Papers 2020- by Dan Zahavi
In recent publications, Jay Garfield and Anil Seth have both written about the you. Whereas Garfi... more In recent publications, Jay Garfield and Anil Seth have both written about the you. Whereas Garfield is a Buddhist scholar who advocates a no-self view, Seth is a neuroscientist who defends a radical form of representationalism. But is it really possible to speak meaningfully of a you (and of a we) if one denies the existence of the self, and if one declares the world of experience a neuronal fantasy? In the following, I will criticize both accounts. I will argue that they both, in different ways, are unable to deal with a real other, and drawing on the work of Husserl, I will argue that a proper understanding of the you doesn’t merely require accepting the reality of the self, but also the existence of a shared lifeworld.
In an article entitled “Phenomenology and mindfulness” published in Journal of Consciousness Stud... more In an article entitled “Phenomenology and mindfulness” published in Journal of Consciousness Studies in 2021, we criticized recent attempts to define phenomenology as a kind of meditative practice, one that like certain forms of mindfulness aims to observe our experience in careful detail in order to describe it. As we argued, to do so is to miss out on the proper philosophical character of phenomenology. In their chapter “Phenomenology and mindfulness-awareness”, Natalie Depraz, Claire Petitmengin and Michel Bitbol take us to task and accuse us of promoting a “reductionist”, “poor”, “extremely limited”, and “trivializing” understanding of both phenomenology and Buddhism. Let us in turn reply to the criticism of our understanding of 1) phenomenology and 2) Buddhism and mindfulness.
Many accounts of collective intentionality target rather sophisticated types of cooperative activ... more Many accounts of collective intentionality target rather sophisticated types of cooperative activities, i.e., activities with complex goals that require prior planning and various coordinating and organizing roles. But although joint action is of obvious importance, an investigation of collective intentionality should not merely focus on the question of how we can share agentive intentions. We can act and do things together, but it is not obvious that the awe felt and shared by a group of Egyptologists when they gain entry to a newly discovered pharaonic tomb can or should be analyzed in the same way as, say, a heist that a group of criminals carefully plan and execute together. The aim of the article is to better understand the kind of emotional sharing that can occur between two individuals who are perceptually co-present. Does the sharing involve a kind of phenomenal fusion? Is it a matter of sharing one and the same token experience? It will be argued that both of these recent suggestions must be rejected as misleading in favor of an account that sees emotional sharing as a form of emotional integration that involves constitutively interdependent processes of empathy, second-personal address, and identification.
Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this... more Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post-Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience.
One of the aims of the 40th Annual Spindel Conference
was to discuss whether the ongoing, but rel... more One of the aims of the 40th Annual Spindel Conference
was to discuss whether the ongoing, but relatively distinct,
investigations of relational autonomy and collective
intentionality could crossfertilize. Whereas the concept
of relational autonomy was developed to do justice to the
relational character of selfhood, and as an alternative to
traditional conceptions of autonomy, which were accused
of exaggerating the self-reliance
and social independence
of the self, recent discussions of collective intentionality
have often centered on the question of whether and how
collective intentions differ from aggregations of individual
intentions. As different as they might otherwise be,
theoretical explorations of autonomy and collective intentionality
intersect at a crucial point: both require an
understanding of the relationship between the self and
the group, between individual subjectivity and social life.
The aim of the following paper is to argue that the collective
intentionality literature contains insights that cannot
merely contribute to our understanding of autonomy, but
also prevent us from taking our relationism too far.
Recent years have seen an upsurge of interest in the second-person perspective, not only in philo... more Recent years have seen an upsurge of interest in the second-person perspective, not only in philosophy of mind, language, law and ethics, but also in various empirical disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience and developmental psychology. A distinctive and perhaps also slightly puzzling feature of this ongoing discussion is that whereas many contributors insist that a proper consideration of the second-person perspective will have an impact on our understanding of social cognition, joint action, communication, self-consciousness, morality, and so on, there remains considerable disagreement about what exactly a second-person perspective amounts to. What is the difference between adopting a second-person and a third-person perspective on another? How does one relate to another as a you and how does that differ from relating to another as a he, she or they? In the following, I will consider three different proposals and argue that a promising but somewhat overlooked account can be found in the work of Husserl.
Husserl's writings on sociality have received increasing attention in recent years. Despite this ... more Husserl's writings on sociality have received increasing attention in recent years. Despite this growing interest, Husserl's reflections on the specific role of communication remain underexplored. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by reconstructing the various ways in which Husserl draws systematic connections between communication and communalization. As will become clear, Husserl's analysis converges with much more recent ideas defended by Margaret Gilbert and Naomi Eilan.
Is selfhood socially constituted and distributed? Although the view has recently been defended by... more Is selfhood socially constituted and distributed? Although the view has recently been defended by some cognitive scientists, it has for long been popular within anthropology and cultural psychology. Whereas older texts by Mauss, Geertz, and Markus and Kitayama often contrast a Western conception of a discrete, bounded and individual self with a non-Western sociocentric conception, it has more recently become common to argue that subjectivity is a fluid intersectional construction that is fundamentally relational and conditioned by discursive power structures. I will assess the plausibility of these claims and argue that many of these discussions of self and subjectivity remain too crude. By failing to distinguish different dimension of selfhood, many authors unwittingly end up advocating a form of radical social constructivism that is not only incapable of doing justice to first-person experience, but which also fails to capture the heterogeneity of real communal life.
Phenomenology has recently been invoked in a large number of publications on mindfulness. The cen... more Phenomenology has recently been invoked in a large number of publications on mindfulness. The central claim being discussed is whether phenomenology should be viewed as a kind of meditative technique or practice, which involves carefully attending to present moment experience without imposing judgments or presuppositions. Elsewhere, we have argued against this claim (Stone & Zahavi 2021). In this chapter, rather than focusing on mindfulness and phenomenology qua ‘first-person methods’ that might be compared, contrasted, or combined, we focus on some of the underlying assumptions and theoretical commitments of the contemporary mindfulness movement. We ask: What are the main ideas informing contemporary mindfulness, and should they be accepted on phenomenological philosophical grounds? In particular, we critically discuss the way in which experience, temporality, and the mind-world relation are being conceived in the context of contemporary mindfulness, as these are topics about which phenomenology has a great deal to say
What goes on in the diagnostic interview, when considered not only as a clinical tool but also as... more What goes on in the diagnostic interview, when considered not only as a clinical tool but also as a specific kind of interpersonal encounter? Might research on interpersonal understanding shed any light on the diagnostic interview? In the following, we address these questions by drawing on recent discussions about second-person and third-person relations. The chapter is structured as follows. In Sect. 4.2, we describe some peculiarities of the diagnostic interview and highlight how it involves
a complex interplay between different sources of diagnostically relevant information. In Sect. 4.3, we turn to research on interpersonal understanding. We reconstruct and critically assess some recent discussions about second-person relations, and present our own take on this notion. In Sect. 4.4, we elaborate on a conceptualization
of second-person relations which foregrounds the roles of reciprocity and
communication. In Sect. 4.5, we return to the diagnostic interview and assess the implications of our discussion.
Whereas classical Critical Theory has tended to view phenomenology as inherently uncritical, the ... more Whereas classical Critical Theory has tended to view phenomenology as inherently uncritical, the recent upsurge of what has become known as critical phenomenology has attempted to show that phenomenological concepts and methods can be used in critical analyses of social and political issues. A recent landmark publication, 50 Concepts for Critical Phenomenology, contains no reference to psychiatry and psychopathology, however. This is an unfortunate omission, since the tradition of phenomenological psychiatry – as we will demonstrate in the present article by surveying and discussing the contribution of Jaspers, Minkowski, Laing, Basaglia, and Fanon – from the outset has practiced critical thinking, be it at the theoretical, interpersonal, institutional, or political level. Fanon is today, a recognized figure in critical phenomenology, even if his role in psychiatry might not yet have been appreciated as thoroughly as his anticolonial and antiracist contributions. But as we show, he is part of a long history of critical approaches in psychopathology and psychiatry, which has firm roots in the phenomenological tradition, and which keeps up its critical work today.
Today, many philosophers write on topics of contemporary interest, such as emerging technologies,... more Today, many philosophers write on topics of contemporary interest, such as emerging technologies, scientific advancements, or major political events. However, many of these reflections, while philosophically valuable, fail to contribute to those who may benefit the most from them. In this article, we discuss our own experience of engaging with nursing researchers and practicing nurses. By drawing on the field of philosophical phenomenology, we intervene in a longstanding debate over the meaning of "empathy" in nursing, which has important implications for nursing research, training, and practice. However, our intention is not only to introduce and discuss this philosophical intervention. Rather, we present this intervention as a model for how philosophers might successfully engage with the field of nursing, and perhaps with other fields as well, with the aim of effecting positive change in research or practice. The article proceeds in five parts. First, we introduce the problem of conceptual clarity in nursing and explain why many nursing concepts are still in need of refinement. Second, we discuss the origins of the concept of empathy in nursing and outline the challenges associated with borrowing theory from other fields. Third, we explain how nurses tend to conceptualize empathy today, drawing upon the psychological distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy. Fourth, we discuss our intervention in this debate and explain how we attempt to resolve existing conceptual confusions by developing the concept of empathy from the ground up. Fifth, we conclude by briefly reflecting upon some of the challenges of interdisciplinary engagement and providing some recommendations based upon our own experience.
Our aim in this article is to argue against the claim that phenomenology in the classical sense o... more Our aim in this article is to argue against the claim that phenomenology in the classical sense of the term is a kind of meditative technique or practice involving the careful observation of present moment experience for the purposes of description. In sections 1. and 2. we give an overview of the contemporary presentation of mindfulness, as well as pointing to some ambiguities that will be relevant to our subsequent discussion. Section 3. offers a brief survey of the various comparisons people have made between phenomenology and mindfulness. As will become clear, the majority have based their comparison on a specific interpretation of Husserl’s key methodological tools, the epoché and reduction. In section 4. we argue that said interpretation is mistaken, and that Husserl’s enterprise is very different from the practice of mindfulness, and then in section 5., we examine two examples of the claim we are criticizing, namely recent articles by Natalie Depraz and Michel Bitbol.
Empathy has recently been described as a dark force of immorality by Bloom and Bubandt and Willer... more Empathy has recently been described as a dark force of immorality by Bloom and Bubandt and Willerslev. In my paper, I contrast their discussion and definition of empathy with the account of empathy found in phenomenology. After highlighting the many differences, I discuss the moral significance of the phenomenological notion of empathy
Journal of Social Ontology
The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suf... more The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be (part of) a we. In presenting this argument, the article seeks to demonstrate that a thorough investigation of collective intentionality has to address the status and nature of the we, and that doing so will require an analysis of the relation between the we and the I, which in turn will call for a more explicit engagement with the question of selfhood than is customary in contemporary discussions of collective intentionality.
The relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics is controversial. One initial source of co... more The relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics is controversial. One initial source of contention concerns the meaning of both terms, which is far from univocal. Consider, for instance, how the term 'phenomenology' is currently used in parts of cognitive science and analytic philosophy of mind to denote the qualitative character of experience. On this reading, phenomenology is a dimension of experience and one way to raise the question concerning the link between phenomenology and metaphysics is by asking whether the fact that it seems to us that we have subjective experiences warrants the conclusion that there really are subjective experiences. This is an interesting (if perhaps also slightly absurd) question, but it is not one I will pursue in what follows. Rather, my concern will be with a different kind of phenomenology, namely phenomenology understood as a distinct philosophical tradition. It was founded by Edmund Husserl and continued by thinkers such as Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas. This list of names already suggests the next complication, however. Even though they all qualify as phenomenologists, they were independent thinkers with divergent and conflicting views on various issues, including the relation between phenomenology and metaphysis. One reason for these divergent views is obviously that the term 'metaphysics' is also being used quite differently. And indeed, one of the main reasons why the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics remains controversial to this day is precisely due to the ambiguity of the latter term.
Nurse Education Today
Is it possible to train empathy? We suggest a new way, based on insights from phenomenology.
International Journal of Nursing Studies
Empathy is a topic of continuous debate in the nursing literature. Many argue that empathy is ind... more Empathy is a topic of continuous debate in the nursing literature. Many argue that empathy is indispensable to effective nursing practice. Yet others argue that nurses should rather rely on sympathy, compassion, or consolation. However, a more troubling disagreement underlies these debates: There's no consensus on how to define empathy. This lack of consensus is the primary obstacle to a constructive debate over the role and import of empathy in nursing practice. The solution to this problem seems obvious: Nurses need to reach a consensus on the meaning and definition of empathy. But this is easier said than done. Concept analyses, for instance, reveal a profound ambiguity and heterogeneity of the concept of empathy across the nursing literature. Since the term "empathy" is used to refer to a range of perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral phenomena, the presence of a conceptual ambiguity and heterogeneity is hardly surprising. Our proposal is simple. To move forward, we need to return to the basics. We should develop the concept from the ground up. That is, we should begin by identifying and describing the most fundamental form of empathic experience. Once we identify the most fundamental form of empathy, we will be able to distinguish among the more derivative experiences and behaviors that are addressed by the same name and, ideally, determine the place of these phenomena in the field of nursing. The aim of this article is, consequently, to lay the groundwork for a more coherent concept of empathy and thereby for a more fruitful debate over the role of empathy in nursing. In Part 1, we outline the history of the concept of empathy within nursing, explain why nurses are sometimes warry of adapting concepts from other disciplines, and argue that nurses should distinguish between adapting concepts from applied disciplines and from more theoretical disciplines. In Part 2, we show that the distinction between emotional and cognitive empathy-borrowed from theoretical psychology-has been a major factor in nurses' negative attitudes toward emotional empathy. We argue, however, that both concepts fail to capture the most fundamental form of empathy. In Part 3, we draw on and present some of the seminal studies of empathy that can be found in the work of phenomenological philosophers including Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Edith Stein. In Part 4, we outline how their understanding of empathy may facilitate current debates about empathy's role in nursing.
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Papers 2020- by Dan Zahavi
was to discuss whether the ongoing, but relatively distinct,
investigations of relational autonomy and collective
intentionality could crossfertilize. Whereas the concept
of relational autonomy was developed to do justice to the
relational character of selfhood, and as an alternative to
traditional conceptions of autonomy, which were accused
of exaggerating the self-reliance
and social independence
of the self, recent discussions of collective intentionality
have often centered on the question of whether and how
collective intentions differ from aggregations of individual
intentions. As different as they might otherwise be,
theoretical explorations of autonomy and collective intentionality
intersect at a crucial point: both require an
understanding of the relationship between the self and
the group, between individual subjectivity and social life.
The aim of the following paper is to argue that the collective
intentionality literature contains insights that cannot
merely contribute to our understanding of autonomy, but
also prevent us from taking our relationism too far.
a complex interplay between different sources of diagnostically relevant information. In Sect. 4.3, we turn to research on interpersonal understanding. We reconstruct and critically assess some recent discussions about second-person relations, and present our own take on this notion. In Sect. 4.4, we elaborate on a conceptualization
of second-person relations which foregrounds the roles of reciprocity and
communication. In Sect. 4.5, we return to the diagnostic interview and assess the implications of our discussion.
was to discuss whether the ongoing, but relatively distinct,
investigations of relational autonomy and collective
intentionality could crossfertilize. Whereas the concept
of relational autonomy was developed to do justice to the
relational character of selfhood, and as an alternative to
traditional conceptions of autonomy, which were accused
of exaggerating the self-reliance
and social independence
of the self, recent discussions of collective intentionality
have often centered on the question of whether and how
collective intentions differ from aggregations of individual
intentions. As different as they might otherwise be,
theoretical explorations of autonomy and collective intentionality
intersect at a crucial point: both require an
understanding of the relationship between the self and
the group, between individual subjectivity and social life.
The aim of the following paper is to argue that the collective
intentionality literature contains insights that cannot
merely contribute to our understanding of autonomy, but
also prevent us from taking our relationism too far.
a complex interplay between different sources of diagnostically relevant information. In Sect. 4.3, we turn to research on interpersonal understanding. We reconstruct and critically assess some recent discussions about second-person relations, and present our own take on this notion. In Sect. 4.4, we elaborate on a conceptualization
of second-person relations which foregrounds the roles of reciprocity and
communication. In Sect. 4.5, we return to the diagnostic interview and assess the implications of our discussion.
As we argue in the article, in formulating his criticism, Paley completely overlooks a rich tradition of applied phenomenology that dates back to the beginning of the 20th century and which has undergone a momentous revival during the last 20–25 years. That Paley seems oblivious to this tradition is one thing. What is more astonishing is that this also holds true for the vast majority of those scholars working within nursing science who happens to be interested in phenomenology.
The aim of this article is, first, to present and consider Paley’s criticism in some detail and, then, to discuss some of the significant applications of phenomenology that have often been overlooked by qualitative researchers. As has been amply demonstrated over the years, phenomenology can not only make a difference in the handling, analysis, and interpretation of the available data, but also, in how the data are obtained in the first place, for instance, through special interview techniques. We will first consider some central figures in classical phenomenological psychology and phenomenological psychiatry, and then present some of the more recent developments in cognitive science. We will next discuss three concrete cases that demonstrate how phenomenology has been applied in clinical work with patients with schizophrenia, cerebral palsy, and hemispatial neglect.
Our main message to qualitative researchers interested in phenomenology is the following. You should also start to consider and draw inspiration from the way in which phenomenology has been applied outside of the domain of qualitative research. There are very successful applications of phenomenology to be found elsewhere, applications that can offer substantial theoretical and methodological support to qualitative researchers. Relevant resources include classical phenomenological psychology, classical and contemporary phenomenological psychiatry, and contemporary discussions of naturalized phenomenology.
debates about collective intentionality concerns the
notion and status of the we. The question, however, is by
no means new. At the beginning of the last century, it was
already intensively discussed in phenomenology. Whereas
Heidegger argued that a focus on empathy is detrimental to
a proper understanding of the we, and that the latter is more
fundamental than any dyadic interaction, other phenomenologists,
such as Stein, Walther and Husserl, insisted on
the importance of empathy for proper we-experiences. In
this paper, I will present some of the key moves in this
debate and then discuss and assess Husserl’s specific proposal,
according to which reciprocal empathy, second-person
engagement and self-alienation are all important
presuppositions for group-identification and we-identity.
• What is a phenomenological analysis?
• What are the methodological foundations of phenomenology?
• What does phenomenology have to say about embodiment and intersubjectivity?
• How is phenomenology distinguished from, and related to, other fields in philosophy?
• How do ideas from classic phenomenology relate to ongoing debates in psychology and qualitative research?
With a glossary of key terms and suggestions for further reading, the book considers key philosophical arguments around phenomenology, making this an ideal starting point for anyone seeking a concise and accessible introduction to the rich and complex study of phenomenology.