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According to Zhao, the criticisms of Falun Gong and Falun Gong's response were one among a number of factors involved in the souring of relations between Falun Gong and the Chinese state and news media. Other factors included infighting between China’s qigong establishment and Falun Gong; speculation over blackmailing and lobbying efforts on the part of Li’s qigong opponents and scientists-cum-ideologues with political motives and affiliations with competing central Party leaders, which she says caused a shift in the state’s position; and, between June 1996 and July 1999, intense struggles among Falun Gong, the mainstream media, and the Chinese power elite over the status and treatment of the movement.<ref name="zhao" /> While Falun Gong had some elite support, its philosophy was still fundamentally at odds with official ideology, and some individuals within the scientific, ideological, and political establishments were predisposed to attacking Falun Gong in the media.<ref name="zhao" />
According to Zhao, the criticisms of Falun Gong and Falun Gong's response were one among a number of factors involved in the souring of relations between Falun Gong and the Chinese state and news media. Other factors included infighting between China’s qigong establishment and Falun Gong; speculation over blackmailing and lobbying efforts on the part of Li’s qigong opponents and scientists-cum-ideologues with political motives and affiliations with competing central Party leaders, which she says caused a shift in the state’s position; and, between June 1996 and July 1999, intense struggles among Falun Gong, the mainstream media, and the Chinese power elite over the status and treatment of the movement.<ref name="zhao" /> While Falun Gong had some elite support, its philosophy was still fundamentally at odds with official ideology, and some individuals within the scientific, ideological, and political establishments were predisposed to attacking Falun Gong in the media.<ref name="zhao" />


In June 1998, Tianjin professor [[He Zuoxiu]] appeared on a [[Beijing Television]] talk show, and openly disparaged ''qigong'' groups, making particular mention of Falun Gong.<ref name=smith2>{{cite web |first=Craig S. |last=Smith |title=Revered by Millions, a Potent Mystic Rattles China's Communist Leaders |page=1 |work=Wall Street Journal |date=26 April 1999 |url=http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=1999&m=5&p=5_3 }}c/o third party link</ref> Some 2,000 Falun Gong practitioners gathered to protest the airing of the show, saying that it "slandered" Falun Gong. Under pressure from the central government to end the protest at the station "at any cost"<ref name=blind>Ian Johnson, [http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2001/international-reporting/works/falungong9.html "A Blind Eye:China's Rigid Policies On Religion Helped Falun Dafa for Years"], Page A1, The Wall Street Journal, 13 December 2000</ref> before the June 4 anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the reporter was dismissed and a favorable report telecast a few days later.<ref>Craig S. Smith, Revered by Millions, a Potent Mystic Rattles China's Comremunist Leaders, Page 1, Wall Street Journal, April 26, 1999 [http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=1999&m=5&p=5_3 c/o third party link] </ref><ref name="spie">{{cite book|last=Human Right Watch|coauthors=M Spiegel|title=Dangerous meditation: China's campaign against Falungong|location=New York|date=2001|page=9|accessdate=2009-12-15}}</ref> Authorities gave directives to cease publishing any content critical of Falun Gong to "ensure stability" in the lead-up to the ten-year anniversary of [[Tiananmen Square protests of 1989|Tiananmen Square]],<ref name=smith2/> and in keeping with the "three nos" policy of media reportage on qigong ("no promoting", "no criticizing" and "no encouraging")<ref name=zhongyu>[http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/nationprofiles/China/yan.html "Spiritual Practice or Evil Cult"?: Comprehending Falun Gong in the Context of China's Religious Policy], Zhonghu Yan, Center for the Study of Religion, University of Toronto, December 13, 2001</ref>
In June 1998, Tianjin professor [[He Zuoxiu]] appeared on a [[Beijing Television]] talk show, and openly disparaged ''qigong'' groups, making particular mention of Falun Gong.<ref name=smith2>{{cite web |first=Craig S. |last=Smith |title=Revered by Millions, a Potent Mystic Rattles China's Communist Leaders |page=1 |work=Wall Street Journal |date=26 April 1999 |url=http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=1999&m=5&p=5_3 }}c/o third party link</ref> Beijing Television is described as "the rough equivalent of the People's Daily as a mouthpiece for state policy and propaganda" by David Ownby.<ref name=Ownby2008 /> Some 2,000 Falun Gong practitioners gathered to protest the airing of the show, saying that it "slandered" Falun Gong. Under pressure from the central government to end the protest at the station "at any cost"<ref name=blind>Ian Johnson, [http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2001/international-reporting/works/falungong9.html "A Blind Eye:China's Rigid Policies On Religion Helped Falun Dafa for Years"], Page A1, The Wall Street Journal, 13 December 2000</ref> before the June 4 anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the reporter was dismissed and a favorable report telecast a few days later.<ref>Craig S. Smith, Revered by Millions, a Potent Mystic Rattles China's Comremunist Leaders, Page 1, Wall Street Journal, April 26, 1999 [http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=1999&m=5&p=5_3 c/o third party link] </ref><ref name="spie">{{cite book|last=Human Right Watch|coauthors=M Spiegel|title=Dangerous meditation: China's campaign against Falungong|location=New York|date=2001|page=9|accessdate=2009-12-15}}</ref> Authorities gave directives to cease publishing any content critical of Falun Gong to "ensure stability" in the lead-up to the ten-year anniversary of [[Tiananmen Square protests of 1989|Tiananmen Square]],<ref name=smith2/> and in keeping with the "three nos" policy of media reportage on qigong ("no promoting", "no criticizing" and "no encouraging")<ref name=zhongyu>[http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/nationprofiles/China/yan.html "Spiritual Practice or Evil Cult"?: Comprehending Falun Gong in the Context of China's Religious Policy], Zhonghu Yan, Center for the Study of Religion, University of Toronto, December 13, 2001</ref>


In April 1999, He Zuoxiu published a short editorial in [[Tianjin Normal University]]'s ''Youth Reader'' magazine. Extending on what he had said earlier on Beijing Television, He again launched into attacks on ''qigong'' groups that purport to give people supernatural powers and heal disease.<ref name=hezuoxiu>{{cite web|url=http://www.cnfxj.org/Html/lgxd/2007-6/24/165513641.html#|title=I do not agree with Youth Practicing ''Qigong'' (我不赞成青少年炼气功)|author=[[He Zuoxiu]]|language=Chinese|date=1999}}</ref> He said that he was particularly opposed to ''qigong'' practice amongst youth, saying that two of his students had already quit their studies because of practicing ''qigong,'' and again made special mention of ''Falun Gong.''<ref name=hezuoxiu/> The article was thought to be a signal and trial of the party's designs, according to Gutmann.<ref name=fuyou>Ethan Gutmann, An Occurrence on Fuyou Street, National Review, July 13, 2009</ref> Falun Gong practitioners gathered to protest in Tianjin, sending petitions and appeals to the Tianjin party headquarters and municipal government. Police were dispatched and practitioners were beaten and arrested.<ref name="Schechter"/>
In April 1999, He Zuoxiu published a short editorial in [[Tianjin Normal University]]'s ''Youth Reader'' magazine. Extending on what he had said earlier on Beijing Television, He again launched into attacks on ''qigong'' groups that purport to give people supernatural powers and heal disease.<ref name=hezuoxiu>{{cite web|url=http://www.cnfxj.org/Html/lgxd/2007-6/24/165513641.html#|title=I do not agree with Youth Practicing ''Qigong'' (我不赞成青少年炼气功)|author=[[He Zuoxiu]]|language=Chinese|date=1999}}</ref> He said that he was particularly opposed to ''qigong'' practice amongst youth, saying that two of his students had already quit their studies because of practicing ''qigong,'' and again made special mention of ''Falun Gong.''<ref name=hezuoxiu/> He Zuoxiu was brother-in-law of Luo Gan, at that time the head of public security. The article, printed in a journal that answers to the Party-State, was thought to be a signal and trial of the party's designs, according to Gutmann.<ref name=fuyou>Ethan Gutmann, An Occurrence on Fuyou Street, National Review, 07/13/2009</ref> Falun Gong denied that the people cited in He's cases were actually Falun Gong practitioners and gathered to protest at the TV station, which, according to Ownby, was "an act of considerable audacity."<ref name=Ownby2008 />
Falun Gong practitioners gathered to protest in Tianjin, sending petitions and appeals to the Tianjin party headquarters and municipal government. Police were dispatched and practitioners were beaten and arrested.<ref name="Schechter"/>


Dissatisfied with the treatment in Tianjin, on 25 April, around ten thousand Falun Gong practitioners lined the streets near [[Zhongnanhai]], the residence compound of China's leaders, in silent protest. It was Falun Gong practitioners' attempt to seek redress from the leadership of the country by going to them and, "albeit very quietly and politely, making it clear that they would not be treated so shabbily.".<ref name="pennyharrold" /> Many Falun Gong practitioners were party members, who openly lobbied for the group. While Falun Gong's pre-1999 political involvement is difficult to verify, no other disenfranchised group has ever staged a mass protest near the [[Zhongnanhai]] compound in PRC history. The incident raised questions about the Party's control over the country<ref name=lestz>Michael Lestz, [http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol2No3/Falun%20Gong.htm Why Smash the Falun Gong?], Religion in the News, Fall 1999, Vol. 2, No. 3, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut</ref> A ''World Journal'' report suggested that certain high-level Party officials wanted to crack down on the practice for years, but lacked sufficient pretext until the protest at Zhongnanhai, which it claims was partly orchestrated by [[Luo Gan]], a long-time opponent of Falun Gong.<ref name = "Ching-Gong">Julia Ching, "The Falun Gong: Religious and Political Implications," American Asian Review, Vol. XIX, no. 4, Winter 2001, p 2</ref> There was also reportedly rifts in the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of China|Politburo]] at the time of the incident. Some reports indicate that Premier [[Zhu Rongji]] met with Falun Gong representatives and gave them satisfactory answers, but was criticized by General Secretary and President [[Jiang Zemin]] for being "too soft."<ref name=Schechter/> Jiang is held by Falun Gong to be personally responsible for the final decision:<ref name=peerman>Dean Peerman, [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_16_121/ai_n8702386/pg_4 China syndrome: the persecution of Falun Gong], Christian Century, 10 August 2004</ref><ref name=Saich>Tony Saich, ''Governance and Politics in China,'' Palgrave Macmillan; 2nd Ed edition (27 Feb 2004)</ref> Peerman cited reasons such as suspected personal jealousy of Li Hongzhi;<ref name=peerman/> Saich postulates at party leaders' anger at Falun Gong's widespread appeal, and ideological struggle.<ref name=Saich/>
Dissatisfied with the treatment in Tianjin, on 25 April, around ten thousand Falun Gong practitioners lined the streets near [[Zhongnanhai]], the residence compound of China's leaders, in silent protest. It was Falun Gong practitioners' attempt to seek redress from the leadership of the country by going to them and, "albeit very quietly and politely, making it clear that they would not be treated so shabbily.".<ref name="pennyharrold" /> Many Falun Gong practitioners were party members, who openly lobbied for the group. While Falun Gong's pre-1999 political involvement is difficult to verify, no other disenfranchised group has ever staged a mass protest near the [[Zhongnanhai]] compound in PRC history. The incident raised questions about the Party's control over the country<ref name=lestz>Michael Lestz, [http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol2No3/Falun%20Gong.htm Why Smash the Falun Gong?], Religion in the News, Fall 1999, Vol. 2, No. 3, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut</ref> A ''World Journal'' report suggested that certain high-level Party officials wanted to crack down on the practice for years, but lacked sufficient pretext until the protest at Zhongnanhai, which it claims was partly orchestrated by [[Luo Gan]], a long-time opponent of Falun Gong.<ref name = "Ching-Gong">Julia Ching, "The Falun Gong: Religious and Political Implications," American Asian Review, Vol. XIX, no. 4, Winter 2001, p 2</ref> There was also reportedly rifts in the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of China|Politburo]] at the time of the incident. Some reports indicate that Premier [[Zhu Rongji]] met with Falun Gong representatives and gave them satisfactory answers, but was criticized by General Secretary and President [[Jiang Zemin]] for being "too soft."<ref name=Schechter/> Jiang is held by Falun Gong to be personally responsible for the final decision:<ref name=peerman>Dean Peerman, [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_16_121/ai_n8702386/pg_4 China syndrome: the persecution of Falun Gong], Christian Century, 10 August 2004</ref><ref name=Saich>Tony Saich, ''Governance and Politics in China,'' Palgrave Macmillan; 2nd Ed edition (27 Feb 2004)</ref> Peerman cited reasons such as suspected personal jealousy of Li Hongzhi;<ref name=peerman/> Saich postulates at party leaders' anger at Falun Gong's widespread appeal, and ideological struggle.<ref name=Saich/>

Revision as of 11:21, 21 December 2009

Falun Gong
The swastika is an ancient Buddhist and Hindu symbol;
the yin/yang symbol is from Taoism
Traditional Chinese法輪功
Simplified Chinese法轮功
Literal meaningPractice of the Wheel of Law
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinFǎlún Gōng
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutpingfat2 lun4 gung1
Falun Dafa
Traditional Chinese法輪大法
Simplified Chinese法轮大法
Literal meaningGreat Law of the Wheel of Law
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinFǎlún Dàfǎ
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutpingfat2 lun4 daai6 fat2

Falun Gong (alternatively Falun Dafa) is a system of beliefs and practices founded in China by Li Hongzhi in 1992. The practice emerged at the end of China's "qigong boom" in the early 1990s as a form of qigong. Falun Gong differs from competing qigong schools through its absence of daily rituals of worship,[1] its greater emphasis on morality, and the purported theological nature of its teachings.[2][3] There is on-going debate about Falun Gong's classification as a religion, a new religious movement (NRM), or a "cult", term used by the Chinese government to describe the movement.[4] Its teachings are derived[5] from qigong, Buddhist and Daoist concepts.[6][7][8]

In April 1999, over ten thousand Falun Gong practitioners gathered at Communist Party of China headquarters, Zhongnanhai, in a silent protest following an an incident in Tianjin.[9][10][11] Two months later the Chinese government banned the practice through a crackdown and began a large propaganda campaign.[5][12][13] Since 1999, Falun Gong practitioners in China have been reportedly subject to torture,[14] illegal imprisonment,[15] beatings, forced labor, organ harvesting, and psychiatric abuses.[16][17] Falun Gong has responded with their own media campaign, and have emerged as a notable voice of dissent against the Communist Party of China, by founding organizations such as the Epoch Times, NTDTV and the Shen Yun Performing Arts to publicize their cause.[18]

The number of Falun Gong practitioners is unknown, and the group has no organized membership system. In 1998, the Chinese government published a figure of 70 million practitioners in China.[19] Falun Gong asserts over 100 million practitioners of Falun Dafa in "114 countries and regions around the world".[20]

Beliefs and teachings

Main article: Teachings of Falun Gong
Practising the fifth exercise of Falun Dafa in Thailand.

Falun Gong was introduced to the public by Li Hongzhi(李洪志) in Changchun, China, in 1992. Its teachings cover spiritual, religious, mystical and metaphysical topics. It promises health benefits to the practitioner and places heavy emphasis on morality. The three central tenets of the Falun Gong system, as articulated by founder Li Hongzhi, are 'Truthfulness' (眞), 'Compassion' (善), and 'Forbearance' (忍). Together, these three ideas are regarded as the fundamental characteristics of the cosmos — an omnipresent nature that permeates and encompasses everything. In the process of cultivation, practitioners are supposed to assimilate themselves to these qualities by letting go of "attachments and notions," thus returning to the "original, true self." In Zhuan Falun, Li Hongzhi said that "As a practitioner, if you assimilate yourself to this characteristic, you are one that has attained the Tao."

Falun Gong is an introductory book that discusses qigong, which introduces the principles and provides illustrations and explanations of the exercises involved in Falun Gong practice. The main body of teachings is articulated in the core book Zhuan Falun (轉法輪),[21] published in late 1994. According to the texts, Falun Gong (or Falun Dafa) is a "complete system of mind-body cultivation practice" (修煉).[22]

Falun Gong presents itself as a virtuous form of self-cultivation which draws on Oriental mysticism and traditional Chinese medicine, criticizes self-imposed limits of modern science, and views traditional Chinese science as an entirely different, yet equally valid knowledge system. While Yuezhi Zhao, professor in the University of California, describes it as a "quasi-religious fundamentalist movement with apparent conservative sensibilities"—where the religious facet is covered by the Taoist and Buddhist influences; the conservative facet is its resistance to the "prevailing pursuit of... the entire value system associated with the project of modernization". Spiritually, it claims supernatural powers, health and longevity, yet it borrows the language of modern science in representing its cosmic laws. Zhao says that Falun Gong is "multi-faceted and totalizing movement that means different things to different people.. from physical exercise... to a moral philosophy...and a knowledge system". Practitioners, which include doctorate holders from prestigious American universities, see it as 'a new form of science.'[23]

Theoretical background

Qigong refers to a wide variety of traditional "cultivation" practices that involve movement and/or regulated breathing designed to be therapeutic. Qigong is practiced for health maintenance purposes, as a therapeutic intervention, as a medical profession, a spiritual path, or a component of Chinese martial arts. Unlike in the West, where many may believe that qigong is a socially neutral, subjective, New Age-style concept incapable of scientific proof, a segment of China's scientific establishment regards qi as a scientific concept. Controlled experiments by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in the late 1970s and early 1980s concluded that qi, when emitted by a qigong expert, "actually constitutes measurable infrared electromagnetic waves and causes chemical changes in static water through mental concentration."[24]

Falun Gong also borrows from Buddhist and Taoist teachings, as well as some aspects of Christianity and Judaism. Theories about the cultivation of elixir (dan), "placement of the mysterious pass" (xuanguan shewei), among others, are also found in ancient Chinese texts such as The Book of Elixir (Dan Jing), Daoist Canon (Tao Zang) and Guide to Nature and Longevity (Xingming Guizhi). Falun Gong's teachings tap into a wide array of phenomena and cultural heritage that has been debated for ages.[25] However, the definitions of many of the terms used differ somewhat from Buddhist and Daoist traditions. Francesco Sisci says that Falun Gong "re-elaborated old, well-known Taoist and Buddhist routines, used the old vocabulary that people found familiar, and revamped them in a simple, persuasive way."[26]

Falun Gong in mainland China

Main article: History of Falun Gong
File:UNGenevaFalunDafaLecture.jpg
Li Hongzhi lectures on Falun Dafa at the UN General Assembly Hall, Geneva, 1998

Falun Gong was founded by Li Hongzhi. Chinese authorities assert that he was a former army trumpet player and grain clerk at the Changchun Cereals Company.[27] While in his spiritual biography, Li Hongzhi claims that he was taught ways of "cultivation practice" (xiulian) by several masters of the Dao and Buddhist traditions, including Quan Jue, the 10th Heir to the Great Law of the Buddha School, a Taoist master from age eight to twelve, and a master of the Great Way School with the Taoist alias of True Taoist from the Changbai Mountains. Li also claimed numerous supernatural feats, including invisibility, levitation, and weather modification.[28]

Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong to the public in May 1992, in Changchun, Jilin.[29] Early versions of Zhuan Falun stated that the system was tested extensively in the years prior to its introduction,[28] while the Chinese government asserted that Falun Gong was based on existing Qigong systems, namely Chanmi Gong and Jiugong Bagua Gong.

Reception

Like many qigong masters at the time, Li toured major cities in China from 1992 to 1994 to teach the practice. Falun Gong websites say that during this time, Li was granted several awards by Chinese governmental organizations.[30] According to Ownby, neither Li nor Falun Gong were particularly controversial in the beginning.[31] Li became an "instant star of the qigong movement," and the movement enjoyed success and rapid growth.[31]

File:PrePersecutionFalunDafaPracticeinChina.jpg
Group practice in China in July 1999

Li made his lectures more widely accessible and affordable in later years, charging less than competing qigong systems for lectures, tapes, and books.[11] On 4 January 1995, Zhuan Falun, the main book on Falun Gong, was published and became a best-seller in China.[11] In the face of Falun Gong's rise in popularity, a large part of which was attributed to its low cost, competing qigong masters accused Li of unfair business practices. According to Schechter, the qigong society under which Li and other qigong masters belonged asked Li to hike his tuition, but Li refused.[11] By 1995, Falun Gong had established, according to Lowe, a clear competitive advantage over alternative qigong groups in its emphasis on morality and life philosophies, low cost, and its benefits to practitioners' health, and rapidly spread via word-of-mouth.[32] Its rapid growth within China was also related to family ties and community relationships.[32] Falun Gong attracted a wide range of adherents from all walks of life.[33]

Falun Gong's rapid growth in China garnered widespread attention from the media, academics, and China's religious community. By 1996, the Buddhist Association and Buddhist journals were issuing in-depth critiques of Falun Gong.[34]

Skeptic and journalist Sima Nan spoke out against qigong movements as early as 1995, arguing in books, articles and documentaries that qigong masters relied on deception and pseudoscience to trick the uneducated and gullible,[35] and performed "nothing more than dime-store magic" when demonstrating "supernormal abilities".[36] Sima drew special attention to Falun Gong, alleging that Li Hongzhi used psychological manipulation and a questionable mixture of traditional thought and modern science to sustain his teachings.[36][37] Major Chinese newspapers also published articles critical of Falun Gong. In response, founder Li Hongzhi called on disciples to "defend the Fa" by lobbying media outlets and government officials to censor content critical of Falun Gong.[38] The attempts resulted in the retraction of several newspaper stories critical of Falun Gong.

Friction with the Party-State

According to Zhao, the criticisms of Falun Gong and Falun Gong's response were one among a number of factors involved in the souring of relations between Falun Gong and the Chinese state and news media. Other factors included infighting between China’s qigong establishment and Falun Gong; speculation over blackmailing and lobbying efforts on the part of Li’s qigong opponents and scientists-cum-ideologues with political motives and affiliations with competing central Party leaders, which she says caused a shift in the state’s position; and, between June 1996 and July 1999, intense struggles among Falun Gong, the mainstream media, and the Chinese power elite over the status and treatment of the movement.[23] While Falun Gong had some elite support, its philosophy was still fundamentally at odds with official ideology, and some individuals within the scientific, ideological, and political establishments were predisposed to attacking Falun Gong in the media.[23]

In June 1998, Tianjin professor He Zuoxiu appeared on a Beijing Television talk show, and openly disparaged qigong groups, making particular mention of Falun Gong.[39] Beijing Television is described as "the rough equivalent of the People's Daily as a mouthpiece for state policy and propaganda" by David Ownby.[40] Some 2,000 Falun Gong practitioners gathered to protest the airing of the show, saying that it "slandered" Falun Gong. Under pressure from the central government to end the protest at the station "at any cost"[41] before the June 4 anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the reporter was dismissed and a favorable report telecast a few days later.[42][43] Authorities gave directives to cease publishing any content critical of Falun Gong to "ensure stability" in the lead-up to the ten-year anniversary of Tiananmen Square,[39] and in keeping with the "three nos" policy of media reportage on qigong ("no promoting", "no criticizing" and "no encouraging")[44]

In April 1999, He Zuoxiu published a short editorial in Tianjin Normal University's Youth Reader magazine. Extending on what he had said earlier on Beijing Television, He again launched into attacks on qigong groups that purport to give people supernatural powers and heal disease.[45] He said that he was particularly opposed to qigong practice amongst youth, saying that two of his students had already quit their studies because of practicing qigong, and again made special mention of Falun Gong.[45] He Zuoxiu was brother-in-law of Luo Gan, at that time the head of public security. The article, printed in a journal that answers to the Party-State, was thought to be a signal and trial of the party's designs, according to Gutmann.[46] Falun Gong denied that the people cited in He's cases were actually Falun Gong practitioners and gathered to protest at the TV station, which, according to Ownby, was "an act of considerable audacity."[40]

Falun Gong practitioners gathered to protest in Tianjin, sending petitions and appeals to the Tianjin party headquarters and municipal government. Police were dispatched and practitioners were beaten and arrested.[11]

Dissatisfied with the treatment in Tianjin, on 25 April, around ten thousand Falun Gong practitioners lined the streets near Zhongnanhai, the residence compound of China's leaders, in silent protest. It was Falun Gong practitioners' attempt to seek redress from the leadership of the country by going to them and, "albeit very quietly and politely, making it clear that they would not be treated so shabbily.".[6] Many Falun Gong practitioners were party members, who openly lobbied for the group. While Falun Gong's pre-1999 political involvement is difficult to verify, no other disenfranchised group has ever staged a mass protest near the Zhongnanhai compound in PRC history. The incident raised questions about the Party's control over the country[47] A World Journal report suggested that certain high-level Party officials wanted to crack down on the practice for years, but lacked sufficient pretext until the protest at Zhongnanhai, which it claims was partly orchestrated by Luo Gan, a long-time opponent of Falun Gong.[48] There was also reportedly rifts in the Politburo at the time of the incident. Some reports indicate that Premier Zhu Rongji met with Falun Gong representatives and gave them satisfactory answers, but was criticized by General Secretary and President Jiang Zemin for being "too soft."[11] Jiang is held by Falun Gong to be personally responsible for the final decision:[49][50] Peerman cited reasons such as suspected personal jealousy of Li Hongzhi;[49] Saich postulates at party leaders' anger at Falun Gong's widespread appeal, and ideological struggle.[50]

The ban

On 20 July 1999, the Chinese government declared the Research Society of Falun Dafa and the Falun Gong organization under its control to be illegal for having been "engaged in illegal activities, advocating superstition and spreading fallacies, hoodwinking people, inciting and creating disturbances, and jeopardizing social stability."[51] Xinhua further declared that Falun Gong was a highly organised political group "opposed to the Communist Party of China and the central government, [that] preaches idealism, theism and feudal superstition."[52] Xinhua also affirmed that "the so-called 'truth, kindness and forbearance' principle preached by Li has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve."[53] In response, Li Hongzhi declared that Falun Gong did not have any particular organization, nor any political objectives.[54] Falun Gong groups in China also responded swiftly immediately following the ban. On July 21, 1999, several thousand protesters demonstrated in front of provincial government offices in Hubei, 700 in Anhui, an unspecified number in Henan, and 2000 in Guizhou.[55] Chinese media reported that there was "307 sieges of government and party buildings" between the April Zhongnanhai incident and August 1999.[55]

The Chinese authorities branded Falun Gong, along with some other practices, movements or organizations xiejiao (Chinese: 邪教),[56] it used the English word "cult" or "evil cult", and introduced a barrage of media material criticizing Falun Gong.[52][57] A nationwide crackdown ensued with the exception of the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. In October 1999, four months after the ban, legislation was created to outlaw "heterodox religions" and applied to Falun Gong retroactively.[15] Leung remarked that the effort was driven by large-scale propaganda through television, newspapers, radio and internet.[15] According to Johnson, the campaign against Falun Gong extended to many aspects of society, including the media apparatus, police force, military, education system, and workplaces.[13] An extra-constitutional body, the "6-10 Office" was created to "oversee the terror campaign."[58][15][59] Within the first month of the crackdown, 300-400 articles attacking Falun Gong appeared in each of the main state-run papers, while primetime television replayed alleged exposés on the group, with no divergent views aired in the media.[60] Human Rights Watch (2002) noted that families and workplaces were urged to cooperate with the government's position on Falun Gong, while practitioners themselves were subject to severe coercive measures to have them recant.[55]

Statewide suppression

Amnesty International states that despite the persecution many Falun Gong practitioners continued to hold exercise sessions in public, usually as a form of peaceful, silent protest against the persecution and imprisonment; they were often attended by large numbers of people, including significant numbers of elderly and women.[61] The Party declared the sessions to be "illegal assemblies;" practitioners or others who "spoke up" for the movement would be detained by officials, at the beginning for several days.[62]

This method was later seen as inadequate, because upon release, practitioners would resume protest activities.[55] The authorities treated these practitioners as "recidivists" and saw them as particularly problematic. By 2000, the Party upped its campaign by sentencing "recidivist" practitioners to "re-education through labor", in an effort to have them renounce their beliefs and "transform" their thoughts.[55] Terms were also arbitrarily extended by police. Some practitioners also had ambiguous charges levied against them, such as "disrupting social order," "endangering national security," or "subverting the socialist system."[63] The majority of long-term Falun Gong detainees were processed administratively through this system instead of the criminal justice system.[63] Upon completion of their reeducation sentences, the practitioners who refused to "recant" were then incarcerated in "legal education centers" set up by provincial authorities to "transform minds". Human rights organizations condemned the Chinese government and treated the campaign as "persecution" against Falun Gong practitioners. Notably, Amnesty International declared that the crackdown was politically motivated. Human Rights Watch delivered a comprehensive report on abuses to Falun Gong pracititoners, and reported that Access to the camps were heavily restricted, the practitioners were subject to a wide range of human rights violations, including forced labour and a wide array of physical abuses.[55] By 25 April 2000, within one year after the gathering at Zhongnanhai, more than 30,000 practitioners had been arrested on Tiananmen Square.[64] Seven hundred practitioners were arrested during a demonstration in the Square on 1 January 2001.[65]

Despite Beijing's heavy hand against practitioners, protests continued well into 2000. According to Time, a Falun Gong website editorial instructed followers to "step up" demonstrations, "especially in Tiananmen Square". Founder Li Hongzhi urged followers to immobilize the police and other "evil scoundrels" through use of supernatural powers.[66] Tiananmen Square thus became one of the prime locations where practitioners routinely demonstrated despite government deterrence. By 25 April 2000, within one year after the massive demonstration at Zhongnanhai, a total of more than 30,000 practitioners were arrested there.[64] Seven hundred Falun Gong followers were arrested during a demonstration in the Square on 1 January 2001.[65]

On the eve of Chinese new year on 23 January 2001, seven people attempted to set themselves ablaze at Tiananmen Square. Although the Falun Dafa Information Center disputed that self-immolators were practitioners,[67] on the grounds that the movement's teachings explicitly forbid suicide and killing,[68] the official Chinese press agency, Xinhua News Agency, and other state media asserted that they were practitioners. The incident received international news coverage, and video footage of the burnings were broadcast later inside China by China Central Television (CCTV). Images of a 12 year old girl, Liu Siying, burning and interviews with the other participants in which they stated their belief that self-immolation would lead them to paradise were shown.[69] According to Falun Gong, the incident itself never happened, and was a cruel but clever piece of stunt-work worthy of Hollywood.[70] Time reported that prior to the self-immolation incident, many Chinese had felt that Falun Gong posed no real threat, and that the state's crackdown had gone too far. After the event, however, China's media campaign against Falun Gong gained significant traction.[66] Practitioners' presence in mainland China has become more low-profile, as they opt for alternative methods of informing the citizenry, such as through overnight letterbox drops of CD-ROMs.

Despite the sweeping nature of the campaign, China's leaders and ruling elites were far from unified in their support for the crackdown.[71] Some leaders suggested that the group be brought under bureaucratic control of the party, like other religious institutions. Many managers of enterprises and bureau chiefs were also not enthusiastic about the crackdown. They treated "recantations" of practitioners under their jurisdiction as a mere formality and turned a blind eye to continued practice of Falun Gong. In February 2001, in an attempt to show unity, the Communist Party held a Central Work Conference and discussed Falun Gong.[71] President and party head Jiang Zemin insisted that all seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee "testify" on the need to eradicate Falun Gong in front of some 2,000 party cadres. Under Jiang's leadership, the crackdown on Falun Gong became part of the Chinese political ethos of "upholding stability" - much the same rhetoric employed by the party during Tiananmen in 1989. Jiang's message was echoed at the 2001 National People's Congress, where Premier Zhu Rongji made special mention of Falun Gong in his outline of China's tenth five-year plan, saying "we must continue our campaign against the Falun Gong cult," effectively tying Falun Gong's eradication to China's economic progress.[71]

According to the Chinese government, Falun Gong activists have launched attacks against Sinosat satellites and jammed television signals, replacing regular state television broadcasts with their own material.[72] For example, in March 2002, Liu Chengjun, a Falun Gong practitioner, managed to intercept eight cable television networks in Changchun City and Songyuan City, Jilin Province, and televised a program titled “Self-Immolation or a Staged Act?”. Liu was arrested and subjected to 21 months of torture that led directly to his death.[73]

Falun Gong outside mainland China

Main article: Falun Gong outside mainland China

Template:Image stack Due to its ban in mainland China, Falun Gong practitioners have taken to their cause internationally, especially in Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Since the ban in China, Falun Gong has alleged that its practitioners in China were subject to torture.[citation needed] Falun Gong related cases comprise 66% of all reported torture cases in China, according to the Special Rapporteur on torture,[74] and at least half of the labour camp population.[75] Amnesty International urged the government to "take seriously its commitment to prevent torture and take action immediately."[76][77] The United Nations asked the Chinese government to respond to the various allegations by Falun Gong and human rights groups.[14]

Falun Gong practitioners in the United States routinely file cases in U.S. federal courts against Chinese leaders once they step upon foreign soil. According to International Advocates for Justice, Falun Gong has filed the largest number of human rights lawsuits in the 21st century and the charges are among the most severe international crimes defined by international criminal laws.[40][78] Practitioners engage in promotional activities by handing out flyers in busy intersections, in the subway or at the mall, leaving Falun Gong literature in stores, libraries, laundries etc. Although some of the literature deal with Falun Gong's situation in China, other publications also include the Nine Commentaries of the Communist Party, a critical editorial of the Communist Party of China, which are distributed by practitioners in both DVD and book form. Falun Gong members also openly participate in activities such as marches, parades, and celebrations of Chinese culture.[36] Response to these appeals have been mixed.[79][80]

Since 2006, a central part of the Falun Gong campaign focused on alleged organ harvesting from living practitioners. The Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong commissioned Canadian parliamentarian David Kilgour and human rights lawyer David Matas to investigate the allegations.[81] The Christian Science Monitor considered the evidence is circumstantial, but persuasive, and criticized the Chinese government for a lack of openness in investigating the claims.[82] Likewise, U.N. special rapporteur Manfred Nowak, said the report "shows a coherent picture that causes concern."[83] In November 2008, the United Nations Committee Against Torture noted that an increase in organ transplant operations coincided with “the beginning of the persecution of [Falun Gong practitioners]” and demanded an explanation. The Chinese government has repeatedly denied these allegations, saying that the report was based on "rumors and false allegations".[84] The United States Congressional Research Service report by Dr. Thomas Lum stated that the Kilgour-Matas report relied largely on logical inference without bringing forth new or independently-obtained testimony, and that the conclusions also rely heavily upon questionable evidence.[33] Human rights activist Harry Wu also voiced doubts about conclusions of the Kilgour-Matas report.[85] David Ownby, a noted expert on Falun Gong, said that he saw "no evidence proving [organ harvesting] is aimed particularly at Falun Gong practitioners."[86]

Falun Gong practitioners have set up international media organizations to promote their cause and criticize the Communist Party of China. These include The Epoch Times newspaper, NTDTV, Sound of Hope radio station,[87] and Epoch Press Inc.[88] Maria H. Chang of the University of Nevada, says these organisations seem to be "[treated as] front organisations to influence public opinion via a concerted information-PR-propaganda campaign". She argues that, like the Chinese state, Falun Gong has to create organisations that are publicly unaffiliated with it for the organization to survive.[87]

While Chinese media have launched an unrelenting assault on Falun Gong since 1999, its response through its various media organizations has earned the practice considerable public relations clout in the West. In North America and Europe, where Falun Gong practitioners are a strong presence, media obtain much of their information about the spiritual group through Faluninfo.net, although Kavan says it comes from a public relations firm for Falun Gong managed by Gail Rachlin, who is considered part of Li’s inner circle.[89] Kavan also compared Falun Gong practitioners' media strategies with those of the Chinese Communist Party: common traits include intolerance of criticism, issuing blanket denials when accused, exaggerating and sensationalizing claims, and deflecting blame by charging the other of the same offence.[89]

After its ban in China, a large number of Falun Gong organisations sprung up in other countries. "Falun Dafa Associations" now exist around the world, of which the Canadian and American chapters are the most prominent. Not all practitioners are members of an association. In addition, Falun Gong has a considerable presence on the Internet,[53] with websites such as clearwisdom.net, faluninfo.net, mingui, pureinsight etc., which they use not only to spread Li's teachings, but also to publicise the plight of practitioners with graphic testimonials.[58] Falun Gong contacts in various locales are visible on Falun Gong websites. Li Hongzhi's directives and dissertations are now largely communicated through Falun Gong websites such as clearwisdom.net. Falun Gong have also set up groups CIPFG and WOIPFG to lobby foreign governments/legislators, human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who now expressed their concerns over allegations of torture and ill-treatment of Falun Gong practitioners in China. They have also urged the United Nations and international governments to intervene and bring an end to what is described as an ongoing persecution of practitioners.[62][61] Friends of Falun Gong USA is a non-profit corporation domiciled in New Jersey which raises funds for Falun Gong causes.[90] Falun Gong has also established university chapters in the United States.[91]

Public debate

Zhao (2003) sees Falun Gong as a profound challenge to China's dominant "meaning system" in terms of Falun Gong's insistence on the public nature of the practice, the imperative to gain positive representation and to make known their dissent.[23]

Organisation

Falun Gong denies having an organizational structure, and maintains that it is merely a spiritual group that practices a brand of qigong.[92] It does not have an centralized membership system, and eschews the term 'membership'. As a result, estimates vary over the number of people practicing Falun Gong. Before the ban, the government estimated 70 million, and later revised the figure to 2 million.[93] Palmer notes that Falun Gong was highly centralised, and it maintained "absolute centralisation of thought, healing and money." Power flowed directly to or from the Master, Li Hongzhi, "whose authority was strictly moral and ideological".[94]

Affiliations and structure

Unlike other qigong groups from the 1990s that maintained decentralized practice stations around the country, Falun Gong's organizational structure was highly centered around Li Hongzhi.[92] After its withdrawal from the Scientific Qigong Association in 1994, the Falun Dafa Research Society (FDRS) applied to be listed as an organization under the National Minority Affairs Commission, to which it was denied. It subsequently applied to the China Buddhist Federation as a cultural organization to study Buddhism, and was also rejected. Its final attempt at registering under a Party-sanctioned organization was an application to the United Front Department as a "non-religious, academic organization", to which it was also rejected.[92] Unable to operate within a state-sponsored framework, Falun Gong pursued a more decentralized and loose organizational structure in 1997, with its main bases located in Beijing and Wuhan. Chinese state media reported that at the time, the Beijing national office was led by Li Chang, Wang Zhiwen, Ji Liewu and Yao Jie;[92] Li and Wang were members of the Communist Party.[95] Regional offices diverged in their organizational structures. State media reported that each office generally maintained a "propaganda department", logistics department, and "doctrine" committee, or variations of those functions thereof.[92]

At the time of the movement's suppression in July 1999, Falun Gong websites claim that the movement had no "national organization", no regulations or by-laws, and that practitioners were free to join or leave at any time, and there were no membership rosters.[citation needed] While it relied on traditional network (in a Qigong sense) for dissemination exercise techniques - a nationwide network of local and regional practising stations, the FDRS acted as a national umbrella organisation, headed by Li Hongzhi.[96] The Chinese government, in contrast, claims that Falun Gong was a highly organized group, with 39 "main stations", 1,900 "guidance stations", and 28,263 practice sites nation-wide, overseeing a total of 2.1 million practitioners.[97] Østergaard observed that Falun Gong's flat and highly centralised organisation was reminiscent of that of the Communist Party in the 1920s and 1930s, although its communication and marketing are modern. Its central committee and local cells communicate directly via email. Li's charisma and authority gave the organisation great flexibility; it would grow horizontally through splitting of cells when they reached a certain size.[98] Østergaard states (p. 216) that Falun Gong "had so little voice for the rank-and-file members in group political activity that it cannot be regarded as a harbinger of democracy."[98]

Finances

Falun Gong also differentiated itself from other qigong groups in that only the Master, Li Hongzhi, was allowed to give lectures and to teach. Assistants were forbidden from teaching, and also barred from giving Qigong therapy and from collecting money. Branches and stations maintained no resources.[38][94] Donations and the sale of all materials were centralised through the FDRS, and funds flowed directly to Li Hongzhi.[94] Citing Dai Qing (2000), Østergaard states that by 1997, Li was receiving annual income streams of in excess of ¥10 million.[98]

The 'cult' label

Some debate exists over whether Falun Gong should be classified as a "cult", and this classification is more common in some social contexts than in others.[99] Since the 1999 ban the Chinese government has repeatedly classified them as a xiejiao, translated[100] as "evil cult" in English,[6][101][102] deeming it harmful to social stability in China.[102] They also claim that Falun Gong damages people's physical and mental health[103] like the Branch Davidians and Aum Shinrikyo.[103] David Ownby and Ian Johnson have argued that the Chinese state seized the cultic appellation of Falun Gong by borrowing arguments from Margaret Singer and the West's anti-cult movement to blunt the appeal of Falun Gong and put it on the defensive.[13][36] Western media's response was initially similar to that of the anti-cult movement,[104] but later used less loaded terms to describe the movement.[105] Other scholars, for example, Cheris Shun-ching Chan considers cults to be new religious movements that focus on the individual experience of the encounter with the sacred rather than collective worship, and says that Falun Gong is neither a cult nor a sect, but a new religious movement with Cult-like characteristics.[106] Other scholars avoid the term "cult" altogether because "of the confusion between the historic meaning of the term and current pejorative use"[107][108] These scholars prefer terms like "spiritual movement" or "new religious movement" to avoid the negative connotations of "cult" or to avoid mis-categorizing those which do not fit mainstream definitions.[104]

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  97. ^ People's Daily, 23 July 1999, "Li Hongzhi qirenqishi"
  98. ^ a b c Østergaard, Clemens Stubbe (2003). Jude Howell (ed.). Governance in China. pp. 214-223 (Governance and the Political Challenge of Falun Gong). ISBN 0742519880.
  99. ^ Frank, Adam. (2004) Falun Gong and the threat of history. in Gods, guns, and globalization: religious radicalism and international political economy edited by Mary Ann Tétreault, Robert Allen Denemark, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, ISBN 1588262537, pp 241-243 Adam Frank has identified five generalizable frames of discourse about Falun Gong that differ in the way they describe the movement, including the use of the "cult" label. These frames are
    1. the Western media,
    2. the Chinese media,
    3. an emerging scholarly tradition,
    4. the discourse of Human rights groups, and
    5. a sympathetic practice-based discourse.
  100. ^ "THE CRACKDOWN ON FALUN GONG AND OTHER SO-CALLED "HERETICAL ORGANIZATIONS"". Amnesty International. 23 March 2000. Retrieved 8 September 2009.
  101. ^ Chan 2004
  102. ^ a b Irons, Edward. 2003 Falun Gong and the Sectarian Religion Paradigm Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, Volume 6, Issue 2, pages 244-62, ISSN 1092-6690
  103. ^ a b The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in International Law
  104. ^ a b Frank, Adam. (2004) Falun Gong and the threat of history. in Gods, guns, and globalization: religious radicalism and international political economy edited by Mary Ann Tétreault, Robert Allen Denemark, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, ISBN 1588262537, pp 241-243
  105. ^ Kipnis, Andrew B. 2001, The Flourishing of Religion in Post-Mao China and the Anthropological Category of Religion, THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY, 12:1, 32-46 Anthropology, Australian National University
  106. ^ Chan, Cheris Shun-ching (2004). The Falun Gong in China: A Sociological Perspective. The China Quarterly, 179 , pp 665-683
  107. ^ Bainbridge, William Sims 1997 The sociology of religious movements, Routledge, 1997, page 24, ISBN 0415912024
  108. ^ Richardson, James T. (1993). "Definitions of Cult: From Sociological-Technical to Popular-Negative". Review of Religious Research. 34, No. 4: 348–356.

Further reading

See also

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