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Realism and Antirealism

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 History

• Aristotle (384-322 BC)  proper study will lead to better and distinct idea
• Strato  Natural Force: “All existence and life is originating in the natural forces
with which matter is endowed”

Leaders of realism:
• Aristotle (384-322 BC)
• Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)
• Francis Bacon (1561-1626)
• John Locke (1632-1704)

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Formulation of Realism
Risto Hilpinen

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 Some Definitions
• Realism [is] a claim about what entities exist and a claim about their
independent nature. (Devitt [1984] 1991: 14)
• To assert that something is somehow mind-independent is to move in the realist
direction; to deny it is to move in the opposite direction … Many philosophical
questions have the following general form: Is such-and-such mind-independent
in so-and-so way? Given specifications of such-and-such and soand-so, one
may call someone who answers “Yes” a realist. (Williamson 1995: 746)
• There are two general aspects to realism, illustrated by looking at realism about
the everyday world of macroscopic objects and properties. First, there is a claim
about existence. Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the
following facts: the table’s being square, the rock’s being made of granite, and
the moon’s being spherical and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the
everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns
independence. The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of
anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter. (Miller 2002: 1) 4
Realism
Realism about a particular domain is the conjunctions of two theses:
1) There are facts or entities distinctive of that domain (existence
theses)
2) Their existence and nature is in some important sense objective
and mind-independent (independence theses)
In general, where the distinctive objects of a subject-matter are a, b, c, … , and the distinctive
properties are F-ness, G-ness, H-ness and so on, realism about that subject matter will
typically take the form of a claim like the following:
Generic Realism:
a, b, and c and so on exist, and the fact that they exist and have properties such as F-
ness, G-ness, and H-ness is (apart from mundane empirical dependencies of the sort
sometimes encountered in everyday life) independent of anyone’s beliefs, linguistic practices,
conceptual schemes, and so on.
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Argument about realism…

 Involves claim about existence and dependence (or

independence) of theories and concepts

What is the nature of dependence and independence?

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Figure 1. Teritory of realism and anti-realism (Brock and Mares, 2007) 7
Three Forms of Realism

1. Metaphysical Realism
 The entities postulated by a (good or acceptable) scientific theory
really exist
2. Semantic Realism
 Scientific theories must be interpreted realistically
3. Epistemic Realism
 To accept a theory is to believe that it is true, to believe that its terms
denote existing entities

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The Apparent Dilemma

Metaphysical Realism  the ordinary world no longer exists

Metaphysical realism says:
Our beliefs and interests are independent of how things really are. Reality is one
thing, our beliefs and interests are another, and our beliefs may fail to be
veridical.
To deny that, then, seems to say:
Reality depends on our beliefs and interests--our beliefs and interests determine
what is real.

Alternative to metaphysical realism : Relativism!

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The Apparent Dilemma

Does reality depend on our beliefs or not?

Yes? Relativism seems to be true!

No? Realism seems to be true!
What to choose?
(1) having our commonsense beliefs turn out to be false because
ordinary objects are really reducible to tiny particles (as with realism)
or
(2) believing that reality is just whatever people think it is--just a matter
of convention--despite the fact that people still accidentally fall off
cliffs” 10
 Internal Realism
Hillary Putnam (1987) :

“The core of internal realism is a view of reality and truth which provides an
alternative to metaphysical realism and cultural relativism by insisting that
conceptual relativity and realism are compatible and that thus we can be
realist about tables and chairs and about electrons and space time regions
(not reduce the former to the latter)”

To avoid the pitfall of metaphysical realism and radical cultural relativism
Taking key element from both : (1) there are thing “out there” and that
truth is not simply legislated by us (metaphysical realism); (2) our
assumptions and interests make a decisive contribution to our view of the
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Scientific Realism vs. Common-Sense Realism
Scientific Realism
 Primarily concerned with the invisible infrastructure of things

Common-sense Realism
 There are intersubjectively share perceptual experiences of a
macro-object constitute perceptions of something “out there”,
something which exists independently of these perceptions of it

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“
To ask questions about existence and identity, we
need individuating concepts or descriptions, and for
some such descriptions the correct (true) answers are
objective in the sense that they are independent of
people’s belief, but in other cses the answers are
genuinely “mind-dependent”.

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Realism, Truth,
and Objectivity

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Realism and Truth

 The aim of scientific inquiry is to discover the truth about the

matter inquired into which incorporates a semantic thesis and an
axiological thesis
 Truth according to Tarski only fixes the extention of “true” if the
logical connectives are classical. Truth becomes provability if the
logical connectives are suitably reinterpreted
Controversial?

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Dissolution of
Realism/Antirealism Problem
Rudolph Krejci

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Realism and Anti-Realism in Science

Realism
 straightforward, true description of the world, observable
phenomenon and theories are true descriptions of the world, the aim of
science is attainable

Anti-realism
 only observable phenomenon are true (unobservable part of reality
is beyond human ken), and theories are neither true of false, that
science is aiming to find theories that are empirically adequate.

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Anti/Non-Miracle Argument

 Hilary Putnam : “it would be an extraordinary coincidence if a theory

which posits electrons and atoms made accurate predictions unless
these entities actually exist.”

The unobservable entities and processes do exist and behave

just as the theories say

“But, Larry Laudan (1980s) has listed more than 30 of

such theory which were empirically successful then
but later turned out to be false” said anti-realists
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The Observable/Unobservable Distinction

Anti-realist : Science cannot give knowledge about unobservable

reality  presume that there is a clear distinction between
observable and unobservable reality

Realists: It is almost impossible to draw the distinction between

observable and unobservable in a principled way

If it can not be observed,

may be we can detect it!!
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The Underdetermination Argument

Anti-realist argue that scientific theories which posit unobservable

entities are underdetermined by the empirical data-there will always be
a number of competing theories which can account for the data equally
well

HUME’s PROBLEM

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Dissolution of Realism and Anti-realism

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Cognitive Science
F. W a l l n e r a n d M . F. P e s c h i l

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1. Phenomenon
James Robert Brown

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Distinction between Phenomenon and Data

The world is full of data but there are relatively few phenomena.
Phenomena are abstract entities which correspond to visualizable
natural kinds.

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2. Constructive Realism: An Experiment

F. W a l l n e r a n d M . F. P e s c h i l

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Constructive Realism
The view of Constructive Realism is influenced by:

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Two Type of Reality
1. Wirklichkeit (Environment – w)
 The world we are living with, i.e the world which is presupposed to our
perceptions and to our processes of life

2. Realitat (Reality)
 The cognitive world being the result of a process of construction

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3. There are no anti-realist in Laboratory

Allan Franklin

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“
To have a good reason for holding a theory is
ipso facto to have good reason for hlding that
the entities postulated by the theory exist
-Cartwright (1983) and Hacking (1983)

Is it empirical?
Is it adequate?
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4. Chemistry against realism ?

Kostas Gavroglu

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The changing idea

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References

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Some References
Broke, S. and Mares, E., 2007, Realism and anti-realism, Durhan: Acumen Publishing Limited.
Brown, J. R., 1996, Phenomena. In Realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science, Cohen, R. S. Hilpinen, R., and
Renzong, Q (eds)., Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
Franklin, A., 1996, There are no antirealists in the laboratory. In Realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science,
Cohen, R. S. Hilpinen, R., and Renzong, Q (eds)., Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
Gavrouglu, K., 1996,Can theories of chemistry provide an argument against realism?. In Realism and anti-realism in the
philosophy of science, Cohen, R. S. Hilpinen, R., and Renzong, Q (eds)., Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
Hilpinen, R., 1996, On some formulations of realism, or how many objects are in the world?. In Realism and anti-realism in
the philosophy of science, Cohen, R. S. Hilpinen, R., and Renzong, Q (eds)., Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
Kreji, R., 1996, Dissolution of the realism/antirealism problem. In Realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science,
Cohen, R. S. Hilpinen, R., and Renzong, Q (eds)., Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
Merril, G. H., 1980, VII. Three forms of realism, American Philosophical Quarterly, 17(3), pp. 229-235.
Musgrave, A., 1996, Realism, truth, and objectivity. In Realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science, Cohen, R. S.
Hilpinen, R., and Renzong, Q (eds)., Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
Niiniluoto, I., 1996, Queries about internal realism. In Realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science, Cohen, R. S.
Hilpinen, R., and Renzong, Q (eds)., Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
Putnam, H., 1976, What is “realism”?, Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, London.
Wallner, F. and Peschil, M.F., 1996, Cognitive science-an experiment in constructive realism: constructive realism – an
experiment in cognitive science. In Realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science, Cohen, R. S. Hilpinen, R.,
and Renzong, Q (eds)., Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
Zerffi, G. G., 1877, The historical development of idealism and realism, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6, pp.
304-323. 34
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Thank You

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