Populism and the left

Italian Sociological Review, 2018

Although populism has many references and various definitions as an elusive and ambiguous concept, this article approaches it as a political strategy which has the potential to destabilize democracy in some ways. This approach enables a broader comprehension of populism rather than confining it to certain ideological tenets or a few undisputed populist movements. This study attempts to reveal the logic of this political strategy through a tripartite analysis which consists of the sense of democracy inherent in populism, its way of thinking and reasoning, and the political circumstances which enable and strengthen populism. It is argued that the analysis performed here can offer an outline of the ground on which the struggle against the features of populism, that threatens democracy, can be carried out. Finally, in the light of the aforementioned analysis and some ideas which are borrowed from the works of Habermas and Mouffe to a large extent, it is aimed to re-read democracy in order to deal with the populist challenge in liberal democracies.

Contemporary Politics, 2023

Populism comes in so many forms, both historically and in its contemporary manifestations, that we cannot assess its relationship with democratic institutions and practices as if it were homogenous. In this article, we reconnect with the history of the first movements that have called themselves populists and draw on an understanding of populism as an egalitarian impulse against oligarchic tendencies, centered on anti-elitism and the defense of a democratic common sense. This genetic approach to populism goes against the dominant definitions which tend to overstretch its range of application while assuming a form of antipluralism as part of its common features. Then, we draw attention to the diversity of conceptions of democracy within populist thought and practices and show that, owing to their ideological plasticity, the types of democratic institutions favored by populist movements, as well as their attitudes towards representation and intermediary bodies, are highly contextual. The article ends with a focus on the relationship between populism and democracy in the current context of disintermediation, in which we argue that populism's inherent ambiguities shed some doubt on its capacity to respond to the current challenges faced by representative institutions.

Recently there has been a return of the notion of the people in discussions related to radical politics. One can see it in the rhetoric coming from movements but also from political organizations, as a unifying point of reference. At the same time there has been a renewed interest in the notion of populism. Although the main focus of interest has been on right wing or far-right wing populisms, there has also been a debate on the possibility of a ‘left populism’. In what follows, I will try to discuss the theoretical and political limitations of such conceptualizations of left populism and attempt to suggest an alternative theoretical framework to rethink the very notion of the ‘people’.

Contemporary Politics, 2003

Traditional approaches to the study of populism highlight the connection with modernization, the enfranchisement of the underdogs, and the role played by charismatic leaders. More recently, the literature has begun to discuss the connection between populism and democracy. This article takes on this relation by thinking populism as an internal periphery of democratic politics. It proceeds to develop this intuition by identifying three possible iterations of the populist phenomenon. The first one looks at populism as a mode of representation. The second possibility, populism as a symptom of democratic politics, ups the ante by looking at the tensions that push populism to the edges of democracy without necessarily stepping out. The third line of inquiry looks at the populist mobilization as a possible underside or nemesis of democracy.

Elgar Research Handbook on Populism, 2023

2018

Populism, in all its varieties, is at the center of numerous debates in the media, political, and academic worlds. It is often viewed as a negative phenomenon. Such anti-populism, however, particularly since the turn of the century, has been countered by an anti–anti-populist movement – in media and scholarly forums - which combats the attempts to stigmatize populism, defending its merits as well as regenerative potential for democratic systems. The article charts the trajectory of the defense of populism, its main centers of irradiation, while reflecting on future prospects of the intellectual “battle” for populism.

The reality of racism, hatred, anger, insecurity and inequalities is spreading irresistibly. There is no way of escaping from all these daily phenomena unless there is an alternative systemic project to challenge it. In the past, when a country was suffocating, it could be aired by opening the windows to neighboring countries. But now we do not have this resource any more. In neighboring countries the air has become as unbreathable as in ours. José Ortega Y Gasset The concept of 'left-populism' that has been attributed to emerging democratic and justice-based political movements throughout the world, including such entities as Podemos, Syriza, France Insoumis, the Five Star Movement, Jeremy Corbyn's Labour and Bernie Sanders' alternative political agendas, involves a misconceptualisation. We offer a new concept called " left-transformation " to explain the policies of those movements and argue that they are not populist, and that their programs are in fact anti-populist and based on justice. In this first piece, we will focus on the concept of populism, elaborate its origins and invite the reader to rethink the concept. Our second article will explain why we use the concept of 'left-transformation' and why it is a more radical way of forming a political strategy for those movements.

National Institute Economic Review, 2022

Much of the media coverage in relation to populism has focused either on populist moments like the Brexit vote or on populist leaders such as Donald Trump or Boris Johnson. Meanwhile, the academic literature on populism is divided between two broad approaches. First, an emphasis in economics on policy (e.g. Dornbusch and Edwards, 1992) and, second, an accentuation in political science on ideology (e.g. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Both approaches capture important aspects, including the rejection of orthodox monetary and fiscal policy positions and a repudiation not only of established elites but also of pluralism and some of the key institutions on which the rule of law and democracy depend. However, these perspectives risk under-exploring some of the long-term structural patterns that are political, economic and social all at once. They include the decline in voter turnout, the collapse of centreleft and centre-right political traditions, the rise in popular support for populist parties or candidates, the effects of deindustrialisation on long-term unemployment and of low wages on falling living standards as well as a sense of powerless and a loss of both community cohesion and identity. The roots of populism go deep and stretch back in time-the economic recessions in the 1980s and early 1990s and the structural upward shift in joblessness, the social crises of the 2000s and 2010s linked to fiscal retrenchment as well as cultural change and the resurgence of extremes such as nationalism and xenophobia (e.g. Aiginger, 2020). The electoral success of populists tends to be a symptom rather than the cause of populism, while the consequences of populist politics (and technocratic responses) are often further to divide countries along both older cultural and class lines as well as newer cleavages of education, age and assets. It is also the case that populist methods, such as the use of demagogic speech in public discussion and political debate, can be deployed by established elites and emerging insurgents alike. Establishment leaders from Margaret Thatcher to Tony Blair and David Cameron resorted to populist rhetoric in ways that were not entirely dissimilar to right-wing populist leaders from Silvio Berlusconi to Donald Trump and Boris Johnson or left-wing ones such as Venezuela's late President Hugo Chavez or the leaders of Syriza and Podemos in Europe. The demon of demagoguery besets democracy that is variously more liberal or more authoritarian (Pabst, 2019). This NIER Special Issue explores the complex phenomenon of populism and popular support for populists from a broad perspective of political economy (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2021). The twin focus is on the drivers of populism and the implications for democracy and the market economy. Although the various contributions differ in terms of their methodology or findings, they share a number of closely connected arguments. One argument is the importance of both formal structures and informal norms to support a functioning democracy, economy and society. Another argument relates to the need for existing political and economic systems to address the grievances underpinning the appeal of populists. A third argument is that populism claims to defend democracy against 'corrupt' and 'unaccountable' elites, but, in reality, it tends to advance authoritarianism, undermines the institutions of representative government and fails to help the most vulnerable groups in society.