The Multidisciplinary Program in the Humanities

Idan Shimony (2011). “What is (the) Matter – Locke, Leibniz, and the Controversy that Could not Take Place.” In H. Breger, J. Herbst, and S. Erdner (eds.), Natur und Subjekt, IX. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Hannover: Gottfried-Wilhem-Leibniz-Gesellschaft, 1070-1079.

Idan Shimony (2016). "Leibniz, the Young Kant, and Boscovich on the Relationality of Space." In Wenchao Li et al. (eds), Für Unser Glück Oder Das Glück Anderer, X. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, vol. 2, pp. 73-85.

Idan Shimony (2018). "Kant’s First Antinomy and Modern Cosmology." In Konstantinos Boudouris (ed.), Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Documentation Center & the Greek Philosophical Society, vol. 60, pp. 31-36.

Kant’s first antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason deals with the question of the size of the world. The temporal portion of the problem, on which I will focus in this paper, concerns the question of whether the world has a beginning in time or whether it exists eternally. Kant is sometimes understood as arguing that since neither one of the conflicting options can be confirmed, one needs to reject the common mistake of both opponents, namely, that we know the world as a thing in itself, and embrace instead Kant’s transcendental idealism. In view of modern cosmology, Kant’s resolution of the first antinomy may appear outdated. Modern cosmological theories, after all, do suggest that the world evolved from a singular point by a big bang or through a cycle of successive expanding and contracting phases. I wish to argue in this paper that Kant’s analysis of the first antinomy does not involve questions of confirmability and that its lessons apply to modern cosmology as well. Kant’s analysis challenges the view that the world as a whole is a proper object for human investigation, but it does not reject the legitimacy of the cosmological project of explaining the current state of the universe and its evolution in terms of earlier events in the history of the world. It merely shows that modern theories are misguided only insofar as they attempt to affirm that the singular point is the absolute beginning of the world or that the cycle of expansion and contraction is ultimately infinite. Thus, Kant does not deny science as a legitimate avenue of research. He rather keeps cosmology from sliding into the dogmatic paths of traditional cosmological speculations, which purported to account for the absolute origin of the world by means of theological and metaphysical considerations.

Idan Shimony (2017). "What Was Kant’s Contribution to the Understanding of Biology?" Kant Yearbook (9), pp. 159-178.

Kant’s theory of biology in the Critique of the Power of Judgment may be rejected as obsolete and attacked from two opposite perspectives. In light of recent advances in biology one can claim contra Kant, on the one hand, that biological phenomena, which Kant held could only be explicated with the help of teleological principles, can in fact be explained in an entirely mechanical manner, or on the other, that despite the irreducibility of biology to physico-mechanical explanations, it is nonetheless proper science. I argue in response that Kant’s analysis of organisms is by no means obsolete. It reveals biology’s uniqueness in much the same way as several current theorists do. It brings to the fore the unique purposive characteristics of living phenomena, which are encapsulated in Kant’s concept of “natural end” and which must be explicated in natural terms in order for biology to become a science. I maintain that Kant’s reluctance to consider biology proper science is not a consequence of his critical philosophy but rather of his inability to complete this task. Kant lacked an appropriate theoretical framework, such as provided later by modern biology, which would enable the integration of the unique features of biology in an empirical system. Nevertheless, as I show in this paper, the conceptual problems with which Kant struggled attest more to the relevance and depth of his insights than to the shortcomings of his view. His contribution to the biological thought consists in insisting on an empirical approach to biology and in providing the essential philosophical underpinning of the autonomous status of biology.

Idan Shimony (2018). "Kant on the Peculiarity of the Human Understanding and the Antinomy of the Teleological Power of Judgment." In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing, David Wagner (Eds.), Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 1677–1684.

Kant argues in the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment that the first stage in resolving the problem of teleology is conceiving it correctly. He explains that the conflict between mechanism and teleology, properly conceived, is an antinomy of the power of judgment in its reflective use regarding regulative maxims, and not an antinomy of the power of judgment in its determining use regarding constitutive principles. The matter in hand does not concern objective propositions regarding the possibility of objects or actual features of certain objects, namely, organisms. It is rather a methodological issue as to the appropriate way to explain the generation, development, and function of organisms. Taken in this manner as subjective maxims guiding the explanation and inquiry of organisms, the principles of mechanism and teleology need not necessarily be seen as contradictorily opposed but instead can be combined in the study of organisms. This, however, is not enough to complete the analysis of the antinomy of the teleological power of judgment. In order to show that there is an antinomy in this case, Kant has to establish that both seemingly conflicting maxims are necessary and natural to the human mind. He does it by grounding them in the ‘special character’ or peculiarity (Eigentümlichkeit) of the human understanding. However, it is not entirely clear just what exactly this peculiarity of the human understanding is. Paul Guyer argues that Kant suggests two different accounts of the peculiarity of the human intellect. According to one account, this peculiarity consists in the fact that our understanding forms general concepts and according to another, in its propensity to proceed from the parts to the whole. I will argue in this paper that Kant puts forward a single account, in which the combination of these two features demonstrate the peculiarity of the human understanding manifested in the encounter with organisms. This account explains the necessity of the regulative maxims of mechanism and teleology, and thus completes Kant’s analysis of the antinomy of the teleological power of judgment.

The following article deals with the story of two German Jewish brothers, Alfred Lemm and Siegfried Lehmann. The first—a forgotten journalist and writer, the second—a doctor and educator, the founder of the Ben Shemen Youth Village in Mandate Palestine. Through the specific story of the two brothers, the article traces the path of messianic antiurban ideas prevalent in expressionist avant-garde circles in pre–World War I Europe, to the circles of German Jewish Zionism and from them to Palestine-Israel. Though German expressionism was itself an urban intellectual phenomenon, expressionist prose often exemplified antiurban and antimodern sentiments, as in the case of Lemm's prose. According to Lemm, redemption from the ills of modern society shall be found in withdrawal from the modern city and return to physical and metaphysical “roots.” Lemm's antiurban attitude influenced his brother Siegfried and found its full manifestation in the founding of the Ben Shemen Youth Village in 1927.

This paper presents a preliminary study of a little-known medieval Jewish philosopher, Joseph ben Moses Qilti 'the Greek'. In the first part of the paper, I present a synthesis of the fragments of information that we possess regarding Qilti's life: the period in which he likely lived, his biography, and his cultural milieu. In the second part, I offer a summary of Qilti's surviving works, none of which have been published previously. My discussion addresses the themes found in these works, as well as questions of attribution: I argue that some writings can be ascribed to Qilti with relative certainty, while others which have been attributed to him previously are likely not his work. Finally, in the Appendix, I present excerpts from two of Qilti's works, each illustrating a different dimension of his writing: First, a section of Qilti's supercommentary to passages in the biblical commentary of Abraham ibn Ezra, based on a lone manuscript. And second, a critical version of the opening chapter of Qilti's work on logic, Minḥat Yehudah, based on the three extant manuscripts.

The intellectual affinity between Thomas Reid, on one hand, and American pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, on the other, has been noted by several scholars. Indeed, Peirce himself professed an admiration for Reid and referred to his own Pragmatism as entailing what he called “Critical Common-sensism”. In recent times, a number of scholars – chiefly Baumann, Magnus, and Lundestad – have investigated the pragmatist elements in Reid’s thought. Each has identified important ways in which Reid prefigured central themes in American pragmatist thought, though none has gone so far as to label Reid himself a pragmatist. In this paper, I demonstrate the great extent of the similarities between Reid and some of the early American pragmatists. In light of these affinities, the term “pragmatist” may, in my opinion, be helpful for categorising Reid’s thought. My central claim, however, is not merely a terminological one: Rather, I attempt to demonstrate the deep and broad intellectual affinity between Reid’s “Common Sense” philosophy and major trends in American Pragmatism, by shedding light on a number of distinct and central shared features.

Born around 1280, the Provencal Jewish philosopher Joseph ibn Kaspi was a prolific writer whose works touched upon a wide range of subjects. I present here an English translation of the eighth chapter of his final work, The Silver is Spent (Tam ha-kesef ). In this chapter, Ibn Kaspi discusses the coming of the Messiah and the rebuilding of the temple in Jerusalem. Coloured by his Aristotelian philosophical outlook, the chapter has a number of interesting features, including its naturalistic approach to history, and the arguments presented for the rationality of belief in a future messianic era.

Joseph Ibn Kaspi was among the most prolific philosophical writers in one of the most vibrant, productive, creative periods in the history of Jewish philosophy. Born around 1280 in Provence, Ibn Kaspi penned works engaging a broad range of fields, including philosophy, theology, grammar, logic, biblical exegesis, and interreligious polemics. In Joseph Ibn Kaspi: Portrait of a Hebrew Philosopher in Medieval Provence, Adrian Sackson asks the question: What was Ibn Kaspi’s overarching intellectual project? The book focuses on several key themes: Ibn Kaspi’s conception of the formative (not just discursive) function of philosophy; his multi-layered esotericism; his distinct approach to the interpretation of Maimonides; his Maimonidean-philosophical approach to the interpretation of religious texts and practices; his Platonic political thought; his approach to messianism, and his attendant conception of the nature of human history.

Moses Mendelssohn, arguably the founding figure of modern Jewish philosophy, famously quipped that it was the hours of his youth spent studying the philosophical work of another Moses—Moses Maimonides—that left him with his famously crooked posture. This study investigates one important aspect of the relationship between Mendelssohn and Maimonides: their respective attitudes toward anthropomorphic language in the Bible. Much of the first part of Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed is devoted to reinterpretation of scriptural language in light of Maimonides’s non-anthropomorphic, incorporeal conception of God. These chapters constitute a central plank of Maimonides’s religious agenda. Like Maimonides, Mendelssohn was both a philosopher and a religious Jew. His most extensive project intended for a Jewish audience was his German translation of the Pentateuch, accompanied by a Hebrew commentary, known as the Bi’ur. This study examines the manner in which Mendelssohn saw fit to interpret precisely the same set of biblical terms selected by Maimonides for philosophical reinterpretation. Through an investigation of Mendelssohn’s approach to anthropomorphism, divine incorporeality, and philosophical reinterpretation in the biblical commentary, I hope to shed light on an important dimension of the nature of his engagement with Maimonides.