IAEA GSG-13
IAEA GSG-13
IAEA GSG-13
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
The IAEA provides for the application of the standards and, under the terms of Articles III
and VIII.C of its Statute, makes available and fosters the exchange of information relating
to peaceful nuclear activities and serves as an intermediary among its Member States for this
purpose.
Reports on safety in nuclear activities are issued as Safety Reports, which provide
practical examples and detailed methods that can be used in support of the safety standards.
Other safety related IAEA publications are issued as Emergency Preparedness and
Response publications, Radiological Assessment Reports, the International Nuclear Safety
Group’s INSAG Reports, Technical Reports and TECDOCs. The IAEA also issues reports
on radiological accidents, training manuals and practical manuals, and other special safety
related publications.
Security related publications are issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.
The IAEA Nuclear Energy Series comprises informational publications to encourage
and assist research on, and the development and practical application of, nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. It includes reports and guides on the status of and advances in technology,
and on experience, good practices and practical examples in the areas of nuclear power, the
nuclear fuel cycle, radioactive waste management and decommissioning.
FUNCTIONS AND PROCESSES
OF THE REGULATORY BODY
FOR SAFETY
The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the
IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957.
The Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and enlarge
the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’.
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS SERIES No. GSG-13
All IAEA scientific and technical publications are protected by the terms of
the Universal Copyright Convention as adopted in 1952 (Berne) and as revised
in 1972 (Paris). The copyright has since been extended by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (Geneva) to include electronic and virtual intellectual
property. Permission to use whole or parts of texts contained in IAEA publications
in printed or electronic form must be obtained and is usually subject to royalty
agreements. Proposals for non-commercial reproductions and translations are
welcomed and considered on a case-by-case basis. Enquiries should be addressed
to the IAEA Publishing Section at:
© IAEA, 2018
by Yukiya Amano
Director General
BACKGROUND
The status of the IAEA safety standards derives from the IAEA’s Statute,
which authorizes the IAEA to establish or adopt, in consultation and, where
appropriate, in collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations
and with the specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for protection of
health and minimization of danger to life and property, and to provide for their
application.
With a view to ensuring the protection of people and the environment
from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, the IAEA safety standards establish
fundamental safety principles, requirements and measures to control the radiation
exposure of people and the release of radioactive material to the environment, to
restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear
reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or any other source of
radiation, and to mitigate the consequences of such events if they were to occur.
The standards apply to facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks,
including nuclear installations, the use of radiation and radioactive sources, the
transport of radioactive material and the management of radioactive waste.
Safety measures and security measures1 have in common the aim of
protecting human life and health and the environment. Safety measures and
security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner
so that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do not
compromise security.
The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what
constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment
from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. They are issued in the IAEA Safety
Standards Series, which has three categories (see Fig. 1).
Safety Fundamentals
Safety Fundamentals present the fundamental safety objective and principles
of protection and safety, and provide the basis for the safety requirements.
Safety Requirements
An integrated and consistent set of Safety Requirements establishes
the requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the
environment, both now and in the future. The requirements are governed by the
objective and principles of the Safety Fundamentals. If the requirements are not
met, measures must be taken to reach or restore the required level of safety. The
format and style of the requirements facilitate their use for the establishment, in a
harmonized manner, of a national regulatory framework. Requirements, including
numbered ‘overarching’ requirements, are expressed as ‘shall’ statements. Many
requirements are not addressed to a specific party, the implication being that the
appropriate parties are responsible for fulfilling them.
1
See also publications issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.
Safety Fundamentals
Fundamental Safety Principles
FIG. 1. The long term structure of the IAEA Safety Standards Series.
Safety Guides
Safety Guides provide recommendations and guidance on how to comply
with the safety requirements, indicating an international consensus that it
is necessary to take the measures recommended (or equivalent alternative
measures). The Safety Guides present international good practices, and
increasingly they reflect best practices, to help users striving to achieve high
levels of safety. The recommendations provided in Safety Guides are expressed
as ‘should’ statements.
The preparation and review of the safety standards involves the IAEA
Secretariat and five safety standards committees, for emergency preparedness
and response (EPReSC) (as of 2016), nuclear safety (NUSSC), radiation
safety (RASSC), the safety of radioactive waste (WASSC) and the safe
transport of radioactive material (TRANSSC), and a Commission on Safety
Standards (CSS) which oversees the IAEA safety standards programme
(see Fig. 2).
All IAEA Member States may nominate experts for the safety standards
committees and may provide comments on draft standards. The membership of
Outline and work plan
prepared by the Secretariat;
review by the safety standards
committees and the CSS
Secretariat and
consultants:
drafting of new or revision
of existing safety standard
Draft
Review by Draft
safety standards Member States
committee(s)
Comments
Final draft
Endorsement
by the CSS
FIG. 2. The process for developing a new safety standard or revising an existing standard.
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background (1.1–1.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Objective (1.6–1.8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Scope (1.9–1.12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Structure (1.13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
BACKGROUND
1.1. Regulation is essential for ensuring the safety of all facilities and
activities that give rise to radiation risks for people and the environment. The
establishment of a legally based, independent, fully resourced and technically
competent regulatory body is a fundamental element set out in Principle 2 of
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles [1]. This
principle is reinforced and further elaborated in IAEA Safety Standards Series
Nos GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1), Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework
for Safety [2], and GSR Part 3, Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation
Sources: International Basic Safety Standards [3].
1.2. This Safety Guide provides guidance on the technical aspects of a regulatory
body’s core functions as defined in GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [2] and the associated
processes for ensuring the regulatory control of facilities and activities1. This
guidance is particularly important for regulatory bodies having responsibilities
covering a range of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, or
when interfaces are present between various regulatory authorities, which require
effective coordination and cooperation. This guidance promotes a consistent
approach to the regulation of radiation risks.
1
Facilities and activities is a general term encompassing nuclear facilities, all uses
of all sources of ionizing radiation, all radioactive waste management activities, transport of
radioactive material and any other activity or circumstances in which people may be exposed
to radiation risks arising from naturally occurring or artificial sources. See footnote 3 of GSR
Part 1 (Rev. 1) [2] for a more complete definition.
1
1.4. The recommendations provided in this Safety Guide and GSG-12 [4]
are intended mainly to be used by regulatory bodies, but can be also useful
for governments that are developing a regulatory framework for radiation and
nuclear safety. This Safety Guide will also assist authorized parties and others
dealing with radiation sources in understanding regulatory procedures, processes
and expectations.
1.5. This Safety Guide supersedes IAEA Safety Standards Series Nos GS-G-1.2,
Review and Assessment of Nuclear Facilities by the Regulatory Body2 issued in
2002; GS-G-1.3, Regulatory Inspection of Nuclear Facilities and Enforcement
by the Regulatory Body3 issued in 2002; GS-G-1.4, Documentation for Use in
Regulating Nuclear Facilities4 issued in 2002; and GS-G-1.5, Regulatory Control
of Radiation Sources5 issued in 2004. This Safety Guide also supersedes the parts
of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-12, Licensing Process for Nuclear
Installations [5] relating to the functions and processes of the regulatory body and
the parts of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-5.1, Release of Sites from
Regulatory Control on Termination of Practices [6] relating to the regulatory
body.
OBJECTIVE
2
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Review and Assessment of
Nuclear Facilities by the Regulatory Body, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-1.2,
IAEA, Vienna (2002).
3
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulatory Inspection of
Nuclear Facilities and Enforcement by the Regulatory Body, IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. GS-G-1.3, IAEA, Vienna (2002).
4
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Documentation for Use
in Regulating Nuclear Facilities, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-1.4, IAEA,
Vienna (2002).
5
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE,
PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
Regulatory Control of Radiation Sources, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-1.5, IAEA,
Vienna (2004).
2
Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency [7] and
comprise:
1.7. The core functions interact with one another; for example, regulations and
guides set out the regulatory requirements to be used in review and assessment,
in the authorization process, in carrying out inspections, and when determining
enforcement actions. Similarly, the findings of review and assessment guide the
approach to inspection, and inspection provides areas for review and assessment.
Both review and assessment, and inspection may influence the development of
regulations and guides. This Safety Guide addresses these interactions between
the core functions.
1.8. There are several supporting functions that are necessary to ensure that the
core functions can be performed efficiently and effectively. These include:
SCOPE
1.9. This Safety Guide covers the core functions of the regulatory body, and
the processes by which they are discharged, for all the stages of the lifetime of
a facility or activity, from initial site evaluation and design through to release
from regulatory control. While this Safety Guide is based on the regulation of
3
authorized facilities and activities, many of the functions and processes also apply
for any pre-authorization stages. However, in line with a graded approach, not all
the regulatory controls and recommendations described will be applicable to all
facilities and activities; even where regulatory controls are applicable, they will
differ and vary in depth and scope in accordance with the facility and activity, as
well as the lifetime stage.
1.11. In this Safety Guide, the expression ‘lifetime of facilities and activities’
is used to cover both the full lifetime of a facility and the duration of an
activity. Site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and
decommissioning or closure are the stages in the lifetime of a facility, and of the
associated authorization process; while these stages apply for all facilities, they
might not apply for all activities. For complex facilities or activities, each stage
of the authorization process may include one or more steps (also referred to as
‘hold points’) at which additional information is required by the regulatory body.
Further definitions are provided in the IAEA Safety Glossary [8].
1.12. The scope of this Safety Guide is limited to the regulation of safety and
does not extend to nuclear security. However, recommendations are provided
in this Safety Guide on the interfaces between safety and nuclear security. The
regulation of safety and nuclear security should be carried out in such a way that
safety measures and nuclear security measures are designed and implemented in
an integrated manner so that nuclear security measures do not compromise safety
and safety measures do not compromise nuclear security. The essential elements
4
of an effective nuclear security regime are established in the Nuclear Security
Fundamentals [9]. Guidance on addressing nuclear security aspects is provided
in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, Nuclear Security Recommendations on
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/
Revision 5) [10], IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14, Nuclear Security
Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities [11] and
IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 23-G, Security of Nuclear Information [12].
STRUCTURE
“The resources devoted to safety by the licensee, and the scope and
stringency of regulations and their application, have to be commensurate
with the magnitude of the radiation risks and their amenability to control.”
5
2.3. Paragraph 2.4 of GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [2] states that:
2.4. Furthermore, para. 4.3 of GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [2] states that:
6
2.6. Furthermore, para. 3.36 of SF-1 [1] states that:
2.7. Thus, all the regulatory core functions (see Section 3) are required to be
subject to a graded approach so that, while the descriptions of these functions are
generic, the degree of application will differ in accordance with the facility or
activity. For example, the degree of review and assessment applied to a nuclear
power plant would clearly not be the same as for a medical X ray unit.
2.8. The main factor to take into consideration in the application of a graded
approach is that the application of the regulatory functions should be consistent
with the magnitude of the possible radiation risks6 arising from the facility or
activity. The approach should take into account any exposures to radiation, and
discharges or releases of radioactive substances in normal operation, anticipated
operational occurrences and accident conditions, as well as the possibility of
events with a very low probability of occurrence, without neglecting very low
probability events with potentially high consequences. An approach to screening
of events based on their probability is included in IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. NS-G-3.1, External Human Induced Events in Site Evaluation for Nuclear
Power Plants [13].
2.9. Other relevant factors, such as the maturity or complexity of the facility or
activity and the knowledge and expertise of the authorized party, should also be
taken into account in a graded approach to regulatory activities. The consideration
of maturity relates to the use of established practices and procedures, established
designs, data on operational performance of similar facilities or activities,
uncertainties in the performance of the facility or activity, and the continuing and
future availability of experienced manufacturers and constructors. Complexity
relates to the extent and difficulty of the effort required to construct and
operate a facility or to implement an activity, the number of related processes
for which control is necessary, the extent to which radioactive material has to
6
The term ‘possible radiation risks’ relates to the maximum possible radiological
consequences that could occur when radioactive material is released from the facility or the
activity, with no credit being taken for the safety systems or protective measures in place to
prevent this.
7
be handled, the half-lives of the radionuclides involved, the reliability and
complexity of systems and components, and their accessibility for maintenance,
inspection, testing and repair. These factors need special consideration during
decommissioning or remediation activities, which will involve new procedures
and processes not applied in other stages of the lifetime (e.g. institutional controls,
including continuing environmental monitoring programmes and controls of the
radiological status of the facility).
3.1. The core functions of a regulatory body are described in the following
subsections. The first subsection contains guidance on establishing and
maintaining regulations that set out the safety requirements for operating a facility
or conducting an activity and guides that set out the procedures and processes
that should be carried out by the regulatory body and authorized parties. These
include the process for notification or authorization of a facility or activity, which
is expanded on in the next subsection.
8
response, although this will differ in accordance with national practices. Finally,
communication and consultation with interested parties are important throughout
the lifetime of the facility or duration of the activity to both inform and obtain the
views of the public and other interested parties.
3.4. The provision of regulations and guides is a means for the regulatory
body to ensure that regulatory control is stable, unambiguous and consistent; to
emphasize the continuous enhancement of safety as a general objective; and to
build confidence among interested parties [2].
3.5. When regulations are not established directly by the regulatory body,
mechanisms established within the legal and governmental framework should
ensure that such regulations are developed and issued in a timely manner. The
regulatory body should advise the government on the need for regulations on
matters affecting safety to be established or adopted.
3.6. The regulatory body should specify the purposes of the various
documents in the legal framework that are necessary to perform its functions.
The documents may be categorized, for example, as legislation and regulations
(mandatory by law), supporting guides (not mandatory by law) to be used either
by the authorized parties or by the regulatory body (internal guidance) and other
relevant documents.
3.7. A suitable system of guides will help the regulatory body to maintain
consistency in the implementation of the regulatory requirements. However, the
regulatory body should refrain from prescribing specific solutions in its guides.
The advisory status of a guide carries the implication that alternative approaches
would be acceptable provided that the authorized party can demonstrate that the
required level of safety will be achieved.
9
3.8. Internationally recognized standards and recommendations as well as
technical standards developed by organizations working in various technological
fields may be referenced by the regulatory body in its regulations and guides or
in the authorization conditions, or may be proposed by the authorized party in the
authorization process.
3.9. The regulatory body should establish a system to ensure that the
development and implementation of regulations and guides is based on a graded
approach, such that the application of regulatory requirements is commensurate
with the radiation risks associated with the type of facility or activity.
3.10. An important objective of the regulations and guides is to ensure the stability
and consistency of regulatory control and to prevent subjectivity in decision
making by individual staff members of the regulatory body. The regulatory
body is required to be able to justify its decisions if they are challenged [2]. The
provision of regulations and guides also enables the regulatory body to inform
authorized parties and applicants of the objectives, principles and associated
criteria for safety on which its requirements, judgements and decisions, in
connection with its reviews and assessments, inspections and enforcement
actions, are based.
3.11. As part of its integrated management system, the regulatory body should
establish a process for the development of regulations and guides. This process
should ensure that the regulations and guides:
10
3.12. Regulations have the force of law and may be issued either by the
government, or by the regulatory body on behalf of the government. The principal
purpose of establishing a system of regulations is to codify safety requirements
of general applicability that require mandatory compliance by all authorized
parties. The system of regulations should provide an appropriate balance between
regulatory provisions that are sufficiently detailed to achieve and maintain safety,
and sufficiently flexible to permit their application to developing technologies
and in new circumstances. The degree to which the regulations are performance
based or prescriptive, and the level of detail in the associated guidance, will
depend on the national approach; however, this should not reduce the authorized
party’s prime responsibility for safety.
3.13. The regulatory body may develop safety objectives and requirements
itself or it may adopt objectives and requirements that have been developed and
issued by international organizations or by regulatory bodies in other States. If
safety objectives and regulatory requirements are to be adopted, the regulatory
body should ensure that it obtains a good understanding of their basis, use and
effectiveness in other States by means of appropriate contact with the relevant
bodies. Safety objectives and regulatory requirements should be adopted as
necessary for specific purposes.
3.14. The safety objectives and regulatory requirements should specify the
performance criteria for structures, systems and components, and management
and operational procedures and processes, to be achieved in operating the facility
or conducting the activity. The regulatory body should refrain from prescribing
specific designs, management systems or operational procedures.
3.15. The safety objectives and regulatory requirements should include the
following, as appropriate:
11
(i) Minimization of waste and management of the waste generated, including
waste from decommissioning;
(j) Emergency preparedness.
3.16. The regulations should explicitly state the obligations, roles and
responsibilities of the applicant or authorized party. In this respect, the regulatory
body should include provisions in the regulations requiring that the applicant
or authorized party accomplish some or all of the following, depending on the
facility or activity:
(a) Prepare and submit a comprehensive application to the regulatory body that
demonstrates that highest priority is given to safety; this means that the
level of safety is as high as reasonably achievable and that safety will be
maintained for the entire lifetime of the facility or duration of the activity,
until it is released from regulatory control by the regulatory body.
(b) Have the capability within its own organization (either at the facility or
activity or within the organization as a whole) to understand the design basis
and safety analyses for the facility or activity, and the limits and conditions
under which the facility is to be operated or the activity performed.
(c) Exercise control over the work of contractors, understand the safety
significance of their work (an ‘intelligent customer’ capability7) and take
responsibility for the implementation of the work.
(d) Submit a procedure or description of the process for dealing with
modifications that may be subject to approval by the regulatory body.
(e) Have a design capability and a formal and effective external relationship
with the original design organization of the facility or equipment, or an
acceptable alternative arrangement.
(f) Assess safety in a systematic manner and on a regular basis.
(g) Develop a safety assessment and submit it to the regulatory body as part of
the application, depending on the magnitude of the possible radiation risks
associated with the facility or activity (e.g. if there is a possibility for an
exposure to be greater than a level specified by the regulatory body).
(h) Have an appropriate prospective assessment made of radiological
environmental impacts, commensurate with the radiation risks associated
with the facility or activity (see GSR Part 3 [3], para. 3.9(e)).
7
An intelligent customer capability is the capability of the organization to have a clear
understanding and knowledge of the product or service being supplied. The intelligent customer
concept relates mainly to a capability required of organizations when using contractors or
external expert support.
12
(i) For an application for authorization, demonstrate that it has and will
continue to maintain:
(i) Adequate financial resources for construction, operation and
maintenance of the facility or activity as well as for the timely
decommissioning (or closure) of the facility or termination of the
activity and the management of radioactive waste and/or spent
radiation sources, including disposal;
(ii) Adequate human resources to safely construct, maintain, operate and
decommission the facility or activity and deal with any radioactive
material and waste and to ensure that regulatory requirements and
safety standards are met and will continue to be met.
3.18. Irrespective of the degree to which the government or regulatory body has
developed prescriptive regulations, the regulatory body should give consideration
to supplementing its regulations with supporting guides of a non-mandatory
nature on how to comply with regulations, where appropriate.
3.19. Guides are advisory in nature; they should allow the authorized party
flexibility in applying new technologies and developing new procedures to
enhance safety. The processes for developing guides should also enable the
regulatory body to promote learning and improvement by modifying guides
as necessary to include innovative good practices and to revoke impractical or
unnecessary provisions.
13
3.21. In developing guides, recent operating experience and developments should
be taken into account, including technological advances that have been shown by
experience or by research results to be capable of providing effective and reliable
means of satisfying regulatory requirements.
3.22. The regulatory body should, where appropriate, also support the production
of guidance documents by professional bodies wishing to help their members
in the discharge of their responsibilities regarding safety; the provision of such
support should be such that any undue influence that may compromise regulatory
independence is avoided.
3.25. Requirement 3 of GSR Part 3 [3] states that: “The regulatory body shall
establish or adopt regulations and guides for protection and safety and shall
establish a system to ensure their implementation.”
The system is required to cover all exposure situations, namely planned exposure
situations, emergency exposure situations and existing exposure situations (see
para. 2.29 of GSR Part 3 [3]).
3.26. The regulatory body is required to establish a regulatory system for safety
that includes (see GSR Part 3 [3], para. 2.30):
(a) Notification and authorization; the regulations should provide clarity and
transparency in the notification and authorization process.
(b) Review and assessment of facilities and activities; the regulations should
require a demonstration of the safety of the facility or activity that enables
14
the regulatory body to make a decision or a series of decisions on the
acceptability of the facility or activity in terms of safety.
(c) Inspection of facilities and activities; the regulatory body should provide
its inspectors with written guidelines in sufficient detail to ensure that
facilities and activities are inspected to a common standard, based on a
graded approach, and that there is a consistent level of safety.
(d) Enforcement of regulatory requirements; the regulatory body should adopt
clear administrative procedures and guidelines governing the use and
implementation of enforcement actions.
(e) The regulatory functions relevant to emergency exposure situations and
existing exposure situations.
(f) Provision of information to, and consultation with, parties affected by its
decisions and, as appropriate, the public and other interested parties.
3.27. The government or the regulatory body should ensure that the following
technical, administrative and procedural topics and requirements are included
in the regulations, if appropriate, depending on the State’s legal system and
practices:
15
(l) Safety criteria and planning for radioactive waste management and
discharge monitoring, as well as aspects of institutional controls at different
stages of the authorized facility or activity’s lifetime, including removal
from regulatory control.
3.28. Requirement 7 of GSR Part 3 [3] states that: “Any person or organization
intending to operate a facility or to conduct an activity shall submit to
the regulatory body a notification and, as appropriate, an application for
authorization.”
As part of the regulations, the regulatory body should clarify those facilities and
activities for which only notification is required and those facilities and activities
for which authorization is required, by providing criteria or lists of activities. The
regulations and guides should cover all the major aspects to be dealt with at all
steps of the authorization process.
3.30. The regulatory body should issue detailed guidance for applicants on how
to notify of the intention to conduct an activity or how to apply for authorization.
The guidance for applicants for an authorization may include, as appropriate:
16
and decisions with respect to safety in the siting, design, construction,
commissioning, operation and decommissioning or closure of a facility or
conduct and termination of an activity.
3.32. The regulations and guides describing the authorization process should
identify the essential documents to be prepared and submitted by the authorized
party. Additional documents may be requested as necessary, depending on the
type of facility or activity, in accordance with a graded approach and at specific
steps in the authorization process.
3.33. The regulations and guides should indicate other documents that should be
submitted to the regulatory body to confirm that the requirements established in
the regulations and in the authorization conditions have been satisfied.
Reporting of events
3.35. The regulations and guides should specify the requirements for the reporting
of changes to the design, prior to their implementation, and design deficiencies
17
and non-conformances identified during commissioning or operation. The
requirements for such reporting should be applied in accordance with the safety
significance of the change, modification or non-conformance.
3.36. The regulations and guides should specify requirements for the authorized
party to keep adequate records relating to the safety of facilities and activities.
Such records, even if not formally requested by the regulatory body for review
and approval, should be capable of being made available, as necessary. The
regulations and/or the authorization conditions should establish the types of
records to be kept and the periods for which they are to be retained. In specifying
the retention period, account should be taken of the possible future need to refer
to these records and of the difficulties of regenerating the information.
“The regulatory body shall make provision for establishing and maintaining
the following main registers and inventories:
18
3.39. The regulatory body should also make provision for the establishment and
maintenance of records by authorized parties of unsealed sources and records of
airborne and liquid releases during normal operation.
3.40. Such registers and inventories may be held by the regulatory body or by the
authorized party. If the regulatory body is not the sole entity responsible for the
maintenance of such registers and inventories, it should ensure that the authorized
party has arrangements for their proper retention and retrieval. The responsibility
of the regulatory body to maintain safety related records at a national level should
not diminish the responsibility of authorized parties to keep their own records.
3.43. In order to fulfil these requirements, the regulatory body should issue
regulations and guides that describe the safety assessments to be performed by
the authorized party for the facility or activity, and how these should be submitted
for review by the regulatory body prior to the granting of the authorization at
each lifetime stage. Further requirements for safety assessment are established in
paras 3.29–3.36 of GSR Part 3 [3] and in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR
Part 4 (Rev. 1), Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities [16].
3.44. In carrying out its review and assessment, the regulatory body should refer
to the relevant regulatory requirements when deciding on the acceptability of an
authorized party’s submission.
3.45. The regulations and guides governing the use and implementation of
enforcement actions should include the policy for the use of regulatory and
19
enforcement measures and the associated authority delegated to inspectors and
other regulatory body staff. Depending on national practices, the need to allow
the authorized party to state a point of view on regulatory decisions, to respond
to enforcement actions and to appeal against enforcement decisions should be
recognized and taken into account in regulations and guides. In some States,
the regulations and guides specify that a hearing with the authorized party be
initiated before significant enforcement actions are taken.
3.46. Considering the level of detail of legislation and regulations, guides should
describe the decision making approach of the regulatory body in determining the
type and extent of the enforcement actions to be taken and the way in which
the actions are to be taken, including how the failure of the authorized party
to comply with requirements for regulatory enforcement is dealt with. Guides
should also indicate which other governmental organizations, if any, are to be
informed in the event of enforcement actions.
(a) Which activities and/or radiation sources are to be exempted from some
or all of the legislative requirements, including the requirements for
notification or authorization. The regulatory body is required to use
as a basis for this determination the criteria for exemption specified in
Schedule I of GSR Part 3 [3], or to specify any exemption levels on the
basis of these criteria. The regulations should clearly state that exemption
cannot be granted for activities deemed to be not justified (see paras 3.10
and 3.11 of GSR Part 3 [3]).
(b) Which sources, including materials and objects, within notified or
authorized activities may be cleared from further regulatory control. The
regulatory body is required to use as the basis for this determination the
criteria for clearance specified in Schedule I of GSR Part 3 [3], or to
20
specify any clearance levels on the basis of these criteria. By means of
these arrangements, the regulatory body is required to ensure that sources
that have been cleared from regulatory control do not again become subject
to the requirements for notification or authorization unless the regulatory
body so specifies (see para. 3.12 of GSR Part 3 [3]).
3.49. The regulations and guides should specify generic release criteria for
use in the evaluation of potential radiological consequences associated with a
site after its release. In order to derive release criteria (in, for example, Bq/g or
Bq/cm2), all relevant exposure pathways should be considered and dose
assessment involving direct radiation, inhalation and ingestion pathways should
be used.
3.50. Alternatively, the authorized party can derive site specific release criteria,
on the basis of an optimization process, which the regulatory body should review
and assess and then approve, if considered adequate.
“The government or the regulatory body shall establish, within the legal
framework, processes for establishing or adopting, promoting and amending
regulations and guides. These processes shall involve consultation with
interested parties in the development of the regulations and guides, with
account taken of internationally agreed standards and the feedback of
relevant experience. Moreover, technological advances, research and
development work, relevant operational lessons learned and institutional
knowledge can be valuable and shall be used as appropriate in revising the
regulations and guides.”
3.52. The nature of the national legal framework, more than any other single
factor, will determine the form and content of the regulations and guides. As
an initial source of information, the regulatory body should base its regulations
and guides on national legislation and should make use of existing national
regulations or technical standards in areas relating to, or adaptable to, facilities
and activities. The degree to which the regulations are prescriptive will depend on
21
national approaches. In some States, for example, detailed guidance is preferred
to prescriptive regulations.
3.57. The regulatory body, as part of the drafting process, should consider
performing comparisons of its national regulations and guides with international
standards.
22
3.58. Consideration should also be given to other sources of information relevant
to safety. This could include relevant industrial standards (in their entirety or in
part), technical standards developed in other States, experience from the nuclear
industry and from users of radiation sources, and the results of research in nuclear
and radiation safety.
3.59. The regulatory body may find it useful to set up an advisory committee to
advise on the need for regulations and on their technical content. The members
of the advisory committee should be independent of the regulatory body and of
authorized parties to ensure separate and unbiased reviews. Such an advisory
committee can provide a valuable service to the regulatory body by helping to
ensure that policies and regulations are clear, practicable and complete.
3.60. The regulatory body should follow a consistent process for establishing,
reviewing and revising regulations and guides. The process should be well
documented, comprehensive, cover all regulated activities and facilities, and
should ensure a clear allocation of responsibilities. When establishing new
regulations as well as revising existing regulations, careful consideration should
be given to the cumulative effect of changes on safety.
3.63. The process used by the regulatory body to establish regulations and guides
should include the following steps:
(a) Determining the need for the regulations or guide. This need may arise
from the regulatory body’s activities and from the inventory of facilities
and activities in the State. Alternatively, the need may be identified as a
result of a request or enquiry by an authorized party, or an applicant for a
new facility or activity. Additionally, the need for regulations may arise as a
result of national debates or to meet international obligations.
23
(b) Setting the priority for the development of the regulations or guide. The
regulatory body should consider the advantages and disadvantages of
the proposed regulations or guide, including such matters as: the risks
associated with the facility or activity; the need for, and the costs associated
with, improvements in safety; the number of authorized parties to be
affected; the effects on the efficiency of the authorization process; and
the feedback of information and experience from review and assessments,
inspections, investigations and enforcement activities.
(c) Determining the scope of the regulations or guide. This involves
clear identification of the facilities and activities to which regulatory
requirements or recommendations are to be applied, as well as the stage
of the authorization process to be covered and the technical topic to be
addressed.
(d) Determining the resources necessary to develop the regulations or guide.
The development of regulations and guides requires sufficient suitably
qualified, competent and experienced people to be available, as well as
adequate financial and other resources [4]. The need for the regulations or
guide and the timescale required for its preparation and establishment will
be a factor in determining the resources required.
(e) Collection of information. The information necessary to prepare the
proposed regulations or guide should be collected. In particular, the state of
the art in technology should be taken into account.
(f) Drafting of the regulations or guide. The staff of the regulatory body,
assisted by technical support organizations, consultants, professional
societies or advisory committees, drafts the initial version of the regulations
or guide. Regulations and guides should be written in a style that is clear and
easy to understand. Regulations and guides should be relevant, precise and
unambiguous so as to be readily applicable and enforceable, as appropriate.
(g) Review of the regulations or guide. Although practices differ widely, legal
staff and special advisory committees, as appropriate, usually review
the initial versions of proposed regulations or guides. In some States,
authorized parties, professional societies or other organizations participate
in these reviews. A draft version may also be published provisionally with
an invitation for comment from the interested parties. Comments received
as a result of the review should be analysed, evaluated and resolved, as
appropriate. A review of the final draft for quality control should be carried
out before formal approval. At this stage, consideration should also be given
to the implications of the new regulations or guide for existing facilities and
activities.
(h) Establishing and issuing the regulations or guide. Regulations should be
established and promulgated in a manner that makes them legally binding
24
in accordance with the national legal system, thereby ensuring that their
provisions can be enforced by the regulatory body. The procedure for
issuing guides should follow steps similar to those for regulations, but
a guide can be formally issued with a lower level of approval, since its
contents are only advisory in nature.
3.65. The regulatory body should ensure that the regulations and guides are kept
up to date and should establish procedures, within its integrated management
system, for their periodic review.
25
of information and experience from events, as well as from relevant national and
international good practices; technological advances; and the need to improve
or eliminate any impractical, misleading, unenforceable or otherwise inadequate
regulations.
3.68. The process and procedures established for the revision of regulations and
guides should not diminish the authority of the regulatory body to take immediate
action if required for reasons of safety.
3.71. The extent to which the proposed changes are to be made applicable to
facilities and activities that have already been authorized and the degree of
back-fitting to be required should also be considered.
Internal guidance
26
given to the extent to which the regulatory body’s internal guidance may be
made available to authorized parties and the public and other interested parties.
Publication is an important aspect of communication with interested parties and
openness demonstrates that the regulatory body is discharging its responsibilities
in an appropriate manner.
General
27
3.78. A notification is “[a] document submitted to the regulatory body by a
person or organization to notify an intention to carry out a practice or other use
of a source” [8].
3.79. For some activities that are suitable for exemption, there may be particular
reasons why a notification should be submitted (e.g. to prevent uncontrolled
waste disposal).
3.82. The authorization process is the principal means by which the regulatory
body is able to initially apply the legal and regulatory framework and by which
the responsibilities of the applicant or authorized party are clearly connected to
the legal framework.
3.84. Registration is “[a] form of authorization for facilities and activities of low
or moderate risks whereby the person or organization responsible for the practice
28
has, as appropriate, prepared and submitted a safety assessment of the facilities
and equipment to the regulatory body” [8]. The regulatory body should determine
which facilities and activities require authorization by registration only and for
which a licensing process is required. In either case, the facility or activity should
be authorized with conditions or limitations as appropriate. The requirements
for safety assessment and the conditions or limitations applied to the facilities
or activities would be less severe for registration than those for issuing a licence.
3.87. The legal framework of the State should set out the responsibilities for
issuing an authorization and, in particular, should determine who is empowered
to issue authorizations. Depending on the system used in the particular State,
different authorizations may be issued by different authorities. Requirement 7 of
GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [2] states that:
3.89. The authorized party is the legal person or organization that has prime
responsibility for safety and retains this responsibility even if the validity of an
29
authorization expires or lapses, or if the authorization is revoked by the regulatory
body. However, the responsibilities conferred by the authorization may be
transferred to a different authorized party (e.g. upon change of ownership, where
this has been approved by the regulatory body).
3.90. After having determined that the justification principle has been
implemented, the regulatory body should specify the conditions under which
consumer products that contain radioactive material may be made available to
the public, who have no regulatory obligation with respect to the product. In this
context, the presumption is that the consumer product can be used and disposed
of without any special safety measures being required. The provision of consumer
products to the public is subject to authorization by the regulatory body unless
their use has been exempted (see Requirement 33 of GSR Part 3 [3]).
(a) A facility or activity should be authorized only when the regulatory body
has confirmed, by review and assessment of the submitted documentation,
that the facility or activity is going to be used or conducted in a manner
that does not pose an unacceptable radiation risk to people or the
environment. This should include confirmation that the applicant has the
organizational capability, the organizational structure, adequate resources,
adequate competence of managers and staff, and appropriate management
30
arrangements to comply with the safety requirements to become an
authorized party.
(b) The regulatory framework for dealing with requests for authorization
should be clear, especially the process for applying for authorization.
(c) The regulatory framework for the authorization process should be explicitly
established by the regulatory body.
(d) The authorization of a facility or activity should be based on a predefined
list of documents that are to be submitted to the regulatory body by the
person or organization responsible for the facility or activity. These
documents should be reviewed by the regulatory body. Expenses associated
with the authorization process and the person or organization that will be
charged these expenses should be clearly specified.
(e) A clear and explicit set of requirements, criteria and standards forming the
basis for authorization should be defined.
(f) A graded approach should be taken by the regulatory body when performing
reviews, assessments or inspections throughout the authorization process.
(g) Clear mechanisms should be established for public participation in the
authorization process.
(h) The authorization process should be transparent to the public, and
authorizations should be published or made available to the public by
other means, with account taken of the need for information security and
protection of proprietary information.
(i) The regulatory body should include conditions in the authorization, as
appropriate.
(j) The scope of the authorization (the site, the facility or activity, or parts
of the facility or activity; or whether the authorization is one of a series
of authorizations), its period of validity and any incorporated conditions
should be clearly defined by the regulatory body.
(k) Responsibility for safety may be transferred to a different authorized party,
depending on national regulations; however, this may be done only with
the agreement of the regulatory body, which may attach provisions and
conditions to the new authorization (see para. 2.14 of GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [2]).
(l) The applicant and the regulatory body should take into account good
practices in other States, as appropriate, throughout the authorization
process.
(m) Regulatory review and assessment of reference or generic facilities and
activities, and of similar facilities or activities in the State or other States,
should be taken into account, if this would contribute to the authorization
process.
31
(n) The analysis approach to demonstrating safety should be clearly defined,
including the use of deterministic and probabilistic methodologies and
analytical tools, as appropriate.
(o) Safety reviews should be carried out by the authorized party as required
by the conditions in the authorization, and the results should be submitted
to the regulatory body for review and assessment. Appropriate regulatory
decisions may then follow.
(p) The prime responsibility for safety is assigned to and assumed by the
person or organization responsible for a facility or activity that gives rise to
radiation risks. Compliance with regulations and requirements imposed by
the regulatory body does not relieve the person or organization responsible
for any facility or activity of the prime responsibility for safety (see
Requirement 6 of GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [2]). The person or organization
responsible for a facility or activity should demonstrate to the satisfaction
of the regulatory body that this prime responsibility has been and will
continue to be fulfilled.
(q) The means of challenging or appealing against an authorization or part of
an authorization should be made clear by the regulatory body and within
the regulatory framework.
3.94. The legal and regulatory framework should include provisions for
unrestricted access for designated staff of the regulatory body, at any time, to:
the premises of an applicant or authorized party, any facility or activity already
authorized or for which an application for authorization has been submitted, and
any documents relating to safety and considered necessary for the authorization
process.
3.95. The regulatory body should ensure that any interfaces between safety and
nuclear security measures are addressed by the authorized party or applicant and
are appropriately considered in conjunction with the competent authority with
responsibility for nuclear security.
Notification
32
(a) Clear identification of the applicant submitting the notification;
(b) Information on the provisions for justification of the facility or activity;
(c) The location(s) of the facility and, if applicable, where the radiation
source(s) will be stored and used;
(d) Specification of the management system for the facility or activity;
(e) Clear specification of the equipment to be used in the facility or activity,
including the radiation source(s) and associated equipment.
Authorization
3.98. The applicant should provide all relevant information describing the
approach to safety in order to demonstrate that the facility or the activity will
not present unacceptable radiation risks to people and the environment. This
should include proposed objectives, principles, criteria, standards and analyses
in relation to safety for all stages of the authorization process. The aim should be
to provide all the relevant information such that the regulatory body can conduct
its review and assessment process without needing to seek further information or
clarification.
3.99. The documents submitted to the regulatory body in the framework of the
authorization process should be updated, as appropriate, during the lifetime of
the facility or activity, to ensure they cover relevant aspects. The documents
submitted to the regulatory body (which may be divided or combined into
different documents, as appropriate) should be incorporated as part of the
authorization, if required by national regulations and the regulatory approach and
practices.
33
facility or characteristics of the activity should be developed in the early stages of
the authorization process.
34
(iii) Where relevant, a description of the site in terms of geography,
demography, topography, meteorology, hydrology, geology and
seismology.
(d) Staff qualification and training:
(i) Identification of the necessary qualifications and training of staff who
will have safety related responsibilities;
(ii) For authorization of certain facilities or activities, the identification
of persons by name may be required to be included in the application
(e.g. the name of radiation protection officers or qualified experts);
(iii) Details of qualifications and training in radiation protection of workers
engaged in activities that involve or could involve occupational
exposure;
(iv) Evidence of trustworthiness of all staff who will be engaged in
responsible or sensitive positions.
(e) The management system:
(i) For relevant safety systems of facilities or activities with significant
risk, the operating procedures and maintenance procedures that will
be followed;
(ii) A description of the system for identification, traceability and
preservation of documents and for control of records;
(iii) The system for the development of procedures;
(iv) Procedures for reporting on and learning from operating experience
including accidents and other incidents;
(v) Procedures for learning from good practices in the State and in other
States;
(vi) A description of the arrangements for establishing and sustaining
leadership and management on the part of organizations and managers
responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks;
(vii) A procedure or description of the process for dealing with
modifications of the facility or activity that may be subject to approval
by the regulatory body, depending on national legislation, regulations
and practices if requirements for dealing with modifications are not
established directly in the regulations;
(viii) A description of the quality assurance arrangements established to
ensure that all items to operate the facility or conduct the activity are
designed, manufactured, constructed, assembled, tested, qualified,
operated, maintained and replaced in compliance with the relevant
safety requirements;
(ix) A description of the arrangements for ensuring the technical quality
of information provided to the applicant by external organizations
35
(e.g. contractors) for use during the operation of the facility or the
duration of the activity;
(x) Quality assurance arrangements, including internal and external
audits.
(f) Safety activities:
(i) Applicable safety regulations, guides and industrial standards.
(ii) Safety assessments for exposures in normal operation and for potential
exposures.
(iii) An appropriate prospective assessment of radiological environmental
impacts, commensurate with the radiation risks associated with the
facility or activity, as required by the regulatory body (see para. 3.9(e)
of GSR Part 3 [3]).
(iv) The occupational radiation protection programme, including
arrangements for designation of areas, local rules and procedures,
monitoring of workers and the workplace, the health surveillance
programme, and provision and maintenance of personal protective
equipment.
(v) Safety assessments and other design related documents that address
the optimization of protection and safety, the design criteria and the
design features relating to the assessment of exposure and potential
exposure of members of the public.
(vi) For activities involving medical exposure, information relating to
the radiation protection of patients, including arrangements for the
calibration of sources used for medical exposure and for clinical
dosimetry and the description of the management system.
(vii) For new, unusual or complex activities, or for the provision of
consumer products, a demonstration that the principle of justification
for engaging in the activity is fulfilled.
(viii) Arrangements for ensuring safety, which will be maintained for all
stages of the lifetime of the facility or the duration of the activity.
(ix) The safety concepts and criteria used in the design of the facility or
for carrying out the activity, including the classification of equipment,
systems and components; the application of the concept of defence in
depth; the use of multiple barriers to prevent radioactive releases; and
the approach to issues relating to the human–machine interface.
(x) A description of the items important to safety for operating the facility
or conducting the activity (e.g. the facility’s structures, systems and
components, including their design criteria, the processes involved in
their design, and the modes of operation and testing).
(xi) Arrangements for the management of radioactive waste generated
throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity, including in
36
decommissioning and for the management of disused sources (disused
sources should either be managed in the State concerned or be returned
to the supplier or manufacturer), and information on the financial
arrangements for such activities.
(xii) The results of an analysis of the normal operation of the facilities
and activities, and, for a radioactive waste disposal facility, of the
long term period after closure, to demonstrate the acceptability of the
design, including a demonstration that radiation protection criteria,
radioactive waste management requirements and effluent limits are
met by the design.
(xiii) The results of a safety analysis to demonstrate how the design
and related operational procedures of the facility or activity will
contribute to the prevention of accidents and to the mitigation of
the consequences of accidents if they do occur. The analysis should
describe and evaluate the predicted response of the facility or activity
to events, both internal and external, which could lead to anticipated
operational occurrences and accident conditions. The analysis should
include relevant combinations of such disturbances, malfunctions,
failures, errors and events. Consideration should be given to aspects,
such as the initial conditions assumed, the physical or mathematical
models used and their correlation with experiments, and the method of
presenting the results.
(xiv) A safety analysis that shows the extent to which the authorized party
addresses precursors to events and anticipated operational occurrences
and accident conditions. The limits and conditions for safe operation
should be derived from this analysis. If any part of the analysis has
been independently reviewed, the results of this review should also
be presented. Additional recommendations and guidance on safety
analysis for nuclear power plants are provided in IAEA Safety
Standards Series Nos SSG-2 (Rev. 1), Deterministic Safety Analysis
for Nuclear Power Plants [18]; SSG-3, Development and Application
of Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Power
Plants [19]; and SSG-4, Development and Application of Level 2
Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants [20].
(xv) Information on other plans and programmes established by the
authorized party in support of its safety activities. This includes areas
such as:
●● The environmental monitoring programme;
●● Fire protection;
●● Research and development in relation to the safe design, operation,
decommissioning or closure of the facility or the activity;
37
●● Feedback of operating experience [21];
●● Thedecommissioning (or closure) strategy.
(g) Emergency arrangements:
(i) Emergency arrangements, including an emergency plan and
financial arrangements for preparedness and response for a nuclear
or radiological emergency, where appropriate, that address the
general, functional and infrastructural requirements established in
GSR Part 7 [7].
(h) Interface with nuclear security:
(i) In accordance with the national regulatory framework, relevant
information on nuclear security needs to be provided to the competent
nuclear security authority [10, 11].
3.103. The information required for notification (see para. 3.96) may be
described in a notification form. The purpose of the notification form is to enable
an applicant to provide information with respect to the provisions for justification
of the activity and to demonstrate that notification is sufficient to allow operation
of the facility or conduct of the activity. Depending on national requirements, the
regulatory body might prefer to have separate notification forms for facilities,
radioactive material and other radiation sources.
(a) For a specific time period (e.g. 10 years, 40 years) or for a specific stage in
the lifetime of the facility (e.g. construction, operation) or for the duration
of an activity. In such a case, a mechanism should be put in place to ensure
that the authorized party responsible for the facility or activity retains
the prime responsibility for safety and for the implementation of security
38
measures at the facility or for the activity, even if the authorization has
expired, unless the site has been removed from regulatory control.
(b) For an indefinite period of time (a permanent authorization), under certain
conditions and until the authorization is officially terminated by the
regulatory body.
(c) For a specific activity or a specific condition of the facility (e.g. the
temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel).
39
(g) Period of authorization. The authorization should state an effective date of
authorization. It may also include a termination date, which may be based
on a fixed term. Alternatively, a period of validity may be stated over which
the assumptions underlying the authorization decision will remain valid
and at the end of which the basis for authorization will be re-examined.
(h) Authorized activity. The authorization should clearly describe, in sufficient
detail, the location of the facility or activity, including, as appropriate:
(i) A clear depiction and description of the site boundaries;
(ii) The facility design and its mode of operation and/or the conduct of
activities;
(iii) The allowed inventory of radioactive material or radiation sources;
(iv) Other relevant information, as appropriate.
(i) The authorized party’s responsibility for compliance. The authorization
should contain:
(i) An appropriate declaration that the authorized party has the
responsibility for compliance with the legal requirements, regulations
and conditions referenced or contained in the authorization or in other
references, as applicable;
(ii) A statement that establishes that the responsibility for safety may be
transferred to a different authorized party, subject to the approval of
the regulatory body.
40
public has been justified, and either their use has been exempted or
their provision to the public has been authorized.”
Authorization conditions
41
and administrative aspects, it may be useful to group the authorization conditions
into categories, such as:
(a) Authorization conditions that set technical limits and thresholds, such as:
(i) Any limits on operation and use, such as dose constraints or discharge
limits;
(ii) Action levels;
(iii) Limits on the duration of the authorization.
(b) Authorization conditions that specify procedures and modes of operation,
such as:
(i) The obligations of the authorized party in respect of its facility,
equipment, radiation source(s), management and personnel;
(ii) Requirements for minimization of the generation of radioactive waste;
(iii) Criteria for conditioning of radioactive waste for existing or foreseen
radioactive waste management facilities;
(iv) Arrangements for emergency preparedness and response.
(c) Authorization conditions pertaining to administrative matters, such as:
(i) Requirements for notifying the regulatory body of any modifications
in accordance with their safety significance;
(ii) Any additional separate authorizations that the authorized party should
obtain from the regulatory body, if necessary;
(iii) The reports that the authorized party should make to the regulatory
body;
(iv) The means and procedures for changing any information stated in the
authorization;
(v) Procedures for, information about and identification of the legal
framework for challenging the conditions in the authorization or part
of it.
(d) Authorization conditions relating to inspection and enforcement, such as:
(i) The records that the authorized party should retain and the time
periods for which they should be retained.
(e) Authorization conditions pertaining to the response to abnormal conditions,
such as:
(i) The requirements for reporting of events and the procedures for taking
suitable corrective actions.
3.115. Although national practices differ, the regulatory body should carry
out authorization in several steps for complex facilities or activities, with
an application usually being required for each step (see Appendix II). For
42
nuclear facilities, industrial irradiation installations and facilities for industrial
radiography, nuclear medicine and radiotherapy, the regulatory body may
require a multistep process of authorization (e.g. it might require the submission
of an application to construct the facility before construction can begin). The
regulatory body might also prohibit the procurement of nuclear material or
radiation sources (including their import) until a particular stage of construction
has been completed and the safe and secure storage of the nuclear material or
radiation sources can be ensured.
43
Authorization process for a particular type of facility
3.119. If the national approach allows it, it may be appropriate for an authorized
party or applicant to provide a submission to the regulatory body in terms of a
‘reference facility’ or a ‘generic design’, for example in cases where a particular
type of facility (or parts thereof) is to be constructed many times. In such cases,
the regulatory body should apply the same rigour in its review as for other
submissions. A reference facility is a designated existing authorized facility of a
type that will also be constructed in other locations, whereas the definition of a
generic design is established by the regulatory body (see SSG-12 [5], para. 3.13)
and relates to a type of facility that is to be constructed with relatively minor
modifications in other locations. The review and assessment by the regulatory
body of a submission in terms of a generic design in a pre-authorization
assessment, if completed satisfactorily, means that it may be accepted as the basis
for granting an authorization.
3.120. The use of generic designs or reference facilities will facilitate the
authorization process. Not all the aspects that need to be considered can be dealt
with on the basis of such a submission, and the regulatory body cannot grant an
authorization in the same manner as for a single, specific facility; however, the
authorized party will then generally only have to provide a limited submission
for each particular facility. Such limited submissions should concentrate on those
aspects for which the facility under consideration differs from the reference
facility or the generic design; in particular, on those features that are specific
to the chosen location or site. In providing a limited submission for a particular
facility, the authorized party should clearly indicate which aspects of the limited
submission differ from the earlier submission in terms of a reference facility or
generic design, and should provide an explanation of why the other aspects of
the limited submission are not affected. In addition, the regulatory body, in its
comments on the generic design or reference facility, may identify particular
aspects that should be addressed in the submission for the particular facility. In
particular, authorization of the design of a facility that has been subjected to a
pre-authorization assessment should consider the actual site characteristics and
should ensure whether the site and the design are compatible. When moving
forward from a pre-authorization step the regulatory body should require a
submission by the applicant or authorized party detailing how it will manage and
operate the facility.
44
Different steps of the authorization process for a complex facility or activity
(a) Siting and site evaluation (which may include the environmental impact
assessment);
(b) Design;
(c) Construction;
(d) Commissioning;
(e) Operation;
(f) Decommissioning (or closure);
(g) Release from regulatory control.
3.122. Each step of the authorization process may be divided into several
substeps or may be merged or combined, as appropriate, to facilitate the regulatory
process. Combining the authorizations (e.g. for construction and operation) may
also give more predictability to the process for the authorized party, but will also
require some information to be submitted earlier in the process.
3.124. Once an initial authorization has been issued, subsequent activities and
arrangements should be undertaken by the authorized party and the regulatory
body, as part of the authorization process.
45
share common safety related items, arrangements should be reviewed to ensure
that overall safety is not compromised.
Site evaluation
Commissioning
46
the facility or activity marks a significant step within the commissioning stage
and is often considered the main point at which regulatory decisions are made.
The introduction of fissile material or other radioactive material should not be
authorized until the proposed commissioning programme has been reviewed and
assessed, preliminary operational limits and conditions have been established,
the final design has been assessed and conformity of the construction with the
design has been verified. Further recommendations on commissioning for nuclear
power plants and research reactors are provided in IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. SSG-28, Commissioning for Nuclear Power Plants [34] and IAEA Safety
Standards Series No. NS-G-4.1, Commissioning of Research Reactors [35].
Operation
3.131. Over the full operational lifetime of the facility or activity, the regulatory
body should require the authorized party to provide evidence at appropriate
intervals, in the form of a comprehensive safety review, such as a periodic safety
review [36], that the facility or the activity is still fit to continue in operation. In
many States, this reassessment period is around ten years for a complex nuclear
installation such as a nuclear power plant. In such comprehensive safety reviews,
account should be taken of significant changes in the potential nature and
magnitude of the associated hazards, operating experience, significant changes to
safety standards, technical developments and new safety related information from
relevant sources. Depending on national laws and regulations and the outcome of
the comprehensive safety review, the regulatory body may decide to renew the
authorization of the authorized party.
3.132. Before bringing a facility back into operation following a major outage,
the authorized party should be required to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the
regulatory body that the facility will be able to continue to operate in compliance
with the safety requirements until the next outage.
47
accordance with their safety significance. This categorization should follow an
established procedure, which may be subject to agreement or approval by the
regulatory body. Modifications that are categorized as significant to safety should
be submitted to the regulatory body for review and approval or agreement.
The regulatory body should inspect the modifications for compliance with the
established categorization procedure on a regular basis. Further recommendations
on modification control at nuclear power plants are provided in IAEA Safety
Standards Series No. NS-G-2.3, Modifications to Nuclear Power Plants [37].
Decommissioning
3.136. The regulatory body should ensure that, before, during and after
decommissioning, relevant documents and records are prepared by the authorized
party, kept for an agreed time and maintained to a specified quality. Requirements
for decommissioning are established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR
Part 6, Decommissioning of Facilities [38] and further relevant requirements and
recommendations are provided in WS-G-5.1 [6], SSG-47 [39], GSR Part 5 [40],
SSR-5 [41], SSG-40 [42], SSG-41 [43] and SSG-49 [44].
3.137. Before release from regulatory control, the authorized party should be
required to demonstrate to the regulatory body that the site meets the release
criteria. The regulatory body should review the evidence submitted by the
authorized party, should confirm compliance with the criteria and only then
should the site be released from regulatory control. Guidance on the release of
sites from regulatory control is provided in WS-G-5.1 [6].
3.138. The regulatory body should ensure that an effective records system is
put in place for sites to be released from regulatory control and is maintained for
48
future users of such sites. The responsibilities for maintaining site release records
should be clearly assigned; these records could be maintained by a specific
organization.
3.139. If the site does not meet the release criteria, restrictions should be
imposed in relation to future use of the site (the ‘restricted use’ option). If after
further remediation and site surveys it can be demonstrated that the site meets the
release criteria and restrictions are not necessary, the selected option should be
‘unrestricted use’.
3.140. For restricted use, the type, extent and duration of the restrictions and
controls for release of the site can range from monitoring and surveillance
to restriction of access to the site. The restrictions should be proposed by the
authorized party on the basis of a graded approach, and after consideration of
factors such as the type and level of residual contamination after the completion
of remediation, the relevant dose constraints and release criteria, and the human
and financial resources necessary to implement the restrictions and controls.
The restrictions proposed by the authorized party should be submitted to the
regulatory body for its agreement and should be enforceable. It should be clear
which organization will be responsible for ensuring that the restrictions are
maintained. In addition, the way in which the restrictions are to be removed when
they are no longer necessary should be specified in the remediation plan.
49
advances, or as a consequence of research and development relating to nuclear or
radiation safety.
3.144. The regulatory body may require the renewal of an authorization after a
set time interval, depending on national legislation. In such cases, a review and
assessment of the safety documentation submitted by the authorized party should
be conducted, which should include the findings of regulatory inspections and
other information on performance. The results should be documented as part of
the renewal process.
3.145. Proposals to change or modify the site, the facility, the activity, the
organizational structure of the authorized party, associated management, and
operational procedures and processes (including plans for future activities such as
decommissioning) may be made. The regulatory body should require notification
by the authorized party of any significant changes affecting safety and that the
authorized party apply, where necessary, for an amendment to the authorization.
Any modification affecting safety should be subject to an assessment by the
authorized party in accordance with the graded approach. In addition, as stated in
GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [2], para. 4.44:
50
REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES
General
3.148. Furthermore, para. 4.45 of GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [2], also states that:
“In the process of its review and assessment of the facility or activity, the
regulatory body shall take into account such considerations and factors as:
51
(15) Relevant research and development plans or programmes relating to
the demonstration of safety;
(16) Feedback of operating experience, nationally and internationally, and
especially of relevant operating experience from similar facilities and
activities;
(17) Information compiled in regulatory inspections;
(18) Information from research findings;
(19) Arrangements for the termination of operations.”
52
or used. Such inspections will also allow the regulatory body to supplement the
information and data necessary for review and assessment. Additionally, such
inspections will enable the regulatory body to extend its practical understanding
of the management, engineering and operational aspects contained within
the application for authorization and to foster links with specialists from the
authorized party.
3.152. The regulatory body should take into account assessments done in the
past as well as assessments by other States for the same or similar facilities.
“In performing its review and assessment of the facility or activity, the
regulatory body shall acquire an understanding of the design of the facility
or equipment, the concepts on which the safety of the design is based and
the operating principles proposed by the applicant, to satisfy itself that,
among other factors:
3.154. In addition, the justification for engaging in the activity or the need for
the facility should be evaluated. (In some States justification is considered by
other processes and is not the responsibility of the regulatory body.)
3.155. In undertaking the review and assessment, the regulatory body should
not rely solely on safety assessments conducted by the authorized party, nor
on those that the regulatory body has commissioned from external consultants
or technical support organizations. Instead, the regulatory body should have
sufficient full-time staff capable of either performing regulatory reviews and
assessments, or evaluating assessments performed for it by consultants.
53
Objectives of review and assessment
3.157. The specific objectives of the review and assessment will depend on the
stage of the lifetime of the facility or activity. Examples of specific objectives
include the following:
54
3.158. Even if the same or a similar design or a similar facility has been
authorized in another State, the regulatory body should still perform its own
independent review and assessment. The review and assessment performed by
the regulatory body may take into account the review and assessment made by the
other State, and also new experience and knowledge that have been gained since
that review and assessment, and should also take into account the differences
in the legal and regulatory framework of the States concerned. The regulatory
bodies of the States concerned should establish close contact in order to facilitate
the review and assessment process.
(a) During the authorization steps of siting and construction, reports on:
—— The progress of site studies;
—— The progress of construction activities;
—— Results of the pre-operational environmental monitoring programme;
—— Relevant events occurring during construction and manufacturing.
(b) During the authorization steps of commissioning and operation, reports on:
—— The results of commissioning tests;
—— Data from operation, including data on the facility’s output and
performance;
—— Modifications;
—— Results of the radiation protection programme;
—— Results of the environmental monitoring programme;
—— Radioactive waste management;
—— Relevant operational safety and performance events occurring during
commissioning and during operation.
(c) For the release of any facility or site from regulatory control, or for
institutional controls for the post-closure stage of a radioactive waste
disposal facility, reports on:
—— The types, amounts and destinations of radioactive waste resulting from
the decontamination and dismantling programme;
—— Levels of residual activity in the facility;
55
—— Results of the radiation protection programme and environmental
monitoring programme, including the final radiological survey, and
other relevant confirmatory programmes;
—— Restrictions and institutional controls in the case of restricted release
from regulatory control.
3.160. During its inspection activities, the regulatory body will collect on-site
information, for example when examining records kept by the authorized party.
Such information should be subjected to review and assessment by the regulatory
body, in addition to any information associated with non-compliances with
regulatory requirements or violations of the authorization conditions. Although
this source of information may only represent a small part of the review and
assessment, it is essential as it provides factual insights on how the authorized
party complies with regulatory requirements.
3.161. In order to provide assurance that all topics significant to safety will be
covered consistently with submissions for similar facilities or activities, review
and assessment should be carried out by means of a systematic and formalized
process implemented through specific procedures.
3.162. The review and assessment process should include the following steps:
8
Follow-up of review and assessment results is conducted through regulatory
compliance activities.
56
Bases for review and assessment
3.163. At all steps of the authorization process, the regulatory body should
have a clear understanding of the safety objectives and regulatory requirements
that will be used in the review and assessment.
3.164. When collecting and structuring the applicable safety objectives and
requirements to be used in its review and assessment process, the regulatory body
should consider a broad range of sources, including the following:
3.165. The regulatory body might not have, in advance, detailed requirements
covering all the areas that are subject to review and assessment since, even
with a fairly comprehensive set of safety objectives and requirements, some
aspects of safety might not be covered. The regulatory body should evaluate the
acceptability of the proposals put forward by an authorized party or applicant
on a case by case basis against general principles stated in laws and regulations.
Consideration of the proposals may provide input for the development of
additional regulations and guides or the modification of existing regulations and
guides (see also paras 3.41–3.44).
57
accordance with industrial standards or other nationally recognized equivalent
standards. In many cases, the safety of the facility or activity will depend on
additional factors, such as the design and manufacture of equipment, qualification
and training of the staff, and management and operational procedures and
processes.
3.168. Since this Safety Guide covers a wide range of facilities and activities, it
is not possible to provide details of specific areas that should be subject to review
and assessment at each stage of the lifetime of each type of facility or activity.
A graded approach should be used to determine how the major areas for review
and assessment should be considered, depending on the nature of the facility or
activity and the risks associated with it.
Site evaluation
3.170. The review and assessment should consider the potential interaction
between the proposed facility or activity and the site, and assess the suitability
of the site from the point of view of safety. The review and assessment of the
site may be performed in parallel with the review and assessment of the design
or may, as in some States, be performed at an earlier stage. Areas of particular
significance are the possible impacts of the local environment (both natural and
human-made aspects of the local environment) on the safety of the facility or
activity, and the demands that the facility or activity would make on the local
infrastructure. Natural phenomena to be considered should include earthquakes,
high winds, flooding and other phenomena as appropriate for the geographical
location of the facility or activity.
58
environment and of the factors that will influence its safety after closure. Such
an understanding is unlikely to exist at this stage and so the outcome of review
and assessment at the site evaluation stage should be reinforced and confirmed
in the construction and operational stages to complete the technical basis and to
gain the public’s confidence. The process of review and assessment of the site
characteristics may take a long time and continue into a period of institutional
control following closure of the facility.
Commissioning
59
commissioning, the regulatory body should determine whether the as-built
facility meets the design requirements.
3.175. The inactive stage of commissioning is aimed at ensuring that the facility
or systems for an activity have been constructed, manufactured and installed
correctly and in accordance with the design documentation. If deviations from
the approved design documentation have occurred, they should be recorded, and
it should be shown by reconsideration of the safety documentation that safety
has not been compromised. The results of inactive commissioning should also
confirm the operational features and should lead to the finalization of detailed
instructions for operators, which should be confirmed during the active
commissioning stage.
Operation
3.178. For normal operation of the facility or conduct of the activity, the
regulatory body should require the authorized party to report regularly on
60
adherence to safety objectives and compliance with specified regulatory
requirements, and on efforts made to enhance safety. The regulatory body
should review and assess the reports and should perform inspections to confirm
compliance with regulatory requirements and to confirm that operation of the
facility or conduct of the activity can continue.
3.180. The regulatory body should require the authorized party to provide
evidence that in normal operation the facility is being operated or the activity
is being conducted in accordance with the safety requirements, in particular the
operational limits and conditions. Such evidence may be provided by means
of reporting on operational parameters and occurrences relevant to safety. The
regulatory body should review and assess the reports, and should perform
inspections to ensure that the facility or activity complies with the safety
requirements and is fit to continue operation.
3.181. From time to time, throughout the operation of the facility or the
conduct of the activity, the initial decommissioning plan should be updated
by the authorized party and reviewed by the regulatory body in the light of
operating experience, new or revised regulatory requirements and technological
developments.
61
Decommissioning
62
environmental monitoring programmes, should be subject to review and
assessment by the regulatory body.
Information exchange between the regulatory body and the authorized party
(a) Requests for additional information and questions by the regulatory body;
(b) Responses from the authorized party (including responses provided by its
contractors);
(c) Records of meetings between staff of the regulatory body and staff of the
authorized party.
3.188. The regulatory body should request any necessary additional information
and should be prepared to suspend or terminate its review and assessment if, in
its judgement, such action is justified because of deficiencies in the information
provided. The regulatory body should require that the documentation submitted
for review and assessment be prepared by the authorized party in accordance with
an effective management system, which should include proper quality assurance
arrangements and an appropriate internal review process.
63
Reassessments
(a) Experience relevant to safety that has been gained from the facility or
activity, at similar facilities or activities or at other relevant nuclear and
non-nuclear facilities or activities;
(b) Information from relevant tests or from research and development
programmes, and new knowledge of technical matters;
(c) Proposed modifications to the facility or activity or to the way in which it is
to be managed and operated;
(d) Changes in the regulatory framework, regulations and guides;
(e) A proposal to extend the lifetime of the facility or activity.
Internal guidance
3.191. The regulatory body should provide internal guidance for its own staff
on the procedures to be followed in the review and assessment process and on the
safety objectives to be met. Internal guidance on specific topics for review and
assessment should also be provided, as necessary.
3.192. The regulatory body should develop internal guidance on reporting on its
review and assessment activities and on how it reaches its regulatory decisions.
The regulatory body’s internal guidance on review and assessment should be
made available to other regulatory bodies worldwide.
64
Confirmatory calculations
3.194. Where additional analyses are deemed necessary, the regulatory body
should require the applicant or authorized party to perform them.
3.195. The review and assessment process by the regulatory body consists of
examination of the submissions from the authorized party on its management
arrangements and operational procedures and verification of the safety analysis.
For complex facilities and activities, additional submissions from the authorized
party on engineered systems should also be examined by the regulatory body.
This safety analysis should cover normal operation, anticipated operational
occurrences and accident conditions in order to demonstrate that the safety of the
facility or activity meets the safety objectives and requirements of the regulatory
body. It is the responsibility of the regulatory body to determine whether these
submissions have provided a sufficiently complete, detailed and accurate
demonstration of this. In carrying out the review and assessment, the regulatory
body may find it useful to perform its own analyses or research. The following
subsections deal with major aspects of such verification; further details of these
aspects are set out in Appendix III.
65
3.196. In the verification of the safety analysis for the facility or activity, the
regulatory body should determine whether the authorized party has defined
criteria that meet the safety objectives and requirements relating to:
3.197. For complex facilities and activities, the review and assessment by the
regulatory body should confirm that the authorized party has performed a suitable
and sufficient safety analysis of the structures, systems and components important
to safety and has used the results to demonstrate that the regulatory requirements
are met by the equipment and are reflected in operational procedures. Specific
features that should be subject to review and assessment include the following:
3.199. The regulatory body should ensure that an effective system for the
feedback of operating experience, including events, is in place. If the severity
of the event warrants it, the regulatory body may conduct or arrange for an
66
independent investigation, usually by a team with appropriately selected areas of
expertise, to confirm that the event was adequately investigated, the root causes
were correctly identified, and that adequate corrective and remedial actions were
taken. The regulatory body’s review should cover the identification of lessons to
be learned and the sharing of safety related information. Operating experience
feedback should not be restricted to consideration of the facility or activity itself
but should consider a wide range of both radiation and non-radiation related
facilities and activities from which lessons may be learned.
3.200. A well-engineered facility or activity will not achieve the required level
of safety if it is not properly built, operated and managed. Review and assessment
by the regulatory body should therefore include consideration of the authorized
party’s organization, management, procedures and safety culture [45], which
may affect the operation of the facility or conduct of the activity. The authorized
party should be able to demonstrate that there is a documented and effective
management system in place that gives safety the highest priority.
(a) Whether the authorized party’s safety policy has been established by and
is promoted by senior management and shows commitment at a high level
to meeting regulatory requirements and states the means by which these
requirements will be met.
(b) Whether the authorized party’s organization is such that it can achieve the
aims and objectives in its safety policy. In particular, the following should
be addressed:
(i) Adequate control of activities at the facility;
(ii) Fostering cooperation between staff members and between staff and
managers;
(iii) A satisfactory system for communication both up and down the
management chain and between managers;
(iv) Systems to ensure that staff are competent for the positions to which
they are assigned.
(c) Whether the authorized party has systems in place to ensure adequate
planning of work and suitable performance standards so that staff and
managers know what is expected of them in order to achieve the aims and
objectives of the safety policy.
67
(d) Whether the authorized party has systems in place to review and to audit
periodically all the evidence on its performance, including consideration
of operational events and other matters important to safety, in order to
determine whether it is adequately achieving its aims and objectives, and to
consider and make improvements where necessary.
(e) Whether the authorized party has systems in place to ensure that it acquires
and retains adequate capability within its organization to understand the
nature, substance and detail of the advice given to it by contractors and is
able to judge the soundness of that advice.
3.202. The review and assessment by the regulatory body should cover all
aspects of the authorized party’s management and organizational procedures and
systems that have a bearing on safety, such as:
68
(d) Radioactive waste management;
(e) Discharge, dilution and dispersion of radioactive effluents.
3.204. In considering these aspects, the regulatory body should satisfy itself
that radiation doses to workers and the public and radioactive releases to the
environment are below relevant limits, and are as low as reasonably achievable.
Specifically, review and assessment should verify that:
(a) The operational limits and conditions and the bases for these have been
determined;
(b) The radiation risks associated with operation at these limits have been
considered;
(c) Arrangements (including operating procedures) are in place to ensure that
protection and safety is optimized.
3.205. The regulatory body should at all times require reasonably achievable
improvements to be made in the design or operating procedures of the facility or
activity with the aim of reducing radiation risks.
3.206. A major part of the review and assessment effort should be directed to
the safety analysis for abnormal operation, anticipated operational occurrences
and accident conditions performed by the authorized party. The review and
assessment of the safety analysis should be performed in accordance with the
nature and magnitude of the risks associated with the particular facility or activity.
69
Records of review and assessment
3.208. The review and assessment process will invariably involve the
production of reports by the regulatory body and, where appropriate, by external
experts. A document control system should be established for keeping records of
the review and assessment process so that these documents and records can be
readily retrieved. The bases for previous decisions should also be made accessible
so as to achieve consistency and to facilitate any reassessment made necessary by
new information.
70
the regulatory requirements and with the conditions specified in the
authorization.”
3.211. The regulatory body should verify the contents of the documents
submitted by the applicant by means of inspection of the facility or activity
where radiation sources are to be installed or used. Such inspections will also
allow the regulatory body to supplement the information and data necessary for
review and assessment.
71
—— Liaison with the relevant organization for joint inspections,
where necessary.”
3.216. The regulatory body should also consider the following aspects in
inspection, as appropriate:
(a) Radiation risks associated with the facility or activity, including areas of
higher risk;
(b) Unintended or accidental medical exposure;
(c) Arrangements for the control of radioactive material.
3.218. The priority and frequency of inspections should reflect the risk
associated with the radiation source and the complexity of the facility or activity,
as well as the possible consequences of an accident and the type and frequency of
any regulatory non-compliances found by inspections.
72
(c) The required quality and performance are achieved and maintained in
the items and activities important to safety throughout the lifetime of the
facility or activity;
(d) Persons employed by the authorized party (including contractors) possess
the necessary competence for the effective performance of their functions
throughout the whole lifetime of the facility or activity;
(e) Deficiencies and abnormal conditions are identified and promptly evaluated
and remedied by the authorized party and duly reported to the regulatory
body as required;
(f) Any other safety issue that is neither specified in the authorization nor
addressed in the regulations is identified and appropriately considered;
(g) Any safety lessons learned are identified and disseminated to other
authorized parties and suppliers and to the regulatory body as appropriate.
73
3.222. The major activities of the inspection programme are related to the steps
of the authorization process. The regulatory body should organize and modify its
inspection activities in accordance with the stage of the lifetime of the facility or
activity. Specifically, as a facility or activity passes from one stage of its lifetime
to another, the regulatory body will normally find it necessary:
(a) To adjust the levels of attention given to particular inspection areas and to
redeploy its human resources accordingly;
(b) To alter the extent to which various inspection techniques and methods are
employed;
(c) To modify the rigour and frequency of the inspections.
Inspection programme
74
(a) A system of prioritizing inspections based on a graded approach;
(b) On-site inspections9;
(c) The investigation and follow-up of events and deviations from normal
operation;
(d) The submission of information on key operational safety parameters by
authorized parties.
3.227. On-site inspection is the element of the regulatory framework that gets
closest to actual operations, and a significant proportion of the regulatory body’s
resources should be allocated to this task.
(a) Housekeeping;
(b) Financial stability;
(c) Staffing, including turnover of staff;
(d) Record keeping and retrieval systems;
(e) Investigation levels set by the authorized party and the procedures to be
followed in the event that investigation levels are exceeded;
(f) Training, including arrangements for retraining of staff;
(g) Occupational exposures for the type of facility or activity;
(h) Recurring failures of structures, systems and components important to
safety;
(i) Unavailability of structures, systems and components;
(j) Frequency of enforcement actions.
9
‘On-site’ needs to be interpreted appropriately: some activities (e.g. well logging) do
not take place on fixed sites so inspections may need to be carried out in a different location.
75
3.230. These indicators could be used as a basis for informing authorized
parties of the need to make safety improvements, and as a basis for establishing
the frequency of inspections for any particular authorized party. The regulatory
body should require authorized parties to pay attention to indicators of degraded
safety performance. This focus on indicators and the underlying performance
issues should contribute to the enhancement of a strong safety culture in the
authorized party.
3.232. The regulatory body should have the capability to undertake inspection
activities when necessary; in particular, sufficient inspection resources should
be available for reactive inspections. For verification of the overall performance
of the authorized party, inspections of adequate depth should be conducted in a
wide range of subject areas and at appropriate intervals. Each planned inspection
should have objectives that have previously been specified by the regulatory
body to serve to the extent practicable as guidance for inspectors.
3.234. The authorized party should be required to keep the regulatory body
informed of its schedules for carrying out activities and tests of regulatory interest
and should submit or make available to the regulatory body, in a timely manner,
the procedures for these activities. To facilitate this process, the regulatory body
should inform the authorized party well in advance as to which activities and
tests it wishes to be kept apprised of and possibly inspect on the site.
76
3.235. As part of the inspection programme, on a regular basis the regulatory
body should compile and assess data on the performance of authorized parties,
the results of the regulatory inspection programme (inspection findings,
corrective actions and inspection reports) and trends in these data and results.
This information should be used to identify potential areas for improvement in
the performance of authorized parties and regulatory processes. The reports of
such assessments and analyses should be shared and communicated within the
regulatory body.
3.239. The regulatory body should use the authorized party’s reports of safety
related activities or events in preparing for both planned and reactive inspections.
Matters to be included in reports from the authorized party should be clearly
defined so that difficulties in interpretation are avoided.
Planned inspections
77
activities in order to confirm the authorized party’s performance and to identify
potential problems at an early stage.
Reactive inspections
78
3.245. For a more serious event (or a potentially serious event), or when
operational parameters (e.g. doses) exceed regulatory limits or are significantly
elevated, an independent investigation should be conducted by the regulatory
body and in some cases by other governmental bodies, in addition to the
investigation to be conducted by the authorized party. There are usually two main
objectives in an investigation of a serious event by the authorities, which are not
completely separable but which need to be distinguished:
(a) Determination of the reasons why the event occurred so as to take measures
to prevent its recurrence;
(b) Consideration of the legal aspects concerning liability for the event.
3.246. Determining why the event happened is of central interest with regard to
safety. Investigations should be carried out by, or in consultation with, a person
with appropriate knowledge and experience of the facility or activity, the type of
event and of investigation techniques. With regard to the regulatory investigation
of the event, the following should be included:
(a) The determination of the root causes, the sequence of events and the
contributory factors;
(b) The assessment of the consequences;
(c) The identification of preventive and corrective actions;
(d) The identification and documentation of lessons to be learned;
(e) The recommendations for measures to be taken for the prevention of similar
events in the future, including changes in the regulatory programme, as
well as any adjustments to the authorized party’s arrangements for safety;
(f) The dissemination of the findings, lessons to be learned and
recommendations to relevant authorized parties, manufacturers and
suppliers, and other interested parties both in the State and in other States.
79
3.248. The main advantage of announced inspections is that the inspector
is able to discuss plans and needs with the authorized party’s personnel in
advance in order to secure assurances that documentation will be available
for inspection, personnel will be available for interview and activities can be
inspected as scheduled. Hence, the announcement of inspections may enhance
their effectiveness.
3.249. Unannounced inspections might not always be feasible, but they have
benefits. The advantage of unannounced inspections is that the actual state of the
facility and the way in which it is being operated can be observed. Inspections
may be carried out at any time of the day or night so as to provide a more
complete picture of the situation at the facility or activity. However, unannounced
inspections need to take account of ongoing activities at the site.
Team inspections
80
Planning of regulatory inspections
3.252. The organization and management of planning for inspection and the
allocation of resources for inspection are described in GSG-12 [4]; this Safety
Guide focuses on technical aspects of the inspection plan.
3.253. The regulatory body should have an overall plan for the programme of
inspection that it intends to undertake at a facility or during an activity.
3.254. For each technical area to be inspected, the intervals between inspections
and the level of effort to be applied to the inspection will depend on the following
factors:
3.256. The inspection plan for a specific facility or activity should be flexible
enough to allow inspectors to respond to particular needs and situations. On
major facilities, many States allow for 25% of the inspection time to be available
for reactive inspections.
81
3.258. Arrangements should be made to ensure that all relevant staff of
the regulatory body can fully contribute to the planning of inspections and, in
particular, if the offices of the regulatory body are distributed over a wide area,
that inspectors are involved in the planning process. This will ensure the best use
of the skills and knowledge of the staff of the regulatory body.
3.259. This Safety Guide covers a wide range of types of facility and activity,
and it is not possible to provide details of specific areas that would be subject to
inspection at each lifetime stage for each type of facility and activity. The degree
to which the areas should be considered will depend on the nature of the facility
or activity and the risks associated with it. Major inspection areas for nuclear
facilities are listed in Appendix IV.
3.260. Inspection should not be limited to the facility or activity itself and
should cover any safety related services that may be provided at an authorized
party’s headquarters or other offices, such as activities relating to the development
of safety assessments, outage planning or training.
3.261. Whenever the authorized party makes use of the safety related services
or products of a contractor, the regulatory body should include the contractor’s
supervision by the authorized party and the contractor’s activities in its inspection
programme in all steps of the authorization process. This may comprise
inspection of the design and manufacturing of components, including, where
appropriate, activities performed in other States. Inspection of the authorized
party’s contractors should only be performed in conjunction with inspection of
the authorized party, so that the authorized party is not relieved of the prime
responsibility for safety.
Internal guidance
3.262. The regulatory body should issue internal guidance for its inspectors
on performing regulatory inspections in order to ensure a consistent approach to
inspection while allowing sufficient flexibility for inspectors to take the initiative
in dealing with new concerns that arise. Each inspector should be given adequate
training in following this guidance.
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3.263. The guidance for inspectors should include the following:
3.264. The regulatory body should stress in the guidance the importance of
objectivity and fairness on the part of inspectors, together with the need to respect
the rules of the facility or activity as established by the authorized party provided
these rules do not prevent inspectors from fulfilling their duty.
83
(c) Findings of previous inspections and enforcement actions relating to the
inspection area, and any unresolved issues from previous inspections;
(d) The analysis of accidents and other events in the past;
(e) Past correspondence between the regulatory body and the authorized party
relating to the inspection area;
(f) The safety documentation and operational limits and conditions;
(g) Documentation on operation and design for the facility or activity;
(h) The authorized party’s management system.
Methods of inspection
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Monitoring and direct observation
3.269. The inspection methods should include provision for direct observation
of elements, such as human factors significant to safety (performance of
personnel, attitudes of managers), tests and other safety related activities carried
out by the authorized party.
3.271. The regulatory inspection programme should provide time for general
surveillance of the facility or activity by regulatory inspectors. Such surveillance
is aimed at gaining an overall impression of the authorized party’s capabilities
and performance and is not restricted to specifically designated components and
systems or designated scheduled activities and tests. Examples of where such
surveillance may be useful include the following:
(a) Workplaces;
(b) Transfer of jobs between persons;
(c) Radiation protection arrangements including boundaries of controlled
areas;
(d) Items important to safety for the facility or activity;
(e) Fire barriers;
(f) Housekeeping;
(g) The presence of management;
(h) Internal and external interfaces and communications;
(i) Arrangements for emergency preparedness and response.
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in which inspectors are involved in reconstructing events and assessing the
authorized party’s response.
86
body’s headquarters or the authorized party’s headquarters — and can contribute
towards the preparation for the inspection of the facility or activity.
3.277. The regulatory body should have the authority and resources [4] to be
able to carry out confirmatory tests and measurements as necessary, at fixed
points or in places of special interest, as applicable, using its own equipment.
3.278. The extent to which the regulatory body conducts its own confirmatory
tests and measurements independently of the authorized party differs greatly
between States, depending upon factors such as the qualifications of personnel
available to the regulatory body, its regulatory approach, and the experience and
demonstrated performance of authorized parties. The regulatory body should
not engage in the conduct of confirmatory tests or measurements that would
necessitate its assuming direct operational control of the facility or activity or any
of its systems.
3.280. Since the regulatory body itself conducts only limited testing, a detailed
review should be carried out of a sample of the authorized party’s procedures
for tests and its interpretation of their results. If external experts are used by the
regulatory body to monitor the confirmatory tests and measurements undertaken
by the authorized party, their reports should also be reviewed. Where further
confirmatory tests or measurements are necessary, the regulatory body should
request that they be performed by the authorized party.
Conduct of inspections
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may require the inspectors to avoid immediate discussions with the personnel
performing the activity, and some inspections may not provide the opportunity
for direct observations.
3.282. Inspectors should write down their observations while conducting the
inspections. Upon completion of the inspection, the inspectors should conduct an
exit briefing with the authorized party’s senior management and should share the
details about the inspection activities, observations, good practices, deficiencies
and deviations with the inspected organization. Inspectors should also seek
feedback from the authorized party about the conduct of inspections.
“The regulatory body shall record the results of inspections and shall take
appropriate action (including enforcement actions as necessary). Results of
inspections shall be used as feedback information for the regulatory process
and shall be provided to the authorized party.”
(a) The general administrative and legal structure in the State and the
requirements established by the regulatory body;
(b) The type of facility or activity and its steps of authorization;
(c) The location of the inspection;
(d) The type of inspection, whether planned or reactive, announced or
unannounced, individual or team;
(e) The purpose of the inspection (e.g. team inspection, special inspection, site
visit by non-resident site inspectors, weekly inspection activities carried out
by resident inspectors).
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3.285. The purposes of inspection reports are:
(a) Details of the authorized party inspected, the purpose and date of the
inspection and the inspectors’ names;
(b) The methods used in the inspection (interviews, observations, review of
documents);
(c) Reference to applicable requirements;
(d) Criteria used in the assessment of safety performance;
(e) Details of areas, activities, documents, processes, items, and qualification
and training of personnel that have been inspected, assessed or reviewed;
(f) A record of actual or potential problems relating to safety;
(g) A record of the results of any checks for compliance with regulatory
requirements and the conditions of the authorization;
(h) A record of any deficiency or non-compliance with regulatory requirements
or violation of conditions of the authorization found in regulatory
inspections, including a record of which requirements or authorization
conditions have been contravened;
(i) A record of discussions held with the authorized party’s staff, managers and
other persons, including a record of discussions with the authorized party’s
managers about points of concern;
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(j) A record of the inspectors’ opinion about the response of the authorized
party’s management to any matter of concern to which their attention was
drawn after a regulatory inspection;
(k) A record of any regulatory action taken by inspectors and any consequent
action taken by the authorized party in the period covered by the report;
(l) A record of the findings or conclusions of the inspectors, including
corrective actions that should be taken;
(m) A record of recommendations made by inspectors for future action, such
as a need to advise other inspectors or authorized parties about particular
problems, proposals for further inspections or proposals for enforcement
actions.
3.289. Inspection findings should be forwarded to the authorized party for its
information and records, as well as for necessary corrective actions. Whenever
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corrective action is necessary, a formal communication including the findings
from inspection reports should be sent to the authorized party. In some States,
the full inspection report is forwarded to the authorized party. In communications
with the authorized party, caution should be exercised in identifying individuals
by their name or their post because of the possible implications (including those
of a legal nature) for the individuals concerned.
3.290. Documents that are made available to the inspector by the authorized
party during an inspection should be referenced in the inspection report.
Inspection reports and copies of relevant documents received in connection with
the inspection should be stored in a manner that permits ready retrieval and that
follows applicable document classification procedures.
3.291. From time to time the regulatory body may find it useful to produce
a composite report covering a type of facility, activity or a specific aspect of
inspection, drawing together findings from a number of relevant inspection
reports.
3.292. In order to inform the public of the safety of facilities and activities
and of the effectiveness of the regulatory body, findings of inspections and the
associated regulatory decisions may be made publicly available. The extent
to which such information is made publicly available will depend on the legal
provisions in the State concerned. Although it may be the practice in some States
to publish individual inspection reports or inspection follow-up letters sent to the
authorized party, such reports and letters may contain confidential information,
such as nuclear security information, information that the regulatory body may
wish to use in connection with future regulatory actions, proprietary information,
or personal or medical information relating to individuals. Such information
should be processed in accordance with the relevant national requirements.
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Follow-up of inspection findings
ENFORCEMENT
3.295. Paragraph 2.5 of GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [2] requires that the government
promulgate laws and statutes to make provision for an effective governmental,
legal and regulatory framework for safety, including provision for the
enforcement of regulations, in accordance with a graded approach.
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3.299. Regulatory enforcement activities should cover all areas of regulatory
responsibility. Enforcement actions should be applied as necessary by the
regulatory body using a graded approach appropriate to the legal system and the
authorization practices of the State.
Objectives of enforcement
Methods of enforcement
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Written warnings or directives
Penalties
3.305. The regulatory body should have the authority to impose or to recommend
penalties; for example, fines on the authorized party, whether a corporate body or
an individual; or to institute prosecution through the legal process, depending on
the legal system and the authorization practices of the State. The use of penalties
is usually reserved for serious non-compliances with regulatory requirements and
for repeated violations of the authorization conditions of a less serious nature.
Experience in some States suggests that imposing penalties on the authorized
party rather than on individual workers is preferable as it is more likely to lead to
improved safety performance.
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facility or the conduct of an activity and may suspend or revoke the authorization.
The authorized party should be directed to eliminate any unsafe conditions.
In considering the withdrawal of an authorization, the regulatory body should
ensure that operations or activities important to maintain safety continue to be
performed by the authorized party.
3.308. The factors to be taken into account by the regulatory body in deciding
which type of enforcement action is appropriate in each case include the
following:
(a) The safety significance of the non-compliance or of the violation and the
complexity of the corrective action necessary;
(b) Whether the non-compliance or violation is repeated;
(c) Whether there has been a willful violation or a willful non-compliance;
(d) Whether or not the authorized party identified and/or reported the
non-compliance or the violation;
(e) Whether the non-compliance or violation impacted the ability of the
regulatory body to perform its regulatory oversight function;
(f) The past safety performance of the authorized party and the
performance trend;
(g) The need for consistency and openness in the treatment of authorized parties.
Implementing enforcement
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immediately if an inspector judges that the health and safety of workers or the
public are at risk, or that the environment is endangered.
3.313. If there is no immediate risk to safety, the regulatory body should allow
the authorized party a reasonable period of time in which to complete a corrective
action. The time period should reflect the safety significance of the issue and
the complexity of the corrective action required as well as other relevant factors
(e.g. the proximity to a maintenance outage). However, in an integrated approach
to safety, the contribution to the total risk of each non-compliance requiring a
corrective action should be considered.
Records of enforcement
“At each significant step in the enforcement process, the regulatory body
shall identify and document the nature of non-compliances and the period of
time allowed for correcting them, and shall communicate this information
in writing to the authorized party.”
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3.317. All enforcement actions should be recorded in accordance with an
established procedure and with legal and regulatory practices. Whenever an
enforcement action has to be taken urgently to ensure the protection of people and
the environment, the action should be confirmed in writing as soon as possible.
3.319. Moreover, para. 4.65 of GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [2] requires that the
regulatory body use such internal records in support of its regulatory functions
and to support the enforcement of regulatory requirements.
“The regulatory body shall require that arrangements for preparedness and
response for a nuclear or radiological emergency be in place for the on-site
area for any regulated facility or activity that could necessitate emergency
response actions.”
3.323. The government may assign the regulatory body other roles and
responsibilities in emergency preparedness and response; the precise nature
of these roles and responsibilities will depend on the specific legal and
organizational structures in the State. Consequently, in the following text it is only
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possible to describe in a generic manner the necessary functions and processes
that the regulatory body should perform in relation to emergency preparedness
and response.
3.324. The functions and processes in which the regulatory body will have a
role can be considered under the following four general headings:
3.326. While much of the effort by the regulatory body and the authorized party
in emergency preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency
will be devoted to incidents including accidents occurring at a facility or activity
within the State, a nuclear or radiological emergency in another State may have
an impact on the State concerned. Such impacts should be considered in the
hazard assessment carried out for the facility or activity by the authorized party
and should be addressed, as appropriate, in the emergency arrangements.
The regulations and guides should include requirements for the following:
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(b) Provisions for establishing and maintaining adequate infrastructure to
support the performance of emergency response actions (e.g. plans,
procedures, training and exercise programmes, staffing, equipment, tools,
facilities, quality management programme and record keeping);
(c) The timely notification of a nuclear or radiation emergency to the
appropriate authorities;
(d) The timely activation of the necessary emergency response actions on-site
and, as relevant, off-site;
(e) Provisions for obtaining off-site support and coordination with
off-site authorities;
(f) Provisions for protecting emergency workers (including health
surveillance, medical follow-up, monitoring and control of exposure during
the response);
(g) Provisions for terminating the emergency;
(h) Conducting a subsequent analysis of the emergency and the
emergency response.
3.328. The regulatory body should review and assess the on-site emergency
arrangements developed by the authorized party, to verify compliance with
regulatory requirements. This review and assessment should ensure that the
on-site emergency arrangements provide, to the extent practicable, assurance
of an effective response to the full range of postulated nuclear or radiological
emergencies, including those of very low probability [7].
3.329. The review and assessment should consider whether the on-site
emergency arrangements:
(a) Are based on a hazard assessment that identifies all postulated nuclear
or radiological emergencies that might occur in relation to the facility or
activity, including those of very low probability;
(b) Include arrangements for managing the on-site emergency response and for
coordination with off-site response;
(c) Address, as applicable, the operability and habitability of emergency
response facilities (e.g. the emergency centre, technical support centre,
operational support centre) under the range of postulated emergency
conditions identified in the hazard assessment;
(d) Include emergency procedures covering all postulated nuclear or
radiological emergencies, including, where necessary, severe accident
management guidelines [46], and which satisfactorily cover the necessary
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operator actions and functions in emergency response (including procedures
for notification and activation of off-site emergency response);
(e) Identify tools, instruments, supplies, equipment and communication
systems necessary for response to a nuclear or radiological emergency that
are adequate for the usage expected;
(f) Include a specific training programme (which includes drills) and
instructions for all staff of the authorized party on how to respond to a
nuclear or radiological emergency and on the discharge of their expected
duties;
(g) Include sufficient suitably qualified staff to be available at all times to
implement the emergency plans and procedures;
(h) Include arrangements for obtaining support from off-site response
organizations;
(i) Describe the coordination with other plans, such as plans for nuclear
security and plans for firefighting;
(j) Include an exercise programme to ensure that all the emergency
arrangements are tested satisfactorily within a specific period.
Inspection
3.330. As part of its inspection plan, the regulatory body should inspect and
evaluate the on-site emergency arrangements against predetermined criteria and
checklists. In addition, it is required that the regulatory body evaluate some of
the emergency exercises carried out by the authorized party (see GSR Part 7,
para. 6.30 [7]). To do so, the regulatory body should develop necessary evaluation
guidelines and checklists. As appropriate, this evaluation should assess the
adequacy of coordination and integration of the on-site emergency arrangements
with those off-site.
3.331. The regulatory body should ensure that the authorized party demonstrates
the effectiveness of the on-site emergency arrangements as a prerequisite to
issuing the authorization to bring nuclear and radioactive material onto the site
and that this is completed before the start of commissioning or operation of a
facility or commencement of the activity.
Enforcement
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Ensuring coordination with off-site response organizations
3.334. The regulatory body will usually be either a source of advice during
the preparation of the national radiation emergency response plan or a lead
organization for its preparation. In many States, the regulatory body may be
assigned the responsibility to provide advice in an emergency to the government
and other response organizations. In some States, the regulatory body may
also provide expert services (e.g. services for radiation monitoring and risk
assessment for actual and expected future radiation risks) in accordance with
the responsibilities assigned to it. Irrespective of its assigned responsibility in
emergency response, the regulatory body should develop and maintain necessary
arrangements (e.g. plans, procedures, tools, equipment, training, exercises) to
effectively discharge this responsibility.
3.335. The regulatory body should take part in the regular exercises for
emergency response, including national exercises, and should evaluate its
own performance against pre-established objectives associated with its duties
in emergency response. The results of this self-evaluation should be used to
identify where and what further improvements are necessary in its emergency
arrangements.
3.337. The regulatory body should set up internal processes and procedures to
ensure that it will fulfil the duties set out in previous paragraphs, both at the
preparedness stage and during an emergency response.
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3.338. The regulatory body, within its sphere of responsibility, should
coordinate its emergency arrangements with those of authorized parties,
with emergency arrangements at national and local levels and with its related
international agreements and obligations.
3.339. GSG-12 [4] describes the management provisions and organizational and
training provisions necessary for regulatory body staff with appropriate training
to carry out their responsibilities in emergency preparedness and response. The
regulatory body should, as applicable, put mechanisms in place to:
3.340. The regulatory body should develop and implement internal training and
exercise programmes to ensure that the emergency arrangements are tested and
that staff are familiar with the roles they will be expected to undertake in the
event of a nuclear or radiological emergency.
On-site responsibilities
3.341. The prime responsibility for safety remains with the authorized party
during a nuclear or radiological emergency confined to the site of the facility or
where the activity is taking place. The role of the regulatory body should be to
observe the actions the authorized party takes; the regulatory body should not
impede the authorized party from taking the necessary pre-planned emergency
response actions on the site in a timely manner (see paras 4.15 and 5.23 of
GSR Part 7 [7]).
3.342. The regulatory body should collect information, analyse the situation
and compare its findings with that of the authorized party. In addition, without
interfering with the authorized party’s responsibilities for safety, the regulatory
body should consider the actions that the authorized party takes. To do this
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effectively, the regulatory body may assign staff to a position on the site or to
other locations. These staff should record how decisions regarding on-site
emergency response actions are taken and implemented by the authorized party.
Off-site responsibilities
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sensitive information, in order to address the legitimate concerns of interested
parties in nuclear and radiation safety matters, to enable the regulatory body to
make informed decisions and to contribute to ensuring its freedom from undue
influences that might adversely affect safety. Recommendations and guidance
covering the communication and consultation with interested parties are provided
in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-6, Communication and Consultation
with Interested Parties by the Regulatory Body [47].
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Appendix I
I.2. The aim of authorization is to ensure that consumer products meet all
the requirements for design and performance that were taken into account in
the generic safety assessment conducted by the manufacturer for the type of
consumer product. The manufacturer should provide the regulatory body with
sufficient documentation and certification to enable it to review and assess the
proposed consumer product. The documentation should include the following:
(a) A description of the consumer product, its intended uses and benefits, the
radionuclide(s) incorporated and the function served by the radionuclide(s).
Documentary evidence that the radioactive substance fulfils its function
should also be provided.
(b) The activity of the radionuclide(s) to be used in the consumer product.
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and abnormal conditions of use and disposal, and the degree of access to
the radionuclide(s).
(d) The quality assurance and verification procedures to be applied to
radioactive sources, components and finished products to ensure that the
maximum specified quantities of radionuclides or the maximum specified
radiation levels are not exceeded, and to ensure that the consumer product
is constructed in accordance with the design specifications.
(e) A description of the prototype tests for demonstrating the integrity of the
consumer product in normal use and in the event of possible misuse and
accidental damage, and the results of these tests.
(f) External radiation levels arising from the consumer product and the method
of measurement.
(g) Safety assessments, including estimates of individual doses and, if
appropriate, collective doses arising from normal use, possible misuse and
accidental damage and disposal and, if applicable, servicing, maintenance
and repair.
(h) The anticipated useful lifetime of the consumer product and the total
numbers expected to be distributed and/or made available annually.
(i) Information about any advice to be provided on the correct use, installation,
maintenance, servicing and repair of the consumer product.
(j) An analysis to demonstrate that the consumer product is inherently safe
(i.e. it will not give rise to significant doses to individuals in the event of
foreseeable accidents).
(k) Information on how the consumer product is intended to be labelled.
(l) The provisions foreseen for recycling or disposal of the consumer product
at the end of its useful lifetime.
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Appendix II
SITE PREPARATION
II.2. The regulatory body should specify the controls that the authorized party is
required to exercise over the use of the site and the degree to which the authorized
party may prepare the site without conducting activities which, under the laws
and regulations of the State, require an authorization for construction.
CONSTRUCTION
II.3. In authorizing construction, the regulatory body should ensure that certain
conditions are fulfilled so that this step can proceed in a manner that ensures safe
operation of the facility. These conditions include the following:
(a) The facility should be designed and constructed in accordance with the
relevant site parameters approved by the regulatory body.
(b) The facility should be constructed in accordance with the design that has
been justified in a safety case. The authorized party should not deviate
from this design in any way that might affect safety without following
a modification process that requires categorization of the modification
according to safety significance. This modification process may require
approval or agreement from the regulatory body depending upon the safety
significance of the modification.
(c) The authorized party should initiate a radiological study of the region,
including an appropriate baseline survey, prior to the start of operation.
(d) The authorized party should prepare reports during the stages of site
evaluation and construction to keep the regulatory body informed of the
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progress of the project, covering the progress of site studies, the progress
of construction and results of the pre-operational environmental monitoring
programme.
(e) The authorized party should keep records of site evaluation and construction
of the facility (as appropriate), such as the results of site evaluation studies
(geological, meteorological and hydrological data, as well as results of the
pre-operational environmental monitoring programme), design records,
manufacturing records (including results from quality control activities)
and erection records (including quality control results and as-built design
records). Such records may be useful later in the investigation of events or
generic problems and in decommissioning.
COMMISSIONING
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security may require that appropriate nuclear security measures be in effect
before nuclear or other radioactive material is brought into the facility.
(e) Fissile material or other radioactive material should not be brought onto the
site without a regulatory authorization.
(f) From the introduction of radioactive material into the facility, the authorized
party should operate the facility only under the control and supervision
of authorized personnel using written procedures, in accordance with the
operational limits and conditions approved by the regulatory body. Any
changes made to the operational limits and conditions should be approved
by the regulatory body prior to their implementation.
(g) The authorized party should have an approved emergency plan, coordinated
with the other authorities involved in emergency preparedness and response.
OPERATION
(a) The authorized party should not operate the facility or conduct the activity
outside the limits authorized by the regulatory body.
(b) The authorized party should have a procedure for modifications to be
approved by the regulatory body in order to ensure that no part of the
approved facility that is important to safety will be modified without the
prior approval of the regulatory body.
(c) The authorized party should ensure that the facility is subjected to in-service
inspection and testing, to be carried out as specified for structures, systems
and components important to safety, in accordance with a schedule
approved by the regulatory body.
(d) The authorized party should keep operational records to be used in the
regulatory oversight for possible examination by the regulatory body.
Operational records should cover:
—— Operational data and performance records of the facility or activity;
—— Operating log books;
—— Inventories of fissile material and other radioactive material;
—— Periodic calibration of equipment;
—— Periodic testing of equipment and systems;
—— Internal reviews or inspections;
—— Preventive maintenance and repairs;
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—— Personnel training;
—— Monitoring of occupational exposures;
—— Records of workplace monitoring for the facility or activity;
—— Radioactive waste management;
—— Effluent discharges and the environmental monitoring programme;
—— Anticipated operational occurrences and accidents.
(e) The authorized party should ensure that the maintenance of equipment and
systems important to safety is carried out in accordance with a schedule
approved by the regulatory body.
(f) Only changes given prior approval by the regulatory body should be made
to the approved arrangements, schedules, procedures and rules.
(g) The authorized party should ensure that the facility is operated or the
activity is carried out only under the control and supervision of authorized
personnel in adequate numbers that are acceptable to the regulatory body.
DECOMMISSIONING
CLOSURE
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Appendix III
III.1. This appendix provides a generic list of topics that should be considered in
the review and assessment process by the regulatory body throughout the lifetime
of a facility or activity, from site selection to decommissioning or closure. Each
topic has been itemized; however, addressing all items does not necessarily mean
that every aspect of safety has been fully addressed. Also, depending on the
facility or activity and on the particular stage of the lifetime, some topics will
be more important than others and the degree of detail necessary in the review
and assessment may differ. This Appendix focuses on complex facilities and
activities. For less complex facilities and activities, the review and assessment
process should follow a graded approach.
III.2. The following information on the facility or activity and on the processes
conducted should be provided by the authorized party at various stages and used
as a basis for review and assessment:
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INFRASTRUCTURAL ASPECTS
III.3. Throughout the lifetime of a facility or activity, the authorized party will
have to propose and implement arrangements for radioactive waste management.
The regulatory body should review and assess any proposals in the safety case
for on-site processing (i.e. pretreatment, treatment and conditioning) and storage
of radioactive waste, to ensure that the characteristics of the processed waste and
the waste packages are compatible with the national strategy for radioactive waste
management, any subsequent waste acceptance requirements and regulatory
requirements. Specifically, the regulatory body should satisfy itself that the
radioactive waste and waste packages:
(a) Are properly characterized and compatible with the anticipated nature and
duration of storage pending disposal;
(b) Can be subjected to regular surveillance;
(c) Can be retrieved for further steps in radioactive waste management.
SAFETY ANALYSIS
III.5. Throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity, the regulatory body
should review and assess the information on the facility or activity provided by
the authorized party to determine whether the facility or activity is in compliance
with the relevant safety and regulatory requirements, and, in particular,
information covering the following:
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—— Internal hazards (e.g. internal fires, internal floods and internally
generated missiles).
(g) Features, events and processes:
—— A list of barriers with their relative contributions;
—— A description of how requirements for defence in depth are met;
—— Anticipated activities for confirmation of performance.
(h) Analytical methods and computer codes used in the safety analyses and the
verification and validation of such codes.
(i) Radioactive releases and radiation exposures in normal operation,
anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions.
(j) The authorized party’s safety criteria for analyses of authorized party
actions, common cause failures, cross-link effects, the single failure
criterion, redundancy, diversity and separation.
III.7. At all stages of the facility’s lifetime, the authorized party should be
required to demonstrate that:
III.9. For some facilities (notably waste disposal facilities) this demonstration
may need to apply for an extended period, perhaps covering several generations,
over which control will need to be maintained.
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III.10. The information to be provided by the authorized party to the regulatory
body for review and assessment should include:
(a) Details of the organizational structure of the authorized party, showing that
it has adequate control over the activities of its own staff and its contractors;
(b) A demonstration of the adequacy of resources in terms of sufficient and
appropriately trained and experienced staff, ensuring in-house expertise;
(c) A demonstration of the adequacy of the procedures for controlling changes
to the organizational structure and resources;
(d) The specification and documentation of the duties of staff, demonstrating
the integration of responsibilities for safety into their duties;
(e) A demonstration of the provision of, or access to, a high level of expertise
in safety to carry out safety and engineering analyses and to perform
associated audit and review functions;
(f) A demonstration of the adequacy of the provisions for financing of
continuing liabilities for nuclear damage and of decommissioning;
(g) Provisions for the use of contractors.
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(n) Systematic and validated methods for the selection of staff, including
testing for aptitude, knowledge and skills;
(o) A systematic approach to fostering leadership and management for safety,
including training in safety culture, particularly for managers;
(p) Guidelines on fitness for duty in relation to hours of work, health and use
of drugs or alcohol;
(q) Competence requirements for operating, maintenance and technical staff
and managers;
(r) A system for consideration of the human–machine interface and its design
and for the analysis of information needs and task workload for operators in
the control room and at other workstations.
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
III.12. The authorized party should be required to demonstrate that the operation
of the facility or conduct of the activity is in accordance with the relevant safety
objectives and safety and regulatory requirements, and that it has developed or
obtained the following:
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EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION
MANAGEMENT OF AGEING
(a) Documented methods and criteria for identifying structures, systems and
components covered by the ageing management programme;
(b) A list of structures, systems and components covered by the ageing
management programme and records that provide information for use in
the management of ageing;
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(c) An evaluation of and documentation of potential ageing related degradation
that may affect the safety functions of structures, systems and components;
(d) Details of the extent of understanding of the dominant mechanisms of
ageing for structures, systems and components;
(e) Details of the programme for the timely detection and mitigation of ageing
processes and/or ageing effects;
(f) Acceptance criteria and required safety margins for structures, systems
and components;
(g) Awareness of the physical condition of structures, systems and components,
including actual safety margins.
(a) The system used for identifying and classifying safety related events.
(b) The arrangements made for root cause analysis of events, the results and
lessons learned and the follow-up measures taken.
(c) Methods for selecting and recording safety related operational data,
including data for maintenance, testing and inspection.
(d) Trend analyses of safety related operational data.
(e) Feedback of safety related operational data, including records and reports
of incidents including accidents.
(f) Records of radiation doses to persons on the site.
(g) Records of off-site contamination and data from radiation monitoring on
the site.
(h) Records of quantities and relevant characteristics of radioactive waste
generated and stored at the facility.
(i) Records of the quantities of radioactive effluents discharged.
(j) Analyses of safety performance indicators, such as:
—— Frequency of unplanned shutdowns of operation;
—— Frequency of selected safety system actuations and demands;
—— Frequency of safety system failures;
—— Unavailability of safety systems;
—— Annual individual and collective occupational radiation doses;
—— Trends in causes of failures (operator errors, equipment failures,
administrative matters, control matters);
—— Backlog of outstanding maintenance tasks;
—— Extent of repeat maintenance;
—— Extent of corrective maintenance, including repair and replacement;
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—— Frequency of unplanned operator actions in relation to safety and their
success rate;
—— Amounts of radioactive waste generated;
—— Quantities of radioactive waste in storage.
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Appendix IV
IV.1. This appendix sets out the areas of nuclear facilities that may be of
particular interest for regulatory inspection at different steps of the authorization
process. Depending on the facility or activity and on the particular stage of the
lifetime, some topics will be more important than others, and the degree of their
applicability may differ.
SITE EVALUATION
IV.4. The chief objectives of the regulatory inspection programme in the design
and construction of the facility should be to verify that:
119
(b) Construction activities associated with manufacturing and installing
structures, systems and components are conducted in accordance with
regulatory requirements and in conformity with general safety objectives;
(c) The as-built configuration of structures, systems and components is in
conformity with the assumptions made in the regulatory review and
assessment, any deviation is analysed and justified and the documentation
is updated accordingly;
(d) The authorized party’s system and procedures for quality assurance and
inspection are adequate to ensure the conformance of equipment to the
technical specifications.
IV.5. The regulatory body should inspect design and construction activities in
a number of areas in order to meet these objectives. In particular, the following
areas should receive close attention in the construction stage, primarily because
of the difficulty of detecting and correcting deficiencies in these areas once fissile
material or other radioactive material has been brought to the site and the facility
enters the active commissioning stage:
(a) Mixing and placement of concrete and its reinforcement, especially in:
—— Foundations;
—— Structures important to safety, particularly containment structures.
(b) Construction of cooling intakes and discharge systems.
(c) Installation of components important to safety, particularly:
—— Containment and shielding boundaries;
—— Internals of vessels that will contain fissile material and other
radioactive material;
—— Equipment to be used in radiation areas.
(d) Installation of control, protection and power systems important to safety.
(e) Areas of the facility that are inaccessible after construction is completed,
particularly systems and components embedded in the foundations or the
building structure.
(f) Housekeeping in respect of structures, systems and components important
to safety.
(g) The management systems of the designer, manufacturer and constructor.
COMMISSIONING
120
construction stage. In some States the commissioning programme is subject to
approval by the regulatory body and the agreement of the regulatory body should
be obtained before advancing beyond certain hold points.
IV.7. Inspection by the regulatory body during the commissioning stage should
focus on four broad areas of the authorized party’s activity:
(a) Testing before the introduction of fissile material and other radioactive
material;
(b) Initial introduction of fissile material and other radioactive material;
(c) Testing of operations involving fissile material and other radioactive
material;
(d) Other commissioning activities.
IV.8. The inspection area of testing before the introduction of fissile material and
other radioactive material encompasses those activities and tests performed before
the introduction of such material by the authorized party in order to demonstrate
that structures, systems and components function properly and conform to design
requirements. It also covers the inspection and acceptance criteria for the receipt
at the facility of fissile material and other radioactive material. The regulatory
inspection programme should include:
IV.9. The number of tests and the key tests that are to be examined and directly
witnessed by the regulatory body will differ depending on factors such as the
importance of the test for safety and whether the facility to be commissioned
is the first of its kind or one of several similar facilities. The regulatory body
should, however, place particular emphasis on inspection by the examination of
documentation and by the direct observation of some of the tests performed on:
121
(a) Structures, systems and components that prevent unsafe conditions or
that mitigate the consequences of anticipated operational occurrences and
accident conditions;
(b) Structures, systems and components whose failure to operate properly
will require action from one or more safety related structures, systems
and components.
IV.10. As such, the regulatory body may inspect the following tests:
IV.12. Although some of these tests may be performed at times other than the
time when fissile material and other radioactive material is first introduced, the
regulatory body should inspect the following:
122
(e) The distribution of fissile material and other radioactive material (such
as the fuel loading pattern in a reactor) and process calculations and/or
criticality calculations, as appropriate;
(f) Systems involved in the handling or movement of radioactive or
fissile material.
IV.13. Tests during this stage, which should be subject to regulatory review and
inspection, will depend on the type of facility being commissioned. They include
tests to demonstrate as far as possible that:
(a) The facility is being operated in accordance with the descriptions given in
the safety analysis report;
(b) Systems respond to malfunctions in accordance with the claims made in the
safety analysis report.
IV.15. Inspectors should examine and assess the safety aspects of a sample of
the authorized party’s procedures for conducting operational tests. In addition,
as the tests are completed, a sample of the test documentation and the results
of the inspection should be examined by regulatory personnel to verify that the
tests have been completed in accordance with the test instructions and that the
results are acceptable. Regulatory inspection should also include the monitoring
and direct observation of several tests.
123
Other commissioning activities
OPERATION
IV.17. Once the facility has reached the authorized operation stage, the
regulatory body shall implement an inspection programme to systematically
verify the authorized party’s compliance with regulatory requirements and
achievement of general safety objectives, and to detect potential safety problems.
This verification should consist of: a balanced approach to monitoring and
direct observation of activities; interviews with personnel, including managers;
a review of the qualifications of the authorized party’s personnel; and sampling
of documentation. For waste management facilities and particularly for waste
disposal facilities, the structure of the inspection programme and the tests to be
carried out will primarily relate to conformance to the relevant design criteria
and waste acceptance criteria for the facility and will constitute an element in
providing confidence in the long term safety of the facility. For all facilities,
these inspections should cover the aspects detailed in paras IV.18–IV.41.
Operations
IV.18. Inspections in the area of operations should focus on the control and
execution of activities directly relating to operating a facility to the operational
limits and conditions established by regulatory requirements and authorizations
or by procedures or specifications. Inspectors should perform safety verification
of: operating procedures; the operating configuration of systems important to
safety; control room activities; and the abilities of the operations staff to perform
their duties. Simulator training and the responses of operating staff to abnormal
events and emergency conditions, as well as the adequacy of the management’s
124
actions, should also be assessed. In performing this safety verification, the
reviews described in paras IV.19–IV.22 should be carried out.
Operating procedures
IV.20. The adequacy of the authorized party’s training programme for staff
should be assessed routinely to ensure that the training reflects actual conditions
in the facility.
Safety systems
125
Management
Outages
IV.24. The area of radiation protection should cover all related activities at
the facility, including radiation protection of staff and contractor personnel
and of the public [49, 50]. The area of radioactive waste management should
cover processing (i.e. pretreatment, treatment and conditioning), storage and
transport of waste, the release of effluents and the environmental monitoring
programme [42].
126
working areas, levels of releases of effluents, and the level of understanding on the
part of management and workers of their responsibilities in the implementation
of the radiation protection programme. Any self-assessments performed by the
authorized party under this programme should be reviewed.
Effluents
IV.27. The inspection programme should include verification that any releases
of effluents are within the authorized discharge limits. This should include the
review of systems for the treatment of radioactive waste and for the monitoring
of effluents. Training and qualifications for technicians and workers employed in
the areas concerned should also be reviewed.
Environmental monitoring
127
facility, degradation of the waste may occur over time. The storage conditions
for the waste and the waste packages should be inspected at appropriate intervals
to provide confidence that the waste remains suitable for treatment and/or
conditioning or that the waste packages will be suitable for retrieval, transport
and further steps in radioactive waste management, as necessary.
Inspectors should note the capability of the individuals performing the tests
and, for complex surveillance activities, should assess the interface between
the surveillance personnel and the operations staff involved in the performance
of the test. The adequacy and usability of the procedures should be assessed
and the control and calibration of the test equipment should be observed. The
inspectors should observe the involvement of management in these programmes
to ensure that the programmes are effective and that safety equipment is
properly maintained, with few recurring problems. Maintenance backlogs, the
128
intervals at which repetitive equipment repairs are carried out and the amount
of maintenance work actually being performed should be noted, as these may
be early indicators of declining performance in the maintenance programme.
A large backlog of repairs, a high number of equipment failures and a low level
of maintenance activity may also be indicative of a maintenance programme that
is difficult to manage and requires a disproportionate amount of documentation.
Self-assessment activities in these programmes should be observed and their
findings should be routinely reviewed.
Engineering support
129
conditions for both adequacy and quality, and should observe the interface
between the maintenance groups and engineering support groups.
IV.36. Inspectors should walk down part of a system to assess how well systems
are being maintained and should note any non-conformance. Any problems
identified by inspectors but not known to the facility’s management would call
into question the adequacy of the support programme for system engineering.
Modifications
130
Management system
DECOMMISSIONING
(a) The adequacy of the authorized party’s procedure for the control of each
stage of decommissioning;
(b) The removal of radioactive material;
(c) The strategy for management of radioactive material;
(d) The drainage of any residual fluids;
(e) Decontamination and dismantling activities;
(f) The waste management strategy for the treatment, conditioning, storage
and disposal of all radioactive waste;
(g) The physical condition of the facility, especially surveillance of the integrity
and/or the availability of relevant structures, systems and components,
including protective barriers, and the appropriateness of the procedures at
each stage of decommissioning;
(h) Characterization of the residual radioactivity;
131
(i) Accounting for and control of nuclear material and access control;
environmental monitoring, radiological monitoring and surveillance,
including plans for radiation protection of workers and the public;
(j) The adequacy and maintenance of instrumentation and control systems for
long term safety;
(k) Decommissioning records.
IV.42. After a long period of safe enclosure, some of these regulatory inspection
activities may be reduced in thoroughness and frequency.
IV.43. Before the regulatory body considers the release of any waste disposal
facility from further regulatory control, inspection activities should concentrate on:
IV.44. Before releasing a site from any further control, the regulatory body
should carry out an inspection to confirm that any residual radioactivity has
been reduced to acceptable levels. This will include review of the remediation
and monitoring procedures, review of the management system, independent
monitoring and analysis of compliance with the release criteria for the site
or review of the implementation of restrictions at the site. For waste disposal
facilities, the release from control will be related to the long term safety of the
facility as set out in the post-closure safety case.
132
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CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW
137
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