Markku Roinila
My central interest has been Leibniz since early 1990s. I first studied in the Department of History where I made a licenciate thesis on Leibniz's practical projects. After that thesis I changed to the Department of Philosophy and wrote a Ph.D. thesis on Leibniz's theory of Rational Decision (2007). My other interests include Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Passions, Dreams and Open Access.
My last research project was on emotions and the perfectibility of man in Leibniz (2011-2013; Postdoctoral Research Fellow of The Academy of Finland) where I concentrated on his view of emotions and their effect on our moral action. I am applying funding for a continuating project which extends the topic to metaphysics and dynamics of the mind.
Currently I am working as an information specialist in Helsinki University Library and I hold a title of a docent in theoretical philosophy of Faculty of Arts in the University of Helsinki since December 2015.
Supervisors: Lilli Alanen and Simo Knuuttila
Address: Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies, Pl 24 00014 University of Helsinki
My stuff is available for download in https://zenodo.org/communities/mro/?page=1&size=20
My last research project was on emotions and the perfectibility of man in Leibniz (2011-2013; Postdoctoral Research Fellow of The Academy of Finland) where I concentrated on his view of emotions and their effect on our moral action. I am applying funding for a continuating project which extends the topic to metaphysics and dynamics of the mind.
Currently I am working as an information specialist in Helsinki University Library and I hold a title of a docent in theoretical philosophy of Faculty of Arts in the University of Helsinki since December 2015.
Supervisors: Lilli Alanen and Simo Knuuttila
Address: Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies, Pl 24 00014 University of Helsinki
My stuff is available for download in https://zenodo.org/communities/mro/?page=1&size=20
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Books by Markku Roinila
Review in Finnish in Helsingin sanomat: http://www.hs.fi/kirjat/artikkeli/Kaikkea+tutkinut+Leibniz+edustaa++yksin+kokonaista+akatemiaa/HS20110703SI1KU02p8v
http://www.hs.fi/kirjat/artikkeli/Viimeinen++diskurssi/HS20040327SI1KU02l90
Teon on saatavissa avoimena Helda Open Books-kokoelmassa https://doi.org/10.31885/9789515150080
Journal articles by Markku Roinila
This passage is typical in Leibniz’s Nachlass. Universal perfection creates in us joy or pleasure of the mind and its source is our creator, God. When this joy is constant, we reach happiness and wisdom which is a kind of standing state of virtue, readiness to practice charity in the best of all possible worlds. However, it also indicates that our knowledge is never perfect. Perfecting our knowledge is a never-ending process which gives us joy in itself and motivates us to act in imitation of God. In this way some passions advance our knowledge and we can create ourselves a passionate habit of knowing more about the world and its perfection.
In this paper I try to see this process of self-perfection from a cognitive rather than ethical point of view. While it is clear that in the final stage of wisdom we act mostly on our volitions which are founded on clear and distinct perceptions, it is less clear what cognitive status is to be attributed to our initial perceptions of perfection, our emotions and finally, the intellectual emotions which lead us to perfection and God. I will also reflect the role of the minute perceptions in our struggle for happiness. My argument is that a central cognitive role in Leibniz’s views on self-perfection is held by clear, but confused perfections which are subjective, undemonstrable impressions, shades, feelings. Therefore our ethical action is largely founded on passing, minute feelings rather than on deliberated conscious volitions, although the goal in Leibniz’s moral theory is to change this fact.
My discussion is founded on several texts from Leibniz’s later philosophy, such as the discussion following from New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances of 1695, Leibniz’s letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte of 1702 (also known as On What is Independent in Sense and Matter), New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Theodicy (1710) and naturally Leibniz’s most important epistemological text, Meditations of Truth, Knowledge and Ideas (1684).
http://inderscience.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,13,14;journal,10,118;linkingpublicationresults,1:110891,1
Aikaisempi suomenkielinen versio tästä artikkelista ("Tieteen historian tähtihetkiä : G. W. Leibniz ja Berliinin tiedeakatemian varhaisvaiheet", Tieteessä tapahtuu 2004:1) on saatavilla: https://oa.doria.fi/handle/10024/21907
Review in Finnish in Helsingin sanomat: http://www.hs.fi/kirjat/artikkeli/Kaikkea+tutkinut+Leibniz+edustaa++yksin+kokonaista+akatemiaa/HS20110703SI1KU02p8v
http://www.hs.fi/kirjat/artikkeli/Viimeinen++diskurssi/HS20040327SI1KU02l90
Teon on saatavissa avoimena Helda Open Books-kokoelmassa https://doi.org/10.31885/9789515150080
This passage is typical in Leibniz’s Nachlass. Universal perfection creates in us joy or pleasure of the mind and its source is our creator, God. When this joy is constant, we reach happiness and wisdom which is a kind of standing state of virtue, readiness to practice charity in the best of all possible worlds. However, it also indicates that our knowledge is never perfect. Perfecting our knowledge is a never-ending process which gives us joy in itself and motivates us to act in imitation of God. In this way some passions advance our knowledge and we can create ourselves a passionate habit of knowing more about the world and its perfection.
In this paper I try to see this process of self-perfection from a cognitive rather than ethical point of view. While it is clear that in the final stage of wisdom we act mostly on our volitions which are founded on clear and distinct perceptions, it is less clear what cognitive status is to be attributed to our initial perceptions of perfection, our emotions and finally, the intellectual emotions which lead us to perfection and God. I will also reflect the role of the minute perceptions in our struggle for happiness. My argument is that a central cognitive role in Leibniz’s views on self-perfection is held by clear, but confused perfections which are subjective, undemonstrable impressions, shades, feelings. Therefore our ethical action is largely founded on passing, minute feelings rather than on deliberated conscious volitions, although the goal in Leibniz’s moral theory is to change this fact.
My discussion is founded on several texts from Leibniz’s later philosophy, such as the discussion following from New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances of 1695, Leibniz’s letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte of 1702 (also known as On What is Independent in Sense and Matter), New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Theodicy (1710) and naturally Leibniz’s most important epistemological text, Meditations of Truth, Knowledge and Ideas (1684).
http://inderscience.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,13,14;journal,10,118;linkingpublicationresults,1:110891,1
Aikaisempi suomenkielinen versio tästä artikkelista ("Tieteen historian tähtihetkiä : G. W. Leibniz ja Berliinin tiedeakatemian varhaisvaiheet", Tieteessä tapahtuu 2004:1) on saatavilla: https://oa.doria.fi/handle/10024/21907
dernin filosofian aikakaudella 1600–1700-luvuilla. Esittelemäni aiheet ovat hieman erillisiä toisistaan, mutta yhteistä niille on ajatus komputaatiosta tai automaatiosta, eräänlaisesta mekaanisesta laskemisesta tai toiminnasta, jota voi pitää tekoälyn varhaisena lähtökohtana.
On kuitenkin huomattava, että pelkkä komputaatio eli
informaation käsittely sinänsä ei riitä tekoälylle – kaikkia näitä
pyrkimyksiä leimaa tietynlainen epistemologinen optimismi:
automatisoidun ajattelun avulla uskotaan saatavan enemmän laa-
dukasta tietoa ja kenties myös uudenlaisia ajatuksia, kun ajattelu-
prosessi tulee sujuvammaksi. Tekoälyn varhaishistoria liittyy siis
nimenomaan inhimillisen ajattelun mekanisoimiseen ja uskoon
siitä, että sen avulla voidaan lieventää ihmismielen rajoituksia ja
ajatella paremmin. Yhteistä sekä tekoälyn että tietokoneen histo-
rialle on kuitenkin laskennan kehitys.
Preprint is available at http://www.helsinki.fi/~mroinila/Hope.doc
Leibniz, however, was not always satisfied with this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66 he presented an alternative model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits well with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different inclinations to different goods.
I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the practical rationality of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. The topics include Leibniz’s criticism of Lockean hedonism and the discussion of acratic behaviour in II, xxi of Essay and Nouveaux essais.""
Lähtökohtani on Descartesin Kuudes Mietiskely, jossa filosofi painottaa aistihavaintojen elävyyttä verrattuna mielen kuvitteluihin ja (sensorisiin) muistijälkiin. Unet ovat mainio esimerkki tälläisista mielen aikaansaannoksista, joiden elävyys häviää aistihavaintojen kouriintuntuvuudelle. Varmuus aistihavaintojen luotettavuudesta nimenomaan osoittaa, että pystyn erottamaan unitilan ja valvetilan toisistaan. Eroon liittyy olennaisesti myös muisti, sillä se yhdistää valvetilassa asiat toisiinsa kun taas unissa näin ei käy. Unessa vain kaikki ilmestyy ja häviää selittämättömästi ja nopeasti (CSM II, 61-62). Descartesin näkemystä vastusti Thomas Hobbes, joka vastaväitteissään kysyi eikö uneksijan uni liity pitkään sarjaan menneitä tapahtumia? Jos tämä on mahdollista, uneksijan arvostelmassa menneet tapahtumat ovat tosia, aivan kuin valveilla. Siten myös unessa voidaan tehdä arvostelmia. Descartesin vastauksen mukaan uneksija ei voi yhdistää uniaan menneiden tapahtumien ideoihin, vaikka hän saattaa uneksia voivansa näin tekevänsä (CSM II, 137).
Käyn esitelmässäni läpi Kuudennen mietiskelyn argumentit ja sen herättämän keskustelun. Aihetta ovat käsitelleet Hobbesin lisäksi ainakin Berkeley, joka oli Descartesin kanssa pitkälti samaa mieltä, Spinoza (joka väitti, että unessa arvostelmaa voidaan lykätä), Leibniz (jonka mukaan herääminen on nimenomaan sitä, että yhdistämme nykyisen tilamme menneisiin tapahtumiin ja että unissa arvostelmat perustuvat vain niissä läsnäolevaan aineistoon), Kant (joka oli Hobbesin kannalla) sekä Locke, joka kiinnostavasti väitti, että unien irrationaalisuus johtuu siitä, että uneksiessa sielu on irrallaan ruumiista, joka takaa mielen järjestyksen ja täydellisyyden.
Vertaan myös varhaismodernien filosofien ajatuksia nykyfilosofiaan sekä unien nykytutkimukseen. Uudemmista filosofeista unien ja muistin suhdetta ovat käsitelleet mm. Ludvig Wittgenstein, joka yhtyy Leibnizin näkemykseen, että muisti aktivoituu herätessä (Philosophical Investigations, 1953), Norman Malcolm, joka tarkentaa Wittgensteinin näkemyksiä (Dreaming, 1959) sekä Owen Flanagan (Dreaming Souls, 2000).
Lähimmäksi nykykäsitystä unien ja muistin suhteesta ylsi varhaismoderneista filosofeista John Locke, jonka mukaan nukkuvien ihmisten unet on tehty valveilla olevien ihmisten ideoista, vaikkakin ne on oudosti koostettu (Essay II, i, §17). Tämä väite on yhdenmukainen aivotutkija Robert Stickgoldin tutkimusten kanssa, joista selviää, että unet muodostuvat muistifragmenteista. Toisin sanoen muisti ikään kuin organisoituu uudelleen unissa (Hobson, Dreaming 109).
Keskustellessaan rakkauden käsitteestä Leibniz argumentoi, että voimme tunnistaa toisessa ihmisessä täydellisyyden, joka herättää meissä mielihyvää. Tämä motivoi meitä toimimaan toisen ihmisen hyväksi. Toisinaan tätä aihetta sivuavissa kirjoituksissa (erit. Elementa juris naturalis (1670-71) ja Codex iuris gentium (1693)) Leibniz viittaa siihen, että moraalisesti tietyn tason saavuttanut ihminen on ikään kuin hyveellisessä tilassa eli hän tunnistaa täydellisyyden herkemmin kuin vähemmän hyveellinen ihminen.
Leibniz ei kovin tarkkaan määrittele mitä tämä hyveellisyyden tila oikeastaan on. Hän puhuu samasta asiasta myös muilla nimillä. Esimerkiksi kirjoituksessa Von der Weisheit (1694-1698?) hän puhuu siitä, että täydellisyyttä maailmassa kokee parhaiten ihminen, jolla on siihen sopiva luonne (Gemüth). Joka tapauksessa on ilmeistä, että hän olettaa tietynlaisten ihmisten olevan valmiimpia Jumalan tarkoituksiin, joiksi hän katsoo täydellisyyden ja onnellisuuden edistämisen maailmassa. Nämä henkilöt voivat edistää universaalia täydellistymistä parhaiten ja tämä tapahtuu paitsi tieteen edistämisen kautta, myös harjoittamalla oikeutta, sillä Leibniz määrittelee oikeuden viisaan ihmisen harjoittamana hyväntekeväisyytenä.
Tarkoitukseni on esitelmässä tarkastella Leibnizin huomautuksia edellämainitusta hyveen tilasta ja verrata sitä Descartesin ja Spinozan käsitykseen hyveestä. Leibnizin näkemyksen voidaan katsoa olevan melko lähellä Spinozan käsitystä, vaikka Leibnizin näkemyksissä on monia piirteitä, jotka erovat Spinozan deterministisestä maailmankuvasta. Joissakin kohdin (esim. vahvan tahdon korostus) hän taas lähestyy Descartesia. Leibnizin omimmat käsitykset hyveestä liittyvät prosessimaisuuteen – hän esimerkiksi katsoi, että onnellisuus vaatii systemaattista ylläpitoa, jonka keskeinen sisältö on nimenomaan hyveellinen toiminta. Toisin sanoen vain systemaattisesti hyveellinen ihminen voi olla onnellinen. Lisäksi tarkastelen mikä on hyveen ja viisauden suhde Leibnizilla – hän käyttää termejä melko vapaasti, mutta näyttää siltä, että ne viittaavat hiukan eri asiaan, hyve moraaliseen hyvään ja viisaus kognition tasoon. Edellinen näyttäisi seuraavan jälkimmäisestä.
"
Leibnizin kritiikki on suunnattu erityisesti hänen aikalaisiaan René Descartesia, Thomas Hobbesia ja Samuel Pufendorfia vastaan. Hän ei voi hyväksyä näkemystä, jonka mukaan oikeudenmukaisuuden mitta on vain Jumalan tahto. Perustan on löydyttävä ikuisista totuuksista, jotka ovat myös Jumalan oikeudenmukaisuuden standardi. Erityisen kuuluisaksi tuli Leibnizin kritiikki Pufendorfin näkemyksiä kohtaan, sillä Pufendorfin laajalle levinneen teoksen De officio hominis et civis ranskalaisen laitoksen neljännen painoksen toimittaja Barbeyrac liitti siihen Leibnizin kiistakirjoituksen, joka tunnetaan lyhyellä nimellä Monita (Epistola viri excellentissimi ad amicum qua monita quaedam ad principia Pufendorfiani operis de officio hominis et civis continentur, 1706) ja puolusti Pufendorfia Leibnizia vastaan.
Leibnizin onnistui kuitenkin ilmeisesti osoittaa eräs heikkous Pufendorfin näkemyksissä, jota Barbeyrac ei pystynyt sivuuttamaan: tämän mukaan Jumala on saman aikaan sekä ylin tuomari että lakien laatija. Siten Leibnizin näkökulmasta Jumala on tyranni – hänen tahtonsa on oikeuden ja etiikan mitta ja koska hän on kaikkivaltias, hän voi pakottaa ihmiset noudattamaan sellaista oikeudenmukaisuutta, joka on hänen mieleistään. Koska Jumalan yläpuolella ei ole Pufendorfin mukaan mitään, hän voi toimia aivan mielivaltaisesti. Leibnizin kritiikki kiteytyy Pufendorfin epäselvään erotteluun ulkoisen ja sisäisen velvollisuuden välillä, joka jättää hänen näkemyksensä arvoitukselliseksi.
Tutkiskelen tässä esitelmässä oliko Leibnzin kritiikki johdonmukainen ja oikeutettu. Onko Pufendorfin näkemyksissä heikkous, jota hän ei itse huomannut? Vertailen myös asiaa koskevia eri kommentaareja (mm. Kari Saastamoinen, Petter Korkman, Fiametta Palladini) ja arvioin Leibnizin kritiikin reseptiota Pufendorf-tutkimuksessa.
In English: This paper discusses Leibniz's views on justice and especially the Divine Command-theory. Of special interest if Barbeyrac's defense of Pufendorf against Leibniz's critcism. I attemp to reflect how Leibniz would have reacted to Barbeyrac's interpretation of Pufendorf's views. An international version of this paper is planned.
Varhaisessa esseessään Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) Immanuel Kant esitti joitakin vastaväitteitä tälle opille. Hänen mukaansa on oltava jokin mahdollinen maailma, joka on raja-arvo eli ei voi olla parempaa maailmaa kuin tietty mahdollinen maailma. Tästä ei kuitenkaan seuraa, että on oltava vain yksi, singulaarinen ja täydellinen mahdollinen maailma, sillä jos kaksi tai useampi maailma on yhtä lailla täydellinen, kumpikaan ei olisi paras, sillä niillä olisi yhtä suuri aste hyvyyttä.
Kant pyrki puolustamaan Leibnizin oppia olettamalla, että olion absoluuttinen täydellisyys on samaistettava sen todellisuuden asteen kanssa. Kahta todellisuutta ei voida hänen mukaansa erottaa toisistaan, voidaan vain väittää, että jokin on läsnä toisessa, mutta ei toisessa. Siten ero on kvantatiivinen, ei kvalitatiivinen. Tästä Kant saattoi päätellä, että kahdella mahdollisella maailmalla ei voi milloinkaan olla sama aste todellisuutta ja siksi ei voi olla kaksi yhtälailla hyvää ja täydellistä maailmaa.
Tässä esitelmässä yritän ajatella Kantin ajatuskulun uudelleen ja tutkia sen pätevyyttä. Ei ole itsestäänselvää, että argumentti toimii. Leibniz jätti melkoisen hämäräksi täydellisyyden ja todellisuuden suhteen – nykykommentaattorit ovat olleet eri mieltä siitä, miten täydellisyyden ja todellisuuden keskinäinen suhde on ymmärrettävä. Tästä johtuen nykyteoriat aiheesta ovat jakautuneet eri leireihin, joissa on samankaltaisuutta Kantin ehdotusten kanssa. Kantin kaltaista ehdotusta parhaasta mahdollisena maailmasta todellisuuden maksimina ovat puolustaneet mm. David Blumenfeld ja Donald Rutherford. Puolustan tässä esitelmässä vanhempaa Nicholas Rescherin teoriaa, joka esittää parhaan mahdollisen maailman valinan kriteerin sittenkin kvalitatiiviseksi. Tällekin teorialle löytyy pohjaa Kantin kirjoituksesta – vaihtoehtoisena ratkaisuna hän esitti, että tämä maailma on paras koska Jumala on sen sellaiseksi arvioinut. Koska Jumalan harkinta on erehtymätön, tämä maailma on paras. Kant jättää kuitenkin avoimeksi sen, mikä takaa tässä ratkaisussa vain yhden parhaan vaihtoehdon olemassaolon. Pyrin esitelmän lopussa tarjoamaan Rescherin teorian perusteella ratkaisun tähän ongelmaan.
In metaphysics, the idea of an automata was expressed most clearly in the 1695 article New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication, and the ensuing correspondence with, among others, Foucher, Bayle, Lamy, Jaquelot and Masham. In the article Leibniz discusses the soul as a spiritual machine in the context of pre-established harmony, arguing that God can "give to a substance at the outset a nature or internal force which could produce in it an orderly way (as in spiritual or formal automaton; but a free one, in the case of a substance which is endowed with a share of reason) everything that is going to happen to it, that is to say, all the appearances or expressions it is going to have, and all without the help of any created thing."
The basic idea of Leibniz's spiritual machine is that the soul or entelechy is an autonomous and spontaneous unity, consisting of internal active force and producing its own perceptions (both confused and distinct). It is a self-moving machine, driven by its perceptions and appetites, but it follows (without being conscious of it) a lawful series or programme created by God. The entelechy remains the same despite undergoing an infinite number of changes. To Foucher he explained that each state of the individual substance is a consequence of its preceding one, "as if there were only God and the substance in the world". Despite this, the spiritual machine is related not only to God, but through the pre-established harmony to bodies or natural machines. However, as it is not dependent on them, the spiritual machine is superiot to natural machines.
In this paper I concentrate on three moral themes related to the spiritual machine: moral deliberation, moral identity and the goal of moral action. All these themes are more or less implicit in the New System, but are discussed in more detail in the ensuing correspondence after the publication of the article. Finally, the themes are given an extended discussion especially in the second book of New Essays on Human Understanding (1704, published 1765), written partly at the same time as some of the correspondence and unpublished related material.
I will first give an overview of Leibniz's position concerning the spiritual machine or automaton in the New System and then go on to explore the three moral themes one by one, as they feature in the subsequent correspondence and in the New Essays. I will show that the three topics are essential to the function of the spiritual machine – to Sophie Charlotte Leibniz wrote: "...let us say that everything in bodies happens mechanically, or in accordance with laws of motion, and that everything in the soul happens morally, or in accordance with perceived good or evil."
There are many texts that anticipate the views in the New System (notably the unpublished memoir De Affectibus of 1679) and Leibniz continued to discuss its themes later on (in addition to correpondence, for example, in Theodicy of 1710 and Monadology and Principles of Nature and Grace of 1714). Here I focus on the short-term development of Leibniz's views on the topic (around 1695-1705), but I argue that his basic view of the spiritual machine did not change much after finishing the dialogue with Locke in 1704.
What about efforts, then? One is certainly the will. In NE, II, xxi, §5 Leibniz argues that volition is the effort (conatus) to move towards what one finds good and away from what one finds bad and that this endeavor arises from the perceptions we are aware of. As an endeavour results in action unless it is prevented, from will (which is always directed to the good) and power together follows action.
However, this is not so simple. Leibniz argues that there is also a second class of efforts: “There are other efforts, arising from insensible perceptions, which we are not aware of; I prefer to call these ‘appetitions’ rather than volitions” (NE II, xxi, §5; RB, 173). Although there are appetitions of which one can be aware, usually these appetitions arise from the insensible petite perceptions and are consequently affecting us subconsciously. Now, although all minute perceptions are confused perceptions, they are always related to pleasure and displeasure and also to perfection and imperfection. From this follows that there can be different efforts present in the soul at the same time: the will which is directed to apperceived good and several separate appetitions which lead to different goals, both to those which bring about perfection and pleasure of the mind (joy) and those which bring about displeasure and imperfection (sorrow).
These efforts are not only in conflict with each other but may also be in conflict with entelechy. A typical case is perceiving a sensual pleasure. Our entelechy which is always directed to final causes (perfection) may be in conflict with several different appetitions which are related in different ways to the sensual pleasure in question. If our understanding is developed enough, our will resists the temptation posed by the pleasure (agreeing with entelechy), but if the temptation is too strong, the appetitions outweigh the will and the resulting action bring about imperfection and sorrow as it is related to imperfection.
In this paper I will argue that deliberation in the human soul is a battle of different endeavors described above: the entelechy in the soul strives according to its law-of-the-series towards its telos (perfection) and the will accompanies it by being automatically directed to the good. This thrust towards the apparent good is aided or hindered by the appetitions which can be thought as derivative forces in the Leibnizian dynamics. Depending on whether the predominant appetitions are related to good or bad desires, the deliberation succeeds or fails in achieving the real good which is the goal of human deliberation. The successs can be facilitated beforehand by developing our understanding so that we are less easily swept away by the derivative forces (NE II, xxi, §19). A central role in this task is played by strong willing. As Martha Bolton has noted in her recent paper, an essential feature of the basic, standing endeavors is that they are continuous – although the power balance in the soul changes from moment to moment, something lingers from our previous volitions. That is why Leibniz argues that we pave way for the future deliberations by our previous voluntary actions (NE II, xxi, §23). In contrast, the appetitions are temporary, fliegende Gedanken as Leibniz says in NE II, xxi, §12. Therefore there is a constant, always changing power balance between two kinds of endeavors in the soul: primitive active force versus derivative forces.
I will argue that the behavior of the forces in the soul can be understood with a vectorial model which is related to Leibniz’s early ideas of calculus of variations and which was anticipated by Arnauld and Nicole’s Port-Royal Logic. The central idea in the model is that the options are in tension towards each other and the ratio between them at each moment determines the consequent outcome. The proper relationship between the endeavors is not a simple balance, two options which exhaust each other, but a case where different efforts complement each other: “Since the final result is determined by how things weigh against one another, I should think it could happen that he most pressing disquiet did not prevail; for even If it prevailed over each of the contrary endeavours taken singly, it may be outweighed by all of them together.” Leibniz continues : “Everything which then impinges on us weighs in the balance and contributes to determining a resultant direction, almost as in mechanics” (NE II, xxi, §40; RB, 193). The different endeavors can be understood as vectors leading to different directions and the end result is a certain direction that deliberation takes.
The dynamical tension between the different endeavors presents a situation where everything affects everything and the following direction, the resulting volition follows more or less automatically. In Theodicy, §325 Leibniz describes the deliberation as follows: “One might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a force that puts forth an effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts only at the spot where action is easiest or there is least resistance” (Huggard, 322)
This kind of dynamical tension can be understood in terms of the calculus of variations where there are several possible variations available but where the dynamics of the situation results in the decision taking the “easiest” route which is more or less objectively good depending on the level of the deliberator’s understanding. In his comments to Bayle’s note L of “Rorarius” Leibniz says: “The soul, even though it has no parts, has within it, because of the multitude of representations of external things, or rather because of the representation of the universe lodged within it by the creator, a great number, or rather an infinite number, of variations (Woolhouse & Francks (ed.), ‘New System’ and Associated Texts, 101). This kind of deliberation is comparable to God’s choice of the best world with the difference that God’s understanding is infinite which again results in the fact that the choice is the best possible. Whereas in nature the easiest route taken is always optimal as nature is God’s creation, in men the goodness or badness of men’s actions is dependent on their state of wisdom, that is, how developed their understanding is. The more wise men are, the more metaphysical goodness or perfection follows from their actions.
The chapter provides also a great platform to study Leibniz’s argumentative techniques and the differences between the philosophers in general. Locke strives to explain the emotions with a single, unifying notion of uneasiness while Leibniz’s view of the mind is much more complex and he finds more unique ways of explaining different emotions.
My paper focuses on Leibniz’s critique of Lockean uneasiness as an explanans for emotions. He views uneasiness as a unavoidable part of all our mental states and therefore it is not sufficient to explain passions or moral wrong-doing of men. I will discuss such passions as love, joy, sorrow, hope, fear, despair, anger, envy and shame and consider Locke’s possible response to Leibniz’s critique.
In general, he avoids discussing emotions in bodily terms, saying that general inclinations, passions, pleasures and pains belong only to the mind or to the soul (NE II, xxi, §72). He is also keen to point out that our passions derive mostly from our bodies. However, like Spinoza (Ethics III, prop. XI, Scholium) he thought that some emotions such as joy can produce pleasures which can be described also in bodily terms. For example, in a short memoir Felicity he says that music can be a pleasure for the ears and symmetry can be a pleasure for the eyes. These more intellectual emotions are actions in the sense that they represent perfection emanating from their source, the absolutely perfect being, that is, God. The feeling of perfection may produce a state of well-being which concerns both the soul and the body.
In my paper I will trace instances of Leibniz’s remarks on how these kind of emotions affect the body. I will also discuss the different ways the body gives rise to passions in the soul. My primary source is Nouveaux essais, book II, chapter xx and xxi, but I will also discuss various other writings by Leibniz.
In his early lecture note Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) a young supporter of metaphysical optimism called Immanuel Kant tested the Leibnizian optimism by posing some counter-arguments against it only to falsify them. His counter-arguments were very inventive and they feature often in modern scholarship on Leibniz. In this paper I will present Kant’s main arguments and evaluate them. I will argue that Kant’s understanding on Leibnizian optimism is little misguided and for this reason his own positive counter-argument despite its ingeniousness is problematic. His second solution to the problem is comparable to the doctrine of metaphysical optimism, but fails also for the same reason as the first one.
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- Various translations of Leibniz's texts in Aho & Roinila (ed.), Leibniz: Filosofisia tutkielmia [Philosophical essays], Helsinki, University Press 2011.
- Dascal: The Challenge of Human Difference and the Ethics of Communication, Finnish translation forthcoming in 2011.
Leibniz : http://filosofia.fi/node/2412
Leibniz tiedosta [Leibniz on knowledge]: http://filosofia.fi/node/2415
Leibniz metafysiikasta [Leibniz's metaphysics]: http://filosofia.fi/node/2413
Leibniz moraalifilosofiasta ja teodikean ongelmasta [Leibniz's moral philosophy and the problem of evil]: http://filosofia.fi/node/2414
http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/08/the-social-media-for-a-philosopher.html
xxi, §70 Locke argues that we have to decide between the probability of afterlife and our present temptations.
in itself, this kind of decision model is not rare in 17th-century philosophy. Blaise Pascal’s Wager is a famous example of a similar idea and one might also think as various theories of theodicy as a similar deciding between pair of scales where the one cup represents good and the other evil. God would have to balance different possible worlds and choose one where there is more goodness than evil.
Leibniz was not satisfied in this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66 he presented an alternative
model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different desires. The two different models are compared in an implicit manner by Leibniz in chapter xxi of the book II when he criticizes Locke’s theory of uneasiness which lead us strive for the absent good. Leibniz also employs his vectorial model in the discussion concerning akractic behavior in the same chapter.
I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the theories of deliberation of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. I will also discuss how Leibniz applies a similar kind of model in his explanation of how God chooses the best among all possible worlds.
Section 13 Kant and the Leibnizian tradition
Abstract
In his early lecture note Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) a young supporter of metaphysical optimism called Immanuel Kant tested the Leibnizian optimism by posing some counter-arguments against it only to falsify them. His counter-arguments were very inventive and they feature often in modern scholarship on Leibniz. In this paper I will present Kant’s main arguments and evaluate them. I will argue that Kant’s understanding on Leibnizian optimism is little misguided and for this reason his own positive counter-argument despite its ingeniousness is problematic. His second solution to the problem is comparable to the doctrine of metaphysical optimism, but fails also for the same reason as the first one.
NWEMP, Uppsala 5-6 June 2010
Markku Roinila
One of the features of John Locke’s moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II,
xxi, §70 Locke argues that we have to decide between the probability of afterlife and our present temptations.
in itself, this kind of decision model is not rare in 17th-century philosophy. Blaise Pascal’s Wager is a famous example of a similar idea and one might also think as various theories of theodicy as a similar deciding between pair of scales where the one cup represents good and the other evil. God would have to balance different possible worlds and choose one where there is more goodness than evil.
Leibniz was not satisfied in this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66 he presented an alternative
model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different desires. The two different models are compared in an implicit manner by Leibniz in chapter xxi of the book II when he criticizes Locke’s theory of uneasiness which lead us strive for the absent good. Leibniz also employs his vectorial model in the discussion concerning akractic behavior in the same chapter.
I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the theories of deliberation of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. I will also discuss how Leibniz applies a similar kind of model in his explanation of how God chooses the best among all possible worlds.
Chapter 20 of Book II of John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, titled ‘Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain’ discusses emotions. Despite its brevity (the chapter consists of only four and half pages in the Nidditch-edition) it is arguably the most extensive discussion of emotions or passions available in Locke’s corpus. The same applies to Leibniz’s discussion in his commentary of Locke’s work, Nouveaux essais sur l’entedement humain (together with the following chapter 21 of book II). Together they offer a very interesting and captivating discussion of moral philosophy and good life in general with the special emphasis on knowledge and the passions.
In my paper I will discuss the views on emotions of the two philosophers and illustrate their differences by comparing their views on akrasia or weakness of the will. Locke strives to explain the emotions with a single, unifying notion of uneasiness while Leibniz’s view of the mind is much more complex and he finds more unique ways of explaining different emotions in each context. Of special interest is his account of emotions as processes where the minute perceptions we have form a certain disquiet (Leibniz’s version of Locke’s uneasiness) which affects us without our knowing the reason why. Only gradually this restless state becomes conscious and an emotion which is directed to a certain object arises.
While Locke is relying on a kind of wager (similar to Pascal’s) in his views of our moral ends, arguing in chapter 21 of book II of his Essay that we should deliberate between our present good and the future good of the afterlife, Leibniz gives a great role to intellectual emotions, arguing that the pleasure of mind or joy leads us to happiness eventually. Whereas for Locke emotions are states of mind (relating to uneasiness), for Leibniz they are based on minute perceptions which implies that they arise by degrees and affect our deliberations as one element among many. Leibniz argues that our mind is in perpetual conflict where desires (which are build from unconscious minute perceptions) and clear and distinct ideas of which we are aware of fight against each other. Leibniz thinks – like Shaftesbury later – that we can conquer our bad passions with better ones. This has its own reward as acting virtuously brings about the happiness, but it has to be sustained continuously by choosing real goods instead of the apparent ones.
Seven years later Leibniz wrote his Nouveaux essays sur l’entendement humain where he comments Locke’s brief discussion of passions in book II, chapter 20. In this paper I will compare Leibniz’s accounts of love in the letter to Sophie and his answer to Locke and discuss his style of argumentation. As Leibniz argues in his letter to Sophie that women (he mentions Miss de Scudery and Lady Norris) are experts on love, it is interesting to see how his answer to Locke differs from his arguments presented to Sophie and from his earlier statements in the Preface of 1693.
I will argue that due to differences on views of mind-body parallelism, Leibniz’s take on emotions is unavoidably different from Spinoza’s. Secondly, whereas Spinoza thinks that conatus is striving to persist in one’s being, Leibniz argues that the will tends towards more particular, a more perfect way of existing. Related to this is my third theme which concerns the intellectual love of God. For Leibniz, Spinoza cannot provide a motivation for self-perfection because his God is grounded in necessity rather than in goodness.
In this paper I strive to think what gives rise to this reflective act in the Leibnizian philosophy of mind, especially what distinguishes it from attention which Leibniz defines as awareness in general. Some epistemological questions are involved in this distinction. Leibniz was perhaps the first to use minute, unconscious perceptions systematically in his philosophy of mind and in my interpretation of the emergence of apperception, inspired by Émilienne Naert, they play a crucial part. I will argue that apperception arises from a concretion of minute perceptions which eventually capture our attention and make us aware of the fact that we perceive something. My main source is Leibniz’s Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (1704) where Leibniz introduces the concept of apperception and discusses it in connection to attention and memory.
I will also briefly discuss the views of Robert McRae and Mark Kulstad and criticise the latter’s interpretation, according to which also animals are capable of low-level apperception as they can use their memory to act in a pseudo-rational manner although their cognition is mostly founded on confused perceptions. In this issue I side with McRae who argues that the ego is inseparable from apperception and therefore requires innate or clear and distinct ideas.
reflections around the topic. While the first part of the text deals mostly with the contents of Descartes’ Passions de l’âme (1649), the second part discusses metaphysics, especially with respect to appetite or action in contrast to passion. Leibniz can be seen to struggle with Descartes’s theory of action and passion, ultimately rejecting it in favour of a more dynamic doctrine which has predecessors in Hobbes and Spinoza. It is
noteworthy that De affectibus was written shortly after Leibniz carefully read Spinoza’s posthumous works. In my paper I will reflect Leibniz’s attempts to create his own metaphysical doctrine of action and passion and to what extend he was influenced by Spinoza in his enterprise. Secondly, I will discuss to what extent this youthful writing differs from Leibniz’s mature view of emotions in his Nouveaux essais sur l’entedement
humain (1704).
For the intelligent being pleasure is a harmonious feeling of metaphysical perfection and in this way the moral instinct guides us to strive for (moral) perfection. In this paper my problem is related to this: supposing our perceptions of pleasure and pain are confused cognition, it is difficult to see how they can affect our will which concerns things we are aware of, that is, clear and distinct perceptions. How can one explain moral motivation in men by only pleasure and pain? One needs an additional intelligible aspect.
I think an answer can be found in Leibniz’s 1702 letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte (also called On What Is Independent Of Sense And Of Matter, GP VI, 499-508) where Leibniz discusses internal sense or imagination “which comprises at once the concepts of particular senses, which are clear but confused, and the concepts of the common sense, which are clear and distinct” (GP VI, 501). My suggestion is that when we explain the perception of perfection, we must look at the internal sense or imagination, because clear and distinct ideas are objects common to many senses.
Leibniz argues that besides sensible and imaginable (numbers and shapes, for example), there is that which is only intelligible, since it is the object of understanding alone (GP VI, 501). The distinction leads to a further classification into three levels of concepts: a) sensible only (objects produced by each sense in particular) b) at once sensible and intelligible (appertain to common sense) c) intelligible only (belong to the understanding, related to self-consciousness). To the first category one can classify the clear, but confused perceptions (images) of sounds, colors, flavors and the like. The second level of concepts consists of the concepts of the internal sense, which are common in the perceptions of the external senses. Concepts, which are intelligible only are beyond our imagination and are related to reason.
When we consider metaphysical perfection, it is clearly sensible in the sense that it is felt as something, that is, pleasure of the mind or joy (see NE II, xxi, §42). In Résumé of Metaphysics (1697) Leibniz says that “an intelligent being’s pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection” (G VII, 290). Perfection is a harmonious feeling rather than an object of the understanding. However, it can be argued that perfection must be more than mere feeling since it motivates us morally, giving us a reason to imitate in our moral action its source, God. Thus feeling perfection is not only sensible, but also intelligible. To my mind, perfection can be compared to the ideas at once sensible and intelligible which Leibniz mentions, that is, number, magnitude, space, figure and motion which come from more than one sense. Perfection can be defined as a mathematical ratio (as variety in unity, for example). It is also noteworthy that in Specimen dynamicum Leibniz allows passion and action and the concept of forces to the realm of imagination (comp. also Monadology, §49).
Through the intelligible element perfection is related to our innate ideas, especially the clear and distinct idea of God and his perfections. Perceiving perfection corresponds with the innate ideas and can affect our volitions despite its having a sensible element. Leibniz wrote to Bayle that “The most abstract thoughts need some imagination: and when we consider what confused thoughts…are…we realize that they always involve the infinite, and not only what happens in our body but also, by means of it, what happens elsewhere” (G IV, 563-564).
The increase in universal perfection produces pleasure and decreases pain in us. When the intellect finds that a present appetition promises future pleasure, the moral instinct is directed to it or “recommends” it. If the appetition is strong enough (or changes from confused inclination or disquiet to clear and distinct passion such as the passion of hope) in its promise of forthcoming perfection, it can appeal to our will and lead to action. Similarly, when we feel pain our moral instinct “tells” us in the form of mental pain that the deed we are about to do is to be avoided. The process is in line with Leibniz’s general definition of substance in Monadology, §14-15 as including only perception and appetite, the latter striving for “better” perceptions, that is, more clear and distinct perceptions, avoiding confused and obscure perceptions (cf. NE II, xxi, §36).
In my paper I will strive to connect the moral instinct to imagination and perfection in Leibniz’s philosophy of the mind. The discussion is founded on Leibniz’s remarks in his letter to Sophie Charlotte (“On What Is Independent of Sense and of Matter”) and Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (especially book I, i and book II, xxi). I aim to show that perception of perfection is essentially related to confused perceptions or feelings of pleasure or pain, even though it also has an intellectual element which is related to innateness. The innate principle of pursuing joy and avoiding sorrow is essential in our route to increasing perfection and its basic push or impetus is provided by the imagination.
Abstract
Markku Roinila
The 26th Baltic Conference In History of Science
It is well known that almost all of the most important European philosophers in the Early Modern period chose not to work in the context of the university. To mention some examples, René Descartes was supported by his legacy, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were tutors at least parts of their lives, George Berkeley tried to establish a colony in North America, Baruch Spinoza made his living by grinding lenses and Gottfied Wilhelm Leibniz was a librarian, historiographer and a diplomat. The most well-known philosophers working in the universities at the time were perhaps Francis Hutcheson who had a chair of moral philosophy in Glasgow and, in Germany, Thomasius and Wolff, not to mention Immanuel Kant a little later.
One wonders why secured positions were not more tempting to philosophers instead of constant striving for patrons and mentors, especially as financial woes were familiar to most philosophers of the Early Modern period. There are known cases (such as Leibniz) who rejected offers on university positions and chose to find other means of support.
In this paper I discuss the significance of the scientific academies that provided possibilities to practice science outside of universities. I am especially interested in the efforts to establish academies which could hire scientists, such as the Brandenburg Academy of Sciences in Berlin, founded by Leibniz, and the French Academy of Science that was supported by the King of France.
An interesting question which is not often raised with respect to these academies is the question of political, philosophical or religious requirements. For example, the Paris academy required catholicism and subscription to Cartesian worldview while the Royal Society in London the dominance of the supporters of Newton was clear and a philosopher who was, for example, more taken by the continental vis viva-conception of nature would have felt uncomfortable in this kind of setting.
It seems to be clear that even academic societies were not always safe havens for doing science professonially. Considering some philosophers, like Antoine Arnauld and David Hume, I discuss of the various ways that philosophers were able to work independently outside of both universities and scientific societies or academies and consider how successful they were in their striving. In my paper I will utilize Mario Biagioli’s pioneering study Galileo, Courtier (1993) and studies by Carolyn Iltis, Steven Shapin and Stephen Gaukroger, to mention a few. A part of my paper will address the situation in Baltic countries, especially Sweden where philosophers like Descartes and Pufendorf were employed.
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