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Yuval Avnur

Scripps College, Philosophy, Faculty Member

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Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

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University of Oxford

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University of Wollongong

The University of Texas at Austin

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Utrecht University

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The University of Texas at Austin

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University of Memphis

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Papers by Yuval Avnur

An Agnostic Defends God: How Science and Philosophy Support Agnosticism by Bryan Frances

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

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Review of: Bryan Frances. An Agnostic Defends God: How Science and Philosophy Support Agnosticism

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

-

Pascal's birds: Signs and significance in nature*

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Jan 9, 2023

Pascal's Birds: Signs and Significance in Nature

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2023

Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy by David J. Chalmers (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022)

Philosophy, Aug 11, 2022

Justification as a loaded notion

Synthese, 2019

The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premi... more The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premises whose conclusion is that we lack justification for perceptual beliefs. Typically, this conclusion is deemed unacceptable, so a theory is offered that posits conditions for justification on which some premise is false. The theory defended here is more general, and explains why the paradox arises in the first place. Like Strawson's (Introduction to logical theory, Wiley, New York, 1952) "ordinary language" approach to induction, the theory posits something built into the very notion of justification: it is loaded with a bias towards the proposition that we are not massively deceived. Beyond the paradox, remaining skeptical problems consist of metaphysical and practical questions: whether we are massively deceived, or why we should use our loaded notion rather than some other. Such challenges have profound epistemological significance, but they are not problems that an a priori theory of justification can solve.

AnnalisaColiva, DanièleMoyal-Sharrock (eds.): Hinge Epistemology (The Netherlands: Brill, 2016). vi + 278, price €70.00 pb

Philosophical Investigations, 2018

The Skeptical Paradox and the Generality of Closure ( and other principles )

In this essay I defend a solution to a skeptical paradox. The paradox I focus on concerns epistem... more In this essay I defend a solution to a skeptical paradox. The paradox I focus on concerns epistemic justification (rather than knowledge), and skeptical scenarios that entail that most of our ordinary beliefs about the external world are false. This familiar skeptical paradox hinges on a “closure” principle. The solution is to restrict closure, despite its first appearing as a fully general principle, so that it can no longer give rise to the paradox. This has some extra advantages. First, it suggests a general strategy that provides solutions to other versions of the paradox, not just those that depend on closure. Second, it clarifies the relation between the paradox and other kinds of skeptical problem.

Our faith in the senses

I offer a non-standard solution to a well-known paradox about justified belief, and in doing so o... more

What's Wrong with the Online Echo Chamber: A Motivated Reasoning Account

Journal of Applied Philosophy

In this 'age of information', some worry that we get our news from online 'echo chambers', news f... more In this 'age of information', some worry that we get our news from online 'echo chambers', news feeds on our social media accounts that contain information from like-minded sources. Filtering our information in this way seems prima facie problematic from an epistemic perspective. I vindicate this intuition by offering an explanation of what is wrong with online echo chambers that appeals to a particular kind of motivated reasoning, or bias due to one's interests. This sort of bias affects, not which evidence one is exposed to, but how one makes use of the evidence that one has, on the basis of one's interests. I argue that consulting an online echo chamber often facilitates and amplifies this bias. I then draw some general conclusions about the potential downside of having ready access to so much information.

On Losing Your Self in Your Afterlife

Self or No-Self, 2018

Justification as a Loaded Notion

Synthese

The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premi... more The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premises whose conclusion is that we lack justification for perceptual beliefs. Typically, this conclusion is deemed unacceptable, so a theory is offered that posits conditions for justification on which some premise is false. The theory defended here is more general, and explains why the paradox arises in the first place. Like Strawson’s (1952) “ordinary language” approach to induction, the theory posits something built into the very notion of justification: it is loaded with a bias towards the proposition that we are not massively deceived. Beyond the paradox, remaining skeptical problems consist of metaphysical and practical questions: whether we are massively deceived, or why we should use our loaded notion rather than some other. Such challenges have profound epistemological significance, but they are not problems that an a priori theory of justification can solve.

Unicorn Agnosticism

Inquiry, 2019

Atheists and agnostics have a vexed relationship. Atheists often regard agnostics as timid, or pe... more Atheists and agnostics have a vexed relationship. Atheists often regard agnostics as timid, or perhaps as disguised apologists. Agnostics often regard atheists as dogmatic hypocrites: they proclaim something on insufficient evidence, while accusing theists of this. This dynamic is familiar from the academic and popular literature. Here, I consider a more radical conflict between the two, based on Kripkean semantics for empty terms applied to atheism. Sorensen (2018) christened the Kripke-inspired formulation of atheism “Unicorn Atheism” and argued from there to the incoherence of agnosticism. But, I argue, the objection fails and instead presents an opportunity to reformulate agnosticism. By appreciating the relevance of Kripkean semantics to the issue, a better understanding of the two positions, and their conflict, emerges.

The Nature and Limits of Skeptical Criticism

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2019

Is there something wrong with the way we form beliefs about our surroundings? Most people assume ... more Is there something wrong with the way we form beliefs about our surroundings? Most people assume not. But there is a character, the skeptic, who disagrees. What, exactly, is this skeptic claiming, and why should this concern us? We are, after all, just humans doing what humans do: forming beliefs on the basis of our faculties. In what sense could this be wrong, and how could it matter if it is? By considering the way in which the notions of vice and criticism can express these questions, we can clarify them and discern some potential answers. These answers, I will suggest, can explain not only why we shouldn't worry too much, but also the lasting appeal of skeptical problems. The idea is that we can accept, or grant for the sake of argument, that we fall short of some important standard while insisting that it is entirely unreasonable to criticize people, or ourselves, on that basis.

What Is Wrong With Agnostic Belief?

Agnosticism: Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought (2020, OUP)

On What Does Rationality Hinge?

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, Volume 7, Issue 4, pages 246 – 257 Publication Year : 2017

The two main components of Coliva's view are Moderatism and Extended Rationality. According to Mo... more The two main components of Coliva's view are Moderatism and Extended Rationality. According to Moderatism, a belief about specific material objects is perceptually justified iff, absent defeaters, one has the appropriate course of experience and it is assumed that there is an external world. I grant Moderatism and instead focus on Extended Rationality, according to which it is epistemically rational to believe evidentially warranted propositions and to accept those unwarrantable assumptions that make the acquisition of perceptual warrants possible and are therefore constitutive of ordinary evidential warrants. I suggest that, even though Extended Rationality might be true, it cannot do the work that Coliva wants it to do. Although my objections do not show that it is false, they can serve to clarify what sorts of problem a theory of justification or rationality could possibly address. This provides an alternative to Coliva's view of the skeptical problem and the question, on what does rationality hinge?

How Irrelevant Influences Bias Belief*

by Dion Scott-Kakures and Yuval Avnur

Philosophical Perspectives, 2015

On An Irrelevant Regress

Theoria

Wilson (2012) argues that Cartesian Skepticism leads to a vicious regress that can only be stopp... more Wilson (2012) argues that Cartesian Skepticism leads to a vicious regress that can only be
stopped by rejecting Cartesian Skepticism. If she is right, Wilson has solved one of philosophy’s
enduring problems. However, her regress is irrelevant to Cartesian Skepticism. This is evident
once the proposition that we should have doubts, the person who has doubts, and the person who
thinks that we should have doubts are carefully distinguished.

Excuses for Hume's Skepticism

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

I offer a novel interpretation of Hume on skepticism, drawing on a theory of excuses—in contrast ... more I offer a novel interpretation of Hume on skepticism, drawing on a theory of excuses—in contrast to justifications and exemptions. Hume’s excuse shows that criticizing one’s beliefs on the basis of skeptical arguments is unreasonable when forming such beliefs is a primary aspect of human nature. Generally, it is unreasonable to criticize a creature for having a feature that is part of the nature of such creatures. The appeal to universal aspects of human nature as an indulgence rather than justification can be found throughout Hume’s texts. Though this excuse holds regardless of whether an individual’s belief is flawed according to some ideal, non-species-specific standard, it does not mitigate criticism of the whole species. Hume accepted the species-wide judgment that humans are epistemically limited, even while excusing individual humans for exhibiting human frailty. Once this is clarified, the differences from and advantages over familiar, “naturalist” interpretations emerge.

NO CLOSURE ON SKEPTICISM

Pacific Philosophical …, Jan 1, 2011

This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standar... more This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure-based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.

An Agnostic Defends God: How Science and Philosophy Support Agnosticism by Bryan Frances

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

-

Review of: Bryan Frances. An Agnostic Defends God: How Science and Philosophy Support Agnosticism

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

-

Pascal's birds: Signs and significance in nature*

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Jan 9, 2023

Pascal's Birds: Signs and Significance in Nature

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2023

Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy by David J. Chalmers (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022)

Philosophy, Aug 11, 2022

Justification as a loaded notion

Synthese, 2019

The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premi... more The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premises whose conclusion is that we lack justification for perceptual beliefs. Typically, this conclusion is deemed unacceptable, so a theory is offered that posits conditions for justification on which some premise is false. The theory defended here is more general, and explains why the paradox arises in the first place. Like Strawson's (Introduction to logical theory, Wiley, New York, 1952) "ordinary language" approach to induction, the theory posits something built into the very notion of justification: it is loaded with a bias towards the proposition that we are not massively deceived. Beyond the paradox, remaining skeptical problems consist of metaphysical and practical questions: whether we are massively deceived, or why we should use our loaded notion rather than some other. Such challenges have profound epistemological significance, but they are not problems that an a priori theory of justification can solve.

AnnalisaColiva, DanièleMoyal-Sharrock (eds.): Hinge Epistemology (The Netherlands: Brill, 2016). vi + 278, price €70.00 pb

Philosophical Investigations, 2018

The Skeptical Paradox and the Generality of Closure ( and other principles )

In this essay I defend a solution to a skeptical paradox. The paradox I focus on concerns epistem... more In this essay I defend a solution to a skeptical paradox. The paradox I focus on concerns epistemic justification (rather than knowledge), and skeptical scenarios that entail that most of our ordinary beliefs about the external world are false. This familiar skeptical paradox hinges on a “closure” principle. The solution is to restrict closure, despite its first appearing as a fully general principle, so that it can no longer give rise to the paradox. This has some extra advantages. First, it suggests a general strategy that provides solutions to other versions of the paradox, not just those that depend on closure. Second, it clarifies the relation between the paradox and other kinds of skeptical problem.

Our faith in the senses

I offer a non-standard solution to a well-known paradox about justified belief, and in doing so o... more

What's Wrong with the Online Echo Chamber: A Motivated Reasoning Account

Journal of Applied Philosophy

In this 'age of information', some worry that we get our news from online 'echo chambers', news f... more In this 'age of information', some worry that we get our news from online 'echo chambers', news feeds on our social media accounts that contain information from like-minded sources. Filtering our information in this way seems prima facie problematic from an epistemic perspective. I vindicate this intuition by offering an explanation of what is wrong with online echo chambers that appeals to a particular kind of motivated reasoning, or bias due to one's interests. This sort of bias affects, not which evidence one is exposed to, but how one makes use of the evidence that one has, on the basis of one's interests. I argue that consulting an online echo chamber often facilitates and amplifies this bias. I then draw some general conclusions about the potential downside of having ready access to so much information.

On Losing Your Self in Your Afterlife

Self or No-Self, 2018

Justification as a Loaded Notion

Synthese

The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premi... more The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premises whose conclusion is that we lack justification for perceptual beliefs. Typically, this conclusion is deemed unacceptable, so a theory is offered that posits conditions for justification on which some premise is false. The theory defended here is more general, and explains why the paradox arises in the first place. Like Strawson’s (1952) “ordinary language” approach to induction, the theory posits something built into the very notion of justification: it is loaded with a bias towards the proposition that we are not massively deceived. Beyond the paradox, remaining skeptical problems consist of metaphysical and practical questions: whether we are massively deceived, or why we should use our loaded notion rather than some other. Such challenges have profound epistemological significance, but they are not problems that an a priori theory of justification can solve.

Unicorn Agnosticism

Inquiry, 2019

Atheists and agnostics have a vexed relationship. Atheists often regard agnostics as timid, or pe... more Atheists and agnostics have a vexed relationship. Atheists often regard agnostics as timid, or perhaps as disguised apologists. Agnostics often regard atheists as dogmatic hypocrites: they proclaim something on insufficient evidence, while accusing theists of this. This dynamic is familiar from the academic and popular literature. Here, I consider a more radical conflict between the two, based on Kripkean semantics for empty terms applied to atheism. Sorensen (2018) christened the Kripke-inspired formulation of atheism “Unicorn Atheism” and argued from there to the incoherence of agnosticism. But, I argue, the objection fails and instead presents an opportunity to reformulate agnosticism. By appreciating the relevance of Kripkean semantics to the issue, a better understanding of the two positions, and their conflict, emerges.

The Nature and Limits of Skeptical Criticism

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2019

Is there something wrong with the way we form beliefs about our surroundings? Most people assume ... more Is there something wrong with the way we form beliefs about our surroundings? Most people assume not. But there is a character, the skeptic, who disagrees. What, exactly, is this skeptic claiming, and why should this concern us? We are, after all, just humans doing what humans do: forming beliefs on the basis of our faculties. In what sense could this be wrong, and how could it matter if it is? By considering the way in which the notions of vice and criticism can express these questions, we can clarify them and discern some potential answers. These answers, I will suggest, can explain not only why we shouldn't worry too much, but also the lasting appeal of skeptical problems. The idea is that we can accept, or grant for the sake of argument, that we fall short of some important standard while insisting that it is entirely unreasonable to criticize people, or ourselves, on that basis.

What Is Wrong With Agnostic Belief?

Agnosticism: Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought (2020, OUP)

On What Does Rationality Hinge?

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, Volume 7, Issue 4, pages 246 – 257 Publication Year : 2017

The two main components of Coliva's view are Moderatism and Extended Rationality. According to Mo... more The two main components of Coliva's view are Moderatism and Extended Rationality. According to Moderatism, a belief about specific material objects is perceptually justified iff, absent defeaters, one has the appropriate course of experience and it is assumed that there is an external world. I grant Moderatism and instead focus on Extended Rationality, according to which it is epistemically rational to believe evidentially warranted propositions and to accept those unwarrantable assumptions that make the acquisition of perceptual warrants possible and are therefore constitutive of ordinary evidential warrants. I suggest that, even though Extended Rationality might be true, it cannot do the work that Coliva wants it to do. Although my objections do not show that it is false, they can serve to clarify what sorts of problem a theory of justification or rationality could possibly address. This provides an alternative to Coliva's view of the skeptical problem and the question, on what does rationality hinge?

How Irrelevant Influences Bias Belief*

by Dion Scott-Kakures and Yuval Avnur

Philosophical Perspectives, 2015

On An Irrelevant Regress

Theoria

Wilson (2012) argues that Cartesian Skepticism leads to a vicious regress that can only be stopp... more Wilson (2012) argues that Cartesian Skepticism leads to a vicious regress that can only be
stopped by rejecting Cartesian Skepticism. If she is right, Wilson has solved one of philosophy’s
enduring problems. However, her regress is irrelevant to Cartesian Skepticism. This is evident
once the proposition that we should have doubts, the person who has doubts, and the person who
thinks that we should have doubts are carefully distinguished.

Excuses for Hume's Skepticism

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

I offer a novel interpretation of Hume on skepticism, drawing on a theory of excuses—in contrast ... more I offer a novel interpretation of Hume on skepticism, drawing on a theory of excuses—in contrast to justifications and exemptions. Hume’s excuse shows that criticizing one’s beliefs on the basis of skeptical arguments is unreasonable when forming such beliefs is a primary aspect of human nature. Generally, it is unreasonable to criticize a creature for having a feature that is part of the nature of such creatures. The appeal to universal aspects of human nature as an indulgence rather than justification can be found throughout Hume’s texts. Though this excuse holds regardless of whether an individual’s belief is flawed according to some ideal, non-species-specific standard, it does not mitigate criticism of the whole species. Hume accepted the species-wide judgment that humans are epistemically limited, even while excusing individual humans for exhibiting human frailty. Once this is clarified, the differences from and advantages over familiar, “naturalist” interpretations emerge.

NO CLOSURE ON SKEPTICISM

Pacific Philosophical …, Jan 1, 2011

This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standar... more This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure-based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.