Wait, hold up, this logic is pretty sus. Not awful, but not the whole picture. Three big points:
A: Warfare today ain't like warfare in WW2. In 1942 the US had to mount up a task force with specially-prepared refueling ships to send out two aircraft carriers on two weeks sailing into the middle of nowhere below just to pretend to bomb Japan:
Meanwhile today currently deployed missiles on Okinawa can strike half of the Asian continent in hours:
The "tempo" of a naval military operations is just radically different now. Japan in WW2 could never hope to, post "decisive battle", strike a single one of the major US naval shipyards to disable production. All they could do was win defensive battles. Meanwhile, if the US were to fight an opening battle against China that was so decisive as to give the US uncontested naval and air supremacy (big if, just roll with me), the air and naval assets on hand could strike every single Chinese port with a wave of missiles and bombers instantly. Now, you can debate how well that will work and how likely that will be, not doing that here - the point is just that Decisive Battle Doctrine is now eminently reasonable in a way that it was never for Japan. The plan is coherent.
B: The United States would not, in any way, be fighting on "China's shores offensively from California". It would be fighting on Taiwan & Japan's shores defensively:
The US has never been planning a solo offensive against China, it is serving as part of a defensive alliance with regional partners out of an extant network of heavily developed bases and strike positions. Refueling and logistics will be based out of Taiwan, Okinawa, Luzon, and Kyushu. This is a logistical tie in a lot of ways, China is obviously "closer" than the US but not as close as Taiwan, the actual battleground! Generally the goal is for the Philippines & South Korea to join as well - more speculative, sure, but not unreasonably so (well, pre-Trump, but that is an own-goal)
C: There is a pretty common illusion about the US shipbuilding in WW2, namely that before the war the US must have been a massive player in commercial shipping? But it was not - US shipbuilding completely failed to keep up with the post-Civil War revolutions in steam shipping, and while due to cabotage laws (Jones Act!! *shakes fist*) we had a large freshwater shipping merchant marine, only 8% of US international trade pre-WW1 was carried on domestically-made ships. A state which didn't really reverse itself after WW1 - most amazingly, "between 1922 and 1928 not a single oceangoing ship was built in the US"!
What actually happened in WW2 is that - with some prep in the late 1930's - the US engaged in a crash course re-industrialization where ship tonnage output increased thousands-fold in a few years. There was not a previous base gigantic shipping industry to pivot (though mothballed WW1 shipyards certainly helped), one was built from scratch. For a tangent, this actually is load-bearing for how stupid Japan was! Ludicrously stupid, yes, but ehh maybe 5% less than you thought - they saw a US in the 1930's that did not output any ships in quantity, and thought maybe WW1 wouldn't repeat itself.
All of this is to say that current civilian shipbuilding capacity is not that indicative of future military shipbuilding capacity. And this makes sense, as the vast majority of civilian ships add no value to a military conflict! All of that has to be retooled. Are ships even going to be the production constraint? Can China make enough missiles to arm the ships its shipyards could put out? Armor plating? Radar systems? Fuel? Can the US, for good measure? To be clear I totally bet China will have the advantage here - just that the headline "230:1" numbers are pretty meaningless. That is fake info.
(There is a quantity vs quality debate here in modern military circles - could you just output 10,000 motorboats with machine guns piloted by raspberry pi's and overwhelm a Ticonderoga-class cruiser? We may learn someday, but there are many who think not - all of those 10,000 motorboats will be shot to scrap by precision-targeted long range munitions. This was the equivalent US experience in Gulf War 1, which has been instrumental to US doctrine - Iraq had one of the largest armoured forces in the world, and all those tanks meant nothing in the face of modern air superiority.)
C.5: Finally, just to tie things back to point B - the plan isn't to fight a solo offensive war. It is to fight an allied defensive war. With South Korea and Japan. Which, well:
Each country has its own strengths and specializations, with China dominating at around 45% of the shipbuilding market. South Korea and Japan follow closely, making up 93% of global shipbuilding output.
Oh hey look at that - South Korea & Japan outproduce China. Other numbers say China does by the way, you can measure things differently. But I think you get the point.
Anyway, shockingly, US military planners are not a bunch of fucking dumb dumbs? Congress is, but when DoD sits down to plan out a military op they think through the basics. No one is saying China's manufacturing dominance isn't a huge issue, DoD has been saying that very loudly for decades. But they aren't planning a Pickett's Charge in response - or at least not one as obviously so as the above outlines.