Paul Weirich

University of Missouri Columbia, Philosophy, Faculty Member

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Paul Weirich is a Curators' Distinguished Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Missouri. His most recent book is Rational Responses to Risks (Oxford University Press, 2020).

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Catherine Rowett

University of East Anglia

Dermot Moran

Boston College

Daniel D. Hutto

University of Wollongong

Galen Strawson

The University of Texas at Austin

Martin Kusch

University of Vienna

Timothy Williamson

University of Oxford

Shaun Gallagher

University of Memphis

Dan Zahavi

University of Copenhagen

John Russon

University of Guelph

Emidio Spinelli

Università degli Studi "La Sapienza" di Roma

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Papers by Paul Weirich

Implications

Collective Rationality, 2010

Compositionality

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2010

Cooperative Games

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2010

Review: The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory

Philosophical Books, 2000

The received view of framing

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2022

Philosophy and Modeling and Simulation

Simulation foundations, methods and applications, 2023

Implications

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2010

Epistemic Game Theory and Logic

MDPI eBooks, Jun 5, 2017

Preface to "Epistemic Game Theory and Logic" Epistemic game theory and the systems of logic that ... more Preface to "Epistemic Game Theory and Logic" Epistemic game theory and the systems of logic that support it are crucial for understanding rational behavior in interactive situations in which the outcome for an agent depends, not just on her own behavior, but also on the behavior of those with whom she is interacting. Scholars in many fields study such interactive situations, that is, games of strategy. Epistemic game theory presents the epistemic foundations of a game's solution, taken as a combination of strategies, one for each player in the game, such that each strategy is rational given the combination. It considers the beliefs of the players in a game and shows how, along with the players' goals, their beliefs guide their choices and settle the outcome of their game. Adopting the Bayesian account of probability, as rational degree of belief, it yields Bayesian game theory. Epistemic game theory, because it attends to how players reason strategically in games, contrasts with evolutionary game theory, which applies to non-reasoning organisms such as bacteria. Logic advances rules of inference for strategic reasoning. It contributes not just standard rules of deductive logic, such as modus ponens, but also rules of epistemic logic, such as the rule going from knowledge of a set of propositions to knowledge of their deductive consequences, and rules of probabilistic reasoning such as Bayesian conditionalization, which uses probabilities conditional on receiving some new evidence to form new non-conditional probabilities after receiving exactly that new evidence. Perea (2012) offers an overview, and Weirich (1998) shows how principles of choice support solutions to games of strategy. The papers in the special issue came in response to the journal's call for papers. Diversity of perspectives was a goal. The papers include four by economists, one by computer scientists, three by philosophers, and one by a psychologist. They display a variety of approaches to epistemic game theory and logic. The following paragraphs briefly describe the topics of the papers, grouped according to discipline and within a discipline according to date of publication.

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Realism about Agents: Mistakes

Rational Plans

Cambridge University Press eBooks, Dec 6, 2018

Economic Rationality

Oxford University Press eBooks, Sep 2, 2009

This article examines three competing views entertained by economic theory about the instrumental... more This article examines three competing views entertained by economic theory about the instrumental rationality of decisions. The first says to maximize self-interest, the second to maximize utility, and the third to “satisfice,” that is, to adopt a satisfactory option. Critics argue that the first view is too narrow, that the second overlooks the benefits of teamwork and planning, and that the third, when carefully formulated, reduces to the second. This article defends a refined version of the principle to maximize utility. It discusses generalizations of utility theory to extend it to nonquantitative cases and other cases with nonstandard features. The study of rationality as it bears on law is typically restricted to the uses made of the notion of rationality by the “law and economics movement.” Legal economists accept the traditional economic assumption that rational agents seek primarily to maximize their personal utility.

AFTERWORDS Criticism and Countertheses

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Mar 1, 1981

Collective Rationality

Rational Attitudes toward Risks

Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 20, 2020

Rationality requires aversions to risks, considering them in isolation, but permits attractions t... more Rationality requires aversions to risks, considering them in isolation, but permits attractions to risks, taken as means to attainment of goals. It specifies the strength of an intrinsic aversion to a risk in the sense of a chance of a bad event, but leaves open the strength of an intrinsic aversion to a risk in the sense of an act’s exposure to chance. Principles of consistency and proportionality govern attitudes to risks and attitudes to prospects, taken as chances for good events. Rationality prohibits being more intrinsically averse to losses than attracted to gains of equal magnitude, provided that losses and gains are assessed using their intrinsic utility assignments. However, it permits attitudes to risks to change as risks move into the past. Requirements concerning attitudes to risks and prospects ground evaluation of acts using their expected utilities.

Realistic Standards for Decisions

Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 19, 2004

Calibration

Springer eBooks, Sep 26, 2011

Ideal to Real

Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 19, 2004

The contributors

Synthese, Feb 27, 2009

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Coordination

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2010

Groups

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2010

Implications

Collective Rationality, 2010

Compositionality

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2010

Cooperative Games

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2010

Review: The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory

Philosophical Books, 2000

The received view of framing

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2022

Philosophy and Modeling and Simulation

Simulation foundations, methods and applications, 2023

Implications

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2010

Epistemic Game Theory and Logic

MDPI eBooks, Jun 5, 2017

Download

Realism about Agents: Mistakes

Rational Plans

Cambridge University Press eBooks, Dec 6, 2018

Economic Rationality

Oxford University Press eBooks, Sep 2, 2009

AFTERWORDS Criticism and Countertheses

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Mar 1, 1981

Collective Rationality

Rational Attitudes toward Risks

Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 20, 2020

Realistic Standards for Decisions

Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 19, 2004

Calibration

Springer eBooks, Sep 26, 2011

Ideal to Real

Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 19, 2004

The contributors

Synthese, Feb 27, 2009

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Coordination

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2010

Groups

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2010

Rational Responses to Risks

Oxford University Press, 2020

A philosophical account of risk, such as this book provides, states what risk is, which attitudes... more A philosophical account of risk, such as this book provides, states what risk is, which attitudes to it are rational, and which acts affecting risks are rational. Attention to the nature of risk reveals two types of risk, first, a chance of a bad event, and, second, an act’s risk in the sense of the volatility of its possible outcomes. The distinction is normatively significant because different general principles of rationality govern attitudes to these two types of risk. Rationality strictly regulates attitudes to the chance of a bad event and is more permissive about attitudes to an act’s risk. Principles of rationality governing attitudes to risk also justify evaluating an act according to its expected utility given that the act’s risk, if any, belongs to every possible outcome of the act. For a rational ideal agent, the expected utilities of the acts available in a decision problem explain the agent’s preferences among the acts. Maximizing expected utility is just following preferences among the acts. This view takes an act’s expected utility, not just as a feature of a representation of preferences among acts, but also as a factor in the explanation of preferences among acts. The view extends to evaluations of combination of acts, either simultaneous or in a sequence. It takes account of an agent’s attitudes to an act’s risk without weakening the standard of expected-utility maximization. The book’s theory of risk also grounds a justification of the risk-return evaluation of investments that finance advances, and a generalized version of this type of evaluation that a professional may use to advise clients about risks and that a government regulatory agency may use to make decisions about risks on behalf of the public.

Models of Decision-Making: Simplifying Choices

In decision problems, efficiency recommends deliberations that attend only to relevant considerat... more In decision problems, efficiency recommends deliberations that attend only to relevant considerations. It suggests ignoring past and remote future events, and using only an option’s consequences to evaluate the option. Decision theory puzzles over the justification of such procedures. For safety, it recommends evaluating an option according to the possible world the option realizes despite the inefficiency of such a comprehensive evaluation. This book uses warranted separation of considerations to justify evaluating an option according to its consequences exclusively. The justification shows that suitably designed methods of dividing a world’s utility into parts allow ranking options according to just a part of the worlds they realize. The methods introduce types of utility of limited evaluative scope and treat realizations of basic intrinsic desires and aversions as the atoms of evaluation. The book’s theoretical account of appropriate simplification of deliberations guides practical efforts to streamline rational choice.

Collective Rationality: Equilibrium in Cooperative Games

This book argues that a group's act is rational if the acts that constitute it are rational. Bui... more

Realistic Decision Theory: Rules for Nonideal Agents in Nonideal Circumstances

Normative decision theory adopts strong idealizations about agents and their circumstances. This... more

Decision Space: Multidimensional Utility Analysis

In a decision problem, an option's utility may be analyzed using the dimension of possible outcom... more

Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules

Epistemic game theory considers how in a game the players' rational choices lead to an equilibriu... more

Labeling Genetically Modified Food: The Philosophical and Legal Debate

Most consumers want to know whether food they purchase contains genetically modified ingredients.... more

Probability and Utility for Decision Theory: Traditional and Modern Concepts

What interpretations of probability and utility best suit decision theory? Twentieth century acc... more What interpretations of probability and utility best suit decision theory? Twentieth century accounts of subjective probability and utility do not give probability and utility the power to explain an agent's preferences among the options in a decision problem. This work constructs alternative accounts that supply the missing explanatory power.

Weirich Paul, Noncomprehensive and Conditional Rationality

by ProtoSociology An International Journal and Interdisciplinary Project and Paul Weirich

Weirich Paul, Noncomprehensive and Conditional Rationality

Rationality's evaluations of beliefs, desires, and acts are variable in at least two ways. First,... more Rationality's evaluations of beliefs, desires, and acts are variable in at least two ways. First, its evaluations have variable scope. For example, an act's evaluation may assess the world that would be realized if the act were performed, or, less comprehensively, the act's causal consequences. Second, rationality's evaluations may be conditional. For example, an act's evaluation may assess the act granting the agent's beliefs and desires, however irrational they may be. This essay characterizes noncomprehensive and conditional evaluations. Then it uses distinctions in types of evaluation to resolve puzzles about rationality's evaluations. The puzzles concern the principle that "ought" implies "can," Newcomb's problem, and the conflict between actualism and possibilism. The essay's final section formulates a principle of detachment for a type of conditional rationality that grants mistakes the condition includes.

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