Chapt 11
Chapt 11
Chapt 11
Trade-off models
Asymmetric information theory
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Finance 404
All cash flows are perpetuities. This implies perpetual debt is issued, firms have zero growth, and expected EBIT is constant over time. In their first paper (1958), MM also assumed that there are no corporate or personal taxes. Later relaxed. The assumptions were necessary in order for MM to use the arbitrage argument to develop and prove their equations.
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Given the following data, find V, S, ks, and WACC for Firms U and L.
Firms U and L are in same risk class.
EBITU,L = $500,000. Firm U has no debt; ksU = 14%. Firm L has $1,000,000 debt at kd = 8%. The basic MM assumptions hold. There are no corporate or personal taxes.
From the Mini Case
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Finance 404
2. Find the market value of Firm Ls debt and equity. VL = D + SL = $3,571,429 $3,571,429 = $1,000,000 + SL
SL = $2,571,429.
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3. Find ksL.
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Graph the MM relationships between capital costs and leverage as measured by D/V.
Cost of Capital (%) 26 20 14 WACC kd Debt/Value Ratio (%) 100
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Without taxes
ks
8
0 20 40 60 80
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The more debt the firm adds to its capital structure, the riskier the equity becomes and thus the higher its cost.
Although kd remains constant, ks increases with leverage. The increase in ks is exactly sufficient to keep the WACC constant.
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3
2 1 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 Debt (millions of $)
Find V, S, ks, and WACC for Firms U and L assuming a 40% corporate tax rate.
With corporate taxes added, the MM propositions become: Proposition I: VL = VU + TD.
2. Find market value of Firm Ls debt and equity. VL= D + SL = $2,542,857 $2,542,857= $1,000,000 + SL SL= $1,542,857.
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3. Find ksL.
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4. Find Firm Ls WACC. WACCL= (D/V)kd(1 - T) + (S/V)ks $1,000,000 = $2,542,857 (8.0%)(0.6) $1,542,857 + $2,542,857 (16.33%)
( (
) )
MM relationship between capital costs and leverage when corporate taxes are considered.
Cost of Capital (%) 26
ks
20
14 8 WACC kd(1 - T)
20
40
60
80
100
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MM relationship between value and debt when corporate taxes are considered.
Value of Firm, V ($) 4 VL TD
3
2 1
VU
Debt
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5 (Millions of $)
Under MM with corporate taxes, the firms value increases continuously as more and more debt is used.
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Assume investors have the following tax rates: Td = 30% and Ts = 12%. What is the gain from leverage according to the Miller model?
Millers Proposition I: (1 - Tc)(1 - Ts) VL = VU + 1 (1 - Td)
]D.
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Tc = corporate tax rate. Td = personal tax rate on debt income. Ts = personal tax rate on stock income.
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VL
]D
= VU + (1 - 0.75)D = VU + 0.25D. Value rises with debt; each $100 increase in debt raises Ls value by $25.
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How does this gain compare to the gain in the MM model with corporate taxes?
If only corporate taxes, then VL = VU + TcD = VU + 0.40D. Here $100 of debt raises value by $40. Thus, personal taxes lower the gain from leverage, but the net effect depends on tax rates.
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When Miller brought in personal taxes, the value enhancement of debt was lowered. Why?
1. Corporate tax laws favor debt over equity financing because interest expense is tax deductible while dividends are not.
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2. However, personal tax laws favor equity over debt because stocks provide both tax deferral and a lower capital gains tax rate.
3. This lowers the relative cost of equity visa-vis MMs no-personal-tax world and decreases the spread between debt and equity costs. 4. Thus, some of the advantage of debt financing is lost, so debt financing is less valuable to firms.
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2. MM, Corporate Taxes: Value increases, so firms should use (almost) 100% debt financing.
3. Miller, Personal Taxes: Value increases, but less than under MM, so again firms should use (almost) 100% debt financing.
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Financial distress: As firms use more and more debt financing, they face a higher probability of future financial distress, which brings with it lower sales, EBIT, and bankruptcy costs. Lowers value of stock and bonds.
(More...)
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Agency costs: The costs of managers not behaving in the best interests of shareholders and the resulting costs of monitoring managers actions. Lowers value of stock and bonds.
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How do financial distress and agency costs change the MM and Miller models?
MM/Miller ignored these costs, hence those models show firm value increasing continuously with leverage. Since financial distress and agency costs increase with leverage, such costs reduce the value of debt financing.
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Heres a valuation model which includes financial distress and agency costs:
PV of agency PV of expected VL = VU + XD . costs fin. distress costs
X represents either Tc in the MM model or the more complex Miller term. Now, optimal leverage involves a tradeoff between the tax benefits of debt and the costs associated with financial distress and agency.
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Relationships between capital costs and leverage when financial distress and agency costs are considered.
Cost of Capital (%) ks WACC or ka kd(1 - T) 4 D*
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14
3
2 1 D*
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Debt ($)
34
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Reality
Firms prefer to finance with internally generated funds - retained earnings and depreciation. Firms set their target payout ratios based on their expected future investment opportunities and expected future cash flows Dividends are sticky in the short run. There is a pecking order of financing, not the balanced approach that is called for under the tradeoff theory.
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How are financial and business risk measured in a market risk framework? ksL= kRF + (kM-kRF)bU + (kM - kRF)bU(1 - T)(D/S)
ksL =
(Hamadas equation)
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Unlevered Increased beta, which volatility of reflects the the returns + business to equity risk of the due to the use firm of debt
Business risk
Financial risk
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Managers will issue new common stock only when no other alternatives exist or when the stock is overvalued. Investors recognize this, so new stock sales are treated as negative signals and stock price falls. Managers do not want to trigger a price decline, so firms maintain a reserve borrowing capacity. Managers act in the best interests of current shareholders.
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Important implication:
Because managers are reluctant to take actions which lower their firms stock price, they try to maintain a reserve borrowing capacity which can be tapped if external equity is needed. They do not want to be forced into a new equity issue at the wrong time.
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First use internal funds. Next, draw on marketable securities. Then, issue new debt. Finally, and only as a last resort, issue new common stock.
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Does the pecking order theory make sense? Explain. Is the pecking order theory consistent with the trade-off theory?
It is consistent with the asymmetric information theory, in which managers avoid issuing equity. Especially true for mature companies which go to the markets infrequently. It is not consistent with trade-off theory.
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The most profitable firms borrow the least Some regard the substitution of Debt for Equity as a Good Change
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Conclusion
MM and Miller models
Financial Distress and Agency Costs
Hamada Equation Tradeoff Theory Asymmetric Information Theory Pecking Order Theory
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