Case Study 修平
Case Study 修平
Case Study 修平
in
Corporate Governance
Winter, 2014
Hsuiping University
2 Principle-Agent Problem
A series of Contracts
Managers are expected to make decisions that will maximize the stock price or
the firm’s value, via various disciplines.
About the function of Management Agency Problems
The cost of ensuring that managers maximize shareholder wealth
Costs are normally higher for MNCs than for purely domestic firms for several
reasons:
Monitoring managers of distant subsidiaries in foreign countries is more
difficult.
Foreign subsidiary managers raised in different cultures may not follow
uniform goals.
4
Three cases
12 Case one: A model for family companies and
good bank governance?
Background
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited (OCBC) is the longest
established
Singapore bank, formed in 1932 after the merger of three local banks –
the Chinese Commercial Bank (1912), the Ho Hong Bank (1917) and
the Oversea-Chinese Bank (1919).
OCBC is the second largest financial services group in Southeast Asia
by assets and one of Asia’s leading financial services groups.
13
Case Overview
In January 2004, an employee within the National Australia Bank (NAB)
revealed that there were cases of unauthorized foreign currency derivatives
trading that resulted in total losses of A$360 million. The NAB trading
scandal was one of the largest rogue trading scandals that shook the Australian
market. The traders had concealed losses by entering into fictitious one-sided
currency transactions.
The objective of this case is to allow a discussion of issues such as the
important elements for good corporate governance, board oversight, internal
control and risk management.
21 Background
The two principal board committees – risk and audit –also failed to
probe further and provide sufficient oversight for the audit and risk
management activities in the firm.
The committee was unaware of the currency option desk’s risk limit
breaches. Had the audit and risk committees actively sought
information and provided oversight over their areas of
responsibilities, they probably would have discovered the warnings
from internal audit and the risk management department.
30 Aftermath
In January 2004, the firm announced that it had uncovered losses of up to A$185
million. The majority of the fictitious trades had occurred between October 2003 and
mid-January 2004. A revaluation of the options portfolio raised the options losses to
A$360 million.
According to NAB Chief Executive Frank Cicutto, weak internal controls enabled the
traders to carry out the fraud. The losses had stemmed from a punt on the value of
Australian and New Zealand dollars, and the four traders – Bullen, Duffy, Ficarra and
Gray - had sought to cover the losses with unauthorized trades on NAB’s account.
31
In May 2006, Michael Geoghegan replaced Stephen Green as CEO of HSBC, while
Green was promoted to Chairman. HSBC has its tradition of promoting its CEO to
Chairman.
Following the handover, Green concurred with governance critics that the operational
management and oversight roles should be separate and distinct. He spent the next few
years of his term as Chairman taking significant steps to re-define these two roles,
transferring the responsibility for strategy development from Chairman to CEO in
2009 and taking on more of a monitoring and ambassadorial role as Chairman.
36 The End of an Era of Smooth Succession
In late May 2010, Green stepped down as Chairman of HSBC within a year leaked
out in various media reports. It involved ceasing the tradition of promoting the CEO
to Chairman, and naming possibly the bank’s first non-executive Chairman successor
– John Thornton - a HSBC non-executive director who was also a former Goldman
Sachs partner. However, these rumours were refuted by HSBC.
Four months later, on 7 September 2010, an official HSBC announcement confirmed
that Green had agreed to become the U.K. Minister of State for Trade and Investment,
which is about 5 months earlier than his plan.
His premature departure forced HSBC’s board to come to a swift decision regarding
the succession.
37
It was reported that, within HSBC, many wished for the bank to maintain its tradition
of promoting the CEO to Chairman. CEO Geoghegan was a hardworking “banker’s
banker” who had held posts within HSBC all around the world in his 37 years with the
bank, a decisive and quick-thinking CEO who had earned the respect of many of his
staff. However, certain factors hampered Geoghegan’s appointment.
First, it seemed that his aggressive management style did not sit well with investors,
who did not see his adversarial ways as suited to leading the board and performing the
role of a Chairman.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, corporate governance guidelines since 2003
had recommended that British companies should not elevate CEOs to Chairmen. This
would leave Geoghegan out of the race.
38
Other frontrunners for the role included John Thornton, a non-executive director
who was more well-received by investors because of his independence from bank
management, but an unpopular choice internally due to his harsh management style
developed from his stint at Goldman Sachs.
Another candidate was Douglas Flint, HSBC’s Finance Director, who was viewed as
a “compromise candidate” to placate both investors and management, although he had
perceivably less showmanship and experience at HSBC than Green and Geoghegan
and faced the same question on independence.
39 Power Struggle in the Boardroom
On 21 September 2010, the Financial Times reported that Geoghegan had be informed
the board did not intend to give him the position of Chairman. The damage had been
done – the information leakage had given the public an insight into the boardroom
power struggle.
The picture of a fractured board and rifts over HSBC’s succession were thrust into
public spotlight.
Even though the official stance of HSBC and its top management suggests that
Geoghegan’s threat to resign might have been exaggerated and sensationalized, but the
public saw at that point in time was an extremely disorganized and poorly conveyed
succession plan within HSBC.
40
If this leadership transition had indeed been planned for, why did
stakeholders and in particular, Geoghegan, not seem aligned to the plan
prior to the announcement, leading to internal confusion and the
subsequent uproar?
It was clear from an external viewpoint that HSBC had not conveyed the
plan and managed expectations well, both internally and externally. The
pressure was intensified for HSBC to achieve a resolution as swiftly as
possible, in order to assuage investors’ discontent, prevent divisiveness
within the organisation on candidate selection, and restore its public image.
41
The Dilemma
In selecting a new Chairman, the Nomination Committee’s dilemma was
obvious.
Geoghegan was a long-serving HSBC banker with a wealth of intimate knowledge
on HSBC’s operations. With Green already leaving, the loss of Geoghegan would be
a double-whammy ( 雙重打擊 ).
Condoning Geoghegan’s appointment and promoting him would undermine
shareholders’ wishes, and impede HSBC’s effort to keep up with changes in the
governance landscape.
It seemed like no resolution would be able to completely reconcile the
interests of shareholders and management.
42 The Resolution
What is the purpose of a succession plan and what are the components of a
comprehensive succession plan?
How is succession planning for the board and senior management different for
companies with controlling shareholders?
What are the roles of the Chairman and the CEO? How are they different?
What are the attributes of a good Chairman?
What are the pros and cons of having the CEO becoming the Chairman? In
your view, has HSBC addressed the concerns of the CEO becoming Chairman
by appointing the Finance Director as Chairman?