OWASP Top 10 2010

The Top 10 Most Critical Web Application Security Risks Dave Wichers COO, Aspect Security OWASP Board Member dave.wichers@aspectsecurity.com dave.wichers@owasp.org
Copyright The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the OWASP License.

The OWASP Foundation OWASP - 2010

http://www.owasp.org/

Whats Changed?

OWASP - 2010

Mapping from 2007 to 2010 Top 10

=
=

= +

OWASP - 2010

OWASP Top 10 Risk Rating Methodology

1 2 3

Injection Example 1.66 weighted risk rating

OWASP - 2010

OWASP Top Ten (2010 Edition)

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10

OWASP - 2010

A1 Injection

OWASP - 2010

SQL Injection Illustrated

"SELECTSummary * FROM Account Account: accounts WHERE SKU: acct= OR 1=1-Acct:5424-6066-2134-4334 Acct:4128-7574-3921-0192 "

HTTP request APPLICATION

ATTACK Application Layer

HTTP SQL response query

AccountsTransactions Bus. Functions Administration E-Commerce Communication Finance Knowledge Mgmt Custom Code

DB Table

Acct:5424-9383-2039-4029 Acct:4128-0004-1234-0293

Human Resrcs Databases Directories Legacy Systems Web Services Billing

1. Application presents a form to the attacker 2. Attacker sends an attack in the form data 3. Application forwards attack to the database in a SQL query

App Server Web Server Hardened OS

4. Database runs query containing attack and sends encrypted results back to application
5. Application decrypts data as normal and sends results to the user

Network Layer

Firewall

Firewall

OWASP - 2010

A1 Avoiding Injection Flaws

Recommendations
1.Avoid the interpreter entirely, or 2.Use an interface that supports bind variables (e.g., prepared statements, or stored procedures), 3.Encode all user input before passing it to the interpreter Always perform white list input validation on all user supplied input Always minimize database privileges to reduce the impact of a flaw
Bind variables allow the interpreter to distinguish between code and data

References
For more details, read the new
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet

OWASP - 2010

A2 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

OWASP - 2010

Cross-Site Scripting Illustrated

1 Attacker sets the trap update my profile Application with stored XSS vulnerability

Attacker enters a malicious script into a web page that stores the data on the server

Victim views page sees attacker profile

Knowledge Finance Communication Accounts Transactions Bus. Functions Administration E-Commerce Custom Code Mgmt

Script runs inside victims browser with full access to the DOM and cookies

Script silently sends attacker Victims session cookie

OWASP - 2010

A2 Avoiding XSS Flaws

Recommendations
Eliminate Flaw

Defend Against the Flaw

Dont include user supplied input in the output page Primary Recommendation: Output encode all user supplied input (Use OWASPs ESAPI to output encode: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI Perform white list input validation on all user input to be included in page For large chunks of user supplied HTML, use OWASPs AntiSamy to sanitize this HTML to make it safe See: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/AntiSamy

References
For how to output encode properly, read the new
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet

(AntiSamy)
OWASP - 2010

Safe Escaping Schemes in Various HTML Execution Contexts

HTML Element Content
(e.g., <div> some text to display </div> )

HTML Attribute Values

(e.g., <input name='person' type='TEXT' value='defaultValue'> )

JavaScript Data
(e.g., <script> some javascript </script> )

HTML Style Property Values

(e.g., .pdiv a:hover {color: red; text-decoration: underline} )

URI Attribute Values

(e.g., <a href="javascript:toggle('lesson')" )

ALL other contexts CANNOT include Untrusted Data

Recommendation: Only allow #1 and #2 and disallow all others See: www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet for more OWASP - 2010 details

A3 Broken Authentication and Session Management

OWASP - 2010

Broken Authentication Illustrated

1 User sends credentials

www.boi.com?JSESSIONID=9FA1DB9EA... Site uses URL rewriting (i.e., put session in URL) 2

Knowledge AccountsCommunication Administration Bus. Funct Finance Transactions E-Commerce Mgmt Custom Code

User clicks on a link to http://www.hacker.com in a forum

Hacker checks referer logs on www.hacker.com and finds users JSESSIONID 5 Hacker uses JSESSIONID and takes over victims account

OWASP - 2010

A3 Avoiding Broken Authentication and Session Management

Verify your architecture
Authentication should be simple, centralized, and standardized Use the standard session id provided by your container Be sure SSL protects both credentials and session id at all times

Verify the implementation

Forget automated analysis approaches Check your SSL certificate Examine all the authentication-related functions Verify that logoff actually destroys the session Use OWASPs WebScarab to test the implementation

Follow the guidance from

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet

OWASP - 2010

A4 Insecure Direct Object References

OWASP - 2010

Insecure Direct Object References Illustrated

https://www.onlinebank.com/user?acct=6065

Attacker notices his acct parameter is 6065 ?acct=6065 He modifies it to a nearby number ?acct=6066 Attacker views the victims account information

OWASP - 2010

A4 Avoiding Insecure Direct Object References

Eliminate the direct object reference
Replace them with a temporary mapping value (e.g. 1, 2, 3) ESAPI provides support for numeric & random mappings
IntegerAccessReferenceMap & RandomAccessReferenceMap

http://app?file=Report123.xls
http://app?id=9182374
Access Reference Map

Report123.xls Acct:9182374

Validate the direct object reference

Query constraints work great!

Verify the parameter value is properly formatted Verify the user is allowed to access the target object Verify the requested mode of access is allowed to the target object (e.g., read, write, delete)

OWASP - 2010

A5 Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

OWASP - 2010

CSRF Vulnerability Pattern

The Problem
Web browsers automatically include most credentials with each request Even for requests caused by a form, script, or image on another site

All sites relying solely on automatic credentials are vulnerable!

Automatically Provided Credentials
Session cookie Basic authentication header IP address Client side SSL certificates Windows domain authentication (almost all sites are this way)

OWASP - 2010

CSRF Illustrated
1 Attacker sets the trap on some website on the internet (or simply via an e-mail)

Hidden <img> tag contains attack against vulnerable site

Application with CSRF vulnerability

While logged into vulnerable site, victim views attacker site

Knowledge AccountsTransactions Finance Communication Administration Bus. Functions E-Commerce Custom Code Mgmt

3 <img> tag loaded by browser sends GET request (including credentials) to vulnerable site Vulnerable site sees legitimate request from victim and performs the action requested
OWASP - 2010

A5 Avoiding CSRF Flaws

Add a secret, not automatically submitted, token to ALL sensitive requests
This makes it impossible for the attacker to spoof the request (unless theres an XSS hole in your application) Tokens should be cryptographically strong or random

Options

Store a single token in the session and add it to all forms and links

Beware exposing the token in a referer header Hidden fields are recommended Can have a unique token for each function Use a hash of function name, session id, and a secret Can require secondary authentication for sensitive functions (e.g., eTrade)

Hidden Field: <input name="token" value="687965fdfaew87agrde" type="hidden"/> Single use URL: /accounts/687965fdfaew87agrde Form Token: /accounts?auth=687965fdfaew87agrde

Dont allow attackers to store attacks on your site

Properly encode all input on the way out This renders all links/requests inert in most interpreters

See the new: www.owasp.org/index.php/CSRF_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet for more details

OWASP - 2010

A6 Security Misconfiguration

OWASP - 2010

Security Misconfiguration Illustrated

Database
AccountsTransactions Bus. Functions Administration E-Commerce Communication Finance Knowledge Mgmt Custom Code App Configuration

Framework App Server

Development

QA Servers Web Server Hardened OS Test Servers

Insider

Source Control

OWASP - 2010

A6 Avoiding Security Misconfiguration

Verify your systems configuration management
Secure configuration hardening guideline Must cover entire platform and application Keep up with patches for ALL components Analyze security effects of changes
This includes software libraries, not just OS and Server applications Automation is REALLY USEFUL here

Can you dump the application configuration

Build reporting into your process If you cant verify it, it isnt secure

Verify the implementation

Scanning finds generic configuration and missing patch problems

OWASP - 2010

A7 Insecure Cryptographic Storage

OWASP - 2010

Insecure Cryptographic Storage Illustrated

Victim enters credit card number in form

Communicatio Knowledge Accounts Administration Finance Transactions Functions E-Commerce Bus. Mgmt Custom Code n

Malicious insider steals 4 million credit card numbers

Log files Error handler logs CC details because merchant gateway is unavailable 3 2

Logs are accessible to all members of IT staff for debugging purposes

OWASP - 2010

A7 Avoiding Insecure Cryptographic Storage

Verify your architecture
Identify all sensitive data Identify all the places that data is stored Ensure threat model accounts for possible attacks Use encryption to counter the threats, dont just encrypt the data

Protect with appropriate mechanisms Use the mechanisms correctly

File encryption, database encryption, data element encryption

Use standard strong algorithms Generate, distribute, and protect keys properly Be prepared for key change

Verify the implementation

A standard strong algorithm is used, and its the proper algorithm for this situation All keys, certificates, and passwords are properly stored and protected Safe key distribution and an effective plan for key change are in place Analyze encryption code for common flaws

OWASP - 2010

A8 Failure to Restrict URL Access

OWASP - 2010

Failure to Restrict URL Access Illustrated

Attacker notices the URL indicates his role /user/getAccounts He modifies it to another directory (role) /admin/getAccounts, or /manager/getAccounts Attacker views more accounts than just their own

https://www.onlinebank.com/user/getAccounts

OWASP - 2010

A8 Avoiding URL Access Control Flaws

For each URL, a site needs to do 3 things
Restrict access to authenticated users (if not public) Enforce any user or role based permissions (if private) Completely disallow requests to unauthorized page types (e.g., config files, log files, source files, etc.) Use a simple, positive model at every layer Be sure you actually have a mechanism at every layer Forget automated analysis approaches Verify that each URL in your application is protected by either

Verify your architecture

Verify the implementation

Verify the server configuration disallows requests to unauthorized file types Use WebScarab or your browser to forge unauthorized requests

An external filter, like Java EE web.xml or a commercial product Or internal checks in YOUR code Use ESAPIs isAuthorizedForURL() method

OWASP - 2010

A9 Insufficient Transport Layer Protection

OWASP - 2010

Insufficient Transport Layer Protection Illustrated

External Victim
Custom Code Backend Systems

Business Partners

Employees
1 External attacker steals credentials and data off network External Attacker 2

Internal attacker steals credentials and data from internal network Internal Attacker

OWASP - 2010

A9 Avoiding Insufficient Transport Layer Protection

Protect with appropriate mechanisms
Use TLS on all connections with sensitive data Individually encrypt messages before transmission E.g., XML-Encryption Sign messages before transmission E.g., XML-Signature

Use the mechanisms correctly

Use standard strong algorithms (disable old SSL algorithms) Manage keys/certificates properly Verify SSL certificates before using them Use proven mechanisms when sufficient
E.g., SSL vs. XML-Encryption

See: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport_Layer_Protection_Cheat_Sheet for more details

OWASP - 2010

A10 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

OWASP - 2010

Unvalidated Redirect Illustrated

1 Attacker sends attack to victim via email or webpage
From: Internal Revenue Service Subject: Your Unclaimed Tax Refund Our records show you have an unclaimed federal tax refund. Please click here to initiate your claim.

Application redirects victim to attackers site

Victim clicks link containing unvalidated parameter

FinanceCommunication Accounts Transactions Bus. Functions Administration E-Commerce Knowledge Mgmt Custom Code

Request sent to vulnerable site, including attackers destination site as parameter. Redirect sends victim to attacker site

Evil Site

http://www.irs.gov/taxrefund/claim.jsp?year=2006 & &dest=www.evilsite.com

Evil site installs malware on victim, or phishs for private information

OWASP - 2010

Unvalidated Forward Illustrated

1
Attacker sends attack to vulnerable page they have access to

Request sent to vulnerable page which user does have access to. Redirect sends user directly to private page, bypassing access control. Application authorizes request, which continues to vulnerable page

public void sensitiveMethod( HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) { try { // Do sensitive stuff here. ... } catch ( ...

Filter

public void doPost( HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) { try { String target = request.getParameter( "dest" ) ); ... request.getRequestDispatcher( target ).forward(request, response); } catch ( ...

Forwarding page fails to validate parameter, sending attacker to unauthorized page, bypassing access control

OWASP - 2010

A10 Avoiding Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

There are a number of options
1.Avoid using redirects and forwards as much as you can 2.If used, dont involve user parameters in defining the target URL 3.If you must involve user parameters, then either

a)Validate each parameter to ensure its valid and authorized for the current user, or b)(preferred) Use server side mapping to translate choice provided to user with actual target page

Defense in depth: For redirects, validate the target URL after it is calculated to make sure it goes to an authorized external site ESAPI can do this for you!!
See: SecurityWrapperResponse.sendRedirect( URL )
http://owasp-esapijava.googlecode.com/svn/trunk_doc/org/owasp/esapi/filters/SecurityWrapperResponse.html#sendRedirect(java.lan g.String)

Some thoughts about protecting Forwards

Ideally, youd call the access controller to make sure the user is authorized before you perform the forward (with ESAPI, this is easy) With an external filter, like Siteminder, this is not very practical Next best is to make sure that users who can access the original page are ALL authorized to access the target page.
OWASP - 2010

Summary: How do you address these problems?

Develop Secure Code
Follow the best practices in OWASPs Guide to Building Secure Web Applications
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Guide

Use OWASPs Application Security Verification Standard as a guide to what an application needs to be secure Use standard security components that are a fit for your organization
Use OWASPs ESAPI as a basis for your standard components http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ASVS

Review Your Applications

Have an expert team review your applications Review your applications yourselves following OWASP Guidelines
OWASP Code Review Guide: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Code_Review_Guide OWASP Testing Guide: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_Guide
OWASP - 2010

OWASP (ESAPI)

Your Existing Enterprise Services or Libraries

ESAPI Homepage: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI
OWASP - 2010

Acknowledgements
Wed like to thank the Primary Project Contributors
Aspect Security for sponsoring the project Jeff Williams (Author who conceived of and launched Top 10 in 2003) Dave Wichers (Author and current project lead)

Organizations that contributed vulnerability statistics

Aspect Security MITRE Softtek WhiteHat Security

A host of reviewers and contributors, including:

Mike Boberski, Juan Carlos Calderon, Michael Coates, Jeremiah Grossman, Jim Manico, Paul Petefish, Eric Sheridan, Neil Smithline, Andrew van der Stock, Colin Watson, OWASP Denmark and Sweden Chapters

OWASP - 2010