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Building an Automated Malware Behavioral Analysis Environment Using Free and Open-Source ToolsJim Clausing, PMTS, AT&T CSO18 Jun 2009
Thanx up frontPage 2
The Author
Page 4Jim Clausing, GCIA, GCFA, GREM, GCIH, GCFW, GSIP, GSOC, SSP-MPA, CISSPGCIA (Gold) #64 – 2000GCFA (Gold) #25 – 2002GREM (Gold) #48 – 2005And other certs along the way…SANS Mentor, StaySharp/STAR instructor, CommunitySANS instructor, Internet Storm Center handler since 2002Instrument-rated private pilot – 2003/2004
The Paper
Page 6SANSFIRE 2008
The patches and scriptshttp://handlers.sans.org/jclausing/grem_gold/http://www.giac.org/certified_professionals/practicals/grem/48.phpPage 7
The Environment – A Little History
In the beginningPage 9
Malware DBPage 10
Motivation – The Environment
Forest?  Trees?Page 12
Unpacking may lead to surprises – like no results Page 13
Page 14We’ve got malware, now what?
Truman (well, and Joe Stewart) FTWPage 15
The Analysis Environment
Processing a Sample
Analysis FlowPage 18
Submission[jac@fltruman001 ~]$ for i in 090???-*.piz; do sudo submit.sh $i && mv $i old-malware/; sleep 10; done    Archive:  090529-rnd_jpg.piz  inflating: rnd.jpg                 *****Processing rnd.jpg - ONEBOOT******interface: eth1 (4.0.0.0/255.0.0.0)filter: (ip) and ( not port 45612 and not port 45611 and not tcp port 6987 and not udp port 32785 )tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decodelistening on eth1, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 96 bytestcpdump: listening on eth1, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 1514 bytesStarting Faux FTP Server Emulation on port 21Starting Faux MySQL Server Emulation on port 3306Starting Faux SMTP Server Emulation on port 25Starting Faux SMB Server Emulation on port 445Starting Faux IRC Server Emulation on port 6667Starting Faux DNS Server Emulation on port 53Page 19
Monitoring[jac@fltruman001 ~]$ alias statusalias status='cat /tmp/current.txt && echo "" && cat /tmp/sandnet*.log | tr -c "[:print:][:blank:]\r\n" "." ; tcpdump -nnr /tmp/sandnet.pcap -w - "not broadcast and (not src net 4.5.6 or not dst net 4.5.6)" | ipaudit -CST -r - -l 4.5.6.7 ; ngrep -I /tmp/sandnet.pcap "GET|POST|HEAD|OPTIONS|JOIN" "tcp port 80 and not host 4.5.6.1" | tr -c "[:print:][:blank:]\r\n" "."‘Page 20
Monitoring, cont’d[jac@fltruman001 ~]$ statusServer.exerequest: name=ftp.sickbassline.com, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7responseIP: 4.3.2.86responseIP: 4.3.2.63response: rcode=NOERROR, … …, auth=, add=, aa=1request: name=time.windows.com, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7responseIP: 4.5.6.1response: rcode=NOERROR, ans=…, auth=, add=, aa=1Connection from 4.5.6.7USER 0wn@sickbassline.comPASS smokeweedTYPE APORT 4,5,6,7,4,7STOR User.mpsreading from file /tmp/sandnet.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet)4.5.6.7 4.3.2.86 6 1030 21 674 578 9 9 2009-06-04-11:24:02.2148 2009-06-04-11:24:03.3459 1 14.5.6.7 224.0.0.22 2 0 0 0 108 0 2 2009-06-04-11:24:09.5569 2009-06-04-11:24:10.4709 1 1input: /tmp/sandnet.pcapfilter: (ip) and ( tcp port 80 and not host 4.5.6.1 )match: GET|POST|HEAD|OPTIONS|JOIN##########exitPage 21
Page 22Original Truman Analysis Tools
Page 23The 4 Areas of Analysis
The Report – Tool Output
Page 25Identify the OSSummary report for xxx.xxx-XPSP2-files created at ………OS info>>>kern - Determine OS from a Windows RAM Dump (v.0.1_20060914)Ex: kern <path_to_dump_file>File Description   : NT Kernel & SystemFile Version       : 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)Internal Name      : ntoskrnl.exeOriginal File Name : Product Name       : Microsoft® Windows® Operating SystemProduct Version    : 5.1.2600.2180
Page 26Analyzing Network Traffic – fauxdnsDNS>>>request: name=sslrapidshare.or.tp, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7responseIP: 4.3.2.51responseIP: 4.3.2.154response: rcode=NOERROR, ans=… …, auth=, add=, aa=1request: name=gfmd1.or.tp, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7responseIP: 4.3.2.104responseIP: 4.3.2.240response: rcode=NOERROR, ans=… …, auth=, add=, aa=1request: name=time.windows.com, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7responseIP: 4.5.6.1response: rcode=NOERROR, ans=…, auth=, add=, aa=1
Analyzing Network Traffic – fauxftpConnection from 4.5.6.7USER 0wn@sickbassline.comPASS smokeweedTYPE APORT 4,5,6,7,4,7STOR User.mpsPage 27
Page 28Analyzing Network Traffic – fauxircIRC>>>2009-05-27-16:49:17: Connection from 4.5.6.72009-05-27-16:49:17: PASS lammers2009-05-27-16:49:17: NICK [00|USA|296161]2009-05-27-16:49:18: USER XP-8165 * 0 :ATT2009-05-27-16:49:18: MODE [00|USA|296161] +iB-x2009-05-27-16:49:18: JOIN #WiFi-a Crypt2009-05-27-17:00:13: QUIT System shutting down.2009-05-27-17:00:15: QUIT Leaving
Page 29Analyzing Network Traffic – ipauditIP traffic>>>srcdst  proto sp dp bytes   pkts  start  end  1 / 24.5.6.7 4.3.2.516 1046 80 748 346 5 5 2009-05-27-16:49:17.1300 2009-05-27-16:49:17.1473 1 24.5.6.7 4.3.2.104 6 1047 4242 816 697 10 10 2009-05-27-16:49:17.1613 2009-05-27-17:00:15.5921 1 24.5.6.7 239.255.255.250 17 1050 1900 0 525 0 3 2009-05-27-16:49:17.3746 2009-05-27-16:49:23.3815 1 14.5.6.7 224.0.0.22 2 0 0 0 108 0 2 2009-05-27-17:00:14.2087 2009-05-27-17:00:14.9690 1 1
Page 30Analyzing Network Traffic – tshark===================================================================Protocol Hierarchy StatisticsFilter: frameframe                                    frames:602 bytes:733467  eth                                    frames:602 bytes:733467ip                                   frames:573 bytes:731979tcp                                frames:387 bytes:146779        http                             frames:30 bytes:22708          short                          frames:5 bytes:17790          data-text-lines                frames:3 bytes:644        data                             frames:8 bytes:849udp                                frames:57 bytes:10014nbdgm                            frames:11 bytes:2511smb                            frames:11 bytes:2511mailslot                     frames:11 bytes:2511              browser                    frames:11 bytes:2511nbns                             frames:27 bytes:2538dns                              frames:6 bytes:532        http                             frames:3 bytes:525ntp                              frames:2 bytes:180bootp                            frames:8 bytes:3728      short                              frames:127 bytes:575066igmp                               frames:2 bytes:120arp                                  frames:29 bytes:1488===================================================================
Page 31Analyzing Network Traffic – tcptraceHTTP>>>mod_http: Capturing HTTP traffic (port 80)1 arg remaining, starting with '../small.pcap'Ostermann'stcptrace -- version 6.6.7 -- Thu Nov  4, 200410 packets seen, 10 TCP packets tracedelapsed wallclock time: 0:00:00.002643, 3783 pkts/sec analyzedtrace file elapsed time: 0:00:00.017257Http module output:4.5.6.7:1046 ==> 4.3.2.51:80 (a2b)  Server Syn Time:      Wed May 27 16:49:17.130145 2009 (1243457357.130)  Client Syn Time:      Wed May 27 16:49:17.130085 2009 (1243457357.130)  Server Fin Time:      Wed May 27 16:49:17.146947 2009 (1243457357.147)  Client Fin Time:      Wed May 27 16:49:17.147323 2009 (1243457357.147)GET /here2 HTTP/1.0        Response Code:       404 (Not Found)        Request Length:      66        Reply Length:        468        Content Length:      289        Content Type  :      text/html;        Time request sent:   Wed May 27 16:49:17.130584 2009 (…)        Time reply started:  Wed May 27 16:49:17.146886 2009 (…)        Time reply ACKed:    Wed May 27 16:49:17.147077 2009 (…)        Elapsed time:  16 ms (request to first byte sent)        Elapsed time:  16 ms (request to content ACKed)
Page 32Analyzing Disk Image – AIDE---------------------------------------------------Added files:---------------------------------------------------added: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/avmont.exeadded: /mnt/new/Documents and Settings/All Users/Application Data/TEMP---------------------------------------------------Removed files:---------------------------------------------------removed: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/system32/CatRoot2/tmp.edb---------------------------------------------------Changed files:---------------------------------------------------changed: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/system32/drivers/etc/hostschanged: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/WindowsUpdate.logchanged: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/setupapi.log
Page 33Analyzing Disk Image – ADSAlternate Data Streams>>>/mnt/new/Documents and Settings/All Users/Application Data/TEMP -> 75443743getfattr --absolute-names -n ntfs.streams.list -PR /mnt/new
Page 34Analyzing Disk Image – RegRipperRegistry Run Key changes>>>Registry Service Key changes>>>+AvMont|Monitor de Antivirus|"C:\WINDOWS\avmont.exe"|0x0|Auto Start|-RemoteRegistry|Remote Registry|%SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService|Share_Process|Auto Start|+RemoteRegistry|Remote Registry|%SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService|Share_Process|Disabled|-wscsvc|Security Center|%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs|Share_Process|Auto Start|+wscsvc|Security Center|%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs|Share_Process|Disabled|Firewall changes>>>-EnableFirewall -> 1
Page 35Analyzing Disk Image – hosts file*Host file changes>>>++127.0.0.1      www.symantec.com+127.0.0.1      securityresponse.symantec.com+127.0.0.1      symantec.com+127.0.0.1      www.sophos.com+127.0.0.1      sophos.com+127.0.0.1      www.mcafee.com+127.0.0.1      mcafee.com+127.0.0.1      liveupdate.symantecliveupdate.com+127.0.0.1      www.viruslist.com+127.0.0.1      viruslist.com+127.0.0.1      viruslist.com+127.0.0.1      f-secure.com+127.0.0.1      www.f-secure.com+127.0.0.1      kaspersky.com+127.0.0.1      kaspersky-labs.com+127.0.0.1      www.avp.com+127.0.0.1      www.kaspersky.com+127.0.0.1      avp.com
Memory Image Analysis – VolatilityPage 36
Page 37Analyzing Memory Image – connectionsOpen Ports>>>Local Address             Remote Address            Pid4.5.6.7:1047              4.3.2.104:4242            1484  896    135    6      Wed May 27 20:39:59 2009  1032   1027   17     Wed May 27 20:40:13 2009  1096   1900   17     Wed May 27 20:40:14 2009  1484   1047   6      Wed May 27 20:49:18 2009 < 908                  ->  135   TCP                                 > 896                  ->  135   TCP                                 9,11c9,11< 992                  ->  1032  TCP                                 > 1484  avmont         ->  1047  TCP   C:\WINDOWS\avmont.exe         14,15c14,16< 992                  ->  138   UDP                                 < 908                  ->  445   UDP                                 > 1484  avmont         ->  137   UDP   C:\WINDOWS\avmont.exe         > 0     System         ->  138   UDP                                 > 896                  ->  445   UDP
Page 38Memory/Static Binary Analysis – ssdeepssdeep info>>>1536:RVt4qqO5FjciL3KBupEAbAX/e9SP+IaiOW:eu5tciL3KApRbAz+Ia1W,"abod.exe"768:ruBNNTLa973GMVkIZqqnO5FDvcTsvJesUJDSP+f4/cF1oGoiOWK:YVt4qqO5FjcSe9SP+JaiOW,"/data/forensics/abod.exe-XPSP2-files/0c596000-abod.exe“--------------------------------------------------------------------------------ssdeep info>>>1536:0BlSTT+JwGgVXGsOkCMGVLwaQyafnSI0OYRr:0BYNlVXGsOtPwFtfm,"1b1e067fdb0f2a44a50d9e290022b9ed.exe"1b1e067fdb0f2a44a50d9e290022b9ed.exe matches e933dbd16c9509418a2212c9d62c7976.exe (80)3072:0zhQO2dw847UiImHkwebMPK4wRE4pRThKt/94:09QbViEwEM94TThKt14,"/data/forensics/1b1e067fdb0f2a44a50d9e290022b9ed.exe-XPSP2-files/0ca74000-sandnet.exe"/data/forensics/1b1e067fdb0f2a44a50d9e290022b9ed.exe-XPSP2-files/0ca74000-sandnet.exe matches /data/forensics/e933dbd16c9509418a2212c9d62c7976.exe-XPSP2-files/007bc000-sandnet.exe (96)
Page 39Static Binary Analysis – binhashBinHash info>>>File: [/forensics/exes/abod.exe]        b826d0f222242c1e48f4e1ebe778a534PE Phdr:        af86103672ba3bba2d21f2691465520fPE Opt Hdr:     f8ea55a399eeec409874af01ca0cf01dImport [1] Offset: (f570) Size: (180): 93f613363a9cb87c3a20e3f2e1fc47b7Import [12] Offset: (f000) Size: (608): eafa58275a218a26f92631bf75b10b8f[0] (.text)(VirtualAddress: 00001000) (PtrToData: 00001000) (SizeOfData: 0000e000) Shdr: aaa4cacbb1cc38713961cc2e5931b982Shdr Data: f571948f8203e66d09c87b00ae748c8d[1] (.rdata)(VirtualAddress: 0000f000) (PtrToData: 0000f000) (SizeOfData: 00002000) Shdr: 46aa637bbc2c0335c427f6ca42021df9Shdr Data: 3b10f3f4c6012e87d46686464575926c[2] (.data)(VirtualAddress: 00011000) (PtrToData: 00011000) (SizeOfData: 00003000) Shdr: cff63d398711731f58eee390a6ce8513Shdr Data: 71cc6a0ff1c18b313d21f1f03229738e
Page 40Static Binary Analysis – packerid.pyPacker info>>>[['Armadillo v1.71'], ['Microsoft Visual C++ v5.0/v6.0 (MFC)'], ['Microsoft Visual C++']]
Page 41Static Binary Analysis – Volatility malfind.py*## lsass.exe (Pid: 676)#+ VAD node @821bfb00 Start 00c60000 End 00c6ffff Tag VadS Flags  18+ VAD node @8236b208 Start 00c80000 End 00c96fff Tag VadS Flags  18  - Status: disassembling with pydasm...   0xc80000 call 0x567d   0xc80005 retn 0x8   0xc80008 push ecx   0xc80009 push esi   0xc8000a call 0x1582Found 2 suspicious Vad entries
Page 42Limitations
Page 43Future Work
Page 44More Future Work
Questions?E-mail: jac@att.com or jclausing@isc.sans.org Page 45
SANS Mentor Class – SEC 508 (Forensics)For those of you from central OH (or folks you work with), I’ll be facilitating another mentor class in the fall.Thursday evenings from 6:30-8:30PM in Reynoldsburg, OH running 10 Sep-12 Nov.http://www.sans.org/mentor/details.php?nid=19458Page 46

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Building an Automated Behavioral Malware Analysis Environment using Free and Open-Source Software

  • 1. Building an Automated Malware Behavioral Analysis Environment Using Free and Open-Source ToolsJim Clausing, PMTS, AT&T CSO18 Jun 2009
  • 4. Page 4Jim Clausing, GCIA, GCFA, GREM, GCIH, GCFW, GSIP, GSOC, SSP-MPA, CISSPGCIA (Gold) #64 – 2000GCFA (Gold) #25 – 2002GREM (Gold) #48 – 2005And other certs along the way…SANS Mentor, StaySharp/STAR instructor, CommunitySANS instructor, Internet Storm Center handler since 2002Instrument-rated private pilot – 2003/2004
  • 7. The patches and scriptshttp://handlers.sans.org/jclausing/grem_gold/http://www.giac.org/certified_professionals/practicals/grem/48.phpPage 7
  • 8. The Environment – A Little History
  • 11. Motivation – The Environment
  • 13. Unpacking may lead to surprises – like no results Page 13
  • 14. Page 14We’ve got malware, now what?
  • 15. Truman (well, and Joe Stewart) FTWPage 15
  • 19. Submission[jac@fltruman001 ~]$ for i in 090???-*.piz; do sudo submit.sh $i && mv $i old-malware/; sleep 10; done Archive: 090529-rnd_jpg.piz inflating: rnd.jpg *****Processing rnd.jpg - ONEBOOT******interface: eth1 (4.0.0.0/255.0.0.0)filter: (ip) and ( not port 45612 and not port 45611 and not tcp port 6987 and not udp port 32785 )tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decodelistening on eth1, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 96 bytestcpdump: listening on eth1, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 1514 bytesStarting Faux FTP Server Emulation on port 21Starting Faux MySQL Server Emulation on port 3306Starting Faux SMTP Server Emulation on port 25Starting Faux SMB Server Emulation on port 445Starting Faux IRC Server Emulation on port 6667Starting Faux DNS Server Emulation on port 53Page 19
  • 20. Monitoring[jac@fltruman001 ~]$ alias statusalias status='cat /tmp/current.txt && echo "" && cat /tmp/sandnet*.log | tr -c "[:print:][:blank:]\r\n" "." ; tcpdump -nnr /tmp/sandnet.pcap -w - "not broadcast and (not src net 4.5.6 or not dst net 4.5.6)" | ipaudit -CST -r - -l 4.5.6.7 ; ngrep -I /tmp/sandnet.pcap "GET|POST|HEAD|OPTIONS|JOIN" "tcp port 80 and not host 4.5.6.1" | tr -c "[:print:][:blank:]\r\n" "."‘Page 20
  • 21. Monitoring, cont’d[jac@fltruman001 ~]$ statusServer.exerequest: name=ftp.sickbassline.com, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7responseIP: 4.3.2.86responseIP: 4.3.2.63response: rcode=NOERROR, … …, auth=, add=, aa=1request: name=time.windows.com, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7responseIP: 4.5.6.1response: rcode=NOERROR, ans=…, auth=, add=, aa=1Connection from 4.5.6.7USER 0wn@sickbassline.comPASS smokeweedTYPE APORT 4,5,6,7,4,7STOR User.mpsreading from file /tmp/sandnet.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet)4.5.6.7 4.3.2.86 6 1030 21 674 578 9 9 2009-06-04-11:24:02.2148 2009-06-04-11:24:03.3459 1 14.5.6.7 224.0.0.22 2 0 0 0 108 0 2 2009-06-04-11:24:09.5569 2009-06-04-11:24:10.4709 1 1input: /tmp/sandnet.pcapfilter: (ip) and ( tcp port 80 and not host 4.5.6.1 )match: GET|POST|HEAD|OPTIONS|JOIN##########exitPage 21
  • 22. Page 22Original Truman Analysis Tools
  • 23. Page 23The 4 Areas of Analysis
  • 24. The Report – Tool Output
  • 25. Page 25Identify the OSSummary report for xxx.xxx-XPSP2-files created at ………OS info>>>kern - Determine OS from a Windows RAM Dump (v.0.1_20060914)Ex: kern <path_to_dump_file>File Description : NT Kernel & SystemFile Version : 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)Internal Name : ntoskrnl.exeOriginal File Name : Product Name : Microsoft® Windows® Operating SystemProduct Version : 5.1.2600.2180
  • 26. Page 26Analyzing Network Traffic – fauxdnsDNS>>>request: name=sslrapidshare.or.tp, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7responseIP: 4.3.2.51responseIP: 4.3.2.154response: rcode=NOERROR, ans=… …, auth=, add=, aa=1request: name=gfmd1.or.tp, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7responseIP: 4.3.2.104responseIP: 4.3.2.240response: rcode=NOERROR, ans=… …, auth=, add=, aa=1request: name=time.windows.com, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7responseIP: 4.5.6.1response: rcode=NOERROR, ans=…, auth=, add=, aa=1
  • 27. Analyzing Network Traffic – fauxftpConnection from 4.5.6.7USER 0wn@sickbassline.comPASS smokeweedTYPE APORT 4,5,6,7,4,7STOR User.mpsPage 27
  • 28. Page 28Analyzing Network Traffic – fauxircIRC>>>2009-05-27-16:49:17: Connection from 4.5.6.72009-05-27-16:49:17: PASS lammers2009-05-27-16:49:17: NICK [00|USA|296161]2009-05-27-16:49:18: USER XP-8165 * 0 :ATT2009-05-27-16:49:18: MODE [00|USA|296161] +iB-x2009-05-27-16:49:18: JOIN #WiFi-a Crypt2009-05-27-17:00:13: QUIT System shutting down.2009-05-27-17:00:15: QUIT Leaving
  • 29. Page 29Analyzing Network Traffic – ipauditIP traffic>>>srcdst proto sp dp bytes pkts start end 1 / 24.5.6.7 4.3.2.516 1046 80 748 346 5 5 2009-05-27-16:49:17.1300 2009-05-27-16:49:17.1473 1 24.5.6.7 4.3.2.104 6 1047 4242 816 697 10 10 2009-05-27-16:49:17.1613 2009-05-27-17:00:15.5921 1 24.5.6.7 239.255.255.250 17 1050 1900 0 525 0 3 2009-05-27-16:49:17.3746 2009-05-27-16:49:23.3815 1 14.5.6.7 224.0.0.22 2 0 0 0 108 0 2 2009-05-27-17:00:14.2087 2009-05-27-17:00:14.9690 1 1
  • 30. Page 30Analyzing Network Traffic – tshark===================================================================Protocol Hierarchy StatisticsFilter: frameframe frames:602 bytes:733467 eth frames:602 bytes:733467ip frames:573 bytes:731979tcp frames:387 bytes:146779 http frames:30 bytes:22708 short frames:5 bytes:17790 data-text-lines frames:3 bytes:644 data frames:8 bytes:849udp frames:57 bytes:10014nbdgm frames:11 bytes:2511smb frames:11 bytes:2511mailslot frames:11 bytes:2511 browser frames:11 bytes:2511nbns frames:27 bytes:2538dns frames:6 bytes:532 http frames:3 bytes:525ntp frames:2 bytes:180bootp frames:8 bytes:3728 short frames:127 bytes:575066igmp frames:2 bytes:120arp frames:29 bytes:1488===================================================================
  • 31. Page 31Analyzing Network Traffic – tcptraceHTTP>>>mod_http: Capturing HTTP traffic (port 80)1 arg remaining, starting with '../small.pcap'Ostermann'stcptrace -- version 6.6.7 -- Thu Nov 4, 200410 packets seen, 10 TCP packets tracedelapsed wallclock time: 0:00:00.002643, 3783 pkts/sec analyzedtrace file elapsed time: 0:00:00.017257Http module output:4.5.6.7:1046 ==> 4.3.2.51:80 (a2b) Server Syn Time: Wed May 27 16:49:17.130145 2009 (1243457357.130) Client Syn Time: Wed May 27 16:49:17.130085 2009 (1243457357.130) Server Fin Time: Wed May 27 16:49:17.146947 2009 (1243457357.147) Client Fin Time: Wed May 27 16:49:17.147323 2009 (1243457357.147)GET /here2 HTTP/1.0 Response Code: 404 (Not Found) Request Length: 66 Reply Length: 468 Content Length: 289 Content Type : text/html; Time request sent: Wed May 27 16:49:17.130584 2009 (…) Time reply started: Wed May 27 16:49:17.146886 2009 (…) Time reply ACKed: Wed May 27 16:49:17.147077 2009 (…) Elapsed time: 16 ms (request to first byte sent) Elapsed time: 16 ms (request to content ACKed)
  • 32. Page 32Analyzing Disk Image – AIDE---------------------------------------------------Added files:---------------------------------------------------added: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/avmont.exeadded: /mnt/new/Documents and Settings/All Users/Application Data/TEMP---------------------------------------------------Removed files:---------------------------------------------------removed: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/system32/CatRoot2/tmp.edb---------------------------------------------------Changed files:---------------------------------------------------changed: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/system32/drivers/etc/hostschanged: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/WindowsUpdate.logchanged: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/setupapi.log
  • 33. Page 33Analyzing Disk Image – ADSAlternate Data Streams>>>/mnt/new/Documents and Settings/All Users/Application Data/TEMP -> 75443743getfattr --absolute-names -n ntfs.streams.list -PR /mnt/new
  • 34. Page 34Analyzing Disk Image – RegRipperRegistry Run Key changes>>>Registry Service Key changes>>>+AvMont|Monitor de Antivirus|"C:\WINDOWS\avmont.exe"|0x0|Auto Start|-RemoteRegistry|Remote Registry|%SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService|Share_Process|Auto Start|+RemoteRegistry|Remote Registry|%SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService|Share_Process|Disabled|-wscsvc|Security Center|%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs|Share_Process|Auto Start|+wscsvc|Security Center|%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs|Share_Process|Disabled|Firewall changes>>>-EnableFirewall -> 1
  • 35. Page 35Analyzing Disk Image – hosts file*Host file changes>>>++127.0.0.1 www.symantec.com+127.0.0.1 securityresponse.symantec.com+127.0.0.1 symantec.com+127.0.0.1 www.sophos.com+127.0.0.1 sophos.com+127.0.0.1 www.mcafee.com+127.0.0.1 mcafee.com+127.0.0.1 liveupdate.symantecliveupdate.com+127.0.0.1 www.viruslist.com+127.0.0.1 viruslist.com+127.0.0.1 viruslist.com+127.0.0.1 f-secure.com+127.0.0.1 www.f-secure.com+127.0.0.1 kaspersky.com+127.0.0.1 kaspersky-labs.com+127.0.0.1 www.avp.com+127.0.0.1 www.kaspersky.com+127.0.0.1 avp.com
  • 36. Memory Image Analysis – VolatilityPage 36
  • 37. Page 37Analyzing Memory Image – connectionsOpen Ports>>>Local Address Remote Address Pid4.5.6.7:1047 4.3.2.104:4242 1484 896 135 6 Wed May 27 20:39:59 2009 1032 1027 17 Wed May 27 20:40:13 2009 1096 1900 17 Wed May 27 20:40:14 2009 1484 1047 6 Wed May 27 20:49:18 2009 < 908 -> 135 TCP > 896 -> 135 TCP 9,11c9,11< 992 -> 1032 TCP > 1484 avmont -> 1047 TCP C:\WINDOWS\avmont.exe 14,15c14,16< 992 -> 138 UDP < 908 -> 445 UDP > 1484 avmont -> 137 UDP C:\WINDOWS\avmont.exe > 0 System -> 138 UDP > 896 -> 445 UDP
  • 38. Page 38Memory/Static Binary Analysis – ssdeepssdeep info>>>1536:RVt4qqO5FjciL3KBupEAbAX/e9SP+IaiOW:eu5tciL3KApRbAz+Ia1W,"abod.exe"768:ruBNNTLa973GMVkIZqqnO5FDvcTsvJesUJDSP+f4/cF1oGoiOWK:YVt4qqO5FjcSe9SP+JaiOW,"/data/forensics/abod.exe-XPSP2-files/0c596000-abod.exe“--------------------------------------------------------------------------------ssdeep info>>>1536:0BlSTT+JwGgVXGsOkCMGVLwaQyafnSI0OYRr:0BYNlVXGsOtPwFtfm,"1b1e067fdb0f2a44a50d9e290022b9ed.exe"1b1e067fdb0f2a44a50d9e290022b9ed.exe matches e933dbd16c9509418a2212c9d62c7976.exe (80)3072:0zhQO2dw847UiImHkwebMPK4wRE4pRThKt/94:09QbViEwEM94TThKt14,"/data/forensics/1b1e067fdb0f2a44a50d9e290022b9ed.exe-XPSP2-files/0ca74000-sandnet.exe"/data/forensics/1b1e067fdb0f2a44a50d9e290022b9ed.exe-XPSP2-files/0ca74000-sandnet.exe matches /data/forensics/e933dbd16c9509418a2212c9d62c7976.exe-XPSP2-files/007bc000-sandnet.exe (96)
  • 39. Page 39Static Binary Analysis – binhashBinHash info>>>File: [/forensics/exes/abod.exe] b826d0f222242c1e48f4e1ebe778a534PE Phdr: af86103672ba3bba2d21f2691465520fPE Opt Hdr: f8ea55a399eeec409874af01ca0cf01dImport [1] Offset: (f570) Size: (180): 93f613363a9cb87c3a20e3f2e1fc47b7Import [12] Offset: (f000) Size: (608): eafa58275a218a26f92631bf75b10b8f[0] (.text)(VirtualAddress: 00001000) (PtrToData: 00001000) (SizeOfData: 0000e000) Shdr: aaa4cacbb1cc38713961cc2e5931b982Shdr Data: f571948f8203e66d09c87b00ae748c8d[1] (.rdata)(VirtualAddress: 0000f000) (PtrToData: 0000f000) (SizeOfData: 00002000) Shdr: 46aa637bbc2c0335c427f6ca42021df9Shdr Data: 3b10f3f4c6012e87d46686464575926c[2] (.data)(VirtualAddress: 00011000) (PtrToData: 00011000) (SizeOfData: 00003000) Shdr: cff63d398711731f58eee390a6ce8513Shdr Data: 71cc6a0ff1c18b313d21f1f03229738e
  • 40. Page 40Static Binary Analysis – packerid.pyPacker info>>>[['Armadillo v1.71'], ['Microsoft Visual C++ v5.0/v6.0 (MFC)'], ['Microsoft Visual C++']]
  • 41. Page 41Static Binary Analysis – Volatility malfind.py*## lsass.exe (Pid: 676)#+ VAD node @821bfb00 Start 00c60000 End 00c6ffff Tag VadS Flags 18+ VAD node @8236b208 Start 00c80000 End 00c96fff Tag VadS Flags 18 - Status: disassembling with pydasm... 0xc80000 call 0x567d 0xc80005 retn 0x8 0xc80008 push ecx 0xc80009 push esi 0xc8000a call 0x1582Found 2 suspicious Vad entries
  • 45. Questions?E-mail: jac@att.com or jclausing@isc.sans.org Page 45
  • 46. SANS Mentor Class – SEC 508 (Forensics)For those of you from central OH (or folks you work with), I’ll be facilitating another mentor class in the fall.Thursday evenings from 6:30-8:30PM in Reynoldsburg, OH running 10 Sep-12 Nov.http://www.sans.org/mentor/details.php?nid=19458Page 46