United States Court of Appeals For The Second Circuit Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500
MOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT
Docket Number(s): Caption [use short title]
Motion for:
Set forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:

MOVING PARTY: OPPOSING PARTY:
9 Plaintiff 9 Defendant
9 Appellant/Petitioner 9 Appellee/Respondent
MOVING ATTORNEY: OPPOSING ATTORNEY:
[name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail]

Court-Judge/Agency appealed from:
Please check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND
INJUNCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:
Has movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1): Has request for relief been made below? 9 Yes 9 No
9 Yes 9 No (explain): Has this relief been previously sought in this Court? 9 Yes 9 No
Requested return date and explanation of emergency:
Opposing counsels position on motion:
9 Unopposed 9 Opposed 9 Dont Know
Does opposing counsel intend to file a response:
9 Yes 9 No 9 Dont Know
Is oral argument on motion requested? 9 Yes 9 No (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)
Has argument date of appeal been set? 9 Yes 9 No If yes, enter date:__________________________________________________________
Signature of Moving Attorney:
___________________________________Date: ___________________ Has service been effected? 9 Yes 9 No [Attach proof of service]
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion is GRANTED DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE OHAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court
Date: _____________________________________________ By: ________________________________________________
Form T-1080
Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group of the U.S. House of
Representatives (Intervenor-
Defendant-Appellant)
12-2335
Expedited review
Windsor v. United States
Plaintiff-Appellee seeks an expedited schedule for the
briefing and oral argument of this appeal.
Edith Schlain Windsor
Roberta A. Kaplan
Paul D. Clement
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019-6064
(212) 373-3000 rkaplan@paulweiss.com
Bancroft PLLC
Washington, D.C. 20036
1919 M Street, Northwest, Suite 470
(202) 234-0090 pclement@bancroftpllc.com
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Jones, J.)
/s/ Roberta A. Kaplan

June 13, 2012

Case: 12-2335 Document: 25-1 Page: 1 06/13/2012 635936 38
1 of 53
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
EDITH SCHLAIN WINDSOR in her
capacity as executor of the estate of THEA
CLARA SPYER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant,
THE BIPARTISAN LEGAL ADVISORY
GROUP OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
Intervenor-Defendant-
Appellant.
No. 12-2335
DECLARATION OF ROBERTA A. KAPLAN
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S
MOTION FOR AN EXPEDITED APPEAL
ROBERTA A. KAPLAN declares as follows:
1. I am a member of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
LLP, 1285 Avenue ofthe Americas, New York, New York 10019, attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellee Edith Schlain Windsor in the above-captioned action.
2. I submit this declaration to provide the Court with copies of
cetiain documents that are referenced in Plaintiff-Appellee's memorandum in
support of her motion for an expedited appeal.
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3. Attached to this declaration as Exhibit A is a true and conect
copy of the Order dated June 6, 2012, entered by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York in the matter captioned Windsor v. United
States, 10 Civ. 8435 (S.D.N.Y.) (Jones, J.).
4. Attached to this declaration as Exhibit B is a true and conect
copy of the letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to Speaker of the United
States House of Representatives John Boehner, dated February 23, 2011.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct.
Executed on June 13, 2012
New York, New York
~ -
Roberta A. Kaplan
2
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EXHIBIT A
4 of 53
Case 1:10-cv-08435-BSJ -JCF Document 93 Filed 06/06/12 Page 1 of 26
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
EDITH SCHLAIN WINDSOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
Defendant.
BARBARA S. JONES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
X
X
USDCSDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC#:
DATE FI-LE- D-:...,... (p-+f- (o-+-/ / ~ l , . -
10 Civ. 8435 (BSJ)
Order
This case arises from Plaintiff's constitutional challenge
to section 3 of Defense Marriage Act ("DOMA"), the
operation which required Plaintiff to pay federal estate tax
on her same-sex spouse's estate, a tax from which similarly
situated heterosexual couples are exempt. Plaintiff claims that
section 3 deprives her of the equal protection of the laws, as
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Uni States
Constitution. For the following reasons, Defendant-Intervenor's
motion to dismiss is DENIED and Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED.
I . BACKGROUND
A. DOMA
DOMA was enacted and signed into law in 1996. The
challenged provision, section 3, defines the terms "marriage"
and "spouse" under federal law. It provides:
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In termining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or
any ing, regulation, or interpretation of the
various administrative bureaus and agencies of the
United States, the word ' age' means only a 1 1
union between one man and one woman as husband and
wi , the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
1 u.s.c. 7.
In 1 , DOMA was a reaction to poss ility that
states would begin to recognize l ly same-sex marri
Specifical , Congress was spurred to action by a 1993 decision
by the Hawaii Supreme Court, which suggested that same-sex
couples might be entitled to marry. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44
(Haw. 1993) . The House iary Committee's Report on DOMA
("House Report") discussed Baehr at length, describ it as a
"legal assault . . against traditional heterosexual marriage."
H.R. Rep. No. 104 664, at 3 (1996). The Report noted that, if
homosexuals were permitted to marry, "that development could
have profound practical implications for federal law," including
making homosexual couples "el e a whole range of
rights and benefits." Id. at 10. A federal def tion of
marriage was seen as necessary ause, the Committee
never before had the "marriage" (which, at the time,
appeared in 800 sections of federal statutes and ations) or
"spouse" (appearing more than 3,100 times) meant anything other
than a union between a man and a woman-an implicit assumption
2
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upon which Congress had reli 1n enacti these statutes and
regulations. Id. at 10.
In tion to this notion of "mak[ explicit what has
always been implicit I II . at 10
1
the House Report justified
DOMA as advancing government interests in: "(1) fending and
nurturing the institution of traditional, heterosexual marriage;
(2) defending traditional notions of morality; (3) protecting
state sovereignty and democratic self-governance;
1
and (4)
preserving scarce government resources.n Id. at 12.
B. The Parties
In 1963
1
Plaintiff in this action
1
Edie Windsor
1
met her
late spouse[ Thea Spyer
1
in New York City. Shortly thereafter
1
Windsor and Spyer entered a committed ationship and
lived together in New York. In 1993
1
Windsor and Spyer
stered as domestic in New York Ci I as soon as
that option became available. In 2007
1
as Spyer
1
S health began
to deteriorate due to her mult e sclerosis and heart
jurisdiction that permitted gays and lesbians to marry. They
were married in Canada t year.
Spyer died in February 2009. According to her last will
and testament
1
Spyer
1
S estate passed for Windsor
1
S benefit.
1
This interest was not addressed to section 3, therefore the Court does not
consider it. See Mas v. U.S. of Servs. et
al., Nos. 10 2207 & 10 2214, slip op. at 25 (1st Cir. May 31, 2012).
3
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Because of operation of DOMA, Windsor d not quali for
the imit marital deduction, 26 U.S.C. 2056(a), and was
required to pay $363,053 in federal estate tax on Spyer's
estate, which Windsor paid in ity as executor of
estate.
On November 9, 2010, Windsor commenced this t, a
refund of the federal estate tax 1 on Spyer's estate a
declaration that section 3 of DOMA violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In February 2011, Attorney General Ho der announced
the Department of Justice would no longer de DOMA's
constitutionality because the Attorney General and the Pres
believed that a heightened standard of scrutiny should apply to
classifications based on sexual entation, and that section 3
is unconstitutional under that standard. Letter from c H.
Hol , Jr., Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S.
House of Rep., at 5 (Feb. 23, 2011). Given the Execut
Branch's decision not to enforce DOMA, the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives ("BLAG")
moved to intervene to defend the constitutionality of
statute. BLAG's motion was granted on June 2, 2011.
On June 24, 2011, Windsor moved for summary judgment,
arguing that DOMA is subject to strict constitutional scrutiny
because homo s are a suspect class. She contends that DOMA
4
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fails under that standard of constitutional review because the
government cannot e ish that DOMA is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling or 1 timate government interest. In the
alternative, she argues that DOMA no rational basis.
On August 1, 2011, BLAG moved to smiss Plaintiff's
complaint. It argues that the weight of t precedent compels
the Court to review DOMA only for a rat sis under
t standard, there are ample reasons that justify the
legislation. Because the motion to smiss turns on the same
l question as the motion for summary judgment, the Court
will address the two motions simultaneously.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil provides
that a court shall grant a motion for summary judgment "if
, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and
any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material t and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Bessemer Trust Co., N.A. v. Branin, 618 F.3d
76, 86 (2d r. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)). "The
party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
undisputed facts establish her right to judgment as a matter of
5
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law."
Cir. 1995)
To survive a mot to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 {b) (6),
"the operat standard requires the plaintiff [to] provide the
grounds upon whi [her] claim rests through factual all ions
sufficient to raise a right to relief above ative
level." Gol tein v. Pataki, 516 F. 3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) . That lS, a
pl ntiff must assert "enough s to state a claim to relie
that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl.
U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see Ashcroft v. I
1949 (2009}.
l, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
B. Windsor's Standing to Pursue this Suit
550
As a threshold matter, the Court addresses whether Windsor
standing to pursue this action. "[T]he irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.
First, the pla iff must have suffered an ' ury in '-an
invasion of a legal protected interest which is (a} concrete
and iculari , and (b) actual or imminent, not
ectural' or 'hypothetical.'" an v. Defenders of
Wildli , 504 u.s. 555, 560 (1992) (citations and int
quotation marks omitt Second, the ainti f must present a
"causal connection between the
of-the injury has to be rly
6
ury and the conduct complai
traceable to the
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challenged action the fendant, and not . result of
the independent action of some third party not before the
court." Id. (internal quotation marks alterations omitt ) .
Finally, "it must 'l ly,' as opposed to merely
'speculat , ' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable
decision.'" Id. at 561.
There is no question that Windsor meets the first and third
rements. BLAG to undermine the second factor by
arguing that Windsor has not proved that her marriage was
recognized under New York law in 2009, the relevant tax year.
In support of s argument, it po s to a 2006 case where the
New York Court of Appeals
does not compel recognit
ld the "New York Constitution
of marriages between members of the
same sex." Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006).
While the Court acknowledges the Court Appeals' decision
in in light subsequent state executive action and
case law, the Court timately f BLAG's argument
unpersuasive. In 2009, all three statewide elected execut
officials-the Governor, the Attorney General, and the
Comptroller-had endorsed recognition of Windsor's marriage.
(describing 2004 informal opinion letters of the Attorney
General and State Comptroller which respectively concluded
that "New York law presumptive requires that part s to such
7
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[same sex] unions must be treated as spouses for purposes of New
York lawn and "[t]he Retirement System will recognize a same-sex
Canadian marriage in the same manner as an opposite-sex New York
marriage, under the pr iple of comityu); ckerson v.
__ -"o_ __ , 73 A.D.3d 52, 54-55 (N.Y.
2008 directive by the Governor to
from other jurisdictions) .
Div. 2010) (citing a
ze same-sex marri s
In addition, every New York State appellate court to have
addressed the issue in the years lowing has upheld
the recognition of same sex marriages from other jurisdictions.
See In re Estate ()f RaJ:1ftle, 917 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. App. Div.
2011) (holding that a Canadian same sex marriage is valid New
York); Lewis v. N.Y. State 't of Civil Serv., 60 A.D.3d 216
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009), aff'd on other sub nom. Godf
13 N.Y.3d 358 (affirming the lower court's ld that New
tion of York's marriage recognition rule requires the
out-of state same sex marriages); Martinez v. of Monroe,

850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (hol ng that aintiff's
in New same-sex Canadian marriage is entitl to recognit
York) .
Finally, though Court of Appeals has yet to readdress
t question of same-sex marriage recognition directly, its 2009
sa nothing to cast doubt on the
8
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form lower-court authority recognizing the validi of same
sex s.
For all of
executive
13 N.Y.3d at 377.
se reasons, s
ies and appellate courts,
State, through its
formly recognized
Windsor's same sex marriage in the year that she paid the
federal estate taxes, the Court finds that standing.
C. The Effect of Baker v. Nelson
The Court next considers BLAG's argument that the Supreme
Court's holding in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972),
requires it to smiss Windsor's case. re, the Supreme Court
summarily affirmed a challenge to a Minnesota state law that
denied a marriage license to a same-sex couple. The aintiffs
challenged the law in state court on equal protect grounds,
arguing that "the right to marry without regard to the sex of
the ies lS a fundamental right," and that "restricting
marriage to only couples of the opposite sex is irrational and
invidiously discriminatory.u v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185,
186 (Minn. 1971). The Supreme Court dismissed the challenge for
"want of a substantial federal question.u Baker, 409 U.S. 810.
BLAG now argues is disposit of the issue before
this Court and, as binding precedent, compels the Court to find
that "defining marriage as between one man and one woman
comports wi equal protection." (BLAG Mot. to Dismiss at 12.)
9
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Summary J s from Supreme Court are binding on the
lower courts only with to the precise legal ions and
facts presented in the jurisdict statement. Ill. State
__ v_. __ __ 440 U.S. 173, 182
(1979). The case before the Court not present the same
issue as that presented in Baker. DOMA defines marriage for
federal purposes, with the effect of allocating federal rights
and benefits. It does not preclude or otherwise bit a state
from authorizing same sex marriage (or is marriage
licenses), as did the Minnesota statute in Baker. Indeed, BLAG
agrees DOMA does not preclude or inhibit same sex marriage
and Windsor does not argue that DOMA affects the fundamental
right to marry.
Accordingly, after comparing the issues in Baker and those
in the instant case, the Court does not believe that Baker
"necessari decided" the ion of DOMA violates the
Fifth Amendment's Protection a use. Accord Smelt
v.
2005), aff'd in
673 (2006) (decl
374 F.
rev'd in
to find
. 2d 861, 872 73 (C .D. Cal.
on other I 447 F.3d
Baker controlled in an
ection lenge to DOMA); see also In re Kandu, 315 B.R.
123, 137 (Bankr. W.D. V.Jash. 2004) (same). The Court will not
of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 203 n.21 (1996)
------
10
l
14 of 53
Having decided that Baker does not require a cision in
BLAG's favor as a matter of law, the Court turns to the parties'
equal protection arguments.
D. Equal Protection
Equal protection requires the government to treat all
similarly situated persons alike. Ci of Cleburne v. Cleburne
It prohibits the
government from drawing "distinctions between individuals based
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265
(1983).
Of course, not all legislative classifications violate
equal protection. See Nordl v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10
(1992). The "promise [of] equal protection of the laws must
coexist with the practi necessity that most legislation
classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting
disadvantage to ous groups or persons." Romer v. Evans, 517
u.s. 620, 631 (1996). With that reality in view, "[t]he
rule is that legislation is presumed to be val and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute lS
rational related to a l timate state interest." Ci of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. That general rule, embodied in the
"rational basis" test, applies in the mine-run of cases
involving "commercial, tax and like ation." Massachusetts
11
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v 't of Health & Human Servs. et al., Nos. 10 2207 &
10-2214, slip op. at 13 (1st r. May 31, 2012)
Rational s1s rev1ew 1s the "paradigm of j cial
restraint." FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314
(1993). The burden of proving a statute unconstitutional falls
on the party attacking the legislation. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 321 (1993); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962)
(Stewart, J., concurring) "A statutory scrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justi it." McGowan v. and, 3 6 6 U. S . 4 2 0 , 4 2 6 ( 19 61) .
Accordingly, courts must as constitutional those
legislative classifications that
a legitimate government interest.
Courts review with scrut
sadvantage a suspect class or impi
a rati relati
classifications that
upon the exercise of a
fundamental right. er v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 17 (1982)
Pursuant to a court's "st ct scrutiny," a classification
violates protect unless it is "precisely tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest." ]:d. at 217; see
to
Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
Classifications that disadvantage a quasi-suspect class are also
subject to a hei ened st of constitutional review.
Courts review those classifications with an intermediate level
of scrut Under "heightened" or "intermediate scrutiny," the
12
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classification must be "substantially related to a legitimate
state erest" to survive constituti attack. Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982).
There are few classifications that trigger st ct or
heightened scrutiny.
461 (1988) (illegitimacy subject to intermediate scrutiny);
1 458 u.s. 718, 723 24 (1982)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - -
Miss. Univ. for Women v.
subject to intermediate scrutiny); nia,
3 8 8 U . S . 1 , 11 ( 19 6 7 ) ( race sub j e c t to s t c t s c rut in y) ;
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (national
---
ancestry and ethnic origin subject to strict scrutiny). "And
because heightened scrutiny requires an exacting investigation
of legislative choices, the Supreme Court has made clear that
'respect for the separation of powers' should make courts
reluctant to establish new suspect classes.u Thomasson v.
of Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 441); see also v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638
(1986) (declining to extend strict scrutiny to "[c] lose
relatives"); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. a, 427 U.S. 307,
313 ( 1976) (per curiam) {declining to extend strict scrutiny to
the elderly) .
Windsor now argues that DOMA should be subject to strict
(or at least intermediate) scrutiny because homosexuals as a
class present the traditional indicia that characterize a
13
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suspect class: a history of discrimination, an immutable
characteristic upon which the classification is drawn, political
powerlessness, and a lack of
characteristic in question
or contribute to society.
relationship
the class's
tween the
lity to rform in
In making this claim, Windsor asks t Court to distingui
the in even Courts of Appeals that have applied the
rational basis test to legislation classifies on the basis
of sexual orientation.
10-2214; Citizens for
See Massachusetts v. HHS, Nos. 10 2207 &
l Protection v. Bruni , 455 F.3d 859
(8 Cir. 2006); Lofton v. Sec' 't of Children & Fami
Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11
F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004);
Cir. 2004); Johnson v. Johnson, 385
of Cincinnati,
128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); Thomasson, 80 F. 3d 915; Steffan v.
Indus. Sec. Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) Ben-
lorn v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodard v. ted
States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Nat'l

?d. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (lOth Cir. 1984). She invites this
Court to deci , as a matter of first sian in Second
rcuit, whether homosexuals are a suspect class.
Though t is no case law in the Second Circuit binding
the Court to the rational basis standard in this context,
Court is not without guidance on matter. For one, as the
14
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Supreme Court has observed, "courts have been very reluctant, as
they should be our federal system," to create new
classes. Moreover, the
Supreme Court " icuously" not signated homosexuals as
a suspect class, even it has had the opportunity to do
so. See Massachusetts v. HHS, Nos. 10-2207 & 10-2214, slip op.
at 15 (noting that "[n]othing indicates that the Supreme Court
is about to this new suspect classification when it
conspicuous failed to do so in Romer"). Against s
backdrop, this district court is not inclined to do so now. In
any event, because the Court believes that the constitutional
question presented here may disposed of under a rational
basis ew, it need not
class.
cide whether homosexuals are a
The Court will, however, elaborate on an aspect of the
equal protection case law that it believes af s the nature of
t rational basis ysis required here. The Court's
equal ection is ions increasingly distinguished
between "[l]aws such as economic or tax legislation that are
scrutinized under rational basis review[, which] normal
constitutional muster," and "law[s that] exhibit[]
pass
a
desire to harm a political unpopular group," which rece "a
more searching form of rational is review . under the
Equal Protection Clause .
J/
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
15
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558, 579-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see "R_ome:l:', 517
u.s. 620; of Cleburne, 473 u.s. 432; _ u _ . _ s _ - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - ~ __ c __ .
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). It is difficult to this
pattern, whi suggests that the rational basis analysis can
vary by context.
At least one Court of Appeals has considered this pattern
as well. As the First explains, "Without relying on
suspect classifications, Supreme Court equal protection
decisions have both intensified scrutiny of purported
justifications where minorities are subject to discrepant
treatment and have limited the ssible justifications." See
Massachusetts v. HHS, Nos. 10 2207 & 10-2214, slip op. at 15.
And, "in areas where state regulation has traditionally
governed, the Court may require that the federal government
interest in intervention be shown with special cl ty II Id.
Regardless whether a more "searching" form of rational
basis scrutiny is required where a classification burdens
homosexuals as a class and the states' prerogatives are
concerned, at a minimum, this Court must "insist on knowing the
relation between the classification adopted and the object to be
attained." Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. "The search for the link
between classification and ective gives substance to the
[equal protection analysis]
II
Id. Additionally, as has always
been required under the rational basis test, irrespective of the
16
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context, Court must consider whether the government's
asserted interests are l timate. Pursuant to these
established princip s, and mindful the Supreme Court's
jurisprudenti cues, the Court finds that DOMA's section 3 does
not pass constitutional muster.
2
E. Congress's Justifications
Contemporaneous with its enactment, Congress justified DOMA
as: defending and nurturing the traditional institution of
marriage; promoting heterosexuality; encouraging responsible
procreation and childrearing; preserving scarce government
resources; and fending traditional notions of morali In
its motion to dismiss and memorandum in opposition to summary
judgment, BLAG advances some, but not all of these interests as
rational bases for DOMA. It additional asserts that Congress
passed DOMA the interests caution, mainta consistency
in citizens' eligibility for federal benefits, promoting a
social understanding that marriage is related to childrearing,
and providing children wi two parents of the opposite sex.
The Court considers all of these interests to determine whether
2
Any additional discussion of heightened or intermediate scrutiny would be
"whol superfluous to the decision" and contrary to settled principles of
constitutional avoidance. Ci of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 456 (Marshall, J.
1
concurring in part, dissent in part);
323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); ss. , 458
U.S. at 724 n.9 (declining to address strict scrut
scrutiny was sufficient to invalidate the challenged action); v.
Bernalillo . Assessor 472 U.S. 612, 618 (1985) (declining to reach
heightened scrutiny in revi classifications that failed the rational
basis test) .
17
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has [d] every conce e basis whi might
[the statute]
II
Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 21 (citation
and ernal quotation marks omit
1. Caution and The Traditional Institution of Marriage
BLAG submits "caution" was a rational basis for DOMA
ar as Congress wanted time to consider whether it should
(some of) t states' "novel redefinition" of age.
As BLAG describes it, caution justified DOMA because al
t soc concept of marriage would undermine Congress's
of nurturing the foundat institution of marriage. (BLAG
Mot. to Dismiss at 29-31.) By that account, Congress's putative
interest in "caution" seems, in substance, no different an
interest nurturing t tional itut of marriage.
See H.R. No. 104 664, at 12. The Court t fore cons rs
both of interests t r.
Wi respect to traditi marriage, BLAG argues that
Congress lieved DOMA would promote it by "rna n[ing] the
definition of marriage that was universally ed in American
law.
11
(BLAG Mot. to Dismiss at 28). That interest may be
legitimate.
3
However, it is unclear how DOMA s it.
3
While tradition as an end in itself may not be a legitimate state interest
in this case, see J::!E:,ller, 509 U.s. at 326 (noting that the "[a] ncient
lineagen of a tradition does not necessari make its preservation a
legitimate government goal), the Court that an interest in
maintaining the traditional institution of marriage, when with other
legitimate interests, could be a sound reason for a legislative
classification, see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
18
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DOMA does not affect the state laws that govern marriage.
(BLAG Mot. to Dismiss at 20 (noting that DOMA does not "directly
and substanti ly erfere with the ability same-sex couples
to marry") . ) Precisely because the decision of whether same sex
couples can marry is left to the states, DOMA does not, strict
speaking, "preserve" the institution of marriage as one between
a man and a woman. The statute creates a federal inition of
marriage. But that definition does not give content to the
fundamental right to marry-and it is the substance of that
right, not its facial inition, that actually shapes the
institution of marriage.
570, 580 (1956) (noting that "[t] scope of a federal right is,
of course, a federal question, but that does not mean that its
content is not to be ermined by state, rather than federal
law, [which] is especial true where a statute deals with a
familial relationship [because] there is no federal law of
domest relations").
To the extent Congress had any other independent interest
in approaching same sex marriage with caut for much the same
reason, DOMA does not further it. A number of states now
(stating that "preserving the traditional institution of marriage'' would be a
imate state interest in an equal protection analysis) . To the extent
Congress had an interest in defending traditional notions of moral in
furtherance of an interest in traditional marriage, H.R. Rep. No. 1 0 4 ~ 6 6 4 , at
16, the Court agrees that "[p]reserving th[e] institution [of traditional
is not the same as mere moral disapproval of an excluded group, and
so in this case given the range of b san support for
Massachusetts v. HHS Nos. 10-2207 & 10 2214, sl op. at 29, 30
(citation and quotation marks omitted)
19
23 of 53
same sex marriages. DOMA did not compel those states to "wait[]
for evidence ng a longer term before engaging in . a
major redefinition of a foundational social institution.n (BLAG
Mot. to Dismiss at 29.) Thus, whatever the "soci
consequences" of this legal development ultimately may be, DOMA
has not, and cannot, forestall them.
2. Childrearing and Procreation
Promoting the ideal fami structure for raising children
is another reason Congress might have enacted DOMA. Again, the
Court does not di that promoting ly values and
responsible parenting are legitimate governmental goals. The
Court cannot, however, discern a logical relationship between
DOMA and those goals.
BLAG argues that Congress enacted DOMA to avoid a social
perception that marriage is not linked to childrearing. In
furtherance of that interest, it argues, Congress might have
4
Congress also expressed "a corresponding interest in promoting
heterosexuality" as "closely related to the interest in protecting
traditional marriage." H.R. Rep. No. 104 664, at 15 n.53. BLAG does not
contend that this is a rational basis for DOMA's classification; nonetheless,
the Court briefly considers it, as a "conceivable" basis that "might" support
it. Heller, 509 U.S. at 320.
A ssible classification must at least "find some footing in the
realities of the subject addressed by the legislation." . at 321. Here,
such is lacking. DOMA affects only those individuals who are already
married. The Court finds it implausible that section 3 does anything to
persuade those married persons (who are homosexuals) to abandon their current
marriages in favor of heterosexual relationships. Thus, the stated goal of
promoting heterosexual is so attenuated from DOMA's classification that it
"render[s] the distinction or irrational." of , 473
U.S. at 446.
20
24 of 53
pas DOMA to deter heterosexual couples from having children
out of wedlock, or to incentivize couples who are pregnant to
married. (BLAG Mot. to Dismiss at 36.) BLAG also aims
that Congress had an erest ln promoting the optimal social
(family) structure for raising children-that is, househol with
one mother and one father. (BLAG Mot. to Dismiss at 38.) These
concerns appear related to Congress's contemporaneously stated
interest in "responsible procreation." H.R. . No. 104 664,
at 12 13.
se are interests in the choices that heterosexual
couples make: whether to get marri , and whether and when to
have children. Yet DOMA has no rect impact on heterosexual
couples at alli therefore, its ability to deter those couples
from having children outside of age, or to entivize
couples that are pregnant to get married, is remote, at best.
It does not follow from the exclusion of one group from federal
benefits (same sex marri persons) that another group of e
(opposite-sex married couples) will be incentivized to take any
action, whether that is marriage or procreation. See In re
Levenson, 587 F.3d 925, 934 (9th Cir. 2009).
Conceivably, Congress could have been interested more
ly in maintaining the societal perception that a primary
purpose of marriage is procreation. However, even formulated as
such, the Court cannot see a link between DOMA and childrearing.
21
25 of 53
DOMA does not determine who may adopt and se children. Nor
could it, as these matters of fami structure and relations
"belong[] to the laws of States and not to the laws of
ted States." Elk Grove Unified S Dist. v. Newdow, 542
u.s. 1, 12 (2004).
perceptions of what a ly "is" and should be, and no effect
at all on types of family structures in whi chil in
this country are raised. And so, although this Court must
"accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an
t fit between means and ends," Heller, 509 U.S. at 320,
, Congress's goal is "so far removed" from the
classification, it is imposs e to credit its justification.
n.27 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting the justification for the law
cannot rely on factual assumptions that are beyond the "limits
of 'rational speculation'" (quot Heller, 509 U.S. at 320))
3. Consistency and Uniformity of Federal Benefits
Additionally, BLAG explains ss was motivated to
def marriage at the level to ensure that federal
benefits are distributed consistently. In other words, Congress
might have enacted DOMA to avoid a scenario in which e in
different States . . have different eligibility to receive
Federal benefits," depending on the state's marriage laws.
22
26 of 53
(BLAG Mot. to Di ss at 34 (quoting 142 Cong. Rec. 810121
ly ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft)).)
Here, Court does discern a link between means and
the It is problematic, though, that the means in this
ance intrude upon the states' business of regulating
domest relations. That incursion skirts important principles
of federalism and therefore cannot be l timate, in this
Court's view.
In the first instance, it bears mention that this notion of
"consistency," as BLAG presents it, is misleading. Historic ly
the states-not the federal government-have defined "marriage.
11
Cf. United States v.
J., concurring) (not
z, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy,
that the states have oyed the
lati to "experiment[] and exercis[e] their own judgment in
an area to which [they] lay claim by right of history and
expertise
11
). For that reason, before DOMA, any uniformity at
the federal level with respect to citizens' eligibility for
marital benefits was merely a byproduct of the states' shared
inition of marriage. The federal government neither
sponsored nor promoted t uniformity. See In re Levenson, 587
F.3d at 933 (not t the relevant status quo prior to DOMA
was the federal government's recognition of any marriage
declared valid according to state law); Gill v. Office of Pers .
. , 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 393 (D. Mass. 2010) (same).
~ ' - - -
23
27 of 53
Yet even if Congress had developed a newfound interest in
promoting or mainta consistency in the marital benefits
federal government provides, DOMA is not a legit e
method for doing so. To accomplish that consistency, DOMA
operates to reexamine the states' decisions concerning same-sex
marriage. It sanctions some of those decisions and ects
others. But such a sweeping federal review in this arena does
not square wi our federalist system of government, which
aces matters at the "core" of the domestic relations law
exclusively within of the states. See Ankenbrandt
v. chards, 504 U.S. 689, 716 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); see also
Mass ts v. u.s. 't of Health & Human Servs., 698 F.
Supp. 2d 234, 249 50 (D. Mass. 2010) scussing the story of
marital status erminations as an attribute of state
sovereignty) .
states choose, through their legislative or
constitutional processes, to preserve traditional marriage or to
redefine it. See Golinski v. Office of Pers.
I
824 F.
Supp. 2d 968, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that thirty states
have passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex
marriage) . But general speaking, barring a state's inability
to assume its role in regulating domestic relations, the federal
government has not attempted to manage those processes and
24
28 of 53
affairs. See . at 1000 n.10 (observing that, historically,
the federal government has only legislated in this area where
re has been a failure or absence of state government). BLAG
has conceded s storical fact. See Transc of Oral
Argument at 10:15 20, 18:2 5, Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968
(No.10-257) (conceding that BLAG's "research hasn't shown that
there are historical examples which [sic] Congress has
l slated on behalf of the federal government in the area of
domestic ations"). This is the "virtue of federalism."
Massachusetts v. HHS, Nos. 10-2207 & 10-2214, s ip op. at 30.
4. Conserving the Public Fisc
Lastly, Congress also justified DOMA as a means of
conserving government resources. (BLAG Mot. to Dismiss at 32.)
An interest in conserving the public fisc alone, however, "can
hardly justify the classification used in allocating those
er, 457 U.S. at 227. After all, excluding any
---"----
resources."
"arbitrari chosen group of individuals from a government
program" conserves government resources. ch v. u.s.
't of the
2011). With no other rational basis to support it, Congress's
interest in economy does not suffice. Accord, :.:_9_:_, ch
op. at 26
(N.D. Cal. May 24, 2012); Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 994 95.
25
29 of 53
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment lS GRANTED and Defendant-Intervenor's motion to dismiss
is DENIED. The Court declares that section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, is unconstitutional as applied to
Plaintiff. Plaintiff is awarded judgment in the amount of
$353,053.00, plus interest and costs allowed by law. Each party
shall bear their own costs and fees.
This case is CLOSED. The clerk of the court is directed to
terminate the motions at docket numbers 28, 49, and 52.
SO ORDERED:
Dated: New York, New York
June 6, 2012
B & ~ ; i ~
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
26
30 of 53

EXHIBIT B
31 of 53
of t4t 1\ttllrntt!
Betg m. Ql. 205:30
February 23, 2011
The Honorable John A. Boehner
Speaker
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Re: Defense of Marriage Act
Dear Mr. Speaker:
After careful consideration, including review of a recommendation from me, the
President of the United States has made the determination that Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act ("DOMA"), 1 U.S.C. 7,
1
as applied to same-sex couples who are legally married
under state law, violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 530D, I am writing to advise you of the Executive Branch's determination and to
inform you of the steps the Department will take in two pending DOMA cases to implement that
determination.
While the Department has previously defended DOMA against legal challenges involving
legally married same-sex couples, recent lawsuits that challenge the constitutionality of DOMA
Section 3 have caused the President and the Department to conduct a new examination of the
defense ofthis provision. In particular, in November 2011, plaintiffs filed two new lawsuits
challenging the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA in jurisdictions without precedent on
whether sexual-orientation classifications are subject to rational basis review or whether they
must satisfy some form of heightened scrutiny. Windsor v. United States, No. l:1O-cv-8435
(S.D.N.Y.); Pedersen v. OPM, No. 3:10-cv-1750 (D. Conn.). Previously, the Administration has
defended Section 3 in jurisdictions where circuit courts have already held that classifications
I DOMA Section 3 states: "In detennining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation ofthe various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage' means
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."
Case 1:10-cv-08435-BSJ-JCF Document 10-2 Filed 02/25/11 Page 1 of 6 Case: 12-2335 Document: 25-1 Page: 32 06/13/2012 635936 38
32 of 53
based on sexual orientation are subject to rational basis review, and it has advanced arguments to
defend DOMA Section 3 under the binding standard that has applied in those cases.
2
These new lawsuits, by contrast, will require the Department to take an affirmative
position on the level of scrutiny that should be applied to DOMA Section 3 in a circuit without
binding precedent on the issue. As described more fully below, the President and I have
concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny and that,
as applied to same-sex couples legally married under state law, Section 3 of DOMA is
unconstitutional.
Standard of Review
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the appropriate level of scrutiny for classifications
based on sexual orientation. It has, however, rendered a number of decisions that set forth the
criteria that should inform this and any other judgment as to whether heightened scrutiny applies:
(1) whether the group in question has suffered a history of discrimination; (2) whether
individuals "exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a
discrete group"; (3) whether the group is a minority or is politically powerless; and (4) whether
the characteristics distinguishing the group have little relation to legitimate policy objectives or
to an individual's "ability to perform or contribute to society." See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S.
587,602-03 (1987); City a/Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Crr., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985).
Each of these factors counsels in favor of being suspicious of classifications based on
sexual orientation. First and most importantly, there is, regrettably, a significant history of
purposeful discrimination against gay and lesbian people, by governmental as well as private
entities, based on prejudice and stereotypes that continue to have ramifications today. Indeed,
until very recently, states have "demean[ed] the[] existence" of gays and lesbians "by making
their private sexual conduct a crime." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).3
2 See, e.g., Dragovich v. Us. Department ofthe Treasury, 2011 WL 175502 (N .D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2011); Gill v. Office
ofPersonnel Management, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); Smelt v. County ofOrange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861,
880 (C.D. Cal.,2005); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 145
(Bkrtcy. W.D. Wash. 2004); In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925,931 (9th CiT. E.D.R. Plan Administrative Ruling 2009).
3 While significant, that history of discrimination is different in some respects from the discrimination that burdened
African-Americans and women. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 216 (1995)(classifications
based on race "must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central purpose ofthe Fourteenth Amendment
was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States," and "[t]his strong policy
renders racial classifications 'constitutionally suspect."'); United States v, Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)
(observing that '''our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination'" and pointing out the
denial ofthe right to vote to women until 1920). In the case of sexual orientation, some of the discrimination has
been based on the incorrect belief that sexual orientation is a behavioral characteristic that can be changed or subject
to moral approbation. Cf Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (heightened scrutiny may be warranted for characteristics
"beyond the individual's control" and that "very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of' the
group at issue); Boy Scouts ofAmerica v, Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Unfavorable opinions
about homosexuals 'have ancient roots. '" (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
2
33 of 53
Second, while sexual orientation carries no visible badge, a growing scientific consensus
accepts that sexual orientation is a characteristic that is immutable, see Richard A. Posner, Sex
and Reason 101 (1992); it is undoubtedly unfair to require sexual orientation to be hidden from
view to avoid discrimination, see Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of201O, Pub. L. No. 111
321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010).
Third, the adoption of laws like those at issue in Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996),
and Lawrence, the longstanding ban on gays and lesbians in the military, and the absence of
federal protection for employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation show the
group to have limited political power and "ability to attract the [favorable] attention of the
lawmakers." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445. And. while the enactment of the Matthew Shepard Act
and pending repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell indicate that the political process is not closed
entirely to gay and lesbian people, that is not the standard by which the Court has judged
"political powerlessness." Indeed, when the Court ruled that gender-based classifications were
subject to heightened scrutiny, women already had won major political victories such as the
Nineteenth Amendment (right to vote) and protection under Title VII (employment
discrimination).
Finally, there is a growing acknowledgment that sexual orientation "bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(plurality). Recent evolutions in legislation (including the pending repeal of Don't Ask, Don't
Tell), in community practices and attitudes, in case law (including the Supreme Court's holdings
in Lawrence and Romer), and in social science regarding sexual orientation all make clear that
sexual orientation is not a characteristic that generally bears on legitimate policy objectives. See,
e.g., Statement by the President on the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of2010 ("It is time to
recognize that sacrifice, valor and integrity are no more defined by sexual orientation than they
are by race or gender, religion or creed.")
To be sure, there is substantial circuit court authority applying rational basis review to
sexual-orientation classifications. We have carefully examined each of those decisions. Many
of them reason only that if consensual same-sex sodomy may be criminalized under Bowers v.
Hardwick, then it follows that no heightened review is appropriate a line of reasoning that does
not survive the overruling of Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, 538 U.S. 558 (2003).4 Others rely on
claims regarding "procreational responsibility" that the Department has disavowed already in
litigation as unreasonable, or claims regarding the immutability of sexual orientation that we do
not believe can be reconciled with more recent social science understandings.
5
And none
4 See Equality Foundation v, City o/Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 266-67 & n. 2. (6th Cir. 1995); Steffan v. Perry, 41
F.3d 677, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989); Padula v, Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
5See. e.g., Lofton v. Secretary o/the Dep't o/Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (lith Cir. 2004)
(discussing child-rearing rationale); High Tech Gays v. De/ense Indust. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571
(9th Cir. 1990) (discussing immutability). As noted, this Administration has already disavowed in litigation the
3
34 of 53
-----------------------------------------
engages in an examination of all the factors that the Supreme Court has identified as relevant to a
decision about the appropriate level of scrutiny. Finally, many of the more recent decisions have
relied on the fact that the Supreme Court has not recognized that gays and lesbians constitute a
suspect class or the fact that the Court has applied rational basis review in its most recent
decisions addressing classifications based on sexual orientation, Lawrence and Romer.
6
But
neither of those decisions reached, let alone resolved, the level of scrutiny issue because in both
the Court concluded that the laws could not even survive the more deferential rational basis
standard.
Application to Section 3 of nOMA
In reviewing a legislative classification under heightened scrutiny, the government must
establish that the classification is "substantially related to an important government objective."
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988). Under heightened scrutiny, "a tenable justification
must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently grounded."
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,535-36 (1996). "The justification must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation." Id. at 533.
In other words, under heightened scrutiny, the United States cannot defend Section 3 by
advancing hypothetical rationales, independent of the legislative record, as it has done in circuits
where precedent mandates application of rational basis review. Instead, the United States can
defend Section 3 only by invoking Congress' actual justifications for the law.
Moreover, the legislative record underlying DOMA's passage contains discussion and
debate that undermines any defense under heightened scrutiny. The record contains numerous
expressions reflecting moral disapproval of gays and lesbians and their intimate and family
relationships - precisely the kind of stereotype-based thinking and animus the Equal Protection
Clause is designed to guard against.
7
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 ("mere negative attitudes, or
argument that DOMA serves a governmental interest in "responsible procreation and child-rearing." H.R. Rep. No.
104-664, at 13. As the Department has explained in numerous filings, since the enactment of DOMA, many leading
medical, psychological, and social welfare organizations have concluded, based on numerous studies, that children
raised by gay and lesbian parents are as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexual parents.
6 See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008); Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir.
2006); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir. 2004); Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 732 (4th Cir. 2002);
Equality Foundation ofGreater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City afCincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 292-94 (6th Cir. 1997).
7 See. e.g., H.R. Rep. at 15-16 (judgment [opposing same-sex marriage] entails both moral disapproval of
homosexuality and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo
Christian) morality"); id. at 16 (same-sex marriage "legitimates a public union, a legal status that most people ...
feel ought to be illegitimate" and "put[s] a stamp ofapproval ... on a union that many people ... think is
immoral"); id. at 15 ("Civil laws that permit only heterosexual marriage reflect and honor a collective moral
judgment about human sexuality"); id. (reasons behind heterosexual marriage-procreation and child-rearing-are
"in accord with nature and hence have a moral component"); id. at 31 (favorably citing the holding in Bowers that an
"anti-sodomy law served the rational purpose of expressing the presumed belief ... that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable"); id. at 17 n.56 (favorably citing statement in dissenting opinion in Romer that "[t]his
Court has no business ... pronouncing that 'animosity' toward homosexuality is evil").
4
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fear" are not permissible bases for discriminatory treatment); see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 635
(rejecting rationale that law was supported by "the liberties of landlords or employers who have
personal or religious objections to homosexuality"); Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)
("Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect.").
Application to Second Circuit Cases
After careful consideration, including a review of my recommendation, the President has
concluded that given a number of factors, including a documented history of discrimination,
classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny.
The President has also concluded that Section 3 of DOMA, as applied to legally married same
sex couples, fails to meet that standard and is therefore unconstitutionaL Given that conclusion,
the President has instructed the Department not to defend the statute in Windsor and Pedersen,
now pending in the Southern District of New York and the District of Connecticut. I concur in
this determination.
Notwithstanding this determination, the President has informed me that Section 3 will
continue to be enforced by the Executive Branch. To that end, the President has instructed
Executive agencies to continue to comply with Section 3 of DOMA, consistent with the
Executive's obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, unless and until Congress
repeals Section 3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive verdict against the law's
constitutionality. This course of action respects the actions of the prior Congress that enacted
DOMA, and it recognizes the judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.
As you know, the Department has a longstanding practice of defending the
constitutionality of duly-enacted statutes if reasonable arguments can be made in their defense, a
practice that accords the respect appropriately due to a coequal branch of government. However,
the Department in the past has declined to defend statutes despite the availability of
professionally responsible arguments, in part because the Department does not consider every
plausible argument to be a "reasonable" one. "[D]ifferent cases can raise very different issues
with respect to statutes of doubtful constitutional validity," and thus there are "a variety of
factors that bear on whether the Department will defend the constitutionality of a statute." Letter
to Hon. Orrin G. Hatch from Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois at 7 (Mar. 22, 1996). This
is the rare case where the proper course is to forgo the defense of this statute. Moreover, the
Department has declined to defend a statute "in cases in which it is manifest that the President
has concluded that the statute is unconstitutional," as is the case here. Seth P. Waxman,
Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L.Rev. 1073, 1083 (2001).
In light of the foregoing, I will instruct the Department's lawyers to immediately inform
the district courts in Windsor and Pedersen of the Executive Branch's view that heightened
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review and that, consistent with that standard, Section 3 of
5
36 of 53
DOMA may not be constitutionally applied to same-sex couples whose marriages are legally
recognized under state law. If asked by the district courts in the Second Circuit for the position
ofthe United States in the event those courts determine that the applicable standard is rational
basis, the Department will state that, consistent with the position it has taken in prior cases, a
reasonable argument for Section 3's constitutionality may be proffered under that permissive
standard. Our attorneys will also notifY the courts of our interest in providing Congress a full
and fair opportunity to participate in the litigation in those cases. We will remain parties to the
case and continue to represent the interests of the United States throughout the litigation.
Furthermore, pursuant to the President's instructions, and upon further notification to
Congress, I will instruct Department attorneys to advise courts in other pending DOMA litigation
of the President's and my conclusions that a heightened standard should apply, that Section 3 is
unconstitutional under that standard and that the Department will cease defense of Section 3.
A motion to dismiss in the Windsor and Pedersen cases would be due on March 11,2011.
Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions.
Sincerely yours,
Eric H. Holder, Jr.
Attorney General
6
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CLARA SPYER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

No. 12-2335

v.

Defendant,

REPRESENTATIVES,
Appellant.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 13, 2012, I caused the foregoing
Motion and Declaration to be served upon all counsel of record
electronically via ECF, with copies sent via email and Federal Express to:
Jean Lin
Senior Trial Counsel
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Roberta A. Kaplan
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
New York, NY 10019-6064
(212) 373-3000
38 of 53


CLARA SPYER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

No. 12-2335

v.

Defendant,

REPRESENTATIVES,
Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES
MOTION FOR AN EXPEDITED APPEAL

We respectfully request that this Court grant expedited consideration
of the appeal from the ruling of the District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Jones, J.) that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (or DOMA) is
unconstitutional.
Plaintiff-Appellee Edith Schlain Windsor, now just days shy of her
83rd birthday and the victim of a heart attack within the past three months, seeks
this expedited relief so that she, not her estate, may see justice achieved within her
lifetime. For forty-four years, Ms. Windsor lived in a committed union with Thea
Spyer. They married in 2007; Ms. Spyer, gravely ill when they wed, died less than
39 of 53

2
two years later, naming Ms. Windsor as her sole executor. Owing solely to
DOMA, which requires the federal government to disregard state-recognized
marriages between same-sex couples, the Internal Revenue Service charged the
Spyer estate over $363,000 in taxes that would not have applied to a heterosexual
widow.
Unique among the federal circuits, every state within this Circuit
expressly permits marriages between same-sex couples. This Courts instruction is
needed to clarify that the conflict between DOMA and laws of the states within
this Circuit should be resolved in favor of the U.S. Constitution, as the court below
held. This Court should quickly assure that Ms. Windsors rights are vindicated,
not to mention those of countless other same-sex couples within New York,
Connecticut, and Vermont.
Accordingly, we respectfully request that this Court set an expedited
briefing schedule. Indeed, the parties do not disagree that this appeal should be
expedited. What they do disagree on is the proposed schedule.
Ms. Windsor respectfully requests that this Court enter a schedule
whereby Intervenor-Defendant-Appellants brief is due no later than July 6, 2012;
Plaintiff-Appellees brief is due no later than July 27, 2012 (with any brief by the
United States due on the same day); and Intervenor-Defendant-Appellants reply
brief is due no later than August 10, 2012. This schedule works no hardship on
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3
any party since the issues have been exhaustively treated below. A slower
schedule would work hardship on Ms. Windsor. By contrast, during a meet and
confer with counsel for Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant, counsel proposed the
following schedule: Intervenor-Defendant-Appellants brief due on July 30, 1012;
Plaintiff-Appellees brief due on August 31, 2012;
1
and Intervenor-Defendant-
Appellants reply brief due on September 21, 2012.
2

This Court should grant Ms. Windsors application and order the
schedule requested by the instant motion.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Appellee and Her Action
Edith (Edie) Windsor, almost 83 years of age, is the sole executor of
the estate of her late spouse, Thea Clara Spyer. (District Court Order at 34,
Kaplan Decl. Ex. A.)
3
Prior to Theas death in February 2009, Edie and Thea
spent over forty-four years together in a loving, committed union, and they were
finally married in Toronto, Canada on May 22, 2007, after a nearly four-decade

1
Plaintiff-Appellee is ready and willing to file her opposition brief far more
quickly than the schedule proposed by Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant. This
would ensure that her appeal proceeds as expeditiously as possible and should
have no impact on counsel for Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant.
2
Counsel for Defendant the United States of America consents to expedition of
the appeal but takes no position on which of the proposed schedules should be
adopted.
3
Citations in the form of Kaplan Decl. refer to the Declaration of Roberta A.
Kaplan, dated June 13, 2012.
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4
long engagement. (Id. at 3.) Shortly after Thea died, Edie suffered a major heart
attack brought on by stress cardiomyopathy, commonly known as broken heart
syndrome. (Aff. of Edith Schlain Windsor 29 (dated June 23, 2011), Windsor v.
United States, 10 Civ. 8435 (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 31.)
Although New York State recognized their out-of-state marriage, the
federal government did not: Section 3 of DOMA requires the federal government
to disregard marriages that are valid under state law if they are not between one
man and one woman. Consequently, the Internal Revenue Service treated Edie and
Thea as legal strangers. Solely because of DOMA, the federal government
imposed more than $363,000 in federal estate tax on Theas estate, significantly
reducing Edies inheritance. (District Court Order at 4.) If Ms. Windsor had been
a heterosexual widow, her estate tax bill would have been $0the marital
exemption to the federal estate tax would have eliminated all federal estate taxes.
See 26 U.S.C. 2056(a).
On November 9, 2010, Ms. Windsor filed suit in the District Court
seeking a refund of the federal estate tax levied on and paid by Theas estate and a
declaration that Section 3 of DOMA violates the equal protection guarantee
secured by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (District Court
Order at 4.) Yet, due to circumstances beyond her control, consideration of
42 of 53

5
Ms. Windsors claims was significantly delayed while the executive branch
considered how to respond to her suit.
Since then, Ms. Windsors health has deteriorated further. On March
7, 2012, she suffered another heart attack. As a result of several other ailments and
the complications from her serious heart condition, over the past several months
she has been under continued medical supervision (both in and out of the hospital),
and has been confined to her apartment for long periods of time. Ms. Windsors
cardiac condition has resulted in her having a defibrillator and pacemaker
surgically implanted in her chest. And given the complications caused by past
medical interventions (although wholly well-intentioned) after the heart attack she
sustained in 2009 following Theas death, Ms. Windsor has made it clear that she
is not willing to have a stent inserted if she suffers another serious heart attack.
Time, then, for this constitutionally injured plaintiff, is of the essence.
The Governments Response
On February 23, 2011, more than four months after Ms. Windsors
suit was filed, and after having carefully considered the constitutionality of Section
3 of DOMA, the President and the Attorney General of the United States
announced that they had determined that heightened judicial scrutiny is the
appropriate standard of review for government classifications based on sexual
orientation and that, under that standard, Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional.
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6
(Id. at 4.) Such consideration was required because, in contrast to suits in
jurisdictions where circuit courts have already held that classifications based on
sexual orientation are subject to rational basis review, Ms. Windsors suit in the
Southern District of New York and a companion case filed in the District of
Connecticut would require the Department [of Justice] to take an affirmative
position on the level of scrutiny that should be applied to DOMA Section 3 in a
circuit without binding precedent on the issue. (Ltr. from Atty Gen. Holder to
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Boehner (Feb. 23, 2011), at 12,
Kaplan Decl. Ex. B.) Accordingly, the executive branch ceased defense of DOMA
in this suit. (District Court Order at 4.)
On April 18, 2011, seven weeks after the Attorney Generals
announcement, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of
Representatives, or BLAG, filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of defending
the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA, which was granted. (See id.) In light
of concerns about Ms. Windsors age and health, Magistrate Judge Francis set an
expedited discovery and briefing schedule, and fully briefed cross-motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment were submitted to the District Court on
September 9 and September 15, 2011, respectively.
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7
The Ruling Below
On June 6, 2012, the District Court granted summary judgment to
Plaintiff-Appellee, issuing an Order holding that Section 3 of DOMA does not
pass constitutional muster. (Id.at 14.) The District Court so ruled without
deciding whether a heightened level of judicial scrutiny should apply to laws
such as Section 3 of DOMAthat discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
(Id. at 17.)
On June 8, 2012, BLAG filed its notice of appeal.
ARGUMENT
This case presents a clear, yet vitally significant question of
constitutional law: Does the federal government violate the equal protection
provisions of the Constitution when it departs from its long-standing practice of
deferring to state determinations on whether a couple is married, solely because
Edith Windsors state-recognized marriage was to a woman, instead of a man?
The District Court properly held that the answer to this question is yes.
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 2, this Court has the
power to suspend any other provision of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
to expedite its decision or for other good cause. Furthermore, this Court is
generous in granting motions to expedite. In re Iceland Inc., 112 F.3d 504 (2d
Cir. 1997) (table). As set forth below, expedited consideration of this appeal is
45 of 53

8
particularly warranted here.
1. Edith Windsors Age and Medical Condition
Of paramount importance, Edith Windsor is almost 83 years old and
suffers from a serious heart condition, which manifested in her latest heart attack
on March 7, 2012, requiring her to be admitted to Mount Sinai hospital for several
days. As a result of several ailments and due to complications from her serious
heart condition, over the past several months Ms. Windsor has been under
continued medical supervision (both in and out of the hospital) and has been
confined to her apartment for long periods of time.
Ms. Windsors advanced age and uncertain health seriously threaten
her ability to participate in the process of vindicating her constitutional rights.
Because the ruling below is entitled to an automatic stay of enforcement,
Ms. Windsor will not receive the benefit of that ruling pending this appeal. See 28
U.S.C. 2414.
4
She must await this Courts ruling before the Government must
return the unconstitutional levy imposed on her. Such considerations manifestly
support expedited consideration of this appeal.
2. The Importance of a Decision by the Second Circuit
Moreover, this Circuit is uniquely poised to address the issues here.

4
Although the appeal in this case was filed by Intervenor-Defendant BLAG, the
judgment against the United States is still automatically stayed pending
resolution of the appeal.
46 of 53

9
In light of New York States legislative decision last year to extend marriage to
same-sex couples, each of the three states in this Circuit not only recognizes, but
expressly provides for marriage for same-sex couples, making the Second Circuit
the only federal circuit in which all states provide for such marriages. See N.Y.
Dom. Rel. Law 10-a; Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-20; 15 Vt. Stat. Ann. 8.
Unfortunately, however, legally married same-sex couples residing in
each state are still subject to continued constitutional injury pursuant to DOMA.
Section 3 of DOMA has daily negative effects on the lives of married same-sex
couples in a multitude of ways. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Dept of Health &
Human Servs., Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214, 2012 WL 1948017, at *1 (1st Cir.
May 31, 2012) (noting that DOMA affects a thousand or more generic cross-
references to marriage in myriad federal laws); Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that Section 3 of DOMA
drastically alter[ed] the benefits structure based on state definitions of marriage
and the federalist balance in the area of domestic relations); Gill v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 37983 (D. Mass. 2010) (addressing the broad impact
of Section 3 of DOMA).
Indeed, because the United States continues to enforce DOMA,
legally married same-sex couples throughout this Circuit (and this country)
continue to be subject to the unconstitutional burdens of this law, including those
47 of 53

10
related to entitlement programs, such as Social Security, health benefits and
taxation. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d. at 379. In light of the continued enforcement of
DOMA, it is vitally important that the Second Circuit be heard on this issue and be
heard as expeditiously as possible in order to ensure that legally married same-sex
couples in New York, Connecticut, and Vermont are protected from the daily
unconstitutional burdens that DOMA imposes.
3. This Court May Provide Guidance on the Appropriate
Level of Scrutiny for Laws that Discriminate on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation

Whether this Court reaches the issue that gave rise to the current
administrations reluctance to defend the law at issuespecifically, the appropriate
standard of judicial scrutiny to apply to laws that classify on the basis of sexual
orientationis an issue of judicial prudence beyond the scope of this application.
(See Order at 14 (denying Ms. Windsors request to decide, as a matter of first
impression in the Second Circuit, whether homosexuals are a suspect class); Ltr.
from Atty Gen. at 1.) In its recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, like the court below, declined to reach this question, holding that prior
First Circuit precedent has already declined to create a major new category of
suspect classification for statutes distinguishing based on sexual preference.
Massachusetts, 2012 WL 1948017, at *4 (citing Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st
Cir. 2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763( 2009)).
48 of 53

11
Even beyond the immediate merits of the instant appeal, however,
courts in this Circuit and beyond would benefit greatly from this Courts reasoned
consideration of this increasingly important question of constitutional
jurisprudence, as each of the aforementioned cases holding Section 3 of DOMA
unconstitutional was decided in a circuit where stale precedent governed. See, e.g.,
id.; Dragovich v. Dept of Treasury, No. C 10-01564 (CW), 2012 WL 1909603, at
*9 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2012) (Although the Ninth Circuit may revisit its ruling
that gay men and lesbians do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the
Court tests the constitutionality of 3 of the DOMA . . . pursuant to current Ninth
Circuit law, by applying rational basis review.); cf. Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at
985 (holding that the outdated holding [of the Ninth Circuit], subjecting gay men
and lesbians to rational basis review, is no longer binding precedent). Our
primary concern here, however, is more human: Ms. Windsor ought to get her
estate tax refund while she is still alive to enjoy it.
4. An Expedited Schedule Will Not Burden BLAG
Finally, our proposed schedule, while admittedly aggressive, is
reasonable under the circumstances. As indicated above, BLAG has already
consented to an expedited schedule, although not as expedited as the one that we
propose. We respectfully submit that filing merits briefs quickly in this case would
not present an undue hardship because counsel for BLAG have now submitted
49 of 53

12
briefs on the merits of these constitutional issues multiple times, including twice at
the appellate level. See Massachusetts, 2012 WL 1948017; Brief of Intervenor-
Defendant-Appellant, Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Nos. 12-15388, 12-15409
(9th Cir. June 4, 2012), ECF No. 36.
5
While factual differences exist between
these litigations, the core legal issues are exactly the same. Furthermore, as noted,
the factual record in this appeal, which involves only a single plaintiff, is
straightforward and uncomplicated. The burden on BLAGs counsel should
therefore not be substantial, particularly when weighed against the daily hardships
encountered by married same-sex couples in this Circuit and the very real risks
engendered by Ms. Windsors advanced age and precarious health.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Plaintiff-Appellee respectfully requests the
Court to order the following expedited schedule for consideration of this appeal:
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellants brief due no later than July 6, 2012; Plaintiff-
Appellees brief due no later than July 27, 2012 (with any brief by the United
States due by the same day); Intervenor-Defendant-Appellants reply brief due no
later than August 10, 2012. Should the Court not order the above schedule,
Plaintiff-Appellees counsel agrees to submit responsive papers on whatever

5
See also Dragovich, 2012 WL 1909603; Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968; Lui v.
Holder, No. 2:11-cv-01267 (SVW) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011); Revelis v.
Napolitano, 11-cv-1991 (N.D. Ill.), ECF Nos. 40, 54; Pedersen v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., No. 3:10-cv-01750 (D. Conn.), ECF Nos. 81, 82, 102.
50 of 53

13
accelerated schedule this Court deems just and appropriate (including of course a
modified version of the schedule already agreed to by counsel for Intervenor-
Defendant-Appellant). Plaintiff-Appellee also respectfully requests that oral
argument be scheduled as soon as possible upon the conclusion of the briefing.
Dated: New York, New York
June 13, 2012
51 of 53

14
Respectfully submitted,

Roberta A. Kaplan
Andrew J. Ehrlich
Jaren Janghorbani
New York, New York 10019-6064
Tel. (212) 373-3000
Fax (212) 757-3990
rkaplan@paulweiss.com
aehrlich@paulweiss.com
jjanghorbani@paulweiss.com
James D. Esseks
Rose A. Saxe
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION FOUNDATION
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004-2400
Tel. (212) 549-2500
jesseks@aclu.org
rsaxe@aclu.org
Melissa Goodman
Arthur Eisenberg
Mariko Hirose
NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION FOUNDATION
125 Broad Street, 19th Floor
New York, New York 10004
Tel. (212) 607-3300
mgoodman@nyclu.org
aeisenberg@nyclu.org
mhirose@nyclu.org
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
Edith Schlain Windsor

52 of 53
CLARA SPYER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

No. 12-2335

v.

Defendant,

REPRESENTATIVES,
Appellant.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 13, 2012, I caused the foregoing
Memorandum to be served upon all counsel of record electronically via
ECF, with copies sent via email and Federal Express to:
Jean Lin
Senior Trial Counsel
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Roberta A. Kaplan
New York, NY 10019-6064
(212) 373-3000
53 of 53

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