Learning From Failures: Case Studies

LEARNING FROM
FAILURES: CASE STUDIES
© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

IIT Madras, SERC Madras, Anna Univ., INSDAG 1
CONTENTS
• INTRODUCTION
• THE NEED FOR FORENSIC STUDIES
• POOR CONCEPTUAL DESIGN
• DESIGN INADEQUACY
• POOR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE DESIGNER AND THE
FABRICATOR
• POOR DETAILING
• POOR INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE
• POOR CONSTRUCTION DETAILING
• POOR CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES
• HIGH ETHICAL STANDARDS AND TIMELY ACTION PREVENT A
FAILURE
• INDIAN EXPERIENCE
• LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE GUJARAT EARTHQUAKE OF 26
JANUARY 2001
• CONCLUSION

THE NEED FOR FORENSIC STUDIES
• Post Mortem: exact science.

• Engineers are reluctant to discuss the causes
of design failures.
• Much learning from failures possible.
• Appreciation of causes of failure helps to refocus on
our conceptual understanding.
• Essential to assess our analytical models for successful
design.

THE NEED FOR FORENSIC STUDIES - I
• Many design decisions are based on engineering

judgement.
• Extensive design experience in an academic context
can provide limited perspectives in engineering
judgement
• Case histories of failures
illustrate invariably to examples of bad judgement.
provide insights into the tripwires in the early attempts
at innovative design and construction.
• Important new principles of engineering may be
brought out.

THE NEED FOR FORENSIC STUDIES - II
• CAUSES OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE
• Poor communication between design professionals.

• Poor communication between fabricators and
erectors.
• Bad workmanship.
• Compromises in professional ethics and failure to
appreciate the responsibility of the profession to
the community.

THE NEED FOR FORENSIC STUDIES - III
• OTHER COMMON CAUSES OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE
• Lack of appropriate professional design and construction

experience.
• Complexity of codes and specifications.
• Unwarranted belief in calculations and specified loads
and material properties.
• Inadequate preparation and review of contract and shop
drawings.
• Poor training of field inspectors.
• Compressed design and/or construction time.

POOR CONCEPTUAL DESIGN
• TACOMA NARROWS BRIDGE
• Tacoma Narrows Bridge was opened in 1940 across

Tacoma Narrows in Washington State.
• Destruction of Tacoma Narrows Bridge by aerodynamic

forces revolutionised the thinking of structural engineers.
• On Nov 7, 1940, with a wind speed of about 60 km/h , the

bridge crashed into the river below, after showing signs of
distress.

TACOMA NARROWS BRIDGE - I
Tacoma Narrows Bridge

TACOMA NARROWS BRIDGE - II
• Excessive vertical and torsional oscillations were the result

of extraordinary flexibility of the structure and a small
capacity to absorb the dynamic forces.
• Deck was too narrow for the span and the torsional rigidity
was inadequate.
• Insufficient flexural rigidity and little torsional rigidity plate
girders, provided for stiffening.
• Elevation caused wind vortices above and below the deck
in moderate and steady winds.
• From the day bridge was opened very substantial
horizontal and vertical movements of the deck in
waveforms were noticeable even in moderate wind and high
traffic.

TACOMA NARROWS BRIDGE - III
• CAUSES OF FAILURE
• Lack of proper understanding of aerodynamic forces and

knowledge of torsional rigidity in the whole profession.
• It was not realised by the designers that the aerodynamic
forces would affect a structure of such magnitude, despite
the fact that its flexibility was greatly in excess of that of
any other long span suspension bridge.
• LESSON
• It is dangerous to exceed the design paradigm without fully
understanding the forces and the limitations of applicability
of current design concepts.

MILLENNIUM BRIDGE AT LONDON
• Millennium Bridge at London ( opened in June 2000 ), is the
first London river crossing, after Tower Bridge and links St.
Paul's Cathedral (in the North Bank) and the new Tate
Modern and Globe Theatre (in the South Bank).
• In many ways it is an unusual structure. According to

Norman Foster, the Architect who claimed to have designed
it, the objective was ” to push the suspension bridge
technology as far as possible, to create a uniquely thin
bridge profile, forming a slender blade across the River
Thames".
• Bridge was made of Aluminium decking and stiffened by

suspension cables in the horizontal plane.

MILLENNIUM BRIDGE AT LONDON-I

MILLENNIUM BRIDGE AT LONDON-II
• Bridge swayed several inches from side to side when

people crossed it and many felt seasick while crossing.
• Bridge had to be closed to traffic after two days.
• No attempt was made to stiffen it in the vertical plane.

• Bridge was not adequately stiffened to resist gravity
loading, and vibrations.
• Engineers/Designers are hoping to install dampers (similar
to shock absorbers) to reduce the oscillations to a
minimum (acceptable) level.

MILLENNIUM BRIDGE AT LONDON-III
• LESSON
• This case study illustrates the dangers of over confidence

and unwarranted interference by other professionals in
the Engineer’s Design decisions.
• The Architect who designed it had extrapolated the
established Technology into untested (and dangerous)
situations. Apparently, this high profile architect over-
ruled the Engineer’s design proposals.
• All the suspension bridges should be adequate both with
respect to "strength" as well as "stiffness".

DESIGN INADEQUACY
Cleddau Bridge, Milford Haven, (UK)
• Failure of three box girder bridges during erection in

1970 in quick succession revealed the need for a radical
re-examination of the prevailing design methodology for
Thin Plated Structures and their erection.
• Bridge was designed as a single continuous box girder
of welded steel. On 2nd June 1970, the bridge failed
during its erection.
• Span that collapsed was the second one on the south
side.

Cleddau Bridge, Milford Haven, (UK) - I
Pier 2
N. abutment
Pier 1 Temporary trestle
Cantilever on north side of Bridge

S. abutment
Temporary trestle
Pier 6
Pier 5
South side cantilever

Cleddau Bridge, Milford Haven, (UK) - II
• Collapse was due to the buckling of a support diaphragm.

• Diaphragm was torn away from the sloping web near the
bottom, allowing compressive buckling of the lower portions
of the web and bottom flange.
• Tendency of bottom flange to buckle in compression (during
erection) increased by the reduction in the distance between
the flanges.
• Support diaphragm was, in effect, a transverse plate girder,
carrying heavy loads from the webs at the extreme ends and
supported by the bearings.

Cleddau Bridge, Milford Haven, (UK) -III
Diaphragm torn
away from web
here
Bearing
Elevation Section
Diaphragm over Pier6 of Milford Haven Bridge
• Shear of transverse girder and diffusion of the point load

from the bearings were compounded with the effects of
inclination of the webs of main girder.
• These produced an additional horizontal compression and
out-of-plane bending effects caused by bearing eccentricity.

Cleddau Bridge, Milford Haven, (UK) - IV
• Calculated design strength was found to be as low as

5000 kN while the total load transmitted by the
diaphragm to the bearings just before collapse was
computed as 9700 kN.
• This load would not have caused any problem provided

the diaphragm was designed to carry it.
• Failure was essentially due to design inadequacy.

CASE STUDIES OF POOR DETAILING
KING’S BRIDGE, MELBOURNE
• Opened in 1961, 15 months later it failed when 45-ton

vehicle was passing over it
• Collapse was prevented by a wall built for enclosing the
space under affected span
• Superstructure consisted of many spans
• Each carriageway was supported by four steel plate girders
spanning 30 m, and topped with R.C.C deck slab
• Each girder bottom flange was supplemented by an
additional cover plate in the region of high bending moment
with a continuous 5 mm fillet weld all around

KING’S BRIDGE, MELBOURNE - I
Stiffeners
Flange plate
30.5 m Cover Plate
Girder Elevation
Girder Cross section
Flange Plate Cover Plate
Fillet Weld
Fillet weld
KING’S BRIDGE, MELBOURNE -II
• Failure was due to brittle fracture and many other spans were
in danger of similar failure
• Cracks were found in the main tension flange plate of the
affected span under seven of the eight transverse fillet welds
• One crack had extended to such an extent that the tension
flange was completely severed, and the crack had extended
halfway up the web.
• Difficulties were experienced during welding. Special care to
avoid unnecessary restraints during welding was not taken,
despite the specifications
• Longitudinal welds were made before the transverse welds. As
a result there was a complete restraint against contraction,
when transverse welds were made

KING’S BRIDGE, MELBOURNE -III
• Cracks were caused in the main flange plate either in the

first run and later covered up by a subsequent one or in the
last run and later covered up by priming paint.
• Penetration of later paint coats into the cracks showed that

they had often extended further before the bridge was
opened for traffic
• Failure was due to carelessness of the fabricators and

maintenance inspectors.
• The most likely and most dangerous cracks were regularly

missed by inspectors. They carefully got the less harmful
longitudinal cracks cut out and repaired !

CASE STUDIES OF POOR JUDGEMENT
QUEBEC BRIDGE, CANADA
• Bridge was intended to carry rail traffic across the St.
Lawrence River at Quebec
• It was designed and built under the supervision of
Theodore Cooper, doyen of American bridge builders in the
late 19th century
• On 29 August 1907, the partially constructed south
cantilever arm of the Quebec Bridge in Canada collapsed
killing 75 workmen due to the grave error made in assuming
the dead load for the calculations
• Even when this error was subsequently noticed the
designer chose to ignore it, relying on the inherent margin
of safety in design.
• The bridge consisted of giant truss cantilevers on two main
piers, with a suspended span in the middle

QUEBEC BRIDGE, CANADA - I
• Two compression chords (made of lattice construction) in

the south cantilever arm failed by the shearing of their
rivets.
• As the distress spread through the entire superstructure,
the nineteen thousand tons of the south anchor, the
cantilever arms and the partially completed centre span
thundered down onto banks of the St.Lawrence River
• Originally the bridge was designed for a span of 1600 ft.

Later, the span was increased to 1800 ft, considering both
engineering and expenditure.

QUEBEC BRIDGE, CANADA - II
• Design calculations were revised but due to an oversight, the

added dead weight was not included in the calculations.
• After placing the first steelwork on site, it was found that the
working stresses were 7 to 10% greater than that allowed by
specification. But Cooper neglected it.
• During construction, Cooper was informed of the difficulties
encountered in riveting the bottom chord splices on account
of their faced ends not matching. But Cooper instructed that
the work should continue, as it was not a serious matter
• When work on the central, suspended span proceeded, the
rapidly increasing stresses (and the consequent buckles) on
the compression members became intolerable.
• Later the end details of the compression chords began to
buckle. The buckles started developing in an alarming fashion
leading to the collapse of the structure.

QUEBEC BRIDGE, CANADA - III
• LESSONS
• Main causes of failure; Designer had failed to provide the

main compressive load-bearing members with adequate
strength.
• Lacing system and the splice joints of the compression
members were not able to resist the effects of the buckling
tendency of the compression members.
• Some other factors that aggravated the failure were:
– Unusually high permissible stresses allowed in the

specification.
– Lack of communication between consultant, designers
and the site management

POOR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE
DESIGNER AND FABRICATOR
HYATT REGENCY WALKWAY COLLAPSE
• This failure illustrates
– professional responsibilities of structural engineers

– need for a uniform understanding of the means by
which specific responsibilities are communicated
between the members of project team.
• On 7th July 1981, Walkway collapsed killing 114 people

and injuring over 200.

Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapses - I
4th floor walkway
32 mm expansion
supporting joints
rods
2nd floor walkway
Dance competition on ground floor
Kansas City Hyatt Hotel: arrangement of walkways
Nut and Washer

under Channels
Hyatt
IIT Regency Hanger
Madras, SERC Details
Madras, Anna As-Designed
Univ., INSDAG 29
Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapses -II
Upper Hanger Rod from Ceiling

Concrete on steel deck
Steel Channels welded to

form transverse box beam
Nut and Washer

Hanger Rod to 2nd
floor walkway
Hyatt Regency Hanger Details As-Built

Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapses -III
2P in rod
2P in rod
Deck slab adds P Deck adds P
P at nut
2P at nut
P from lower deck P from lower deck
(a) (b)
Free-Body Diagram (a) As Designed (b) As Built
Upper
Hanger
pulled out
Lower hanger
© Teaching Resourcerod
in Design of Steel Structures
Pulled -Out Rod at Fourth-Floor Box Beam
Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapses -IV
• Two walkways were supported above one another and

suspended from the ceiling by hanger rods.
• Walkways were supported on box beams, made by welding
two steel channels.
• In original design a single rod supported the two walkways
but at the time of fabrication the originally designed hanger
detail was altered, without considering design implications.
• Second floor walkway was suspended from the fourth one
and hence connection between the fourth floor cross beam
and the hanger, supported double the load originally
intended.
• Examination after the collapse showed that the upper
hanger rod had pulled through the beam.
• Beam design was also unsatisfactory

Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapses -V
• LESSONS
• Shows carelessness of the engineer concerned as he

failed to understand the importance of the details he had
changed. He approved the change in originally designed
detail at the request of steel fabricator without even
checking the calculations!!!
• It also illustrates the importance of understanding the

force flow in the joints on what is often considered as
minor detail.

POOR INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE
SILVER BRIDGE COLLAPSE
• Considered to be first eyebar suspension bridge in U.S.A.:

Spanning Ohio River between Point Pleasant, West Virginia, and
Gallipolis, Ohio.
• On Dec 15, 1967 the bridge collapsed.
• Collapse of the bridge was caused by the failure of the eyebar at the
first panel point west of Ohio tower. As a result, the Ohio tower fell
eastward and the collapse continued eastward, causing the
West Virginia tower to fall eastward.
• Once the continuity of the suspension system was severed at first
panel point west of Ohio tower, the unbalanced forces on each
side of that joint caused the bridge to disintegrate totally.
• Two main elements that caused the failure : Extremely high
tensile stresses and corrosion on the inside of the eyebar.
Silver Bridge Collapse -I
• Chain composed of two bars - breaking of one bar would

inevitably result in total instantaneous collapse of the entire
bridge.
• Factor of safety for the eyebar design were too low compared to
the requirements of the original design.
• No consideration was given in the design to secondary stresses

arising from
– Inaccuracies in the manufacture of the bars.
– Stresses created by unbalanced loads.
– Unequal distribution of the total stress between the two
eyebars.
– Lack of complete free movement around the pins.

Silver Bridge Collapse -II
Detail of Eyebar Chain Joint

Silver Bridge Collapse -III
• Another undesirable feature of the design; the eye, where

the pin fits, was elongated 3 mm in a horizontal direction for
ease of erection. This created an air space where corrosion
could develop undetected and unabated.
• Inspection or lubrication of the inside of eyebar was

impossible without dismantling the joint.
• Combination of high tensile stresses and corrosion caused

a crack on the inside of the eyebar, under the pin.

Silver Bridge Collapse -IV
• LESSONS
• This collapse is considered to be one of the failures that had

been very influential. It led to the approval of the 1968 National
Bridge Inspection Standards by the U.S. Congress.
• Attention paid to eyebar trusses and details.

• In particular, tension members composed of two eyebars became
suspect and required special attention. Such lower chords were
strengthened or replaced.
• Attention given to all connections.

• floor beams to trusses, stringers to floor beams, trusses to
bearings, and so on. It became necessary to inspect these details
with great care.

POOR CONSTRUCTION
CRACKING IN SUSPENDED FLOORS OF A SCHOOL

BUILDING
• Concerns the cracking of a slab caused by the constructor
not paying attention to the requirements of the
Serviceability Limit State
• Important for structural engineers involved in Composite
Construction
• All the cracks were found on the top surfaces of the one-
way slabs, on each side of, and parallel to, the beams that
were supporting them.
• Poor workmanship was responsible for the cracking. There
are adverse deviations from the specifications in slab
thickness, effective depth, as well as reinforcement spacing

Cracking in suspended floors of a school building - I
• In the course of investigation, surface crack widths were

measured
Suspended floor slab parameters
Specification Measured range
Slab thickness (mm)100 100 83 - 106

Reinforcement spacing
top (mm) 225 235- 400
Effective depth
of top steel (mm) 75 35-55

POOR CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES
ROOF TRUSS COLLAPSE
• Designer did not have any field inspection responsibilities.
Construction was left to the hands of contractors who used
"customary" installation techniques that left the trusses
inadequately braced
• Building had been in service for six years.
• Roof of a shopping centre collapsed after two days of snow and
rain. Most of the trusses on one side of the centre beam had
collapsed and the top of the load-bearing wall was pushed out.
The centre beam was undamaged and undeflected
• Trusses that were still standing on affected side of the beam
had no lateral bracings and none of the internal diagonals had
any bracing. Lateral bracings were provided only for the
vertical members of the trusses at the beam bearing.

Roof Truss Collapse - I
• First diagonal members in compression were found to be out

of plane by several centimetres. They had failed as load
bearing members.
• Analysis showed that these members, when unbraced,
exceeded the allowable length to depth ratio for in plane
compression. They were not able to withstand the requisite
snow loading.
• Shop drawings showed that two lateral members were
required for the first diagonal and one brace was required for
the second diagonal. This information was either never
furnished to the installer or ignored by the installer.
• Many truss installers ignored the guidelines developed by the
manufacturers.

HIGH ETHICAL STANDARDS AND TIMELY
ACTION PREVENT A FAILURE
THE FIFTY NINE STOREY CRISIS
• An example of high ethical standards and professionalism

characteristic of a competent engineer involved in areas of
safety and welfare of the public.
• The Citicorp centre a fifty nine-storey tower in Manhattan,
New York, would have faced a major disaster if a serious
error in its design had not been detected in time.
• Tower had twenty five thousand individual steel jointed
elements.
• Supported on four massive two hundred and seventy eight
meter high columns, positioned at the centre of each side
allowing the building corners to cantilever twenty two
metres out.
The fifty Nine Storey Crisis - I
• Wind bracing system consisted of forty-eight braces. A

tuned mass damper was also provided to dampen the wind-
induced vibrations.
• Later it was found that the wind braces were not
checked for diagonal winds, which would result in a
40% increase in strain in some braces and a 160%
increase on the bolts at some levels of the building.
• Assumption of 40% increase in stress from diagonal winds
was theoretically correct, but it would go higher in reality,
when the storm lashed at the building.
• Despite the welded joints specified, bolted joints were
provided by the contractor as the welded joints were
considered to be expensive and stronger than necessary.

The fifty Nine Storey Crisis -II
• Weakest joint was discovered at the thirtieth floor and if that

one gave way, catastrophic failure of the whole structure
would have resulted.
• Statistical probability of occurrence of a storm was found to
be 1 in every 16 years. The probability of failure was further
reduced to 1 in 55 years if the tuned mass damper was taken
into account. But this machine required electric current,
which might fail as soon as a major storm hits.
• Le Meassurier learnt of these faults after the building was
completed and handed over. He brought these errors to the
notice of the owners of the building and persuaded them to
invest in his newly prepared rectification scheme.
• His honesty, courage, adherence to ethical and social
responsibility during this ordeal remains a testimony to the
high ideals of a true professional.
INDIAN EXPERIENCE
Improper Design Leads to Heavy Restoration
• Concerns a factory building near Nellore, India. Its an example
of errors committed in design due to inexperience and wrong
assumptions.
• Building was of size 25.7 m X 52.5 m. The roof was made up of
steel Pratt trusses supported on concrete columns. The entire
truss was exposed except for the bottom chord members,
which were embedded in concrete slab.
• After curing, when the scaffoldings were removed, the
deflection of the roof was found to be 100 mm (>L/325).
• From the analysis, it was found that most of the members of
the roof truss were not safe.

Improper Design Leads to Heavy Restoration - I
• Original designer of the truss, due to his inexperience,

considered the truss to support Asbestos sheeting, instead
of heavier concrete slab.
• Analysis considering only AC sheet roofing confirmed that
all the members of the roof would be safe for the reduced
loading.
• By the time the investigation started, the expensive
machinery were under installation at various parts of the
building.
• The repair of the roof had to be done without affecting the
work of installing these machineries.
• It was decided to strengthen the top and bottom flanges of
the top chord members by welding extra plates on them.

Improper Design Leads to Heavy Restoration - II
• It was decided to weld angles inside the web members of

the truss.
• Since the bottom chord member was inside the concrete
slab, it was not possible to add anything to the bottom
chords.
• It was recommended to provide temporary supports to the
truss at 1/3 point for welding extra plates and angles. But
the contractor welded the extra plates and angles without
the temporary supports. This resulted in the buckling of the
web of the top chord members.
• The web members in one or two trusses had also buckled.
• After careful consideration it was decided to reduce the
span of the truss which would eventually reduce the forces
in the members.

• Restoration of a factory building
• Deals with design error made by the designer due to

overconfidence in designing a factory building located at
about 100 km from Bombay that collapsed during a
windstorm in 1994
• Building was built using cold-formed channel members.The

structure was provided with column bracings in every sixth
bay. No gable end bracings were provided.
• Extra columns were provided at the gable end to support

the cladding. The structure was covered with asbestos
roofing and all the sides were covered with asbestos sheet
cladding.

Restoration of a factory building- I
Gable wall Ridge line
Column bracing
Front side
Gable end bracing

(not provided originally)
Rear side
Layout plan of the factory building
Restoration of a factory building- II
Cross section of collapsed frame

Restoration of a factory building- III
• Structure was designed to support a 4t gantry in each bay.

A crane bracket supported by the column which in turn
was supported the gantry
• Main causes of failure were found to be,
– Wind loads were not estimated properly as per IS:875

– Column and rafter sections were found to be inadequate
to resist the load; they did not even satisfy the main /r
ratio specified in the Code.
– During erection, the bracings were not connected
properly to the main members

Restoration of a factory building- IV
• For the restoration of the structure same channels were

used; but their spacing was altered to form a box section
with diagonal bracings of channel section.
• The span and bay width were kept the same. This
arrangement increased the moment of inertia of the section
along the frame and perpendicular to the frame.
• The rigidity of the structure increased considerably in both

the directions and the bending stress was found to be well
within the allowable range of stresses.

• Improper detailing results in delayed commissioning
• Deals with wrong detailing adopted by a designer that

resulted in delayed commissioning of the project. - A 144 m
X 60 m factory building constructed at Cochin, India.
• Building was made up of portal frames spanning 60 m and

placed at 6 m intervals. The portal frames were supported
alternately on columns and on lattice girder that was placed
longitudinally at the mid-span
• Portals and columns were made up of four angles, which

were laced to form a box section

Improper detailing results in delayed commissioning- I
Lattice girder support

Plan view of the structure
Improper detailing results in delayed commissioning-II
• The lattice girder and the central column were made up of 4

channels, laced to form a compound section. The sides of
the building were also covered by cladding from 1.5 m
above G.L.
• After the erection of portal frames and placing of asbestos

sheets, some problems were encountered
– The purlins and side cladding girts got twisted. This

resulted in the cracking of some AC sheets.
– Some columns (especially those supporting the
partitions) were not straight and gave a buckled column
appearance
– Most of the side cladding girts were sagging.

Improper detailing results in delayed commissioning - III
• Investigation showed that the purlins were not detailed

properly and were placed in the wrong orientation, which
resulted in the torsion of the purlin sections till the tip of
the purlins rested on the rafter section.
• By this time all the machinery of the plant had arrived and
the erection was in progress. It was also a costly
proposition to remove all the AC sheets, correct the
detailing errors by refabricating the joints and relaying the
AC sheets. Hence, it was decided to replace only the
cracked AC sheets and to adopt a temporary solution which
would arrest further twisting of the purlin.

Improper detailing results in delayed commissioning- IV
Torsion of Purlins

Improper detailing results in delayed commissioning- V
Connection detail as adopted at site
Correct connection detail

Adopted and correct seating detail of purlin
Improper detailing results in delayed commissioning- VI
Solution adopted to hold the purlin in place

Improper detailing results in delayed commissioning- VII
• The sagging of the side cladding girts was due to the fact
that the sag rods were not anchored by providing diagonal
sag rods at the ends. This was rectified.
• The other problem was due to the fact that the fabricator
was not experienced in cold rolled steel sections. Since
these sections were flexible and made of thin sections, the
fabricators simply bent the columns and fixed them at the
required place. These mistakes were also rectified.
• These corrective measures delayed the starting of the plant

production by about six months.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE GUJARAT
EARTHQUAKE OF 26 JANUARY 2001
• Over 30,000 people died and thousands of people lost their

life-savings in the earthquake that hit the Northwest Gujarat
on the Republic Day 2001.
• Do we have to accept this human suffering and carnage

with fatalism and detachment?
Or
• can we protect our buildings by careful designs and
thereby save lives?

Lessons learnt from the Gujarat Earthquake of 26 January 2001-1
• In California the buildings in that State are required to

comply with the State’s Earthquake-resistant Design Codes.
• In Seattle (U.S.A) earthquake, on 1 March 2001 there was

not even a single loss of life and only a few persons were
injured, none seriously. This is the result of the extensive
retrofitting that was carried out in the city during the 1970’s.
• The Buildings constructed by the Central Public Works

Department had not suffered any damage during the
earthquake due to their sound structural designing.

• Technology exists to protect our buildings and prevent loss

of lives.
• building designs in Gujarat have not been subjected to

checks on their structural adequacy and on their safety by
qualified Structural Engineers and Soil Engineers.
• Code-prescribed checks were not insisted on before the

appropriate authorities approved the designs for
construction.
• In India there is reluctance to use steel due to

misinformation, lack of confidence, or inexperience.

• Steel is inherently ductile; steel structural components,

when stretched or elongated under overload, do not fail or
collapse.
• On the other hand, concrete is a fracture-sensitive material,

which cracks under tensile forces. As a material, concrete
is inherently unsuitable to sustain overloads or repeated
loads caused by earthquakes.
• The only steel-concrete composite multi-storeyed building

under construction in Ahmedabad suffered no damage due
to the earthquake.

• The ignorance of currently available technology is

compounded by the willingness of the Indian Builders and
clients to accept shoddy and primitive construction,
particularly in concrete structures.
• There are endemic problems such as low cement content,

poor quality reinforcing-steel, inadequate concrete cover to
reinforcing steel and non-existent site supervision.

• List of inadequacies and infractions, identified by

professional engineers who visited Ahmedabad after the
disaster:
• Most buildings that had a planning approval for (Ground

floor plus 4 levels) had a further floor added illegally;
– buildings with approval for (Ground floor plus 10 levels)

had two further floors added illegally.
– Swimming pools and/or roof gardens (on soils spread to

a depth of one metre over the roof) were added features
of some of these luxury buildings

• columns loaded from above were terminated at the free end

of a cantilever at the second floor level. There was no
provision for transferring these loads on to the foundations
• Most buildings that collapsed were built on stilts, with the ground
floor being used for car parking.
• This type of failure could have been prevented by concrete

infill walls or suitably designed bracings to the ground floor
columns.

• The falling concrete debris from collapsed structural

components caused substantial loss of life during the
earthquake. It is essential that the structural integrity of
the building be maintained even if the individual members
had failed.
• unsymmetrical Buildings are subjected to unexpected

twisting which would cause substantial damage. Re-
entrant corners should be avoided. It is sensible to split
such plans into rectangles, with a crumple zone (or
construction joint) in-between.
• The structural framing system chosen should invariably be

of the “strong column and weak beam” type
• All buildings should invariably be designed to

prevent collapse and loss of life under the most
severe earthquake it is likely to be subject to within
its design life.
• The lessons from this experience and loss of life must be

an eye-opener for all building professionals. Sound
engineering principles should never be compromised and
there is no room for complacency, when it comes to safety.

CONCLUSION
• case studies are a source of understanding our
present state of technology and its limitations.
• Much improvement of our design concepts has

been possible from a study of failures.
• Design - a process of the anticipation of failure,
• This chapter provides examples of failures due to

design error, construction error and
communication gap among the team members
having different responsibilities.

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LEARNING FROM

FAILURES: CASE STUDIES

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

• Post Mortem: exact science.

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

• Many design decisions are based on engineering

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

• CAUSES OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE

• Poor communication between design professionals.

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

• OTHER COMMON CAUSES OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE

• Lack of appropriate professional design and construction

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

• TACOMA NARROWS BRIDGE

• Tacoma Narrows Bridge was opened in 1940 across

• Destruction of Tacoma Narrows Bridge by aerodynamic

• On Nov 7, 1940, with a wind speed of about 60 km/h , the

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

Tacoma Narrows Bridge

• Excessive vertical and torsional oscillations were the result

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

• Lack of proper understanding of aerodynamic forces and

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

• In many ways it is an unusual structure. According to

• Bridge was made of Aluminium decking and stiffened by

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

• Bridge swayed several inches from side to side when

• Bridge had to be closed to traffic after two days.

• No attempt was made to stiffen it in the vertical plane.

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

• This case study illustrates the dangers of over confidence

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

• Failure of three box girder bridges during erection in

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

Pier 1 Temporary trestle

Cantilever on north side of Bridge

South side cantilever

• Collapse was due to the buckling of a support diaphragm.

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

Diaphragm over Pier6 of Milford Haven Bridge

• Shear of transverse girder and diffusion of the point load

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

• Calculated design strength was found to be as low as

• This load would not have caused any problem provided

• Failure was essentially due to design inadequacy.

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

KING’S BRIDGE, MELBOURNE

• Opened in 1961, 15 months later it failed when 45-ton

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

Girder Cross section

Flange Plate Cover Plate

© Teaching Resource in Design of Steel Structures

• Cracks were caused in the main flange plate either in the

• Penetration of later paint coats into the cracks showed that

• Failure was due to carelessness of the fabricators and

• The most likely and most dangerous cracks were regularly