Evaluation of Inherent Safety

Potential in Offshore Oil and

Gas Activities

Faisal I. Khan
Faculty of Engineering & Applied Science
Memorial University of Newfoundland
St. John's, NL
Outline of the presentation

 Inherent safety
 Inherent Safety Principles
 Inherent Safety Application to
Offshore
 Inherent Safety Evaluation Techniques
 Summary and Conclusion
Lets build a safe
offshore platform

3
Start with a module

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

and add the process

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

and duplicate the
pumps for availability

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

and the instrumented
safety systems

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

and the relief systems

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

and the shutdown systems

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

and the depressurisation

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

and the fire and gas detection
with its access ladders

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

and the firefighting
systems

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

and access for
maintenance

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

and competent
people to operate

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

and then we’ll write
how we turned a
dangerous platform

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

like this

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

into a safe one
like this

Curtsy: Graham Dalzell, TBS3

or did we?
Design Excellence?
What is Inherent Safety ?

 Safety by virtue of selection and design

rather than end of the pipe arrangements or
safety procedures
 It is a proactive approach of risk
management during plant design and
operation
 It attempt to eliminate and/or minimize risk
 Inherent Safety Principles

 Inherent safety principles:

Simplify
Minimize equipment
Substitute
Use hazardous
Eliminate useuse
use of ofand
ofmaterials
– Elimination processes
hazardous
in least
hazardous
that are used;
hazardous
material, avoid
forms;
complexities;material,
make equipment
– Minimization operation,
run processand/or
operation, equipment
and/or
robust; eliminate
– Substitution operating
with less severe
operating
opportunitiescondition
for error with
condition
operating
less hazardous
conditions
option
– Attenuation
(e.g. T and P)
– Simplification

Khan, F.I., and Amyotte, P. (2003).

Canadian Journal Of Chemical
Engineering, 81,2-16
Inherent Safety example
 Bhopal: Real life example
– Elimination: MIC would not have been produced
if alternate chemistry was used to produce the
same chemical
– Minimization: Such large storage of MIC was
unnecessary
– Substitution: An alternative route involving
Phosgene as an intermediate could have been
used
– Attenuation: MIC could have been stored under
refrigerated condition
– Simplification: Simplification of piping system
would have alerted the maintenance crew of
necessary action
Inherent Safety example
 Piper Alpha Accident
– Elimination: The gas pipelines were not essential
(through this route)
– Minimization: Such large capacity pipelines, which
were the main cause of secondary explosions and
fire. Pipelines with smaller capacity would have
avoided such catastrophic consequences
– Substitution: An alternative route of gas
transportation could have been used, lack of
explosion/fire barriers
– Simplification: Lord Cullen report highlighted many
lapses, many of them are associated with
simplification, i.e. location accommodation
module, ventilation system, complex evacuation
system
Inherent Safety

 Cost:
Considering the lifetime costs of a
process and its operation, an
inherently safer approach is a cost-
optimal option. Lifetime costs include
the fixed cost of the facility, as well as
the costs for operations, maintenance,
and safety measures
Inherent Safety Application to
Offshore Process Facility
 Framework
– Based on hierarchy in which inherent
safety principles are considered first,
followed by engineered and procedural
safeguards
– It emphasize that inherent safety
achieves its greatest impact when applied
early in either process design or selection
of prevention and protection measures

Khan F.I. et al. (2003). Process Safety Progress, 18, 279-289

 ACTIVITIES STEPS

Identify all hazards and causes of these materials, actions, IDENTIFY HAZARDS
and conditions

Assess hazards, their causes and effects, and how these UNDERSTAND HAZARDS
interact with the design

AVOID HAZARDS
INHERENT SAFETY PRINCIPLES

Eliminate: Avoid or eliminate the hazard by design

Minimize: Minimize the severity of the hazard REDUCE SEVERITY
Substitute: Substitute with less hazardous materials
Moderate: Moderate to reduce the hazard
Simplify: Simply the process or plant to reduce the
likelihood of the hazard REDUCE LIKELIHOOD

Use distance, or use sections of the plant itself as barriers to

SEGREGATE
segregate/protect people and emergency systems from
effects of hazards

ADD-ON SAFETY APPLY PASSIVE

Use safeguards that do not need initiation, and hence have SAFEGUARDS
high availability
oUse active systems, but note these depend on timely
hazard detection and initiatio APPLY ACTIVE SAFEGUARDS

Operator and maintenance procedures should be the last

resort
APPLY PROCEDURAL
SAFEGUARDS

Use findings of the hazard assessment to estimate the risks,

and target and implement inherent/segregation/ APPLY RESIDUAL RISK
add-on/procedural safeguards until risks are tolerable REDUCTION MEASURES
 Inherent Safety Application to
Offshore Process Facility
 Wellhead Locations
– risks from wellheads are significant
– wellheads tied back to facilities and
can offer significant benefits with
respect to risk management
– maintaining a distance between
wellhead and platform is an inherent
safety feature offering considerable
benefits with respect to reducing
hazards to the platform by
eliminating the risk
– to gain the maximum safety benefit
from subsea wellheads, distance
considerations require a more robust
risk management strategy
Khan F.I. et al. (2002). Journal of Loss
Prevention in Process Industries, 15, 279-289
Inherent Safety Application to
Offshore Process Facility

 Subsea Manifolding
– risers have traditionally been a significant
contributor to the risk profile for offshore
facilities
– use of subsea manifolding to reduce the number
of risers considered an inherent safety feature
that minimizes the hazard, rather than
eliminating it
– if gas lift/gas re-injection is a requirement, then
as far as possible single risers should be used to
convey the gas to the seabed where it is
distributed in different flowlines to the users
Inherent Safety Application to
Offshore Process Facility

 Accommodation Module
– maximizing the distance between risers and
accommodation is a fundamental element in
managing the issues of riser risk
– FPSO with forward turret, the most inherently
safe location for the accommodation module is
at the stem
– for fixed platforms, detailed simulation of various
plausible events needs to be conducted before
deciding location of the accommodation module
 Inherent Safety Application to
Offshore Process Facility

 Process Operation
– elimination or reduction in size of
equipment can lead to the use of
simpler, smaller, more compact
equipment which offers the promise
of reduced hazard and risks, reduced
weight and space requirements, and
less maintenance
 Separation process
 Heat exchangers
 Compressors
 Multi-phase pumping and metering
Inherent Safety Application to
Offshore Process Facility

 Others
– Process operation layout
– Escape route
– Structural integrity
– Subsea installation
Available tools and technique
for inherent safety assessment
 The INSIDE Project Toolkit
– Commission of European Community
 Overall Inherent Safety Index
– Edwards and Coworkers of Loughborough
University
 Inherent Safety Index
– Heikkila and Coworkers of Helsinki University
 Fuzzy Based Inherent Safety Index
– Gentile and Coworkers of Mary O’Connor Process
Safety Center of Texas A&M University
 Integrated Inherent Safety Index
– Khan and Coworkers of Memorial University
 Integrated Inherent Safety
Index (I2SI)
 I2SI is guideword based indexing
approach to measure inherent safety
 I2SI = ISPI/HI
– HI is hazard index; ranges values from 1 to
200
– ISPI is measures of the applicability of
inherent safety principles; values ranges
from 1 to 200
 Conceptual framework
Khan F.I. & Amyotte, P. (2003). AIChE Loss Prevention Symposium , April 2,
New Orleans
 Take unit

Identify
. chemical in use
. operating conditions
. inventories
. design option or alternative
Conceptual framework of I2SI

Estimate damage index

(DI) Estimate cost associated

H a za rd in d e x
with damage

In h e re n t sa fe ty c o st in d ex : N o t d iscu ssed in th is p a p e r
Estimate process and
hazard control index Estimate cost associated
(PHCI) with process and hazard
control)

Evaluate potential of
applicability of inherent Estimate cost associated
safety principles to the with inherent safety
unit

Estimate cost associated

Estimate inherent safety In h e r en t sa fe ty p o te n tia l
with process and hazard
index (ISI) control after
implementing inherent
safety
in d ex

Estimate process and

hazard control index
(PHCI) after
implementing inherent Estimate inherent safety
safety principles cost index (ISCI)

Estimate integrated
inherent safety index
(I2SI)

No Are all units

evaluation over?

Yes
Stop
 Take unit

Identify
. chemical in use
. operating conditions

Hazard Index
. inventories
. design option or alternative

Estimate damage index

(DI) Estimate cost associated

H a za rd in d e x
with damage

In h e re n t sa fe ty c o st in d ex : N o t d iscu ssed in th is p a p e r
Estimate process and
hazard control index Estimate cost associated
(PHCI) with process and hazard
control)

Evaluate potential of
applicability of inherent Estimate cost associated
safety principles to the with inherent safety
unit

Estimate cost associated

Estimate inherent safety In h e r en t sa fe ty p o te n tia l
with process and hazard
index (ISI) control after
implementing inherent
safety
in d ex

Estimate process and

hazard control index
(PHCI) after
implementing inherent Estimate inherent safety
safety principles cost index (ISCI)

Estimate integrated
inherent safety index
(I2SI)

No Are all units

evaluation over?

Yes
Stop
Hazard Index (HI)

 It is measure of damage potential of the

process considering both hazards and
available control measures
 HI = DI/PHCI
– DI is damage index, ranges from 1 to 100
– PHCI is process and hazard control measure;
ranges from 1 to 100

 Conceptual framework of HI
 Consider one unit and identify process

Framework of HI computation
involved and operating conditions

Identify chemicals and collect their

physicochemical characteristics

Identify types of hazards

 Fire and explosion
 Toxic/corrosive release &
dispersion
 A combination of both Damage index

Fire and Acute toxicity Chronic toxicity Environmental

explosion hazard hazard hazard damage hazard

Calculate Calculate Calculate Calculate

damage radii damage radii damage radii damage radius
for 50% for 50% for 50% for causing
probability of probability of probability of significant
causing fatality causing fatality causing fatality damage

Calculate Calculate Calculate Calculate

damage index damage index damage index damage index

Combined these indexes to give

final damage index (DI)

Calculate process and hazard

control index (PHCI)
Repeat the
Elaborated in process for
next slides Calculate hazard index (HI) all units
Damage Index (DI)

 DI is function four parameters namely:

– Fire and explosion, acute toxicity, chronic
toxicity, environment damage
 Which are combine as:
 
 
DI  Min 200,  DI fe 2  DI ac 2  DI ch 2  DI en 2 
1 / 2 

   

 DI for each parameter is calculated

using Monograph developed using
SWeHI approach
 Consider one unit and identify process
involved and operating conditions

Framework of HI computation
Identify chemicals and collect their
physicochemical characteristics

Identify types of hazards

 Fire and explosion
 Toxic/corrosive release &
dispersion
 A combination of both

Fire and Acute toxicity Chronic toxicity Environmental

explosion hazard hazard hazard damage hazard

Calculate Calculate Calculate Calculate

damage radii damage radii damage radii damage radius
for 50% for 50% for 50% for causing
probability of probability of probability of significant
causing fatality causing fatality causing fatality damage

Calculate Calculate Calculate Calculate

damage index damage index damage index damage index

Combined these indexes to give

final damage index (DI)
PHCI
Calculate process and hazard
control index (PHCI)
Repeat the
Elaborated in process for
next slides Calculate hazard index (HI) all units
Process and Hazard Control
Index (PHCI)
 It account the impact of add-on
process and hazard control measure
required or present on the system
 It quantify the index value based on
necessity of the control measure
 Presently, PHCI considers 10 control
measure, which are combined as:
  PHCI p  PHCI t  PHCI f  PHCI l  PHCI c
PHCI  


 PHCI iv  PHCI b  PHCI fr  PHCI s  PHCI d 
 Take unit

Identify
. chemical in use
. operating conditions
. inventories
. design option or alternative

Estimate damage index

(DI) Estimate cost associated

H a z a rd in d e x
with damage

In h e r e n t sa fe ty c o st in d ex : N o t d isc u ssed in th is p a p e r
Estimate process and
hazard control index Estimate cost associated
(PHCI) with process and hazard
control)

Evaluate potential of
applicability of inherent Estimate cost associated
with inherent safety
ISPI safety principles to the
unit

Estimate cost associated

Estimate inherent safety with process and hazard
In h e r e n t sa fe ty p o te n tia l
index (ISI) control after
implementing inherent
safety
in d ex

Estimate process and

hazard control index
(PHCI) after
implementing inherent Estimate inherent safety
safety principles cost index (ISCI)

Estimate integrated
inherent safety index
(I2SI)

No Are all units

evaluation over?

Yes
Stop
Inherent Safety Potential
Index (ISPI)
 ISPI accounts for the applicability of
inherent safety principles
 ISPI = ISI/PHCI
– ISI is inherent safety index; value ranges
1-100
– PHCI is process and hazard control index
value ranges from 1-100
Inherent Safety Index (ISI)
Minimization,
 ISI computation follow the Hazard and Substitution,
Simplification,
Operability (HAZOP) procedure etc.

 Guide words (principles) are applied

 Index is computed based on the
extent of applicability and ability to
reduce the hazard
 Finally index is combined as:
 1 / 2 
 ISI  Min 200, ISI m 2  ISI su 2  ISI a 2  ISI si 2  ISI l 2 
   

 Consider one unit and identify the

Framework of ISI computation

process involved & operating conditions

Evaluate the extent of Quantify the impact of

Is guideword Yes applicability of the Minimization, ISIm
Minimization
guideword
applicable?

No

Evaluate the extent of Quantify the impact of

Is guideword Yes applicability of the Substitution, ISIsu
Substitution
guideword
applicable?

No

Evaluate the extent of Quantify the impact of

Is guideword Yes applicability of the Attenuation, ISIa
Attenuation
guideword
applicable?

No

Evaluate the extent of Quantify the impact of

Is guideword Yes applicability of the Simplification, ISIsi
Simplification
guideword
applicable?

No

Evaluate the extent of Quantify the impact of

Is guideword Yes applicability of the Limiting Of , ISIl
Limiting Of
guideword
applicable?

No

Repeat the process Computation of final

ISPI=ISI/PHCI
for all units inherent safety index, ISI
Process and Hazard Control
Index (PHCI)
 It account the impact of add-on
process and hazard control measure
required or present on the system
 It quantify the index value based on
necessity of the control measure
 Presently, PHCI considers 10 control
measure, which are combined as:
  PHCI p  PHCI t  PHCI f  PHCI l  PHCI c
PHCI  


 PHCI iv  PHCI b  PHCI fr  PHCI s  PHCI d 
Integrated Inherent Safety
Index (I2SI)
10.0
 I2SI = ISPI/HI High Inherent
Safety Zone
– HI is hazard index;
5
– ISPI is measures of Inherent safety

the applicability of Zone

inherent safety 1

principles
Add on Safety
Dominating Zone

0.1
Summary and Conclusion

 If safety is addressed as simple go/no go

criteria at the early stages of design, many
opportunities for an inherently safer, and
perhaps cheaper, installation may be lost
 Dealing with hazards at their source may
also provide cost effective safety
performance; thus inherently safer
principles go hand-in-hand with cost
reduction
Summary and Conclusion
 The important points to transform inherent safety
consideration into routine offshore design practice
are:
– A culture shift towards inherently safer design
– Consistent consideration of the chemical and
physical principles that ultimately produce the
desired inherent safety effects
– Examination of lifetime cost reduction to determine
the cost benefits of inherently safer options
– Basic understanding of desired phenomena versus
the actual phenomena in the system
– Use of systematic methodologies and tools to
translate the principles of inherent safety from
concept to implementation
Thanks
ISI continue…
 Classification of extent indicator
Description Extent indicator (used for
index measurement)
Completely applied and hazard eliminated 10
Completely applied and most significant hazard 9
reduced
Completely applied and hazard reduced 8
Completely applied and hazard moderately reduced 7
Significantly applied and hazard eliminated 6
Significantly applied and hazard reduced 5
Applicable and hazard may be eliminated 4
Applicable and hazard may be reduced 3
May be applicable and hazard may be eliminated 2
May be applicable and hazard may be reduced 1
ISI continue…

 Illustrative figure for minimization principles

101

91

81

71
Inherent Safety Index

61

51

41

31

21

11

1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Extent of guideword applicability