Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster MARCH 11,2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster MARCH 11,2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster MARCH 11,2011
MARCH 11,2011
PRESENTED BY:
1.MUHAMMAD ADIWIRAWAN BIN SUHANDI AL-AZHAR
2.NAJMI IZZUDIN BIN AB MANAP
3.MOHD AZIZUL BIN MUHAMMAD AZMI
4.AHMAD AIMAN BIN AHMAD IZZUDIN
5.Amer badzli Irfan bin johan
Outline of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS
• Nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in
Ōkuma, Fukushima Prefecture.
• The disaster was the most severe nuclear accident since the 26 April
1986 Chernobyl disaster
• Only other disaster to be given the Level 7 event classification of the
International Nuclear Event Scale.
• The accident was started by the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami on
Friday, 11 March 2011.
• On detecting the earthquake, the active reactors automatically shut
down their fission reactions.
• Because of the reactor trips and other grid problems, the electricity
supply failed, and the reactors emergency diesel generators
automatically started.
The Real Catastrophe was from
the Tsunami
As additional safety margin, the ground level had been set to as +10m
MAJOR CAUSE OF
ACCIDENT
1. On 11 March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake
(2011 Tohoku Earthquake) happened.
2. It was the most powerful earthquake ever recorded in
Japan and the 4th most powerful earthquake in the world.
The magnitude of the earthquake was 9.0-9.1 s.r.
3. It was caused by a sudden release of energy at the
interface where the Pacific tectonic plate forces its way
under the North American tectonic plate.
4. A section of the Earth’s crust, estimated to be about 500
km in length and 200 km wide, was ruptured, causing a
massive earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 and a
tsunami which struck a wide area of coastal Japan, where
several waves reached heights of more than 10 metres.
MAJOR CAUSE OF ACCIDENT
1. The earthquake caused damage to the
electric power supply lines to the site.
2. The tsunami also caused significant
destruction of the operational and
safety infrastructure on the site.
3. These two disasters led to the loss of
off-site and on-site electrical power.
4. It also resulted in the loss of the cooling
function at the 3 operating reactor units
as well as at the spent fuel pools.
IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF ACCIDENT
Timeline of the Accident:
1. Loss of Power:
The earthquake caused an embankment to collapse that in turn brought down the steel
electrical towers. There was damage to the electrical circuit breakers and disconnecting
switches. Because of that, the power could no longer be received from any of the 6 lines
that make up the electrical supply system to the plant.
2. Loss of AC Power:
The tsunami struck approximately 40 minutes after the earthquake. In Units 1-5,
the diesel generators and AC power supply equipment were engulfed and
damaged by the water, making them unusable and as a result the water
injection and cooling equipment that are driven by those power sources were
unusable.
The tsunami engulfed and damaged the cooling seawater pump in all of the
reactors, leading to a loss of function of the residual heat removal system and
the component cooling water system.
4. Total Loss of Power:
In Units 1, 2, and 4, the occurrence of the tsunami led to a total loss of function of the DC
power sources and the central control room instrumentation. In Unit 3, where DC power
functions remained, eventually the batteries ran out and units 1-4 were faced with a total loss
of power which is lacking both AC and DC power sources for an extended period of time.
5. Core Meltdown:
The shutdown of the core cooling system caused the water level in the nuclear reactor to drop and the
exposure of the core eventually led to a core meltdown. In Unit 1, water injections had stopped for
approximately 14 hours, while in Units 2 & 3, injections had stopped for approximately 6 hours. According
to reports by the Government of Japan & by TEPCO, damage to the core began approximately 3 hours
after the earthquake struck in Unit 1 and approximately 40 hours after the earthquake in Units 2 & 3.
6. Hydrogen Explosions
During the core meltdown process, the zirconium in the fuel cladding reacted with the
water, producing a large quantity of hydrogen. This hydrogen combined with the volatile
radioactive materials, leaked out of the containment vessels and into the reactor
buildings, resulting in hydrogen explosions in the reactor buidings of Units 1, 3 & 4.
How to prevent another Fukushima?
• Stabilize the electricity supply system.
Install multiple connections to the offsite power grid; station emergency diesel
generators on high ground; and deploy plenty of mobile emergency diesel
generators.
• Store spent fuel in dry casks.
To minimize the risks of a similar situation happening again, plant operators should
remove spent fuel from pools after five years. By that time, the fuel is cool enough
to be stored in dry casks, which are sealed metal cylinders surrounded by concrete
or other materials. These casks provide robust protection against physical damage,
and are expected to maintain their integrity for 100 years or more.
Dry-cask storage also helps to alleviate shortages of storage-pool capacity, which
some countries are facing.
• Install filtered vent systems.
In an accident like the one at Fukushima, a filtered vent system could reduce the possibility of containment-
building explosions, by releasing radioactive gases to the atmosphere through a large filter system. This system
traps the most dangerous radioactive species, including cesium 137, and prevents them from spreading beyond
the containment building.
• Wake-up call
There were no safety factors built in the analysis, which anyway lacked context. Globally, we lack
standards for the tsunami-specific training and certification of engineers and scientists who perform
hazard studies, and for the regulators who review them, who can in principle ensure that changes be
made, if needed
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