A prototype artificial womb is anticipated to be ready for human trials within five years. This t... more A prototype artificial womb is anticipated to be ready for human trials within five years. This technology departs from previous forms of neonatal care. Rather than treating the complications of premature birth, if successful, it will prevent these complications from arising to begin with by extending the period of gestation and allowing the neonate to continue to develop in an environment analogous to the uterus. Much of the social-scientific literature suggests that artificial wombs will improve health outcomes for pregnant people and neonates in general and may improve or expand reproductive choice in pregnancy. Using a critical lens informed by a reproductive justice framework, I argue that this approach to artificial wombs meets a challenge in (1), the persistence of racialized inequity in health outcomes for pregnant people and neonates and (2) historical and contemporary instances of classed and racialized reproductive coercion. I argue that beyond acting to prevent circumstances in which the artificial womb creates opportunities for coercion or exacerbates existing inequity, we might explore alternative paths for this technology as a tool to benefit all pregnant people by reorienting the discourse toward a focus on justice. I propose an approach to artificial wombs informed by a reproductive justice framework that centralizes those who have been most marginalized within reproductive care at each stage of the technology's design, development, and implementation.
In this short response, I agree with Cavaliere’s recent invitation to consider ectogenesis, the p... more In this short response, I agree with Cavaliere’s recent invitation to consider ectogenesis, the process of gestation occurring outside the body, as a political perspective and provocation to building a world in which reproductive and care labour are more justly distributed. But I argue that much of the literature Cavaliere addresses in which scholars argue that artificial wombs may produce greater gender equality has the limitation of taking a fixed, binary and biological approach to sex and gender. I argue that in taking steps toward the possibility of more just practices of caregiving and family making, we must look first not to artificial womb technologies but to addressing the ways that contemporary legal and social practices that enforce essentialising, binary ways of thinking about reproductive bodies inhibit this goal.
A growing body of scholarship argues that by disentangling gestation from the body, artificial wo... more A growing body of scholarship argues that by disentangling gestation from the body, artificial wombs will alter the relationship between men, women, and fetuses such that reproduction is effectively 'degendered'. Scholars have claimed that this purported 'degendering' of gestation will subsequently create greater equity between men and women. I argue that, contrary to the assumptions made in this literature, it is law, not biology, that acts as a primary barrier to the 'degendering' of gestation. With reference to contemporary case law involving disputes over frozen embryos, I demonstrate that though reproductive technologies have already made it possible for gendered progenitors to have an 'equal' say in gestation, law mires the possibilities of these technologies in traditional stories of gendered parenthood. Looking to the way binary assumptions about gender limit the self-determination of trans men and nonbinary and genderqueer people who are gestational parents, I argue the 'degendering' of gestation will come not with artificial wombs but with the end of limited legal paradigms for gendered gestational parenthood.
IJFAB: International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics
Since the 1920s there has been much speculation about the possibility of gestating an embryo from... more Since the 1920s there has been much speculation about the possibility of gestating an embryo from conception to full term in an artificial womb (full ectogenesis). In this paper, we argue that bioethics scholarship on this subject often both overstates the capacities of current technologies and underestimates the barriers to the development of full ectogenesis. Moreover, the current ectogenesis debate potentially causes harm by (1) neglecting some of the more immediate problems in the development of artificial wombs, (2) treating abortion as a ‘problem to be technologically solved’ bolstering anti-abortion rhetoric, and (3) presuming the stability of all women’s reproductive rights. We argue that the ectogenesis conversation should be re-grounded in the immediate anticipated uses of the technology (neonatal intensive care) and in the realities of the immediate healthcare context (acknowledging abortion as essential healthcare and recognizing the problem of reproductive inequities).
Significant scientific progress has been made toward artificial womb technology, which would allo... more Significant scientific progress has been made toward artificial womb technology, which would allow part of human gestation to occur outside the body. Bioethical and legal scholars have argued that artificial wombs will challenge defences of abortion based in arguments for protecting bodily autonomy, for a pregnant person could have the foetus transferred to an artificial womb instead of being terminated. Drawing on examples from the common law jurisdictions of Canada, the USA, and the UK, I assess three ways scholars have argued abortion might be defended after ectogenesis (through redefining foetal viability, through a property right, and through a right to avoid genetic parenthood). I argue that while each of these proposals has strategic merit, each has significant legal and ethical limitations. Taking the normative position that abortion will remain a vital healthcare resource, I make the case for protecting abortion rights from a challenge posed by ectogenesis by focusing on decriminalisation.
In this short article, I consider the mythologies of ectogenesis that have arisen in response to ... more In this short article, I consider the mythologies of ectogenesis that have arisen in response to breakthroughs in scientific research on incubators from the 1880s to the present day. In particular, I interrogate contemporary claims that artificial womb technologies could one day replace abortion. I argue that these claims demonstrate a significant lack of attention to care and relationality during pregnancy. Finally, I propose that we can use the fantasy of ectogenesis in a different way, to imagine a new kind of future rather than replicating the narratives of the past.
In this critical perspective, I call for interdisciplinary feminist research to reclaim the subje... more In this critical perspective, I call for interdisciplinary feminist research to reclaim the subject of artificial womb technology from anti-abortion discourse. In 2017, scientists announced the successful animal trials of a highly advanced incubator that replicates the conditions of the uterus and was used to gestate lamb fetuses from the equivalent of approximately 22-24 weeks human gestation through to term in good health. This technology, now being prepared for human trials, has generated a new wave of research on ectogenesis, the process of gestating a pregnancy outside the body. But while ectogenesis raises many pressing ethical concerns, the discourse has frequently reverted to one claim: that by allowing the fetus to be removed from the pregnant person’s body without causing its death, ectogenesis will “solve” abortion. I argue that authors who make these claims fail to understand why feminists fight for abortion rights, take a narrow approach to reproductive freedom, neglect the social construction of “viability”, and fail to acknowledge the dependency of the fetus on care. Finally, I identify areas for future feminist intervention.
A prototype artificial womb is anticipated to be ready for human trials within five years. This t... more A prototype artificial womb is anticipated to be ready for human trials within five years. This technology departs from previous forms of neonatal care. Rather than treating the complications of premature birth, if successful, it will prevent these complications from arising to begin with by extending the period of gestation and allowing the neonate to continue to develop in an environment analogous to the uterus. Much of the social-scientific literature suggests that artificial wombs will improve health outcomes for pregnant people and neonates in general and may improve or expand reproductive choice in pregnancy. Using a critical lens informed by a reproductive justice framework, I argue that this approach to artificial wombs meets a challenge in (1), the persistence of racialized inequity in health outcomes for pregnant people and neonates and (2) historical and contemporary instances of classed and racialized reproductive coercion. I argue that beyond acting to prevent circumstances in which the artificial womb creates opportunities for coercion or exacerbates existing inequity, we might explore alternative paths for this technology as a tool to benefit all pregnant people by reorienting the discourse toward a focus on justice. I propose an approach to artificial wombs informed by a reproductive justice framework that centralizes those who have been most marginalized within reproductive care at each stage of the technology's design, development, and implementation.
In this short response, I agree with Cavaliere’s recent invitation to consider ectogenesis, the p... more In this short response, I agree with Cavaliere’s recent invitation to consider ectogenesis, the process of gestation occurring outside the body, as a political perspective and provocation to building a world in which reproductive and care labour are more justly distributed. But I argue that much of the literature Cavaliere addresses in which scholars argue that artificial wombs may produce greater gender equality has the limitation of taking a fixed, binary and biological approach to sex and gender. I argue that in taking steps toward the possibility of more just practices of caregiving and family making, we must look first not to artificial womb technologies but to addressing the ways that contemporary legal and social practices that enforce essentialising, binary ways of thinking about reproductive bodies inhibit this goal.
A growing body of scholarship argues that by disentangling gestation from the body, artificial wo... more A growing body of scholarship argues that by disentangling gestation from the body, artificial wombs will alter the relationship between men, women, and fetuses such that reproduction is effectively 'degendered'. Scholars have claimed that this purported 'degendering' of gestation will subsequently create greater equity between men and women. I argue that, contrary to the assumptions made in this literature, it is law, not biology, that acts as a primary barrier to the 'degendering' of gestation. With reference to contemporary case law involving disputes over frozen embryos, I demonstrate that though reproductive technologies have already made it possible for gendered progenitors to have an 'equal' say in gestation, law mires the possibilities of these technologies in traditional stories of gendered parenthood. Looking to the way binary assumptions about gender limit the self-determination of trans men and nonbinary and genderqueer people who are gestational parents, I argue the 'degendering' of gestation will come not with artificial wombs but with the end of limited legal paradigms for gendered gestational parenthood.
IJFAB: International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics
Since the 1920s there has been much speculation about the possibility of gestating an embryo from... more Since the 1920s there has been much speculation about the possibility of gestating an embryo from conception to full term in an artificial womb (full ectogenesis). In this paper, we argue that bioethics scholarship on this subject often both overstates the capacities of current technologies and underestimates the barriers to the development of full ectogenesis. Moreover, the current ectogenesis debate potentially causes harm by (1) neglecting some of the more immediate problems in the development of artificial wombs, (2) treating abortion as a ‘problem to be technologically solved’ bolstering anti-abortion rhetoric, and (3) presuming the stability of all women’s reproductive rights. We argue that the ectogenesis conversation should be re-grounded in the immediate anticipated uses of the technology (neonatal intensive care) and in the realities of the immediate healthcare context (acknowledging abortion as essential healthcare and recognizing the problem of reproductive inequities).
Significant scientific progress has been made toward artificial womb technology, which would allo... more Significant scientific progress has been made toward artificial womb technology, which would allow part of human gestation to occur outside the body. Bioethical and legal scholars have argued that artificial wombs will challenge defences of abortion based in arguments for protecting bodily autonomy, for a pregnant person could have the foetus transferred to an artificial womb instead of being terminated. Drawing on examples from the common law jurisdictions of Canada, the USA, and the UK, I assess three ways scholars have argued abortion might be defended after ectogenesis (through redefining foetal viability, through a property right, and through a right to avoid genetic parenthood). I argue that while each of these proposals has strategic merit, each has significant legal and ethical limitations. Taking the normative position that abortion will remain a vital healthcare resource, I make the case for protecting abortion rights from a challenge posed by ectogenesis by focusing on decriminalisation.
In this short article, I consider the mythologies of ectogenesis that have arisen in response to ... more In this short article, I consider the mythologies of ectogenesis that have arisen in response to breakthroughs in scientific research on incubators from the 1880s to the present day. In particular, I interrogate contemporary claims that artificial womb technologies could one day replace abortion. I argue that these claims demonstrate a significant lack of attention to care and relationality during pregnancy. Finally, I propose that we can use the fantasy of ectogenesis in a different way, to imagine a new kind of future rather than replicating the narratives of the past.
In this critical perspective, I call for interdisciplinary feminist research to reclaim the subje... more In this critical perspective, I call for interdisciplinary feminist research to reclaim the subject of artificial womb technology from anti-abortion discourse. In 2017, scientists announced the successful animal trials of a highly advanced incubator that replicates the conditions of the uterus and was used to gestate lamb fetuses from the equivalent of approximately 22-24 weeks human gestation through to term in good health. This technology, now being prepared for human trials, has generated a new wave of research on ectogenesis, the process of gestating a pregnancy outside the body. But while ectogenesis raises many pressing ethical concerns, the discourse has frequently reverted to one claim: that by allowing the fetus to be removed from the pregnant person’s body without causing its death, ectogenesis will “solve” abortion. I argue that authors who make these claims fail to understand why feminists fight for abortion rights, take a narrow approach to reproductive freedom, neglect the social construction of “viability”, and fail to acknowledge the dependency of the fetus on care. Finally, I identify areas for future feminist intervention.
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Papers by Claire Horn