Homicide

299 to 304
HOMICIDE

Unlawful/culpable homicide Lawful homicide

Not amounting to Amounting to Justifiable Excusable
murder murder 1) Insanity Right of Private
(section 300- (Sections 300 and 2) Accident Defence
exceptions) 302) 3) Intoxication
 Definition of Homicide
• Stephen defined murder as: “killing of a human
being by another human being”.

• Lord Edward Coke: Murder is when a man

unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature or rerum
naturae (living creature) under the Kings peace
with malice aforethought, either express by the
party or implied by law, so as the party wounded
or hurt dies of the wound within a day and a year
after the sin.
 Mensrea and Homicide
• Malice aforethought: Operates in many ways:
• Specific/Particular: Intention to kill a particular person who in fact was killed. Malice
directed towards one particular person.
• Example: Indira Gandhi/ Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination
• Exception: X wanted to kill Y, mixes poison in Y’s food, but Y’s daughters are killed.
Technically, X had no intention to kill Y, intention to kill only Y’s daughters. Here,
constructive malice or transfer of malice is made. Law transfers malice. Section 301 is
applied here.
• Transfer of malice: Intention to kill a particular person but not the one who was actually
killed.
• Emperor v. Mushnooru Suryanarayana Murthy (1912) 22 MLJ 333
• Facts: Suryanarayan takes policy in name of X, tries to kill X by poisoning food, X’s
daughters killed, Suryanarayan was liable by transfer of malice.

• Universal malice: Intention to kill but without selecting any particular individual as the
victim. Section 300(4)
• Homicide Act 1957 of UK
• Intention only to hurt but not to kill; but to hurt by means of an act which the
prisoner/accused realised was likely to kill someone.
 In UK
• Till 1957 the above definition was used. Now, the
Homicide Act, 1957 gives the following definition:
• “Where a person kills another in the course or
furtherance of some other offence, the killing shall
not amount to murder unless done with the same
malice aforethought, express or implied, as is
required for a killing to amount to murder when
not done in the course or furtherance of another
offence.”
 Features of culpable/unlawful homicide:

• There must be death of a person: which shall be

proved
• Causation: Link between act and death.
Prosecution has to prove causation, that the act of
the accused was operative cause of the death.
• Corpus delecti: Body has to be present to prove
death.
• Sir Mathew Hale: “Without a dead body you
cannot convict a person.” In India the rule is not as
strictly followed as it was for centuries in England.
• Guilty mind and homicide-

• Intention and knowledge- There are 2 kinds of guilty mind in applying 299 and
300 of IPC. Intention: Design of doing an act. It’s a subjective
inquiry. Knowledge also forms part of intention for homicide. This
is easy to prove.

• Intention from the weapon used, place of injuries, manner of commission of

the act. Intention is subjective, state of mind evident from his conduct.
• Knowledge: it is objective, consciousness is future contingency
• There can be no knowledge without perception, but the knowledge in its wide
sense connotes the future probabilities. It is based on reasoned inference.
• Knowledge is a condition of mind and as such incapable of proof. Not the best
evidence procurable can therefore warrant a finding that the accused knew a
certain fact.
• All that such evidence would justify is a finding that its knowledge was
extremely probable and this is all the law requires.
• The knowledge so proved can only be the knowledge of the likelihood’. The
word “likely” means probably.
• Knowledge implies consciousness.
Consciousness is necessarily of a future
contingency, the happening of which may
depend upon a variety of circumstances.
There can be no knowledge without
perception but it is knowledge in its wide
sense as connoting such inference as future
probability as is only next to..............| In
this sense it is something more than belief
because it is based on reasoned inference.
 Knowledge contd
• Test of Ordinary reasonable man: The standard which the Court
fixes is that of a reasonable man and the question it ultimately asks
itself is not whether the accused had the knowledge but whether
as a reasonable man he could have had that knowledge. This is the
real test for knowledge.
• The Court/jurors have to place themselves in the situation of the
accused and then judge what the degree of his mental
consciousness was at the time of the act in question. For this
purpose it is necessary to take not only the facts that are proved
but also the facts which are probable. These furnish the data upon
which the inference as to knowledge as well as likelihood is to be
based. In judging of the knowledge had by the accused, we must
consider the circumstances.
 Meaning of Life
• Who is a rarem naturae ? - can an unborn child or half born
child come under the purview, if child is brought out of
mother’s body, but umbilical cord is not cut, if the baby is still—
born.
• When the baby is in mother’s womb- no offence of murder.
Now, it is an offence under common law,
• If part of child’s body- no murder
• If umbilical cord is not severed- it is murder
• If baby is born without movement, it is an offence
• Intentional killing of unborn child till 1925 was not an offence,
• Case: R v. Poulton (1832) I, C & P 330
• R v. Reeves (1839) 9 C & P 25: life existed should be proved by
crying, moving, breathing, pulsation.
 Actus reaus and Homicide
• SC: “We have to consider in each case the relative value and
efficiency of the various causes in producing the effect and then to
say whether responsibility should be assigned to a particular act or
not as the proximate and efficient cause.
• It cannot be a sufficient criterion in this connection whether the
affect could have been produced in the case in question without a
‘particular cause’, for it is involved in the very idea of a cause that
the result would not have been produced without it.
• Contributory cause: Cumulative effect has to be seen.
• Death should have been caused by the act/omission of another
person.
• Act of death should have been done with the intention of causing
death, Causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
• With the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death.
 SECTION 300- MURDER

• Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder if

• the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of
causing death, or
• if it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the
offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom
the harm is caused, or
• if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and
the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, or
• if a person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous
that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for
incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
 Cases under 300 (1)
Rawalpenda Venkalu v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1956 SC 171

• The first information report of the occurrence was lodged at Penpabad

police station on the morning of the 19th of February by Yousuf Ali, a
cousin of the deceased, to the effect that some goondas of the village
had set fire to the cottage occupied by Moinuddin after chaining the
outer door, with the result that he was burnt alive and that the villagers
who tried to extinguish the fire had been beaten away by those goondas.
The villagers thus became terrified and had to retreat to the village.
• The first information report of the occurrence was lodged at Penpabad
police station on the morning of the 19th of February by Yousuf Ali, a
cousin of the deceased, to the effect that some goondas of the village
had set fire to the cottage occupied by Moinuddin after chaining the
outer door, with the result that he was burnt alive and that the villagers
who tried to extinguish the fire had been beaten away by those goondas.
The villagers thus became terrified and had to retreat to the village.
 Contd….,

• It has been found by the courts below that

there was longstanding dispute between the
deceased and the family of the second
Appellant over land which belonged to the
deceased but which was in cultivating
possession of the second Appellant's family.
(Motive)
 Vasant v
The State of Maharashtra
AIR1998SC699

• It was the prosecution case that Shridhar, a Social Worker,

was complaining against the appellant as he has parking a
jeep near his house and thereby creating an obstruction to
the residents of that locality. That led to enmity between
him and the appellant. A few days before the date of the
incident, Shridhar had threatened the appellant that he
would complain about his behavior to his superior officers.
On 13.7.84, at about 1.30 p.m., the appellant was seen
grappling with Shridhar on the road about 400 feet away
from. Shivni Bus stand. This incident was witnessed by PWs
3 and 5 - Gajanan Murumkar and Shrikrishna.
• The appellant and Shridhar were separated by Pws 2, 3, 5 and others.
Shridhar at that time told the appellant that it was open to him to put him in
jail on that day as he was drunk but he would see him on the next day after
coming out of the jail. The appellant thereupon went running towards the
place where boring work was going on and where he had kept his Jeep
bearing No. MTJ 7343. He jumped into the jeep, started it and took it in
reverse upto the intersection of the road and then took it towards the
deceased in high speed. PW 4 - Sultan who was walking ahead of the
deceased got frightened and as a result thereof articles which he was carrying
on on his head fell down and he had to run for cover. The appellant
proceeded ahead by taking his jeep on the wrong side of the road and then
knocked down Sridhar-deceased, Sridhar fell down and was run over by the
jeep. The appellant took his jeep ahead by a few feet and then brought it back
on the left side of the road. It was the prosecution case that the appellant had
dashed his jeep against Shridhar intentionally with a view to cause his death.
 Sec 300(2)

• Intention to cause bodily harm

• There is subjective knowledge that death will
be the likely result.
• Ram Sagar Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh
AIR 1985 SC 416
• Brijlal was hale and hearty on the morning of August 29, 1969. He was ploughing his field
when respondents 3 and 4 reached Haibatpur in order to arrest him. They took him on foot
to the Hussainganj Police Station which is about 3 km. away from Haibatpur. They reached
the police station at 10.00 A.M. Two hours later, Brijlal was taken in a police van to the
Court of the learned Additional District Magistrate for obtaining remand. Shri R.C. Nigam,
the Presiding Officer of the Court, had finished the winding list of the remand applications,
at the end of which the Moharir of the Court informed him that a remand order had
remained to be passed against an accused who was brought from the Hussainganj Police
Station and that the accused could not be produced in Court since he was lying in the
verandah in a badly injured condition. Shri Nigam (P.W. 5) says in this evidence that since
the accused could not be brought to the Court-room, he himself went to the verandah
where the accused was lying and he asked him his name. The accused was unable to
respond at first since his condition was "very serious" but, on repeated inquiries, the
accused told Shri Nigam that his name was Brijlal. On being questioned as to how he came
to receive the injuries, Brijlal replied that 'the Darogah of Hussainganj and the constables
had beaten him very badly'. Shri Nigam made a note of the statement made by Brijlal on
the remand application (Exhibit Ka-1). That application bears Shri Nigam's signature and
the thumb impression of Brijlal.
 judgment
• In this case, the injuries suffered by Brijlal
would appear to fall under the clause '2ndly'
of Section 300, since the act by which his
death was caused was done with the intention
of causing such bodily injury as the
respondents knew to be likely to cause his
death.
• Before we close, we would like to impress upon the Government the
need to amend the law appropriately so I hat policemen who commit
atrocities on persons who are in their custody are not allowed to escape
by reason of paucity or absence of evidence. Police Officers alone, and
none else, can give evidence as regards the circumstances in which a
person in their custody comes to receive injuries while in their custody.
Bound by ties of a kind of brotherhood, they often prefer to remain
silent in such situations and when they choose to speak, they put their
own gloss upon facts and pervert the truth. The result is that persons,
on whom atrocities are perpetrated by the police in the sanctum
sanctorum of the police station, are left without any evidence to prove
who the offenders are. The law as to the burden of proof in such cases
may be re-examined by the legislature so that hand-maids of law and
order do not use their authority and opportunities for oppressing the
innocent citizens who look to them for protection. It is ironical that, in
the instant case, a person who complained against a policeman for
bribery, was done to death by that policeman, his two companions and
his superior officer, the Station House Officer.
 Sec 300(2)
• if it is done with the intention of causing
bodily injury to any person and the bodily
injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death,
 : Virsa Singh Vs The State of Punjab
AIR1958SC465

• First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is

present;
• Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are
purely objective investigations.
• Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or
unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
• Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry
proceeds further and.
• Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just
described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the
enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do
with the intention of the offender.
 facts
• The accused thrust a spear into the abdomen of ,he deceased. This
injury caused his death. In the opinion of the doctor the injury was
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It was
found by the Sessions judge that the accused intended to cause
grievous hurt only. In his opinion however the third clause Of S. 300
Indian Penal Code applied. He accordingly convicted and sentenced
the accused under S. 302 India, Penal Code. The High Court upheld
the conviction, It was argued that the third clause Of s. 300 Indian
Penal Code did not apply as it was not proved that the accused
intended to inflict a
bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature as s. 300 Indian Penal Code third clause states, " If it is done with
the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily
injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death
• Three coils of intestines were coming out of the wound."
The incident occurred about 8 p. m. on July 13, 1955.
Khem Singh died about 5 p. m. the following day.
• When the common object of the assembly seems to have
been to cause grievous hurts only, I do not suppose Virsa
Singh actually had the intention to cause the death of
Khem Singh, but by a rash and silly act he gave a rather
forceful blow, which ultimately caused his death.
Peritonitis also supervened and that hastened the death
of Khem Singh. But for that Khem Singh may perhaps not
have died or may have lived a little longer
 Facts

• There was only one injury on Khem Singh and

both Courts are agreed that the appellant
caused it. It was caused as the result of a spear
thrust and the doctor who examined Khem
Singh, while he was still alive, said that it was.
• "a punctured wound 2 x 1/2" transverse in
direction on the left side of the abdominal wall
in the lower part of the iliac region just above
the inguinal canal.
 judgment
• first be found that bodily injury was caused and the
nature of the injury must be established, that is to say,
whether the injury is on the leg or the arm or the
stomach,
• how deep it penetrated, whether any vital organs were
cut and so forth.
• These are purely objective facts and leave no room for
inference or deduction : to that extent the enquiry is
objective; but when it comes to the question of intention,
that is subjective to the offender and it must be proved
that he had an intention too cause the bodily injury that is
found to be present
• The first part of this is descriptive of the earlier part of the section,
namely, the infliction of bodily injury with the intention to inflict it, that is
to say, if the circumstances justify an inference that a man's intention was
only to inflict a blow on the lower part of the leg, or some lesser blow,
and it can be shown that the blow landed in the region of the heart by
accident, then, though an injury to the heart is shown to be present, the
intention to inflict an injury in that region, or of that nature, is not proved.
In that case, the first part of the clause does not come into play.
• But once it is proved that there was an intention to inflict the injury that
is found to be present, then the earlier part of the clause we are now
examining -
• "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted" is merely descriptive. All it
means is that it is not enough to prove that the injury found to be present
is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature; it must in
addition be shown that the injury is of the kind that falls within the earlier
clause, namely, that the injury found to be present was the injury that
was intended to be inflicted.
• Whether it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature
is a matter of inference or deduction from the proved facts about the
nature of the injury and has nothing to be with the question of intention.
• In considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury
found to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds
on broad lines as, for example, whether there was an intention
to strike at a vital or a dangerous sport, and whether with
sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to have been
inflicted.
• It is, of course, not necessary to enquiry into every last detail
as, for instance, whether the prisoner intended to have the
bowels fall out, or whether he intended to penetrate the liver
or the kidneys or the heart.
• Otherwise, a man who has no knowledge of anatomy could
never be convicted, for, if he does not know that there is a
heart or a kidney or bowels, he cannot be said to have intended
to injure them. Of course, that is not the kind of enquiry.
 Laxman Kalu Nikalje
Vs.
The State of Maharashtra
AIR1968SC1390
• Some days before Nag Panchami of the year 1962 Shantabai was brought to
her parent's place. She stayed with them till the 10th August 1962. Laxman
wanted his wife back and arrived at Gartad to take her away to his own
house. Bhika put in some excuses saying that he had no money and he
could only send his daughter back after he gets his pay on the 21st or the
22nd. The excuse given by Bhika and his wife Gangubai was that they could
not let the girl go without giving her some presents and that money was
needed for the purchase of these presents. However, as Laxman insisted on
taking his wife away immediately, a sum of Rs. 10 was borrowed. It is said in
one place that money was borrowed from one Tarachand and in another,
from Laxman himself. Gangubai in the company of Shantabai went to Dhulia
to make some purchases and returned on August 10 in the afternoon. It
appears that a train was then due and Laxman is said to have insisted that
his wife should go with him by that train.
• The parents, however, said that it was not auspicious to send the girl at night
and that they could go in the morning. It does not appear that any quarrel
over this took. Whether Laxman was reconciled to this suggestion or was still
angry is not known. In the evening at about 7 P.M. Laxman was sitting with
Shantabai and Ramrao outside the quarter and Bhika was chopping some
fuel at the back of the hut, Kamlabai (the widow of Ramrao), Gangubai,
Bharat and Laxman were inside the room. According to Shantabai, Ramrao
and Laxman had a few words and on that Laxman took out a knife and
stabbed Ramrao on the shoulder and ran away. Ramrao shouted and so did
Shantabai; Bhika and others arrived on the scene. They carried Ramrao on a
cot to the Railway Crossing and when the train arrived, it was stopped by
showing the danger signal. Ramrao was placed on the train and left on the
train accompanied by Bhika, Gangubai and Kamlabai. On the train, Bhika told
the Guard that his son-in-law had stabbed the injured man. The Railway
guard noted this fact in his log book.
• On examination the injury was found to be situated 2
inch below the outer 1/3 of right clavicle on the right
side of the chest and penetrated to the depth of 4 inch
into the chest cavity. It is no doubt true that the injury
was serious, but it is to be noticed that it did not
penetrate the lung. Death was caused mainly because
it cut the auxiliary artery and veins and caused shock
and haemorrhage leading to death. In these
circumstances, it is necessary to consider whether this
case is covered by any of the clauses of s. 300 of the
Indian Penal Code.
• It must be remembered that the quarrel between Ramrao and
Laxman was not such as would have prompted Laxman to make a
homicidal attack upon his brother-in-law. The quarrel was only
this much, whether Laxman's wife should accompany him by the
evening train or the morning train. It may be that some abuses
might have ensured as is common among these people, and
Laxman having lost his temper whipped out his knife and gave
one blow. It must be remembered that he gave one blow and
although it was given on the chest, it was not on a vital part of
the chest and but for the fact that the knife cut an artery inside,
death might not have ensued. Therefore the question is whether
the offence can be said to be covered by thirdly of s. 300 of the
Indian Penal Code.
 B Kameshwar Rao v State of AP
AIR 2008 SC 1854
• Insofar as the first accused-appellant Bavisetti
Kameswara Rao is concerned, the learned Counsel urged
before us that this was a case of single injury that too, the
weapon used was a screw driver which was in the regular
use of the accused as a tool, the accused-appellant being
a motor mechanic. It was but natural that he would use
the said screw driver in the regular course of his
occupation and since he had not used any other weapon,
it could not be said that his intention was to cause death
of the deceased or also to cause such bodily injury as
would be sufficient to cause death of the deceased.
• When the screw driver was plunged into the vital part
of the body of the deceased, it cut his liver and
spleen. Therefore, this was a case where the act was
done with intention of causing bodily injury and the
body injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, covered by
'Thirdly' of Section 300 of 'Indian Penal Code'. The act
of the accused-appellant would, therefore, clearly
come within the definition of 'murder' under Section
300 of the 'Indian Penal Code'.
 Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana
MANU/SC/0153/1981 : 1981CriLJ1136 Supreme Court
observed:
• There is no justification for the assertion that the giving of a solitary
blow on a vital part of the body resulting the death must always
necessarily reduce the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to
murder punishable under Section 304 Part II of the Code. If a man
deliberately strikes another on the head with a heavy log of wood or
an iron rod or even a lathi so as to cause a fracture of the skull, he
must, in the absence of any circumstances negativing the presumption,
be deemed to have intended to cause the death of the victim or such
bodily injury as is sufficient to cause death. The whole thing depends
upon the intention to cause death, and the case may be covered by
either clause 1stly or clause 3rdly. The nature of intention must be
gathered from the kind of weapon used, the part of the body hit, the
amount of force employed and the circumstances attendant upon the
death.
 :Anda and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent:The State of Rajasthan
AIR 1966 SC 148
 Rajwant Singh v State of Kerala
AIR1966SC1874
• The case relates to the death of one Lt. Commander
Menianha of the Naval Base, I. N. S. Vendurthy,
Willingdon Island, Cochin Harbour, on the night of
March 30, 1963. Unni was attached as a rating to this
Naval Base and at the time of the offence was on leave.
Taylor, who has not appealed was an ex-sailor and
Rajwant Singh was attached to I. N. S. Vikrant. The case
of the prosecution was that these persons conspired
together to burgle the safe of the Base Supply Officer on
the eve of the pay-day, when a large sum of money was
usually kept there for distribution on the pay-day
• On the night in question they decoyed the Lt. Commander from his
house on the pretext that he was wanted at the Naval Base, and in
a lonely place caught hold of him. They covered his mouth with the
adhesive plaster and tied a handkerchief over the plaster and
plugged his nostrils with cotton wool soaked in chloroform. They
tied his hands and legs with rope and deposited him in a shallow
drain with his own shirt put under his head as a pillow. They then
went up to the sentry, who was induced to part with his rifle to one
of the accused who had dressed himself as an officer, and attacked
him. The sentry would have received the same treatment as his Lt.
Commander but he raised a hue and cry and attracted the
attention of the watchman. Fearing detection the assailants
released the sentry and took to their heels. The sentry after
escaping informed the Officer-on-duty at the Base and stated that
he had recognised Rajwant Singh as one of his assailants. Next
morning the dead body of the Lt. Commander was discovered in
the drain where he had been left by the assailants.
• Our attention has been drawn to the inquest and
postmortem reports to establish what was actually done to
the Lt. Commander. From these, it is established that the
legs of the victim were tied with rope and his arms were
tied behind his back. A large adhesive plaster was stuck
over his mouth and completely sealed it. A handkerchief
was next tied firmly over the adhesive plaster to secure it in
position. The nostrils were plugged with cotton soaked in
chloroform. Counsel for the appellants submit that all this
shows that the assailants did not intend to kill the Lt.
Commander but to render him unconscious.
• The second clause deals with acts done with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the
person to whom harm is caused. The mental attitude here is two-fold.
There is first the intention to cause bodily harm and next there is the
subjective knowledge that death will be the likely consequence of the
intended injury. English Common Law mad no clear distinction between
intention and recklessness but in our law the foresight of the death must
be present. The mental attitude is thus made of two elements - (a) causing
an intentional injury and (b) which injury the offender has to foresight to
know would cause death. Here the injury or harm was intended. The
appellants intended tying up the victim, closing his mouth by sticking
adhesive plaster and plugging his nose with cotton wool soaked in
chloroform. They intended that the Lt. Commander should be rendered
unconscious for some time but they did not intend to do more harm than
this. Can it be said that they had the subjective knowledge of the fatal
consequences of the bodily harm they were causing ? We think that on the
facts the answer cannot be in the affirmative. To say that the act satisfied
the test of subjective knowledge would be really tantamount to saying that
the appellants intended to commit the murder of the Lt. Commander
which, as said already, was not the case.
• 11. The third clause discards the test of subjective knowledge. It deals with acts
done with the intention of causing bodily injury to a person and the bodily
injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. In this clause the result of the intentionally caused injury must be
viewed objectively. If the injury that the offender intends causing and does
cause is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary way of nature the offence is
murder whether the offender intended causing death or not and whether the
offender had a subjective knowledge of the consequences or not. As was laid
down in Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab MANU/SC/0041/1958 : 1958CriLJ818
for the application of this clause it must be first established that an injury is
caused, nest it must be established objectively what the nature of that injury in
the ordinary course of nature is. If the injury is found to be sufficient to cause
death one test is satisfied. Then it must be proved that there was an intention
to inflict that very injury and not some other injury and that it was not
accidental or unintentional. If this is also held against the offender the offence
of murder is established.
• Applying these tests to the acts of the appellants we have to see first what bodily
injury has been established. The bodily injury consisted of tying up the hands and
feet of the victim, closing the mouth with adhesive plaster and plugging the
nostrils with cotton soaked in chloroform. All these acts were deliberate acts which
had been pre-planned and they, therefore, satisfy the subjection test involved in
the clause. The next question is whether these acts considered objectively were
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In our judgment they
were. The victim could only possibly breathe through the nostrils but they were
also closed with cotton wool and in addition an asphyxiating agent was infused in
the cotton. All in all it would have been a miracle if the victim had escaped. Death
of the victim took place as direct result of the acts of his assailants.
• Mr. Sethi suggested that the victim must have struggled to free himself and had
rolled into the drain and this must have pushed up the cotton further into the
nostrils. This is not correct. The victim was placed in the drain by his assailants
because his folded shirt was placed under his head and had obviously fainted by
that time. No one seems to have been aware of his presence; otherwise discovery
would have taken place earlier. This leads to the only conclusion that there was no
change in the circumstances in which the victim was left by the assailants. The
bodily injury proved fatal in the ordinary course of nature. The ordinary course of
nature was neither interrupted nor interfered with by any intervening act of
another and whatever happened was the result of the acts of the assailants, and
their acts alone
• Mr. Sethi argues that the sufficiency of the injury to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature is something which must be proved and cannot be inferred
from the fact that death has in fact taken place. This is true of some cases. If a
blow is given by reason of which death ensues, it may be necessary to prove
whether it was necessarily fatal or in the language of the Code sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. In such a case it may not be open to
argue backwards from the death to the blow, to hold that the sufficiency is
established because death did result. As death can take place from other causes
the sufficiency is required to be proved by other and separate evidence. There
are, however, cases and cases. Where the victim is either helpless or rendered
helpless and the offender does some act which leads to death in the ordinary
course and death takes place from the act of the offender and nothing else, it is
hardly necessary to prove more than the acts themselves and the causal
connection between the acts and the end result. Mr. Sethi contends that the
concentration of chloroform, the quantity actually used and its effect on the
victim ought to have been proved. Alternatively he argues that the quantity of
the cotton wool used to plug the nostrils and the manner of plugging should
have been established before a finding can be given that the bodily injury was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
• This would, of course, have been necessary if it could at all
be thought that not the acts of the assailants but some
other intervening circumstance might have led to the death
of the victim. But there was none. There was no
interference by anyone else. Death was due to asphyxiation
whether caused by the mechanical obstruction of the
nostrils or by chloroform as an asphyxiating agent, or both.
Whichever way one looks at it, the injury which caused the
death was the one inflicted by the assailants. The
sufficiency of the injury was objectively established by the
nature and quality of the acts taken with the consequence
which was intimately related to the acts.
• As we are satisfied that this case falls within clause thirdly we
need hardly consider whether it falls also within the fourth
clause or not. That clause comprehends, generally, the
commission of imminently dangerous acts which must in all
probability cause death. To tie a man so that he cannot help
himself, to close his mouth completely and plug his nostrils with
cotton wool soaked in chloroform is an act imminently
dangerous to life, and it may well be said to satisfy the
requirements of the last clause also, although that clause is
ordinarily applicable to cases in which there is no intention to kill
any one in particular. We need not, however, discuss the point in
this case. We accordingly hold that the offence was murder