Avionics_MVJ20AE741_Module 2_MVJCE

MVJ20AE741-Avionics
SEMESTER: VII (ELECTIVE)

MODULE 2: INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEMS AND ELECTRONIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
• Dr P.Suresh
• Asso. Prof., Dept. of Aeronautical Engg.
• MVJCE
Affiliated to VTU, Belagavi, Approved by AICTE, New Delhi, Recognised by UGC with 2(f) & 12 (B), Accredited by NBA & 1
An Autonomous
Part I
Inertial Navigation System
I. Gyroscopic versus Inertial platform.

II. Structure of stable platform.
III. Inertial Navigation units.
IV. Inertial alignment.
V. Inertial Interface system.
VI. Importance of Compass swing
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15AE81 - Avionics Module II 2
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Inertial Navigation System
• Inertial navigation is a self-contained navigation technique in which
measurements provided by accelerometers and gyroscopes are used to
track the position and orientation of an object relative to a known starting
point, orientation and velocity.
• Inertial measurement units (IMUs) typically contain three orthogonal rate-
gyroscopes and three orthogonal accelerometers, measuring angular
velocity and linear acceleration respectively.
• Inertial navigation is used in a wide range of applications including the
navigation of aircraft, tactical and strategic missiles, spacecraft,
submarines and ships.
• Recent advances in the construction of MEMS devices have made it
possible to manufacture small and light inertial navigation systems. These
advances have widened the range of possible applications to include areas
such as human and animal motion capture.
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10AE82 - Avionics Unit II 3
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I. Gyroscopic versus Inertial Platform
A. Gyroscope
Mechanical
• A conventional gyroscope consists of a spinning wheel mounted on two
gimbals which allow it to rotate in all three axes.
• An effect of the conservation of angular momentum is that the spinning
wheel will resist changes in orientation. Hence when a mechanical
gyroscope is subjected to a rotation the wheel will remain at a constant
global orientation and the angles between adjacent gimbals will change.
• To measure the orientation of the device the angles between adjacent
gimbals can be read using angle pick-offs.
• Note that a conventional gyroscope measures orientation. In contrast
nearly all modern gyroscopes are rate-gyros, which measure angular
velocity.
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I. Gyroscopic versus Inertial Platform – Contd..
• The main disadvantage of mechanical
gyroscopes is that they contain moving
parts. Moving parts cause friction, which
in turn causes the output to drift over
time.
• To minimise friction high-precision
bearings and special lubricants are used,
adding to the cost of the device.
Mechanical gyroscopes also require a Typical Mechanical Gyroscope
few minutes to warm up, which is not
ideal in many situations.
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Optical Gyro
• A fibre optic gyroscope (FOG) uses the interference of light to measure
angular velocity.
• A FOG consists of a large coil of optical fibre. To measure rotation two light
beams are fired into the coil in opposite directions. If the sensor is
undergoing a rotation then the beam travelling in the direction of rotation
will experience a longer path to the other end of the fibre than the beam
travelling against the rotation, the Sagnac effect.
• When the beams exit the fibre they are combined. The phase shift
introduced due to the Sagnac effect causes the beams to interfere, resulting
in a combined beam whose intensity depends on the angular velocity.
• It is therefore possible to measure the angular velocity by measuring the
intensity of the combined beam.
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• Ring laser gyroscopes (RLGs) are also based on the Sagnac
effect.
• The difference between a FOG and RLG is that in a RLG laser
beams are directed around a closed path using mirrors rather
than optical fibre.
• Unlike mechanical gyroscopes, optical gyros contain no
moving parts and require only a few seconds to start-up. The
accuracy of an optical gyro is largely dependent on the length
of the light transmission path (larger is better), which is
constrained by the size of the device.
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B. Accelerometers
Mechanical
• A mechanical accelerometer consists of a
mass suspended by springs.
• The displacement of the mass is measured
using a displacement pick-off, giving a signal
that is proportional to the force F acting on
the mass in the direction of the input axis.
• Newton’s second law F = ma is then used to
calculate the acceleration acting on the
device.
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Solid State
• Solid-state accelerometers can be broken into various sub-groups,
including surface acoustic wave, vibratory, silicon and quartz devices.
• Solid state accelerometers are small, reliable and rugged. An example of a
solid-state accelerometer is the surface acoustic wave (SAW)
accelerometer.
• A SAW accelerometer consists of a cantilever beam which is resonated at a
particular frequency. A mass is attached to one end of the beam which is
free to move. The other end is rigidly attached to the case. When an
acceleration is applied along the input axis the beam bends. This causes
the frequency of the surface acoustic wave to change proportionally to
the applied strain. By measuring this change in frequency the acceleration
can be determined.
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MEMS Accelerometers
• Micro-machined silicon accelerometers use the same principles as
mechanical and solid state sensors. There are two main classes of MEMS
accelerometer.
• The first class consists of mechanical accelerometers (i.e: devices which
measure the displacement of a supported mass) manufactured using
MEMS techniques.
• The second class consists of devices which measure the change in
frequency of a vibrating element caused by a change of tension, as in SAW
accelerometer
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SAW Resonator
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II. Structure of Stable Platform
• In stable platform type systems the inertial sensors are mounted on a platform
which is isolated from any external rotational motion.
• In other words the platform is held in alignment with the global frame. This is
achieved by mounting the platform using gimbals (frames) which allow the
platform freedom in all three axes.
• The platform mounted gyroscopes detect any platform rotations. These signals
are fed back to torque motors which rotate the gimbals in order to cancel out
such rotations, hence keeping the platform aligned with the global frame.
• To track the orientation of the device the angles between adjacent gimbals can
be read using angle pick-offs.
• To calculate the position of the device the signals from the platform mounted
accelerometers are double integrated.
• Note that it is necessary to subtract acceleration due to gravity from the vertical
channel before performing the integration.
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II. Structure of Stable Platform – Contd..
A Stable Platform IMU
Stable platform inertial navigation algorithm.
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Strapdown Systems
• In strapdown systems the inertial sensors are mounted rigidly onto the
device, and therefore output quantities measured in the body frame rather
than the global frame. To keep track of orientation the signals from the rate
gyroscopes are ‘integrated’.
• To track position the three accelerometer signals are resolved into global
coordinates using the known orientation, as determined by the integration of
the gyro signals.
• The global acceleration signals are then integrated as in the stable platform
algorithm.
• Stable platform and strapdown systems are both based on the same
underlying principles. S
• Strapdown systems have reduced mechanical complexity and tend to be
physically smaller than stable platform systems. These benefits are achieved
at the cost of increased computational complexity. As the cost of computation
has decreased strapdown systems have become the dominant type of INS
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Strapdown Systems – Contd..
Strapdown inertial navigation algorithm
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IV. Inertial Alignment
• Alignment is the process whereby the orientation of the axes of an inertial
navigation system is determined with respect to the reference axis system.
• The basic concept of aligning an inertial navigation system is quite simple and
straight forward.
• However, there are many complications that make alignment both time
consuming and complex.
• Accurate alignment is crucial if precision navigation is to be achieved over long
periods of time without any form of aiding.
• In addition to the determination of initial attitude, it is necessary to initialise
the velocity and position defined by the navigation system as part of the
alignment process.
• It is the angular alignment which frequently poses the major difficulty.
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IV. Inertial Alignment – Contd..
• There are two fundamental types of alignment process: self-alignment, using
gyrocompassing techniques, and the alignment of a slave system with
respect to a master reference.
• There are various systematic and random errors that limit the accuracy to
which an inertial navigation system can be aligned, whichever method is
used.
• These include the effects of inertial sensor errors, data latency caused by
transmission delays, signal quantisation, vibration effects and other
undesirable or unquantifiable motion.
• Various techniques have been developed to overcome the effects of the
random and systematic errors and enable slave systems in missiles, for
example, to be aligned whilst under the wing of an aircraft in-flight, or in the
magazine of a ship underway on the ocean.
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• The Inertial Alignment can be done either on a fixed platform
of on the moving platform.
• whilst the are particular problems encountered when aligning
on the ground, in the air and at sea .
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i) Alignment on a Fixed Platform
• Consider the situation where it is required to align an inertial navigation system to the
local geographic co-ordinate frame defined by the directions of true north and the local
vertical.
• For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the navigation system is stationary
with respect to the Earth.
• In this situation, the accelerometers measure three orthogonal components of the
specific force needed to overcome gravity whilst the gyroscopes measure the
components of the Earth's turn rate in the same directions.
• The alignment of a stabilised platform system in which the instrument cluster can be
rotated physically into alignment with the local geographic reference frame.
• In this situation, it is usual to refer to the accelerometers whose sensitive axes are to be
aligned with the north, east and vertical axes of the reference frame as the north, east
and vertical accelerometers respectively.
• Similarly, north, east and vertical gyroscopes may be defined.
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• In a platform mechanisation, alignment is achieved by adjusting the
orientation of the platform until the measured components of specific
force and Earth's rate become equal to the expected values.
• The horizontal components of gravity acting in the north and east directions
are nominally zero.
• The instrument cluster is therefore rotated until the outputs of the north
and east accelerometers reach a null, thus levelling the platform.
• Since the east component of Earth's rate is also known to be zero, the
platform is then rotated about the vertical until the east gyroscope output is
nulled, thus achieving an alignment in azimuth.
• This type of process is referred to as gyrocompassing
• An equivalent alignment process, sometimes referred to as analytic
gyrocompassing, can be used to align a strapdown inertial navigation
system as described next.
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• In a strapdown system, attitude information may be stored either as a
direction cosine matrix.
• The objective of the angular alignment process is to determine the
direction cosine matrix which define the relationship between the
inertial sensor axes and the local geographic frame.
• The measurements provided by the inertial sensors in body axes may be
resolved into the local geographic frame using the current best estimate of
the body attitude with respect to this frame.
• The resolved sensor measurements are then compared with the expected
turn rates and accelerations to enable the direction cosines or quaternion
parameters to be calculated correctly.
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ii) Alignment on a Moving Platform
• When aligning in a moving vehicle, the accelerations and turn rates to
which the system is subjected are no longer well defined in the way that
they are when the system is stationary.
• It therefore becomes necessary to provide some independent measure of
these quantities against which the measurements generated by the
aligning system may be compared.
• As an alternative, alignment may be achieved by comparing estimates of
velocity or position generated by the strapdown system with similar
estimates provided by an external source over a period of time.
• Velocity and position errors will propagate with time as a result of the
angular alignment errors. Therefore, any difference in the velocity and
position estimates generated between the aligning system and the external
source over this time will be partially the result of an alignment error.
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• With aircraft and shipboard systems, the independent measurement
information may be provided by a separate inertial navigation system on-
board the same vehicle.
• By comparing the two sets of inertial measurements it is possible to deduce
the relative orientation of the two frames on a 'continuous' basis. The
precise measurements available will be dependent on the reference system
mechanisation on-board the ship or aircraft.
• As a rule, a stable platform navigation system will only output estimates of
position, velocity, attitude and heading.
• A strapdown reference system offers greater flexibility, potentially providing
linear acceleration and angular rate information in addition to the usual
navigation outputs listed above.
• Alternatively, position fixes may be derived on-board the vehicle from
signals transmitted by a radio beacon or from satellites.
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V. Inertial Interface system
• Typical Triple INS System
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 Air Data and Inertial Reference Systems (ADIRS)
• The new integrated ADIRS developed in the early 1980s combined the
computation for air data and inertial parameters in one multichannel unit.
• Taking the B777 as an example, the primary unit is an Air Data and Inertial
Reference Unit (ADIRU) which provides the main source of air data and
inertial information.
• This unit is supported by an Attitude and Heading Reference System
(AHRS) which on the B777 is called the Secondary Attitude Air data
Reference Unit (SAARU).
• This provides secondary attitude and air data information should the
primary source, the ADIRU, become totally unusable.
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• B777 ADIRU
• There are six Ring Laser Gyros (RLGs)
and six accelerometers included in the
unit. It can be seen that both sets of
sensors are arranged in a hexad-skew
redundant set in relation to an
orthogonal axis set.
• This means that, by resolving the output
of each of the six sensors in the
direction of the axis set, each sensor is
able to measure an element of the
relevant inertia parameter, Body rate or
acceleration, in each axis.
• This provides a redundant multichannel
sensor set with the prospect of achieving
higher levels of accuracy by scaling and
combining sensor outputs.
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• B777 air data and inertial reference
system
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VI. Compass swing
The process of swinging and compensating a ship or aircraft compass
by determining and reducing the deviation coefficients and recording
the residual deviations.
When to Perform a Compass Swing?
• Whenever the accuracy of the compass is suspected.
• After a cockpit modification or major replacement involving ferrous
metal.
• Whenever a compass has been subjected to a shock; for example,
after a hard landing or turbulence.
• After aircraft has passed through a severe electrical storm.
• After a lightning strike.
• Whenever a change is made to the electrical system.
• Whenever a change of cargo is likely to affect the compass.
• After an aircraft has been parked on one heading for more than a
year.
• When flux valves are replaced
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Compass Swing
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Part II
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Electronic Flight Control System
Contents
I. Fly-by-wire system: - basic concept and features.
II. Pitch and Roll rate: - command and response.
III. Control Laws.
IV. Frequency response of a typical FBW actuator.
V. Cooper Harper scale.
VI. Redundancy and failure survival.
VII. Common mode of failures and effects analysis.
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Flight Control Systems
• Concorde – First civil A/c to introduce FBW system with a mechanical back
up.
• A320 – First from Airbus.
• B777 – Boeing’s first civil implementation.
• Generally we have:
– Primary Flight Control or FBW
– Autopilot/Flight Director System
– Flight Management System (FMS)
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Inter-relationship of Flight control functions
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Inter-relationship of Flight control functions – Contd ..
• FBW comprises the inner loop, concerned with controlling the attitude of
aircraft.
– Inputs from the pilot (control column of side stick, rudders or throttles) will
determine the attitude.
– The a/c pitch, roll and yaw are presented on the flight display and nav
display.
• The autopilot flight director systems (AFDS), performs additional control loop
closure to control the aircraft trajectory
– It controls the speed, height and heading. Nav functions like heading hold,
heading acquire are also included.
– Approach and guidance is provided by coupling the autopilot with ILS or
MLS.
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Inter-relationship of Flight control functions – Contd ..
• The FMS performs the navigation or mission functions, ensuring that the
FBW and AFDS system position the a/c at the correct points or way points.
– Multi Functional Control and Display Unit (MCDU), also know as CDU.
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Flight Control – frames of reference
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Generic Primary FCS - FBW
• Pitch control is usually effected by four powered flight control actuators
powering four elevator sections.
• Pitch trim is undertaken by means of two Tailplane Horizontal Stabilizer
(THS) actuators . operating as normal and standby systems . which move the
entire horizontal tailplane surface or stabilizer (or stabilator in US parlance).
• Roll control is invoked by using the left and right ailerons, augmented as
required by the extension of a number of spoilers on the inboard wing
sections.
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Generic Flight Control System – Civil aircraft.
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Generic Primary FCS – FBW – Contd..
• Yaw control by means of two or three rudder sections.
• Both wing sets of spoilers may be extended together to perform the
following functions:
- Inboard spoiler sections to provide a speed brake function in flight,
allowing the aircraft to be rapidly slowed to the desired
airspeed, usually during descent.
- Use of all spoilers in a ground spoiler or lift dump function during
the landing roll, helps it to reduce the lift drastically.
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• Direct inputs from the pilot’s controls or inputs from the autopilot feed the
necessary guidance signals into a number of flight control computers
depending upon the system architecture.
• These computers modify the flight control demands according to a number
of aerodynamic and other parameters such that effective and harmonized
handling characteristics are achieved.
• In addition, secondary flight control or high lift augmentation is provided by
leading-edge slats and trailing-edge flaps.
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• On the Boeing 777, the aileron and flap functions are combined by the use
of two inboard flaperons.
• Operation of the speed brakes, flaps, and slats is initiated by dedicated
control levers located on the flight deck central console.
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Mechanical back - Up
• FBW systems employ some form of direct mechanical link as a back-
up system:
• In the Boeing 777 system, alternate pitch trim levers are
mechanically connected directly to the horizontal stabilator.
– A direct mechanical link from the rudder to one pair of spoilers
allows roll control to be maintained in a standby mode.
• In Airbus, the mechanical trim wheel can alter the position of the tail-
plane surface for pitch control.
– Inputs from the rudder pedals can alter the inputs to the three
rudder actuators. A combination of pitch trim and rudder pedals
deals the emergency.
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I. FBW – Basic Concepts and Features
• The total elimination of all the complex mechanical control runs and
linkages – all commands and signals are transmitted electrically along
wires, hence the name fly-by-wire.
• The interposition of a computer between the pilot’s commands and the
control surface actuators.
• The aircraft motion sensors which feed back the components of the
aircraft’s angular and linear motion to the computer.
• The air data sensors which supply height and airspeed information to the
computer.
• Redundancy to enable failures in the system to be absorbed. The flaps can
also be continually controlled by the Flight Control Computer.
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I. FBW – Basic Concepts and Features – Contd..
• Basic Elements of a FBW flight Control System
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• Electrical Data Transmission
• FBW Control Surface Actuation
• Motion Sensor Feedback
• Air Data
• High Integrity Failure Survival Computing System
• Very High Overall System Integrity
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• Flight Control System Bus Configuration
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• Quadruplex Actuation System
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• Integrated Air Data Transducer System (BAE Systems)
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• FBW Control Stick/ Passive FBW inceptor features
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• FBW actuator
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Advantages of FBW Control
• Increased Performance
• Reduced Weight
• FBW Control Sticks/ Passive FBW Inceptors
• Automatic Stabilization
• Carefree Manoeuvring
• Ability to Integrate Additional Controls
• Ease of Integration of the Autopilot
• Closed Loop Manoeuvre Command Control
a. Roll Rate Command System
b. Pitch Rate Command FBW loop
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II. Closed Loop Manoeuvre Command Control
• A closed-loop manoeuvre command control is achieved by increasing the
gain of the motion sensor feedback loops.
• The control surface actuators are thus controlled by the difference, or
error, between the pilot’s command signals and the measured
aircraft motion from the appropriate sensors,
• For example, pitch rate in the case of a pitch rate command system and
roll rate in the case of a roll rate command system.
• Other control terms may also be included such as airstream incidence
angles and possibly normal and lateral accelerations.
• The flight control computer derives the required control surface
movements for the aircraft to follow the pilot’s commands in a fast, well
damped manner.
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II. Closed Loop Manoeuvre Command Control – Contd..
• A well designed closed-loop control system offers the following advantages
over an open-loop control system:
(i) The steady-state output to input relationship is substantially
independent of changes in the loop gain provided this remains
sufficiently high.
(ii) The system bandwidth is improved and the phase lag when
following a dynamically varying input is reduced.
(iii) A fast well damped response, which is little affected by normal
changes in the loop gain, can generally be achieved by suitable design of the
control loop.
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II. Pitch Rate Command FBW loop
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II. Pitch Rate Command FBW loop -Contd
• Consider now what happens when the pilot exerts a force on the stick to
command a pitch rate.
• The aircraft pitch rate is initially zero so that the resultant pitch rate error
causes the computer to demand an appropriate deflection of the tail plane
from the trim position.
• The ensuing lift force acting on the tail plane exerts a pitching moment on the
aircraft about its CG causing the pitch attitude to change and the wing
incidence to increase.
• The resulting lift force from the wings provides the necessary force at right
angles to the aircraft’s velocity vector to change the direction of the aircraft’s
flight path so that the aircraft turns in the pitch plane.
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II. Pitch Rate Command FBW loop - Contd
• The increasing pitch rate is fed back to the computer reducing the tail
plane angle until a condition is reached when the aircraft pitch rate is
equal to the commanded pitch rate.
• The pitch rate error is thus brought to near zero and maintained near zero
by the automatic control loop.
• Pitch rate command enables precise ‘fingertip’ control to be achieved.
• For example, to change the pitch attitude to climb, gentle pressure back on
the stick produces a pitch rate of a few degrees per second; let the stick go
back to the central position and the pitch rate stops in less than a second
with negligible overshoot with the aircraft at the desired attitude.
• Increasing the stick force produces a proportionate increase in pitch rate.
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II. Roll Rate Command System
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II. Roll Rate Command System – Contd..
• Consider what happens when the pilot pushes the stick to command a roll
rate.
• At the instant the command is applied the roll rate is zero, so that the roll
rate error produces a large aileron deflection.
• This creates a relatively large rolling movement on the aircraft so that the roll
rate builds up rapidly.
• The roll rate error is rapidly reduced until the roll rate error is near zero, and
the aircraft roll rate is effectively equal to the commanded roll rate.
• Because the roll rate creates an aerodynamic damping moment which
opposes the rate of roll, the aileron deflection cannot be reduced to zero but
is reduced to a value where the rolling moment produced is equal and
opposite to the aerodynamic damping moment.
• The controller gain is sufficiently high, however, to keep the steady-state roll
rate error to a small value.
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• A much faster roll response can be obtained compared with a
conventional open loop system, as can be seen in the following figure, the
variation in response across the flight envelope is also much less.
• Aircraft need to bank to turn, so that a fast, precise roll response is
required
• Push the stick sideways and a roll rate directly proportional to the force
exerted on the stick is obtained. Return the stick to the centre when the
desired bank angle is reached and the aircraft stops rolling, without any
overshoot.
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• Roll rate response
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III. Control Laws
• The term ‘control laws’ is used to define the algorithms relating the
control surface demand to the pilot’s stick command and the various
motion sensor signals and the aircraft height, speed and Mach number.
• As an example, a very simple basic pitch rate command law would be:
• where ηD is the tail plane demand angle; θi is the pilot’s input command;
q is the pitch rate; K is the forward loop gain; and Gq is the pitch rate
gearing (Gain coefficient).
• In practice, additional control terms from other sensors (e.g., incidence
and normal acceleration may be required.
• The value of K and the sensor gearings would also almost certainly need to
be varied with height and airspeed by an air data gain scheduling system
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III. Control Laws Contd..
• Control terms proportional to the derivative or rate of change of error and
integral of error are also used to shape and improve the closed-loop
response.
• Proportional plus derivative of error control provides a phase advance
characteristic to compensate for the lags in the system, for instance
actuator response, and hence improve the loop stability.
• This increases the damping of the aircraft response and reduces the
overshoot to a minimum when responding to an input or disturbance.
• The control term is filtered to limit the increase in gain at high frequencies
and smooth the differentiation process which amplifies any noise present
in the error signal
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• A more physical explanation of the
damping action of a phase advance
element is shown in the figure.
• This shows how a control moment
which is proportional to error plus
rate of change of error (suitably
smoothed) changes sign before the
error reaches zero and hence applies a
retarding moment to decelerate and
progressively reduce the velocity
before the error reaches zero and
hence minimises the overshoot.
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• Proportional plus integral of error control eliminates steady-state errors
and reduces the following lag.
• The integral of error term increases the loop gain at low frequencies up to
theoretically infinite gain at dc so that there are zero steady-state errors
due to out of trim external moments or forces acting on the aircraft.
• The error when following a low frequency input command is also reduced
and is zero for a constant input rate.
• The magnitude of the steady-state error is dependent on the loop gain, K
which in turn is limited by the loop stability.
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• The effect of ‘proportional plus integral’
error control can be seen in the figure
• The steady-state error is zero; however
the integral of the error is not zero and
reaches a value sufficient to generate the
necessary control moment to balance the
trim moment.
• The value of an integral term control can
thus be seen in achieving automatic
trimming of the control surfaces.
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IV Redundancy and Failure Survival
• The safety levels required are specified in terms of the probability of a
catastrophic failure - result in loss of control of the aircraft.
• It is generally specified that the probability of a catastrophic failure in the
flight control system must not exceed 1 × 10−7/hour for a military aircraft
or 1 × 10−9/hour for a civil aircraft.
• These very low probability figures are difficult to appreciate and also
impossible to verify statistically.
• To give some idea of their magnitude, a failure probability figure of
1×10−9/hour means that a fleet of 3,000 aircraft flying an average of
3,000 hours per annum would experience one catastrophic failure of the
FBW system in 100 years!
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IV Redundancy and Failure Survival – contd..
• Level of safety currently being achieved with civil aircraft transport
corresponds to a figure of around 1 × 10−6/hour.
• This figure is derived from the total number of civil aircraft crashes
occurring in a year from all causes divided by the total number of aircraft
flying and their annual operating hours.
• The mean time between failures, or MTBF, of a single channel FBW system
is in the region of 3,000 hours.
• The FBW system must thus possess redundancy with multiple parallel
channels so that it is able to survive at least two failures, if these very low
failure probability figures are to be met.
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• Redundancy Configurations
• A well established redundant configuration comprises four totally
independent channels of sensors and computers in a parallel arrangement
to give the required failure survival capability – such a configuration is
referred to as a quadruplex system.
• The four independent channels are then configured to drive a failure
survival actuation system with sufficient redundancy such that the overall
FBW system of interconnected sensors, computers and actuators can
survive any two failures from whatever cause.
• The integrity of the electrical power supplies and the hydraulic power
supplies is absolutely vital.
• Adequate redundancy must be provided so that the system can survive
failures in both the electrical and hydraulic power supplies.
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• Quadruplex system configuration
• Assumed that the probability of 3 or
more channels failing is negligible.
• Failures are therefore detected by
cross-comparison of the parallel
channels and majority voting on the
‘odd man out’ principle.
• System degrading to triplex
redundancy after the first failure
and duplex redundancy after the
second failure.
• A third failure results in a fail
passive situation, the ‘good’ channel
counteracting the failed channel.
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• Monitored Triplex Redundancy
• The incorporation of a monitoring system to check the
correct functioning of a channel to a very high
confidence level can also enable a failed channel to be
identified and disconnected and this leads to an
alternative failure survival configuration known as
‘monitored triplex’.
• Comprises three totally independent parallel channels
with each channel monitored by a dissimilar system.
• Provided this monitoring is to a sufficiently high degree
of integrity and confidence level, such a system can
survive two failures.
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• Voting and Consolidation
• Failures are detected by cross-comparison and majority voting.
• It is necessary to allow for normal variations in the outputs of the parallel
sensors measuring a particular quantity.
• Normal errors in sensors include such parameters as:
(a) Scale factor errors.
(b) Linearity errors.
(c) Null or zero offset errors.
(d) Hysteresis errors.
(e) Variation of the above parameters with temperature, etc.
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• Failures can be divided into the following categories:
(i) ‘Hard over’ failures whereby the failed sensor output is hard over full scale and
would demand full authority control surface movement with catastrophic results.
(ii) Zero output failures whereby the sensor output is zero and thus no control action
would take place.
(iii) ‘Slow over’ failures whereby the sensor output is slowly increasing or drifting with
time, although the input is stationary, and would eventually cause a full scale hard
over.
(iv) Oscillatory failures whereby the sensor output is oscillating, the amplitude and
frequency being dependent on the type of failure. Loss of feedback, for instance, can
result in a stop to stop oscillation.
(v) ‘Soft’ failures whereby the sensor is functioning but its output is outside the
specification tolerances.
(vi) Intermittent failures whereby the sensor fails and then recovers intermittently.
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• Quadruplex Redundancy
• Lane Processing task. Quadruplux system
architecture
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• Boeing philosophy: the system comprises Top-level Boeing and airbus
three Primary Flight Computers (PFCs), each of comparison of control philosophy
which has three similar lanes with dissimilar
hardware but the same software.
• Communication with the four Actuator Control
Electronics (ACE) units is by multiple A629 flight
control data buses.
• Airbus Philosophy: three Flight Control Primary
Computers (FCPCs) and two Flight Control
Secondary Computers (FCSCs). Each computer
comprises command and monitor elements
with different software.
• The primary and secondary computers have
different architectures and dissimilar hardware
and software
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• Dissimilar Redundancy
1. Use of two or more different types
of microprocessorswith dissimilar
software.
2. Use of a back-up analogue system
in addition to the main digital
system which is at quadruplex or
triplex level of redundancy.
3. Use of a back-up system using
different sensors, computing and
control means e.g., separate
control surfaces.
4. Combinations of equations (1) to
(3) above.
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V. Common Mode Failures
• Overview of Failure Classification and Safety Objectives
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V. Common Mode Failures – Contd..
• A single event causing all the parallel channels to fail simultaneously as
being negligibly small.
• The type of failure which can affect all systems at the same time is termed
a Common Mode Failure.
Examples of common mode failures are:
• Lightning strike.
• Electro-magnetic interference
• Fire/explosion/battle damage.
• Incorrect maintenance.
• Common design errors – e.g., software.
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VI. Failure Modes and Effect Analysis
• For examining total system integrity using a bottom – up
approach.
• Certain parts of a system may be subject to scrutiny as they
represent single-point failures and as such warrant more
detailed analysis.
• The analysis used in this situation is the FMEA (Failure
Modes and Effect Analysis).
• The process used in the FMEA is best illustrated by the use
of a simple example.
• In the case of an electrical generator feeding an aircraft
main electrical busbar via an electrical power line contactor.
• The line contactor is operated under the control of the GCU
as shown
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VI. Failure Modes and Effect Analysis – Contd..
• An FMEA on this portion of the aircraft electrical system will examine the possible
failures of all the elements:
1. The generator failures and effects; in other words, examine in detail all the failures
that contribute to the generator failure rate of 5 × 10-4 per flight hour.
2. The GCU failures and effects: examining all the failures that contributed to the
overall failure rate of 2 × 10-4 per flight hour.
3. The line contactor failures and effects: If a line contactor has an MTBF of 100000 h
with a failure rate of 1 × 10-5 per flight hour.
• The ways in which the contactor may fail are ascribed portions of this failure rate
for the different failures and effects:
i. the contactor may fail open,
ii. the contactor may fail closed,
iii. the contactor may fail with one contact welded shut but the others open and so
on until all the failures have been allocated a budget.
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• This process is conducted in a tabular form such that:

1. Failure modes are identified.
2. Mode failure rates are ascribed.
3. Failure effects are identified.
4. The means by which the failure is detected is identified.
5. An FMEA should therefore respond to the questions asked of the system or
element under examination in a quantitative manner.
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Fault Tree Analysis
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is one of the tools described in SAE document ARP 4761
(2).
• This analysis technique uses probability to assess whether a particular system
configuration or architecture will meet the mandated requirements.
• For example, assume that the total loss of aircraft electrical power on-board an
aircraft has catastrophic failure consequences as identified by the functional
hazard analysis
• The ability of a system design to meet these safety objective quantitative
requirements is established by an FTA using the following probability techniques.
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• In the example it is assumed:
• That the aircraft has two independent electrical power generation systems, the
main components of which are the generator and the Generator Control Unit
(GCU) which governs voltage regulation and system protection.
• The aircraft has an independent emergency system such as a Ram Air Turbine
(RAT).
• That the failure rates of these components may be established and agreed on
account of the availability of in-service component reliability data or sound
engineering rationale which will provide a figure acceptable to the certification
authorities.
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Simplified FTA on a Aircraft
Electrical System
• The combined failure rate gives
the probability of loss of electrical
power to main bus 1.
• This is calculated by summing the
failure rates of the generator and
controller, as either failing will
cause the loss of main bus 1
• 5.0 × 10-4 + 2.0 × 10-4 = 7 × 10-4
per flight hour
• Other components and branches
are calculated in a similar way
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Important Question
• What is INS? Explain the operational principle of INS.
• What are the different types of inertial navigation systems? Explain the
structure of stable platform Inertial Navigation System.
• Explain in detail the leveling and the alignment in stable platform INS?
• What is accelerometer? Explain types of accelerometers along with
neat sketch?
• What is fly by wire system? Explain the basic concepts and features
with neat sketch.
• Define control laws and Explain role rate command system in detail
with a neat block diagram?
27/12/2024
15AE81 - Avionics Module II 85
An Autonomous
Thank you
An Autonomous

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MVJ20AE741-Avionics

SEMESTER: VII (ELECTIVE)

I. Gyroscopic versus Inertial platform.

A Stable Platform IMU

Stable platform inertial navigation algorithm.

Strapdown inertial navigation algorithm

• Roll rate response

• Overview of Failure Classification and Safety Objectives

• This process is conducted in a tabular form such that:

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