FAPSE

Although a large number of studies have demonstrated that a motor response to a visual stimulus is, at least to some extent, independent of the perceptual response, little effort has been spent on the investigation of the explicit characteristics of this independency. In the present experiment, observers were presented with an S1–S2 stimulus-pair, with S1 within the threshold range and with S2 highly suprathreshold. S2 was displayed either at the same location as S1 (masked condition), or some degree to the left or right of S1 (non-masked). Both the observers’ sensitivity to S1 and simple RTs elicited by the stimulus pair were jointly assessed on a trial-by-trial basis. Response times decreased with increasing S1 contrast for perceptual Hits both when S1 was masked by S2 and when it was not, but for Misses only when S1 was masked, though to a lesser extent than for Hits. When RTs are collapsed across perceptual Hits and Misses for any given S1-contrast, they were independent of whether S1 was masked or not. The data indicate that the motor system has a fixed, high-energy threshold, whereas the perceptual system has a d′-dependent criterion that can either be higher or lower than the motor threshold—depending on the particular conditions.

The metajudgment of motor responses refers to our ability to evaluate the accuracy of our own actions. Can humans metajudge the duration of their Reaction Times (RTs) to a light-flash and the accuracy of their reproduction of a reference time interval bounded by two light flashes (Anticipatory Response Time, ART)? A series of four distinct experiments shows that RT_Meta and ART_Metajudgments are possible but with accuracies about ×2.4 and ×3 poorer than the corresponding RT and ART ones. In order to reveal the origin of this drop in performance, we ask whether a visual feedback synchronous with subjects’ key-presses could improve performance. We show that overall the presence of a visual feedback does not significantly improve metajudgment accuracy although such a trend is noticeable in ART_Meta. We then compare these performances with the passive perceptual estimation of the played back (Pb) RT and ART time intervals when bounded by two (RT_Pb) and three (ART_Pb) light flashes. We show that RT_Meta and RT_Pb accuracies are close to equal, but that ART_Meta is about ×2 less accurate than ART_Pb which in turn is ×1.5 less accurate than ART. The latter observation fails however to reach statistical significance hence not sustaining proposals that active time estimation is more reliable than passive one. The whole dataset is accounted for by a clock-type model where duration estimation performance is limited by four noise sources (visual, clock-count, motor and proprioceptive + efference copy) plus one proper to ART_Meta task. It is proposed that the latter reflects the impossibility for the time-counting system to use the same time origin more than once.

Cardoso-Leite P, Gorea A. Comparison of perceptual and motor decisions via confidence judgments and saccade curvature. . This study investigated the effects on perceptual and motor decisions of low-contrast distractors, presented 5°on the left and/or the right of the fixation point. Perceptual decisions were assessed with a yes/no (distractor) detection task. Motor decisions were assessed via these distractors' effects on the trajectory of an impending saccade to a distinct imperative stimulus, presented 10°above fixation 50 ms after the distractor(s). Saccade curvature models postulate that distractors activate loci on a motor map that evoke reflexive saccades and that the distractor evoked activity is inhibited to prevent reflexive orienting to the cost of causing a saccade curvature away from the distractor. Depending on whether or not each of these processes depends on perceptual detection, one can predict the relationships between saccades' curvature and perceptual responses (classified as correct rejections, misses, false alarms, and hits). The results show that saccades curve away from distractors only when observers report them to be present. Furthermore, saccade deviation is correlated (on a trial-by-trial basis) with the inferred internal response associated with the perceptual report: the stronger the distractor-evoked perceptual response, the more saccades deviate away from the distractor. Also in contrast with a supersensitive motor system, perceptual sensitivity is systematically higher than the motor sensitivity derived from the distributions of the saccades' curvatures. Finally, when both distractors are present (and straight saccades are expected), the sign of saccades' curvature is correlated with observers' perceptual bias/criterion. Overall the results point to a strong perceptual-motor association.

We present a simple reaction time (RT) versus temporal order judgment (TOJ) experiment as a test of the perception-action relationship. The experiment improves on previous ones in that it assesses for the first time RT and TOJ on a trial-by-trial basis, hence allowing the study of the two behaviors within the same task context and, most importantly, the association of RT to "correct" and "incorrect" TOJs. RTs to pairs of stimuli are significantly different depending on the associated TOJs, an indication that perceptual and motor decisions are based on the same internal response. Simulations with the simplest onesystem model (J. Gibbon & R. Rutschmann, 1969) using the means and standard deviations of the RT to stimuli presented in isolation yield excellent fits of the mean RT to these increments when presented in sequence and moderately good fits of the RT when classified according to the TOJ categories. The present observation that the point of subjective simultaneity for stimulus pairs is systematically smaller than the difference in RT to each of the two increments in the same pairs pleads, however, in favor of distinct decision criteria for perception and action with the former below the latter. For such a case, standard one-system race models require that the internal noise associated with the TOJ be less than the one associated with the RT to the same stimulus pair. The present data show the reverse state of affairs. In short, data and simulations comply with "one-system-two-decision" models of perceptual and motor behaviors, while prompting further testing and modeling to account for the apparent discrepancy between the ordering of the two decisions.

Cardoso-Leite P, Gorea A. Comparison of perceptual and motor decisions via confidence judgments and saccade curvature. . This study investigated the effects on perceptual and motor decisions of low-contrast distractors, presented 5°on the left and/or the right of the fixation point. Perceptual decisions were assessed with a yes/no (distractor) detection task. Motor decisions were assessed via these distractors' effects on the trajectory of an impending saccade to a distinct imperative stimulus, presented 10°above fixation 50 ms after the distractor(s). Saccade curvature models postulate that distractors activate loci on a motor map that evoke reflexive saccades and that the distractor evoked activity is inhibited to prevent reflexive orienting to the cost of causing a saccade curvature away from the distractor. Depending on whether or not each of these processes depends on perceptual detection, one can predict the relationships between saccades' curvature and perceptual responses (classified as correct rejections, misses, false alarms, and hits). The results show that saccades curve away from distractors only when observers report them to be present. Furthermore, saccade deviation is correlated (on a trial-by-trial basis) with the inferred internal response associated with the perceptual report: the stronger the distractor-evoked perceptual response, the more saccades deviate away from the distractor. Also in contrast with a supersensitive motor system, perceptual sensitivity is systematically higher than the motor sensitivity derived from the distributions of the saccades' curvatures. Finally, when both distractors are present (and straight saccades are expected), the sign of saccades' curvature is correlated with observers' perceptual bias/criterion. Overall the results point to a strong perceptual-motor association.

We present a simple reaction time (RT) versus temporal order judgment (TOJ) experiment as a test of the perception-action relationship. The experiment improves on previous ones in that it assesses for the first time RT and TOJ on a trial-by-trial basis, hence allowing the study of the two behaviors within the same task context and, most importantly, the association of RT to "correct" and "incorrect" TOJs. RTs to pairs of stimuli are significantly different depending on the associated TOJs, an indication that perceptual and motor decisions are based on the same internal response. Simulations with the simplest onesystem model (J. Gibbon & R. Rutschmann, 1969) using the means and standard deviations of the RT to stimuli presented in isolation yield excellent fits of the mean RT to these increments when presented in sequence and moderately good fits of the RT when classified according to the TOJ categories. The present observation that the point of subjective simultaneity for stimulus pairs is systematically smaller than the difference in RT to each of the two increments in the same pairs pleads, however, in favor of distinct decision criteria for perception and action with the former below the latter. For such a case, standard one-system race models require that the internal noise associated with the TOJ be less than the one associated with the RT to the same stimulus pair. The present data show the reverse state of affairs. In short, data and simulations comply with "one-system-two-decision" models of perceptual and motor behaviors, while prompting further testing and modeling to account for the apparent discrepancy between the ordering of the two decisions.

Deplancke A, Madelain L, Chauvin A, Cardoso-Leite P, Gorea A, Coello Y. Influence of near threshold visual distractors on perceptual detection and reaching movements. J Neurophysiol Providing evidence against a dissociation between conscious vision for perception and unconscious vision for action, recent studies have suggested that perceptual and motor decisions are based on a unique signal but distinct decisional thresholds. The aim of the present study was to provide a direct test of this assumption in a perceptual-motor dual task involving arm movements. In 300 trials, 10 participants performed speeded pointing movements toward a highly visible target located at 10°from the fixation point and Ϯ45°from the body midline. The target was preceded by one or two close to threshold distractor(s) (80 ms stimulus onset asynchrony) presented Ϯ30°a ccording to the target location. After each pointing movement, participants judged whether the distractor was present or not on either side of the target. Results showed a robust reaction time facilitation effect and a deviation toward the distractor when the distractor was both present and consciously perceived (Hit). A small reaction time facilitation was also observed when two distractors were physically present but undetected (double-miss)-this facilitation being highly correlated with the physical contrast of the distractors. These results are compatible with the theory proposing that perceptual and motor decisions are based on a common signal but emerge from a contrast dependent fixed threshold for motor responses and a variable context dependent criterion for perceptual responses. This paper thus extends to arm movement control previous findings related to oculomotor control.

With its roots in uncovering of two distinct -ventral and dorsalanatomical pathways for the processing of visual information, and boosted by behavioral study of patients with lesions of either of these pathways, the perception-action dissociation became a standard reference in the sensorimotor literature. Here we present briefly the anatomical, neuropsychological and, more extensively, the psychophysical evidence favoring such dissociation and pit it against counteracting evidence as well as against potential methodological and conceptual pitfalls. We also discuss classes of models accounting for a number of 'dissociation' results and conclude that the most general and parsimonious one posits the existence of one single processing stream that accumulates information up to a decision criterion modulated by stimulation conditions, response mode (motor vs. verbal/perceptual), task constraints (speeded vs. free time responses) and the nature of the task (detection, discrimination, temporal order judgment, etc.). The reviewed evidence is not meant to refute or validate the hypothesis of a perceptual-motor dissociation. Rather, its main objective is to show that, beyond its self-evidence, such dissociation is difficult if not impossible to test.

Voluntary actions are thought to be selected with respect to their intended goal. Converging data suggests that medial frontal cortex plays a crucial role in linking actions to their predicted effects. Recent neuroimaging data also suggests that during action selection, the brain pre-activities the representation of the predicted action effect. We review evidence of action effect prediction, both in terms of its neurophysiological basis as well as its functional consequences. By assuming that action preparation includes activation of the predicted sensory consequences of the action, we provide a mechanism to understand sensory attenuation and intentional binding. In this account, sensory attenuation results from more difficult discrimination between the observed action effect and the pre-activation of the predicted effect, as compared to when no (or incorrect) prediction is present. Similarly, a predicted action effect should also reach the threshold of awareness faster (intentional binding), if its perceptual representation is pre-activated. By comparing this potential mechanism to mental imagery and repetition suppression we propose a possible neural basis for the processing of predicted action effects.

The systematic association of an action that a person performs with its sensory effects is thought to attenuate that person's perception of the effect of the action. However, whether learned sensorimotor contingencies truly affect perception, rather than just inducing a response bias, has yet to be determined. The experiment presented in this article comprised two parts: an action-effect association phase and a test phase, during which the actions' perceptual effects were tested. During the association phase, specific actions (left-key and right-key presses) were associated with specific visual effects (tilted Gabor patches). In the test phase, participants' left-key presses and right-key presses triggered the onset of a low-contrast tilted Gabor patch in 50% of trials (no stimulus was presented on the remaining 50% of trials). Participants were required to report the presence or absence of this tilted Gabor patch. Our results showed that participants' sensitivity (d′) to the Gabor patches was reduced by 10% when the patches were triggered by the action they had previously been associated with. This finding indicates that a person's action does not induce a response bias (c), but changes the perception (d′) of the learned action effect.

A briefly flashed target stimulus can become "invisible" when immediately followed by a mask-a phenomenon known as backward masking, which constitutes a major tool in the cognitive sciences. One form of backward masking is termed metacontrast masking. It is generally assumed that in metacontrast masking, the mask suppresses activity on which the conscious perception of the target relies. This assumption biases conclusions when masking is used as a tool-for example, to study the independence between perceptual detection and motor reaction. This is because other models can account for reduced perceptual performance without requiring suppression mechanisms. In this study, we used signal detection theory to test the suppression model against an alternative view of metacontrast masking, referred to as the summation model. This model claims that target- and mask-related activations fuse and that the difficulty in detecting the target results from the difficulty to discriminate this fused response from the response produced by the mask alone. Our data support this alternative view. This study is not a thorough investigation of metacontrast masking. Instead, we wanted to point out that when a different model is used to account for the reduced perceptual performance in metacontrast masking, there is no need to postulate a dissociation between perceptual and motor responses to account for the data. Metacontrast masking, as implemented in the Fehrer-Raab situation, therefore is not a valid method to assess perceptual-motor dissociations.

Perceptual filling-in occurs when visual stimuli are recognized in impoverished viewing conditions. Whether missing information is filled-in during face perception and which stages might be involved in this process are still unresolved questions. Because an identity can be brought to mind by seeing eyes only, we hypothesized that missing information might be filled-in from a memory trace for the whole face identity. We presented participants with faces in phase 1 and later we presented eyes-only in phase 2. For some of these eyes in phase 2, the whole face had been presented in the previous phase, for others identical eyes had been presented. Event-related potentials (ERPs) revealed an N170 component that was more negative when eyes were preceded by a whole face in the previous phase compared to eyes preceded by identical eyes-only. A more positive-going late positive complex (LPC) was also found, suggesting enhanced retrieval of face memory representations when eyes were preceded by whole faces. Our results show that pre-existing representations of face identity can influence early stages of visual encoding, 170 ms after stimulus onset. These effects may reflect top–down modulation by memory on visual recognition processes by filling-in the missing facial information.

Numerous studies have suggested that the deployment of attention is linked to saliency. In contrast, very little is known about how salient objects are perceived. To probe the perception of salient elements, observers compared two horizontally aligned stimuli in an array of eight elements. One of them was salient because of its orientation or direction of motion. We observed that the perceived luminance contrast or color saturation of the salient element increased: the salient stimulus looked even more salient. We explored the possibility that changes in appearance were caused by attention. We chose an event-related potential indexing attentional selection, the N2pc, to answer this question. The absence of an N2pc to the salient object provides preliminary evidence against involuntary attentional capture by the salient element. We suggest that signals from a master saliency map flow back into individual feature maps. These signals boost the perceived feature contrast of salient objects, even on perceptual dimensions different from the one that initially defined saliency.

Attentional capture by salient distractors has been confirmed by the occurrence of an N2pc to the salient distractor. To clarify some failures to replicate this finding, we varied target predictability to induce different search modes. In the unpredictable target condition, the target shape varied randomly from trial to trial, favoring singleton detection mode. In the predictable target condition, the target shape remained the same in a block of trials, favoring feature search mode. With unpredictable targets, we observed an N2pc toward the salient color distractor, confirming attentional capture in singleton search mode. With predictable targets, there was no N2pc to the salient distractor, but a distractor positivity (Pd), suggesting distractor suppression. Also, differences emerged in the topographic segmentation of N2pc and Pd. Further, the amplitude of the N2pc toward the target was larger with predictable than with unpredictable targets.

Cortical blindness refers to the loss of vision that occurs after destruction of the primary visual cortex. Although there is no sensory cortex and hence no conscious vision, some cortically blind patients show amygdala activation in response to facial or bodily expressions of emotion. Here we investigated whether direction of gaze could also be processed in the absence of any functional visual cortex. A well-known patient (TN) with bilateral destruction of his visual cortex and subsequent cortical blindness was investigated in an fMRI paradigm during which blocks of faces were presented either with their gaze directed towards or away from the viewer. Increased right amygdala activation was found in response to directed compared to averted gaze. Activity in this region was further found to be functionally connected to a larger network associated with face and gaze processing. The present study demonstrates that in human subjects, the amygdala response to eye contact does not require an intact primary visual cortex.