THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:
A REFORM CALL
2014, TÜSÝAD, Lewiatan, Economiesuisse
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ISBN: 978-605-165-009-8
November 2014
TUSIAD Publication No: T/2014,11-561
THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:
A REFORM CALL
This study is the result of a joint initiative from three European business federations:
Economiesuisse (Business Federation of Switzerland), LEWIATAN (Polish Business
Confederation) and TÜSÝAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association).
Each chapter of the report was written by independent authors and does not necessarily
reflect the views of neither the business federations nor the other authors.
Joint study project of
Avenir Suisse - Zurich, Boðaziçi University - TÜSÝAD Foreign Policy Forum - Istanbul and THINKTANK Centre - Warsaw
Supported by
L E W I ATA N
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ..............................................................................................................5
Introduction ........................................................................................................................6
Prof. Günter Verheugen .....................................................................................................6
CHAPTER I: Subsidiarity Wherever Possible, Solidarity Where Needed .......................14
Alois Bischofberger, Dr. Samuel Rutz and Dr. Rudolf Walser
(Avenir Suisse- Zurich) .....................................................................................................14
CHAPTER II: Competitiveness of Europe - Economy First!............................................38
(THINKTANK Centre - Warsaw) ........................................38
CHAPTER III: Europe in a Globalizing World: A Matter of Survival .............................50
Prof. Hakan Yýlmaz (Boðaziçi University-TÜSÝAD Foreign Policy Forum-Istanbul).....50
CHAPTER IV: More of the Sane, or: Europe Where We Need It ..................................64
Dr. Cornelius Adebahr (German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) - Berlin) .......64
Authors ..............................................................................................................................83
Acknowledgments
The project partners namely Economiesuisse, Lewiatan and TÜSÝAD would like to
gratefully acknowledge Avenir Suisse (Zurich), Boðaziçi University - TÜSÝAD Foreign
Policy Forum (Istanbul), European Experience Company (Potsdam) and THINKTANK
Centre (Warsaw) for supporting this collaborative study and providing a platform of
dialogue for the authors. We would also like to express our special appreciation and
thanks to the project coordinator Günter Verheugen and the authors namely, Dr.
Cornelius Adebahr, Alois Bischofberger,
Bonikowska, Dr. Samuel Rutz,
Dr. Rudolf Walser and Prof. Hakan Yýlmaz for their dedication and excellence in
research as well as their collaboration in finalizing this study.
Futhermore, the project partners would like to thank Barýþ Ornarlý, Washington
Representative of TÜSÝAD and Bahadýr Kaleaðasý, International Coordinator of TÜSÝAD
and President of Institut du Bosphore for their comments in the editing process. We
would like to extend our gratitude to DGAP Consulting Managing Director Stefan Dauwe
for facilitating the organisation of this study. We would like to extend our gratitude to
Harold James, Jean-Pierre Roth and Gerhard Schwarz for their inputs on Chapter I
"Subsidiarity Wherever Possible, Solidarity Where Needed". Valuable comments on
various parts of this volume were also received, often at roundtable discussions, from
Barçýn Yinanç, Baþak Kale, Cengiz Aktar, Emre Erdoðan, Emre Gönen, Fuat Keyman,
Gün Kut, Senem Aydýn Düzgit and Soli Özel for Chapter III "Europe in a Globalizing
World: A Matter of Survival".
5
Introduction
PROF. GÜNTER VERHEUGEN
With a new European Parliament and the Juncker Commission in place, there is an
excellent opportunity to give the process of European integration a new momentum.
This opportunity should not be missed, because the EU is in a critical stage. Due to the
deep financial and economic crisis and the sluggish recovery, the risk of a lost decade
in terms of growth and job creation remains high. Social inequality has become a burning
issue. Moreover, the crisis has fuelled public mistrust in the European integration and
for the first time in the history of the EU, the discussion about exiting the community
is no longer a purely theoretical consideration. The crisis has also shed light on the
deep inherent disparities within the EU, where catching up is going hand in hand with
drifting apart from the EU economies. All the more, it is urgent to reassure its more than
500 million citizens that the European integration doesn't only mean to ensure peace
and stability creation but also refers to driving prosperity and shared welfare. The
European crisis strategy has undoubtedly created further bonds between the EU countries,
notably the European Monetary Union (EMU) member states; however the concept of
an ever-closer integration of the European nations is not only questioned from a political
point of view. While the EU and especially the EMU stood together to rescue the Eurozone and to overcome the crisis, it became equally clear, that the member states are
the owners of the integration and that the conflicts between European solidarity challenges
and national interests still form a complex and very often tense relationship.
The crisis has hit the EU fully unprepared and the EU has entered new territory in
dealing with the crisis. However, the EUs crisis reaction was largely concentrated on
avoiding the worst case - the break up of the Eurozone and in so far rather a defensive
approach. Such a defensive policy approach seems to prevail also in some other core
EU policies, such as research and development or innovation, immigration or dealing
with an aging population, industrial policy or energy policy. Still, the EU has an overall
tendency to predominantly react to obvious threats instead of strategically using emerging
opportunities. The recent debates around the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership shed light on a profound EU dilemma: Different problems or fears may
easily overshadow the undoubted overall stability and welfare gains and consequently
may put a whole project at risk.
The dynamics of globalisation aggravate the substantial internal problems of the EU
and any inward looking European policy will only lead to a further political and economic
marginalization of the EU. The EU needs to tackle its weaknesses in a decisive manner,
because the world will not wait for the EU to fix its problems, but puts expectations
6
and hopes upon the EU and attributes responsibilities to it, which cannot be ignored.
The situation in Eastern Europe or in the Middle East will have its impact on Europe,
and the only question is, whether the EU is prepared to shoulder the tasks or whether
the EU will have to deal with the consequences in a fully unprepared manner.
As the EU is at a critical junction, it must address its predominant weaknesses, by
setting a positive reform agenda, which builds on its core strength: The potential of the
internal market, the four freedoms, its commitment to open markets and fair trade and
the political will to exit the crisis in a strengthened way. Apart from dedicated political
leadership, it is the economy that will make the difference. With unsustainable high
unemployment rates, and a youth unemployment rate, which prevents a whole generation
from equal opportunities it will be difficult, if not impossible, to change the present
mood in our societies, which is characterized by growing scepticism regarding the
usefulness of European integration. Obviously, there is more than just disappointment
with the economic conditions. A long list of complaints and critical questions finally
comes down to one central weakness. All opinion polls suggest that Europeans across
the EU are convinced that the EU has infringed the right balance between national
responsibilities and supra-national decision-making, thus objecting any further deepening
of the European integration. The call for "more Europe" does not meet an enthusiastic
population in the EU but is rather perceived as a threat by many, feelings that are fuelled
by nationalist or anti-European parties, which, representing still a minority, are on
upswing across the EU.
Such a situation needs immediate action and the strongest possible concentration of
policy makers at European and national level on political and economic reform. It is
time for a change, time to overcome European deficiencies, time to correct wrong
developments and to focus on improvements, on delivery in direct benefit of the citizens.
Business as usual is not an option. Strong leadership and close cooperation between
the political and economic actors is therefore indispensable.
While the EU has focussed on the financial sector during past years, without having
sorted out the problems of this sector, the deficiencies of the real economy have not
been properly addressed. The EU is faced with macroeconomic imbalances, unsustainable
public finances and a lack of global competitiveness. Strengthening the competitiveness
of the EU economy, while addressing internally the drifting apart, must be the toppriority for years to come.
This report has been initiated by three business organizations namely TÜSÝAD,
Turkish Industry and Business Association; Polish Confederation of Lewiatan and
Economiesuisse. These organisations have always been strong advocates for European
7
values and the European project and have been the drivers of the European economic
integration for a long time. What is new however is, that, instead of agreeing among
themselves they have asked leading European think tanks to reflect upon the future
reform needs of the EU. Consequently this report has been prepared by three think
tanks namely Boðaziçi University - TÜSÝAD Foreign Policy Forum, THINKTANK Centre,
Avenir Suisse and by Dr. Cornelius Adebahr, Associated Fellow of German Council on
Foreign Relations (DGAP). Coming from different backgrounds and with different
experiences they are all sharing the view that close cooperation, partnership and
integration is the lesson European history tells us.
The first chapter, written by Alois Bischofberger, Dr. Samuel Rutz and Dr. Rudolf
Walser (Avenir Suisse) provides an analysis of the challenges, which the shortcomings
of the EMU and the macro-economic imbalances have created. The chapter also deals
with eventual policy options. The second chapter, contributed by
Bonikowska (THINKTANK Centre), focuses on reform needs the business environment
and the completion of the internal market. The third chapter, authored by Prof. Hakan
Yýlmaz (Boðaziçi University - TÜSÝAD Foreign Policy Forum) analyses the foreign policy
needs of the EU by casting a light on the nature of globalisation and dealing in particular
with enlargement and neighbourhood policy. The final chapter presented by Dr. Cornelius
Adebahr (DGAP), addresses urgent institutional reform options.
All contributions are focused on a European reform agenda, which could be pursued
without changing the European Treaty and consequently could be implemented without
any delay to deliver immediate or mid-term results. Formally, the potential EU-exit of
the UK has not been dealt with, however many of the recommendations have picked
up current concerns of European citizens, which are echoed by the UK government and
some other EU countries. Any substantial EU reform agenda may therefore have not
only a positive impact on the public opinion in the EU at large but also on the UK
discussion about its future European destiny.
What are the main lessons to be learned or recommendations to be followed?
All recommendations are of truly European nature. The authors do not present some
academic thinking about more or less integration. Instead they concentrate on improvements
based on the existing Treaty and are focussed on the achievable and the likely output
of any suggested reform steps. Moreover, they make a strong point to set up positive
reform agenda and unveil their commitment for change through reform steps. All authors
point to the urgency of EU reforms, however, as the analyses of the contributing think
tanks also unveil, there is no magic solution. Instead the authors understand the working
agenda ahead as a pragmatic step-by-step approach, with not much political glamour,
but far from a mere muddling through.
8
There is also no single solution to one of the most pressing issues the EU is facing
in the years to come: How to manage diversity in a way that ensures sustained European
competitiveness not just in average, but in a shared manner, without leaving some
countries behind, neither within the Eurozone nor across the meanwhile 28 member
states.
The first chapter authored by Alois Bischofberger, Dr. Samuel Rutz and Dr. Rudolf
Walser (Avenir Suisse) concentrates on macroeconomic challenges and on particular
needs of the EMU. Its main advantage, compared to reports written by the EU insiders
is its sharp and neutral analysis of the achievements and weaknesses of the current EU.
It makes a strong plea for a differentiated integration approach, finding the right balance
between a common rule setting, which should be thoroughly followed through and
preserving the free competition between member states, including about the best
economic policy to be followed. This interpretation of the future economic governance
needs of the EU and notably the EMU is clearly at the core of any EU policies in the
years to come. This report also points to the need to further follow a clear consolidation
policy, however rightly sheds a light to the limits of the application of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) in times of crisis. Whenever the forecasts do not match with realities,
all assumptions about the needed consolidation paths turn out to be an illusion and are
thus not politically deliverable. What is however even more important is that the
consolidation need is not just seen as complying with the SGP targets but measured
against the challenges of aging Europe. How to finance the demographic change in the
EU remains an unanswered question. It will therefore have to be in the focus in the EU
in the years to come. Authors also suggest the need to agree on an insolvency system
within the EMU, not only for banks, but also for states. While being a legitimate
consideration, shared by a number of economists, politically, the EU has already answered
this question differently, when deciding to rescue the Eurozone as such, clearly being
more concerned about uncontrollable developments in the case of any country (Greece)
exiting the Eurozone than about the costs of the rescue actions. Since then the
developments have backed this policy choice and it would be highly recommendable,
if the leaders would start thinking about any EU exit in a comparable way and not let
the development slip out of their hands.
Following the analysis of
Bonikowska (THINKTANK Centre), the EU
has generally found the right recipe for strengthening European competitiveness, as
they are enshrined in the Europe 2020 strategy: Ensuring more convergence, a rational
energy and climate change policy, promoting SMEs and entrepreneurship and boosting
research and innovation are at the core of this chapter. It cannot answer however the
question, how to ensure the full delivery.
9
As it stands now, the EU will miss many of the 2020 targets: On employment, on
poverty and on research and development (R&D) spending. To change the situation
the EU would have to pursue a double approach: While pushing the national reform
agendas, it would also have to push the best performing member states to do much
more than planned, to counterbalance weaknesses, which are not likely to be overcome
in the medium term. Even with best efforts, and well targeted spending the unacceptable
high youth unemployment will not substantially decline in some countries. All the more,
it would be important that those countries with solid labour markets strengthen the job
creation measures even further in order to promote more European labour mobility.
The same strategy holds true for European R&D spending. There is not much hope for
the EU to reach the agreed common goal of 3% in 2020, as long as countries such as
Germany will limit themselves to just reaching the 3% target at national level, given the
weak R&D performance of a number of member states in the medium term. On the
longer run however, the substantial gap between the member states as regards to their
R&D and innovation capacities will have to be closed. Achieving coherence between
industrial policy, climate change policy and energy policy turns out to be another
challenge for the years to come. The process of deindustrialisation in the EU needs to
be reverted, and consequently appropriate framework conditions must drive
entrepreneurship and investments accordingly. Better regulation both at European and
the national level, including a substantial de-burdening of businesses, primarily of SMEs
from regulatory and administrative burdens are since long on the European agenda,
however the results so far are sobering. This situation will not change, even with the
strongest political will, as long as substantial deregulation is not fully appreciated as a
horizontal policy priority of the whole Commission. The announced re-launch of the
better regulation program by the President of the Commission, Mr. Juncker, is a decisive
move. If thoroughly implemented, the Juncker Commission may achieve a remarkable
push for investment and competitiveness, with a much larger impact than any financial
stimulus package - as needed as it is - would achieve. All depends however whether
the new Commission will really be able to restrain its rule setting power as this is much
easier said than done. It will not only require political courage but a cultural change
inside the Commission, which still perceives harmonisation as the preferred integration
option. The fact that a Vice-President is now overseeing better regulation can help
mastering the challenge.
However the EU needs also to act more commonly in selected areas, such as energy.
The energy community needs to be formed, both in terms of energy safety but more
importantly in terms of ensuring affordable energy prices. Future reports will have to
deal with the question, whether the EU is politically and mentally prepared to abandon
its current focus on national energy security in favour of a community system of energy
production and distribution, which is based on full competition of all available energy
10
resources, including nuclear power and indigenous resources. The support of the
European leaders from October 2014 will need to be translated in concrete actions,
which may undoubtly face public resistance.
The contribution of Prof. Hakan Yýlmaz (Boðaziçi University - TÜSÝAD Foreign Policy
Forum) takes a refreshing new look on the nature of globalisation, echoing the doubts
about a one-size-fits-all approach and instead urges for flexible EU-solutions that may
be picked up by different microeconomic environments. The "collective bargaining
power" of the EU is seen as its biggest asset, on which must be capitalised, while lagging
behind in the "smart, knowledge-based, innovative, higher value added, high technology
economy" is being rightly described as the biggest weakness of the EU. Consequently
it is recommended to follow a pro-active foreign affairs and foreign trade policy, instead
of solely focussing on domestic issues. The EU should therefore exploit its strength as
a value driven Community and soft rule setter to positively influence European and the
global developments and also strengthen a global level playing field. A second set of
recommendations may be summarized under the heading of partnering and networking
across the world. Next to the transatlantic market place, the continental economic
integrations should be seen as natural further integration step, thus creating more stability
and prosperity across Europe. This chapter also deals with one of the most controversial
policy issues - the enlargement of the EU. Current EU thinking, deeply influenced by
enlargement fatigue and the shock of the EU crisis, does not consider dedicated
enlargement policies of the EU as a "must" for the next years, not only in policy terms
but also from a competitiveness angle. This applies not only for Turkey but also for any
European country aspiring EU membership, such as Ukraine and other countries next
to Russia, as they represent the major growth markets in Europe for the foreseeable
future, provided that the process of political and economic reform continues.
The contribution from Dr. Cornelius Adebahr (DGAP) deals with institutional reforms
and arrangements, which should help focussing the integration on the core European
needs. It places a strong focus on the reform needs inside the European Commission.
There were many discussions, whether the institutional power is been shifting away
from the Commission towards the Council, or from the Community method towards a
more intergovernmental approach. The author of the chapter is firmly convinced that
the future shape of European integration stands and falls with finding a new balance
of power between the Commission and member states, including Parliaments at national
and European level. In any event, much depends on the policy choices the Commission
will make.
At first sight, many of the institutional recommendations may look rather technical;
however their implementations would profoundly change the Commission. Working
11
with an external impact assessment board or publically consulting draft impact assessments
would not only improve the political culture in European decision-making but also
ensure that subsidiarity and proportionality are respected. The analysis of the European
added value would be broadly shared. This would be one important step to accommodate
concerns of national parliaments and the wider public. Generally, the Commission still
lacks a proper follow up of concerns and desires of national parliament and the working
relations with national parliaments require substantive improvement. Equally important
will be a common understanding between the new Commission, the Council and the
newly elected European Parliament, to fully back a European legislative approach that
is self-restraint and based on the real needs.
Concluding remarks
The EUs recovery is still fragile and recent international developments, both the
deterioration of the relationship with Russia and the developments in the Middle East
put the EU under additional constraints. The risks of the EMU are still not fully overcome
and the threats of deflation are looming. There is still no agreed European recipe how
to ensure growth and job creation while maintaining and sustaining the indispensable
fiscal consolidation. What is however undisputed is that competitiveness is key for
ensuring medium and long-term growth. All European institutions are therefore challenged
to scrutinise existing policies or intended new policies according to their capacity to
foster competitiveness. The design of new policies with a clear focus: Adding value to
competitiveness, both at national and at European level. To this end, the EU must set
free the full potential of small and medium sized enterprises. This cannot be done
without the substantial reduction of legislative burden. Furthermore the EU will have
to deal with the transport sector and the logistics in general to make the internal market
fully functioning. As the internal demand in the EU will remain relatively weak in the
years to come, it shall be balanced by accelerating the internationalisation of the EU.
The EU should therefore strive for the transatlantic market place with its huge investment
and trade potential. As other economic blocks are forming, the EU needs to realise that
time is running short. Equally the EU must foster its economic ties with catching up
economies, and new economic "tiger" states such as Turkey or the BRICS. Finally, not
least in the light of the crisis in Ukraine, the EU shall overcome its reluctance towards
enlargement because all European experiences demonstrate that stability and growth
are best preserved within a truly integrated European space. The recent Balkan Summit
in Berlin has revealed that the process of rethinking the reluctance towards enlargement
has already started.
Much will depend on the political authority and leadership of the European Commission
as regards the challenges the EU is confronted with.
12
Mainstreaming differentiation as an opportunity, smart regulation as a mean to win
back public support and enhanced participation to increase transparency, accountability
and democratic scrutiny - this is by no means a wish list of European scientists - but
an urgent policy agenda aiming at enhanced competitiveness. The EU patient has been
sick for too long, and the suffering has been painful enough in some parts of the EU,
however with political courage and the mobilisation of the economy, the therapy can
be successful, and the remedy - as suggested by the authors - are by no way too bitter
to swallow, but represent a smart and innovative medicine. Thanks to the social
commitment and responsibility of three European business organisations, these
recommendations are now public. May they serve as an inspiration and input for
discussion and for European policy-making for the years ahead.
13
I
Subsidiarity Wherever Possible,
Solidarity Where Needed
ALOIS BISCHOFBERGER, DR. SAMUEL RUTZ AND DR. RUDOLF WALSER
(AVENIR SUISSE- ZURICH)
Summary of Recommendations
- Given the high degree of heterogeneity and the wide discrepancies in macroeconomic
performance between EU member states, the most promising path for the EU to
follow in the foreseeable future is a multi-speed variable-geometry concept.
- The reformed Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) - enshrined in the Fiscal Compact
- and the EU scheme for a banking union are the central pillar of an institutionally
strengthened Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of Sovereign Member States
(Maastricht 2.0).
- The "no-bail-out" clause in the treaty must henceforth be strictly adhered to since
each member state is ultimately responsible for its own policy. Credibility can only
be restored if treaties and rules are respected again. Eurobonds would be contrary
to Maastricht 2.0 since they would introduce joint liability without sufficient control
possibilities.
- To provide flexibility and facilitate economic adjustments in the peripheral countries,
parallel currencies might be an effective interim solution to regain competitiveness,
especially since the adjustment process via internal devaluation may be confronted
with insurmountable social limits.
- The window of opportunity opened by the rescue funds and the emergency
measures of the ECB should now be used for reform-oriented policies, in
particular the removal of rigidities in the labour and product markets. If certain
member countries of the EMU permanently lag in the development of productivity,
the Euro area is confronted with a serious structural problem.
- The connection between banks and the public sector was a major driving force
behind the crisis in the Euro area. To break the vicious circle between bank balance
14
sheets and public debt, which is a result of mutual and implicit state guarantees,
a restructuring and an insolvency regime for EU member states and a European
banking union are unavoidable.
- The Single Banking Supervision (SBS) may, however, create a potential conflict
between monetary and financial stability. The ECB could come under pressure to
perform a quasi fiscal rule, which would undermine its ability to maintain price
stability. One would worry less about these imperfections if there was a commitment
to improve the new procedure at a later stage by transferring the task of supervising
banks to an authority independent of the ECB.
- The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is an important step in the direction of
a robust banking union, irrespective of the fact that the resolution procedure is
probably too complex, slow, and involves too many institutions. Therefore, practice
will have to prove the effectiveness of the SRM.
- To restore competitiveness, the overarching goal of EU governance must be to
emphasise the crucial role of market forces. This implies the rigorous implementation
of structural reforms in all EU countries with the aim to make it easier to do business
and to increase employment, thereby enhancing the growth potential of individual
EU countries and reducing unemployment for the benefit of the EU as a whole.
1. Introduction
There is no doubt that the EU as a project for peace, open markets, fundamental
freedoms, and eastward expansion has created conditions and initiated processes that
should no longer be questioned. Europe has profited from this in legal, economic,
political and cultural terms. So, we may properly describe the EU as "the most ambitious
and successful example of voluntary international cooperation in world history" (Moravcsik,
2012).
At the same time it would be an act of self-deception to deny that the EU has failed
to reach important targets. Ultimately, politics can be measured and judged only against
the targets it sets itself. For this reason, it is important to begin with a brief assessment
of the latest developments, in order to create a basis on which to set out possible paths
to successful EU policies for the future. Today, the EU does not need sweeping visions
or new strategies but consistent market-oriented policies, in accordance with the EU
Treaty. In fact, Art. 3, par. 2 of the Treaty postulates that the Union shall work for "...the
sustainable development of Europe, based on balanced economic growth and price
stability, a highly competitive social market economy...".
15
In view of the global competition between countries, the thrust of the EU must be
to offer highly mobile resources such as capital and qualified manpower conditions that
grant these resources the best possibilities for unfolding optimal productivity, thereby
fostering growth and employment. Therefore, the quality of the legal framework of the
EU is an essential prerequisite for competitiveness, and the macroeconomic framework
is an important part of it.
1.1 A Weakened European Union
The expectation that the European single market would gradually lead to better
aligned economic development, and thus to a more homogeneous economic area with
greater resistance to external economic shocks, has, sadly, only been partially fulfilled.
The macroeconomic imbalances have not been evened out. Until the reforms of the last
few years, the opposite was true. This was shown, for example, in the great discrepancy
in unit wage costs, current accounts, and private and public debt. And accordingly, the
various competitiveness indicators reveal a fairly disappointing picture. While a few of
the more recent member countries have been able to make up ground economically,
the past years have seen a loss of competitiveness in the southern peripheral countries
and France. The latest global rankings of the International Institute for Management
Development (IMD, 2013) and the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2013) includes only
a few EU countries in the top group: According to the IMD's World Competitiveness
Yearbook 2013 these are Sweden and Germany; according to the WEF's Global
Competitiveness Index they are Finland, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom.
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is anchored in Treaty provisions and was intended
to ensure budgetary discipline among member states. However, due to pressure from
France and contrary to the original German proposal - which foresaw nearly automatic
sanctions in case of non-compliance - the SGP also refers to extraordinary economic
circumstances, which may prevent countries from playing by the rules. As a result the
SGP entails an element of appreciation whether extraordinary economic circumstances
are applicable. The SPG has been changed twice, yet the inherent dilemma between
fiscal efforts and real economic developments is not solved. In particular, the SGP cannot
deal with unexpected economic downturns, where the rules are overtaken by realities.
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 debt has risen sharply in almost all
member countries and, with the exception of Finland, Luxembourg and Slovakia, is now
well over the upper limit of 60% of GDP. If implicit state debt is also taken into
consideration, the situation is alarming. According to calculations by the
Generationenverträge research centre at the University of Freiburg, the unfunded pension
benefits in Germany, Italy, France and Austria represent well over 300% of the relevant
GDPs.
16
According to the 2000 Lisbon Strategy, the EU was to become the most dynamic and
competitive economic area in the world by 2010 with an employment rate of 70%. The
employment rate rose from 62,6% (2000) to 65,8% in 2008, but decreased in the wake
of the financial crisis to 64,1% in 2010. The implementation of the strategy remained
well below expectations. A further aim was establishing a research and development
quota of 3% of GDP; however only 2% was allocated. Not only did the EU as a whole
lose ground against other regions, but since 2000, industry's share of gross value-added
has fallen in almost all EU countries, with detrimental effects on innovation (Deutsche
Bank, 2013). The successor to the Lisbon Strategy is the Europe 2020 strategy, with the
goal of creating "smart, sustainable and inclusive growth" in Europe, through research
and development, higher education and life-long learning. The EU is well behind
achieving this goal as well.
1.2 European Monetary Union - a Problem Child
The very start of the European Monetary Union (EMU) was problematic, as membership
was not only determined by strict economic criteria but also based on predictions of
future economic and fiscal developments. This approach allowed political considerations
in decision-making. As so often, the politicians indulged in leniency, in the hope that
the consolidation process would at least go in the right general direction. However, the
"windfall gains" of interest-rate convergence in the so-called GIPSIC countries1 were not
used to strengthen their competitiveness; rather, the low interest rates above all encouraged
credit-financed consumption and a real-estate boom. The flow of funds into these
countries allowed wages to rise faster than productivity. With its low interest rates, the
Euro as a single currency reduced rather than strengthened the pressure for reform.
The hope for disciplining states by financial markets also turned out to be illusory
and inadequate. The markets were either too uncritical, and took too little account of
the growing imbalances, or they were too clever, and did not believe that the "no bailout" clause would actually be applied and that the other member countries would permit
the default of any individual country. And developments proved them right. Finally, the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision took the decision, with far-reaching consequences
for the Eurozone, to regard government bonds as risk-free investments, for which banks
did not need to hold any equity. As a result, many banks inflated their balance-sheets
with such paper. They thus reinforced the mutual escalation of bank balance sheets and
public debt that proved so disastrous in the financial crisis.
The current crisis in the Eurozone is primarily a crisis of the European financial
framework, and not of the Euro as a currency. It has, though, laid bare the design defects
of the monetary union. These were revealed in a fragmentation of the financial markets,
1
The GIPSIC countries are Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Cyprus.
17
the problematic feedback effects between state debt and bank balance sheets and the
serious macroeconomic imbalances between the core members and the peripheral
countries, as the competitiveness levels of the members of the Eurozone drifted apart.
Although real exchange rates diverged, the implicit national Euro exchange rate remained
fixed at a nominal 1:1.
The crisis has shown that a monetary union is by no means a guarantee against
problems caused by the persistent payment imbalances in member countries. Deficits
still must be financed in a monetary union. However, the adjustment process is different
as monetary policy and exchange rates are no longer at the disposal of member countries.
In fact, the adjustment process is cushioned and protracted by the single monetary policy
through harmonised interest rates and liquidity assistance measures of the Euro system.
Empirical studies of the Deutsche Bundesbank have confirmed that current account
adjustments therefore take longer in a monetary union than in fixed exchange rate
regimes (Weidmann, 2014). While the current account surplus of the northern countries
increased since the beginning of 2000, the deficit in the peripheral countries mounted
accordingly (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2012). The much cited target balances of the Euro
system reflect not only the serious divergences in the current accounts within the
Eurozone, but also the fact that the countries with a deficit could no longer finance their
deficits through private capital inflows. At the start of the monetary union the possibility
of such a development was dismissed, so any correction mechanism was regarded as
unnecessary. It was believed that individual countries within a monetary union would
no longer experience funding shortages after the elimination of exchange rate risk. The
Eurozone's GDP at the end of 2013 was 3% below the level of 2007, though with large
differences between member countries. This can hardly be regarded as evidence of
success.
However important healthy state finances may be, the lop-sided fixation of the
monetary union on fiscal development may well have been a mistake. This approach
loses sight of other potential undesirable developments, such as cross-infection between
member countries, loss of competitiveness, and high levels of private debt. A deep
divide runs through the Eurozone today. The crisis has revealed serious competitive
weaknesses in the peripheral countries, which is by no means to say that all is well with
the core countries of the Eurozone.
2. How Could This Ever Have Happened?
The Maastricht Treaty defined clearly, with the agreement of the governments and
parliaments of all member countries, how Europe and its monetary union were supposed
to function. It was to be a community based on individual responsibility, in which each
18
state was responsible for its own finances. The aim was to take account of the differing
perceptions of the role of the state, as primarily revealed in the relationship between
states and their citizens.
It rapidly proved, however, that the rules for limiting public deficits were unable to
achieve binding status. Either countries flouted the rules without fear of punishment,
or the rules were temporarily bent, so that more and more holes were knocked in the
"fiscal rules" (Weidmann, 2013). With only slight exaggeration, the treaty union turned
into a breach-of-treaty union. This did serious damage to the rule of law. It is thus little
surprise that in the well-known Economic Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation
the great majority of EU countries appear only in mid-field, because they "are generally
plagued by an encroaching state and deterioration in the rule of law" (NZZ, 2013).
Today, we must conclude that the EMU has not served as the pacemaker for a political
union. It started with illusions and has led to severe problems, which may not be
overcome within a few years. The EMU has provided the EU with its own currency,
which is globally respected; however, it has also eliminated a major instrument for
dealing with competitive pressures and current account imbalances. The political debate
about the distribution of the costs of the Euro-Stabilisation Policy, being conducted
against the backdrop of the unequal distribution of assets in the Eurozone, serves as
an example.
The development of the EU in recent years, broadly sketched out here, has resulted
in the concept of "Europe" suffering serious loss of credibility and appeal among many
citizens. Belief in a European policy has been shaken, and confidence in the project
of European unification has been damaged. The EU appears no longer as the solution,
but as the problem. In all probability, never since the foundation of the European
Community have so many divisions opened up. The proposal in the United Kingdom
to hold a referendum on continuing membership in the EU is the most striking outcome
of these problems.
3. The Reaction to the Latest Crisis
In reaction to the global financial crisis, the heads of state and government of the
G20 resolved on numerous programmes of action, with the aim of strengthening the
resistance of the financial sector, and overcoming the weaknesses in international
cooperation. Even if much remains patchwork, it has at least been possible to prevent
the total collapse of the global financial system, and a slide into global depression.
19
In the EU, the global financial crisis transformed, from 2010 onwards, into a banking
and state debt crisis. The starting point was May 10, when the ECB started with its
purchases of sovereign bonds of peripheral countries. Numerous rescue plans for
distressed states and reform packages were stitched together under enormous time
pressure, not least to gain time for the development of a stable long-term framework.
And it was possible to initiate some important reforms, and create preconditions for
better crisis management. At the same time, a lack of clarity persisted as to what longterm strategy the EU would pursue, and what its structure should ultimately look like.
The key decisions and measures of the most recent past are:
- Strengthening of the rule-based elements of fiscal policy (reform of the SGP; better
monitoring of macroeconomic imbalances; review of the Euro-states' budgets in
the context of the "European Semester") and, as an important innovation, Reverse
Qualified Majority Voting, intended to complicate the formation of coalitions against
the enactment of sanctions.
- The Fiscal Compact Treaty, under which the participating countries make a
fundamental commitment to a balanced budget and an upper limit to structural
deficit of 0.5% of GDP, either through a debt cap in their constitution, or by means
of similarly binding national legislation.
- The transformation of the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
into a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a safety net and to
relieve the crisis management of the central banks.
- The implementation of the Basle III framework in the "CRD IV" package.
- The creation of a banking union via the Europeanisation of material banking
regulation law (Single Rule Book, Single Supervisory Mechanism, Single Resolution
Mechanism).
The economic governance of the EU and the Eurozone has thus been subject to
extensive revision, with the aim, firstly, of intensifying the monitoring of the member
countries' financial policies and secondly, of enabling the early identification of any
macroeconomic imbalances, in order to be able to take counter-measures swiftly.
Associated with these are some potentially effective reforms that should lead to higher
growth rates in the medium and long term, if they are implemented consistently. These
measures and decisions also involve an increase in the European capacity for action,
something that has been widely overlooked by the general public. It is only fair to
mention that the reformed economic governance has some punch to it.
However, the whole regulatory structure for economic and financial-policy coordination
and monitoring has become overly complex and allows for considerable political leeway.
Moreover, many bodies are involved in decision making. This could lead to fragmentation
20
of EU-policy and a loss of coherence and open new areas for interpretation offering
opportunities for evasion and reciprocal indulgence. From the point of view of
accountability the "new economic governance" is undoubtedly not optimal.
There have also been problematic decisions, such as the exercise of banking supervision
by the ECB as this might result in a potential conflict between monetary and fiscal policy.
Commissioning the ECB to provide financial as well as price stability might give rise
to time-inconsistency problems. In such a setting the ECB could promise an inflation
goal ex ante, but deviate from it ex post. With regard to crisis management, it is therefore
essential to keep monetary and fiscal policy separate. And lastly, some hot topics have
not been addressed at all yet. Most worthy of mention here is the concept of a wellfunctioning insolvency procedure for the member countries of the Eurozone that would
at last give credibility to the "no bail-out" principle. Empirical research tells us that a
state default usually entails the insolvency of the national banking systems and an
economic recession. This underlines the necessity for an efficient regime for state
insolvency and restructuring (Weder di Mauro, 2014).
4. The ECB as Sheet-Anchor
At the height of the financial and state-debt crisis, the ECB, as virtually the only
properly functioning institution of the monetary union, played a key role. With its
"unconventional" measures from 2010 onwards, in the form of the purchase of some
220 billion of state debt from the peripheral countries and a comprehensive credit line
totalling one billion Euros, it poured massive liquidity into the banking system during
the critical phase. This was successful in calming the financial markets and creating
more attractive conditions for state financing. With the promise in July 2012 to begin,
if need be, the unlimited purchase of government bonds of individual member states provided that the countries concerned agreed on a reform programme with the EMS the ECB effectively provided not only a guarantee for the Euro but also an implicit
interest-rate guarantee for certain countries. Whether in doing so it exceeded its mandate,
which forbids monetary state financing, is a matter of intense and controversial debate
in political and economic circles. There is also a lack of clarity in this context concerning
the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) for problem countries provided by the national
central banks without sufficient involvement of the ECB.
There is little doubt that with its unconventional monetary policy, the ECB now finds
itself in a quandary. This is most obvious in the substantial rise in its balance-sheet.
Much more difficult, however, is the question of whether the ECB has not crossed "red
lines" that may endanger its functionality, effectiveness and independence in the longer
term. Lastly, it is unclear how the ECB will eventually be able to disengage from its
"unconventional monetary policy" and its quasi-fiscal role (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2013).
21
This holds all the more true after the ECB's decision to purchase covered bonds and
asset-backed securities and significantly increasing its balance sheet. In any event, it will
have to break the expectation that it can be put at the service of state financing, and
take account of the economic damage caused by its ultra-expansive monetary policy
(e.g. misallocation of resources, penalisation of savers, financial-market bubbles and
potential inflation). Not the least source of anxiety is the high level of private debt,
resulting from extremely low interest rates, which significantly exceeds public-sector
debt in some countries. The shift in power over economic policy to the ECB was justified
in the crisis on stability grounds. Now, however, the political actors, which have happily
taken refuge behind the central bank, must accept their responsibility. Economic and
fiscal-policy conditions must be set by politicians.
Lastly, in light of the most recent turbulence in the Eurozone, the question arises of
whether the ECB's mandate should be adjusted with regard to a more symmetrical
alignment process. It can be argued that a higher rate of inflation in the stronger countries
of the Eurozone would facilitate relative price adjustments, as the exclusive fixation on
internal devaluation in the deficit countries is not only expensive, but probably also
ineffective. Whether this would require a shift in monetary policy towards nominal GDP
targeting, or even the "Evans rule" of the Federal Reserve System (federal funds rate
dependant on a given unemployment and inflation rate), will need further analysis. We
give preference to a return to the ECB's price-stability mandate over other monetarypolicy approaches -especially since the ECB has acquired a fair amount of additional
responsibilities, such as banking supervision.
5. Where from Here?
Essentially, there are three preconditions for a successful reform policy. Firstly, it
needs consensus-based clarification of its objectives. Secondly, the policy must be simple
(transparent, coherent mission statement), efficient (primarily market-based control
processes) and effective (measurable achievement of targets). Thirdly, stable conditions
are essential to give the different actors the necessary security for planning and investment.
Every policy will ultimately be measured against these principles.
Basically, there are various possibilities for the economic and institutional strengthening
of the EU:
- Greater integration into a European fiscal union and a European economic
government.
- Consolidation and expansion of cooperation between EU member states on variablegeometry lines.
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- Strengthening of the Maastricht Treaty in the sense of a version 2.0, based on the
principle of individual national responsibility, and the completion of the monetary
union by a banking union, for the institutional security of the Eurozone.
- Consistent implementation of the subsidiarity principle (strengthening of EU
regulatory policy and reduction of interventionist policy).
Regardless of which route is chosen, the EU's political aims must be brought into
better alignment with the preferences of its citizens, if EU policy is to regain credibility
and trust. In this context, it is undoubtedly a disadvantage that the EU lacks an institutional
safety-valve for the accumulated anxieties and anger of its citizens. For this reason too,
EU policy should not run away from the people (Riecke, 2013).
5.1 Fiscal Union and a European Economic Government
Greater joint liability, in the form of a fiscal union with its own budget and tax
competences, is often promoted as the solution to today's problems. Not only could
this close off the open flanks of the EU and the monetary union, but it would also be
an important stage on the route towards "ever closer cooperation between the people
of Europe." A fiscal union appears to be an obvious move since individual crisis measures
increased joint liability de facto, but without establishing effective controlling legislation.
The relationship between liability and control has thus become unbalanced, and a fiscal
union could restore the balance.
In principle, a fiscal union need not necessarily involve a uniform taxation system,
as demonstrated by the USA and Switzerland. Comprehensive joint liability would,
however, necessitate the cession of a large part of fiscal sovereignty on the part of
member states. Such a comprehensive renunciation of sovereignty and transfer of
competence to the EU-level, seems fairly unrealistic today and would require tedious
and protracted changes to the EU treaty. The creation of only partial EU responsibilities,
such as the generation of funds by the issue of long-term, jointly guaranteed state bonds
- the so-called Eurobonds - would, absent corresponding rights of intervention in national
budgets, rapidly result in a system of organised irresponsibility (Deutscher
Sachverständigenrat). Eurobonds would not only be associated with the serious issue
of moral hazard, but would also penalise all the member countries with good credit
ratings. The joint, cross-border liability inevitably involved with Eurobonds would
ultimately give rise to still more serious problems, as the incentives to budgetary discipline
would be weakened. State expenditure would remain a national prerogative, while debt
would be communitised. This fundamental problem would still remain if joint liability
were limited to the part of national debt below 60% of GDP.
23
The notion that centralising economic competences with a European economic
government would make it easier to solve the structural problems is equally fallacious.
The German chancellor contributed such a proposal to the discussion in spring 2011,
with the Pakt für Wettbewerbsfähigkeit (Competitiveness Pact). Analysis of where the
structural problems of individual member countries lie, and whether their solution is
to be found at national or supranational levels, rapidly produces a more differentiated
picture. Differing problem areas require differentiated measures; some at the supranational
level, others at the national level. Thus, the real-estate crisis, youth unemployment and
state debt should be tackled predominantly at the national level, as there are great
structural differences between the member countries in these areas. Furthermore, some
of the political preferences of member countries are so varied that it would be impossible
to find a common denominator. This is why there should be no attempt to iron out
European variety by means of the enforced homogenisation of all country-specific areas
of politics. Competition as a coordination process is based on the opposite approach.
A general transfer of national responsibility to EU level would not only undermine
the responsibility of individual states, but necessarily also result in an ever more complex
and unpredictable coordination of economic policy. Ultimately, it would further diminish
institutional competition, in which governments offer varying economic-policy concepts,
in favour of a bureaucratic coordination mechanism. This would contradict the European
idea of competition between Europeans as the motor of prosperity. The great hymn to
competition would thus finally degenerate into empty rhetoric. The EU will not survive
global competition under the overall control of a command economy (Stezner, 2011).
For all these reasons, the creation of a fiscal union, with comprehensive cession of
national sovereignty, does not appear to be a promising strategy for the EU. Political
theory teaches that heterogeneous constructs tend not to be stable. "A European
Federation would be quite heterogeneous by most measures (ethnic, linguistic, cultural)
and likely to face significant political costs when choosing common public goods and
policies at the federal level" (Spolaore, 2013).
5.2 Greater Cooperation on Variable Geometry Lines
The variable-geometry strategy is nothing new for the EU. It is based on the concept
of enhanced cooperation between member states. This provision has been integrated
for the first time in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and is today enshrined in the
primary law of the EU (Art. 20 EU-Treaty respectively Art. 326-334 of The Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union). Akin to this concept of enhanced cooperation is
the notion of "core Europe" that originated from the German debate about Europe. It
refers to those member states that are prepared to go further in the political and
24
economic integration process than others. The variable-geometry strategy has already
been applied in the Schengen-Dublin agreement, in the social protocol to the EU-Treaty,
in the EMU and now also with the Fiscal Pact. Nevertheless, it seems that there is no
clear policy behind this instrument, so that the variable-geometry concept resulted in
ad-hoc measures.
However, the concept of variable geometry achieved a new respectability through
a speech by the British prime minister at the beginning of 2013, on Britain and Europe
(Cameron, 2013). In the speech, Prime Minister David Cameron advocated abandoning
the idea of the EU as a political bloc in favour of a structure better suited to the variety
of its members than is now the case. In concrete terms, what is needed is fewer "onesize-fits-all" majority decisions, and more flexible options for integration.
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI, 2013) also calls for an EU that is much
more "outward-looking", rather than being preoccupied with itself: "A competitive EU
is also one which ensures that its regulatory environment is globally competitive and
not unduly burdensome". There is a direct link here to the reinforcement of the subsidiarity
principle. The EU should exercise self-restraint in taking on further tasks, particularly
in social and labour-market policy and the ever more favoured area of "lifestyle regulation".
And the member countries must be granted greater freedom of action in the achievement
of objectives. A statement by the Dutch government indicates a similar point of view:
"The time of an ever closer union in every possible policy area is behind us". These
considerations are also partly reflected in the history of the EU itself: "The European
project has been much more successful when fostering economic exchanges and a
common market, while it has stalled when attempting to pool federal public goods,
such as defence and security" (Spolaore, 2013). It might well be that the present crisis
paves the way to more enhanced cooperation.
Particularly in the case of the United Kingdom, however, the question of the potential
limits of variable geometry arises with some urgency. The island kingdom is the most
important financial centre in Europe, and its participation in regulation and monitoring
within a European banking union would be needed. If the UK stands to one side, the
banking union might be revealed as a paper tiger.
5. 3 Institutional Frameworks and Individual National Responsibility
Behind the catchword "Euro-crisis" lie three major problem areas:
- The state debt crisis characterised by sharply rising debt ratios in many member
countries and some high risk premiums against German government bonds as a
reference point.
25
- The macroeconomic crisis, revealed in the recessionary economic development
in an increasing number of member countries, and particularly in the loss of
competitiveness in the peripheral countries.
- The banking crisis, reflected in investors' loss of confidence in the financial
institutions of the problem countries, and the renationalisation of credit relationships.
EU policy has been focused on these trouble spots. Its aim is to keep the Euro as
the common currency, and it is deploying an impressive range of instruments to achieve
this desirable goal. It has succeeded in strengthening the institutional framework, by
means of a series of packages that would previously have been regarded as inconceivable.
Particularly remarkable are the envisaged disciplining of fiscal policy, closer control of
economic policy, and the creation of a European banking union for supervision,
restructuring and settlement.
It remains to be seen whether the toughened Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal
Pact will strengthen the statics of the EU structure in a sustainable manner. Previous
experience teaches that the mere existence of rules is not of itself sufficient; they must
also actually be applied, and non-compliance punished. But compliance with rules
remains difficult as long as decision-makers are confronted with contradictory objectives,
which is why clear objective-setting at the top level of the EU is important. And there
is still a lack of tough correction and sanction mechanisms; ultimately judgement on
sinners is pronounced by those who are themselves potential sinners. For this reason,
the EU Commission has a special responsibility, for it has substantial discretionary scope
in interpreting the fairly imprecisely formulated rules. As the German Bundesbank warns:
"If the rules are rendered too flexible, through exceptions and latitude in decisionmaking, there is a danger that their disciplinary effect will be lost" (Deutsche Bundesbank,
2013).
It may be that the strengthened institutional framework will suffice in a fair-weather
economy. Not least, in that it cannot be ruled out that greater coordination and more
monitoring may have some disciplinary influence on the national financial policy of
member countries. But whether the new rules will be adequate when the structure is
exposed to a new endurance test is difficult to say. An additional complication is that
bringing the debt ratios back to the reference figure of 60% of GDP may take some
countries over 20 years, which may give rise to domestic political tensions. What will
ultimately be decisive is how the member countries assume their responsibilities, and
how the markets exercise their function of disciplining national financial policies.
26
The economic and financial-policy coordination at the EU-level, being implemented
in parallel with the restructuring and reform policies in the programme countries (Greece
and Portugal), and Italy and Spain, are beginning to show some results. These countries
are now at the top of the OECD's "reform responsiveness" indicator, which measures
the reaction to the OECD's previous recommendations in the "Going for Growth" project.
There have been structural improvements to the balance of trade in Ireland, Spain and
Portugal, even if this may in part be due to falling imports. And improvements are also
visible in the current budgets. Nevertheless, debt levels will continue to rise, so that the
cost of servicing debt represents a critical factor. The situation remains difficult in Greece,
Cyprus and Slovenia. In general, in these countries an overdimensioned state sector and
rigorously regulated factor and product markets hinder the development of a free,
innovative market economy.
The Eurozone appears to have come through the worst of the economic crisis, and
the North-South divide has been somewhat reduced. However, the medium and longterm outlook for growth remains bleak. Despite reforms, the labour markets remain
divided, as shown in the youth unemployment rates in some of the southern countries
- nearly twice the average unemployment rate. The high youth unemployment rate is
not only a tragedy for all those affected, but also has an explosive social component.
If unemployment remains high for a long period of time, the related social problems
will affect an entire generation. The debt ratio is - with few exceptions - high, not only
measured against the Maastricht quota of 60%, but also with regard to the consequences
of an aging population for state finances and growth.
Although basic conditions have to some extent improved, political will appears strong,
and reforms are gaining acceptance, the situation remains vulnerable. The EMU must
therefore take action in four areas to become sustainably resistant to crises.
First, the EMU must address the problem of competitiveness. As exiting the EMU is
no viable political option, the EU must concentrate on the problem of enhanced diversity
within an EU where the exchange rate is no longer available to address competitiveness
issues. The standard recipe so far was that countries had to undertake an "internal
devaluation", which essentially means substantial reduction of prices, to be achieved
notably through the reduction of wages and social spending. This is happening in
varying degrees in all crisis countries and has led to social unrest. Structural reforms,
although important for sustaining competitiveness, will not improve the situation
overnight. Furthermore, the massive European support measures have not yet led to
the envisaged stronger coherence in the EU. Therefore, the EU needs to consider further
reforms, which would also buy time and reduce costs for countries with a weak economic
performance (flexible transitional periods or opt-ins for lower income countries with
27
severe competitiveness problems; impact assessments that distinguish more closely
between countries and regions with stronger and weaker economic performance).
Secondly, there is a need for the introduction of an insolvency regime for EU states.
There is no other way to break the potential unholy alliance between politics, the banks
and the financial system. This alliance results from the situation that states regard
themselves a priori as good debtors, whose debt the banks do not need to back with
equity. Insolvency regimes create incentives for sustainable national fiscal policy, and
enhance the credibility of the "no-bail-out" clause (Sachverständigenrat, 2013/14).
Thirdly, the currency union's regulatory framework was blind to a crisis in the financial
markets (Sachverständigenrat). And today, many questions are still open. The "too big
to fail" problem remains unsolved. There is still the risk that tax-payers, businesses, and
national economies could suffer damage in the event of insolvency problems. The
monetary transmission mechanism still functions inadequately. Furthermore, for historical
reasons, the monitoring of the financial institutions is still too nationally focused. Many
banks are still carrying too much distressed credit, and many bank balance sheets are
still inflated and backed by too little equity. For this reason, given the close interrelationships
between the banking systems, it is appropriate and correct for the European monetary
union to be complemented by a European banking union, providing uniform financial
supervision, with comprehensive competences and intervention rights. What is important
is that in the winding up of a bank, there is a clear cascade of liability that ensures that
shareholders and creditors incur liability before tax-payers do.
The responsibility of banking supervision will undoubtedly put further pressure on
the role and the independence of the ECB, due to conflicts of interest between decisions
on monetary policy and financial stability. These are not easily resolvable. Some
economists fear that this could cause price stability to suffer, in that preference would
be given to overall financial stability, or even to the stability of a systemically important
financial institution (Stark, 2013). Others think that central banks need to keep their eye
not only on monetary stability, but also on the stability of the financial system (Blanchard,
2013). This discussion is still in full swing. An additional difficulty for the ECB is that it
is inheriting hidden legacy burdens, and could therefore be drawn into the emergency
financing of equity gaps. The banking union would be off to a poor start if legacy
burdens were not cleared up beforehand. Now that the decision has been taken in
favour of supervision by the ECB, the focus should be on drawing the appropriate
conclusions from the most recent asset quality review without paying heed to national
susceptibilities or the desire of national authorities for regulatory unilateralism. Also
necessary is clear institutional and personal separation of the two mandates, monetary
policy and supervision, in order not to endanger the independence of monetary policy.
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The political independence of central banks, a prerequisite for price stability, is always
in danger. This holds true even for the ECB. Empirical research shows that between
1999 and 2007 government officials have advocated in 82% of all public statements
lower interest rates (Ehrmann/Fratscher, 2011). Likewise, the level of government debt
had an important influence on the monetary thinking of politicians. This can be interpreted
as a neuralgic point of the monetary union (Sorbeck, 2010). With the new mandate for
banking supervision in place, the situation is getting even more difficult for the ECB.
It is therefore advisable to transfer this task in the medium term to a new independent
European authority or the existing European Banking Authority.
Despite these qualifications, the establishment of the banking union is well on track.
However, potential pitfalls must be avoided. Four points are important:
- The supervisory authority must guarantee that false incentives are eliminated, credits
with the potential to default cannot be concealed, interventions in business strategy
do not occur, and the higher equity requirements are implemented consistently.
- Given the global character of banking today, the European authorities should
campaign for an international resolution process, to avoid competitive distortions,
the fragmentation of the financial system, and regulatory arbitrage. The key to
insolvency law for banks is the "bail-in" of shareholders and creditors. They, and
not tax-payers, should foot the bill if banks become distressed.
- Depositor protection, whose realisation at European level is contested, should if implemented - primarily be financed by the banks themselves, but not ensured
by means of the introduction of a tax on financial transactions. Such a tax risks
deteriorating the financial conditions for European companies and compromising
the international competitiveness of the European financial industry.
- As long as it remains unnecessary for government bonds to be backed with equity,
a banking union will fail to achieve one important goal - the breaking of the vicious
circle between bank balance sheets and public debt.
Fourthly, and this concerns not only the EMU, but the EU as a whole, there is need
for economic-policy reform in the areas of public finance, labour-market policy,
competition policy, tax policy and social policy. This does not mean that all these policy
areas should be harmonised across the whole EU. It is a task for national governments
to find the optimum mix of reforms for their country, and to be inspired by progress
in partner countries. The EU institutions can serve as providers of impulse and support
here. If, however, they undermine the decision-making autonomy of national politics,
29
they will arouse resistance, strengthen the centrifugal forces, and do a disservice to the
community spirit.
- Public finances: When public subsidies for particular economic sectors and interest
groups are abolished, it benefits public finances, and puts an end to the preservation
of obsolete and uncompetitive economic structures. The privatisation of unprofitable
and often over-dimensioned state enterprises has the same effect. Additionally, it
releases funds for the financing of education and basic research - and the reduction
of debt.
- Labour-market policy: The abolition of obstacles to the free movement of persons
between states, one of the four fundamental freedoms of the single market, increases
the flexibility of the whole community, as knowledge and expertise can flow freely
from country to country, and increases its resistance to external shocks. Flexible
working hours and free collective bargaining between the social partners contribute
to European businesses' ability to react rapidly to economic fluctuations and
structural changes. Relaxations to employment protection facilitate access to
employment for young people, increase the mobility of the labour market, and
reduce the danger of ossification. Need-based social benefits, that do not make
employment unattractive, create incentives for entry, or re-entry, into employment.
- Competition Policy: Competition policy is viewed as a public policy to promote
competition or more specifically to ensure that competition is not restricted by
private players. In this sense, competition policy should contribute to achieving
economic efficiency and maximising social welfare. To reach this goal it is essential
that the approach to competition policy is effect-based rather than form-based,
where an effect-based approach focuses on the presence of anti-competitive effects,
and rests on sound economic analysis of each specific case. The "more economic
approach" to Article 101 TFEU (formerly Article 81 of the EC Treaty) and merger
control introduced a decade earlier was therefore a step in the right direction.
However, the "more economic approach" was not pursued consistently, particularly
with regard to vertical restraints.
Furthermore, although widely debated some years ago, a "more economic approach"
to Article 102 TFEU (abuse of dominance) was also never consistently implemented
- the recommendations by the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy
(EAGCP) were largely ignored. A more economics-based approach would also be
advisable in the control of state aid. Although the Commission seems to have
recognised this lack, the underdevelopment of economics-based analysis in the
control of state aid is still prevalent.
30
- Tax policy: Favourable taxation conditions, not least a transparent, simplified and
non-discriminatory tax regime, are important for businesses facing increasing
competitive pressure. Tax competition between EU member states should not be
hindered, though it is necessary to find a fair solution for the problem of tax evasion
and to close off unacceptable bolt-holes within the system.
- Social policy: The financing of social security is reaching its limits almost everywhere,
and is unsustainable, given the ageing of the population. This is indicated by the
high implicit state debt already mentioned. It points to the danger that current
prosperity is being maintained on the backs of the future generations. To put oldage pensions on a sound basis, aligned with demographic developments, will take
a shift of emphasis from the currently prevailing pay-as-you-go system to a fullyfunded system. This will be a long and hard road, as reforms in this area demonstrate.
But it should be embarked on.
The EU has succeeded, under difficult conditions, in strengthening its institutional
framework, under the keyword of "Maastricht 2.0". There are still, however, some
weaknesses and false incentives, which promoted the development of the crisis, to be
addressed. Given the circumstances though, this approach still seems the most promising
way to put the EU on track for greater stability, more growth and more competitiveness.
But it should always be kept in mind that ultimately - in what remains a highly
heterogeneous society - every economic system will fail once responsibility and liability
cease to apply.
5.4 Implementation of a Consistent Subsidiarity Policy
The criteria for an efficient distribution of competences between the EU level and
the member countries are known, and can be easily derived from the economic theory
of federalism. Essentially, there are four good reasons for locating competences at the
EU level:
- The existence of cross-border impact from measures taken by individual states
(e.g. in environmental and climate policy).
- The existence of advantages of scale, i.e. if a task can be carried out more costeffectively by a larger political unit (e.g. the centralisation of defence policy).
- Commitment problems on the part of national decision-makers, i.e. when, on
account of conflicts between interest groups, it is impossible to take appropriate
economic measures (e.g. state-aid control).
- "Ruinous" regulatory competition.
31
There are equally good reasons against the centralisation of policy at the EU level:
- Significant differences in preferences between member countries.
- Information deficits at the central level.
- Aggravation of the "principal-agent" problem, because the distance between the
central and national level is too great.
- Maintenance of inter-system competition, to gather experience with various regulatory
approaches, and thus trigger a learning process.
With increasing integration, the EU's advantages and disadvantages of scale have also
grown. Accordingly, the importance of the subsidiarity policy has increased. The EU
could undoubtedly have spared itself some inconvenience on its journey so far, had it
given more attention to the implementation of a consistent subsidiarity policy right from
the start. Developments were, however, in the opposite direction, in that the EU
Commission cleverly broke down major issues into individual acts, and thus depoliticised
them. In this way, it not only avoided conflicts with the EU Council, but also expanded
its own room for manoeuvre. The subsidiarity principle was thus effectively turned
upside down, so that "regulation by Brussels" gradually took over. Consequently, the
politicians would be well advised to give thought to a readjustment of the distribution
of competences between the community and national levels.
In this context it is also noteworthy that the EU Commission comprises a portfolio of
27 areas of activity, with a Commissioner, with his or her own legislative agenda, for
each. There is, though, no subsidiarity policy as such, although such a policy would
not only facilitate priority-setting, but also simplify horizontal coordination.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
Variable geometry: The most promising concept
The EU is far from being a homogeneous entity. Aspirations of individual member
states and opinions about the desirable future shape of the Union diverge widely. In
some countries, there are even centrifugal forces at work. Furthermore, the EMU is not
an optimum currency area. There are wide discrepancies in macroeconomic performance
and international competitiveness. Therefore, the most promising path to follow is the
multi-speed variable-geometry concept. It does not prevent individual EU countries from
going farther in the integration process, while at the same time allowing other members
to proceed at a slower pace. It requires opt-in clauses to provide more flexibility as well
as less emphasis on the principles of unanimity and qualified majority voting.
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Governance under Maastricht 2.0: less complicated, more efficient and
transparent
A single monetary policy and a fiscal union are often seen as basic requirements for
a well-functioning monetary union. However, hurdles for establishing a fiscal union
encompassing either all EU or Eurozone member states appear insurmountable for the
time being. Changing the treaties is difficult because unanimity is required, and the
principle of "no taxation without representation" is violated as long as the EU is not a
genuine political union. A more realistic approach comprises three elements: 1) the
consistent application of the principle of subsidiarity, 2) strictly and transparently
monitored cooperation, including the imposition of sanctions in the event of noncompliance, and 3) effective fiscal rules. Especially promising are the strengthening of
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the introduction of debt brakes in national
legislations or constitutions, as envisaged in the Fiscal Compact Treaty.
However, effective coordination in fiscal governance, essential as it is, should not
end up in a bureaucratic overload of coordination and monitoring instruments. Otherwise,
there is a risk of failing to see the wood for the trees, and the door to excuses and
overindulgence is wide open. In the interest of clarity, efficiency and effectiveness, this
should be avoided. A good example of overload is the Macroeconomic Imbalances
Procedure Scoreboard, with its abundance of indicators to be monitored and assessed.
The reforms to the SGP have also increased its complexity and lack of transparency.
EMU remains under stress
In all likelihood, the Euro will not cease to exist. Breaking up EMU would carry high
political and economic costs, and the political will to keep the common currency is
strong. Monetary policy will therefore continue to be conducted in a centralised way,
while fiscal policy remains for the foreseeable future the prerogative of national fiscal
authorities. This increases the danger of high budget deficits and rising state debt levels.
Therefore, given the risk of non-compliance with the tougher rules and the possibility
of an increasing gap in competitiveness, parallel currencies in the peripheral countries
might be a promising interim solution that provides flexibility and facilitates adjustments
without compelling those countries to leave the Eurozone (Mayer, 2012; Vogelsang,
2013).
In such a setting, a national currency would be introduced alongside the Euro. The
national central bank would tie the national currency to the Euro at a fixed rate. This
would allow the country to execute the exchange rate devaluation that is necessary to
regain international competitiveness. At the same time however, there would still be
a reliable form of participation without formally leaving the Euro system. In retrospect,
the same regime would again be put into place as during the introduction of the Euro
between 1999 -2001. At that time, the national currencies served as transaction currencies,
33
while the Euro was reserved for banking transactions. A parallel currency would of
course not be a magic solution but a tool for economic self-help and for facilitating the
internal adjustment process in order to restore competitiveness.
Finding the right balance between subsidiarity and solidarity
In the absence of a fiscal union, and in view of persistent huge gaps in competitiveness
and economic performance, the "no-bail-out" clause in the treaty should again be strictly
adhered to. In our view, European policy-makers are well advised to refrain from
advocating the creation of Eurobonds. Eurobonds have the ostensibly attractive advantage
of deleting interest rate differentials between bonds issued by individual EMU countries.
However, they would ultimately facilitate bail-outs and thus invite indebted countries
to free-load on the discipline of other member states. Efforts at implementing structural
reforms would be undermined, and countries pursuing relatively sound fiscal policies
would be penalised by an increase in interest rates.
Fundamental reforms to replace emergency measures
The emergency measures taken by the ECB - not least the abundant supply of liquidity
- have reduced the risk of a breakdown of EMU and provided short-term relief. However,
the more fundamental problem of diverging competitiveness and economic performance
has not been solved and indeed cannot be solved by such measures. Accordingly, fiscal
and economic policy reforms in all EMU countries, but particularly in the most indebted
and less competitive ones, remain extremely important. The fundamental mistake made
during the first years of EMU must not be repeated. At that time, former high-interestrate countries benefited from a sharp decline in yields and reaped windfall profits, but
neglected structural reforms. The increasing divergences between unit labour costs and
current-account balances bear witness to this undesirable development. This time round,
EMU countries should utilize the window of opportunity provided by the emergency
measures and embark on reform-oriented policies aimed at improving competitiveness.
Flexible, mobile labour markets and decentralised wage-setting, deregulated product
markets and cutbacks in subsidies serve this purpose. Not only must public finances
be consolidated, but it is also important to remove incentives for ever-increasing private
debt. In a medium-term perspective, and against the background of high implicit public
debt levels, social security reforms are particularly urgent (e.g. the transition from the
traditional pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and notional defined contribution (NDC) and funded
systems).
State debt restructuring and banking union: two cornerstones of a more
stable EMU
To break the vicious circle between bank balance sheets and public debt (the "bankstate loop"), clear and predictable mechanisms for restructuring Eurozone state
34
debt, an insolvency regime for EU member states and the European banking union are
unavoidable. The disorderly default of a member country would jeopardise the stability
of the entire monetary union. Whether it is appropriate to allocate the task of supervising
systemically important European banks to the ECB is debatable. However, as the decision
has been taken, emphasis should now be drawing rigorously the conclusions from the
most recent asset quality review, tackling the problem of non-performing loans without
succumbing to national sensitivities, and erecting a firewall within the ECB in order to
avoid conflicts of interest between the objectives of monetary policy and banking
regulation.
The agreement on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is an important step in
the direction of a robust banking union: It has been deliberately designed to ensure that
no government needs to bail out its domestic banking system ever again. Whether the
resolution procedure - a fairly complex mechanism - will allow speedy decision-making
in a crisis situation is, however, an open question.
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the ECB has been burdened with tasks that
are not part of its mission of providing price stability. The ECB should as soon as possible
exit from unconventional monetary policies that must not become a permanent monetary
policy instrument. This is all the more important as the double mandate of guaranteeing
price stability and supervising systemically important banks is challenging enough.
Banking union: sound, binding regulation
The establishment of a banking union is well on the way, but important issues remain.
Single Banking Supervision (SBS) raises questions about the extent of regulation. In our
view, SBS must refrain from supervising business models and financial products. An
important issue is the regulation of the shadow banking system and OTC derivatives.
Distortions in national banking systems, among them the existence of governmentsponsored banks, need to be abolished. Compensation incentives that may generate excessive
balance-sheet growth should be avoided. Furthermore, the financing of the controversial
single deposit insurance scheme is unclear. The various proposals have to be carefully
evaluated in order to avoid new distortions and competitive disadvantages. Finally, it is
important that the EU is vocal in the international regulatory debate, and supports sound,
binding regulatory arrangements between the main financial centres, ideally within the
framework of the Financial Stability Board (FSB). Participation of non-EMU EU countries
in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) would strengthen that voice.
Competitive advantages thanks to market-oriented policies
Finally, an overarching goal of EU governance must be to emphasise the crucial role
of market forces. During the financial crisis, trust in market forces and the benefits of
35
competition has been undermined. Markets have been distorted by interventions. Yield
curves and sovereign spreads have been manipulated; signals by the financial markets
have been suppressed. This trend must be reversed. Otherwise, Europe will increasingly
lag behind the more market-oriented parts of the world in competitive terms.
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Frankfurt am Main, November 4, 2013.
Deutsche Bundesbank, Jüngste Entscheidungen des Ecofin-Rats zu den Defizitverfahren
der Länder im Euro-Raum, in: Monatsbericht August 2013.
Deutsche Bundesbank, Finanzkrise und Zahlungsbilanzentwicklungen in der Europäischen
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des Internationalen Währungsfonds, in: Handelsblatt Wirtschafts- und Finanzzeitung,
Düsseldorf/Frankfurt, October 11, 2013.
Mayer, T., Geuro und Deuro - Die Griechen und Deutschen könnten Parallelwährungen
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Düsseldorf/Frankfurt, July 26, 2013.
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2013.
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II
Competitiveness of Europe - Economy First!
(THINKTANK CENTRE - WARSAW)
Summary of Recommendations
OECD defines international competitiveness as the ability and motivation for longterm growth and development under free market conditions. The EU, including former
powers that are now in relative decline individually, can be an important global player
in shaping the networked international order, on the condition that member states work
out a European competitiveness strategy which looks towards competing globally. This
report proposes to build such a strategic approach around 5 key areas, where
EU action at the community level is needed:
1. convergence: Enhance strong cooperation and exchange of knowledge among
all the 28 EU member states, especially in innovation and new technologies;
2. single market: Fully implement services directive all over the EU, stimulate further
integration of all sectors and enhance e-commerce;
3. growth and environment: Establish a European Energy Union and common
energy market as well as implement measures to keep energy costs low;
4. friendly business environment: Reduce EU regulations for SMEs by 25%,
implement a legal framework to provide easier access for SMEs to public procurement
and financial instruments, both public and private;
5. bridge between research and industry: Stimulate commercialisation of research,
create a legal and financial framework to attract the best minds to work in Europe
and for Europe.
Europe has always been strategically flexible and adaptable and should remain so
in the new millennium. Changes in the world economy are pushing the Old Continent
to reassess itself. If it wants to remain a success story - which it has been for the last
few decades - it should look for new opportunities for growth. Paradoxically, the
economic and political crisis in Europe as well as instability at the EU's Eastern border
might lead it to the right approach and mobilize the best resources to find practical
solutions for the whole European Community.
38
If Europe is to remain a global economic leader and boost growth and jobs, it should
focus not only on an "industrial renaissance" led by the biggest, but rather look to an
innovative business spirit and creative potential of individuals and SMEs. This will be
one of the main challenges for the new commission, especially for its new Vice-President
responsible for Jobs, Growth, Investments and Competitiveness. While leading the
commissioners' team for a special project: A boost for Jobs, Growth and Investment, it
would be useful to remember that the debate about the European Union's competitiveness
too often has concentrated on generalities. The main challenges faced by the EU
institutions are about changing both their approach and mindset. "More Europe" should
not lead to more regulations, but more interaction with people. The EU needs today
not so much new ideas but successful leadership and effective management to implement
practical and pragmatic recommendations from the experience and expertise of European
business, for which competitiveness is a must.
1. Introduction
It is argued that ageing Europeans find it difficult to compete with innovative Americans
and efficient Asians. Although the situation is far from dire, a loss of confidence could
be dangerous. In rushing to restart by all means, Europe may throw out the attractive
attributes of its development model. The truth is that its economy has many strong
elements and that Europe might again be innovative and efficient if only it
would use its shared potential.
First, the EU has been growing steadily over the last 60 years and has become an
absolute and unique success story of regional integration free from domination of any
single country. In constructing the new, networked international order and moving from
the rule of power to the power of rules, the European project is invaluable as a source
of inspiration. The process of integrating markets and institutions resulted in remarkable
convergence, which was the major driving force of European economic growth until
the present crisis.
Thanks to its strong and efficient institutions, in 50 years, the EU was able to create
and operate the European single market based on free movement of capital, goods,
services and employees. Unlimited internal trade resulted in quicker convergence not
only in incomes but also in living standards. The EU became a lifestyle role model,
highly attractive for outsiders. Real democracy and human rights, good work-life balance,
healthcare and social security have been developed.
At the same time, European business and industry grew. All together, the EU remains
the strongest economy: In 2011 the GDP of 27 member states reached $17,577 trillion,
39
compared with the US at $15,094 trillion. The GDP of the Eurozone is $13,115 trillion.2
Furthermore, European business has been growing wisely, but is limited by strong
national governments and the institutions of the emerging European Union. A sustainable
and inclusive approach to its growth ensured the Old Continent the protection
of its natural resources and controlled enlargement of its metropolis.
On the other hand, European human capital became highly skilled and effective,
where 1/10 of the world's population has been producing 1/3 of the world's GDP.
European secondary school students have been well placed in the PISA scores and
European universities generally enjoy good academic rankings, although Europe is not
leading the scores. Together with a strong economy and trade domination (almost 50%
of the global trade in goods involves Europe), Europe has truly become a recognized
global brand. European soft power is seen as its greatest competitive advantage, which
is why enlargement has been such a success story, further stimulating European politics
and economy.
However, the last few years have shown that the European dream is over. It is not
only because of the internal situation but also because of the radical changes in the
external environment. The world driven by globalization, urbanization and digitalization
has become different and smaller. The emerging global powers in Asia, Latin America,
and Africa have awakened. Over the last few years, major weaknesses of the European
project have emerged. First, being an incomplete union of 28 countries, permanently
under construction, the EU lost its convergence skills. The number of member states
is more than double the original 12, which signed the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. The
enlargements in 2004 and 2007 not only doubled participants in the single market, but
also incorporated a number of much poorer countries, which widened differences
between member states in development and innovation. The global economic and
financial crisis has deeply impacted the EU and shed a light on the weaknesses of
competitiveness. The budgetary crisis has further aggravated the situation.
At the end of 2013, The European Commission and International Monetary Fund
expected average global economic growth to be 3.3% and 4% the following year, largely
as a result of growth in developing countries.3 By the end of 2013, the GDP of the EU
remained the same as the year before, while the US grew by 1.9%. The forecast for 2014
indicated slow growth in Europe at 1.4% (3 % in the US) and by 1.9% in 2015. Compared
with Turkey's 5% and China's 8% growth rate, European growth has been far from
impressive. How can European economies perform better to close the gap between
ambition and reality?
2
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2012: Nominal GDP list of countries.
Data for the year 2011
3
World Economic Outlook, 10.2013, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/
40
There is no lack of strategic thinking in the EU but unfortunately its objectives remain
largely on paper. Some of the Lisbon Strategy's general objectives for European
competitiveness remain valid (especially prioritizing a knowledge based economy,
liberalization of the domains left behind the single market regulations, deregulation,
new stimulations for entrepreneurship and labor market flexibility) but there is a need
for practical solutions. The Europe 2020 strategy rightly focuses on re-modelling the EU
cohesion and competitiveness policies to face the new global powers (mainly China,
ASEAN countries and BRICS) but its performance in seven flagship initiatives (enterprise
environment, digital agenda, innovative Europe, education and training, labor market
and employment, social inclusion and environmental sustainability) differs in member
states. The 2013 European Competitiveness Report by European Commission makes the
case for a re-industrialization of the EU economy, building on existing strengths in terms
of its knowledge base, sophistication and specialization; however it underestimates the
huge potential of SMEs in a new era of e-commerce and globalization.
Therefore, the present report states that the Commission's current actions and future
plans in order to ensure European competitiveness should concentrate on few actions
and be implemented in all member states with a high level of determination. New leaders
of the European Union should remodel its competitiveness strategy on the base of 5
major ideas, which can be transformed into 5 major community programs:
1. "Convergence 28": Restart the convergence machine which was one of the major
drivers of the Europe's successes for decades;
2. "Single Market really single": Unlock the full potential of the EU 28 by implementing
EU directive on services in all member states, liberalising all sectors, enhancing
mobility and harmonising some elements of tax systems;
3. "Smart E-G balance" (between Environment and Growth): Correct the EU
policy towards a realistic energy mix and adopt a more pragmatic approach for
climate change;
4. "Business-friendly Europe": Deregulation and liberalisation of private sector
with clear rules for common European standards: lower barriers for business, lower
costs of running enterprises and introduce innovative financial instruments for
SMEs; introduce early education training for entrepreneurial skills and business
approach, improve the climate for businesses in all member states; attract more
people with business experience into the EU institutions, remodel private and
public financial instruments,
5. "Science - Business Bridge": Attract the best minds to work in Europe, for Europe,
stimulate cooperation among EU member states in commercialisation of research
results and building bridges between science and business.
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2. Recommendations
1. Convergence 28
In the Global Competitiveness ranking by the World Economic Forum, some European
countries are excellent, while others are severely lacking behind. The US, having topped
the list in the past, now ranks fifth. Today the leading countries are Switzerland and
Singapore and there are five EU member states in top 10 (Finland is 3rd, Germany is
4th, Sweden is 6th, the Netherlands is 8th, and the UK ranks 10th). The problem is,
however, that some EU member states rank fairly low (Hungary is 63rd, Croatia 73rd,
Romania 76th, Slovakia - 78th and Greece - 91st). Such wide interregional differences are
one of the reasons of Europe's problem with competitiveness today.4
The gap between the richest, innovative member states and the poorest ones is
widening further, as the cohesion policy has not been fulfilling its objectives. In trade
and manufacturing all member states do well, but in innovation and R&D - key
factors to add value to products and services - the countries at the bottom of
the list do much worse, as they are seen as sales markets or subcontractors. The new
EU leaders have to look at these differences and implement instruments to minimalize
these gaps. The EU should encourage the leading countries in competitiveness to guide
the rest by engaging them in large-scale common European projects in ICT infrastructure
(such as cloud and fast internet availability), R&D or exchange of knowledge, instruments,
research and training, instead of distributing funds by countries and regions.
The EU convergence does not only have internal implications. In the global dimension,
European Union member states must speak with one voice and have a common economic
agenda towards the emerging powers, especially BRICS. Companies from different
member states will always compete but their governments should not. The new
leaders should lead the EU 28 towards a serious political debate about global strategy
and form a new pragmatic approach that takes into consideration economic weaknesses
and strengths of all the community members. The common trade and industrial
policies in free trade negotiations, including TTIP, should reflect the positions
and interests of all 28 countries to ensure that the companies from weaker
member states will have equal changes at other markets.
Deeper internal convergence of EU 28 is a great opportunity for each and every
member state: for richer ones to enlarge their markets, for poorer ones - to modernise
their economies and generate wealth. This mechanism - which worked well for
enlargement - might also work well in an international scale if the EU opens up to other
4
World Economic Forum, www.weforum.org
42
markets. The "more trade not aid" approach would be the best for Europe's southern
and eastern neighbours. Turkey, which has a Customs Union with the EU, is a good
test.
2. Single Market Really Single
The fact is that the European Union does not benefit fully from its Single Market of
over 500 million consumers and 20 million entrepreneurs. Legally, it operates well, but
in practice it is not fully integrated and the EU convergence is weak. Therefore, the new
EU leaders should concentrate on tapping into the full potential of the EU 28, firstly by
reducing burdens in services, which account for 75% of its GDP. Both legal and practical
solutions are needed here: From consequent monitoring of the implementation of the
EU directive on services in all member states to the creation of a single information
point which would reduce confusion and bring the legislations closer. Moreover, further
integration and synergies stimulated by EU institutions are needed in transport, railways,
telecommunication, post, finance, energy and gas, ITC and defence sectors. Elimination
of roaming within the EU, liberalization of its internal markets to avoid national
monopolies, enhancement of interconnections of same sectors in different EU member
states, creation of a friendly legal EU framework for e-commerce and digital economy
will reduce the cost of doing business for both the European businesses and foreign
companies operating in Europe.
The Single Market will not be complete without easy mobility of workers, requiring
wider compatibility of health insurance systems and transferability of social security
benefits. This should apply not only to fixed contracts but temporary employees as well.
Common migration policy and regulations will have to be finalised in order to attract
foreigners with necessary skills to fulfil the gaps in the EU labour market.
Tax differences within the EU are an important obstacle to the integration of the
Single Market. The full harmonization of tax systems in Europe may never happen but
their simplification and wider unification are possible and necessary. This will considerably
reduce business costs such as implementation of European warrant. The EU directive
2006/112/WE proved Europe can have a common VAT minimum rate of 15%, so keeping the rates different - the EU could implement common tax bases for VAT
declarations and reimbursement as well as common lists of goods and services with
reduced rates. As for corporate taxes the EU should implement the common catalogue
of legible income costs.
43
3. Smart Balance between Environment and Growth
Energy is one of the biggest cost elements in business, especially for heavy industry.
To remain competitive, Europe has to have stable and cheap sources of energy. Currently
energy costs are almost twice as high as in the US, mostly due to low emission regulations
and strict environmental policy. If Europe (and the US) alone implement strong
environmental regulations without the compliance of other countries, environmental
impact would be more limited, while competitiveness would suffer greatly. Therefore,
a right balance should be reached between measures taken to modernize power
generation systems by green technologies and renewable energy sources, and the
necessity to use the traditional ones, which will continue to cover over 87% of the energy
demand over the next few decades.
A qualitative change in the generation and supply systems to reduce the cost of green
energy requires a technological breakthrough, which may only be fostered by intensified
research. Therefore, adequate research budgets must be secured not only by
member states and the business sector but also by the EU 28. At the same time,
the EU should ensure good management over energy prices by a quick implementation
of Energy Package III and the creation of a common energy market (planned for 2014),
accompanied by an energy union, which would reduce foreign dominance over this
market. The EU's legal framework instruments and "energy diplomacy" should lead to
diversification of external providers and the supply channels of energy sources, including
shale gas and LNG. The EU-US TTIP agreement might offer a great opportunity in this
regard, while European potential for shale gas should not be overlooked. EU leaders
should also implement diversified framework instruments to support renewable
energy (RES) within the EU 28 in view of the considerable diversification of
territorial conditions and availability of raw materials.
Furthermore, Europe should aim towards a global climate agreement that would help
control climate change and create equal conditions for business operations for entrepreneurs
all over the world. Some steps toward an agreement on climate change in 2015 were
made at the 19th Conference of Parties (COP19) talks in Warsaw. Plans for the coming
two years were made but the legal nature of the agreement remains undecided. From
the business perspective, Europe should be pragmatic: More prudent and less doctrinal
EU policy should take into account the interests of individual EU economies (coal,
nuclear fuel, shale), as well as ecological issues. A sensible debate on shale gas as an
alternative to natural gas is required. The EU should also encourage businesses to search
for innovative products and technologies, instead of focusing on lowering energy costs
alone.
44
An integration of EU energy, industrial and climate policies is absolutely essential.
Therefore a fundamental change in communication on energy and climate issues is
needed. The technological jargon must be set aside and Europe should start speaking
in terms of creating a vision for the sustainable long-term benefit of people and societies.
Energy costs in Europe can be considerably reduced by the right approach of individuals
who are interested in issues such as independence from electricity distributors, making
money on power generation, reduction of maintenance costs of households etc. Therefore,
an exchange of experience and education for businesses and households in the EU 28
are needed regarding energy efficiency as well as financial public support for individual
consumers. Small generation units subsidized by governments and placed within
reasonable legal systems would enable private individuals to generate their own power.
Such installations may act as catalysts to change the energy mix with a shift toward
green energy, but could also change consumer mentality. Once people start to recognize
the direct interdependence between their daily lives and green technologies, the general
public will eventually increase their support to EU initiatives aimed at modernizing the
European energy market. Local governments might become the EU's most important
allies in this process. Smart cities could introduce electrical vehicles in the local
transportation systems and deploy solar panels to supply electricity to street lamps and
traffic lights. The EU and central governments should offer financial and legal support
to such innovative projects.
4. Business-Friendly Europe
The British report Cut EU red tape: Report from the Business Taskforce stresses that
European companies offer excellent products and services with top world standards,
but they are often restrained by regulations, which increase business costs, limit freedom
of operations and, in consequence, slow growth. Simple and clear rules speed up
economic activity. Therefore, the new EU leaders should place particular emphasis on
simplifying administrative procedures in all member states in order to lower the barriers
for business. The focus on deregulating Europe has to be accompanied by monitoring
the implementation of the EU common quality standards in the EU 28.
SMEs constitute the European business core (roughly 99% of companies), provide
two out of three of the private sector jobs and contribute to more than half of the total
value-added created by businesses in the EU5. The EU's new leaders should pay special
attention to this sector. Small and medium enterprises may not be able to retain costly
legal counsel and could be overlooked by specific regulations at the community level.
Therefore, the EU should reduce the total of the acquis dedicated to SMEs by 25% until
5
Fact and figures about the EU´s Small and Medium Enterprise (SME), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/factsfigures-analysis/index_en.htm
45
2020 and introduce exceptions from a number of regulations, such as Waste Framework
Direction or data protection rules. Instead, the EU should support the formation and
consolidation of national and regional associations of small firms whose task is to support
the development of SMEs, including helping them obtain capital, arranging tuition on
the regulations in force and on other aspects of running a business. It should also
encourage changes in the bankruptcy laws to implement a positive approach for taking
risks and restarting a new business after a failure.
The new EU leaders should also pursue reforming European financial instruments,
especially funds for SMEs. A healthy business environment needs an adequate financial
system to support growth, however grants tend to lead to dependence on public support
instead of encouraging innovation. Today, the financial structures in the EU are conservative
and not sufficiently open for innovative business ideas. The system is composed mainly
of banks with 80% - while in the US it is only 20%. In France the national balance sheet
of three main banks is larger than the country's GDP, so it is not a surprise that the
banking sector is highly influential. Banks and public funds will not be willing to finance
risky innovations without guarantee of success. Therefore, to ensure innovation and
development of knowledge based economy in practise, the EU leaders need to
differentiate the EU financial system and enhance financial institutions such
as private equity funds, venture capital, corporate bonds or credit letters to be
more active.
EU policy should ensure that start-ups and SMEs especially have easier access to
external sources of funding beyond banks, such as preferential credits and loans, crowd
funding, business angels and venture capital funds. It should also take action to promote
the work of entrepreneurship incubators. Moreover, deep reform of the EU funds system
is needed where the quality and efficiency of the projects are evaluated first. In the EU
financial perspective 2007-2013, funding was often provided to companies who knew
how to fill in forms, even if they were not truly innovative ones.
The EU also needs to further develop its competition policy towards a more
economic approach in order to allow European companies to be globally
competitive. European competition policy should always consider the global environment
in which European companies compete as to facilitate the emergence of new European
global players.
European education systems, different in each and every member state, may have
their own strengths, but also have one weakness: The system does not provide enough
skilled workers needed in business. For example, there are too few engineers to fulfill
industry demand and those emerging from the system are not sufficiently qualified.
46
The new leaders should enhance a common EU 28 approach to education by
implementing standards to ensure the right quality and quantity of human
capital for a sophisticated, digital, knowledge based economy. The EU should
also enhance such modification in social security systems, which would combine
unemployment benefits with vocational training to prepare individuals for employment
or economic activity, perhaps in the form of social business.
Social enterprises account for 6% of workplaces in EU member states and produce
10% of GDP. This approach should be promoted further as an ideal solution to mix the
market needs and expectations of people, as opposed to the European social model.
Both social business and corporate social responsibility (CSR) - regarded as part of a
firm's strategy, and not as an element of marketing - allow to reduce costs of social
policy instruments and to use public money for innovation. Implemented properly,
they boost confidence in the business community and in the idea of
entrepreneurship itself.
The approach to business is not the same in all EU 28 member states as a result of
each country's culture of entrepreneurship and each society's perception of business
activities. Therefore, the EU should enhance community actions to promote
entrepreneurship and specific skills needed for taking the risk of establishing
a company. Business education should start in elementary schools and continue
in colleges in order to prepare students to be mentally ready for running a business one
day.
Moreover, the EU should help build a positive image of entrepreneurs by
underlining the private sector's role in contributing to the local, regional,
national and European socio-economic environment (creating new jobs, producing
new goods and services, increasing the national income etc). Business confederations,
chambers of commerce and other business-related institutions should also contribute
to building a better climate for entrepreneurship in Europe. In particular, the idea of
entrepreneurship should be promoted among social groups with untapped potential,
such as women and young people.
5. Bridge between Research and Business
In many European countries, science and business do not converge and commercialisation
of research is not easy to promote. However, collaboration between European universities
and companies are crucial to help the Old Continent to remain innovative and competitive.
The EU leaders should build bridges between science and business by launching
European common research programs and creating an open R&D market. Such
47
integration would promote better allocation of resources and increase competitiveness
of European products globally. Excellent conditions for new technologies and R&D
sectors could be provided by the European Centers for Research and Development
created partly with EU funds in the form of special economic zones. At the same time,
Europe could accumulate its shared capital to make investments externally, much like
the US or China.
Research requires time and money and there is no automatic cause and effect between
heavy spending and successful products. However, in the US - where R&D market
challenges are similar to those in Europe - motivations in private sector to invest in
research commercialization are much higher. In the US innovative solutions are immediately
commercialized bringing profits for business and in case of failure there is no hostility
and social exclusion. In Europe, high domination of the public sphere over the private
one discourages individuals to take risk and encourages them to rely on public funding
for innovations.
According to experts, there are certain differences between individual systems
of state support for private activities in R&D. Some countries offer exceptionally
favorable tax and grant incentives, not encumbered with restrictions on the location,
the way it is financed, and intellectual property rights. Other countries only offer basic
incentives, with considerable restrictions regarding eligibility of sectors for concessions
and grants and the costs of the application procedure. Most advantages are constructed
in such a way as to encourage the preservation of a certain level of intensity of R&D,
while the remaining incentive systems were introduced in order to increase substantive
spending on R&D. Only a few systems offer tax incentives and grants for capital spending
on R&D. In most countries, incentives apply to operating costs, i.e. salaries, supplies
of raw and other materials, and the costs of outside services.
Highly innovative countries not only have growing R&D budgets but they also operate
good networking schemes bringing together large corporations and SMEs, which helps
disseminate good practices across the economy. The example of Switzerland, which is
not part of the EU and does not benefit from the EU programs and other forms of
support offered by the EC, proves that the ecosystem which encourages innovation
matters most. The EC should put pressure on member states to create conditions
which encourage investments in R&D and innovation as well as convergence
in this sector as well.
The new EU leaders should constantly push for spending for innovation and
research and less for agriculture and infrastructure. Currently the EU 28 spends
on average 2.04% on R&D, which is less than the 3% target. This means that larger
48
countries such as Germany or Sweden will need to spend more because other member
states will not. Large investments in this sector require a radical change of mindsets.
Poland for instance, which enjoyed the highest GNP growth in the EU, averaging 4.3%
over ten years (compared with 1.2% growth for the EU) places close to Romania in the
Competitiveness ranking,6 spending only 0.77% of its GDP on R&D. This is not due to
low public spending, which is adequate under current economic conditions, but as a
result of limited engagement of private companies in innovative investments. Currently,
in the majority of the member states that joined the EU after 2004, the public sector
spends more on R&D than the private sector. Low social capital is an issue in many
countries. As a result, societies lack the collaboration and teamwork skills that are
required, which could be corrected by education.
At the same time, the EU's new leaders should try to create mechanisms to
attract the best minds from outside Europe by providing incentives, career
opportunities and financial support (subsidies and grants) for start-ups and
commercialization of research. Such grant schemes should be open to failures as
risk is a part of both business and research. At the same time, Europe needs to keep
its best people in place. Roughly 150.000 students of new technologies leave Europe
each year to study abroad and only 20% return. They need to find jobs or work, which
seems easier elsewhere. Promotion for European partnerships between the scientific
and business institutions from different member states and their partners beyond Europe
should happen on the condition that the result of the commercialization will remain in
Europe. At the same time, Europe should try to attract more non-European capital
(investment funds, venture capital) to co-finance European R&D activities.
6
49
III
Europe in a Globalizing World: A Matter of
Survival
PROF. HAKAN YILMAZ (BOÐAZÝÇÝ UNIVERSITY - TÜSÝAD FOREIGN POLICY FORUM)
Summary of Recommendations
On the EU's Global Competitiveness
a) As the EU is faced with increasing disparities, all policies aimed at increasing the
EUs competitiveness need to take into account the different conditions in member
states and the different competitive potentials of micro units (e.g., individuals,
companies, universities, NGOs, cities, regions).
b) Increase the EU's "global cultural capital" by raising the international standing and
credibility of the EU leaders at the level of the Council, CFSP and Commission.
c) Promote the more universal notion of "rule of law" rather than the more specific
notion of "democracy" both in the European neighborhood and worldwide,
particularly in countries where the socio-economic and cultural prerequisites of
democracy are missing.
d) Import global talent to Europe to enhance the "smartness" and "innovation"
dimension of Europe's competitiveness.
e) Start discussions on finding ways to ensure that highly skilled non-EU immigrants
would be allowed to move and work freely within the EU.
On the Relations with USA, Russia and China
a) Keep the deep-rooted political, economic and military ties with the US and bring
the TTIP negotiations to a successful completion.
b) Support strongly all efforts to find a political solution for the Ukraine crisis and,
based on that solution, review EU-Russia relations. Keep the door open for a
revitalisation of the strategic partnership with Russia and explore the ways for
deepening the economic integration of the whole European continent.
50
c) Raise the level and intensity of political dialogue with China with the aim of
enhancing rule of law, core human rights and environmental sustainability in China.
On Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement
a) Continue the enlargement process towards Turkey and the Western Balkans.
b) Define "associate membership" criteria for the neighboring countries in the Eastern
Partnership and Union for the Mediterranean, a status that would be less than full
member and more than neighbor.
On Turkish Enlargement
a) Contribute to the UN plan for a fast-track and comprehensive resolution of the
Cyprus question.
b) Harmonize EU and Turkish policies in the MENA region.
c) Bring the visa liberalization process to a conclusion within the scheduled timetable.
d) Open the negotiation chapters regularly, in order to bring Turkey back on the EU
agenda and help solve the country's current political stalemate in a democratic and
European way.
1. Introduction: The Changing Context, Meaning and Means of
Competitiveness in a Globalizing World
Globalization "de-centres" every country and every continent, puts an end to centrisms
of all types and varieties, and then "re-centres" everything through a competitive process.
In this globalizing world, the critical question is which cities, regions, corporations,
NGOs, hospitals, research centres, universities, schools, scientists, artists, designers,
ideas, and so on from Europe (and from other world regions) will pass the global
competitiveness test and make their way to the global centres of influence.
With globalization the very idea of geography started to change, connoting more and
more a sense of "space" as opposed to a sense of "place". Instead of imagining the
world as a whole physical place made up of contiguous countries, the post-Cold War
generation began to view the globe, and Europe itself, as a patchwork of cities, regions,
web sites, streets, rivers, highways, internet discussion groups, film festivals, business
centres, airports, vacation resorts, friends here and there, NGOs, academic meetings,
restaurants, museums and so on. In this new, post-modern global space, Europe is
being re-defined in the language of globalization, and it is itself a part of the emerging
51
global space. Dramatically increased, diversified, individualized and less costly means
of communication and transportation, from the email to SMS and easy jet, supplied the
material conditions for the passage from place to space. This new global space is a
competitive arena, with continually changing, sometimes expanding, sometimes contracting
"boundaries" rather than fixed "borders". It is competitive in the sense that how much,
and for how long, a given city, event, happening, building, art form, NGO or even
individual will be a part of it is not to be taken for granted but decided competitively
by the "market", i.e. by the decentralized decisions and signals of all the individuals
who interact through that space. Because the insertion of something in the new global
space, and its position in the ranking of global prestige, is never guaranteed, each
individual unit tries to increase its global value by means of imaginative ways. In other
words, much depends on how much a country, a city, a university, a museum, an
individual spends its efforts to find a place for itself in the newly forming global space,
and on how well-endowed, receptive, willing, creative, imaginative, and skilful it is.
What could the EU do to uphold and boost Europe's competitive power in a globalizing
world? As a general principle, the EU's policies geared towards increasing Europe's
competitiveness should take into account the different conditions in member states and
different competitive potentials of micro units, individuals, companies, NGOs, cities and
regions. A non-selective, non-specific, overly egalitarian policy would result not in a
meaningful increase in the EU's competitiveness in the global arena, but in a larger rent
distribution mechanism, regardless of the good intentions of any policy making and EU
spending objectives.
2. The EU in Global Competition: Problems, Success Stories,
Recommendations
The EU's foreign policy has many goals and objectives, but enhancing Europe's global
competitiveness should no doubt be at the top of the policy agenda. If the European
Union desires to remain a global power in a multi-polar world, improve its citizen's
living standards, and expand the reach of European ideas, norms and values, such as
rule of law, human rights, women's rights, democracy, social inclusion, environmental
sustainability, it must prioritize competitiveness, and take appropriate external actions.
The EU must prioritize competitiveness if it seeks to establish Europe as a centre for
scientific discovery and technological innovation, where European companies set global
trends and produce globally demanded services and products. And it must do so if it
wishes to attract investment capital as well as top scientists, engineers, designers and
artists from around the world, and aims to induce other states to take on their responsibilities
for environmentally sound and sustainable development strategies. The question is,
naturally, what specific external actions can the EU take for the purpose of enhancing
Europe's global competitiveness?
52
The EU, as a global actor, can be viewed as a trade union, representing the "collective
interests" and embodying the "collective bargaining power" of its member states. The
EU can achieve what individual member states might not have achieved on their own.
The EU, like a trade union, aggregates, articulates, represents and promotes the interests
of its members at the global level. The EU is needed, because diverse, and often
conflicting, interests of European nations, regions, corporations, associations and
individuals are not likely to naturally come together and automatically add up to a
common European interest. On the contrary, left to themselves in a non-cooperative
state of nature, those different and contradictory interests can, and do, result in intraEuropean conflicts and wars, whose overall outcome weakens Europe globally. The EU
is a system of democratic cooperation in an environment of regional and global
competition, and it is based on its members' ability to compromise. European integration
is a modern tool to ensure compromise building, based on shared values, shared
responsibilities and shared benefits. As differences increase, mistrust spoils relations,
which may only be overcome by strengthening partnership and mutual understanding.
In a survey of the European business community regarding Europe's competitiveness,
many respondents said that they want to see an EU which is more authoritative internally
and more powerful internationally.1 More specifically, the European business community
wanted the EU to play a greater role in the making of fiscal and monetary policy at
home, and to represent, with one voice, European interests at international economic
negotiations. An often-cited example by the business community, on EU negotiations
with the rest of the world on cross border issues, is airline industry deregulation. This
provided a Europe-wide solution that "broke down internal protectionism; opened the
door to new European, low-cost airlines; rationalised the process of bilateral negotiations
and protected governments from being played off against each other by non-European
actors". The project to create a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
is cited as another success story, however the support of the business community is not
fully shared by the general public.
The EU too shares the business community's vision to boost global bargaining power
by making the EU play a more active and unified role in the global economic and
political institutions, specifically in G20, WTO and UN. Thus, in the "Europe 2020"
document the EU sets for itself the tasks of encouraging "trading in open, fair markets
worldwide, within a rule-based international framework; promoting external aspects of
various internal policies (e.g. energy, transport, agriculture, R&D); enhancing trade and
international macroeconomic policy coordination; and pursuing an assertive and effective
participation in international forums such as the G20, to shape the future global economic
order".2
1
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2012: Nominal GDP list of countries.
Data for the year 2
2
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/eu-tools-for-growth-and-jobs/index_en.htm
53
Another essential goal of the EU's international economic policy, this time oriented
towards the least developed countries, is to fight poverty, protect human and labour
rights, and promote environmental and good governance standards. Under the Generalised
Scheme of Preferences (GSP) arrangement, the EU promises a less developed country
partial or entire removal of tariffs, on the condition that the government observes policies
to set up institutions that ensure transparency, responsiveness and accountability; to
establish a dialogue with NGOs regarding social and environmental effects of trade and
economic policy; to eradicate poverty; to sustain the balances between economic growth
and the protection of natural resources; and to promote core labour and human rights.
The mechanisms of supervision for these goals are: (a) regular supervisory meetings
between the EU and partner countries (Korea, Colombia, Peru, and so on) with which
it has concluded agreements; (b) close involvement of civil society advisory groups,
including environment, labour, and business organisations, in the implementation of
the agreement provisions, to help identify issues and future areas of action.3
One major deficit in the European economies that is hindering competitiveness is the
relative lack of "smart" development, based on high technology, knowledge and
innovation. According to a report published by the World Economic Forum on European
competitiveness, so long as social inclusiveness and sustainability dimensions of
competitiveness are concerned, the EU fares better than or as well as its competitors
in the Western world, namely the US, Japan and Canada. The real problem of the EU
in the area of competitiveness is to build a "smart", knowledge-based, innovative, higher
value added, high technology economy. In terms of the "smartness" of its economy, the
EU is lagging behind all of its competitors in the Western world, most notably the US.4
The European business community, in the survey mentioned above by INSEAD, Booz
& Company and the European Executive Council (EEC), has also pointed to a lack of
a culture of innovation as the main reason for Europe lagging behind its competitors
in terms of the "smartness" of its economy. This is one area where there is ample room
for EU policy making.
Based on these observations, we can make the following recommendations as a way
to enhance Europe's total competitive power at the global level:
1. Raise Europe's collective bargaining power at the global level, by better coordinating
the foreign and the trade policy of the EU. Such an approach would certainly
require boosting the capacity and capability of EU Delegations worldwide.
2. Increase the EU's "global cultural capital", and thereby its soft power, by raising
the international standing and credibility of the EU leaders at the level of the
Council presidency, CFSP, and Commission. The EU must be represented in the
3
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/index_en.htm.
World Economic Forum. 2012. The Europe 2020 Competitiveness Report: Building a More Competitive Europe.
Published by the World Economic Forum within the framework of the Global Competitiveness Network.
4
54
global arena by internationally recognized and respected leaders as an essential
part of adding more substance to its soft-power.
3. Boost the EU's global soft-power, by trying to give the EU a seat among the
permanent members of the UN Security Council. The EU will use this position to
better voice its democratic values and its commitment to sustainable development,
poverty reduction, social welfare, and peaceful resolution of conflicts. As an
egalitarian power, the EU can and should also defend to expand the permanent
membership of the UN Security Council in a way to include emerging powers such
as Japan, India, Brazil, and Turkey, which would be more reflective of the new
global distribution of economic, social, political and cultural capital. Such an
egalitarian proposal would certainly increase public and elite sympathies for the
EU around the globe and it will show the outside world that the EU is not simply
a narrowly defined "Western" power but a global player, with global sensitivities,
in the true sense of the term.
4. Ensure that third parties also comply with the EU's environmental sustainability
and social protection principles and standards. This will enhance the global
competitiveness of the products produced in the EU by increasing production and
labour costs, and therefore the world prices, of goods produced in third countries.
Inducing third countries to adopt Europe's environmental and social protection
standards will take away parts of the "rents" that are accruing to them because they
do not have to pay for environment-friendly technologies and they do not have
to cover very costly social protection schemes such as unemployment salaries,
retirement pensions, health coverage, and job security.
5. Promote rule of law in the third countries, which would increase social trust and
lay the foundations of a fair and predictable economic environment. The EU may
want to make a strategic choice of promoting the more universal notion of "rule
of law" rather than the more specific notion of "democracy" both in its neighborhood
and worldwide, particularly in countries where the socio-economic and cultural
prerequisites of democracy (e.g., a relatively well-developed and widespread middle
class; a minimal degree of national unity; a civic culture of dialogue and tolerance)
are missing. We have to admit that democracy promotion by the EU, often following
a blue-print not applicable to non-European conditions, has often resulted in more
instability, social unrest, and economic downturn, when not based on the necessary
preconditions of rule of law, a large layer of middle class, and the peaceful
coexistence of different ethnic and sectarian groups. A fair and predictable market
and investment environment, protected by well-functioning legal institutions, is a
necessary condition for third parties to be able to deliver to the EU what they
55
promised in trade agreements; and for the EU companies to be able to survive and
keep their profitability in foreign settings. One way of achieving this goal is
enhancing political, social, environmental conditionality in all trade agreements
with third parties, and establishing better supervisory mechanisms and a credible
system of rewards and punishments, so that trade agreements could help promote
rule of law, human rights, ecological sustainability in partner countries. Most
agreements that the EU signed with third parties, except for the association
agreements envisaging future membership, have been of an economic and
commercial nature. All these agreements did have clauses that are making references
to rule of law and human rights. However, these clauses were rather short, general
and symbolic, and there was no conditionality embedded in the agreements that
said that violation of the political values by the other party would cause significant
negative effects on the implementation of the economic and commercial parts of
the agreements. The EU can and should add a higher dose of political conditionality
to its economic agreements. An example of such political conditionality is the EUChina Human Rights Dialogue that has taken place twice annually since 1995. The
EU can set up such dialogue institutions with various other nations with whom it
signed partnership and cooperation agreements. These institutions can be empowered
by establishing joint ombudsman-like bodies, to which individual citizens and
private associations of the nations that are party to the agreement can apply, if
they think their political and economic rights, as envisioned in the agreement, have
been violated. In other words, the EU can transfer a version of its own ombudsman
institution into its international relations, by providing it the power to oversee the
implementation of the agreement clauses in the area of rule of law and individual
freedoms. This "EU-Third Party Joint Ombudsman" would be staffed by experts
from both sides and ideally have the power to conduct investigations to highlight
the alleged rights violations; to ask questions and gather data from private individuals
and authorities involved; to form its independent opinion about the case at hand;
pass its opinion on to the decision-makers; supervise the decision-makers to see
if they are taking the necessary corrective actions; and in the likely event of delay,
inaction or avoidance on the part of the authorities, use the "shaming effect" by
bringing the case to the attention of national and international media.
6. Import global talent to Europe to enhance the "smartness" and "innovation"
dimension of Europe's competitiveness. Although EU countries are some of the
world's most desirable places to settle, live and work, they could not so far make
enough use of this "attraction factor" to draw the world's scientific and artistic
talent. EU countries lag far behind the US in their ability to attract scientific and
artistic talent from abroad. The US, and to a lesser extent the UK, have been
traditionally strong in importing talent, and this has been one of the determining
56
factors behind American leadership in the area of innovation. In a survey of the
American business community conducted by the Harvard Business School, in order
to enhance American competitiveness, many respondents would like the Federal
government to "ease the immigration of highly skilled individuals, starting with but not restricted to - international graduates of US universities"5. Public resistance
to immigration in many EU countries, as well as rigid citizenship rules and language
barriers stand between the EU's need for international talent and the actual import
of talent to the EU countries. Unfortunately, under the current rules the establishment
of an "EU residency" for such elite immigrants, to be offered not by any individual
member state but directly by the EU itself, is out of question. Nonetheless, in order
to establish a globally competitive European research and science space the EU
may need to discuss solutions in order to ensure that highly skilled immigrants
would be able to freely move and work with the EU. For the moment granting
residency status to non-EU nationals is within the authority of the member states,
although in 2003 the Council issued a Directive (2003/109/EC) concerning the
status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. This Directive
determines "(a) the terms for conferring and withdrawing long-term resident status
granted by a Member State in relation to third-country nationals legally residing
in its territory, and the rights pertaining thereto; and (b) the terms of residence in
Member States other than the one which conferred long-term status on them for
third-country nationals enjoying that status."6 Given the critical importance of
attracting talent to the EU, and given the fact that this is a general problem that
cannot be sufficiently addressed by the member states and can therefore, by reason
of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved by the Community, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the member states may choose to
delegate their authority to the Community for designing a policy for attracting
talented people to the EU and for issuing EU long-term resident status to elite
immigrants. This approach would also create a competition among the companies,
research centres and universities of the member states for creating better conditions
that would attract the best minds from the talent pool.
3. The EU versus the US, Russia, China: Partners or Competitors in the Global
Arena?
The US is the oldest and longest partner of the EU and the axis of stability of the
global economy. Relations between the EU and the US are overshadowed by the recent
spy scandals, but both parties made a wiser choice by continuing negotiations on the
free trade agreement agreement - the Transatlantic Trade and Investiment Partnership
(TTIP) - which shall bring benefits to both and to the international community as a whole.
Independent research shows that TTIP could boost the EU's economy by 120 billion;
5
Porter, Michael E.; Rivkin, Jan W.; Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 2013. COMPETITIVENESS AT A CROSSROADS, Findings
of Harvard Business Schools 2012 Survey on U.S. Competitiveness, February 2013.
6
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32003L0109
57
the US economy by 90 billion; the rest of the world by 100 billion of additional
national income annually.7 The TTIP would be the fourth ambitious free trade agreement
of the EU, followed by the ones with Norway, South Korea and Canada.
Currently, the essence of the economic relations between the EU and Russia is Russian
energy against European technology, and this is unsustainable in the long term. The
EU cannot continue with over-dependence on Russian energy, and Russia cannot
continue without developing a viable manufacturing industry of consumer and investment
products and services. Moreover, as the recent events in Ukraine have clearly demonstrated,
the EU cannot carry on its integration plan with Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership
countries without first establishing a modus vivendi with Russia. The EU will have to
deal with the Russian question sooner rather than later, if it wants to secure its energy
supplies and maintain peace, stability and prosperity in the larger eastern Europe,
including the European republics and regions of the former USSR. The political and
economic conditions have worsened for the deepening of the political and economic
integration between the EU and Russia. Nonetheless the EU should keep the door open
and not fully abandon the idea of building a truly European market place.
A quick look at the results of the INSEAD and Harvard Business School surveys with
the business communities in Europe and the US, China represents both the greatest
opportunity and the biggest challenge. Imports of cheap Chinese products to Europe,
exports of high-end European goods and services to the Chinese market, as well as
European investments in China have been the welfare engine for the EU for years. The
major legal framework for the EU-Chinese economic relations has been the Trade and
Economic Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and
the People's Republic of China, which went into force in 1985. In the field of political
cooperation, there exists, since 1995, the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue, whose aim
is supporting China's transition to an open society based on the rule of law and the
respect for human rights.8 Admittedly, the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue has not
yielded many tangible results and the EU's capacity to push China towards rule of law
and democracy is limited. The EU, therefore, concentrated its efforts to maintain in China
an environment for level playing and market viability.
We can make the following recommendations with regard to the EU's relations with
the US, Russia, and China:
First, keep the deep-rooted political, economic and military ties with the US and bring
the TTIP to completion. However, raise the EU's global strategic value to parity and
equality with the US, in all common institutions, based on the argument that European
soft power in the West's power equation carries equal weight the hard power of the
US, particularly in view of rising anti-Americanism around the world and a general global
7
8
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/eu_china/political_relations/humain_rights_dialogue/index_en.htm
58
sympathy for the European model of open society, cultural and artistic legacy, social
justice, and gusto and quality of life.
Second, keep the door open for the normalization of relations with Russia and the
eventual development of a continental Economic space.
Third, change the European public and elite perceptions of China towards that of a
rising global power, in economic, political and cultural terms, instead of a factory for
cheap manufacturing.
Fourth, raise the level and intensity of political dialogue with China with the aim of
enhancing rule of law, core human rights and, last but not least, environmental
sustainability.
4. The European Neighborhood Policy: Problems and Prospects
The European neighborhood policy was launched for its expected economic and
political benefits for both Europe and the partner countries. The overriding reason
behind the neighborhood policy has been to ensure stability and prosperity in the
neighboring countries, and to provide the EU with a source of energy and other natural
resources, a market for its exports, and an area for its capital investments. Two pillars
for the Neighborhood policy are the Mediterranean Union and Eastern Partnership.
Mediterranean Union embodies long-standing relations between the partner countries
and the EU, though the potential benefits have not materialised. The main reason behind
the relative failure of the Mediterranean Union is that the EU lacks the carrot: It does
not offer membership perspective for its southern Mediterranean neighbors, and therefore
lacks the leverage to induce them to adopt European norms, values and standards. As
many observers of EU integration noted, EU conditionality has not been effective for
countries with no prospect of membership. A case in point is the Mediterranean countries
of North Africa. The Barcelona Process, which had been set in motion in the mid-1990s
to bring the Mediterranean countries to a closer political and economic cooperation
with the EU, and to socialize the political class and civil society in the region into a
greater acceptance of European democratic ideals and values, has not produced tangible
results. A closer analysis of the "Union for the Mediterranean" reveals that, unlike the
previous Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process), this second EUMediterranean cooperation scheme did not have much political or democratic substance.
Avoiding serious commitments to democratization, the Mediterranean Union's focus has
been on crime and terrorism, sustainable development, illegal immigration and energy
security, and its key objective is to establish a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area.
59
The Eastern Partnership countries, unlike the southern Mediterranean ones, do aspire
to eventually join the EU. Some Eastern partnership countries, most notably Ukraine,
have gone far enough in economic restructuring and prepared to enter into deeper
economic relations with the EU as foreseen in the Association agreements. Ukraine
stands out among the Eastern Partnership countries with a sizeable market of over 40
million consumers. The mechanisms at work and the structure of the process are similar
to the ones at the Eastern enlargement, however the risks of conflict and an eventual
failure are much higher, as the EU is hesitant in offering a membership perspective to
its Eastern neighbors and any further integration is likely to be perceived as a threat
by Russia and pro-Russian groups in partner countries. Hence, as the recent events in
Ukraine demonstrated, the sustainability of the EU's economic and political integration
with the Eastern Partnership countries would be substantially facilitated if the repercussions
for Russia and the other countries of the Eurasian Union are taken into account and are
discussed in a political dialogue before the final decisions are taken.
5. EU Enlargement: Problems and Prospects
After the breakdown of the socialist system and the Soviet Union, political and
economic stabilisation in the former socialist countries of eastern and central Europe
became a must - no peace and prosperity in the continent as a whole was sustainable
in the long term if one part of the continent continued to live in a poverty zone, with
people without a future. The particular challenge in the former socialist countries was
to address the needs of a triple system transformation: Transformation of the economic,
political, and administrative systems.
Striving for EU membership has guided the countries in this difficult process of system
transformation. Full market opening by 1997 came much faster than the political process
of enlargement, the latter starting on the basis of the Europe Agreements. In a sense,
by opening their markets earlier, the EU wanted to see whether the potential members
were able to withstand the pressures of the EU market. This strategy resulted in major
economic gains for those EU member states with strong central and Eastern European
ties, notably Germany and Austria. On the other hand, incoming member states profited
as well from the market opening, even if the restructuring process was painful and
created much social hardship. As of now, the new eastern and central European members
are catching up with the old members, creating a win-win situation.
The completion of the next enlargement cycle, covering Turkey and the western
Balkan countries, is a political, economic and moral must. It will make a substantial
difference for these countries, whether they will remain unstable or stabilized by being
firmly embedded in the European family. Negotiations with many of the western Balkan
60
countries are underway or will start soon, Bosnia-Herzegovina being the hot spot. When
starting accession negotiations with Turkey, one major pro-Turkey argument was that
it presented an economic opportunity for the EU, not least because of the size of its
market. This type of argument has become more credible since then, given Turkey's
economic performance in recent years and its political reforms to undertake the Union's
membership criteria.
As opposed to the views that point to the last enlargements as the main source of
the financial crisis in the EU, one can safely argue that enlargement did not contribute
to the economic crisis. On the contrary, new member states like Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania and Bulgaria demonstrated how to cope with financial turmoil and how to
return to a growth path. On the other hand, countries like Poland and Estonia kept
relatively high growth rates in an environment of crisis.
6. The Turkish Enlargement: How to Overcome the Deadlock?
A quick comparison of the current population, land size and gross national income
of Turkey with the 13 new Central and East European member states and four Western
Balkan candidate states shows us that, from the perspective of boosting the size of the
EU economy and its competitiveness in the broader region of the Caucasus, Middle East,
North Africa and Central Asia, it would be logical for the EU to prioritize Turkish
accession.9 That being said, there has been an increasing resistance in the EU to the
Turkish membership, both at the elite and public opinion levels. One factor that turned
part of the EU public opinion against Turkish membership was the perceived cultural
difference between Turkey and Europe. This cultural resistance can be tracked in the
findings of a survey that we have conducted in five EU member states (Germany, France,
Poland, Spain, and UK) in the fall of 2009.10 As may be seen in the survey data, when
forming their opinion on Turkey's EU membership, 25% of the respondents would weigh
economic factors and another 25% would consider political factors, while the proportion
of those who would base their decision on cultural factors was around 40%.
Turkey has been a candidate for EU membership since December 1999 and it has
started accession negotiations in October 2005. Ironically, the opening of the accession
negotiations became a point from which both the EU and Turkey have taken steps that
were in the direction of disengagement and divergence rather than engagement and
convergence. The increasingly negative tone of the EU public opinion regarding Turkey,
the Cyprus question, the financial crisis, the enlargement fatigue, the "culture" factor,
9
World Development Indicators 2013, THE WORLD BANK, Last updated date 09/23/2013,
http://wdiworldbankorg/table/11#
10
European Perceptions of Turkey as a Future Member State: Results of an Opinion Poll in France, Germany, Poland,
Spain and the United Kingdom (Field Work: August-September, 2009; Sample Size: 5000+ respondents). Conducted
as part of the project entitled Problems of Europeanization and European Perceptions of Turkey as a Future Member
State, supported by a grant from the European Union, Promotion of the Civil Society Dialogue between European
Union and Turkey, Universities Grant Scheme (Contract No: TR0604.01-03/070). Project Coordinator: Boðaziçi
University, Centre for European Studies; Partners: Autonomous University of Madrid and University of Granada.
61
Turkey's problems in the area of democracy and human rights, all have played their
role in this disengagement. A severe consequence of this mutual disengagement has
been that European values have been losing ground in the Turkish political and civil
society, critically placed Turkish political actors and social forces have been detaching
themselves from the EU project, and there have been serious setbacks in the area of
democratization and liberalization reforms. Given the current deadlock in the accession
process of Turkey, what concrete steps can the EU take to put the process back on a
fast track?
First, there must be a renewed understanding that enlargement in general, and
enlargement towards Turkey in particular, is not an external but an internal policy of
the EU. The EU was not set up as an exclusive club within Europe, pertaining to a
particular group of European countries. On the contrary, the EU was set up to expand
to potentially cover all the countries on the European continent, including Turkey.
Questioning Turkey's European identity from a historical, geographical or cultural point
of view can be an interesting and legitimate intellectual exercise, but, after more than
50 years of integration at all levels between the EU and Turkey, and after so many legal
agreements linking the two entities together, such intellectual opinions can not, and
should not, be made the basis of Turkey's eligibility or qualification for EU membership.
Second, European officials should avoid using labels, such as privileged partnership
or the like, for the finality of the process, even though they individually believe in it
or they find it useful to use such labels to gain the favors of powerful anti-Turkey
domestic lobbies.
Third, the EU should make sincere efforts for a fast-track and comprehensive resolution
of the Cyprus question, as this has been the single most important issue for blocking
some negotiating chapters. Happily, negotiations for a resolution of the Cyprus questions
did restart recently, and we can only hope that they will produce positive results in a
rather quick and efficient way. Both Cyprus, and particularly France, may go ahead and
lift their blockages over one or two negotiating chapters, as a sign of good will, even
before the end of the peace talks, if the talks are believed to proceed towards a final
resolution acceptable to both the Greek and the Turkish sides. Bringing as many chapters
as possible to the negotiation table will put Turkey back on the EU agenda and help
solve the country's current political stalemate in a democratic and European way.
Fourth, the visa liberalization process should come to a conclusion in the shortest
possible time, as this would be, for the time being, the single most important policy
that would directly touch the lives of ordinary Turkish citizens and sensitize them towards
the EU. The Turkish side must hold on to its commitments in the readmission agreement
and the EU side must not create unnecessary delays in the existing time table for visa
liberalization.
62
Fifth, there must be a common understanding in the EU that without Turkey being
firmly anchored in the EU any European Neighborhood policy towards the Middle East,
and towards the Islamic countries in general, can only come half way. Turkey, for its
part, must realize that its prime value and appeal for Middle Eastern and other Islamic
countries is that it is a Muslim country embracing European values of democracy,
secularism, women's rights, free press, and individual rights and freedoms. An EUTurkish collaboration is a natural and necessary condition for the success of both in the
MENA region. The recent setbacks of both Turkish and European foreign policies in
the face of the various crises following the Arab revolutions, most visibly in Syria,
constitute further proof that a convergence of policies and close collaboration is urgently
called for, if they want to exert any meaningful impact on the course of events in the
MENA region.
7. Conclusion
In the last few years, as a result of "enlargement fatigue" and a severe financial crisis,
the EU has turned inwards, giving priority to its internal economic and institutional
restructuring. Ironically, though, this happened at a time when the pace of history
hastened in the EU's southern and eastern neighborhood. Hence, by the beginning of
2011 the "Arab Spring" took off, giving way to popular uprisings, internal conflicts and
regime changes in many Arab countries of the MENA region. Soon after, the Ukraine
crisis hit the ground, in which Ukraine turned into a battlefield between those who
wanted to stay in Ukraine and those who pursued a line of separatism and unification
with Russia, with the active encouragement and support of Russia. The EU certainly
needed some time to put its house in order, but history did not wait. Now it is time for
the EU to face two challenges at the same time: To continue its internal reform process
and to develop an active foreign policy, particulary towards the MENA region, Ukraine
and Russia. Given Turkey's proximity towards both problems areas, it is also time to
put EU-Turkey integration process back on solid track.
Jean-Claude Juncker, President-elect of the European Commission, in his initial
statements, promised that the Juncker Commission "will be political, and not technocratic"
and that they will face both the internal and external challenges simultaneously "to
address the very difficult geo-political situation; to strengthen economic recovery and
to build a united Europe that delivers jobs and growth for its citizens."11. In the globalizing
world of the 21st century the EU should certainly be a fortress, but a fortress of democracy,
human rights, economic growth, distributional justice, scientific progress and technological
innovation. To be a fortress in the sense of isolationism, inward-looking, disinterest or
indifference in the face of regional and global challenges would mean trading long-term
well-being for short-term comfort. Adapting itself to the changes in a globalizing world
is not a matter of choice but a matter of survival for the EU. Given its crowning
achievements in the 20th century, there is no reason why the EU cannot overcome the
challenges of the 21st century.
11
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-585_en.htm
63
IV
More of the Sane, or: Europe Where We
Need It.
DR. CORNELIUS ADEBAHR, GERMAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (DGAP)*
Summary of Recommendations
In order to increase democratic legitimacy and public scrutiny, European leaders
should:
1) Better connect the next Commission to the national arenas by having Commissioners
speak more often in national parliaments;
2) Rigorously pursue the Commission's new organisation around political clusters
responding to the EU's main challenges, each led by one of its Vice-Presidents;
3) Make use of EU funds more transparent by involving citizens in regional budgeting
and increasing its anti-corruption profile.
As a means to improve respect for sovereignty and subsidiarity, leaders in
member states and at the EU level should:
1) Put differentiated integration at the service of the European project by mainstreaming
it based on clear conditions rather than seeing it as a measure of last resort;
2) Involve national parliaments more, mainly around the existing yellow card'
procedure but also in their interactions in collaborative fora such as the Eurozone
Assembly' and directly with the European Parliament;
To improve inter-institutional cooperation and law making, Europe's leaders
should:
3) Get the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament to agree on a tripartite work
programme for the 2014-19 period;
4) Sign a new Compact for better law-making' that will result in a net reduction of
EU regulation by the end of this legislative cycle. A new agency should provide
independent impact assessment for all three law-making institutions as well as
make information on the actual national transposition publicly available.
*
The manuscript for this chapter was finalised in March 2014. It has been updated since then to reflect political
changes.
64
1. Introduction
Now in its fifth consecutive crisis year, the European Union is still deeply mired in
a crisis of political legitimacy. What started out as a contagion' from the world financial
crisis, infecting' in a way primarily the European financial institutions and the real
economy, has by now morphed into an all-out questioning of the political, social, and
democratic fundamentals of the Union.
An analysis of the root causes of the current malaise reveals one structural asymmetry,
which is compounded by a well-known schizophrenia. The asymmetry is between the
national and the European level: Starting with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, member states
have delegated certain policies to Brussels while retaining the means to execute those
policies in national capitals. National and European competencies are particularly
intertwined in the economic governance of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU),
the foreign, security and defence policy (CFSP and CSDP) and the coordination of social
and employment policies that have developed in the new policy field. In more formal
terms: While the EU's competences for market-making and market-correcting regulation
have grown; the provision of the fundamentals such as security and welfare has remained
at the national level. When the system cannot deliver, due to its obvious dysfunctionalities,
the political and institutional imbalance is made worse by national politicians and their
schizophrenic' tendency to blame the EU for a country's problems, while simultaneously
claiming all benefits as their own success.
The question of accountability shows how this structural imbalance has also worsened
the existing democratic disconnect'. It is true that calls to make the EU more accountable
have long been a part of the - rather academic - debate about the Union's alleged
democratic deficit'. Yet the situation is different when citizens across the EU feel that
their voice is not heard in politics - or, worse, that there are no mechanisms to make
themselves heard, such as in the deliberations of the European Central Bank (ECB) or
the work of the Troika. Moreover, national governments share much of the blame, as
they have been unable to solve the crisis, either in each member state or collectively
at the European level. This apparent inability of both national and European institutions
to significantly improve the situation combined with politicians' tendency to shift blame
to Brussels has led to a veritable crisis of confidence among EU citizens. Citizens simply
no longer trust political institutions at the national and EU level to find the right solutions
to urgent issues.
These findings thus question the very nature of the European project, as it no longer
seems to command the democratic legitimacy it needs. Whereas in the past, defenders
of the EU would counter arguments about the lack of democratic input with reference
65
to the Community's tangible output, in terms of economic well-being and citizen
satisfaction (the permissive consensus'), the Union currently cannot command neither
input nor output legitimacy. More than ever, people feel forced to accept decisions
from Brussels' that they have no say in, while they clearly cannot see that even such
high-level crisis management is able to deliver'.
All this breeds a particular kind of populism at the national level that not only threatens
the EU's basic tenets but is also beyond the Union's reach in terms of countering it.
Based on the assumption that only full-fledged functioning democracies can enter the
club and, once they are in, they do not want the Commission to meddle into their
constitutional affairs, the EU has few means to save democracy in member states. What
is worse, with the elections to the European Parliament in May 2014, the EU experienced
a "populist backlash". This is not to say that the EU does not deserve criticism. Yet the
effect of a polarised, potentially paralysed EP with a large number of members actually
working against the Commission and the Council is bound to frustrate European citizens
even more. Therefore, not only the governance structure at the EU level but also the
spirit of cooperation (or lack there of) will be deciding factors of going forward.
This chapter thus looks at ways in which the EU can improve its governance structures
as well as the cooperation among European bodies and national institutions. The aim
is to increase the EU's overall legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. Ultimately, the
competitiveness of European industry does not merely need the famous slashing of red
tape,' but also a thriving community with a functioning institutional environment that
enjoys citizens' support.
2. Increasing Democratic Legitimacy and Public Scrutiny
As mentioned before, legitimacy is usually understood as having both an input and
an output category. Thus a government or indeed any ruling entity may be regarded
as democratically legitimate if it relies on a popular mandate (input) and/or produces
the results that its people want to see (output). While ideally it would equally rely on
both elements, it has come to be accepted that tangible output legitimacy can make up
for weak input legitimacy.
Now that both ends are in question, is there anything the EU could do, short of
reinventing itself as either the supranational federation that many loath or the loose
trade block that others fear? One part of the answer points to the primacy of politics
in general and political leadership in particular, which have been lacking throughout
the crunch.
66
With hindsight, we know that, in a way, there was maybe too much politics to the
Euro: From its idealisation as an issue of "war and peace" (German Chancellor Helmut
Kohl in 1995); to the admittance of Greece to the Euro despite the country's obvious
non-compliance with the EMU criteria; to European politicians' first line of defence once
the crunch had kicked in to blame American rating agencies for the EU's woes rather
than recognise the continent's very own problems.
At the height of the crisis, however, it seemed as if politics had given up on itself.
Rather than displaying a notion of being in charge, even the heads of state or government
appeared to be driven by brute market forces. Small wonder that people started to
believe that their elected representatives no longer looked after their interests but merely
bowed to market pressures. As one survey conducted in the spring of 2013 by the Open
Society Initiative for Europe shows, people across Europe feel that politicians have
generally lost touch with the fate of ordinary citizens. The latter wants to see more rather
than less European solidarity.
2.1. Connecting the Commission to National Political Arenas
Hence the importance to return to the primacy of politics: While politicians know
about the influence of markets as much as the more general interdependence of a
globalised world, they need to spell out the political goals guiding their decisions instead
of simply reacting to perceived threats. Yes, today's politics are - or, must be - different
from those of 30 years past, and they need a different kind of toolset. This holds
especially true for the EU, which, in addition to the globalisation around it, has seen
further ramifications of its system of multi-level governance since Maastricht. Yet, speaking
of tools, politicians must go beyond taking technocratic decisions and expecting people
to understand them, merely because there is no alternative'. This approach of nonexplication has only contributed to an increased frustration among citizens who feel
they have little direct input on EU-related policies that affect them.
This leads, first and foremost, to the European Commission as the political heart' of
the integration process. This may seem odd given that the European Council has played
a much more prominent role recently, yet the focus on the Commission is both normative
and practical. It is normative because this is the institution that should, by Treaty
definition, drive the process of European integration. The problem is that, in the past
twenty years or so, the Commission has mostly focused on regulatory integration - to
the minutest details that have long become the object of citizens' mockery of a European
regulatory frenzy' - rather than on the overall political integration. In addition, targeting
the Commission is practical because there are much more concrete steps one can ask
of it rather than the heads of state or government. The tasks of the European
67
Council are circumscribed only vaguely in the Treaty, found in Articles 15 TEU, and 235
and 236 TFEU and otherwise littered over articles that relate to other institutions or
policy areas. In the end, the greatest improvement of the heads' would be defining
whatever they regard as 'national interest' in a more fundamentally European way.
The Commission in all its actions is still guided by the ever closer union' principle,
which has come under strident criticism more recently, not only from the UK government,
but also from its Dutch counterpart and other voices throughout Europe. This, however,
means reading - very literally - only half of the respective sentence from the Treaty's
preamble, which further stipulates "decisions are [to be] taken as closely as possible to
the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity". Instilling this respect for
subsidiarity in the new Commission would help a great deal towards rebalancing the
relationship between Brussels and member states' capitals, the subnational levels, and
Europe's citizens.
Another way for the Commission to reconnect to the people is, of course, to tie its
President to a democratic vote, as it happened with the selection of Jean-Claude Juncker
after the European elections in May 2014. Whether such a politicisation' of the Commission
- i.e. to replace the intimate working relationship with the Council of Ministers by a
popular mandate' that would count for little in the day-to-day work of technical EU
legislation - is of added value, has been controversial even before the nomination of
the former Prime Minister of Luxembourg. If anything, it is likely to encourage
intergovernmental tendencies among member states, as they might perceive the
Commission to be beholden to the European Parliament. Ultimately, this would risk
ending up with a weaker, not a stronger Commission.
Despite the initial controversy around his nomination, Commission President Juncker
has managed to work with member states in the Council when setting up a list of
candidates for approval by the EP (Art. 17 (7) TEU). The hearings have confirmed that
he not only balanced the top jobs, but also succeeded in turning the College of
Commissioners into a more political (rather than politicised) body, with a number of
political heavyweights from the national and European arenas having transitioned into
the Berlaymont.
It is now crucial to bring the work of the Commission closer to national audiences
and, thus, make it more visible. While Commissioners are of course not bound by any
national directives, their ability to spark interest in the public in any member state helps
increase the understanding. In the same vein, individual Commissioners should appear
in national parliaments more often. This would not only connect national deputies to
the European level but also give Commission members an exposure in the respective
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national press that they otherwise would not have. Ultimately, one way to counter the
vicious circle of policy without politics' (or technocracy) at the EU level and politics
without policy' (i.e. populism) in member states is to increase participation of national
parliaments in EU decision-making (cf. below on subsidiarity).
2.2. Improving the Work of the College of Commissioners
Having the right people at the Commission is one thing; having the right number of
them is another important aspect to its work. The Lisbon Treaty foresees a reduction
in the overall number of Commissioners to two thirds of the number of member states
(Articles 17 (5) TEU) starting with the current College (2014-19). This was intended to
improve the Commission's working atmosphere, making more in-depth discussions
possible, which is more difficult in a larger group of 28. In addition, having fewer
Commissioners than member states would have underscored - to both the incumbents
and those behind them in their respective capital - that the members of the Commission
are indeed not representatives of national governments. However, the European Council
decided in May 2013 to make use of a safety clause' contained in the same article and
postponed this restructuring to 2019. Given the arguments that speak in favour of the
Treaty change made, this is unfortunate and a transition to the two-thirds rule should
be made by 2019, at the latest.
In the meantime, however, there are other ways to obtain manageable work relations
even among 28 Commissioners and, at the same time, strengthen the political agenda
of the next Commission. It is thus fortunate that the new President has chosen to establish
priority clusters' corresponding to the major challenges the EU faces (jobs & growth,
Euro and social dialogue, energy union, foreign policy etc.). Each cluster comprises a
number of Commissioners (or all of them, in the case of better regulation or budget)
under the supervision of a Commission Vice-President. Giving them the responsibility
to coordinate an otherwise equal group of Commissioners does not require a Treaty
change but lies within the prerogatives of the Commission President set out in Article
17 (6) TEU.
While meetings in an executive format' between the President and the Vice-Presidents
are possible, these should be kept to a minimum in order to avoid frictions among
Commissioners. Instead, topical sessions among two or more clusters on a certain issue
can enable meaningful discussions that are difficult to achieve at 28. This would keep
the spirit of the new Lisbon Treaty provisions aiming to make the College more flexible,
while respecting the desire of member states to at least formally continue with the one
state, one Commissioner' rule.
69
In addition, Vice-Presidential coordination based on political priorities should also
help prevent an increase in legislation on ever-minor issues. Proposed EU regulation
of olive oil bottles on restaurant tables or of the shoes that hairdressers could wear are
less likely to get into the College with a Vice-President focused on the broader challenges
his or her cluster faces. In particular, the veto power over new legislation given to the
First Vice-President is crucial in this regard.
That may be one of the reasons why member states have so far accepted this
hierarchisation' of the College, which naturally brings a loss of prestige to countries
whose Commissioner' is coordinated by a Vice-President. The real difficulty will be to
keep up this sensible arrangement in the face of institutional politics as well as bureaucratic
persistence. Legislation still originates from the College of Commissioners as a whole,
so personalities will still play a role as will organisational weight stemming from the
directorate-generals that each Commissioner or Vice-President can mobilise. A new
organogram doesn't yet make the Commission a more political body; it merely holds
the potential for it.
2.3. Enhancing Transparency and Citizens' Involvement in the EU
Spending
One issue for the EU to increase its reputation and to allow for better public scrutiny
is to strengthen its declared approach of zero tolerance' to embezzlement and fraud
even though it is true that the latter is much rarer at the European level than within
member states. The European Court of Auditors, for example, which controls whether
funds from the EU budget have been spent according to the Union's financial rules and
whether spending programmes are well managed and effective, has not found evidence
of any serious maladministration in Brussels over the past decade. Yet it is in the EU's
own interest to counter any impression of wasting large sums of money, be it on useless
projects or through negligence or even criminal activity.
If anything, the recent crisis has increased pressure on the Commission to show that
every Euro is well spent. Beyond assuring the factual accuracy of its spending, the EU
should ensure that it demystifies a debate often full of barroom clichés about how
Brussels' is eating up taxpayers' money. Two things can help in this regard: A better
resourced Court of Auditors and a well-staffed, independent anti-fraud agency.
For one, the EU should grant the Court of Auditors more resources to produce its
annual as well as special reports in a more timely fashion so that they influence the
debate when an issue is still on the agenda. In turn, MEPs as those giving the Commission
approval for its budgetary operations on the basis of those reports, should use the
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Court's findings much more proactively. Rather than being afraid of raising a critical
issue for fear of stoking Euroscepticism', they should be the ones pressing, if necessary
in public, for the EU's spending to achieve its goals efficiently. This is due to the fact
that what is usually more damaging than the fraud itself is any perceived cover-up from
a body that would like to see itself high on the echelon of political institutions.
Similarly, the EU's anti-fraud agency OLAF plays a central role in checking that the
EU spends taxpayers' money properly. While having had some successes in uncovering
fraud against the Union budget (e.g. through smuggling and VAT fraud), the agency
remains poorly staffed - a mere 20 officers are responsible for investigating fraud in
regional funds, which comprise roughly one third of the EU's annual budget of around
150 billion. In addition, OLAF formally remains a unit of the Commission, even though
it was founded as a response to the allegations of corruption leading to the resignation
of the Santer Commission in 1999.
It is advisable to reconstitute OLAF as an independent body, separate from the
Commission, with adequate staff, resources, and management procedures. Admittedly,
a 2005 report of the Court of Auditors maintains that OLAF's "hybrid status" - i.e. enjoying
investigative autonomy from the Commission while reporting to it on other functions
such as anti-fraud strategy and funding programmes - has been beneficial. A 2011 followup report, in contrast, does not take up this positive assessment but deplores inter alia
the lack of an independent control of investigative acts in progress.
Interestingly, the Commission's first "EU Anti-Corruption Report" published earlier
this year highlights cases of corruption in member states but not at the European level.
Thus, if the EU wants to underline its model function in fighting corruption, it should
officially ask an institution such as Transparency International - which already provides
its own reports on the EU's performance in fighting corruption - to independently assess
the work of its main administrative bodies, i.e. the Commission as well as the SecretariatsGeneral of the Parliament and the Council. If EU institutions were thus ranked alongside
the member-states, the European public might understand that it is the national rather
than the European level, which has problems with spending European funds adequately.
Another way of making the EU budget more transparent to the citizens is involving
them in the decision making process on how money is spent locally. Such communityled local development has been part of the EU's agricultural fund ever since 1991, and
was more recently expanded to all budget lines covered by the EU's Common Strategic
Framework (i.e. from regional development to agriculture, maritime and fisheries to
social cohesion). The idea is to encourage local communities to develop bottom-up
approaches to respond to structural change and, ultimately, increase the effectiveness
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of EU policies by promoting community ownership. Together with member states, the
EU should promote this new framework as a tool for citizens to determine the use of
EU funds and encourage its expansion.
3. Respecting Sovereignty and Subsidiarity
Similar to the input and output dimension of democratic legitimacy outlined above,
it also helps to differentiate between various understandings of sovereignty. National
governments tend to see the sharing of sovereignty in the EU framework mainly as an
input function, i.e. how much independence in decision-making they can retain. The
classical elements here are the veto power and policy opt-outs of member states. The
former usually resides in foreign policy where national interests are thought to be
particularly high. The latter is prevalent in internal affairs where national interests are
similarly valued, though member states feel less affected when they let others go ahead
regardless of their own objections. From this input perspective, the pooling of sovereignty'
- i.e. of joint decision-making at the EU level - is often seen as a euphemism for actually
losing sovereignty by no longer being able to make decisions independently.
However, in today's world, the question for EU member states should be less whether
they have a say in an EU decision but whether their decision matters at all. In other
words, what output (sovereign or not) could any of the 28 member states have alone?
Such questioning should produce a change of mind-set preferring the material benefits
of cooperation to the insistence on formal elements of old-fashioned sovereignty.
Ultimately, with regard to the broader public debate focused on how Brussels constrains
national (or citizens') freedoms', such a focus would highlight the EU's contribution to
actually preserving the liberty of all of its citizens.
The efforts in two member states, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, to conduct
a balance of competences review with the ultimate goal of a repatriation of powers'
from the European to the member state level, is hardly helpful in this regard. First of
all, any such step would imply a Treaty change, something that is not on the agenda
at present and certainly not part of the assumptions of this report. Secondly, and worse,
it furthers a spirit of national cherry-picking where member states, starting from their
national preferences, list the powers they would like to regain for themselves rather
than assessing the challenges the EU and its member states are facing and (possibly)
re-arranging the Union's competences accordingly.
Rejecting this national approach does not, however, exclude a number of efforts to
boost both member state sovereignty and the principle of subsidiarity within the provisions
of the current Treaty. The following are some proposals in this regard.
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3.1. Putting Differentiated Integration at the Service of the European
Project
Differing understandings of sovereignty have led to a number of areas where only
some member states integrate their policies and others do not. The best-known examples
are the Euro and the Schengen area. Beginning cooperation among a smaller group of
countries - in the case of Schengen even outside of the Treaties at the time - has allowed
those members wanting to advance with integration to do so without forcing others to
go along.
While accepted as an alternative route to integration where the full-fledged one-sizefits-all community approach does not work, differentiated integration' is still often seen
as a measure of last resort. One reason for such hesitance is that any integration effort
in which not all member states participate bears a divisive core. The question of how
potential frictions between the ins' and the outs' can be avoided, points to the decisionmaking procedures applied. For the existing legal frameworks, the rule is that the
supranational bodies, the Commission and the Parliament, participate as normal (i.e.
with their full membership), whereas in the intergovernmental body, the Council, only
those member states vote which are also part of the cooperation procedure. This is also
the basis for enhanced cooperation based on Article 20 TEU.
To reduce the potential for tensions and to make differentiated integration a more
accepted flexible tool, such flexible arrangements should meet three core conditions.
First, they should be permeable, i.e. remain open to those EU members that decide to
join at a later stage. This implies permanent and close consultation mechanisms between
the ins' and the outs' so that the latter have a real opportunity to join. Second,
differentiated integration should - whenever possible - be organised on the basis of the
respective Treaty provisions, i.e. enhanced cooperation. Staying within the EU structures
secures Commission involvement and thus prepares for a long-term transfer of the
scheme under the community method. Third, the aim should be to consolidate the
existing opt-outs so as to minimise overlap and, ultimately, bring as many of these into
the EU proper.
If equipped with this Community-oriented perspective, differentiated integration would
be less of a necessary evil but could rather be used as a tool to shape intermediate
cooperation when and where full integration is not yet possible. In the same spirit,
member states should reorient their efforts from intergovernmental crisis management
to a more integration-oriented rebuilding of the EU. Ultimately, the EU is founded on
the rule of law, which is why such intergovernmental efforts should be transformed into
proper law-making activities in the mid- to long-term.
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The indicator of whether a proposal for differentiated integration is communityfriendly' will be the Single Market. The Treaty provision for enhanced cooperation in
effect forbids any detrimental effects to this core area of European integration, stipulating
that it "shall not undermine the internal market or economic, social and territorial
cohesion [nor ] constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between Member States,
nor shall it distort competition between them" (Article 326 TEU). However, measures
that have been taken primarily with a view to overcoming the crisis in the Eurozone,
such as financial and banking regulations, also impact the eleven non-Euro states.
A case in point is the proposed EU Financial Transaction Tax, which is to be adopted
under the enhanced cooperation procedure among eleven member states after failing
to win the approval of all. The United Kingdom has challenged the proposal at the
European Court of Justice, arguing that its extra-territorial effects on countries not
participating in the scheme distort competition within the Single Market. While this case
still needs to be resolved - both legally and politically - it highlights the difficulties of
finding the right balance when enhancing integration for a few (or in the Commission's
jargon, creating a "deep and genuine Economic and Monetary Union") in areas that
touch upon the EU's fundamental core.
While not strictly an element of differentiated integration, the potential bilateral
contractual arrangements (or reform contracts') between individual member states and
the Commission are likely to have a similar effect. On the one hand, they may create
sub-groups of member states that have entered similar obligations to reform. This would,
ideally, also lead to an increased cooperation among the respective national parliaments
in their efforts to scrutinise their government even prior to ratifying this contract (cf.
also next point). However, it would also further complicate the legal and institutional
foundations of the EMU, making it less transparent. Again, picking up the third core
condition' mentioned above, it is in the EU's interest to formulate those contractual
arrangements in a coherent fashion (i.e. to create as much overlap between them as
possible) and to gradually integrate their provisions into its legal body, the acquis, so
that they are one day binding for all (Eurozone) member states.
Finally, extending the idea of differentiated integration beyond those countries that
are already in the EU, membership itself should be handled more flexibly. In order to
better accommodate the needs of acceding countries as well as the preparedness of the
Union itself, the EU should opt for flexible arrangements such as extending pre-accession
membership benefits or cooperating closely in certain policy areas. Such flexibility would
be a mean to keep the EU's enlargement policy from being stifled by an increasing
amount of demands (due to an evolving Union itself) placed on countries that appear
less capable of fulfilling them.
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3.2. Involving National Parliaments More
With respect to subsidiarity, the national parliaments of member states have an
important role to play. The Lisbon Treaty did more than elevate them from being a mere
note to the protocol to an active contributor to the good functioning of the Union (Article
12 TEU). More precisely, it granted national assemblies an early warning mechanism
by spelling out the idea of subsidiarity in what has been termed a "yellow card" system
(Article 7 (2) of Protocol No 2). That is to say, if one third of parliaments object to a
draft legislative act that according to their reasoned opinion does not comply with the
principle of subsidiarity, then the European Commission must review its proposal. This
is an important innovation because it ties national parliaments directly to EU legislation,
beyond the control of member states' governments. If exercised diligently - parliaments
have only an eight-week window to voice their concerns - then this provision has the
potential to turn the assemblies from hitherto being rather toothless at the EU level into
a "virtual third chamber" (next to the EP and the Council).
So far, there have been (only) two instances where parliaments flagged the yellow
card: In September 2012, national parliamentary chambers in twelve member states
ranging from France to Latvia, from the UK to Malta, and from Portugal to Poland as
well as the three Scandinavian countries, decried the proposed legislation limiting
workers' right to strike. They argued that the so-called Monti II regulation touched on
an issue to be regulated at the national level. Not least because trade unions across the
EU as well as MEPs had also strongly objected to the proposal, the Commission abandoned
the proposal altogether, even though it maintained that it did not violate the principle
of subsidiarity.
In October 2013, the national parliamentary chambers in eleven member states
complained that plans to create a European Public Prosecutor Office (EPPO) breach the
subsidiarity principle. They included some assemblies that had already said no to Monti
II (from the UK, Malta, the Netherlands, France, and Sweden - the latter three being the
most active complainants' in 2012) but also a number of first-timers' (the Parliaments
of Hungary, Ireland, Romania, Slovenia,and Cyprus). Interestingly, the Commission
decided to go ahead with the legislation while promising to take into account the
opinions submitted by 14 national parliamentary chambers in 11 member states.
In the case of the EPPO, the Commission feels that it has strong reasons to maintain
its legislation. Most importantly, the Lisbon Treaty in Article 86 TFEU explicitly called
for the establishing of the Office. In addition, with the prosecutor only but exclusively
being responsible for investigating the fraud of EU funds, it argues that national offices
could not possibly handle cases with an intrinsic Union dimension effectively, especially
75
when cross-border activities are involved. Finally, it points to the Lisbon Treaty, which
envisions a special unanimity procedure to adopt the EPPO, whereas - failing to reach
unanimity - a group of at least nine member states can pursue the proposal by means
of enhanced cooperation (Article 20 TEU). In that sense, one could argue that the
Commission owes this, not only to the Treaty itself, but also to those 17 national
parliaments that did not see a violation in the subsidiarity principle to table the legislation.
What can those two cases of the use of the yellow card tell us about the role of
national parliaments in EU legislation? Being regarded as something of a cornerstone
of policing subsidiarity, some argue that a "red card" be introduced (i.e. two-thirds or,
on important issues, half of national parliaments forcing the Commission to abandon
the draft legislation) or that a yellow card simply be treated as a red card. The EPPO
case, however, shows that things are not so simple: While critical involvement of national
assemblies should be more than welcome, the reasoned objection of a minority among
them should not suffice to kill the process altogether. Moreover, a yellow card issued
by one third of national parliaments means that, two thirds of those chambers do not
see a violation of the subsidiarity principle. That is why it would be overhasty to consider
any future yellow card as an order to abandon legislation. Finally, the "orange card" by
which half of national parliaments, supported by either the Council or the EP, can
actually vote down a Commission proposal (Article 7 (3) of Protocol No 2), has not
been tried to this date.
That's why, for the time being, the yellow card procedure should rather lead to a
substantiated dialogue about how the envisaged legislation could be made to fit the
requirements of subsidiarity. While the eight-week period for consideration may be
deemed too short, going down the route of changing the respective Treaty protocol (for
which not even the simplified revision procedure could apply) would be extremely
difficult. Instead, national parliaments should enhance their practical cooperation in
Brussels and through the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs
(COSAC) in order to better respond to new Commission legislation and thus preserve
the principle of subsidiarity. This also includes the use of IPEX, the InterParliamentary
EU information exchange platform facilitating cooperation between national parliaments
and the EP on legislative issues.
The establishment of an Inter-Parliamentary Conference for Economic and Financial
Governance, based on Article 13 of the new Fiscal Stability Treaty signed by 26 member
states in response to the reforms of the Eurozone, will prove critical for how national
parliaments make their voices heard at the European level. Given enough political will
among national parliamentarians, this new gathering, which convened for the first time
in October 2013 under the Lithuanian EU Presidency, could become a permanent forum
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for national parliaments to discuss and comment on the Commission's Annual Growth
Survey. This document, published in October of each year, sets out the broad EU
economic priorities for the following year and thus launches the European Semester.
In particular, a discussion among national assemblies in the Fall would thus precede
both the adoption of national budgets (usually in December) and the Council's consent
to the Survey in January. Regular meetings in this setting, preceding important decisions
by the European Council and the Commission, would thus contribute to a higher level
of parliamentary scrutiny of decisions taken at the EU level on member states' fiscal and
economic policies.
In addition, a number of practical aspects can enhance cooperation between national
parliaments and the EP as well as within national parliaments. For one, the EP could
invite national MPs more regularly for hearings, especially if there is growing concern
about a new piece of legislation's compatibility with the subsidiarity principle. To facilitate
this, national parliamentarians should have direct access to the EP buildings rather than
going through visitor procedures. Moreover, much should and could be done to enhance
cooperation between the EU affairs and functional committees at the member states
level as well as between a country's MEPs and its national deputies - from regular
briefings, including to different party groups, to scheduling meetings according to the
political calendars in both Brussels and the national capital, to more mundane things
such as agreeing to work in English on a draft legislative proposal.
This point about the preparedness of national parliaments to get engaged on questions
of subsidiarity also points to the domestic arena in member states. While the Treaty
grants parliaments the right - or even the duty - to uphold the subsidiarity principle of
a legislative proposal, it also gives them the right to take the EU to the European Court
of Justice over an alleged violation by a law that is already passed. While it is true that
the ECJ is thought of as being integration-friendly, it is the threshold for this procedure,
set at national level, which makes this a useful instrument: In Germany, for example,
the law implementing the Lisbon Treaty granted this right for a subsidiarity appeal to
one fourth of members of the Bundestag. If they were serious about their claims about
EU laws violating national (or regional) prerogatives, even minority parties could set
in motion a process at the end of which EU legislation is repealed.
In addition, once national parliaments are more involved in EU decision-making by
way of institutionally preparing for the yellow-card procedure, they can also better use
the old-fashioned way of working through their respective governments. After all, the
prospect of facing a blocking minority in the Council of Ministers has in the past led
the Commission to either alter or altogether abandon a legislative proposal. This is the
preferred avenue, especially when the - often times politically controversial - substance
of a Commission proposal is at issue, as opposed to procedural questions.
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This classical' method is also more effective than the new yellow card procedure:
A one-fourth minority in the Council (i.e. 26% of the weighted votes) can block new
legislation, whereas it takes a third of national parliaments for a yellow card, which
forces the Commission only to reconsider its proposal. Similarly, national parliaments
could use this route to propose to abolish out-dated legislation or even initiate new
ones - for which the prerogative is, of course, with the Commission, but which should
be forthcoming if presented with a joint initiative of national parliaments and governments.
4. Improving Inter-institutional Cooperation and Law-Making
As mentioned earlier, the past years have seen an institutional rebalancing towards
both the European Council and the European Parliament. The former has gained weight
thanks to the Maastricht policy inventions and the EU's recent crisis management activities,
whereas the latter's role increased mostly due to the Nice and Lisbon Treaty provisions
making it a law-maker near-equal to the Council. At the same time, the institutions of
the Eurozone - both the established ECB and the Eurogroup meeting of finance ministers
as well as newly created ones such as the Eurozone summit or the semi-permanent
Eurogroup president - have grown in importance. Both trends took place mostly at the
expense of the Commission, in terms of its political profile as well as public visibility.
In order to put this new institutional tableau on more solid grounds, there are a number
of considerations on how the functionality of the EU bodies, including the relations
among the main (classical) institutions, can be further improved.
4.1. Getting Commission, Council, and Parliament to Agree on the
EU's Work Programme
A closer look at the fields where the European Council is most active - i.e. economic
governance and foreign policy- reveals that the Commission does not have the right of
initiative for these policy areas. Therefore, the involvement of the heads of state or
government does not necessarily crowd out the Community method from areas where
it was previously applied. Instead, it can actually help bring about the necessary consensus
between member states and the Commission. This is particularly relevant with regard
to the emerging economic governance in EMU.
This consensus is also needed when it comes to the EU's work programme for the
next five years. Here, the Council should join the Commission and Parliament to draw
up a tripartite inter-institutional agreement outlining where the Commission as the sole
initiator of legislation should become active. This is something member states neglected
to do in 2009, leaving it to the EP to outline future legislation and procedures with the
Commission. With the overall policy guidelines from the European Council plus the
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EU's priorities co-defined by the Council in such a tripartite "European Governance
Manifesto", member states would be more accountable for EU policies. This means that
they could no longer blame an alliance between the Commission and Parliament for
pushing supranational policies too hard.
Such a tripartite accord would allow the Commission to regain its equidistance to the
other two main institutions, Council and Parliament. By establishing a work programme
between the three law-making bodies, it could also promote a normalisation' of the
role of the European Council, stepping away from concrete (crisis-driven) decisionmaking and becoming - again - the forum to discuss the long-term political guidelines.
Furthermore, it could provide an opening to a factual "right of initiative" of the
European Parliament: As part of the accord and on certain predetermined issues, the
Commission could agree to table a proposal coming from Parliament as its own. Certainly,
this appears as further (unwanted) federalisation to some, even though it would not
change anything in the official law-making procedure (which, ultimately, grants member
states a collective veto via the Council). Furthermore, in practice it is likely that the
relevant Commission units would be involved in the preparatory work at the desk level
anyway, so that the final draft might not be so different after all. However, the symbolism
would be huge - and precedent-setting, for better or for worse.
4.2. A New Compact for Better Law-Making
While such a tripartite inter-institutional agreement tackles new (secondary) legislation,
the bulk of EU regulation is indeed by way of delegated (implementing) acts. This points
to the existing smart regulation' agenda, through which the EU has already begun to
lessen the regulatory burden on the European economy. While being on the right track,
the EU - and here the Commission as the main body for proposing and implementing
legislation - needs to do more to make companies more competitive in a global market
place. This is not a special interest of business organisations but a feeling that is shared
by the wider public. Moreover, it is not merely a concern driven by the desire to enhance
the EU's competitiveness and, thus, prosperity, but also a demand of the principles of
proportionality and subsidiarity. Better (i.e. often times: less) regulation then feeds back
into the perception of citizens whether the EU duly exercises its powers or not.
What is thus needed is a "Better Law-making Compact" as a major focus of the next
Commission's work. Building on activities that have been pursued in the field of law
making since the mid-1990s, a compact would reinforce those in order to reach a clearly
stated aim: To have less, not more, regulation at the end of the 2014-19 period than at
its start. Such a net reduction' can be achieved by the following means.
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First of all, the Commission should refrain from new law making to the greatest extent
possible. There must be no legislation only for the sake of legislation. When legislation
appears necessary, a "think small first" approach should be pursued. In addition, when
proposing new legislation, the Commission should place particular emphasis on possible
exemptions or lighter regulatory regimes for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
In pursuing the agenda of the above-mentioned tripartite agreement, the Commission
should try to integrate and simplify existing legislation wherever possible. Both codification
- to bring together one or more legislative acts and their possible amendments in a
single new act - and recasting - substantively changing an original act while simplifying
it and its amendments - are desirable in this regard. Finally, the First Vice-President
responsible for better regulation should carefully supervise such legislative work, making
sure that it corresponds to the political challenges the EU faces.
Secondly, the new Commission should complete REFIT, the Regulatory Fitness and
Performance Programme that has identified opportunities to reduce regulatory burdens
and simplify existing laws.
This programme, initiated in December 2012, resulted in a number of proposals in
its October 2013 report. It is, however, important to ensure that this effort does not fade
out with the current legislative period but is carried on - and with renewed vigour post-2014. SMEs across the EU should make it their goal that the REFIT evaluation is
extended to the full regulatory acquis.
Having mainstreamed smart regulation tools such as impact assessment, stakeholder
consultation and evaluation throughout the policy cycle (as the Commission claims in
its report) is a first step. However, even those tools can be improved. For one, impact
assessment should be independent and public. This means that any impact assessment
made should be publicised, including - and especially - those that lead to the repeal
of the proposed act. While this may initially appear embarrassing to the College as such
or to the individual Commissioner proposing the legislation, it would help counter the
public perception of the Commission as a body only keen on churning out more
regulation.
As for the independence of impact assessment, some experts have proposed that the
Commission's Impact Assessment Board include outside experts, nominated by the
Council and Parliament. At the same time, the latter two institutions have their own
share to contribute by assessing the impact of the amendments they propose as part
of the legislative process. While the Commission's impact assessment only relates to the
original proposal, it is the alterations coming from the European Parliament and from
member states that can make a legal act much more regulation-heavy towards the end
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of the legislative process. (The same is true for amendments by the College of
Commissioners after an impact assessment is made.) The EP has already established an
impact assessment capacity, which it has to bring to use now; the Council, according
to the Inter-Institutional Common Approach to Impact Assessment, is to do the same
with regard to its own proposed amendments.
However, rather than trying to harmonise those activities across the three institutions,
the EU should establish an independent agency conducting both impact assessment and
policy evaluation for EU legislation. Agreeing on such an "Agency for Better Law-making"
could be part of updating the 2003 Inter-institutional Agreement on Better Law-making.
A new agreement has to take into account the post-Lisbon legislative environment and
consolidate the advancements of the better law-making agenda of the past decade.
Furthermore, member states bear special responsibility when it comes to EU directives.
Here, the level of regulatory burden often increases when national lawmakers add
further details in the process of transposition. These range from additional regulatory
measures to administrative requirements such as reports, authorisations, inspections and
fees. Such gold-plating' may satisfy certain national, administrative, or special interests;
however, its necessity is hardly explained to the public. Thus companies, citizens and
the like perceive another EU directive that increases regulatory burden.
Simply appealing to the forthrightness' of member states governments is not enough,
which is why the new Agency for Better Law-making should make information on
national transposition publicly available. This would enable business organisations,
academic institutions, think tanks, and watchdogs alike to critically assess overregulation
at the national level. Especially if measured against the upcoming annual REFIT scoreboard
of the Commission's initiatives to simplify legislation, this will provide a more balanced
picture as to where it is really Brussels' (i.e. the Commission) that drives regulation and
where the Council and the EP or individual member states have to bear the blame.
Building on its "Top Ten" consultations with SMEs, the Commission should explore ways
to extend public hearings to the evaluation of legislation. Such fitness checks' review
existing legislation to assess whether it reasonably supports economic activity and does
not result in disproportionate compliance costs. Because the actual costs and benefits
entailed in implementation of a directive also depend on how it is transposed at the
national level, the Commission should work closely with member states on the methodology
of such evaluations. Merely assessing the conformity of transposed national legislation
with EU law is not enough; it needs to be evaluated with regard to its actual impact,
including on the broader competitiveness of the economy. The revision of the Commission's
guidelines for evaluations and impact assessments, to be undertaken in 2014, can only
be the beginning.
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Ideally, stringent policy evaluation should tie back to the initial impact assessment
made during the legislative process, thus informing the latter process with the actual
results of a legal act and, ultimately, improving the assessments of future acts.
5. Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the EU's competitiveness hinges on much more than
only' improving the conditions for business. Given that the Union remains engulfed
in a crisis of political legitimacy, worsened by the outcome of the European Elections
in May, the justified concern of business organisations as much as ordinary citizens is
also on the EU's governance structures and their interplay with the national level. The
proposals made here aim to increase the EU's institutional capacities so as to enhance
its overall legitimacy.
Still, while institutions matter (even a great deal), they are not everything. To function
properly, they also need a guiding principle, a spirit of cooperation, both within and
among them. It is this spirit of cooperation and solidarity, which has suffered most from
the current crisis in Europe. To overcome this malaise, any group of individuals can
make a contribution. That is because, ultimately, institutions are more often a product
than an agent of change. Or as the father of European integration,' Jean Monnet, rightly
said: "Nothing is possible without men; nothing lasts without institutions".
These men' include of course all European citizens, male or female, while targeting a
specific group among them: Those elected for public office. Calling upon their political
will' may appear futile at times, leading people to assume they had better take matters
into their own hands. Yet especially when democratic procedures are questioned both
at the national and European levels, it is important to work through the established
procedures and hold representatives accountable.
By making concrete proposals on how to reform the EU's governance structures, this
chapter contributes to the on-going debate about the necessary next steps and enables
interested citizens as much as civil society organisations and business confederations
to lobby for a more competitive, flexible, and effective EU.
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Authors
Dr. Cornelius Adebahr is a political analyst and entrepreneur based in Washington,
DC, and Berlin, Germany, working on European foreign policy in its broadest sense.
He is an associate in the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and an associate fellow of the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign
Relations (DGAP). Until 2011, he also was a lecturer at the Willy Brandt School of Public
Policy at Erfurt University and a member of the Team Europe of the European Commission.
In 2002/2003, he was a fellow of the Robert Bosch Foundation's Post-Graduate Program
in International Affairs. He studied Political Science (International Relations), Philosophy,
Public Law, and International Economics in Tübingen, Paris, and at the Free University
Berlin, where he graduated in 2001 before receiving his PhD (Dr. rer. pol.) in 2008.
Alois Bischofberger, M.A. in Economics from Zurich University. Professional
experience in management consultancy and economic as well as financial market
research. From 1986 to 2008 Chief Economist of Credit Suisse and member of the bank's
Global and Economic Strategy Group. Since September 2008 Senior Consultant at Avenir
Suisse. Contributions to monetary policy, macroeconomic and social security issues.
Dr. Ma gorzata Bonikowska, political scientist and EU expert, is a President of
Centre for International Relations (www.csm.org.pl) - a leading Polish independent think
tank in foreign affairs - as well as a co-founder of the THINKTANK Centre for dialogue
and analysis (www.mttp.pl). She specializes in European studies and international affairs.
Graduated from University of Warsaw (Italian studies), University of Paris Sorbonne
(history and political studies) and Polish Academy of Performing Arts (history of culture),
she finished two Ph.D programmes in Poland and abroad as well as attended specialisation
studies at the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at the Columbia University
in New York, within the Fulbright Program.
Between the years 1995-1998, she was editor in the Polish Public Television, than
moved the Polish Ministry of European Integration (UKIE) as director of the European
Information Centre. In 2001-2008, she was working for the European Commission,
chairing the EC's Information and Communication Program in Poland and then in
Bulgaria. In the same time, Dr. Bonikowska has been continuing academic career as a
lecturer and researcher, tutor of MA and BA thesis, as well as a government advisor.
She is an author of over a hundred articles and publications.
Dr. Samuel Rutz studied economics and gained his PhD at the University of Zurich.
During his PhD, he worked as an assistant at the Centre for Economic Research at ETH
Zurich. He then joined the Swiss Competition Commission in Bern, initially as scientific
officer, and latterly as chief economist and member of the extended management board.
In 2012 he joined the Avenir Suisse as a vice director.
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Prof. Günter Verheugen, started his political carrier in 1969 after having worked
as a journalist and having studied history and political sciences. He was a member of
the German Bundestag from 1983 until 1999, where he hold a number of senior posts
and was mainly dealing with foreign and security policy and European affairs. He was
appointed Minister of State for European affairs in the Foreign Office in 1998. In 1999
He became a member of the European Commission, responsible for enlargement until
2004. In 2002, he also took over the responsibility for the European neighbourhood
policy. In his second term in the European Commission, from 2004 to 2010, he served
as Vice-President and was in charge of enterprise and industry. In this capacity he was
the European chairperson of the Transatlantic Economic Council as of 2007.
He is now an honorary professor of Viadrina University in Frankfurt/Oder and
published a number of books and essays on European and other issues.
Dr. Rudolf Walser has had a wide variety of management and specialist roles in
academia, business, public administration and politics, including assistant and lecturer
at the University of St. Gallen's Institute of Banking, assistant to the executive board of
Swiss Bank Corporation, academic adjunct to the trade department at the Swiss Federal
Department of Economic Affairs, head of the economics staff at F. Hoffmann-La Roche,
chief economist at economiesuisse, and local councilor in Meilen. He has authored more
than 100 publications in respected newspapers and magazines. He has been a senior
consultant at Avenir Suisse since 2008.
Prof. Hakan Yýlmaz is a professor at the Department of Political Science and
International Relations, Boðaziçi University, Istanbul. He's got his BA degree at the
Economics Department of Boðaziçi University (1987). He received his M.A. (1991) and
Ph.D. (1996) degrees at the Political Science Department of Columbia University in New
York City. Academically, he is interested in political ideologies and political culture in
post-war Turkey; culture and identity dimensions of European integration and EUTurkish Relations; and external-internal linkages in the processes of democratization.
He has conducted research projects on Euroskepticism in Turkey (2004 and 2012);
conservatism in Turkey (2006 and 2012); the middle classes in Turkey (2007 and 2012);
the knowledge and image of Turkey, as well as the level of support for Turkey's EU
membership, in five EU member states (UK, Germany, France, Spain, Poland) (2009);
the processes of othering and discrimination in Turkey (2010).
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