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This study explores the possible scenarios of a regional conflict that may occur initially between Israel and Lebanon but may grow and extend to other regions involving more nations. It informs leaders of the consequences of such a conflict for all parties. By utilizing the scenarios matrix, it develops alternative scenarios according to the nature and combinations of four variables, including the Israel Defense Forces’ (I.D.F.) fighting power, Hezbollah’s response, the United States (U.S.) and allies’ intervention, Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s intervention. Analyzing the relationships of these variables also warns of wildcard scenarios that can impact the course of the conflict significantly and increase the risks as it may get out of control. If diplomatic efforts fail to de-escalate tensions between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the potential consequences could be severe and multifaceted as identified by this inquiry. The study suggests that decision-makers and policymakers rethink the idea of pre-emptive wars as any miscalculations can impose severe humanitarian impacts and irrecoverable costs on nations involved directly or indirectly in the conflict.
N/A, 2017
Israel’s war with Hezbollah in 2006 remains relevant for Israel and the larger Middle East because it is the most recent conflict Israel in which has been involved beyond its security borders, and the most recent one in which Israel has had to fight a large-scale engagement with an enemy capable of seriously disrupting the Israeli home front. Because of the asymmetric nature of the war in question, it also likely presents a pattern that will be repeated in future confrontations. Finally, Hezbollah remains both viable financially and potent militarily due to its role as an Iranian proxy in the ongoing confrontation between Iran and Israel over the former’s nuclear aspirations. This paper shows operational plans to deal with all of Hezbollah’s capabilities existed and therefore that something went fundamentally wrong in the decision-making process at the strategic level. This paper claims that suboptimal decision-making was primarily related to risk aversion and very much influenced the conduct of the war on the Israeli side. The aim of this paper is not to criticize or improve Israeli decision-making processes but to understand the broad reasons why certain risks were deemed acceptable and others not. This paper, therefore, seeks to highlight that though Israel’s strategic principles remain sound, they require capable statesmen and/or more strategic and operational forethought to effectively serve Israel in actual wartime implementation.
Journal of International Relations, 2016
This article tries to enrich the conceptual debate and discussions among international relations and strategic studies scholars regarding explanations of weak actor‟s victories against strong actors in military conflicts. For longtime strategic studies scholars have tried to find the most relevant and valid explanations on the reasoning on how a weak actor can achieve victory in asymmetric conflict despite overwhelming inferiority in terms of power. Previous strategic studies scholars have proposed competing hypothesis ranging from regime type, balance of interests to the types of strategic interaction between the two actors. In this essay, the author would like to underline the significance of fog of war or uncertainty as a significant contributing factor during strategic interactions at tactical-operational towards shaping either a favorable or vice-versa unfavorable war conditions for the weak actor to modify pre-war political objectives of the asymmetric conflict. In this analys...
For 7 years now, the border area between Israel and Lebanon has witnessed calm and stability. At first sight, this has all the appearances of a paradox. The 2006 war between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese organization, Hezbollah, was followed neither by a peace agreement nor by a mere diplomatic process. Both sides prepared their forces to wage the next war and additionally have been confronted in past years to major changes in the distribution of power in the Middle East in the midst of the so-called “Arab Spring.” Against all odds, the area comprising north Israel and south Lebanon remained very quiet these last months. This monograph argues that the key to understand this paradox is the game of deterrence played by both Israel and Hezbollah. Specifically, an informal deterrence dialogue has been developing between Israel and Hezbollah and that strategic stability prevailed because of this indirect exchange. Because both sides understood that a next round would be devastating and that each could not entirely eliminate the threat of retaliation in a first wave the solution has been to bargain deterrence, meaning to deter the other party from attacking its homeland by pledging a full-scale retaliation. But to say that stability has been preserved between Israel and Hezbollah thanks to deterrence does not mean that this is a perennial state. This monograph also stresses the precariousness of such deterrence system. The stand-off between Israel and Hezbollah reached this level only through specific measures and conditions that can be reversed in the future. In particular, exogenous factors such as the unraveling of the Syrian civil war or the developments of the Iranian nuclear issue can jeopardize the equilibrium. Moreover, the study of Lebanese politics emphasizes the uncertainties related to the logic of deterrence with a nonstate actor like Hezbollah. This is why this analysis offers a cautious look at deterrence theories in the Middle East and reminds that such situations are neither naturally engendered nor eternally established.
In this research, the risks perception of Israeli Jews will become the basis for looking at the Israeli Palestinian conflict as a case study for an intractable conflict. By mapping the complexity of risk dynamics in the conflict system, through collecting data from three levels of sources, a new understanding of how the perception of risks contribute to the intractability of the conflict will be achieved. Furthermore, combining this new understanding with frameworks taken from the DST approach and from Anthropology, which relate to the rationale of risks analysis, together with the functions of civil society theory during peace building, this research will suggest an interventionary process that will transform the current dynamics of the conflict. This intervention will be based on a process called ‘scenario thinking,’ which will allow the weaving together of a network of participants on the micro level of civil society into a core group of leaders which will impact the system on the macro level. This network will envision future possible scenarios based on the key uncertainties identified and will establish a monitoring task force which will conduct ongoing monitoring of these scenarios and their indicators. This intervention will create the change in the skills and function of civil society that will allow it to work on the edge of chaos and become a key factor in the transformation of the risks system. Although the research is limited to one case study and to the Jewish Israeli public, it is suggested that the findings could be implemented in other contexts and with larger groups of stakeholders.
2017
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