Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 41 views

    Sistemas de Sensores en Red Lectura24

    Uploaded by

    marchelo_chelo
    The document describes SPINS, a set of security protocols for sensor networks proposed by Perrig et al. It addresses the challenges of providing security in resource-constrained sensor networks. The protocols included are SNEP for point-to-point communication security and μTESLA for broadcast authentication. SNEP provides data confidentiality, integrity and replay protection using symmetric cryptography. μTESLA enables broadcast authentication through delayed key disclosure and loose time synchronization. The protocols aim to fit security in sensor network scenarios with low computational resources and communication overhead.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Sistemas de Sensores en Red Lectura24

    Uploaded by

    marchelo_chelo
    41 views20 pages
    The document describes SPINS, a set of security protocols for sensor networks proposed by Perrig et al. It addresses the challenges of providing security in resource-constrained sensor networks. The protocols included are SNEP for point-to-point communication security and μTESLA for broadcast authentication. SNEP provides data confidentiality, integrity and replay protection using symmetric cryptography. μTESLA enables broadcast authentication through delayed key disclosure and loose time synchronization. The protocols aim to fit security in sensor network scenarios with low computational resources and communication overhead.

    Original Description:

    Networking, Sistemas de Sensores en Red, Networked Sensor Systems

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PPT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    The document describes SPINS, a set of security protocols for sensor networks proposed by Perrig et al. It addresses the challenges of providing security in resource-constrained sensor networks. The protocols included are SNEP for point-to-point communication security and μTESLA for broadcast authentication. SNEP provides data confidentiality, integrity and replay protection using symmetric cryptography. μTESLA enables broadcast authentication through delayed key disclosure and loose time synchronization. The protocols aim to fit security in sensor network scenarios with low computational resources and communication overhead.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as ppt, pdf, or txt
    41 views20 pages

    Sistemas de Sensores en Red Lectura24

    Uploaded by

    marchelo_chelo
    The document describes SPINS, a set of security protocols for sensor networks proposed by Perrig et al. It addresses the challenges of providing security in resource-constrained sensor networks. The protocols included are SNEP for point-to-point communication security and μTESLA for broadcast authentication. SNEP provides data confidentiality, integrity and replay protection using symmetric cryptography. μTESLA enables broadcast authentication through delayed key disclosure and loose time synchronization. The protocols aim to fit security in sensor network scenarios with low computational resources and communication overhead.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as ppt, pdf, or txt
    of 20

    Outline

    A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culler, and J.


    D. Tygar. SPINS: Security protocols for sensor
    networks. In Proceedings of MOBICOM, 2001
    Sensor networks and security are important
    Sensors are deployed in hostile territory. The
    communications are sparse because of energy
    constraints, the computational resources are sparse.
    However, attackers need not be energy constrained, they
    can replay packets, inject spurious packets etc. and
    affect the system
    How do we make security (heavy weight) fit into sensor
    scenarios (low resources)
    Slides courtesy Adrian Perrig

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 1

    Security in sensor networks


    Emergency response: responders need security
    Medical monitoring: automated drug delivery need security to ensure safety
    Logistics and inventory management:
    Battlefield management
    Security:
    Authentication
    Ensures data integrity & origin
    Prevents injecting bogus messages

    Confidentiality
    Ensures secrecy of data
    Prevents eavesdropping
    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 2

    Challenges
    Integrity of sensor: hard to manage without
    expensive crypto processors or ensuring physical
    security
    Key distribution is a challenge
    Dont want to store private keys in sensors
    Key strength weakens with time

    Freshness important
    Prevent replay attack
    Define notions of strong freshness (delay estimation, total
    ordering) and weak freshness (partial ordering)

    Keys are too long to store, much less process


    Authenticated broadcast challenging
    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 3

    Challenge: Resource Constraints


    Limited energy
    Limited computation (4 MHz 8-bit)
    Limited memory (512 bytes)
    Limited code size (8 Kbytes)
    ~3.5 K base code (TinyOS + radio encoder)
    Only 4.5 K for application & security

    Limited communication (30 byte packets)


    Energy-consuming communication
    1 byte transmission = 11000 instructions

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 4

    SPINS: Our Solution


    SNEP
    Sensor-Network Encryption Protocol
    Secures point-to-point communication

    TESLA
    Micro Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication
    Provides broadcast authentication

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 5

    System Assumptions
    Communication patterns
    Frequent node-base station exchanges
    Frequent network flooding from base
    Node-node interactions infrequent

    Base station
    Sufficient memory, power
    Shares secret key with each node

    Node
    Limited resources, limited trust

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 6

    SNEP Security Goals


    Secure point-to-point communication
    Confidentiality, secrecy
    Authenticity and integrity
    Message freshness to prevent replay

    Why not use existing protocols?


    E.g. SSL/TLS, IPSEC

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 7

    Encryption methods (background)


    Symmetric cryptography
    Sender and receiver know the secret key (apriori )
    Fast encryption, but key exchange should happen outside
    the system

    Asymmetric cryptography
    Each person maintains two keys, public and private
    M PrivateKey(PublicKey(M))
    M PublicKey (PrivateKey(M))

    Public part is available to anyone, private part is only


    known to the sender
    E.g. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), RSA

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 8

    Asymmetric Cryptography is Unsuitable


    Overhead of digital signatures

    High generation cost


    High verification cost
    High memory requirement
    High communication cost

    O(minutes)
    O(seconds)
    ~128 bytes

    SNEP only uses symmetric crypto

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 9

    Basic Crypto Primitives


    Code size constraints code reuse
    Only use block cipher encrypt function
    Counter mode encryption
    Cipher-block-chaining message authentication code
    (MAC)
    Pseudo-Random Generator

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 10

    SNEP Protocol Details


    A and B share
    Encryption keys: KAB KBA
    MAC keys: K'AB K'BA
    Counters: CA

    CB

    To send data D, A sends to B:


    A B:

    {D}<KAB, CA>
    MAC( K'AB , [CA || {D}<KAB, CA>] )

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 11

    SNEP Properties
    Secrecy & confidentiality
    Semantic security against chosen ciphertext attack
    (strongest security notion for encryption)

    Authentication
    Replay protection
    Code size: 1.5 Kbytes
    Strong freshness protocol in paper

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 12

    Broadcast Authentication
    Broadcast is basic communication mechanism
    Sender broadcasts data
    Each receiver verifies data origin

    Alice

    Sender

    M
    Bob
    07/30/16

    Dave

    M
    Carol
    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 13

    Simple MAC Insecure for Broadcast

    K
    Sender

    M, MAC(K,M)

    K
    07/30/16

    Alice

    M, MAC(K,M)
    Bob

    M', MAC(K,M') K
    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 14

    TESLA: Authenticated Broadcast


    Uses purely symmetric primitives
    Asymmetry from delayed key disclosure
    Self-authenticating keys
    Requires loose time synchronization
    Use SNEP with strong freshness

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 15

    TESLA Quick Overview I


    Keys disclosed 2 time intervals after use
    Receiver knows authentic K3

    Authentication of P1: MAC(K5, P1 )


    Authenticate K5
    K3

    K4

    Time 4
    Verify MAC

    07/30/16

    K5
    Time 5

    K6
    Time 6

    K7
    Time 7

    P1

    P2

    K3

    K5

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 16

    TESLA Quick Overview II


    Perfect robustness to packet loss

    Authenticate K5
    K3

    K4
    Time 4
    P1

    K5

    K6

    Time 5

    Time 6

    K7
    Time 7

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

    K2 K2

    K3

    K4

    K5

    Verify MACs
    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 17

    TESLA Properties
    Low overhead (1 MAC)
    Communication (same as SNEP)
    Computation (~ 2 MAC computations)

    Perfect robustness to packet loss


    Independent of number of receivers

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 18

    Energy Cost for Sending a Message


    Typical packet size: 28 bytes

    Security Computation 2%
    MAC transmission
    21%
    Data
    transmission
    77%
    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 19

    Conclusion
    Strong security protocols affordable
    First broadcast authentication

    Low security overhead


    Computation, memory, communication

    Apply to future sensor networks


    Energy limitations persist
    Tendency to use minimal hardware

    Base protocol for more sophisticated security


    services

    07/30/16

    CSE 4/60484: Networked Sensor Systems

    page 20

    You might also like