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alluring heian courtesan

@eightyonekilograms / eightyonekilograms.tumblr.com

omnia conspiratio indoctis

I do not understand Wisconsin voters. Good for them for not electing another trump judge, but where was this energy back in November? You'd think fewer people would give a shit during off years, not more (proportionally; I know turnout is lower, I'm just saying I'm surprised conservatives didn't show up in droves considering how much money trump and musk have sunk into this cycle).

The effect of Musk associating himself with the Supreme Court race in Wisconsin was to cost the Republican candidate 5% of the vote. As in, other GOP candidates in Wisconsin are doing 5% better tonight, because Elon Musk is absolutely radioactive.

The GOP won last year because of the inflation-driven anti-incumbent wave that took down every government that was in power during the pandemic.* Musk's money just bring's Musk's stench.

*Canada soon to be an exception for hilarious reasons, although it did require the Prime Minister stepping aside.

All of this is true, but there is also a theory that these days special elections structurally favor Democrats: the median voter is deeply unengaged and only tunes in for the big races, while the kind of high-neurosis (said with affection!) highly-engaged politics junkie who knows about and turns out for these things is way more likely to be a Democrat now.

It's great that Wisconsin was won, but I'm not sure I want to get too optimistic about what these one-offs mean for the Dems' chances in "real" races.

I read Annihilation recently, and while I concede that it was well-written in terms of prose style and pacing, it left me with little desire to continue the series. A puzzle-box novel should leave you feeling you understand at least a little bit of the puzzle by the end.

I suppose as the resident Annihilation fanboy around here, it's my job to respond. I like it mostly as

a) a moody, atmospheric tone poem, in the same way I play Metroid Prime for the setting and soundtrack and not the plot,

b) one of the better attempts from recent-ish fiction to do Lovecraft (or even pre-Lovecraft) cosmic gothic horror, and

c) a character study of the Biologist, who remains either my favorite or second-favorite schizoid character in fiction, possibly after Stevens in Remains of the Day

But if none of those sound resonant, it's probably not the book for you. It certainly does not explain or really even hint at what's going on. The third (and now fourth) books do, but if you didn't like the first one I doubt you'll get much more out of going that far.

(ok fine and d) just slightly kinking on all the mind control despite the text's determined refusal to do so)

OK I actually do have one other thing to say. This is definitely hyperspecific to me, and it's a very tangential focus of the book, but I found Annihilation's depiction of romance and marriage pretty moving, which doesn't happen to me with many novels.

(some minor spoilers below the cut)

I read Annihilation recently, and while I concede that it was well-written in terms of prose style and pacing, it left me with little desire to continue the series. A puzzle-box novel should leave you feeling you understand at least a little bit of the puzzle by the end.

I suppose as the resident Annihilation fanboy around here, it's my job to respond. I like it mostly as

a) a moody, atmospheric tone poem, in the same way I play Metroid Prime for the setting and soundtrack and not the plot,

b) one of the better attempts from recent-ish fiction to do Lovecraft (or even pre-Lovecraft) cosmic gothic horror, and

c) a character study of the Biologist, who remains either my favorite or second-favorite schizoid character in fiction, possibly after Stevens in Remains of the Day

But if none of those sound resonant, it's probably not the book for you. It certainly does not explain or really even hint at what's going on. The third (and now fourth) books do, but if you didn't like the first one I doubt you'll get much more out of going that far.

(ok fine and d) just slightly kinking on all the mind control despite the text's determined refusal to do so)

I read Annihilation recently, and while I concede that it was well-written in terms of prose style and pacing, it left me with little desire to continue the series. A puzzle-box novel should leave you feeling you understand at least a little bit of the puzzle by the end.

I suppose as the resident Annihilation fanboy around here, it's my job to respond. I like it mostly as

a) a moody, atmospheric tone poem, in the same way I play Metroid Prime for the setting and soundtrack and not the plot,

b) one of the better attempts from recent-ish fiction to do Lovecraft (or even pre-Lovecraft) cosmic gothic horror, and

c) a character study of the Biologist, who remains either my favorite or second-favorite schizoid character in fiction, possibly after Stevens in Remains of the Day

But if none of those sound resonant, it's probably not the book for you. It certainly does not explain or really even hint at what's going on. The third (and now fourth) books do, but if you didn't like the first one I doubt you'll get much more out of going that far.

Anonymous asked:

You could do possibly anything else with your time, as reading longform journalism is possibly the most useless activity there is.

So, mutatis mutandis for a minimum baseline of staying informed as to what's going on in the world, I don't actually disagree with this. If I'm being honest, I have a bit of a problematic addiction with doomerist longform writing (in the same way people get addicted to doomscrolling Twitter). It's why I had to block Substack at the DNS level from all my devices: most of the times that I was depressed in the last 18 months, and it wasn't the fault of Seattle's weather, it was because I ended up in an S-hole and kept reading articles, often from people I profoundly loathe like Walt Bismarck.

American Affairs is essentially the nicotine patch keeping me off Substack. It's a good-enough hit, and since it's only quarterly instead of a literally bottomless well of content, it limits the damage.

In a broader sense, I think I've done a decent job— maybe a B grade— at cutting down ingestion of insight porn in the last 12 months. The next problems to solve, though, are that a) I haven't really replaced it with anything yet and b) I am, depressingly, not joking when I say that among the reasons I'm posting less is that I have less to say without the insight porn for easy things to make commentary about. But I'm working on it.

Criticizing the logic of the Navy endlessly waiting for Godot in terms of frigate design without ever examining the even more lopsided logic of how the Navy is supposed to use that frigate is self-defeating. Currently, the idea is that the Navy will use said frigate to fight a war on the other side of the Pacific, against an industrially superior power, while lacking the capacity to sustain logistics, replace casualties, or repair combat damage. No serious American military planner from the mid-twentieth century (back when the United States enjoyed a massive industrial advantage compared to the rest of the world) would consider this to be a coherent or practical goal to begin with. Let us thus put the real nature of the issue at stake in the most blunt terms possible: the Navy is being asked to maintain the dream of the American empire. Lacking a political class willing to seriously acknowledge or address the very real crisis this empire now faces, the burden of that political crisis is being shifted onto the shoulders of admirals and generals who were never intended to take on that role in the first place, nor do they have the capability to do so. Yet even so, by promising some unspecified, undefinable capability at some hazy point in the future, the Navy is, in its own peculiar way, doing the best job it can with the hand it has been dealt. This job cannot be done by delivering a handful of unremarkable Italian frigates, frigates the Navy cannot realistically repair in wartime nor fully crew in peacetime in any case. The Navy is not just building ships; it is trying to shield an increasingly fragile American leadership class from reality, and like the other services, it is paying a ruinous cost to do so.

Once you deliver some frigates it can be clear that frigates are shit but you can do so much with having everyone imagine a frigate, an imaginary frigate could do anything!

The underling issue that Navy leadership has to deal with is that the main scenario the Navy is supposed to prepare for—a kinetic war against China—is actually completely nonsensical, or at least it would have appeared as such to mid-twentieth century military planners. The Pentagon itself estimates that China’s shipbuliding capacity today is roughly 230 times greater than America’s. Many Japanese elites, most notably Admiral Yamamoto himself, were extremely skeptical of the idea that any sort of combination of tactics and strategy could make up for the gulf in industrial potential between Imperial Japan and America, and yet that advantage was an order of magnitude less than the advantage enjoyed by China today; it was far closer to ten to one than a hundred to one. To add insult to injury, one of the central themes of the ultimately disastrous Japanese doctrine of Kantai Kessen—decisive naval battle doctrine—was to leverage the vast size of the Pacific Ocean itself to partially make up for the difference in industrial capacity. The (ultimately vain) Japanese hope was that America would have to stretch its supply lines to the point where the Imperial Japanese Navy could still hope to engage in set piece battles under locally favorable conditions. The Japanese imagined themselves using the tyranny of distance to draw America into one or several confrontations in the mold of the battle of Tsushima, after which the American public or its military planners would hopefully conclude that a protracted war in the Pacific simply wasn’t worth it, resulting in a negotiated settlement where both sides recognized the other’s sphere of influence. The disastrous failure of many of the assumptions underpinning this doctrine would end up dooming the Japanese Empire, but at least the Japanese doctrine made some measure of basic sense. No Japanese planner, no matter how optimistic they were about Japan’s chances, even considered for a second the idea that a war with America was somehow going to be winnable if it had to be fought off the Californian coast.

Wait, hold up, this logic is pretty sus. Not awful, but not the whole picture. Three big points: A: Warfare today ain't like warfare in WW2. In 1942 the US had to mount up a task force with specially-prepared refueling ships to send out two aircraft carriers on two weeks sailing into the middle of nowhere below just to pretend to bomb Japan:

Meanwhile today currently deployed missiles on Okinawa can strike half of the Asian continent in hours:

The "tempo" of a naval military operations is just radically different now. Japan in WW2 could never hope to, post "decisive battle", strike a single one of the major US naval shipyards to disable production. All they could do was win defensive battles. Meanwhile, if the US were to fight an opening battle against China that was so decisive as to give the US uncontested naval and air supremacy (big if, just roll with me), the air and naval assets on hand could strike every single Chinese port with a wave of missiles and bombers instantly. Now, you can debate how well that will work and how likely that will be, not doing that here - the point is just that Decisive Battle Doctrine is now eminently reasonable in a way that it was never for Japan. The plan is coherent.

B: The United States would not, in any way, be fighting on "China's shores offensively from California". It would be fighting on Taiwan & Japan's shores defensively:

The US has never been planning a solo offensive against China, it is serving as part of a defensive alliance with regional partners out of an extant network of heavily developed bases and strike positions. Refueling and logistics will be based out of Taiwan, Okinawa, Luzon, and Kyushu. This is a logistical tie in a lot of ways, China is obviously "closer" than the US but not as close as Taiwan, the actual battleground! Generally the goal is for the Philippines & South Korea to join as well - more speculative, sure, but not unreasonably so (well, pre-Trump, but that is an own-goal)

C: There is a pretty common illusion about the US shipbuilding in WW2, namely that before the war the US must have been a massive player in commercial shipping? But it was not - US shipbuilding completely failed to keep up with the post-Civil War revolutions in steam shipping, and while due to cabotage laws (Jones Act!! *shakes fist*) we had a large freshwater shipping merchant marine, only 8% of US international trade pre-WW1 was carried on domestically-made ships. A state which didn't really reverse itself after WW1 - most amazingly, "between 1922 and 1928 not a single oceangoing ship was built in the US"!

What actually happened in WW2 is that - with some prep in the late 1930's - the US engaged in a crash course re-industrialization where ship tonnage output increased thousands-fold in a few years. There was not a previous base gigantic shipping industry to pivot (though mothballed WW1 shipyards certainly helped), one was built from scratch. For a tangent, this actually is load-bearing for how stupid Japan was! Ludicrously stupid, yes, but ehh maybe 5% less than you thought - they saw a US in the 1930's that did not output any ships in quantity, and thought maybe WW1 wouldn't repeat itself.

All of this is to say that current civilian shipbuilding capacity is not that indicative of future military shipbuilding capacity. And this makes sense, as the vast majority of civilian ships add no value to a military conflict! All of that has to be retooled. Are ships even going to be the production constraint? Can China make enough missiles to arm the ships its shipyards could put out? Armor plating? Radar systems? Fuel? Can the US, for good measure? To be clear I totally bet China will have the advantage here - just that the headline "230:1" numbers are pretty meaningless. That is fake info.

(There is a quantity vs quality debate here in modern military circles - could you just output 10,000 motorboats with machine guns piloted by raspberry pi's and overwhelm a Ticonderoga-class cruiser? We may learn someday, but there are many who think not - all of those 10,000 motorboats will be shot to scrap by precision-targeted long range munitions. This was the equivalent US experience in Gulf War 1, which has been instrumental to US doctrine - Iraq had one of the largest armoured forces in the world, and all those tanks meant nothing in the face of modern air superiority.)

C.5: Finally, just to tie things back to point B - the plan isn't to fight a solo offensive war. It is to fight an allied defensive war. With South Korea and Japan. Which, well:

Each country has its own strengths and specializations, with China dominating at around 45% of the shipbuilding market. South Korea and Japan follow closely, making up 93% of global shipbuilding output.

Oh hey look at that - South Korea & Japan outproduce China. Other numbers say China does by the way, you can measure things differently. But I think you get the point.

Anyway, shockingly, US military planners are not a bunch of fucking dumb dumbs? Congress is, but when DoD sits down to plan out a military op they think through the basics. No one is saying China's manufacturing dominance isn't a huge issue, DoD has been saying that very loudly for decades. But they aren't planning a Pickett's Charge in response - or at least not one as obviously so as the above outlines.

That single quote probably wasn't the best to include, a lot of of your points are right and I think the better points of the article were toward the end about the Potemkin readiness for the sake of impressing Congress. But I don't think the point about industrial capacity before and during WWII holds a lot of water: in the event of a shooting war over Taiwan, assuming it happens within the next 30 years, China is also going to undergo a WWII-style crash industrial scale-up, and they'll be doing it from a much bigger baseline, both in industrial capacity and population able to be mobilized to work there. If we assume a "total war" footing on both sides of the Pacific, I don't think it's unreasonable to assume the 230:1 ratio will approximately hold start-to-finish. I don't think going "well what if they can't make missiles" significantly dents this analysis, nor do I think the presence of South Korea and Japan significantly change this calculus: they don't have nearly as much headroom as China does.

EDIT: I think I also dispute the point about deployed missiles in Okinawa. This reminds me too much of the point Bret Deveraux always makes about the somehow-inexhaustible faith from both military and civilian leadership in the ability of strategic air power to win wars, despite its ongoing inability to do so, especially when the projections say we would run out of missiles basically immediately. I am not a military planner, but those hypothetical missile strikes look to me to be not all that different from Pearl Harbor: a momentary setback which the target dusts off, re-arms, and proceeds like nothing happened.

But I might be doing too much armchair generaling way outside my area of expertise now and so I'm not sure I'll keep going.

(To be clear about my tags re: American Affairs, they do have some real scumbags on their staff and if you go reading through the whole archive you will find plenty of despicable opinions. But I've mostly given up on finding any periodical which is straightforwardly always good, and so I have to settle for one with a high-enough density of engaging and accurate longform writing)

Criticizing the logic of the Navy endlessly waiting for Godot in terms of frigate design without ever examining the even more lopsided logic of how the Navy is supposed to use that frigate is self-defeating. Currently, the idea is that the Navy will use said frigate to fight a war on the other side of the Pacific, against an industrially superior power, while lacking the capacity to sustain logistics, replace casualties, or repair combat damage. No serious American military planner from the mid-twentieth century (back when the United States enjoyed a massive industrial advantage compared to the rest of the world) would consider this to be a coherent or practical goal to begin with. Let us thus put the real nature of the issue at stake in the most blunt terms possible: the Navy is being asked to maintain the dream of the American empire. Lacking a political class willing to seriously acknowledge or address the very real crisis this empire now faces, the burden of that political crisis is being shifted onto the shoulders of admirals and generals who were never intended to take on that role in the first place, nor do they have the capability to do so. Yet even so, by promising some unspecified, undefinable capability at some hazy point in the future, the Navy is, in its own peculiar way, doing the best job it can with the hand it has been dealt. This job cannot be done by delivering a handful of unremarkable Italian frigates, frigates the Navy cannot realistically repair in wartime nor fully crew in peacetime in any case. The Navy is not just building ships; it is trying to shield an increasingly fragile American leadership class from reality, and like the other services, it is paying a ruinous cost to do so.

Once you deliver some frigates it can be clear that frigates are shit but you can do so much with having everyone imagine a frigate, an imaginary frigate could do anything!

The underling issue that Navy leadership has to deal with is that the main scenario the Navy is supposed to prepare for—a kinetic war against China—is actually completely nonsensical, or at least it would have appeared as such to mid-twentieth century military planners. The Pentagon itself estimates that China’s shipbuliding capacity today is roughly 230 times greater than America’s. Many Japanese elites, most notably Admiral Yamamoto himself, were extremely skeptical of the idea that any sort of combination of tactics and strategy could make up for the gulf in industrial potential between Imperial Japan and America, and yet that advantage was an order of magnitude less than the advantage enjoyed by China today; it was far closer to ten to one than a hundred to one. To add insult to injury, one of the central themes of the ultimately disastrous Japanese doctrine of Kantai Kessen—decisive naval battle doctrine—was to leverage the vast size of the Pacific Ocean itself to partially make up for the difference in industrial capacity. The (ultimately vain) Japanese hope was that America would have to stretch its supply lines to the point where the Imperial Japanese Navy could still hope to engage in set piece battles under locally favorable conditions. The Japanese imagined themselves using the tyranny of distance to draw America into one or several confrontations in the mold of the battle of Tsushima, after which the American public or its military planners would hopefully conclude that a protracted war in the Pacific simply wasn’t worth it, resulting in a negotiated settlement where both sides recognized the other’s sphere of influence. The disastrous failure of many of the assumptions underpinning this doctrine would end up dooming the Japanese Empire, but at least the Japanese doctrine made some measure of basic sense. No Japanese planner, no matter how optimistic they were about Japan’s chances, even considered for a second the idea that a war with America was somehow going to be winnable if it had to be fought off the Californian coast.

Don't get why they didn't just recycle the boops. Everyone liked them, they were straightforward, it was apparently not hard to reset the counter etc

McRib effect

I wanted to read more about the economics of that but

???

that's not...wait were people actually saying that?

The stock market is some sense a cross between those apocalyptic witch doctors who perform rituals to calm the animal spirits in an electric clock and those scientists in fantasy books trying to mathematically explain away magic as swamp gas.

Not a majority but enough

lol, I had never heard of this. When I said "McRib effect", I just meant the artificial scarcity of having a product be only intermittently available makes it more desirable and that's what I assume Tumblr is doing with the boops.

Back in the 2000s when conspiracy theories were still fun, instead of depressing signs of our impending doom, people said the intermittent McRib was McDonalds manipulating pork futures, which I find a lot more fun than whatever Investopedia is talking about here.

Ever since the 08 crisis (and probably before) there's been recurring "Universities in crisis" pieces about how American higher education institutions appeared to be heading towards nonviability and it happened over a long enough time that we all could go "Nothing Ever Happens" and be maybe a bit worried but only a bit.

I have been on this beat for a long time and continue to be on it, but I will admit this is the first time Something Actually Has Happened, there is nothing even remotely comparable in previous administrations. I think they will weather it fine because "the uni system" simply works and can't be easily replaced. But for once someone is actually trying to prove the negative case.

The more rigorous analyses of this problem were the ones which noted the “demographic cliff”, i.e. that American TFR fell off a cliff during the financial crisis and never recovered, and so the real crunch for universities would begin at “GFC + 18 years”, which is pretty much exactly where we are.

That the cliff also lines up with all the Trump shit is an unexpected bit of even worse news, but it’s not a “this time is different” situation: people really were saying as far back as (I think) 2015 that 2025-2030 would be when higher education began to implode.

That is an argument but I think a mislabeled one! Ofc it is all about your intended meaning of a "crisis in higher ed". If you mean "the lowest ranking private schools will churn out as net students slowly decline" then sure, that had been going on for decades and it will continue.

But who cares? That isn't what people mean on average by the "death of higher ed" imo - they mean the figurative death of *top* schools as arbiters of success and class. They mean students will stop caring so much about Harvard apps, Goldman & Google won't distinguish between MIT & CalTech, the rich will stop donating $200 million pots to name buildings after them. And even all that chained down in scale to good-but-not-Ivy schools. The demographic shift is not going to materially affect the top 50% of schools in the US in any notable way.

I was more responding to @collapsedsquid than you: the implication I took from the first post was "people kept saying there was a crisis, but it's only now that Something is Happening, so the earlier predictions were bunk and are just a case of a stopped clock being right twice a day", and my reply was "some people were making amorphous and unfalsifiable predictions of eternal crisis, but others made pretty concrete predictions about what would break and when, and those so far look pretty accurate". I could be doing a sharpshooter fallacy here, but I really have seen the demographic cliff projections for quite a while.

But I do disagree with your opinion that the demographic shift isn't going to affect the upper half of schools. Like I said, I think it will wipe out much of the job market for tenured academics, which might be the last blow to the already-shaky PhD pipeline. AIUI even at elite universities undergraduate enrollment is collapsing for a bunch of liberal arts disciplines; if people see no future in those fields, they will stay away even harder and eventually even at the elite schools these programs and departments will close for lack of use.

If someone hasn’t already, one of these days we’ll have to do a poll-based tournament for all the various kink metas that Tumblr has cycled through in the last couple years to find the best one.

I was a particular fan of the mech pilots myself, the current maid/princess thing doesn’t do much for me.

Ever since the 08 crisis (and probably before) there's been recurring "Universities in crisis" pieces about how American higher education institutions appeared to be heading towards nonviability and it happened over a long enough time that we all could go "Nothing Ever Happens" and be maybe a bit worried but only a bit.

I have been on this beat for a long time and continue to be on it, but I will admit this is the first time Something Actually Has Happened, there is nothing even remotely comparable in previous administrations. I think they will weather it fine because "the uni system" simply works and can't be easily replaced. But for once someone is actually trying to prove the negative case.

The more rigorous analyses of this problem were the ones which noted the “demographic cliff”, i.e. that American TFR fell off a cliff during the financial crisis and never recovered, and so the real crunch for universities would begin at “GFC + 18 years”, which is pretty much exactly where we are.

That the cliff also lines up with all the Trump shit is an unexpected bit of even worse news, but it’s not a “this time is different” situation: people really were saying as far back as (I think) 2015 that 2025-2030 would be when higher education would begin to implode.

And yet we still have those people complaining that a 1500+ SAT score isn't enough to get them into their top university, still too competitive. Even as the kids are apparently all becoming illiterate too which is not something I think they factored in then.

Elite universities were never going to have a problem with demographic change, they'll always get more applicants than they need. Associate degree programs and community colleges will probably be fine too. But it will wallop state schools and small liberal arts colleges, which means even fewer tenure-track positions, which in turn makes the entire traditional academic pipeline even less viable.

Ever since the 08 crisis (and probably before) there's been recurring "Universities in crisis" pieces about how American higher education institutions appeared to be heading towards nonviability and it happened over a long enough time that we all could go "Nothing Ever Happens" and be maybe a bit worried but only a bit.

I have been on this beat for a long time and continue to be on it, but I will admit this is the first time Something Actually Has Happened, there is nothing even remotely comparable in previous administrations. I think they will weather it fine because "the uni system" simply works and can't be easily replaced. But for once someone is actually trying to prove the negative case.

The more rigorous analyses of this problem were the ones which noted the “demographic cliff”, i.e. that American TFR fell off a cliff during the financial crisis and never recovered, and so the real crunch for universities would begin at “GFC + 18 years”, which is pretty much exactly where we are.

That the cliff also lines up with all the Trump shit is an unexpected bit of even worse news, but it’s not a “this time is different” situation: people really were saying as far back as (I think) 2015 that 2025-2030 would be when higher education began to implode.

this random substack guy is making a compelling case that i should watch The X-Files:

It’s all about the Mulder-Scully love story, which is one of the most compelling I’ve ever seen in any medium. Their relationship is an n-dimensional object that combines all of the following sorts of relationship: two loyal platonic friends who thought about fucking at one time; two loyal platonic friends who never fucked and never considered it; two loyal platonic friends who fucked exactly once; two people who have just met and are succumbing to strong mutual attraction; siblings; wary but loving exes; work spouses; songwriting partners; two people currently united by the strongest romantic love imaginable.

chat is it that good. is such a thing mathematically possible.

also, bonus: i’m kind of in love with this guy’s footnoted description of Ronald Reagan vs Carter lmao

Reagan was apparently an effective lifeguard, but Carter’s the one who actually served in the military. As a backer-up, Reagan would sell you out the first time the winds in the fantasy universe he always lived in shifted just a bit. Whereas Carter would back you up and then, if you lost, he’d have a multi-day crisis of conscience about it. He’d invite the Dalai Lama, Zbigniew Brzenski, Harry Chapin, and Big Bird to come help you figure out why you lost. That’s still a better wingman, though not a much better wingman. Carter was an incompetent manager of reality, but reality was still where he lived. Not Reagan!

It is good, although it does have the TNG problem where people gushing about it tend to remember the really good episodes, and forget how many marginal or outright bad MOTW ones there were also. I don't know how much you can skip and still get the meat of the Mulder/Scully relationship, but maybe use IMDB to drop, like, the bottom quintile.

A while back I made fun of Japanese* for its measure words (the fact that you need to memorize dozens of different counting systems for different classes of nouns), although English does have the same thing to an extent. Consider the case when there are three units of 8.5x11 paper on the table: you have to say "three sheets of paper" or "three pieces of paper". Pretty much any other measure word sounds deranged, and you can't leave out the measure word and say "three papers", because then it sounds like you might be talking about three research papers, three theses, etc. Arguably Japanese just applies this concept to a much larger subset of its nouns.

* Chinese and Korean do this as well AIUI

"Reverend Lua of the Universal Life Church" is such a badass-sounding title for the rather-more-mundane reality of "i spent ~3 minutes filling out an online form so i could legally marry my friends"

I think I’ve mentioned this on Tumblr before, but my university lets me set my name and title to anything I want on the personnel portal, and whatever I put is what they use for all official communication. So a couple times a year I get letters to “Admiral 81k” asking for donations.

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