Papers by Alfredo Paternoster
Sistemi intelligenti, 2010
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Sistemi intelligenti, 2013
In this article I discuss the question whether cognitive unconscious is actually mental. In the f... more In this article I discuss the question whether cognitive unconscious is actually mental. In the first section I introduce the notion of cognitive unconscious, focusing in particular on the differences between the cognitive unconscious and the Freudian one. The second section contains a critical analysis of Searle's argument (the so-called "connection principle") against the mental nature of cognitive unconscious. In the last section I explain how and to what extent cognitive unconscious can be regarded as a genuine piece of mind.
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An overview of the book is given. In this book, Di Francesco, Marraffa and Paternoster offer a th... more An overview of the book is given. In this book, Di Francesco, Marraffa and Paternoster offer a theory of the self (which is at the same time a theory of self-consciousness) whose core ideas are that (1) the self is a process, the activity of self-representing of a psychobiological system, and (2) this process aims mainly at defending the self-conscious subject against the threat of its metaphysical inconsistence. In other words, the self is essentially a repertoire of psychological maneuvers whose outcome is a self-representation aimed at coping with the fundamental fragility of the human subject. It is a constructive process that starts in the very early stages of our life and runs unceasingly during all our life.
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We focus on the relation between emotions and consciousness in Damasio's theory. We will argu... more We focus on the relation between emotions and consciousness in Damasio's theory. We will argue that, in the model of emotional processes offered by Damasio, there are a few tensions. Yet, these could be solved adopting a gradualist framework in which the distinction between core consciousness and extended consciousness is fuzzy.
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Lingua E Stile, 1997
In this work I discuss the opposition between atomistic and holistic semantics, trying to clarify... more In this work I discuss the opposition between atomistic and holistic semantics, trying to clarify some confusion concerning the notion of semantic holism. I will be concerned only with a linguistic version of holism, ignoring other variants which are under certain aspects semantic. In the first section I show that some alleged versions of semantic holism are either implausible or not well defined. In the second section I discuss in detail the argument proposed by Fodor and Lepore (1992). According to them, there is no intermediate position between semantic atomism and holism. Fodor, in particular, claims that holism entails very harmful consequences for philosophy of mind and epistemology, so he defends an atomistic (punctuate) conception of meaning. I try to show that this attitude is not justified and, in the last section, I propose an alternative, molecolaristic account of semantics. According to this point of view, what is typically called - not very perspicuously - holism is either a clearly implausible thesis, or an innocuous and reasonable description of semantic phenomena
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Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, Oct 31, 2016
According to some critics of the generativist program, recursion is not a linguistic universal, t... more According to some critics of the generativist program, recursion is not a linguistic universal, thus it cannot be regarded as the distinctive property of natural language. The criticism is based on a counterexample: Piraha language, which seems to be devoid of any nestled structure. Moreover, there are other languages, such as Bininj Gun-wok, Kathlamet and Kayardild, in which nestled structures are very rare or limited to only one level of nestling. In this paper I propose to address this issue not from the point of view of the ( stricto sensu ) universality of recursion, but, instead, from the point of view of its explanatory role. In other words, the real question is to what extent we need recursion to explain how language works. More specifically, I will argue that: i ) recursion is the best explanation of the discrete infinity –which is a constitutive property of language; and ii ) syntax must have a recursive structure, because it must express conceptual structures that are in turn recursive.
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Dialectica, Dec 1, 2008
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Giornale italiano di psicologia, 2013
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Starting from the premise that common-sense realism (about the existence of the external world) i... more Starting from the premise that common-sense realism (about the existence of the external world) is non-negotiable, i.e., from the idea that the presence of the object as something separate and independent from us is inescapable, in this paper I will defend the thesis that the best justification of realism requires direct realism in the philosophy of perception and I will argue for a relational version of direct realism.
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This book presents a theory of the self whose core principle is that the consciousness of the sel... more This book presents a theory of the self whose core principle is that the consciousness of the self is a process of self-representing that runs throughout our life. This process aims primarily at defending the self-conscious subject against the threat of its metaphysical inconsistence. In other words, the self is essentially a repertoire of psychological manoeuvres whose outcome is self-representation aimed at coping with the fundamental fragility of the human subject. This picture of the self differs from both the idealist and the eliminative approaches widely represented in contemporary discussion. Against the idealist approach, this book contends that rather than the self being primitive and logically prior, it is the result of a process of construction that originates in subpersonal unconscious processes. On the other hand, it also rejects the anti-realistic, eliminative argument that, from the non-primary, derivative nature of the self, infers its status as an illusory by-product of real neurobiological events, devoid of any explanatory role.
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Epistemologia, 2003
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In this paper, I discuss three questions concerning the alleged coherence between direct realism ... more In this paper, I discuss three questions concerning the alleged coherence between direct realism and other parts of Searle’s theory of perception. The outcome of the discussion is that, despite the clarity of his arguments and the commonsensical character of his main theses, Searle has hardly succeeded in justifying his theory, and for a fundamental reason: direct realism is very likely more a constraint on a theory of perception than a substantive theory one can argue for.
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Papers by Alfredo Paternoster