Astm G 88 PDF

Designation: G 88 – 05
Standard Guide for

Designing Systems for Oxygen Service1
This standard is issued under the fixed designation G 88; the number immediately following the designation indicates the year of original
adoption or, in the case of revision, the year of last revision. A number in parentheses indicates the year of last reapproval. A superscript
epsilon (e) indicates an editorial change since the last revision or reapproval.
1. Scope Section Title Section

Particle Impact 5.2.6
1.1 This guide applies to the design of systems for oxygen Heat of Compression 5.2.7
or oxygen-enriched service but is not a comprehensive docu- Friction and Galling 5.2.8
ment. Specifically, this guide addresses system factors that Resonance 5.2.9
Static Electric Discharge 5.2.10
affect the avoidance of ignition and fire. It does not thoroughly Electrical Arc 5.2.11
address the selection of materials of construction for which Flow Friction 5.2.12
Guides G 63 and G 94 are available, nor does it cover Mechanical Impact 5.2.13
Kindling Chain 5.2.14
mechanical, economic or other design considerations for which Other Ignition Mechanisms 5.2.15
well-known practices are available. This guide also does not Test Methods 6
address issues concerning the toxicity of nonmetals in breath- System Design Method 7
Overview 7.1
ing gas or medical gas systems. Final Design 7.2
Avoid Unnecessarily Elevated Temperatures 7.3
NOTE 1—The American Society for Testing and Materials takes no Avoid Unnecessarily Elevated Pressures 7.4
position respecting the validity of any evaluation methods asserted in Design for System Cleanness 7.5
connection with any item mentioned in this guide. Users of this guide are Avoid Particle Impacts 7.6
expressly advised that determination of the validity of any such evaluation Minimize Heat of Compression 7.7
methods and data and the risk of use of such evaluation methods and data Avoid Friction and Galling 7.8
are entirely their own responsibility. Avoid Corrosion 7.9
Avoid Resonance 7.10
1.2 This standard does not purport to address all of the Use Proven Hardware 7.11
Design to Manage Fires 7.12
safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the Anticipate Indirect Oxygen Exposure 7.13
responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appro- Minimize Available Fuel/Oxygen 7.14
priate safety and health practices and determine the applica- Avoid Potentially Exothermic Material Combinations 7.15
Anticipate Common Failure Mechanism Consequences 7.16
bility of regulatory requirements prior to use. Avoid High Surface-Area-to-Volume (S/V) Conditions 7.17
1.3 This standard guide is organized as follows: where Practical
Section Title Section Avoid Unnecessarily-Elevated Oxygen Concentrations 7.18
Referenced Documents 2 Anticipate Permutations from Intended System Design 7.19
ASTM Standards 2.1 Avoid Designs and Failure Scenarios that can Introduce 7.20
CGA Documents 2.3 Potential Flow Friction Ignition Hazards
EIGA Documents 2.4 Use Only the Most Compatible of Practical Materials 7.21
ASTM Manuals 2.5 and Designs
Terminology 3 Provide Thorough Safety Training for All Personnel 7.22
Significance and Use 4 Working with Oxygen or Oxygen-Enriched
Purpose of G 88 4.1 Components or Systems, including Design,
Role of G 88 4.2 Cleaning, Assembly, Operations, and
Use of G 88 4.3 Maintenance as Applicable to Personnel
Factors Affecting the Design for an Oxygen or Oxygen- 5 Miscellaneous 7.23
Enriched System Examples 8
General 5.1 Key Words 9
Factors Recognized as Causing Fires 5.2 References
Temperature 5.2.1
Spontaneous Ignition 5.2.2 2. Referenced Documents
Pressure 5.2.3 2.1 ASTM Standards: 2
Concentration 5.2.4
Contamination 5.2.5 G 63 Guide for Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials for Oxy-
gen Service
1
This guide is under the jurisdiction of ASTM Committee G04 on Compatibility
2
and Sensitivity of Materials in Oxygen Enriched Atmospheres and is the direct For referenced ASTM standards, visit the ASTM website, www.astm.org, or
responsibility of Subcommittee G04.02 on Recommended Practices. contact ASTM Customer Service at service@astm.org. For Annual Book of ASTM
Current edition approved July 1, 2005. Published November 2005. Originally Standards volume information, refer to the standard’s Document Summary page on
approved in 1984. Last previous edition approved in 1997 as G 88 – 90 (1997)e1. the ASTM website.
Copyright © ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, PO Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959, United States.
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Copyright ASTM International 1

Copyright by ASTM Int'l (all rights reserved);
Provided by IHS under license with ASTM Licensee=Praxair Inc/5903738101, User=Cabriales, Rodolfo
No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS Not for Resale, 11/25/2009 08:04:03 MST
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G 88 – 05
G 72 Test Method for Autogenous Ignition Temperature of 3.1.4 indirect oxygen service—service in which oxygen is
Liquids and Solids in a High-Pressure Oxygen-Enriched not normally contacted but in which it might be as a result of
Environment a reasonably foreseeable malfunction (single fault), operator
G 74 Test Method for Ignition Sensitivity of Materials to error, or process disturbance. Examples: liquid oxygen tank
Gaseous Fluid Impact insulation, liquid oxygen pump motor bearings.
G 93 Practice for Cleaning Methods for Material and 3.1.5 oxygen-enriched atmosphere—a fluid (gas or liquid)
Equipment Used in Oxygen-Enriched Environments mixture that contains more than 25 mol % oxygen.
G 94 Guide for Evaluating Metals for Oxygen Service 3.1.6 qualified technical personnel—persons such as engi-
G 128 Guide for Controlling the Hazards and Risks in neers and chemists who, by virtue of education, training, or
Oxygen Enriched Systems experience, know how to apply physical and chemical prin-
G 175 Test Method for Evaluating the Ignition Sensitivity ciples involved in the reactions between oxygen and other
and Fault Tolerance of Oxygen Regulators Used for materials.
Medical and Emergency Applications
2.2 ASTM Adjuncts:3 4. Significance and Use
ADJG0088 Oxygen Safety Videotape and Separate 4.1 Purpose of Guide G 88—The purpose of this guide is to
2.3 ASTM Manual: furnish qualified technical personnel with pertinent information
Manual 36 Safe Use of Oxygen and Oxygen Systems: for use in designing oxygen systems or assessing the safety of
Guidelines for Oxygen System Design, Materials Selec- oxygen systems. It emphasizes factors that cause ignition and
tion, Operations, Storage, and Transportation enhance propagation throughout a system’s service life so that
2.4 Compressed Gas Association Documents: the occurrence of these conditions may be avoided or mini-
CGA G-4.1 Cleaning Equipment for Oxygen Service mized. It is not intended as a specification for the design of
CGA G-4.4 Oxygen Pipeline Systems oxygen systems.
CGA G-4.6 Oxygen Compressor Installation and Operation 4.2 Role of Guide G 88—ASTM Committee G04’s abstract
Guide standard is Guide G 128, and it introduces the overall subject
CGA G-4.8 Safe Use of Aluminum Structured Packing for of oxygen compatibility and the body of related work and
Oxygen Distillation related resources including standards, research reports and a
CGA G-4.9 Safe Use of Brazed Aluminum Heat Exchangers video3 G04 has developed and adopted for use in coping with
for Producing Pressurized Oxygen oxygen hazards. The interrelationships among the standards
CGA P-8.4 Safe Operation of Reboilers/Condensers in Air are shown in Table 1. Guide G 88 deals with oxygen system
Separation Units and hardware design principles, and it is supported by a
CGA P-8 Safe Practices Guide for Air Separation Plants regulator test, and a computer algorithm.4 Other standards
CGA PS-15 Toxicity Considerations of Nonmetallic Mate- cover: (1) the selection of materials (both metals and nonmet-
rials in Medical Oxygen Cylinder Valves als) which are supported by a series of standards for testing
2.5 European Industrial Gases Association Documents: materials of interest and for preparing materials for test; (2) the
EIGA/IGC Doc 11/82 Centrifugal Oxygen Compressor cleaning of oxygen hardware which is supported by a series of
Code of Practice standards on cleaning procedures, cleanliness testing methods,
EIGA/IGC Doc 13/02/E Oxygen Pipeline Systems and cleaning agent selection and evaluation; (3) the study of
EIGA/IGC Doc 27/01 Centrifugal Oxygen Compressor fire incidents in oxygen systems; and (4) related terminology.
Code of Practice 4.3 Use of Guide G 88—Guide G 88 can be used as an
EIGA/IGC Doc 65/99/E Safe Operation of Reboilers/ initial design guideline for oxygen systems and components,
Condensers in Air Separation Units but can also be used as a tool to perform safety audits of
EIGA/IGC Doc 73/00/E High-Pressure Breathing Gas Sys- existing oxygen systems and components. When used as an
tems Toxicity Risks of Using Non Metallic Materials auditing tool for existing systems, Guide G 88 can be applied
in two stages: first examining system schematics/drawings,
3. Terminology then by visually inspecting the system (that is, “walking the
3.1 Definitions of Terms Specific to This Standard: pipeline”). Guide G 88 can be used in conjunction with the
3.1.1 characteristic elements—those factors that must be materials selection/hazards analysis approach outlined in
present for an ignition mechanism to be active in an oxygen- Guides G 63 and G 94 to provide a comprehensive review of
enriched atmosphere. the fire hazards in an oxygen or oxygen-enriched system (1).5
3.1.2 direct oxygen service—service in contact with oxygen
during normal operations. Examples: oxygen compressor pis- 5. Factors Affecting the Design for an Oxygen or
ton rings, control valve seats. Oxygen-Enriched System
3.1.3 galling—a condition whereby excessive friction be- 5.1 General—An oxygen system designer should under-
tween high spots results in localized welding with subsequent stand that oxygen, fuel, and heat (source of ignition) must be
splitting and a further roughening of rubbing surfaces of one or
both of two mating parts. 4
ASTM G4Math Utility software, available from ASTM International Technical
& Professional Training Course Fire Hazards in Oxygen Systems.
5
The boldface numbers in parentheses refer to the list of references at the end of
3
Available from ASTM Headquarters, Order ADJG0088. this standard.

Provided by IHS under license with ASTM Copyright by ASTM Int'l (all rights reserved); Licensee=Praxair Inc/5903738101, User=Cabriales, Rodolfo
G 88 – 05
TABLE 1 Role of Guide G 88 with Respect to Other ASTM G04 ignition decreases (2). Operating a system at unnecessarily
Standard Guides and Practices and their Supporting elevated temperatures, whether locally or generally elevated,
Test MethodsA
reduces the safety margin. The ignition temperature of the most
G 128 Guide to Control of Hazards and Risks in Oxygen-Enriched
Systems easily ignited material in a system is related to the temperature
G 88 Designing Systems for Oxygen Service measured by Test Method G 72, but is also a function of system
G 175 Evaluating the Ignition Sensitivity and Fault Tolerance of pressure, configuration and operation, and thermal history of
Oxygen Regulators
the material. Elevated temperature also facilitates sustained
G 63 Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials burning of materials that might otherwise be self-
D 2512 Compatibility of Materials With Liquid Oxygen
(Mechanical Impact)
extinguishing.
D 2863 Measuring the Minimum Oxygen Concentration to Support 5.2.1.1 Thermal Ignition—Thermal ignition consists of
Candle-Like Combustion (Oxygen Index)
D 4809 Heat of Combustion of Liquid Hydrocarbon Fuels by
heating a material (either by external or self-heating means, see
Bomb Calorimeter (Precision Method) also section 5.2.2) in an oxidizing atmosphere to a temperature
G 72 Autogenous Ignition Temperature of Liquids and Solids in sufficient to cause ignition. In thermal ignition testing, the
High-Pressure Oxygen Enriched Atmospheres
G 74 Ignition Sensitivity of Materials to Gaseous Fluid Impact spontaneous ignition temperature is normally used to rate
G 86 Determining Ignition Sensitivity of Materials to Mechanical material compatibility with oxygen as well as evaluate a
Impact in Pressurized Oxygen Environments
G 114 Aging Oxygen-Service Materials Prior to Flammability
material’s ease of ignition. The ignition temperature of a given
Testing material is generally dependent on its thermal properties,
G 125 Measuring Liquid and Solid Material Fire Limits in Gaseous including thermal conductivity, heat of oxidation, and thermal
Oxidants
diffusivity, as well as other parameters such as geometry and
G 94 Evaluating Metals environmental conditions (22). The characteristic elements of
G 124 Determining the Combustion Behavior of Metallic Materials
in Oxygen Enriched Atmospheres
forced thermal ignition in oxygen include the following:
5.2.1.1.1 An external heat source capable of heating a given
G 93 Cleaning Methods for Material and Equipment
G 120 Determination of Soluble Residual Contamination in
material to its spontaneous ignition temperature in a given
Materials and Components by Soxhlet Extraction environment.
G 136 Determination of Soluble Residual Contaminants in
Materials by Ultrasonic Extraction
5.2.1.1.2 A material with a spontaneous ignition tempera-
G 144 Determination of Residual Contamination of Materials and ture below the temperature created by the heat source in the
Components by Total Carbon Analysis Using a High given configuration and environment.
Temperature Combustion Analyzer
G 127 Guide to the Selection of Cleaning Agents for Oxygen 5.2.1.1.3 Example: A resistive element heater in a thermal
Systems runaway fault condition causing oxygen-wetted materials in
G 122 Test Method for Evaluating the Effectiveness of
Cleaning Agents near proximity to spontaneously ignite.
G 121 Preparation of Contaminated Test Coupons for the 5.2.2 Spontaneous Ignition—Some materials, notably cer-
Evaluation of Cleaning Agents
G 131 Cleaning of Materials and Components by Ultrasonic tain accumulations of fines, porous materials, or liquids may
Techniques undergo reactions that generate heat. If the heat balance (the
rate of heating compared to the rate of dissipation) is unfavor-
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G 145 Studying Fire Incidents in Oxygen Systems
able, the temperature of the material will increase. In some
G 126 Terminology Related to the Compatibility and Sensitivity of cases, a thermal runaway temperature (a critical condition)
Materials in Oxygen-Enriched Atmospheres
A
may be attained and some time later the material may sponta-
ASTM D 2863 is under the jurisdiction of Committee D20 on Plastics, and
D 4809 is under the jurisdiction of Committee D02 on Petroleum Products and neously ignite. Ignition and fire may occur after short (seconds
Lubricants but both are used in the asessment of flammability and sensitivity of or minutes) or over long (hours, days or months) periods of
materials in oxygen-enriched atmospheres. time. In the most extreme cases, the thermal runaway tempera-
ture may be near or below normal room temperature. The
present to start and propagate a fire. Since materials of characteristic elements of spontaneous ignition in oxidants
construction of the system are often flammable and oxygen is
include the following:
always present, the design of a system for oxygen or oxygen-
enriched service requires identifying potential sources of 5.2.2.1 A material that reacts (for example, oxidizes, de-
ignition and the factors that aggravate propagation. The goal is composes) at temperatures significantly below its ignition
to eliminate these factors or compensate for their presence. temperature. If the rate of reaction is low, the effect of reaction
Preventing fires in oxygen and oxygen-enriched systems in- can still be large if the material has a high surface-area-to-
volves all of the following: minimizing system factors that volume ratio (such as dusts, particles, foams, chars, etc.).
cause fires and environments that enhance fire propagation; Likewise, materials that will not spontaneously combust in
maximizing the use of system materials with properties that bulk forms may become prone to do so when subdivided. In
resist ignition and burning, especially where ignition mecha- some cases, reaction products may instead serve to passivate
nisms are active; and using good practices during system the material surface producing a protective coating that pre-
design, assembly, operations and maintenance. vents ignition so long as it is not compromised (by melting,
5.2 Factors Recognized as Causing Fires: cracking, flaking, spalling, evaporating. etc.). Reaction prod-
5.2.1 Temperature—As the temperature of a material in- ucts may also stratify or otherwise form an ignition-resistant
creases, the amount of energy that must be added to produce barrier.

G 88 – 05
5.2.2.2 An environment that does not dissipate the trans- some particles. The hazard associated with particles increases
ferred heat (such as an insulated or large volume vessel or an with both the particles’ heat of combustion and their kinetic
accumulation of fines). energies.
5.2.2.3 Examples: an accumulation of wear dust in an 5.2.6.2 High Fluid (Gas) Velocities—High fluid velocities
oxygen compressor that has been proof-tested with nitrogen increase the kinetic energies of particles entrained in flowing
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gas, then exposed to oxygen. Contaminated adsorbent or oxygen systems so that they have a higher risk of igniting upon
absorbent materials such as molecular sieves (zeolites), alu- impact. High velocities can occur as a result of reducing
mina, and activated carbon may become highly reactive in pressure across a system component or during a system start-up
oxygen-enriched atmospheres. transient where pressure is being established through a com-
5.2.3 Pressure—As the pressure of a system increases, the ponent or in a pipeline. Components with inherently high
ignition temperatures of the materials of construction typically internal fluid velocities include pressure regulators, control
decrease (2, 3), and the rates of fire propagation increase (2, 4). valves, and flow-limiting orifices. Depending on system con-
Therefore, operating a system at unnecessarily elevated pres- figuration, some components can generate high fluid velocities
sures increases the probability and consequences of a fire. It that can be sustained for extended distances downstream.
should be noted that pure oxygen, even at lower–than- System start-ups or shut-downs can create transient gas veloci-
atmospheric pressure, may still pose a significant fire hazard ties that are often orders of magnitude higher than those
since increased oxygen concentration has a greater effect than experienced during steady-state operation.
total pressure on the flammability of materials (5, 6). NOTE 2—The pressure differential that can be tolerated to control high
5.2.4 Concentration—As oxygen concentration decreases gas velocities is significantly smaller than for control of downstream heat
from 100 % with the balance being inert gases, there is a of compression (8) (see 5.2.7 for discussion of heat of compression). Even
small pressure differentials across components can generate gas velocities
progressive decrease in the likelihood and intensity of a
in excess of those recommended for various metals in oxygen service (9,
reaction (2). Though the principles in this standard still apply, 10). Eq 1 can be used to estimate the downstream gas pressure for a given
greater latitude may be exercised in the design of a system for upstream pressure and maximum downstream gas velocity, assuming an
dilute oxygen service. ideal gas and isentropic flow (8):
5.2.5 Contamination—Contamination can be present in a PT
PD 5 (1)
system because of inadequate initial cleaning, introduction
during assembly or service life, or generation within the system FS VD2
D G
2gcKRTD 1 1
K
by abrasion, flaking, etc. Contaminants may be liquids, solids,

or gases. Such contamination may be highly flammable and where:
readily ignitable (for example, hydrocarbon oils). Accordingly, PD = downstream pressure (absolute),
it is likely to ignite and promote consequential system fires PT = source pressure (absolute),
through a kindling chain reaction (see 5.2.14). Even normally VD = maximum gas velocity downstream,
inert contaminants such as rust may produce ignition through gc = dimensional constant (1 kg/N s2 or 4636 lb in.2/lbfs2
particle impact (see 5.2.6), friction (see 5.2.8), or through ft),
K = g/(g-1) where g is the ratio of specific heats Cp/Cv (g
augmentation of resonance heating effects (see 5.2.9). A
= 1.4 for O2),
properly designed system, if properly cleaned and maintained,
R = individual gas constant for O2 (260 N-m/kg °K or
can be assumed to be free of unacceptable levels of hydrocar-
0.333 ft3 lbf/in.2 lbm °R),6 and
bon contamination, but may still contain some particulate TD = temperature downstream (absolute).
contamination. System design and operation must accommo-
date this contamination, as discussed in the following para- NOTE 3—Fig. 1 shows the maximum gas velocity versus pressure
graphs. differential considering isentropic flow for gaseous oxygen, based on the
equation shown above. Even with only a 1.5-percent differential pressure,
5.2.6 Particle Impact—Collisions of inert or ignitable solid gas velocity exceeds the 45 m/s (150 ft/s) minimum velocity required to
particles entrained in an oxidant stream are a potential ignition ignite particles in particle impact experiments (11).
source. Such ignition may result from the particle being
5.2.6.3 Impingement Sites—A particle entrained in a high-
flammable and igniting upon impact and, in turn, igniting other
velocity fluid must impinge upon a surface, or impact point, to
system materials (7). Ignition may also result from heating of
transfer its kinetic energy to heat and ignite. Impingement sites
the particle and subsequent contact with system plastics and
can be internal to components (for example in the body of an
elastomers, from flammable particles produced during the
in-line globe valve just downstream of its seat), or downstream
collision, or from the direct transfer of kinetic energy during
of high fluid velocity components (for example inside an elbow
the collision. Particle impact is considered by many to be the
or Tee placed close to the outlet of a component with a high
most commonly experienced mechanism that directly ignites
fluid velocity). Generally, impacts normal (perpendicular) to
metals in oxygen systems. The characteristic elements of
the impact surface are considered most severe.
particle impact ignition include the following:
5.2.6.1 Presence of Particles—Absolute removal of par-
ticles is not possible, and systems can generate their own 6
Reference (8) provides Eq 1 with the given list of variables as defined here.
particles during operation. The quantity of particles in a system However, the value for the Individual Gas Constant, R, was incorrectly stated as the
will tend to increase with the age of the system. Hence, a Universal Gas Constant, and its metric value was incorrectly listed as 26 N-m/kg K
system must be designed to tolerate the presence of at least instead of 260 N-m/kg K.

G 88 – 05
FIG. 1 Maximum Oxygen Gas Velocity Produced by Pressure Differentials, Assuming Isentropic Flow
5.2.6.4 Flammable Materials—Generally, both the par- vulnerable to direct ignition by this mechanism. Fig. 2 shows
ticle(s) and the target (impact point) materials must be flam- an example of a compression heating sequence leading to
mable in the given environment for ignition and sustained ignition of a nonmetal valve seat. Sequence A shows high-
burning to occur. However, particle impact ignition studies pressure oxygen upstream of a fast-opening valve in the closed
have shown that some highly flammable metals, such as position. Downstream of the valve is oxygen at initial pressure,
aluminum alloys, may ignite even when impacted by inert volume, and temperature (Pi, Vi, Ti, respectively). Pi and Ti are
particles (7). Additionally, common nonmetal particles have assumed to be at ambient conditions in this example). A second
been shown to be ineffective igniters of metals by particle valve with a nonmetallic seat is shown downstream in the
impact (12), and softer nonmetal targets, though more prone to closed position, representing a “dead-end,” or closed volume.
ignition by other means, are generally less susceptible to direct Sequence B shows the opening of the fast-opening valve,
ignition by particle impact because they tend to cushion the rapidly pressurizing the downstream volume with high-
impact (13). This cushioning effect of nonmetals can act to pressure oxygen (final pressure shown as Pf), compressing and
increase the time-to-zero velocity of a particle, lower its peak heating the original gas volume. The final temperature gener-
deceleration, and generally create a less destructive collision. ated at the “dead-end” from such an event (shown as Tf) can
However, harder nonmetal targets, such as those used in some exceed the ignition temperature of the exposed nonmetal valve
valve seat applications, have been shown to ignite in particle seat and cause it to ignite. The presence of lubricant, debris, or
impact studies (13). other contaminants proximate to the valve seat may increase
5.2.7 Heat of Compression—Heat is generated from the the hazard since they may be easier to ignite. Once ignited, the
conversion of mechanical energy when a gas is compressed lubricant, debris, or other contaminants may begin a kindling
from a lower to a higher pressure. High gas temperatures can chain (see 5.2.14). In order for ignition to occur, pressurization
result if this compression occurs quickly enough to simulate of the downstream volume must be rapid enough to create
adiabatic (no heat transfer) conditions. Heat of compression near-adiabatic heating, as discussed below. The characteristic
has also been referred to as compression heating, pneumatic elements for heat of compression include the following:
impact, rapid pressurization, adiabatic compression, and gas- 5.2.7.1 Compression Pressure Ratio—In order to produce
eous impact. This can occur when high-pressure oxygen is temperatures capable of igniting most materials in oxygen
released into a dead-ended tube or pipe, quickly compressing environments, a significant compression pressure ratio (Pf/Pi)
the residual oxygen initially in the tube or pipe. The elevated is required, where the final pressure is significantly higher than
gas temperatures produced can ignite contaminants or materi- the starting pressure.
als in system components. The hazard of heat of compression NOTE 4—Eq 2 shows a formula7 for the theoretical maximum tempera-
increases with system pressure and with pressurization rates. ture (Tf) that can be developed when pressurizing a gas rapidly from one
Heat of compression is considered by many to be the most
commonly experienced mechanism that directly ignites non-
metals in oxygen systems. In general, metal alloys are not 7
Formula shown is based upon isentropic flow relations for a ideal gas.
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G 88 – 05
FIG. 2 Example of a Compression Heating Sequence Leading to Ignition of a Nonmetal Valve Seat
pressure and temperature to an elevated pressure without heat transfer:
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G 88 – 05
Tf Pf
Ti 5 Pi FG ~n21!/n
(2)
casing creating ignition from galling and friction at the
metal-to-metal interface. Heat produced by friction and galling
(see 3.1.3) may elevate component materials above their
where:
Tf = final temperature, abs, ignition temperature. Particles can participate in ignition as
Ti = initial temperature, abs, contaminants (see 5.2.5) or in particle impacts (see 5.2.6). The
Pf = final pressure, abs, characteristic elements of ignition by galling and friction
Pi = initial pressure, abs, and include the following:
Cp 5.2.8.1 Two or More Rubbing Surfaces—Metal-to-metal
n 5 C 5 1.40 for oxygen (3) contact is generally considered most severe as it produces a
v
high-temperature oxidizing environment, and it destroys pro-
where: tective oxide surfaces or coatings, exposing fresh metal and
Cp = specific heat at constant pressure, and generating fine particles. By comparison, limited test data for
Cv = specific heat at constant volume. nonmetals suggests that nonmetals can deform or fragment
NOTE 5—Table 2 gives the theoretical temperatures (Tf) that could be under frictional loading and not necessarily ignite (though
obtained by compressing oxygen adiabatically from an initial temperature generally none of these results are desirable in an oxygen
(Ti) of 20°C and initial pressure (Pi) of one standard atmosphere to the system).
pressures shown. Figs. 3 and 4 show these final temperatures graphically
as a function of Pressure Ratio (Pf/Pi) and Final Pressure (Pf), respectively. 5.2.8.2 High Rubbing Speeds and/or High Loading—These
Table 2 and Fig. 3 show that pressure ratios as low as 10 (for example conditions are generally considered most severe as they create
rapidly pressurizing a system from ambient to 1 MPa (145 psia)) can a high rate of heat transfer as reflected by the Pv Product, (the
theoretically produce temperatures that exceed the autogenous ignition loading pressure normal to the surface multiplied by the
temperatures (AIT) of many nonmetals or contaminants in oxygen velocity of the rubbing surfaces) (15).
systems (based upon the AIT of various materials per Test Method G 72).
Fig. 4 shows how increasing the downstream pressure prior to the 5.2.9 Resonance—Acoustic oscillations within resonant
compression event lowers the final temperature. cavities can create rapid heating. The temperature rises more
5.2.7.2 Rapid Pressurization—The rate of compression, or rapidly and achieves higher values when particles are present
time of pressurization, must be fast to minimize heat loss to the or when gas velocities are high. Resonance phenomena in
surroundings. Pressurization times on the order of fractions of oxygen systems are well documented (16) but limited design
a second as opposed to seconds or minutes are most severe. For criteria are available to avoid its unintentional occurance. An
example, Teflon-lined flexhoses can be ignited if pressurized in example of resonance ignition has been demonstrated in
fractions of a second but not if pressurized in seconds (14). aerospace applications with solid or liquid rocket fuel engines.
5.2.7.3 Exposed Nonmetal Proximate to a Dead-end—For Gaseous oxygen flows through a sonic nozzle and directly into
ignition to occur by heat of compression, a nonmetal material a resonance cavity, heating the gas and solid or liquid fuel.
must be exposed to the heated compressed gas slug proximate When the gas reaches the auto-ignition temperature of the fuel,
to a dead-end location (for example a nonmetal valve seat in a ignition occurs and a flame jet is emitted from the chamber
closed valve). Nonmetals typically have low thermal diffusivi- (17). The characteristic elements of ignition by resonance
ties and have lower autogenous ignition temperatures than include the following:
metals and thus are more vulnerable to this mechanism. 5.2.9.1 Resonance Cavity Geometry—The requirements in-
5.2.8 Friction and Galling—The rubbing together of two clude a throttling device such as a nozzle, orifice, regulator, or
surfaces can produce heat and can generate particles. An valve directing a sonic gas jet into a cavity or closed-end tube.
example is the rub of a centrifugal compressor rotor against its Fig. 5 shows an example of a system with a sonic nozzle/orifice
directly upstream of a Tee with a closed end. The gas flows out
TABLE 2 Theoretical Maximum Temperature Obtained when the branch port of the Tee (making a 90° turn) but the closed
Compressing Oxygen Adiabatically from 20°C and One Standard end creates a cavity in which shock waves generated by the
Atmosphere to Various Pressures throttling device can resonate.
Final Pressure, Pf Pressure Ratio, Final Temperature, Tf 5.2.9.2 Acoustic Resonance Phenomena—The distance be-
kPa PSIA Pf/Pi °C °F tween the throttling device and the closed end affects the
345 50 3.4 143 289 frequency of acoustic oscillations in the cavity, similar to a
690 100 6.8 234 453 pipe organ with a closed end, due to the interference of incident
1000 145 9.9 291 556
1379 200 13.6 344 653 and reflecting sound waves. This distance also affects the
2068 300 20.4 421 789 temperature produced in the cavity. Higher harmonic frequen-
2758 400 27.2 480 896 cies have been shown to produce higher temperatures. The
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3447 500 34.0 530 986

5170 750 51.0 628 1163 resonant frequency has been shown to be a function of pipe
6895 1000 68.0 706 1303 diameter and pressure ratio (16).
10 000 1450 98.6 815 1499
13 790 2000 136.1 920 1688 5.2.9.3 Flammable Particulate or Contaminant Debris at
27 579 4000 272.1 1181 2158 Closed End—Particulate or debris residing at the closed end of
34 474 5000 340.1 1277 2330 the cavity (see Fig. 5) can self-ignite due to the high tempera-
100 000 14 500 986.4 1828 3322
1 000 000 145 000 9863.9 3785 6845 tures produced by resonance heating, or they can vibrate and
their collisions generate sufficient heat to self-ignite.

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FIG. 3 Final Compression Temperatures for Pressure Ratios
FIG. 4 Final Compression Temperatures for Final Pressures Given the Initial Presssures Shown
5.2.10 Static Electric Discharge—Accumulated static poorly cleaned, inadequately grounded piping; two pieces of
charge on a nonconducting surface can discharge with enough clothing or fabric creating a static discharge when quickly
energy to ignite the material receiving the discharge. Static pulled apart; and large diameter ball valves with nonmetal
electrical discharge may be generated by high fluid flow under upstream and downstream seats, where the ball/stem can
certain conditions, especially where particulate matter is become electrically isolated from the body and can develop a
present. Examples of static electric discharge include arcing in charge differential between the ball and body from the ball

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FIG. 5 Example of a System Configuration with Potential for Resonance Heating
rubbing against the large surface area nonmetallic seat. The seat from a plug-style cylinder valve that has been cycled
characteristic elements of static discharge include the follow- extensively and is used in a throttling manner. Flow friction
ing: ignition is supported by unverifiable anecdotes. The back-
5.2.10.1 Static charge buildup from flow or rubbing accu- ground for the flow friction hypothesis suggests the character-
mulates on a nonconducting surface. istic elements:
5.2.10.2 Discharge typically occurs at a point source be- 5.2.12.1 Higher-pressure Systems—Though there is cur-
tween materials of differing electrical potentials. rently no clearly defined lower pressure threshold where flow
5.2.10.3 Two charged surfaces are not likely to discharge friction ignition becomes inactive, the current known fire
unless one material is conductive. history is in higher-pressure systems operating at approxi-
5.2.10.4 Accumulation of charge is more likely in a dry gas mately 3.5 MPa (500 psi) or higher.
or a dry environment as opposed to a moist or humid 5.2.12.2 Configurations including leaks past nonmetal com-
environment. ponent seats or pressure seals, or “weeping” or “scrubbing”
5.2.11 Electrical Arc—Sufficient electrical current arcing flow configurations around nonmetals. These configurations
from a power source to a flammable material can cause can include external leaks past elastomeric pressure seals or
ignition. Examples include a defective pressure switch or an internal flows on or close to plastic seats in components. Flow
insulated electrical heater element undergoing short circuit friction is not believed to be a credible ignition source for
arcing through its sheath to a combustible material. The metals.
characteristic elements of electrical arc ignition include the 5.2.12.3 Surfaces of nonmetals that are highly fibrous from
following: being chafed, abraded, or plastically deformed may render flow
5.2.11.1 Ungrounded or short-circuited power source such friction more severe. The smaller, more easily ignited fibers of
as a motor brush (especially if dirty and/or high powered), the nonmetal may begin resonating, or vibrating/flexing, per-
electrical control equipment, instrumentation, lighting, etc. haps at high frequencies due to flow, and this “friction” of the
5.2.11.2 Flammable materials capable of being ignited by material would generate heat.
the electrical arc or spark. 5.2.13 Mechanical Impact—Heat can be generated from the
5.2.12 Flow Friction—It is theorized that oxygen and transfer of kinetic energy when an object having a relatively
oxygen-enriched gas flowing across the surface of or imping- large mass or momentum strikes a material. In an oxygen
ing directly upon nonmetals can generate heat within the environment, the heat and mechanical interaction between the
nonmetal, causing it to self-ignite. Though neither well under- objects can cause ignition of the impacted material. The
stood, well documented in literature, nor well demonstrated in characteristic elements of mechanical impact ignition include
experimental efforts to date, several oxygen fires have been the following:
attributed to this mechanism when no other apparent mecha- 5.2.13.1 Single, Large Impact or Repeated Impacts—
nisms were active aside from a leaking, or scrubbing action of Example: If a high-pressure relief valve “chatters,” it can
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gas across a nonmetal surface (most commonly a polymer) impart repeated impacts on a nonmetallic seat, in combination
(18). An example is ignition of a nonmetallic cylinder valve with other effects, and lead to ignition of the seat.

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5.2.13.2 Nonmetal at Point of Impact—Generally, test data specialized technology addressed in general by a wealth of textbooks,
show this mechanism is only active with nonmetals, though college curricula and professional societies, standards and codes. Among
aluminum, magnesium, and titanium alloys in thin cross- the sources are the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Pressure
Vessel and Piping Division, the American Petroleum Institute, the Ameri-
sections as well as some solders have been ignited experimen- can National Standards Institute, and Deutsches Institut für Normung.
tally (19, 20). However, in these alloys, mechanical failure Prevailing standards and codes cover many mechanical considerations,
(which introduces additional ignition mechanisms) will likely including adequate strength to contain pressure, avoidance of fatigue,
precede, or at minimum coincide with, mechanical impact corrosion allowances, etc.
ignitions in liquid oxygen (LOX) (21).
7.2 Final Design—Oxygen system design involves a com-
5.2.13.3 Special caution is required for mechanical impact
plex interplay of the various factors that promote ignition and
in LOX environments. Some cleaning solvents are known to
of the ability of the materials of construction to resist such
become shock-sensitive in LOX. Porous hydrocarbons such as
ignition and potential burning (9, 10, 23). There are many
asphalt, wood, and leather can become shock-sensitive in LOX
subjective judgements, external influences, and compromises
and react explosively when impacted even with relatively small
involved. While each case must ultimately be decided on its
amounts of energy (55). Testing has showed that the presence
own merits, the generalizations below apply. In applying these
of contamination on hydrocarbon materials will increase the
principles, the designer should consider the system’s normal
hazard (56). If LOX comes into contact with any porous
and worst-case operating conditions and, in addition, indirect
hydrocarbon materials, care should be take to avoid mechani-
oxygen exposure that may result from system upsets and
cal impacts of any kind until the LOX has dissipated. This can
failure modes. The system should be designed to fail safely. To
take as long as 30 minutes depending on the material exposed.
this end, failure effect studies to identify components subject to
Examples of this include leather work gloves soaked in LOX
indirect oxygen exposure or for which an oxygen exposure
and exposed to impact of a wrench, and LOX overflow onto an
more severe than normal is possible are recommended. Not
asphalt driveway then driven over by truck or walked on by
every principle can be applied in the design of every system.
personnel.
However, the fire resistance of a system will improve with the
5.2.14 Kindling Chain—In a kindling chain (referred to as
number of principles that are followed.
promoted ignition in Guide G 94), an easily ignitable material,
7.3 Avoid Unnecessarily Elevated Temperatures.
such as flammable contamination, ignites and the energy
release from this combustion ignites a more ignition resistant NOTE 7—Ignition requires at least two key conditions to be met: (1) the
material such as a plastic, which in turn ignites an even more minimum in-situ ignition temperature must be exceeded, and (2) the
ignition-resistant material such as a metallic component. The minimum in-situ ignition energy must be exceeded. The optimum com-
fire eventually leads to a breach of the system. The primary bination of temperature and energy required for ignition have not been
studied for most oxygen system hardware.
intent is to prevent ignition of any material in the system, but
secondarily, to break the kindling chain so if ignition does 7.3.1 Locate systems a safe distance from heat or radiation
occur, it does not lead to a breach of the system. One method sources (such as furnaces).
to accomplish this is to limit the mass of nonmetallic compo- 7.3.1.1 Avoid large energy inputs. Large energy inputs from
nents so if the nonmetal does ignite, it does not release hot gases, friction, radiation, electrical sources, etc. have the
sufficient energy to ignite the adjacent metal. effect of increasing the propensity of a material to burn
5.2.15 Other Ignition Mechanisms—There are numerous extensively if ignited and, if the input is large and at a sufficient
other potential ignition sources that may be considered in temperature, may actually produce ignition.
oxygen system design that are not elaborated upon here. These 7.3.1.2 Example—An external electrical heater experiences
include environmental factors such as personnel smoking; open a short circuit and arcs to the wall of a heat exchanger for
flames; shock waves and fragments from vessel ruptures; oxygen. As the arcing progresses, a progressively larger region
welding; mechanical vibration; intake of exhaust from an of the heat exchanger will become overheated and if the
internal combustion engine; smoke from nearby fires or other temperature rises sufficiently or if the arcing actually breaches
environmental chemicals; and lightning. the exchanger wall, ignition and fire may result. Even if the
exchanger was initially operated under conditions where it was
6. Test Methods burn-resistant, the region that is preheated may achieve its fire
6.1 The test methods used to support the design of oxygen limit and burn.
systems are listed in Table 1.
NOTE 8—Electrical heaters on oxygen equipment may require ground
fault interrupters (GFI) to prevent large energy inputs and fires due to
7. System Design Method heater failure. When GFI is used, its trigger current should be significantly
7.1 Overview—The designer of a system for oxygen service below any level that could sustain arcing or protracted heating during a
should observe good mechanical design principles and incor- failure.
porate the factors below to a degree consistent with the severity 7.3.2 Design for efficient dissipation of heat.
of the application. Mechanical failures are undesirable since 7.3.3 Provide monitoring equipment and automatic shut-
these failures, for example rupture and friction, can produce down devices where practical (such as heaters and bearings).
heating, particulates, and other factors which can cause ignition
7.3.3.1 Avoid temperature envelope drift. Temperature drift
as discussed in the following sections.
may occur from increasing ambient temperature, heater con-
NOTE 6—Good mechanical design practice is a highly advanced and troller failure, etc.

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NOTE 9—Whenever a temperature controller is used, an over- 7.5.2.2 Design necessary sumps, cavities, dead-ends or
temperature alarm or shutdown should also be incorporated and it should remote chambers carefully to exclude or minimize the accu-
not share common components, including the temperature sensor, with the mulation of contaminants.
controller.
NOTE 12—Sumps and cavities cannot always be avoided and some-
7.3.4 Prefer a nonmetallic material whose autogenous igni- times they are desirable to safely accumulate small amounts of debris. In
tion temperature in oxygen (per Test Method G 72) exceeds the these cases, they should be of burn-resistant alloys capable of withstand-
maximum use temperature by at least 100°C (per Guide G 63). ing ignition of the debris that might be present and should not be prone to
A larger temperature differential may be appropriate for high acoustic resonance (see 7.10.1). Heat sinks or diluents (see 7.18.2) can
use pressures or other aggravating factors. also help to reduce this hazard.
7.4 Avoid Unnecessarily Elevated Pressures. NOTE 13—Systems that are free draining and smooth surfaced inter-
nally, and that have a general downward flow direction will tend to retain
7.4.1 Reduce pressure near the supply point rather than near
less debris and deposits. Some contaminants (oils in particular) migrate
the use point. This allows intermediate equipment to be at more easily across polished surfaces than across rough (for example,
minimum pressure. grit-blasted) surfaces (52). The amount of oil retained on a smooth surface
7.4.2 Ensure proper system relief protection. texture is less, and the surface-area-to-volume is less (see 7.17). Thus,
7.4.2.1 Avoid pressure envelope drift. Pressure drift may smooth surface finishes may be used to reduce contamination and oil
result from creep in an oxygen pressure regulator, a sticking hazards at critical regions.
relief valve, increased system temperature, vent failure, etc. NOTE 14—“Seal welds” are sometimes used to isolate internal regions
of oxygen systems that cannot be adequately finished or cleaned. Because
7.5 Design for System Cleanness:
this practice has been linked to known incidents within industry, if seal
7.5.1 Design a system that is easy to clean and easy to welds are to be used, they should be used with caution and always
maintain clean (see Practice G 93 and Ref (24)). It should be properly applied.
possible to disassemble the system into components that can be
7.5.2.3 Design bypass lines to exclude or minimize the
thoroughly cleaned.
accumulation of contaminants.
7.5.2 Avoid the presence of unnecessary sumps, dead-ends
and cavities likely to accumulate debris. NOTE 15—A compatible bypass valve is typically a small economical
copper-base alloy or nickel-base alloy valve that can be installed directly
NOTE 10—Any groove (including the corrugations of bellows-type across a rapid-opening valve for use in pressure equalization to minimize
flexible hoses), depression, ridge (including mismatched coaxial piping or particle impact and heat of compression ignition (see 7.6.2.3 and 7.7.2.4).
weld-backup ring edges), projection or upwardly inclined section may The associated piping upstream and downstream of the bypass valve
retain and accumulate debris. should also be designed for these hazards (see 7.6.3 and 7.6.4).
NOTE 11—Any upward flow, including vertical piping and inclined NOTE 16—Bypass lines are often used for system start-up scenarios or
piping will act as a phase separator and leave debris that is not entrained to facilitate cleaning or maintenance. When used on horizontal piping,
at its lower end. With two-phase liquid and gas flow, any region that is not bypass lines should be added off the top of the piping (see Fig. 6). Related
free-draining may allow fractional evaporation (see 7.17.3.1) of the liquid tactics may be used on vertical piping. Though bypass piping off the top
and production of a deposit. is preferred, construction at or above the horizontal center line is
acceptable (9).
7.5.2.1 Avoid sumps, dead-ends, or cavities in LOX and
oxygen-enriched cryogenic systems where the liquid is stag- 7.5.3 Use filters to limit the introduction of particles and to
nant and can vaporize, allowing dissolved low-boiling-point capture particles generated during service.
hydrocarbons to concentrate and eventually precipitate. Vari- 7.5.3.1 Consider use of filters at sites of oxygen entry into a
ous names have been applied to this vaporization and precipi- system, downstream of points where particles are likely to be
tation process including: fractional vaporization, LOX boil-off, generated, and at points where particle presence produces the
dead-end boiling, boiling-to-dryness, and dry boiling (see greatest risk, such as at the suction side of compressors or
7.17.3) (59-62). upstream of throttling valves.
FIG. 6 Proper Orientation of Bypass Valves

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7.5.3.2 Use the finest (that is, smallest) filtration for a systems (see 5.2.6). Particle impacts tend to occur where oxygen streams
system that meets system flow requirements. are forced to stop or change direction near obstacles. Particles, which have
greater inertia than gases, do not change direction as quickly and often
NOTE 17—Common strainer mesh sizes for larger industrial gas appli- impact the obstacle. The obstacle may be a large blunt surface or a raised
cations range from 30 to 100 mesh (60 to 150 micron). For smaller, edge.
higher-pressure applications such as aerospace or welding, filters range
from 2 to 50 micron.
7.6.1 Use filters to entrap particles (see 7.5.3).
7.6.2 Limit gas velocities to limit particle kinetic energy.
7.5.3.3 Filter elements should not be fragile or prone to 7.6.2.1 For steel pipelines, Oxygen Pipeline Systems (9)
breakage. If complete blockage is possible, the elements should may be consulted for an industry approach to limiting oxygen
be able to withstand the full differential pressure that may be gas velocities for given materials and pressures.
generated. 7.6.2.2 Use caution with choke points, nozzles or
7.5.3.4 Design and maintain filters to limit local debris. converging/diverging geometries that can produce venturi
Preventive maintenance of filters should be adequate to limit effects and high local velocities (see Fig. 7).
the hazard associated with flammable debris collected on the
filter element. NOTE 23—These geometries can produce local velocities far greater
7.5.3.5 Provide for preventive maintenance of filters. than the calculated average. They can even produce localized sonic and
supersonic velocities in some cases where the overall pressure differential
NOTE 18—Such provision may include pressure gauges to indicate is less than required for critical (or choked) flow (33).
excessive pressure drop and a method of isolating the filter from the (1) Use reducers with caution. Tapered “reducers” that
system to perform maintenance on it.
downsize or “upsize” piping of differing diameter can produce
7.5.3.6 Use burn-resistant materials for filter elements since extremely high local velocities and even form a rudimentary
they typically have high surface-area/volume ratios (see 7.17 venturi tube (see Fig. 7A) (33).
and Guides G 63 and G 94). (2) Do not neck tubing bent to form elbows or radii. Do not
7.5.3.7 Consider parallel, redundant filter configurations kink, compress or crush tubing (see Fig. 7B) (33).
with upstream and downstream shutoff valves (with pressure (3) Avoid configurations and operating conditions that
equalization if required) if the system cannot be shut down to would allow liquids to freeze and obstruct flow paths (see Fig.
change filter elements. 7C) (33).
7.5.3.8 Avoid exposing filters or strainers to bi-directional (4) Recognize that tapered valve stems can form diverging
flow. Exposing filters to backflow allows collected debris from geometries (see Fig. 7D) (33).
the filter to flow back into the system and defeats the purpose 7.6.2.3 Equalize pressure across valves prior to their opera-
of the filter. Furthermore, large debris dumps from backflow tion (see 7.7.2.4).
can increase the likelihood of ignition. (1) Consider that system start-ups or shut-downs can create
7.5.4 After assembly, purge systems with clean, dry, oil-free high transient gas velocities. These velocities are often orders
filtered inert gas, if possible, to remove assembly-generated of magnitude higher than those experienced during steady-state
contaminants. operation.
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NOTE 19—Unlike fuel gas systems, oxygen systems generally do not (2) Consider that even small pressure differentials across
require inert gas purges after use, prior to “breaking into” the system for components can generate gas velocites in excess of those
maintenance. The bulk materials of construction are often considered recommended for various metals in oxygen service (see
situationally nonflammable at ambient conditions (even with 5.2.6.2) (9, 10).
commercially-pure oxygen in the system), and the energies required to 7.6.3 Use burn-resistant materials where gas velocities can-
ignite these materials under these conditions are very high. If there exists
not be minimized (such as internal to and immediately up-
a possibility of fuel gases or other ignitable contaminants being present,
inert gas purges prior to maintenance are generally required. stream and downstream of throttling valves).
7.5.5 Consider the locations and effects of operationally- NOTE 24—High-velocity and turbulent gas streams may be present in
generated contaminants in oxygen systems. systems where the average cross-sectional velocity is calculated to be
acceptable. For example, flow through a throttling valve or from small-
NOTE 20—Components that, simply by their function, generate particu- bore piping into large-bore piping may create localized high-velocity jets,
lates include compressors, pumps, check-valves, rotating-stem valves, and eddies and turbulence. These flow disturbances may cause high-velocity
quick-disconnect fittings. fluids to impinge against the interior of the larger piping. However at some
NOTE 21—Erosion in system piping caused by particle impingement point, the high-velocity fluid caused by these flow disturbances will settle
can produce additional particulate debris and potentially contribute to and again resemble the calculated average velocity of the flowing fluid.
ignition in an oxygen environment. Erosion has been shown to depend Traditional practice (9) has been to assume that the flow velocities within
strongly on the angle of impact (angle between the direction of motion of the pipe will approach the average velocity within a distance of about
the impinging particle and the tangent to the impacted surface at the point eight to ten internal pipe diameters. Therefore, burn-resistant alloys are
of impact) and the properties of the impacted material, among other often used for a minimum of eight inside pipe diameters (based on the
factors (58). For ductile materials, erosion is considered most severe at smallest diameter that would produce an acceptable average velocity)
impact angles between 20 and 30 degrees, as material removal is implied downstream of high-velocity flow disturbances. In some applications, the
to be predominantly by plastic flow. For brittle materials, erosion is required length of burn-resistant alloy may also be determined using
considered most severe at a 90 degree impact angle, and material removal computational fluid dynamics to model areas of high velocity and
is implied to be predominantly by brittle fracture. impingement.
7.6 Avoid Particle Impacts. NOTE 25—If a high-velocity stream flows at right angles from a small
diameter line, d, into a large diameter line, D, as shown in the bypass valve
NOTE 22—Particle impact can lead to ignition and fire in oxygen assembly in Fig. 8, then the design should ensure the flow is settled (that

G 88 – 05
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FIG. 7 Converging/Diverging Geometries that can Produce Venturi Effects and High Local Velocities
FIG. 8 Example of Bypass Line Configuration
is, gas velocities should be low) before it reaches the opposite wall to these impingement sites should be calculated and appropriate materials
avoid designing for impingement at this location (circled in Fig. 8). considered.
However, as in all oxygen system designs, the worst-case gas velocities at

G 88 – 05
7.6.4 Use burn-resistant materials at particle impingement 7.6.7.2 Streams interfacing at an angle of 20° or less are not
points (such as short-radius elbows, Tees, branch connections, considered hazardous for particle impingement (9) but may
orifices, and globe-style valves (9). still be severe for erosion.
7.6.4.1 Burn-resistant alloys may be used as liners in NOTE 30—Where gas streams are merged at an acute angle, the normal
applications where experience shows good reliability (Fig. 9). component of particle velocity (V sin theta) is often taken as a measure of
However, experience shows that welded impingement plates the effective gas velocity (a 45-degree angle would be treated as 70 % of
are generally not reliable and therefore not preferred. actual velocity). Further, the particle residence time (that is, time a burning
particle resides against an impact target) is low. Thus, streams that
NOTE 26—There is industrial experience with welded impingement impinge at an angle of 20° or less are not considered impingement sites
plates in locations such as branch ports of Tees, and they have exhibited (9).
poor reliability, tending to break free in service if inadequately supported,
NOTE 31—Streams containing particulates impacting at an angle of 20
and may flex and fatigue if inadequately supported or if insufficiently
to 30 degrees on a ductile material, or 90 degrees on a brittle material may
rigid. They may form a pressure-containing crevice (possibly containing
cause debris generation through erosion (see 7.5.5).
unacceptable debris), or even a pressure-vessel-within-the-pressure-vessel
if seal welded and the crevice may need to be vented externally. They are 7.6.8 Arrange for particles to move through a system
discouraged for general use. If used, they should be designed the same as without accumulation or sudden dispersal.
for any pressure-containing component.
7.6.8.1 Orient high-flow (for example, ball, plug, butterfly,
7.6.4.2 Weld overlay of burn-resistant metal alloy may be and gate) valves so that particles do not accumulate at the point
used to protect impingement sites (34). of first opening, as shown in Fig. 10C. In horizontal piping
NOTE 27—Overlay thickness must be sufficient to resist particle igni- configurations, orient high-flow valves vertically (with the
tion (typically more than 1.0 to 3-mm, 0.039 to 0.125-in., thick). This stem directed up as shown in Fig. 10C) as opposed to
precludes the use of electroplating to protect impingement sites, because horizontally (stem directed to the side as shown in Fig. 10A
it is too thin and may break free to produce unwanted debris. Platings are and B).
used only rarely in oxygen systems; typically only on precision surfaces 7.6.8.2 Implement strategic use of downward or upward
such as valve balls and only if of the highest quality and adhesion. flow piping where practical to accumulate fewer particles.
7.6.5 Minimize pressurization rates which can create high 7.6.8.3 Use excess flow mechanisms, such as automatically
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transient gas velocities. resetting (35) or manually resetting excess flow valves, to
NOTE 28—System start-up dynamics can produce gas velocities and
reduce particle acceleration and to reduce both the conse-
flow profiles that are more severe than those for steady-state flow quences of ignition and the volume of oxygen that is available
conditions. Slow pressurization of a system can minimize these dynamics. for reaction or release during a fire (see 7.12.1.1).
7.6.9 Relocate vulnerable impingement sites.
7.6.6 Do not impinge gas streams onto seats, seals, or other
7.6.9.1 Locate vulnerable components out of both the
plastics or elastomers.
normal- and upset-flow path.
NOTE 29—Gas streams that impinge on nonmetals can cause premature
deterioration of the nonmetal and lead to ignition by several mechanisms NOTE 32—In Fig. 11, for pressure taps, location A is an impingement
(for example, see flow friction, 5.2.12). Further, particulate entrained in point for larger particles. Locations B, and C, are less vulnerable.
gas streams can become embedded in the nonmetal and create surface NOTE 33—Flow through elbows and curved piping can produce in-
impurities that may render the nonmetal more vulnerable to ignition. creased velocities through the establishment of twin-vortex secondary
flow that may occur for some distance and may cause smaller particles to
7.6.7 Design for particle impacts to be at shallow oblique impact the wall or other obstacles, as shown in Fig. 11 (36).
angles where practical. NOTE 34—In assessing flow patterns in oxygen systems, modern
7.6.7.1 Use the calculated normal (perpendicular) compo- computational fluid dynamics software can be helpful. These programs
nent of particle velocity as the effective gas velocity. can calculate local gas velocities and gas directionality which can aid in
FIG. 9 Example of a Burn-Resistant Liner Applied Inside a Pipe

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FIG. 10 Debris in Ball Valve Installations, Side and End Views
evaluating the particle impact ignition hazard. exceeds their autogenous ignition temperatures and minimum ignition
energies.
7.6.10 Eliminate impingement sites when possible.
7.6.10.1 Do not use weld-backup rings. The edge of back-up 7.7.1 Do not rapidly compress gas volumes against nonme-
ring can be a blunt target for particles (see Fig. 12A) tallic materials.
7.6.10.2 Match piping joint bores carefully to prevent the NOTE 36—Rapidly pressurizing nonmetallic materials to pressures
edge from being a blunt target (see Fig. 12B). greater than 3.4 MPa (500 psi) can generate theoretical maximum
7.6.10.3 Match flange-gasket bores to piping inside diam- temperatures greater than the autogenous ignition temperature of all
eter (see Fig. 12C). practical nonmetallic materials (see 5.2.7.1, Table 2).
7.6.10.4 Avoid large reduction ratios in pipe reducers (see
7.7.2 Avoid rapid pressurization of components.
Fig. 12D).
7.7.2.1 Avoid the use of fast-opening valves where down-
(1) Inlet:outlet diameter ratios > 3:1 are considered im-
stream system volumes can be quickly pressurized.
pingement sites (9).
7.6.10.5 Use elbows and bent pipe with large ratios of NOTE 37—Fast-opening valves (such as standard ball valves) may be
curvature to diameter (L:d). used if specifically designed to enable slow pressurization or used
(1) Industry practice states that piping bends with a radius strategically for isolation only and are never opened with a differential
pressure across the valve.
of curvature less than 1.5 times the pipe diameter (R < 1.5D)
are considered impingement locations (9). More “conserva- 7.7.2.2 Select automatic valve operators that are slow open-
tive” designs have historically considered R<5D as causing ing.
impingement (31). 7.7.2.3 Install flow restrictors where practical to limit pres-
7.7 Minimize Heat of Compression. surization rates.
NOTE 35—Heat of compression (also called adiabatic compression or NOTE 38—Orifice plates that are used for flow restriction typically
pneumatic impact) is heat transferred when a gas is compressed (see experience high pressure differentials and choked flow. To reduce the risk
5.2.7). Ignition can occur if the temperature produced and the energy of particle impact ignition, burn-resistant materials should be used for the
transferred to surrounding vulnerable materials (typically polymers) orifice plastes and components/piping immediately downstream up to the

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FIG. 11 Particle Paths and Twin Vortex Secondary Flows
point of flow settling (see 7.6.3). Orifice plates that are used for flow For example, if a downstream pressure is at least 90 % of the upstream
measurement typically experience relatively small pressure drops and only absolute pressure, then its compression only increases the system tem-
marginal gas velocity increases. They are much less severe in service and perature by 9°C (16°F), usually sufficient to defeat this ignition mecha-
are often treated as impingement sites but not necessarily as causing nism (8). If the downstream pressure is at least 50 % of the upstream
hazards downstream. absolute pressure (pressure ratio = 2), then its compression results in a
7.7.2.4 Provide for pressure equalization across rapid- final estimated temperature of less than 93°C (200°F) (starting from 20°C
opening valves (see 7.6.2.3). (68°F)), which is below the AIT of most nonmetals (see Figs. 3 and 4).
Further, even a downstream pressure of only 15 % of the upstream
(1) Use slow-opening compatible bypass valves for pres-
absolute pressure (pressure ratio = 6.7), will probably not generate
sure equalization where applicable (see 7.5.2.3). sufficient temperature to ignite most highly compatible nonmetals such as
(2) Equalize pressure from alternative (including tempo- PTFE (see Figs. 3 and 4) (8).
rary) sources where applicable prior to operating the fast- NOTE 40—Depending upon the sealing mechanism of some ball valves
opening valve (8). and how they are operated, they can isolate the ball bore when closed,
NOTE 39—When a valve is opened, the gas velocity through it is a potentially creating a low-pressure cavity within the bore that can be
maximum initially then decreases as the downstream system pressure rapidly pressurized upon initial opening of the valve, subjecting the
increases. Particle impact is the primary concern and must be addressed at downstream seat to heat of compression (37). Ensure that ball valves are
this time when gas velocities are greatest. As the downstream system specified with features to prevent this.
approaches the upstream pressure, gas temperature downstream ap-
proaches a maximum and ignition of exposed polymers is the primary 7.7.2.5 Avoid pressurization times of less than 1 second
concern that must be addressed. Estimates can be made of the degree of where practical. Longer pressurization times are preferred and
pressure equalization needed to cope with each portion of the hazard (8). may be required for larger piping systems.

G 88 – 05
--````,,``,,`,`,``````,```,,`-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---
FIG. 12 Eliminating Impingement
NOTE 41—Testing has shown that pressurization rates of less than 1 7.7.2.7 Use larger distance/volume pieces where applicable
second can ignite polymer-lined flexible hoses, even at low pressures (14). for increased protection from compression heating.
Experience indicates that smaller, high-pressure systems, such as those
with an oxygen cylinder source can be especially vulnerable to ignition by NOTE 43—When a system is rapidly pressurized, the initial gas volume
heat of compression. (slug) is compressed and heated. For a constant final pressure, the lower
7.7.2.6 Use “distance/volume pieces” to isolate polymers the initial system pressure, the higher will be the final compressed-slug
from end points that experience heat of compression (25). temperature, and the greater the prospect of exceeding polymer (or
contaminant) autogenous ignition temperatures. However, up to a point
NOTE 42—A distance/volume piece (DVP) is a section of metal, as (estimated at about 31 % of the final absolute pressure (39)), the higher the
shown in Fig. 13, that is used (typically at the end of a flexible initial system pressure, the greater the heat available to transfer to system
polymer-lined hose) to contain the hot compressed-gas slug that can form components, and therefore the greater the chance of exceeding the
during pressurization and to safely absorb its heat of compression. Fig. component’s minimum ignition energy. The critical initial condition
13A and B show DVPs at the ends of hoses downstream from where they relative to these combined factors lies within these extremes and has not
are pressurized. Fig. 14C shows DVPs on both ends of a hose that may be been well studied. Designs should ensure that the initial pressure does not
pressurized from either direction. Several design criteria for these devices
vary greatly from the design pressure to prevent both of these effects.
have been proposed (14, 25, 38). The required size of distance/volume
piece can be calculated by ensuring the compressed volume of gas in the 7.8 Avoid Friction and Galling.
system downstream of the pressurization point is completely contained in
the distance/volume piece. A complimentary computer algorithm4 is 7.8.1 Avoid rubbing components. Components that com-
available from ASTM G04 committee to assist in this calculation based on monly rub include some valve stem and seat assemblies,
two of the strategies that have been proposed (38). packing glands, etc. (10).

G 88 – 05
--````,,``,,`,`,``````,```,,`-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---
FIG. 13 Distance/Volume Pieces (DVPs) on Polymer-Lined Flexible Hoses
7.8.2 Design rotating or reciprocating machinery so that 7.8.5 Ensure periodic maintenance is performed on rubbing,
clearances are adequate and verifiable (64-66). rotating or reciprocating equipment at intervals specified by the
7.8.3 Use burn-resistant materials where friction cannot be manufacturer.
limited. 7.9 Avoid Corrosion.
7.8.4 Use sensors to detect rubs or instabilities in rotating or
reciprocating equipment and, if applicable, to initiate shut NOTE 45—Corrosion prevention is a highly advanced and specialized
down. technology addressed in general by a number of textbooks, college
curricula and professional societies (40, 57). Within ASTM, Committee
NOTE 44—Carefully assess whether to shut down or otherwise respond G01 on Corrosion of Metals publishes a body of standards and sponsors
to anomalous conditions in the operation of high-speed machinery that is manuals and symposia on the subject. Important corrosion issues that are
rotating above its critical speeds. The transition through the critical-speed commonly dealt with by oxygen system designers include the following:
points may worsen rubs and instabilities and be an additional ignition- (1) influence of internal moisture, (2) external corrosion prevention
inducing or fire-aggravating influence. If such anomalous conditions occur through material selection, coatings and both active and passive cathodic
in rotating or recipricating equipment, sensors may also act to shut off the corrosion prevention, (3) stress corrosion cracking, (4) corrosive product
oxygen supply where appropriate. species, and (5) corrosive degradation or combustion species.

G 88 – 05
FIG. 14 Examples of Safeguard for a Heat Exchanger
NOTE 46—Moisture should be avoided in oxygen systems unless must be taken not to introduce particle impingement sites with these
specifically designed for corrosion resistance (57). A dew point of -40°C design changes.
(-40°F) or lower is preferred for oxygen systems. 7.11 Use Proven Hardware.
7.10 Avoid Resonance. 7.11.1 Use hardware that has a significant trouble-free
history in oxygen service under similar operating conditions.
NOTE 47—Resonance is a highly configuration-dependent phenomena
in which standing (resonant) pressure waves form in relatively stagnant
7.11.2 Pretest components or systems with oxygen in a
regions of a gas system. A detailed description of resonance ignition and controlled environment prior to use.
an example illustration are provided in 5.2.9. NOTE 49—“Techniques Employed by the NASA White Sands Test
Facility to Ensure Oxygen System Component Safety” in STP 812 (26),
7.10.1 Avoid unnecessary blind, open, symmetrical, un-
discusses one procedure for stress-testing of components that has been
swept passages (see Fig. 5). used with the basic apparatus specified for gaseous impact testing in Test
7.10.2 Avoid unintentional sonic gas jets into closed-end Method G 74. An elaboration of one philosophy for this type of testing is
cavities. given in ASTM Manual 36, “Safe Use of Oxygen and Oxygen Systems”
(10). In the case of oxygen regulators for medical applications, a recent
NOTE 48—Studies performed to date on resonance phenomenon indi-
standard, Test Method G 175, provides a consensus validation procedure.
cate that acoustic resonance generally requires internal symmetry and
open flow geometries. Baffles, mufflers, or other system configuration 7.11.3 Ensure the conditions that establish the history of use
changes can prevent resonant conditions from developing. However, care or component testing (that is, pressure, temperature, flow rates,
--````,,``,,`,`,``````,```,,`-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

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etc.) are as severe or more severe than the intended application. chlorine reactions. Worst-case applications may include connection fit-
System severity is discussed in Guide G 128. tings where higher stress loads are common.
7.12 Design to Manage Fires (27, 28). 7.15.2 Avoid contact of corrosion products, especially ox-
7.12.1 Provide an automatic remote means of gas shutoff to ides of iron, copper and nickel, with aluminum.
isolate critical components from all bulk oxygen supplies.
NOTE 54—Iron oxide (rust) in the presence of aluminum powder can,
NOTE 50—The shutoff may be activated by a fire or other sensor and upon ignition, result in an exothermic reaction as the oxygen in the iron
may, if advantageous, simultaneously vent the oxygen in the system (see oxide is transferred to the aluminum with a net release of heat. This is in
7.13.1). In some cases where shutoff valves may be at risk in an incident a class of reactions known as thermite, which can also occur with less
or where the consequence of failure is great, they should be protected common low-heat-of-formation metal oxides (zinc oxide, copper oxide,
(such as by barricades or fire-breaks) etc.) and other metals (magnesium, titanium, zirconium, etc. (20, 42)) that
have high heat-of-formation oxides. Thermite igniters are sometimes used
7.12.1.1 Use excess flow valves where practical to shut off to ignite metals in experimental programs. It should be noted, however,
flow in the event of a line rupture. Ensure that the materials and that thermite reactions require large energy inputs for initiation (that is, the
design of excess flow valves are suitable for the oxygen aluminum must reach its melting temperature) and are relatively uncom-
application. (see 7.6.8.3). mon in general oxygen applications. Theoretical heats of reaction for
7.12.2 Locate bulk oxygen supplies away from the system thermite reactions can be cited (20, 42).
--````,,``,,`,`,``````,```,,`-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---
and flammable materials. 7.15.3 Avoid conditions where molten or powdered alumi-
7.12.3 Use shields, barriers, or safety distance as required to num may form in the presence of palladium or nickel. These
isolate potentially hazardous apparatus (9). combinations can form exothermic intermetallic compounds.
7.12.4 Install fire extinguishment equipment where appli-
cable, to extinguish secondary (and in some cases primary) NOTE 55—Aluminum powders are very reactive and can readily self-
ignite, becoming molten. Palladium in contact with aluminum powder
fires caused by the initial fire in the oxygen system. can, upon ignition, result in an energetic exothermic reaction as the
7.12.5 Install fire-break sections in pipelines, tubing runs, palladium alloys with the aluminum to produce an intermetallic compound
equipment, etc. Use burn-resistant materials or changes in flow (such as palladium aluminides) with a net release of heat. Nickel can also
direction, such as elbows, to enhance fire-break performance form intermetallic compounds with aluminum powder (such as nickel
where practical. aluminides) (20). Bifilar palladium and aluminum wire with electrical
7.13 Anticipate Indirect Oxygen Exposure. stimulation is a frequently used ignition source for experimental materials
flammability testing in oxygen.
7.13.1 Discharge vents to areas capable of dissipating the
oxygen or resisting ignition, and direct vents above and away 7.15.4 Avoid conditions where metal hydrides contact oxy-
from personnel. gen without a sufficient heat sink.
7.13.2 Evaluate the effects of leaks or releases on surround- NOTE 56—The hydrogen in metal hydrides can react with oxygen
ing areas and equipment. For example, avoid cryogens on exothermically, sometimes spontaneously, upon first contact. Common
carbonaceous surfaces (see 5.2.12). practice is to use palladium oxide to getter hydrogen in the vacuum jackets
7.13.3 Anticipate that mechanical failures, such as leaks of liquid oxygen vessels. Incidents have occurred where failure of the
through control valve seats, may result in an oxygen exposure vacuum space produced spontaneous reactions of the gettered hydrogen
exceeding system design limits. when oxygen leaked into the vacuum space. Some of these incidents may
7.14 Minimize Available Fuel/Oxygen (29). have involved the formation of palladium hydrides at some stage of the
getter lifetime. Subsequent testing has shown that wrapping the palladium
7.14.1 Shield and minimize the size of all system nonmet- oxide with a properly-designed heat sink that contains the palladium oxide
als, especially primary seals and seats (10). can reduce the hazard. This approach is being successfully used through-
NOTE 51—Most nonmetals will support burning in near-100 % oxygen out industry. Further, stable hydrides may not be as reactive in oxygen.
concentrations at just slightly elevated oxygen pressures. They are also 7.15.5 Avoid conditions where burning metals contact liq-
more easily ignited than metals and generally exhibit larger heats of uids.
combustion when they burn (see 7.21.3). Thus, nonmetals are generally
considered the most vulnerable parts in oxygen system components and as NOTE 57—Contact of hot molten and/or burning metals with liquids can
such should be minimized and protected from potential ignition mecha- lead to “steam” explosions (20) or even more severe reactive explosions,
nisms. either of which can be particularly destructive. Very reactive metals, such
as aluminum, have produced severe reactions when burned under or
7.14.2 Minimize the internal volume of components to spilled into liquid oxygen (LOX), and even when abruptly combined with
reduce the oxygen they contain. water (20). In some cases, the reaction can be more destructive than TNT
7.15 Avoid Potentially Exothermic Material Combinations. (43).
NOTE 52—Exothermic material combinations are generally most severe 7.16 Anticipate Common Failure-Mechanism Conse-
as finely-divided geometries such as metal powders, dust or fine particu- quences.
lates, which may be generated by metal fabrication processes, wear, and 7.16.1 Avoid unintended exposure to oxygen. Materials not
corrosion processes. Poor cleaning practices may aggravate the potential
hazard.
intended to be exposed to oxygen may not be compatible with
oxygen and ignition mechanisms may be present.
7.15.1 Avoid chlorine-containing lubricants on aluminum in 7.16.1.1 Spillage of LOX onto porous materials (wood,
high-stress load applications. asphalt, macadam, etc.) can produce an easily ignited explo-
NOTE 53—Testing and experience has shown that aluminum and sion hazard (see 5.2.13.3).
lubricants containing chlorine components (for example CTFE) can react 7.16.2 Use redundant safeguards where secondary hazards
violently under increased mechanical stress due to exothermic aluminum- are present.

G 88 – 05
NOTE 58—A safeguard can be a physical container wall, electronic TABLE 3 S/V Ratio of Various Shapes
system (interlock), or computer code, administrative procedure, etc. When Shpae S/V Ratio (m2/m3)
the failure of a single safeguard can lead to a hazard (exposure of
1 µ dust Spheres 6 000 000
contamination, over-pressurization of components, excess velocities, etc.), 0.3 mm Spheres 20 000
it is referred to as a single-safeguard failure (10). In crucial systems, or 0.2 mm RodsA 20 000
systems prone to failure, corrosion, etc., two or more levels of safeguards 0.1 mm SheetsB 20 000
may be required. 0.6 mm Spheres 10 000
0.2 mm Sheets 10 000
7.16.2.1 Example: Noncontact heat transfer fluid of ethyl- 3.2 mm (0.13-in.) Rods 1259
ene glycol and water is often used in heat exchange with an 6.4 mm (0.25-in.) Rods 630
A
oxygen system. The heat-exchanger wall between the fluids is B
Wires, screens, and rods, for the same diameter, have identical S/V ratios.
Sheets, strips and structured packing, for the same thickness, have identical
one safeguard against their mixture. Fig. 14, Parts A-C exhibit S/V ratios.
three different multiple safeguard systems for this application.
(1) Fig. 14, Part A is the least conservative and exhibits a
simple shell-and-tube. In this case, failure of the press fit on for their respective applications (see 7.5.3.5).
any tube or corrosion at the tube/header interface may allow 7.17.2 Avoid thin metallic sections where practical.
contact of the coolant and gas. Water in any coolant that enters 7.17.2.1 Metals are more flammable in thin sections than in
the oxygen circuit will quickly evaporate to leave ethylene thick sections. Also, thin metallic sections can ignite thicker
glycol which has a very low ignition threshold in oxygen. adjacent sections through the kindling chain mechanism (see
Oxygen leaking into the coolant circuit presents less risk 5.2.14).
because of the large amount of water that is present. A second 7.17.2.2 Thin sections of metals should be avoided where
safeguard could be achieved by maintaining the oxygen practical but if required (for example, metal filter) should be
pressure significantly above that of the coolant so that any made from burn-resistant metals.
leakage is in the less risky direction. Methods to sense such
leakage in the coolant circuit should be used. NOTE 61—Experimental data reveal that for most materials, ignitability
and flammability decrease with increasing thickness of the specimen. In
(2) Fig. 14, Part B shows a more conservative system in
some cases, a component may be shifted from a flammable condition to a
which the oxygen and coolant circuits do not share a common nonflammable condition by increasing its thickness. Practical criteria to
header. In this case leakage of oxygen or coolant at the exploit this effect with piping components in some situations have been
vulnerable press fits does not introduce either fluid into the proposed (9). However, the flammability of materials also varies greatly
--````,,``,,`,`,``````,```,,`-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---
other circuit. If both leak and contact, it is at the low risk with system conditions (pressure, temperature, gas velocity, etc.). Thus,
atmospheric pressure condition. increasing thickness to reduce flammability may not necessarily be
(3) Fig. 14, Part C shows the most conservative system in reliable.
NOTE 62—Exterior corrosion creating thin sections on piping can
which the vulnerable press-fits have been eliminated and reduce both the pressure rating and oxygen compatibility of the pipe. For
leakage between the circuits must breach two contiguous example, an oxygen fire internal to piping is more likely to burn through
physical walls. In this case, as well as Case B, a tertiary a thin section of corroded pipe (especially at an elbow, Tee, or other
safeguard could be applied by maintaining the oxygen pressure impingement point).
above the coolant pressure to minimize the effect of the most 7.17.2.3 Remove sharp edges and burrs exposed to oxygen
hazardous leakage path. because they are more easily ignited than bulkier base materi-
7.17 Avoid High Surface-Area-to-Volume (S/V) Conditions als.
where Practical—High S/V conditions include mesh screens,
powders, granules, open-cell foams and sponges, thin fins, NOTE 63—Burrs are also easily broken off in systems and can become
undesired contaminant or potential particle impact ignition hazards.
sharp edges, points, sintered filters, etc.
7.17.3 Avoid intimate contact configurations of oxygen with
NOTE 59—The hazards of fires in oxygen increase with the amount of
flammable materials.
exposed surface area, and the speed and extent to which a material is
heated increases as the mass of the material absorbing the heat is NOTE 64—Many of the hazards of oxygen fires increase with the degree
decreased. Therefore objects that expose a lot of surface area with minimal of intimacy of oxygen with flammable (that is, “reactive”) materials.
associated mass tend to be more flammable (more easily ignited, faster Intimate configurations are those where the quantity of oxygen in close
burning, etc.) than objects with small reaction surfaces and large masses proximity with flammable materials is large. This produces the ability for
(heat sinks) to absorb heat. Further, high S/V geometries can be difficult a large quantity of oxygen to rapidly combine with the fuels, even at
to sufficiently clean for oxygen service and often require special treatment. explosive speed, as opposed to slower combustion in which vaporization,
Table 3 (47) shows the wide range of S/V properties of many common diffusion and other mass transport must occur for the oxygen to react. As
shapes. a result, ignition is easier, rate of reaction is greater, peak temperatures and
pressure during a fire are increased.
7.17.1 Use burn-resistant materials for high S/V configura- NOTE 65—Solutions and some mixtures of oxygen do not exhibit a
tions. The higher the surface-area-to-volume, the more critical clearly defined surface area, but as with high S/V geometries, they have
is the use of burn-resistant materials. In the most extreme large numbers of oxygen molecules in close proximity with reactive
cases, such as powders, even the most highly burn-resistant of material molecules and can yield rapid or even explosive reactions. Some
common engineering metals may be too flammable for any of these configurations can be difficult to identify but include porous
practical use. closed-cell materials into which oxygen may diffuse, materials with a high
solubility for oxygen (including miscible gas/gas and liquid/liquid mix-
NOTE 60—Mesh screens of nickel and sintered element filters of brass tures), molecular sieves containing both oxygen and hydrocarbon adsor-
or tin bronze have been shown to be burn-resistant and therefore preferred bates (that is, activated charcoal), “char” products from incomplete

G 88 – 05
combustion processes, etc. (see 7.5.2.1). human actions) are significantly less reliable than well-designed automatic
7.17.3.1 Example: Fractional evaporation of liquid oxygen. systems. However, automated systems (especially software driven sys-
tems) can be unreliable and many are cited as “fault-intolerant.” In crucial
As the liquid vaporizes, low-boiling-point hydrocarbons con- circumstances, redundant systems may be needed to achieve the degree of
centrate and may ultimately produce an intimate mixture or reliability on critical factors a system requires.
slurry of fuel with oxygen.
7.19.2 Design for component directionality and verify flow
NOTE 66—Where explosive reactions of intimate mixtures may occur, direction after installation.
one can estimate the scale of damage possible and the zone of hazard
using TNT equivalencies (44-46) which relate the available heat of NOTE 71—Many components can be used in assorted orientations that
combustion (as limited by the amount of fuel or oxidant, whichever is less, may seem similar in function, but can be widely different in oxygen
in the intimate configuration) plus any compressed-gas energy to a compatibility. As discussed above, Fig. 10 illustrates how the angular
comparable energy release from TNT and its studied destructive potential. orientation of valves may affect compatibility. Fig. 15 illustrates how the
These estimates can help decide if a system will safely contain a reaction, flow direction used with valves can also affect compatibility by altering
or assist in the design of any needed barriers and the selection of safe the components that experience the most severe impingement. For
distances (10). globe-style valves such as that shown in Fig. 15, the generally preferred
flow direction to minimize oxygen hazards is from under to over the seat,
7.18 Avoid Unnecessarily Elevated Oxygen Concentrations. shown in example A and C. This configuration is generally considered less
7.18.1 Reduce the oxygen concentration (that is, perform severe for high-velocity particle impingement and also may provide some
any mixing operations) near the oxygen supply point rather level of flow control during opening (depending on the valve stem/plug
than near the mixture use point so that intermediate equipment characteristics). An over to under the seat flow direction exposes the stem
is exposed to lower oxygen concentrations. seals to the high-pressure side even when the valve is closed. For the valve
7.18.2 Use diluents where practical to minimize ignition shown in Fig. 15, if the pressure drop (that is, highest gas velocity) is
taken at the seat (Examples A and B), changing flow direction changes the
and increase the burn-resistance of the materials (48-50). most severe impingement sites from the stem tip and inside cage surface
NOTE 67—A diluent is most commonly taken to be a material that is in Example A, to the downstream body of the valve in Example B.
nonreactive with oxidants or fuels in the system of interest (50). Diluents Similarly, if the pressure drop is taken through the cage (Examples C and
may be inherent (nonreactive under all conditions) or situational (nonre- D), the most severe impingement sites change from the bonnet wall in
active at system conditions). Examples commonly include the noble gases Example C, to the stem and stem tip in Example D. Other compatibility
and stable oxides such as carbon dioxide. Diluents may be solids, liquids factors may be altered in similar or differing ways.
or gases. In rare cases, diluents can enable or accelerate a fire. More often, NOTE 72—Though many components have the intended flow direction
diluents slow or swamp a reaction, often preventing it. They are often used stamped on the component body to ensure proper installation, many do not
as extinguishers. Their effect depends on their mass, heat capacity and have this feature. Component directionality should always be verified after
specific chemistry among other factors. In most cases, the effectiveness of system installation. When in doubt, the component manufacturer should
a diluent increases as the size and mass of the diluent molecule increases always be consulted regarding intended flow direction.
(monatomic neon is more effective than monatomic argon, triatomic 7.19.3 Control system configurations and custom modifica-
carbon dioxide is more effective than diatomic nitrogen) because heavier
and larger diluents absorb more heat and diffuse more slowly. However,
tions, including materials.
diluents may be situational. Nitrogen is a diluent that does not react during NOTE 73—Once an oxygen system is designed, reviewed, and ap-
iron or hydrocarbon combustion, but may be a slight oxidant during proved, its configuration should be controlled to ensure inappropriate
aluminum or titanium combustion. In some cases, tiny amounts of diluents substitutions are not made. In many cases, components may be customized
may have dramatic effects on the hazard of oxygen. to adjust a specific property and to achieve an adequate oxygen compat-
NOTE 68—Common diluent impurity gases in commercial oxygen ibility. When these components fail, wear out, are upgraded or undergo
include argon, nitrogen, and water vapor. Even as minor constituents, preventive maintenance, it is critical that components are replaced in-kind
these diluent gases can be crucial to the oxidation hazard of a system, or that a formal management of change process is employed to ensure new
especially if the system contains specific metals (aluminum, magnesium, configurations are properly reviewed for oxygen hazards.
titanium, etc.). Oxygen specifications may vary in purity from 99.5 % NOTE 74—Whenever a component is customized (a material change, a
oxygen to 99.9999 % oxygen (balance largely argon) and the flammability geometry change, an installation change) it should be given a unique part
hazard can vary widely (6). number that distinguishes it from off-the-shelf hardware, and the new part
7.18.3 Avoid unintentional oxygen concentration drift in number should be placed on the component and on all parts lists and flow
oxygen-enriched air systems. sheets. In some cases components can be manufactured so that they can
only be installed correctly.
NOTE 69—Oxygen concentration drift may result from depletion of
diluent sources, software bugs in programmable logic controllers (PLCs)
7.19.4 Avoid overly-complicated procedures.
or other computerized controllers, creep in the oxygen pressure, etc. NFPA NOTE 75—Complex and repetitive procedures are more prone to
86 on ovens and furnaces (50) is concerned with the use of PLCs on discrepancy than simple, straightforward procedures. Equipment should
critical systems. Similar safety concerns apply to use of these devices with be designed for simple verifiable operation.
critical oxygen systems.
7.19.5 Ensure that oxygen is not substituted for other gases.
7.19 Anticipate Permutations from Intended System Design. A common error is to substitute oxygen for compressed air.
7.19.1 Perform failure effects and reliability studies to 7.19.5.1 Do not use oxygen to purge or proof-test incom-
identify predictable system failures. These include Failure patible equipment.
Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEAs), Hazards and Operabil- 7.19.5.2 Prevent misconnections. To prevent misconnec-
ity Studies (HAZOPS), and fault-tree analyses (49) in addition tions, the designer can employ unique fittings (such as the
to Oxygen Hazards and Fire Risk Assessments (OHFRA) (1, CGA cylinder-valve fitting scheme), different line sizes for
63). different chemical streams, color coding of piping, labeling,
NOTE 70—In general, administrative controls (procedures that rely on etc.
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FIG. 15 Reversing Flow through a Common Cage-Type Valve
7.19.5.3 Prevent cross-piping. interlocks, flow logic, ganged tions around nonmetals. These configurations can include
valves, automated systems, and double-block-and-bleed piping external leaks past elastomeric pressure seals or internal flows
can all be used to prevent cross-piping. on or close to plastic seats in components.
7.19.5.4 Use caution with check valves intended to prevent NOTE 77—Flow friction has not been shown to be a credible ignition
cross-contamination by oxygen. source for metals (see 5.2.12).
NOTE 76—The use of check valves to exclude oxygen from selected 7.20.1.1 Ensure that redundant O-ring seals can contain
regions of systems must be done with extra care if a reliable block is reverse pressure between them. O-ring seals are sometimes
crucial. Most check valves are not designed as absolute shut off valves. As
redundant, creating a chamber between the seals that can retain
such, many check-valve designs do not provide reliable or complete
blockage against reverse flows. Others will not seal against small reverse pressure when the system is vented. O-rings not designed to
differential pressures. Where exposed to contamination or process liquids, contain reverse pressure may be forced out of their grooves or
deposits may prevent their closure. Thus, other methods, such as auto- become damaged, producing loose slivers of elastomer.
matic or manual block valves, or redundant or double check valves, are 7.20.1.2 Ensure that polymers that can absorb oxygen do
used to provide a more reliable block than single check valves, especially not expand and “push out” from their grooves. Porous poly-
in applications where preventing cross-contamination is critical. mers, especially some fluorocarbon rubbers, when exposed to
7.20 Avoid Designs and Failure Scenarios that can Intro- oxygen under pressure for long periods, can become permeated
duce Potential Flow Friction Ignition Hazards. with oxygen, potentially increasing their flammability. Upon
7.20.1 Avoid leaks past nonmetallic component seats or venting they may expand to sizes significantly larger than
pressure seals, or “weeping” or “scrubbing” flow configura- normal. Polymers exposed to other gases (especially carbon
--````,,``,,`,`,``````,```,,`-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

G 88 – 05
dioxide, which dissolves into many polymers) may experience address toxicity issues of nonmetallics in breathing gas systems (53, 54).
similar “inflations.” This can result in damage as the polymer 7.22 Provide Thorough Safety Training for all Personnel
expands and pushes itself from its groove. Working with Oxygen or Oxygen-Enriched Components or
7.20.2 Avoid oxygen flow over nonmetal surfaces that are Systems including Design, Cleaning, Assembly, Operations,
highly fibrous, as from being chafed, abraded, or plastically and Maintenance as Applicable to Personnel.
deformed.
NOTE 81—In the Unites States, federal requirements for training on
NOTE 78—These scenarios may render flow friction more severe as hazardous materials are listed in the Code of Federal Regulations. 49 CFR
smaller, more easily ignited fibers of the nonmetal may actually begin 172.702(a) mandates that employers provide training for all employees
resonating, or vibrating/flexing, perhaps at high frequencies induced by using hazardous materials. Oxygen is on the list of hazardous materials.
flow, and this “friction” would generate heat (see 5.2.12). 7.23 Miscellaneous.
7.21 Use Only the Most Compatible of Practical Materials 7.23.1 Eliminate internal mechanical collisions.
and Designs. 7.23.2 Ensure proper grounding and bonding of every
portion of an oxygen system to avoid internal arcing or
NOTE 79—In most oxygen systems the cost of using only the most sparking. Ensure equal electrical potential is maintained be-
compatible materials and designs is justified by the additional safety that
is achieved. However, there are many instances in which cost, complexity,
tween all components in an oxygen system to avoid arcing.
reliability, and performance cannot accommodate the most compatible 7.23.3 Consider lightning protection. Protection against
materials. For example, compressors must seek the maximum efficiency, lightning arcing across insulated flanges of cathodic corrosion-
and are often barricaded to achieve safety and allow design flexibility. prevention systems of pipelines is particularly important. One
Industrial gas pipelines often can only be realistically fabricated of steel, method is the use of fusing spark gaps. NFPA 780 (41)
and a large body (9) of practices has evolved to achieve safety, etc. In addresses lightning protection in general.
these cases where system materials are potential fuels, identifying and
7.23.4 Provide the capability to start up the system using
minimizing ignition mechanisms is critical to avoiding fires. Guides G 63
and G 94 provide guides for selecting nonmetals and metals, respectively, inert gases as a means to seat surfaces, displace particulates,
for oxygen service. prove mechanical integrity, leak-test the system, etc. Following
inert gas use in rotating machinery, precautions are required
7.21.1 Use the most ignition- and burn-resistant materials in prior to oxygen exposure in the event that an accumulation of
component and system designs wherever practical. pyrophoric materials may have been formed by wear.
7.21.2 Choose fully-oxidized materials such as minerals in 7.23.5 Eliminate valve chatter and fretting throughout the
preference to metals or polymers where practical. Most min- operating range (that is, check valves, relief valves, regulating
erals are effectively nonflammable in oxygen. However, their components, etc.).
mechanical properties render them practical in only a small 7.23.6 Design for maximum pressures assuming unpressur-
number of applications. ized adjacent chambers. Oxygen systems should be able to
7.21.3 Use metals in preference to polymers. In general, safely contain maximum anticipated pressure in any chamber,
metals are far more difficult to ignite than polymers, but assuming any adjacent chamber contains no pressure. In one
applications that require elasticity or plasticity (gaskets, valve case (51), a LOX pump fire is believed to have occurred after
seats, packings, etc.) often preclude the use of metals. For these a bank of cylinders was filled and the pump inlet was vented
applications, use the minimum size and quantity of nonmetals while full pressure remained on the outlet, possibly leading to
and embed them within or otherwise protect them with metals a reverse-pressure failure of the discharge valve seat.
(see 7.14.1).
7.21.3.1 Use copper/copper-base and nickel/nickel-base al- 8. Examples
loys as opposed to other metals where practical. 8.1 System Design Procedures—Some detailed examples of
7.21.4 Use fluorinated/halogenated polymers (PTFE, PFPE, system design procedures (10, 30-33) may be consulted for
CTFE, FPM, FKM) as opposed to polymers containing carbon- further reference. A video3 illustrating the hazards when using
hydrogen bonds (hydrocarbons such as EPDM, PVC, SBR, oxygen and the selection of components for oxygen service is
fluorosilicones) where practical. available.
NOTE 80—Toxicity of combustion products can be a crucial concern in 9. Keywords
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certain equipment, such as medical oxygen hardware, and fluorinated

polymers can produce especially toxic combustion and decomposition
9.1 burning; burn-resistant materials; combustion; contami-
products that may offset the benefits of their superior compatibility. In nation; fire; heat of compression; ignition; oxygen-enriched
these instances additional care must be applied to balance and control both atmosphere; oxygen service; oxygen system; particle impact;
sets of risks. Both the CGA and EIGA have published documents that propagation; system cleanness

G 88 – 05
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G 88 – 05
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G 88 – 05
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What factors are recognized as causing fires in oxygen systems?

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Designation: G 88 – 05

Standard Guide for

1. Scope Section Title Section

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by abrasion, flaking, etc. Contaminants may be liquids, solids,

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pressure and temperature to an elevated pressure without heat transfer:

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3447 500 34.0 530 986

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FIG. 3 Final Compression Temperatures for Pressure Ratios

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Copyright by ASTM Int'l (all rights reserved);

FIG. 5 Example of a System Configuration with Potential for Resonance Heating

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FIG. 6 Proper Orientation of Bypass Valves

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FIG. 8 Example of Bypass Line Configuration

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FIG. 9 Example of a Burn-Resistant Liner Applied Inside a Pipe

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FIG. 11 Particle Paths and Twin Vortex Secondary Flows

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FIG. 12 Eliminating Impingement

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FIG. 14 Examples of Safeguard for a Heat Exchanger

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FIG. 15 Reversing Flow through a Common Cage-Type Valve

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certain equipment, such as medical oxygen hardware, and fluorinated

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