External vs Internal Relations, States

vs Processes: Some Old Philosophical

Problems in New Physical Clothes

John Stachel
Department of Physics &Center for Einstein Studies
Boston University

Wartofsky Memorial Lecture, 28 September 2005

Graduate School CUNY
Sunny Auyang
 How is Quantum Field Theory Possible?--
Sonny Auyang (1995)
 
We must mark the logical distinction between substantive
and general concepts, or the substantive content and the
categorial framework of a theory. Electron, electrically
charged, a dozen and in between are substantive
concepts, which characterize the subject matter of the
empirical sciences. Object, property, quantity, and
relation are general concepts that constitute the
categorial framework within which the substantive
contents are acknowledged as a description of the world.
... Modern physical theories introduce radically new
substantive concepts but maintain the continuity of the
categorial framework. They do not overthrow general
common concepts but rethink them and make them their
own, effectively clarifying and reinforcing them.
Conceptual Foundations of Scientific Thought/An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Science

The concept of external and internal relations has

a long history in philosophy and science, and is
not self-evident distinction, to say the least. But
it means that certain relations among parts
cannot be characterized by enumeration or by
simple analysis of part by part. Rather, such
internal relations are characteristic of the
system as a whole, and are exhibited only in the
systemic unity of a whole (p. 354).
 Conceptual Foundations … (cont’d)

[A] thing, insofar as it is more than an

instantaneous occurrence and has duration
through time, is a process. This introduces some
odd results in our ways of talking. For example,
talking would be a process but we would hardly
talk of it as a “thing”; similarly, it is not usual
to talk of a rock or a human being as a process
(p. 332).
 Some Notes on Internal and External
Relations and Representation--Mark H.
Bickhard
Internal relations are
those relations that are
intrinsic to the nature
of one or more of the
relata. They are a kind
of essential relation,
rather than an essential
property. ...
 Note On My Terminology-JS
I shall use property (often confined, as in
the quotation here, to a 1-place relation)
without prejudice, as synonymous with a
relation R, which may have any number
of places:
R (1, 2, …, N),
where N = 1 is not excluded.
 Some Notes … Bickhard (cont’d)

The Idealists of the 19th century made massive

use of internal relations. The universe was
supposed to be a whole united by internal
relations among everything. Russell reacted
strongly against internal relations (although
some of his reasons were based more on the
fact that the Idealists Green and Bradley
supposed all internal relations to be symmetric
than on internal relations per se), but was
unable to do away with all of them….
T. H.Green and F. H. Bradley
Bertrand Russell
The Classification of Relations,
Bertrand Russell
Mr. Bradley has argued much and hotly
against the view that relations are ever
purely “external.” I am not certain
whether I understand what he means by
the expression but I think I should be
retaining his phraseology if I described
my view as the view that all relations are
external
 Some Notes …Bickhard (concluded)

Quine has ushered in a period in which all things

intensional or modal or normative are under
grave suspicion, and to be rejected if at all
possible. Internal relations have mostly
disappeared from the scene because of their
‘essentialism’. All relations are assumed to be
external, except that most people, including
most philosophers, today don’t know what an
internal relation is, and, therefore, don’t know
what an external relation is either.
Willard Van Ormand Quine
Richard Rorty
 Relations, Internal and
External– Richard Rorty (1967)
Two extreme positions have been put forward by
philosophers who regard the internal-external
distinction as unclear or incoherent. The first is that all
of a thing’s properties are essential to its being what it
is (and a fortiori) that all its relations are internal to it.
This position is associated with idealism and monism …
The second extreme position holds that none of a
thing’s properties are essential to it (and a fortiori that
no relations are internal to it). … Both positions hold
that the traditional essence-accident distinction, which
was drawn by common sense and was first formulated
explicitly by Aristotle, must be abandoned.
 Metaphysics--
Aristotle
... it is clear that each
individual thing is one
and the same with its
essence, and not
accidentally so, but
because to understand
anything is to
understand its
essence.
 Relations, Internal and
External– Rorty (cont’d)
It may be useful to put the contrast between the
roughly Aristotelian common-sense view and
the two extreme views yet another way. If we
say that common sense holds that there are
both particulars and properties of particulars,
then we may say that common sense holds that
each particular stands in a necessary relation to
some of its properties and a contingent relation
to others.
Roy Bhaskar
 The Possibility of Naturalism–
Roy Bhaskar (1979)
The doctrine that all relations are external is implicit in
the Humean theory of causality [and] has been
accepted by virtually the whole orthodox (empiricist
and neo-Kantian) tradition in the philosophy of science.
Conversely, rationalists, absolute idealists and
mistresses of the art of Hegelian and Bergsonian
dialectics have usually subscribed to the equally
erroneous view that all relations are internal … Now it
is essential to recognize that some relations are
internal, and some are not …[I]t is an epistemologically
contingent question whether or not some given relation
is internal …
 Moore vs McTaggart
Although he had studied with Bradley and McTaggart
at Cambridge, Moore was an early leader in the
revolt against absolute idealism. Amazed by the
peculiar character of philosophical controversy,
Moore supposed that common-sense beliefs about
the world are correct as they are. The purpose of
philosophy is not to debate their truth, but rather to
seek an appropriate analysis of their significance….
Moore's departure from idealistic philosophy began
with a criticism of internal relations in the careful
analysis of truth and falsity in "The Nature of
Judgment" (1899).
McTaggart and Moore
George Edward Moore—Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
The final aspect of Moore's critical response to idealism concerns his
rejection of the monism which was characteristic of British idealism.
This is the holistic thesis that ordinary things are essentially inter-
related in such an intimate way that they constitute together an ‘organic
unity’ which is, in a sense, the only thing that ‘really’ exists, since it is
the only thing whose existence is not dependent on the existence of
anything else. This thesis is especially characteristic of Bradley's
idealism, according to which the Absolute is the one real thing. …[I]n
his paper ‘External and Internal Relations’ (written in 1919) Moore
focused on the idealist conception of internal relations which lies at the
heart of the monist thesis. Moore's argument against the thesis that all
relations are internal starts from the claim that the burden of proof lies
on its supporters since it conflicts with our common sense conviction
that things are not essentially inter-related in such a way that a change
to one thing in one respect necessitates changes to everything else.
Katherine Hawley
Why Temporary Properties are not Relations
between Physical Objects and Times --
Katherine Hawley

Take this banana. It is now yellow, and when I

bought it yesterday it was green. How can a
single object be both green all over and yellow
all over without contradiction? It is, of course,
the passage of time which dissolves the
contradiction, but how is this possible? How
can a banana ripen? These questions raise the
problem of change.
 Temporal Parts- Katherine
Hawley (2004)
The two most popular accounts of persistence are
perdurance theory (perdurantism) and endurance
theory (endurantism). Perdurantists believe that
ordinary things like animals, boats and planets have
temporal parts (things persist by ‘perduring’).
Endurantists believe that ordinary things do not have
temporal parts; instead they are wholly present
whenever they exist (things persist by ‘enduring’). This
looks like a straightforward ontological disagreement,
a dispute about what exists. Perdurantists think that
objects have both spatial and temporal parts, while
endurantists think they have only spatial parts.
 Temporal Parts- Hawley
(cont’d)
Other non-standard views take the basic
perdurantist idea that persistence is
much like spatial extension, then they
develop the idea in different ways. For
example, perhaps persisting things
stretch out four-dimensionally through
time, but without being subdivided into
temporal parts.
David Finkelstein
 A Process Conception of Nature--
David Finkelstein (1973)
The powerful conceptions of nature surveyed …
incorporate two recent revolutions [relativity and
quantum-JS] and yet may still be upside-down … They
employ spacetime to describe matter and process as
though spacetime were primary and process
secondary .. I believe the way has been prepared to
turn over the structure of present physics, to take
process as fundamental at the microscopic level and
spacetime and matter as semimacroscopic statistical
constructs akin to temperature and entropy.
 My Account of :
Structural Realism
Relations, Internal and External
Things between Relations
Relations between Things
Quiddity and Haecceity
Processes and Events
Dynamic Structural Realism
Social Relations
Background-Dependent and Background-
Independent Physical Theories
 What is Structural Realism?
The term “structural realism” can be (and has been)
interpreted in a number of different ways. I assume that, in
such discussions, the concept of “structure” refers to some
set of relations between the things or entities that they relate,
called the relata.

Here I interpret “things” in the broadest possible sense: they

may be material objects, physical fields, mathematical
concepts, social relations, processes, etc. So, in this section,
“thing” is used in a sense that includes “processes.”

Later “thing” is used in a more restricted sense, in which it is

contrasted with “process.”
The Relation Between ‘Things’
and ‘Relations’

People have used the term ‘structural

realism’ to describe different approaches
to the nature of the relation between
‘things’ and ‘relations’. These differences
all seem to be variants of three basic
possibilities:
I. There are only relations
without relata.
( Krause 2004)
 Relations Without Relata?
As applied to a particular relation, this assertion
seems incoherent. It only makes sense if it is
interpreted as the metaphysical claim that
ultimately there are only relations; that is, in
any given relation, all of its relata can in turn
be interpreted as relations. Thus, the totality of
structural relations reduces to relations
between relations between relations ...
Simon Saunders (2003).

I believe that objects are

structures; I see no
reason to suppose that
there are ultimate
constituents of the world,
which are not themselves
to be understood in
structural terms. So far
as I am concerned, it is
turtles all the way down.
Jean Toussaint Desanti
 La philosophie silencieuse ou critique des
philosophies de la science– (1975)

There no longer exists a fixed point, from which one could

hope to recapture, even in its simple form, the
configuration of knowledge and thereby propose its
closure. It is not the temptation that is lacking but the
instrument that would allow one to give into it in a
convincing manner. Neither from the side of the
Subject, nor that of the Concept, nor that of Nature do
we find something today to nourish and complete a
totalizing discourse. It is better to take note of this and,
on this score, to renounce an anachronistic rear-guard
battle.
 More Attractive Possibilities
It is undoubtedly true that, in certain cases, the
relata can in turn be interpreted as relations;
but I would not want to be bound by the claim
that this is always the case.

I find rather more attractive the following two

possibilities:
II. There are relations, in
which the things are primary
and their relation is
secondary (often called
external relations)
III. There are relations, in
which the relation is primary
while the things are
secondary.
(often called internal
relations)
 Essential vs Accidental
In order to make sense of either of these possibilities, and hence of
the distinction between them, one must assume that there is
always a distinction between the essential and non-essential or
accidental properties of any thing (remember the earlier
discussion).
For example, in quantum mechanics, electrons are characterized by
their essential properties of mass, spin and charge. All other
properties that they may exhibit in various processes - such as
positions, momenta, or energies - are non-essential and
relational.
As this example suggests, the distinction between essential and non-
essential properties - and indeed the distinction between
elementary and composite entities - may be theory-dependent
(see Dosch 2004).
Essential vs Accidental (cont’d)
One could convert either possibility into a
metaphysical doctrine: “All relations are
external” or “All relations are internal”; and
some philosophers have done so (remember the
earlier discussion).

But, in contradistinction to I, there is no need

to do so to make sense of II and III. If one
does not, then the two are quite compatible.
 Essential vs Accidental
(concluded)
For II to hold (i.e. things are primary and their
relation is secondary), no essential property of
the relata can depend on the particular relation
under consideration.

While for III to hold( i.e. the relation is primary

and the relata are secondary ), at least one
essential property of each of the relata must
depend on the relation.
Fourth logical possibility:
IV. There are things, such
that any relation between
them is only apparent
Example: two dolls pre-programmed to each
move separately, but as if each were dancing
with the other (the apparent relation - I assume
that ”dancing together'' is a real relation
between two people).
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz
 Leibniz’ Monadology
Again, one might convert this possibility into a universal
claim: “All relations are only apparent.”

Leibniz’ monadology, for example, might be interpreted as

asserting that all relations between monads are only
apparent. God set up a pre-established harmony among
them, so that they are pre-programmed to behave as if they
were related to each other.

As a metaphysical doctrine, I find IV even less attractive than

I. And if adopted, it could hardly qualify as a variant of
structural realism, so I shall not mention IV any further.
Dynamic Structural Realism
While several eminent philosophers of science (e.g.
French and Ladyman) have opted for version I of
structural realism, to me versions II and III (each
interpreted non-metaphysically) are the most attractive.
They do not require commitment to any metaphysical
doctrine, but allow for a decision on the character of the
relations constituting a particular structure on a case-by-
case basis. And the decision may change on the basis of
additional knowledge or the problem being considered.
For further discussion of cases II and III, see Stachel 2002, which
refers to case II as “relations between things,” and to case III as
“things between relations.”
 Dynamic SR (cont’d)
• My approach leads to a picture of the world, in which
there are entities of many different natural kinds, and
it is inherent in the nature of each kind to be structured
in various ways. These structures themselves are
organized into various structural hierarchies, which do
not all form a linear sequence (chain); rather, the result
is something like a partially-ordered set of structures.
This picture is dynamic in two senses; there are:
1) changes in the world,
2) changes in our knowledge of the world.
 Dynamic SR (cont’d)
1) As well as a synchronic aspect, the entities and structures
making up our current picture of the world have a
diachronic aspect: they arise, evolve, and ultimately
disappear-- they constitute processes that can be analyzed
synchronically and diachronically.
2) Our current picture is itself subject to change. What
particular entities and structures are posited, and whether a
given entity is to be regarded as a thing or a relation, are not
decisions that are forever fixed and unalterable; they may
change with changes in our empirical knowledge and/or our
theoretical understanding of the world. So I might best
describe this viewpoint as dynamic structural realism.
 Dynamic SR (conclusion)
Two Footnotes:
For further discussion of the structural
hierarchy, see Stachel 2004. For many
examples of such hierarchies in physics, biology
and cosmology, see Ellis 2002.
Although my concepts of entity and structure are
meant to be ontological, the term “ontic
structural realism” has been preempted and
given a different significance (see
Ladyman1998).
 Excursus into Social Relations
I choose to cite Karl Marx here because:

Both Marx Wartofsky and I chose this Marx early on

as our guide to thought and action.
He is too often treated today, like Spinoza and Hegel
as a “dead dog.”
[I]t was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre ‘Epigonoi’
who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as
the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing's time treated Spinoza, i.e., as
a "dead dog." I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty
thinker (Marx, Afterword to Vol. One of Capital).
•
Karl Marx 1839
 Example of Internal Relations
in Social Science

Marx’s concept of social relations, in general,

relations of production in particular
Value and Capital are relations between people
expressed through relations between things:
• As biological individuals, human beings are the
bearers (Träger) of these social relations
• As physical goods, commodities are the bearers
 Wage Labor and Capital– Karl
Marx (1849)
“Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of
labor and means of subsistence … Embodied
labor that serves as the means of new
production is capital.”
So say the economists
What is a Negro slave? A human being of the
black race. The one explanation is worth as
much as the other
Wage Labor and Capital– Marx
(cont’d)
• A Negro is a Negro. Only in certain
definite [social] relations is he
transformed into a slave. A cotton-
spinning machine is a machine for
spinning cotton. Only in certain [social]
relations is it transformed into capital.
Sundered from these relations, it is as
little capital as gold in and for itself is
money, or sugar is the price of sugar.
 Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy
of Law- Marx (1843)
Hegel thinks he has proven that the subjectivity of the state,
sovereignty, the monarch, is ‘essentially characterised as this
individual, in abstraction from all his other characteristics, and
this individual is raised to the dignity of monarch in an immediate,
natural fashion, i.e., through his birth in the course of nature’.
Sovereignty, monarchial dignity, would thus be born. The body of
the monarch determines his dignity. Thus at the highest point of
the state, bare Physis rather than reason would be the determining
factor. Birth would determine the quality of the monarch as it
determines the quality of cattle.
Hegel has demonstrated that the monarch must be born, which no
one questions, but not that birth makes one a monarch.
That man becomes monarch by birth can as little be made into a
metaphysical truth as can the Immaculate Conception of Mary.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
 Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy
of Law- Marx (cont’d)
The prince's hereditary character results from his
concept. He is to be the person who is specified from
the entire race of men, who is distinguished from all
other persons. But then what is the ultimate fixed
difference of one person from all others? The body.
And the highest function of the body is sexual activity.
Hence the highest constitutional act of the king is his
sexual activity, because through this he makes a king
and carries on his body. The body of his son is the
reproduction of his own body, the creation of a royal
body.
Capital, Vol. One– Karl Marx
(1867)
Reflexive relations of this kind are
altogether very curious. For instance, one
man is king only because other men
stand in the relation of subjects to him.
They, on the other hand, imagine that
they are subjects because he is king.

Marx calls internal relations “reflexive”

 Structure and Individuality
In Marx’s examples, the social relations
supervene on an already-existent
biological individuality.
As a woman, Elizabeth Windsor has
biologically distinctive features.
She is Queen of England only because
her subjects acknowledge her to be queen
 Alienation: Marx’s Conception
of Man in Capitalist Society
• Bertell Ollmann has claimed that Marx’s
viewpoint requires all relations to be
internal. But I think this is wrong. The
relation of use value between people and
goods is based on the inherent properties
of each good. It’s wood burns at a certain
temperature, whether or not a tree is
ever cut down for fuel.
 Confusion of biological and
social relations

By quoting Shakespeare, Marx humorously

reminds us how often people confuse the
biological with the social:
 Much Ado About Nothing–
Dogberry: Come hither, neighbor Seacoal:
God hath blessed you with a good name:
to be a well favored man is a gift of
fortune; but to read and write comes by
nature.

[well favored = good looking]

End of the Excursus

BACK TO PHYSICS!
 Loss of Individuality
It seems that, as deeper and deeper levels of these
structural hierarchies are probed, the property
of inherent individuality that characterizes
more complex, higher-level entities- such as a
particular crystal in physics, or a particular cell
in biology– is lost. Using some old philosophical
terminology, I say that a level at has been
reached, which the entities characterizing this
level possess quiddity but not haecceity.
 Quiddity and Haecceity
“Quiddity” refers to the essential nature of an entity, its natural kind;
and-- at least at the deepest level which we have reached so far -
entities of different natural kinds exist, e.g., electrons, quarks, gluons,
photons, etc.

Believers in a unified ``Theory of Everything'' will hope that ultimately

only entities of one natural kind will be needed, and that all
apparently different kinds will emerge from the relational properties
of the one fundamental quiddity. String theory might be regarded as
an example of such a theory; but, aside from other problems, its
current framework is based on a fixed a background space-time (see
Stachel 2005).

• What distinguishes entities of the same natural kind (quiddity) from

each other, their unique individuality or “primitive thisness,'' is called
their “haecceity.”
John Duns Scotus
Dictionary of Philosophy—Dagobert D.
Runes, ed. (1962)
Quiddity (Lat. quidditas, whatness) Essence, that which is described
in a definition- Vernon J. Bourke

Haecceity (Lat. haecceitas, literally thisness) A term employed by

Duns Scotus to express that by which a quiddity, or general
essence, becomes an individual, particular nature, or being. That
incommunicable nature which constitutes the individual
difference, or individualizes singular beings belonging to a class;
hence his principle of individuation.– J. J. Rolbieck

Teller (1995) following Adams (1979), noted the utility of the term
“haecceity,”and his suggestion has been followed by many
philosophers of physics
 Quiddity without Haecceity
Traditionally, it was always assumed that every
entity has a unique individuality: a haecceity as
well as a quiddity.
However, modern physics has reached a point,
at which we are led to postulate entities that
have quiddity but no inherent haecceity, i.e.,
individuality that is independent of the
relational structures in which they may occur.
Elementary particles are such entities
 Quiddity without Haecceity (cont’d)

Electrons, for example, have quiddity: mass,

spin, charge; but no inherent haecceity.
In so far as they have any haecceity (and degrees of haecceity must
be distinguished) it is inherited from the structure of relations in
which they are enmeshed. In this sense, they are indeed examples
of the case III, “things between relations.”
• For example, three electrons confined to a particular
“box'' (i.e., infinite potential well) may be distinguished
from all other electrons, but not from each other.
 Principle of Individuation:
Space and Space-time
Since Kant, philosophers have often used position in space as a
principle of individuation for otherwise indistinguishable entities.
More recently, similar attempts have been made to individuate
physical events or processes in space-time (See Auyang 1995).
A physical process occupies a (generally finite) region of space-time;
a physical event is supposed to occupy a point of space-time. In
theories, in which space-time is represented by a continuum, an
event can be thought of as the limit of a portion of some physical
process as the dimensions of the region of space-time occupied by
this portion shrink to zero. Classically, such a limit may be
regarded as physically possible, or just as an ideal limit.
Three Roads to Quantum Gravity--
Smolin (2002).

An event may be
thought of as the
smallest part of a
process .... But do not
think of an event as a
change happening to
an otherwise static
object. It is just a
change, no more than
that.
 General Relativity Without
Points
It is probably better to avoid attributing physical
significance to point events, and accordingly to
mathematically reformulate general relativity
in terms of sheaves

For one such reformulation of differential

geometry, see Mallios (1998), and for
applications to general relativity, see Mallios
(2004) and Mallios (2003)
 Principle of Individuation:
Space-time (cont’d)
Individuation by means of position in space-time
works at the level of theories with a fixed space-
time structure, notably special-relativistic theories
of matter and/or fields.*
• *Actually, the story is more complicated than this. The points of Minkowski space-time,
for example, are themselves homogeneous, and some physical framework must be
introduced in order to physically individuate them. Only after this has been done, can
these points be used to individuate other events or processes. The physical framework
may be fixed non-dynamically (e.g., by using rods and clocks introduced a priori); or if
fixed by dynamical process (e.g., light rays and massive particles obeying dynamical
equations), the resulting individuation must be the same for all possible dynamical
processes. This is better said in the language of fiber bundles, in which particular
dynamical physical fields are represented by cross-sections of the appropriate bundle: If
the metric of the base space is given a priori, the individuation of the points of the base
space is either also so given, or is the same for all cross-sections of the bundle (see
Stachel and Iftime 2005).
 General Relativity

But, according to general relativity, because of

the dynamical nature of all space-time
structures, the points of space-time lack
inherent haecceity; thus they cannot be used
for individuation of other physical events in a
general-relativistic theory of matter and/or
non-gravitational fields. This is the purport of
the “hole argument” (see Stachel 1993 and
earlier references therein).
 General Relativity (cont’d)
The points of space-time have quiddity as such,
but only gain haecceity (to the extent that they do)
from the properties they inherit from the metrical
or other physical relations imposed on them.
In particular, the points can obtain haecceity from the inertio-gravitational field
associated with the metric tensor: For example, the four non-vanishing invariants of the
Riemann tensor in an empty space-time can be used to individuate these points in the
generic case (see ibid., pp. 142-143)
Again this is better said in the language of fibered manifolds, in which particular
dynamical physical fields are represented by cross-sections of the manifold: One can
now define the base space as the quotient of the total space by the fibration. Thus, even
the points of the base space (let alone its metric) are not defined a priori, and their
individuation depends on the choice of a cross-section of the fibered manifold, which will
include specification of a particular inertio-gravitational field. For a detailed discussion,
see Stachel and Iftime 2005.
 Individuation by Physical Events
Indeed, as a consequence of this
circumstance, in general relativity the
converse attempt has been made: to
individuate the points of space-time by
means of the individuation of the physical
(matter or field) events or processes
occurring at them; i.e., by the relation
between these points and some
individuating properties of matter and/or
non-gravitational fields.
 Individuation by Physical Events (cont’d)

Such attempts can succeed at the macroscopic,

classical level; but, if the analysis of matter and
fields is carried down far enough - say at the
level of the sub-nuclear particles and field
quanta– it fails. Particles and field quanta* of
differing quiddity all lack inherent haecceity.

• *I use the term ”sub-nuclear (elementary) particle“ for fermions

and ``field quantum'' for bosons, although both are treated as
field quanta in quantum field theory. I aim thereby to recall the
important difference between the two in the classical limit:
classical particles for fermions and classical fields for bosons.
 Individuation by Physical Events (cont’d)

Like the points of space-time, insofar as they

have any individuality, it is inherited from the
structure of relations in which these particles
or quanta are embedded. For example, in a
process involving a beam of electrons, a
particular electron may be individuated by the
click of a particle counter.
The macroscopic counter is assumed to be inherently individuated. It seems that,
for such individuation of an object, a level of structural complexity must be
reached, at which the object can be uniquely and irreversibly “marked” in a way
that distinguishes it from other objects of the same nature (quiddity).
 Quantum Mechanics
My argument is based on an approach to quantum
mechanics that does not deal with quantum systems in
isolation, but only with processes that such a system
can undergo. (For further discussion of this approach,
see Stachel 1986, 1997).
A process (Feynman uses “process,” but Bohr uses “phenomenon” to
describe the same thing) starts with the preparation of the system, which
then undergoes some interaction(s), and ends with the registration of
some result (a ``measurement''). In this approach, a quantum system is
defined by certain essential properties (its quiddity); but manifests other,
non-essential properties (its haecceity) only at the beginning (preparation)
and end (registration) of some process. (Note that the initially-prepared
properties need not be the same as the finally-registered ones.) The basic
task of quantum mechanics is to calculate a probability amplitude for the
process leading from the initially prepared-values to the finally-registered
ones.
Niels Bohr
Richard Feynman
 Quantum Mechanics
As Bohr emphasized, the existence of the quantum of action h
prevents such a complete separation between a quantum-
mechanical system and its macroscopic surroundings:
Quantum mechanics can only treat open systems.
Two major consequences are:
1) A full description of a quantum-mechanical
phenomenon (Bohr) or process (Feynman)-- the word
“process” will be used hereafter-- must include a
specification of the result of an initial preparation of the
system, an account of the type of interactions it undergoes
subsequently, and of the result of some act of registration
(“measurement”) to which the system is finally subjected.
 Quantum Mechanics (cont’d)
2) A maximal quantum-mechanical preparation or
registration only specifies “half” the data about a
system that would be specifiable classically. For
example, while one could in principle prepare or
register a classical-mechanical system with a
determinate position and momentum, one can only
prepare or register a quantum-mechanical system
with either a determinate position or momentum.
(Such quantum-mechanical quantities are often
referred to, in a somewhat misleading fashion, as
“observables.”).
 Quantum Mechanics (cont’d)
• As a consequence, a typical proposition about a process
involving an electron might read:

• “At time t1 the electron was prepared with momentum p 0,

subsequently passed through a certain electric field E, and at
(a later) time t2 was registered at position q 0,” .

• Quantum mechanics assigns a probability to such a

proposition as explained next.
•  
•
 Probability Amplitudes and
Feynman Paths.
Because of point 2), rather than being analogous
to preparation of an individual classical system,
a quantum mechanical preparation is
analogous to the preparation of a classical
ensemble. Given such an ensemble, only the
probability for a definite value of that “half” of
the data chosen for final registration
(“measurement”) can be calculated.
 Probability Amplitudes and
Feynman Paths (cont’d)
In quantum mechanics too, only the probability of
a quantum-mechanical process leading from an
initial preparation to a final measurement can be
defined (in limiting cases, this probability may be
1--certainty, or 0--impossibility). The central
difference in quantum mechanics is that, rather
than a probability (or probability density in the
continuous case) as in the classical case, one
computes a probability amplitude – a complex
number of amplitude  1– for each process.
Probability Amplitudes and
Feynman Paths (cont’d)
This amplitude must then be “squared” to get
the corresponding probability. Using Dirac’s
bra-ket notation, one may write <ba> as the
total amplitude for some process connecting an
initially prepared value a and a finally
registered reading b (note that a and b may be
the values of different observables). The
probability of this process is then equal to the
square of the absolute value of the amplitude: .
P ( ab ) = <ba>2.
Haecceity via Inernal Relations
In all three of these cases - space-time points or
regions in general relativity, elementary particles
in quantum mechanics, and field quanta in
quantum field theory - insofar as the fundamental
entities have haecceity, they inherit it from the
structure of relations in which they are enmeshed.
But there is an important distinction here between
general relativity one the one hand and quantum
mechanics and quantum field theory on the other:
the former is background-independent while the
latter two are not.
•
A Quantum Theory of Gravity
This suggests an approach to the search for a theory of quantum
gravity. The theory that we are looking for must underlie both
classical general relativity and quantum theory, in the sense that
each of these two theory should emerge from “quantum gravity”
by some appropriate limiting process. Whatever the ultimate
nature(s) (quiddities) of the fundamental entities of a quantum
gravity theory turn out to be, it is hard to believe that they will
possess an inherent individuality (haecceity) already absent at the
levels of both general relativity and quantum theory.

So I was led to propose that, whatever the nature(s) of the

fundamental entities of quantum gravity, they will lack inherent
haecceity, and that such individuality as they manifest will be the
result of the structure of dynamical internal relations in which
they are enmeshed.
 The Principle of Maximal
Permutability
Given some physical theory, how can one
implement this requirement of no inherent
haecceity? Generalizing from the previous
examples, I maintain that the way to assure
the inherent indistinguishability in of the
fundamental entities of the theory is to
require the theory to be formulated in such
a way that physical results are invariant
under all possible permutations of the basic
entities of the same kind (same quiddity).
 The Principle of Maximal Permutability (cont’d)
• The exact content of the principle depends on the
nature of the fundamental entities. For theories , such
as non-relativistic quantum mechanics, that are based
on a finite number of discrete fundamental entities, the
permutations will also be finite in number, and
maximal permutability becomes invariance under the
full symmetric group. For theories, such as general
relativity, that are based on fundamental entities that
are continuously, and even differentiably related to
each other, so that they form a differentiable manifold,
permutations become diffeomorphisms. For a
diffeomorphism of a manifold is nothing but a
continuous and differentiable permutation of the points
of that manifold.
The Principle of Maximal Permutability (cont’d)

Here, diffeomorphisms are to be understood in the active sense, as

point transformations acting on the points of the manifold, as
opposed to the passive sense, in which they act upon the
coordinates of the points, leading to coordinate re-descriptions of
the same point. See Stachel and Iftime (2005) for a more detailed
discussion, based on the use of fibered manifolds and local
diffeomorphisms

So, maximal permutability becomes invariance under the full

diffeomorphism group. Further extensions to an infinite number
of discrete entities or mixed cases of discrete-continuous entities, if
needed, are obviously possible.
 Dynamical Individuation
In both the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics and of general
relativity, it is only through dynamical considerations that individuation
is effected.

In the first case, it is through specification of a possible quantum-

mechanical process that the otherwise indistinguishable particles are
individuated.

Example: The electron that was emitted by this source at 11:00 a.m. and
produced a click of that Geiger counter at 11:01 a.m..

In the second case, it is through specification of a particular solution to

the gravitational field equations that the points of the space-time manifold
are individuated

Example The point in the source free solution at which the four non-
vanishing invariants of the Riemann tensor have the following values: ...
So one would expect the principle of
maximal permutability of the
fundamental entities to be part of a
theory in which these entities are only
individuated dynamically.

And one would expect it to apply to any

theory of quantum gravity
Thomas Thiemann
Thomas Thiemann (2001) has pointed out that, in the
passage from classical to quantum gravity, there is
good reason to expect diffeomorphism invariance to be
replaced by some discrete combinatorial principle:

The concept of a smooth space-time should not have

any meaning in a quantum theory of the gravitational
field where probing distances beyond the Planck length
must result in black hole creation which then evaporate
in Planck time, that is, spacetime should be
fundamentally discrete. But clearly smooth
diffeomorphisms have no room in such a discrete
spacetime. The fundamental symmetry is probably
something else, maybe a combinatorial one, that looks
like a diffeomorphism group at large scales.
 States or Processes: Which is
primary ?
There has been a long-standing debate between
adherents of covariant and canonical
approaches to quantum gravity. The former
attempt to develop a four-dimensionally-
invariant theory of quantum gravity from the
outset; the latter start from a (3+1)-breakup of
space-time, emphasizing three-dimensional
spatial invariance, developing quantum
kinematics before quantum dynamics.
Christian Wüthrich
 Wüthrich (2003)
Christian Wüthrich has related this debate to the philosophical
debate between proponents of the endurance view of time and
those of the perdurance view , which “reflects a disagreement
concerning whether, and to what degree, time is on a par with
spatial dimensions.”

According to the former view, ''an object is said to endure just in case
it exists at more than one time.'‘

According to the latter view, “objects perdure by having different

temporal parts at different times with no part being present at
more than one time. Perdurance implies that two [space-like]
hypersurfaces ... do not share enduring objects but rather harbour
different parts of the same four-dimensional object.
 Things vs Processes
I use a different terminology to make this important distinction.

One approach to the quantum gravity problems places primary

emphasis on the three-dimensional state of some thing; from this
point of view, a process is just a succession of different states of this
thing. (The relation of this succession of states to some concept of
``time'' is a contentious issue).

The other approach places primary emphasis on four-dimensional

processes; from this point of view, a “state” is just a particular
spatial cross-section of a process and of secondary importance: all
such cross-sections are equal, and each sequence of states represents
a different ``perspective'' on the same process.
 Classical Physics
In pre-relativistic physics, the absolute time provided a
natural foliation of space-time into spatial cross-
sections. So, even if one favored the “process''
viewpoint for philosophical reasons, there was little
harm done to physics - if not to philosophy - in using
the alternate “state” viewpoint. While the split into
spaces was not unique (one inertial frame is as good as
another), each inertial frame corresponding to a
different preferred fibration of space-time,they all
shared a unique time (absolute simultaneity). In short,
there was a unique breakup of 4-dimensions into (3+1).
 Special Relativity
In special-relativistic physics, this is no longer the case:
there are an infinite number of such preferred cross-
sections (one for each family of parallel space-like
hyperplanes in Minkowski space). Not only is the split
into spaces not unique (one inertial frame is still as
good as another), but now they do not even agree on a
unique time slicing (the relativity of simultaneity):
there is a different foliation for each preferred
fibration. In short, there is a three-parameter family of
``natural'' breakups of 4-dimensions into (3+1). So, in
special-relativistic physics, and quite apart from
philosophical considerations, the “process” approach
has much to recommend it over the ``state'' approach.
 General Relativity
General relativity is an inherently four-
dimensional theory of space-time-- even
more so than special relativity. There is
no ``natural'' breakup of space-time into
spaces and times, such as the inertial
frames provide in special relativity.
There are no preferred timelike
fibrations or spacelike foliations.
 Three Roads to Quantum Gravity--Lee Smolin
(2002)
[R]elativity theory and quantum theory each... tell us--
no, better, they scream at us-- that our world is a
history of processes. Motion and change are primary.
Nothing is, except in a very approximate and
temporary sense. How something is, or what its state is,
is an illusion. It may be a useful illusion for some
purposes, but if we want to think fundamentally we
must not lose sight of the essential fact that it ‘is’ an
illusion. So to speak the language of the new physics we
must learn a vocabulary in which process is more
important than, and prior to, stasis.
Bryce DeWitt
Global Quantum Field Theory-
Bryce DeWitt (2003)
Bryce DeWitt, in his final book, has put the case in the
context of quantum field theory:

When expounding the fundamentals of quantum field

theory physicists almost universally fail to apply the lessons
that relativity theory taught them early in the twentieth
century. Although they carry out their calculations in a
covariant way, in deriving their calculational rules they
seem unable to wean themselves from canonical methods
and Hamiltonians, which are holdovers from the
nineteenth century, and are tied to the cumbersome (3+1)-
dimensional baggage of conjugate momenta, bigger-than-
physical Hilbert spaces and constraints.
Quanta of Space or of Space-Time?

Whether one should be looking for

quanta of space or quanta of space-time
seems to be one essential point of
difference between the canonical loop
quantum gravity approach and the
covariant causal set approach.
Rafael Sorkin
 Causal Set Theory
Causal set theory, a “process” approach to quantum
gravity, does not attempt a quantization of the classical
theory. Rather, its aim is to construct a quantum
theory of causal sets based on two features of classical
general relativity that it takes as fundamental:

1) the causal structure, which is replaced by a discrete

causal set; and

2) The four-volume element, which is replaced by the

quantum of process.
Fay Dowker
 Most physicists believe that in any final
theory of quantum gravity, space-time
itself will be quantized and grainy in
nature. .... So the smallest possible
volume in four-dimensional space-time,
the Planck volume, is 10-42 cubic
centimetre seconds. If we assume that
each of these volumes counts a single
space-time quantum, this provides a
direct quantification of the bulk.
 Conclusion (Whew!)
• I hope to have convinced you by force (!!!) of
example that:
• 1) modern physics can transform old
philosophical debates into current physical
issues;
• 2) not only does physics seem to force certain
choices on us in these debates, but
• 3) these choices in turn can play a role in
determining the direction of current research