with fits and starts. In February 1985, King Hussein
announced a Jordanian-PLOaccord based on UN resolutions 242 and 338 and
with a provisionfor an internationalconference. In October 1985,Peres agreedto
a modifiedversion of Hussein's proposalfor an internationalpeace conference.
Unfortunately, agreement could not be reached over the issue of Palestinian
representation,and in 1986, the peace process was dealt two majorblows: King

19. New York Times, November 29, 1984.

20. For a discussion of Arafat's role, see Pierre Fauvier and Michel Martin-Roland, La
decennie Mitterrand vol. 2. (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991), part 8, chapter 3, pp. 411-51.
21. See Arafat statement in Le Monde, March 9, 1985.
22. In one of his numerous trips to Paris, Peres stated that France "could speak to both sides
... and had earned a lot of confidence in the Arab world and with us." Le Monde, October 27, 1985.

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 FRANCE* 31

Hussein suspended the Amman accord and expelled PLO representativesfrom

Jordan, and Yitzhak Shamirbecame prime ministerof Israel.
AlthoughShamiropposed the land for peace principleand the concept of an
internationalconference, French policy throughoutthese developmentsconcen-
trated on actively consulting with all parties, supportingthe regional peace
initiatives, and persuadingall sides that compromisewas essential.23Mitterrand
and Foreign Minister Roland Dumas met numerous times with Peres, King
Hussein, Shamir, Arafat, and Egyptian president Husni Mubarakbut failed to
break the numerousdeadlocks amongthe many differentparties.
By the beginning of 1987, with the peace process stagnant, the French
governmentendorsed stronglythe idea of an internationalpeace conference. On
February23, 1987,the foreignministersof the EC (supportedby France)released
a declarationcallingfor an internationalconferenceto be held underthe auspices
of the United Nations. PrimeMinisterJacquesChirac,in an addressto the Israeli
Knesset, also pressed for an internationalconference that would bring together
the permanentmembersof the UN SecurityCouncilandthe interestedparties. He
carefullyaddedthatthe outside powers wouldnot have the power to arbitrate,but
could guaranteeany solution reached in the negotiations.24
Althoughthe French stressed on numerousoccasions that the international
conference would not impose a solution on the partiesinvolved, Israel remained
unconvinced. Shamiradamantlyopposed an internationalconference that in his
view did not oblige the Arabsto acknowledgethe existence of Israeland distanced
them from bilateralnegotiationswith the Israeli government.Equally important
was his belief that an internationalconferenceheld underUN auspices would be
highly disadvantageous to Israel, given the positions of the majority of its
membersregardingthe conflict.
To a large degree, the Frenchand EC initiativesreflectedtheir concern over
a stagnatingpeace process that mightlead to regionalinstability.In theirview, an
internationalconference might fill the vacuum caused by US disinterest in the
peace process-the US governmentwas embroiledin the Iran-contrascandal-
and Shamir's hard-linepolicies toward the Palestinians. In addition, France's
permanent membershipin the UN Security Council would allow it, in Mitter-
rand's words, to "tenir son rang." Despite France's active diplomacy,its ability
to shape the debate or push the peace process forwardwas limited by its lack of
leverage over any of the parties. By 1988, Shamir'sextremistpolicies towardthe
Palestiniansand the intifadahad alienatedthe French government.As a result,
France once again placed emphasis on its relationshipwith the PLO.

23. Le Monde, March 10, 1985.

24. Le Monde, November 3, 1987.

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32 * MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL

ARAFATAND THEPALESTINIANS,1987-1990

The intifada returned the Palestinianissue to the top of the international

agenda, and the repressive Israeli response helped shift internationalsupportin
favor of the Palestinians.It also served as a catalyst for King Hussein to sever in
July 1988all legal and administrativeties to the West Bank. Hussein's decision,
in turn, removedthe Jordanianoptionfromthe politicalagendaand galvanizedthe
PLO leadership. After a great deal of debate, Arafat launched a diplomatic
initiative that reinvigoratedthe peace process and led to US-Palestinianconsul-
tations.
The French governmentresponded to the intifada and Arafat's diplomatic
offensive by engagingin a more active diplomacy. Angered by Israel's intransi-
gence and oppressive measures in the occupied territories,the French govern-
ment emphasized its support for the rights of the Palestinians and adopted a
harder line toward Israel. The French representative at the United Nations
continually voiced opposition to Israeli expulsions and beatings of Palestinians
and to Palestiniandeaths. France voted in favor of Security Council resolutions
that condemnedIsrael's violations of the 1949Geneva convention that called for
the respect of the civilian populationsin territoriesoccupied as a result of war.
Mitterrand, in an interview on Israeli television, sharply criticized Israel's
handling of the intifada: "[T]his daily killing . . . has become insupportable,
unacceptable."25He called for an internationalconference.
During Israeli president Chaim Herzog's visit to Paris in October 1988,
Mitterrandagain stressed the rightof the Palestiniansto a patriewhere they could
build the structuresof a state. He also supportedIsrael's rightto exist and called
for the convening of an internationalconference. A Shamir visit to Paris in
February1989was fruitlessgiven that Israel continuedto reject negotiationswith
any member of the PLO, the establishmentof an independentPalestinianstate,
and the convening of an internationalconference.
Mitterrand'ssharpcriticismof Israel was accompaniedby a show of support
for Arafatand the PLO andby several disputeswith the United States. In January
1988,the French governmentdecided to upgradethe PLO bureauto "delegation
generale de Palestine." Arafat's meeting with Foreign Minister Dumas in Sep-
tember 1988, after Arafat addressed the European Parliament, was also an
importantgesture of support. AlthoughDumas repeated France's long-standing
position of securityfor Israel and the rightof the Palestiniansto choose their own
destiny, it was clear that he wished to emphasizethat the PLO and Arafatwere,
in the French view, valid interlocuteurs.Arafat'sdeclarationof independencefor
the State of Palestine in November 1988 was given greater credibility by
Mitterrand's statement of support. Although he did not extend diplomatic
recognition,Mitterrandexplainedthat, in principle,he had no objectionsbut that

25. Le Monde, February 27, 1988.

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 FRANCE* 33

recognition must be founded on independent authority with control over the

territoryand population,a criterionthat had not been satisfied.26
As the Mitterrandgovernmentsought to encourageArafat and the PLO to
further moderate their position, France clashed with US policies that favored
Israel. Not only did the United States veto in 1988almostall UN SecurityCouncil
resolutions that condemned Israeli practices in the occupied territories,but the
Reaganadministrationalso vetoed a resolutionin Februarythat had called for an
internationalconference. Prime MinisterChiracstronglycriticized the decision,
declaringthat the veto representeda "bad appreciationof thingson the partof the
United States."27 In December, Mitterrandharshlycriticized Secretaryof State
Shultz's 29 November decision to deny Arafat a visa to address the United
Nations; as a result, Mitterrandsupportedthe decision to hold the session in
Geneva to allow Arafatto speak.28It was not until the US decision to open talks
with the PLO on 14 December that France found anythingpositive to say about
US actions.
Of all France's gestures of supportfor Arafat, perhapsmost importantwas
Mitterrand'sface-to-facemeetingwith him on May 2, 1989.Dumas explainedthat
Arafat's acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 338, his explicit recognition of
Israel, and his renunciation of all forms of terrorism (as stated at a press
conference in Geneva on December 14, 1988),had satisfiedFrance's conditions
for an invitation. France also made it clear that the invitationwas contingenton
a clarificationof Arafat'sposition on the PalestinianNational Charterthat called
for the destructionof Israel. On the firstday of his visit to Paris,Arafatannounced
that the charterwas caduc, null and void.29
For the Frenchgovernment,the decisionto meet Arafatwas based on several
considerations.First, it wished to confirmthe PLO's recognitionof Israel, and its
renunciationof terrorismand the PalestinianNational Charter, and encourage
furthermoderation.Second, Arafat's receptionin Paris would provide him with
greater internationalrecognition and respectability,which was particularlyim-
portantin lightof the Reaganadministration'sdecisionto open talks with the PLO
in late December 1988. Third, the meeting served to increase French and
Europeanpressure on Israel to enter into talks with the PLO and on Arafat to
consider the Shamir government's May 1989 peace initiative that included
Palestinianelections in the occupied territories.
Despite strong criticismfrom the Israeli governmentand some membersof
the French Jewish community,Mitterrandstood firm, statingthat his decision to
host Arafatdid not marka change in Frenchforeign policy, but was in line with
his speech given in Israel in 1982.He pointedout that not only did he supportthe
security of Israel, but also the rightof the Palestiniansto a patrie. He voiced his

26. Le Monde, November 24, 1988.

27. Le Monde, February 6, 1988.
28. Le Monde, December 2, 1988.
29. Le Monde, May 5, 1989.

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34 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

skepticism concerning Shamir's proposal for free elections because their authen-
ticity could be jeopardized by the presence of the Israeli military. He ended with
a firm warning: "And you see, the foreign policy of France, it is decided in Paris,
it is decided here, it does not depend on others.... France does not live under
a protectorate and will not let anyone dictate her decisions. This holds true for this
affair, as well as for others."30
Arafat had supported strongly France's proposals for an international con-
ference under UN auspices and stated on numerous occasions that France should
play an important role in the peace process.31 Clearly, the French government
believed that its own status in the Middle East would be enhanced if Arafat and
the PLO achieved greater credibility as the key organization representing the
Palestinians. Mitterrand further assisted Arafat in his search for credibility in
April 1990 by hosting talks between former US president Jimmy Carter and Arafat
in Paris. Despite French diplomacy, it remained clear that only the new US
presidential administration of George Bush had the power to move the peace
process forward.
As the United States began to pursue negotiations more vigorously, France
found itself once again on the sidelines. The Bush administration did not favor an
international conference, preferring instead direct talks between the parties, a
position that effectively marginalized Paris.32 Nevertheless, the active diplomacy
conducted by the French government and the Mitterrand-Arafat meeting did serve
in the short-run to enhance France's "presence" in the Middle East peace
process. In the long run, however, the political benefits for France were limited
because the Israeli-Palestinian issue was completely overshadowed by Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait.

IMPLICATIONSOF THEPERSIAN GULF WARAND THEMADRID

CONFERENCE,1990-92

Although Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was not linked initially to the Israeli-
Palestinian problem, the two conflicts quickly became connected after Saddam
Hussein stated that an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait must be accompanied by an
Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Mitterrand, while demanding that
Iraq withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, did agree that all the problems in the
region were interlinked and should be addressed simultaneously through an
international conference.33 This perception formed the basis of France's peace

30. For the full text of the press conference, see Le Monde, May 20, 1989.
31. See for example the interview with Arafat in L'Express, April 28, 1989.
32. Le Monde, November 17, 1988.
33. For an analysis of France and the Persian Gulf War, see Pia Christina Wood, "Francois
Mitterrand and the Persian Gulf War: The Search for Influence," French Politics and Society 11, no.
3 (Summer 1992).

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 FRANCE* 35

initiativesthroughoutthe crisis and led, once again, to majordisagreementswith

the United States.
For the French government, the Persian Gulf crisis presented the interna-
tional communitywith an opportunityto make progresson solving other regional
problems,includingthe Palestinianissue. Franceundertooka diplomaticeffortto
keep the ideas of a linkage between the two conflicts and an international
conference alive. At the same time, a strong French commitmentto an interna-
tional conference, sharplyopposed by the United States, reflectedboth France's
independentforeign policy and its politiquearabe.
To underlinethe Frenchdifferenceand to demonstrateFrance's commitment
to solving the gamut of regional problems, Mitterrandproposed his own peace
plan in a speech to the UN GeneralAssembly on September24, 1990. In stage
three of his four-partplan, he called for dialoguebetween the parties-Lebanese,
Palestinians,and Israelis-involved in other MiddleEast problems.Althoughthe
phrase internationalconference was not mentioned,the implicationwas clear.34
As expected, the United States, GreatBritain,and Israelreacted with hostility to
what they perceived to be linkage, an attitude that eventually prevented the
acceptance of the French peace plan (or any subsequentversion) at the United
Nations.
As the crisis unfolded,the internationalconferencebecame a majorpoint of
contention between France and the United States. Washington'sintransigence
over this issue completely frustratedthe French. While agreeing that no link
should be made between an Iraqi withdrawaland an Israeli withdrawal,Mitter-
randbelieved that the opportunityto settle otherproblemsin the region shouldbe
seized. The differing viewpoints led to increased tensions between the two
governmentsand bitterremarks.Mitterrandacidly commentedthat "France is a
faithfulfriend,but nobodydictatesto her.. . . I respectMr. Bush but I do not feel
myself to be in the position of a second-class private obliged to obey his
commander-in-chief." 35
As the deadline for Iraq's withdrawalapproached,Mitterrandattempteda
last-ditch effort to avoid war and realize one of his major objectives-the
internationalconference. On January14, 1991, he proposed a draftresolutionin
the United Nations that was divided into two distinct sections to resolve the
debate over linkage.36As expected, Washingtonstill consideredthe proposal to
include linkage and, therefore,refused to discuss the plan at all. Faced with US
opposition and Iraq's complete lack of interest, the French initiativedied.
Duringthe war, the Franco-US disagreementover the internationalconfer-
ence and the Arab-Israelipeace process was put on the back burneras priority
was given to defeatingIraq.It was clearthatone of Mitterrand'smajorreasonsfor

34. For full text of the plan, see Le Monde, September 28, 1990.
35. Le Monde, January 6-7, 1991.
36. Washington Post, January 15, 1991.

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36 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

participatingin the multinationalcoalition was to obtain a voice in the peace

process that would follow the end of the war. With Iraq's surrender,however,
France clashed again with the United States over the international peace
conference and the role of Arafatand the PLO.
France's supportfor Arafat and the PLO remainedstrong both duringand
after the Persian Gulf crisis. Although the French government disapproved of
Arafat's show of support for Saddam Hussein, it recognized that Arafat had a
difficult choice to make given Hussein's popularityamong many Palestinians.
Hussein's linkageand his consistent referencesto double standardshad returned
the Palestinianquestion to center stage, an opportunityArafatfelt he could not
ignore. In addition, Arafat's link to Hussein was considered to be one path that
the French governmentmightuse to defuse the crisis. Arafatmet both Cheysson
and Dumas to discuss the issue of Western hostages in Iraq and ways to avoid
war.37
With the end of the war, Mitterrandmoved quickly to convince the United
States that the PLO was still the legitimaterepresentativeof the Palestiniansand
must be consultedin all negotiations.At a March1991meetingheld in Martinique
between presidents Mitterrandand Bush, Mitterrandnot only reiterated his
support for Arafat and the PLO but also reminded Bush that UN resolutions
called for both a state of Israel and an independent Palestine: "It would be
historicallyabsurdto refuse a people all form of identity." 38
Mitterrand'sintervention on behalf of the PLO was accompanied by his
support, albeit lukewarm,for the US-sponsored peace process based on direct
bilateralnegotiationsin a regional conference. In fact, France had little choice.
Although support for the US proposals did not guaranteea role for France or
Europe in the peace process, a lack of supportcertainlywould end any possible
participation.As a result, Mitterrandaffirmedthat Francewould do everythingto
facilitate US secretary of state James Baker's peace initiatives as long as UN
resolutionsandthe rightsof the Palestinianswere recognized.For France,the key
to possible influenceremainedArafatand the PLO.
Recognizingthat Arafatand the PLO mightbe excluded from all aspects of
the negotiations, Dumas met with the PLO leader in April 1991, despite an EC
decision to freeze all contact with high-level PLO officials. The Dumas-Arafat
meetingwas held for several reasons:to restoresome credibilityto Arafatand the
PLO as valid representatives of the Palestinians; to present France as the
intermediarybetween the PLO and the United States; and, to avoid being left out

37. Josette Alia and Christine Clerc, La guerre de Mitterrand: la derniere grande illusion
(Paris: Olivier Orban, 1991), pp. 54-9, 133-5. When Iraq announced that it would free all French
hostages, numerous charges were made that France had made a separate deal. This was denied by the
French government. Arafat announced that he had been France's envoy. See the Arafat interview,
L'Express, November 23, 1990, p. 19.
38. Le Monde, March 16, 1991. He also stated, "Yasser Arafat remains to my knowledge the
head of the PLO and the PLO to my knowledge a representative organization."

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 FRANCE* 37

of the diplomacyof the peace process at a time that the United States was clearly
leading the way.39
Despite French supportfor the PLO and greaterinternationalacceptance of
Arafat throughout1991, the major stumblingblock for France continued to be
Israel's rejection of either French or European participation in a regional
conference. Franco-Israeli relations, in particular, had reached a new low
following a series of acrimoniousexchanges. In response to the October 1990
shooting deaths of Palestinianson the Haramal-Sharif,France supportedstrong
condemnation of Israel at the United Nations. This position, combined with
meetings between French officials and Arafat, and French insistence on an
internationalconference under UN auspices, antagonizedIsrael. In turn, Israel
accused France of having helped Iraq modify its Scud missiles to hit Israel, and
rejected both an internationalconference and French-Europeanparticipationin
any peace negotiations.
The formationof the new right-wingLikudgovernmentin June 1991,with its
championingof "GreaterIsrael," did little to improveFranco-Israelirelations.40
As Bush and Baker increased their pressure on Israel to attend a peace
conference, France confined its diplomacy to supportingthe United States,
encouragingPLO moderation,and demandingEC participation.Despite Israel's
acceptance of EC representativeHans Van den Broek as an observer at the
October 1991 Madridconference, both the EC and France remainedoutside the
negotiations.
Between the Madridconference and the June 1992elections in Israel, only
limited progress was recordedin the peace negotiations.French supportfor the
US-led process continued, but without any appreciable enthusiasm. Dumas
agreed to Baker's proposal to set up multilateralnegotiationson such issues as
refugees, security and arms control, distributionof water resources, regional
economic development, and the environment, but insisted that any meetings
between Arabs and Israelis be only preparatoryin nature. In Dumas's view,
substantialprogressin the bilateraltalks, which appearedunlikelyunderShamir's
government,was a prerequisitefor any multilateralnegotiations.4'French pessi-
mismover the stagnatingpeace talks disappearedin the wake of the LaborParty's
electoral victory. Mitterrandsent congratulatorymessages to new primeminister
Yitzhak Rabin and new foreign ministerShimon Peres. The French government
was particularlypleased by the appointmentof Peres, a known Europeanist.His
close ties to France held out the possibilityfor a greaterFrenchrole in the peace
process.
At the express invitation of Bush, bilateral peace talks reconvened in
Washingtonon August 24, 1992.By mid-Septemberthere was cautious optimism

39. See comments by Dumas, Le Monde, April 24, 1991.

40. See comments by Foreign Minister Dumas, Le Monde, July 2, 1991.
41. Le Monde, November 5, 1992.

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38 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

that agreements could be reached between both Israel and the Palestiniansand
Israel and Syria. Neither French nor European representatives were at the
discussions. Even in the multilateraltalks, Franceand the EC had been unableto
assert any appreciable influence. On 9-11 September, Peres, who supported
augmentingthe importanceof the multilateraltalks and creatinga ministerial-level
steering committee, visited Paris and suggested that Dumas use his influence to
gain Syrian participation.France, ambitiousto play a greater role in the peace
process, readily agreed. Dumas secretly visited Syria on 14 Septemberbut was
unable to convince Asad to attend multilateraltalks.42
Despite this setback, Dumas declaredthat France would try to play a useful
role. "You heard Mr. Peres in Paris, and Israelileaders, call on France to play a
role in the [MiddleEast] conflict. It's true that today new things are happeningin
the peace process. Everywherethat Francecan be useful it will try to be."43 The
United States, however, considered the French initiative unhelpfulinterference
and complainedto Rabin. He, in turn, reprovedthe initiative and made it clear
that only the US-sponsorednegotiationsin Washingtonwere valid: "All sorts of
mediators aren't relevant to the negotiationsand aren't authorizedto speak in
Israel's name."44 Thus, Mitterrandwas no more successful than his predecessors
in overcoming the limits inherentin France's Middle East policy, and France's
absence from the negotiatingtable in Madridin 1991and again in Washingtonin
1992 underlined this continuing problem of securing an importantrole in the
Middle East peace process.45

CONCLUSION

Over the past decade, Mitterrand'sattemptsto make France a key player in

the Israeli-Palestinianpeace process met with numerousproblems.Perhapsmost
importantwas Israel's hostility towarda French role because of France's strong
friendship with Arab countries and its outspoken support for the Palestinian
cause. France also lacked the economic and politicalpower to convince eitherthe
PLO or a reluctant Israel to begin serious negotiations. The United States
remainedthe only country able to influenceIsrael, which meant that the peace
process could move forwardonly when a US administrationwas fully engaged.
Finally, active US diplomacymade it necessary for France to supportthe United
States or risk being completely marginalized.
Recognizing these problems and constraints, the Mitterrandgovernment
followed a nuancedstrategy, searchingfor compromisesthat would satisfy all the
key players. This approach,however, was inherentlyflawed. The Likud party,
bitterly opposed to any negotiationswith the PLO or land for peace, refused to

42. Washington Post, September20, 1992.

43. Washington Times, September16, 1992.
44. Washington Post, September20, 1992.
45. For Mitterrand'sassessmentof France'snon-role,see Le Monde, October23, 1991.

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 FRANCE* 39

countenance any role for France. Ironically, in light of Mitterrand's early

overtures to Israel, it soon became apparentthat France's strongest link to the
peace process was Arafatand the PLO.
Franco-USrelationsalso ebbed andflowed, reflectingdifferentapproachesto
the Israeli-Palestinianconflict. Mitterrandcooperated with the United States
during major crises-Lebanon, the Persian Gulf War-in order to protect
France's status as a greatpower, but, after 1984,he stronglycriticizedthe United
States for not supportinga peace process based on an internationalconference
under UN auspices. Despite internationaland Palestiniansupportfor the latter,
the United States insistedon bilateraltalks in the context of a regionalconference.
Thus, the Madrid conference and the subsequent peace negotiations held in
WashingtonhighlightedFrance's difficultyin resistingUS dominancein the peace
process.
It may be temptingto characterizeMitterrand'spolicies toward the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict as a failure, but a more careful evaluation of the relative
success or failureof Frenchpolicy reveals a mixedpicture.CertainlyMitterrand's
strategyto play a key mediatingrole in the peace process was largelyunsuccess-
ful. Mitterrand,like his predecessors, however, can claim legitimately to have
maintaineda strong presence despite obvious limitationsimposed on France by
virtue of its middle-powerstatus. France's willingness to support and "legiti-
mize" Arafatand the PLO cannot be dismissedin assessing Arafat's long march
to recognizingIsrael, acceptingUN resolutions242 and 338, renouncingall forms
of terrorism,and approvingPalestinianparticipationat the Madridconference. In
fact, Mitterrand'ssupportfor the rights of the Palestinians, self-determination,
and a Palestinianstate helped keep it in the forefrontof internationalissues. In
this sense French foreign policy can be considereda success.
Mitterrandoccasionally sought to use EC diplomacy to support French
policies in the MiddleEast, and despite Frenchsupportfor the participationof the
EC in the recent peace negotiations,the historyof Europeanpoliticalcooperation
in the Middle East suggests that a commonforeignpolicy or a Europeanidentity
remains elusive. Membergovernments,particularlyFrance, continue to bypass
the EC in orderto pursuenationalforeignpolicies. At best, the EC will continue
to participateas an observer in the bilateralnegotiationsbetween Israel and the
Palestinians.
The Persian Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the June 1992
elections in Israelhave provideda new state of affairsin the MiddleEast, and one
that is alreadyshowingsigns of influencingthe peace process. Althoughthe future
of French relations with Israel, the PLO, and the United States is uncertain,
recent history offers some clues. Franco-Israelirelationshave alreadyimproved
because of Labor's 1992victory. Closer ties, however, are not likely to open the
door to a significantlygreaterrole for France.
In late November 1992,Mitterrandvisited Israelfor the second time and held
talks with Israelileaders, includingPrimeMinisterRabin.Althoughhe supported

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40 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Israel's proposalsfor elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and promisedto
propose a $1.23 billion EC fund for economic developmentprojects in the region,
Mitterrandreaffirmedhis supportfor the PLO and a Palestinianstate. "I seem to
recall that a Palestinianstate was recognized by the United Nations at the same
time as Israel was created.... [Palestine]has the same right [as Israel].'"46
As in the past, the United States and Israel agree that the Europeansdo not
need to play a significantrole in the peace negotiations.In addition,the civil war
in Yugoslavia has diverted the attention of France and the EC away from the
Middle East-a situation that is unlikely to change in the near future. French
supportof the US-led peace process will also continue as long as some progress
is recorded. Mitterrandhas stated that he supportsthe currentnegotiations, but
will almost certainlyreturnto the idea of an internationalconference if the peace
process stagnates or if the Clinton administrationproves less committed to the
present path.
Mitterrand'sstrong supportfor Arafatand the moderatefaction of the PLO
is the most likely constant. Throughoutthe 1991-92 negotiations, France main-
tained discreet ties to the PLO, which it believes eventually must be allowed to
participatedirectly in the peace process. For example, Palestinianleader Faisal
al-Husseinihas met with RolandDumas, and AhmadKurei, directorof the PLO's
economic department,held talks with Serge Boidevaix, the secretary-generalof
the Quai d'Orsay. Political support also has been accompanied by financial
support; in 1992, Paris allocated 13 million francs for technical and cultural
cooperationwith the occupied territories.47The Frenchgovernment'ssupportfor
chairmanArafatremains a key element in its approachto the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. His brushwith death in the Libyandesert in April 1991,however, and the
infightingbetween Fatah and HAMAS in the Gaza Strip in 1992 raise concerns
that France's relationswith the Palestiniansmightbe too narrowlydependenton
Arafatand the Fatah organization.

46. Washington Times, November 27, 1992.

47. Le Monde, July 25, 1992.

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