How the Russia-Ukraine war ends

Defence Viewpoints, 2023

Unconditional surrender by Russia at the end of the Ukraine War it started seems an entirely fanciful notion. But as Edward Lucas wrote in The Times of London on 5th December 2022, "Dealing with a defeated Russia will be tricky and western failure so far to prepare for this eventuality is lamentable." This aide memoire lays out various starting points for such considerations Contents 1. The EU's current policy 2. Russia's position 3. Ukraine's 10 point peace plan 4. The Minsk agreements 5. Principles for a new EU-Russia strategy

2021

The strengthening of Ukraine’s naval capabilities in the Black Sea is taking place in line with the growing U.S. understanding of the need to contain Russia at sea. Ukraine’s new Naval Doctrine implies building up its naval potential to the level of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, with the tactical goal of ensuring freedom of navigation for Ukrainian ships and the strategic goal of restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine over Crimea. As for NATO, a militarily strong Ukraine will help contain Russia in the Black Sea without the organization’s direct involvement. Kyiv would be shrewd to be at the forefront of this containment strategy, preventing Moscow from transforming the Black Sea’s gray zones into Russian mainstays. However, strengthening the capacity of the Ukrainian Navy in the Black Sea creates a security dilemma. In response to the consolidation and improvement of Ukrainian naval capabilities, Russia plans to bolster Crimea’s military potential further, which could cause ...

2014

"A further Russian military intervention in Ukraine would not only be damaging to the security of both Ukraine and Europe. It could also entail significant military-strategic risks for Russia, reducing its military options in other strategic directions such as Central Asia and the Caucasus. While Russian officials still claim they have a one-million-strong army, it may still face military-strategic overstretch should the Kremlin decide to launch extended combat operations in Ukraine. What are the reasons for this? What military options are available to secure Russia from perceived threats in its western strategic direction? What risks do operations beyond Crimea entail?"

Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, 2015

2019

Five years after the annexation of Crimea and onset of war in Donbas, Ukrainian-Russian conflict is taking on additional dimensions. Russia applies ‘testing the waters’ approach. Falling short of spilling into a wide-scale military confrontation, Kerch Strait incident is nevertheless not a minor one. It was first-ever open admission and showcase of Russian conventional use of force against Ukrainian army. This emboldened tactics can be a sign of a new offensive strategy. It was not a covert operation carried out with an engagement of proxy forces or disguised Russian military. In military lexicon, one would say that it was a transition from a hybrid-type of non-kinetic and covert kinetic conflict to overt kinetic armed conflict. In general, the incident at the Kerch Strait was meant to send a message that Moscow will not fall short of a preemptive strike in case of Western growing assertiveness in its perceived sphere of influence. Any attempts of Kyiv to grow its military capabilities in the Azov and Black Sea regions and West to assist will be followed by full-scale military response. Recognition of Crimea belonging to Russia should be a total starter in all Russia-West transactions. It is a price, Moscow argues, for any even symbolical advancement in Donbas or even for keeping Russia at the table whatsoever.

Security dilemma in the Black Sea region in light of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, 2021

The Black Sea basin is one the most dangerous sectors of European security and one of, if not the most militarized zones in Europe. Russia has pursued highly aggressive policies in order to secure its dominance over the Black Sea region. After the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in 2014, the Black Sea area has gradually turned into a hotbed of mutual NATO-Russia tensions. Moscow’s threats to Ukraine are multi-dimensional in nature, as are its similarly conceived threats to Europe. NATO’s inaction would greatly enhance Russia’s prestige, demonstrating its ability to challenge the West. How these security dilemma will be solved in the nearest future?

Defence Viewpoints, 2024

A summary of the naval war between Russia and Ukraine 2022-24. Order of battle of Russian Black Sea Fleet and losses (to March 24) Change in strategic balance.

Marshall Center Security Insights, 2019

Russian policy towards Ukraine can be interpreted as a form of “strategic deterrence,” in which Moscow seeks to achieve its goals in Ukraine through a policy of active containment and strategic patience while avoiding overt military conflict. In current Russian usage, “strategic deterrence” is the use of both military and non-military means to prevent strategic gains by an opponent. It combines military means short of the use of force, such as an aggressive military build-up, with non-military tactics, including diplomacy, peace negotiations, information warfare, and political tactics. This strategy has allowed Russia to consolidate control of the Crimean peninsula, the Donbas region, and the Kerch Strait with only limited use of regular military forces. In the longer term, however, the strategic deterrence mindset poses problems for Russia. First, it escalates every local conflict in Russia’s borderlands into a high-level strategic game between Russia and the West, ensuring a long-term crisis in Moscow’s relations with the West, and limiting Russia's influence inside Ukraine. Second, instead of resolving conflicts, it produces militarized, stalemate-prone outcomes, leaving Russia entangled in a belt of semi-frozen conflicts around its borders.

Atlantic Voices, vol. 4, issue 4, 2014

Mediterranean Quarterly (2012) 23 (4): 43–68

Russia is a pivotal actor in the Black Sea. Russia's maritime power and the country's ability to use the maritime domain to achieve its political goals have important consequences for regional and international security. Recently, the Russian government announced an extensive and significant program of naval modernization and upgrades. Under these ambitious plans the Russian Black Sea Fleet could receive up to four new frigates, four submarines, and one of the French Mistral-class helicopter platforms in the near future. 1 If realized, these plans would dramatically increase Russian maritime power in the Black Sea over the next decade. Moreover, the successful use of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in 2008 in the war with Georgia to land forces ashore, blockade ports, and defeat the small Georgian navy demonstrated not only force readiness, reach, and versatility of Russia's fleet but also Moscow's commitment to using its maritime power. In addition, the controversial decision by Ukraine's president Viktor Yanukovych in 2010 to extend the Russian lease of Sevastopol in the Crimea has also ensured that Russia has the infrastructure and maritime support to continue to exercise maritime power in the Black Sea over the next twenty-five years. Russia's proposed increase in maritime power and Moscow's commitment to using the Black Sea to protect its interests has led some analysts to claim