POLITICAL PROCESS AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN
INDIA: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
S.N. MISHRA AND SWETA MISHRA
In their bid to explore the impact of nomination process,
followed for election purposes by political parties in India, the
authors analyse the trends that prevailed in our general
elections since Independence. They identify in the process
certain features, which, according to them, may have serious
implications in future.
THE DEVICE which offers citizens the opportunity to make choice among
political parties or candidates and authorises them to rule the nation is called
political process. Social scientists have interpreted this process in different
ways. To sociologists, it is a monetary X-ray of social cleavage, thrust upon
politics. To economists, it is a variant of maximising behaviour in the
political market place. Accordingly for psychologists, it is attitude formation
and choice behaviour. A political scientist will perceive political process
as an educative opportunity, a process of legitimisation of power and a
therapeutic exercise. In other words, it is an institutional device to ensure that
the nature of political authority remains popular and the control on the
misuse of power remains operative. Again, it gives opportunity to those
who seek power and domination to do so through social channels and in
the process oppose the social reality before the megalomania in human
beings.
Political process is a way to sort out the means and to chart the way
towards the goal. It is an index and instrument of dynamics of democracy
through which qualitative changes occur. It is one of the crucial indices by
which one may attempt to measure as to how far democracy as a value has
been internalised among the political elites and masses. Thus, it constitutes
the mechanism for communication, influence and control from grassroots
upwards. This mechanism involves both the political parties and voters: one .
for materialising the public welfare programmes and the other for
institutionalising the people's will.
The heart beat of a democratic political system is largely regulated by
the sound health of political parties. Political parties not only channelise the
political process during elections through nomination and campaign but also
set forth the political goal and provide incentives to citizens for political
participation.
444
S.N. MISHRA AND SWETA MISHRA
NOMINATION PROCESS OF THE ELECTION SYSTEMS
The focus of this article is on analysing as to what extent periodic
elections to Parliament and State Legislatures have set forth the process of
parliamentary democracy on the right track; as to whether the emerging
electoral trends are any indicator of stability and viability of our political
system; as to whether elections reflect the institutionalisation of citizens' will;·
to assess the extent to which our parliamentary system has sustained the test
of the time; and, finally, if the answer is in .negative, to examine the
measures required to be adopted to enable our political system to sustain
emerging challenges flowing from criminalisation of politics, liberalisation of
economy and erosion in administrative and judicial system. However, our
effort is limited only to the nomination process of the candidates of different
political parties and its effect on the status, stature and organisational
soundness of our political parties.
The process through which political parties authorise their candidates to
enter into electoral battle for public posts based on people's consent is
called nomination process. To put it differently, selection of candidates by
parties is nomination and selection of candid.ates by the voters is election.
Nomination is a supplementary but most crucial process of election. If
election is a competition among political parties, nomination process is a
competition within the party. One represents inter-party competition, another
stands for intra-party competition. Through this competition, the inherent
tendencies and attitudes of political parties are exposed to citizens. Through
nomination process, political parties confine the choice of voters to the
limited candidates and the motives behind the nomination of candidates
pervade throughout the electoral fray and thereby affect the working of
parliamentary government. It not only determines the number, quality and
ideology of candidates appearing at the hustings but also shapes the main
contours of electoral fray. To be precise, the emerging trends of Indian
parliamentary system are to a great extent an outcome of nomination politics.
For understanding the futuristic trends in our parliamentary system, we have
to peep into the past.
GENERAL ELECTIONS AND THE NOMINATION PROCESS
Importance of Party High Command
Democratic values, ideological commitment and integrity of the candidate
ran supreme in the nomination process of political parties in three successive
elections starting from 1952. All political parties (ruling or opposition)
authorised only those candidates to contest the elections whose party
allegiance, loyality, and ideological commitment was beyond doubt. By and
large, these candidates were involved in freedom movement and had a good
image of their own in public life. Congress Party, being the vanguard of
freedom movement, enjoyed unquestionable popularity, and to get its ticket
was a gate-pass of victory at the hustings. Hence, there used to be a neck
POLITICAL PROCESS AND POLmCAL PARTIES
445
and neck competition among ticket seekers within the party. The selection
process varied somewhat at different times, places and situations which
occasionally allowed district and state party organisations to play their role.
However, the central leadership generally used to exercise major influence.
Since the procedural mechanism of conflict resolution was never properly
internalised, the result was that each dispute tended to be channelled upwar~s
involving intervention by party high command. As a consequence, most of
the aspiring candidates devoted more time and made more effort to cultivate
proximity to member (s) of party high command then concentrating on their
constituencies and winning confidence of party workers and masses. As a
result incentive for nursing the constituency got blunted. It further led to
frustration and heart burning among the grassroots workers, who lacked
access to the big bosses of the party. As a result the process of nomination left
the organisation anamic at the base and prone to manipulation at the top. 1
Criterion for Ticket Allotment
Thus, increasing interference by central leaders in the nomination process
gradually denied the effectiveness of democratic functioning at the state level
and below. Consequently, Congress was plagued with bossism. However, so
long as Nehru was alive, bossism could not come in the way of democratic
process of nomination as he always tried to maintain tiarmony among
different units of party organisation. Inspite of the fact that his towering
personality dominated the organisational wing of the party, he neither filled
up the organisation with his sycophants nor silenced criticism of his actions.
As regards nomination of Congress candidates for the First General Elections,
he despatched a strong-worded circular to the party members, which not only
reiterated the ban on groups inside the party but went further prohibiting any
association of members with communal organisations and re'lfiring. men of
progressiv.e social outlook to be chosen as the party candidates.. He gave due
importance to constituency units in the selection of candidates and
encouraged to bring popular and allegiant members in the electoral fray
belonging to both right and left wings of the party.
.
During this period, Opposition parties, in the absence of.tough
competition among the ticket aspirants, conferred tickets only on· those
candidates who had their own standing in the constituency as also in the
national and state politics through their social and political services. This
was the period during which two major progressive forces, Socialist Party
and Communist Party of India witnessed vertical splits in their ranks and
gave birth. to Praja Socialist· Party, Socialist Party, Communist Party of
India and Communist Party Marxist respectively and Akhil Bhar.tiya Jansangh
was also gaining ground slowly but gradually.
1
2
Asoka Mehta, A Decade t1f Indian Pt1litics, New Delhi, S. Chand, 1984, p.7.
W.H. Morris Jones, The Gt1vemment and Pt1litics in India, London, Hutchinson, 1971, p. 92.
446
S.N. MISHRA AND SWETA MISHRA
Post-Nehru Developments
However, in the absence of Nehru's towering personality, in the Fourth
General Elections of 1967, Congress faced with internal quarrel and leaders
of both the right and left wings of the party endeavoured to hold Congress
command in their own hands even at the cost of party's ideology and
integrity. In such a changing and confusing situation, central leadership which
was at a time cementing force of their party organisation, weakened and
became dependent on the ·faction-and caste-oriented. provincial leadership. In
majority of provinces, these state leaders tried to manipulate the grant of
Congress ti~kes
in such a way that their facti?n co~ld
do~inat
.the ne~l
elected legislature and they could, on that basis, claim chief mm1stersh1p:
Sadique Ali, the then Congress General Secretary, confessed that while
distributing tickets, the party had to take into account several factors which
4 This unprincipled
did not give a representative character to the par~y.
factional competition within the Congress led the national and state leadership to
prepare their personal lobby through nomination process. A sense of
complacency within leadership degenerated the ideological base of nomination
politics and thwarted the party harmony and hegemony which ultimately
resulted in establishment of regional political parties--Jana Congress in Orissa
and Maharashtra, Janata Party in Rajasthan, and Lok Kranti Dal in Bihar.
On the other hand, the growing concern and anxiety of opposition
parties, to oust the Congress from power, led them to forge anti-Congress
alliance and absorb the Congress left-overs in their parties. As a result,
anti-Congress grand alliance deprived many competent party workers of the
tickets in their respective constituencies and strongholds. No doubt, at the
higher level, grand alliance partners were cooperative and accommodative but
the lower echelons, particularly the deprived candidates, adopted the
antagonistic mood to the authorised candidates. At the same time, the rural
elite, emeorging in the wake of government-sponsored Community
Development Programmes, felt alienated from the party as their claims were
ignored either in favour of sitting MLAs or an imposed choice from above.
All these i.rends eroded the ideological commitment and allegiance of party
members. As a result, party membership became extremely vague and their
Constitution became either non-existent or dead, leaving the way open for
authoritarian dictates from the leading personalities and, ultimately,
nomination of candidates virtually was a trial of strength among different
personalities at the top. 5 In such a situation, leaving aside the party and the
national interests, self interests of the legislators motivated them to commit
3Iqbal Narain, Twilight or Dawn: The Political Change in India (1967-71), Agra, Shivlal
Agrawal, 1972, pp. 35-36.
4/bid., p. 34.
5L.N.Sharma, "Selection of Candidates by Political Parties in Bihar for Mid-term
Parliamentary Poll 1971", Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, Janurary-March,
1980.
POLITICAL PROCESS AND POLITICAL PARTIES
447
political sin of defection, re-defection and counter-defection. In other words,
the politics of "Aaya Ram-Gaya Ram" surfaced on the Indian political scene
and the concept of strong Opposition and a stable government became only a
distant possibility for India.
Personalised Politics
For a brief period ( 1971-77), trend towards non-ideological membership,
immense increase in the number of defectors and emergence of Mrs. Indira
Gandhi as unchallenged leader of the country, especially after the liberation
of Bangladesh, provided scope for personalised politics in the guise of caste,
creed, communalism and regionalism.
In the elections of 1971, the nomination process of Opposition parties to
some extent and Indira Congress to a great extent, was marked by individual
dominance. The candidates who had proved their loyalty to the top leadership
or had been in close contact of the top leaders, and belonging to the majority
caste in the constituency were rewarded with party tickets. The party
allegiance and id~olgca
commitment of the candidates did not play a
decisive role at the time of distribution of tickets.
After the decisive victory of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in Jhe 1971 elections,
the trend towards personalised politics became more visible and chief
ministership of states did not remain confined to democratic process to be
decided by representatives of State Legislature on the basis of numerical
strength of the contesting candidates for the post. It was thrust upon the
legislature party by the party high command. The trend afterwards led
towards money-bag politics and use of muscle power. This was the period
d·uring which Youth Congress (the youth wing of the Congress Party)
emerged as a potential force. It was followed by excesses of internal
emergency and infringement upon fundamental rights which ultimately
resulted into JP Movement in Bihar and Nav Nirman Movement in Gujarat.
The· success of Nav Nirman Movement in Gujarat and JP Movement in
Bihar forced political parties to think in terms of polarisation of opposition
parties to provide the nation an alternative to the Congress. However, in the
elections of 1977, all the opposition parties were entrenched in personalised
politics. Party leaders became more important than parties and nomination
process was guided by individual allegiance rather than party allegiance. The
Jan ta Party, which emerged in the wake of emergency, was an amalgamation
of six parties whose top leaders, after the merger, tried their best to dominate
the party. In their attempt of grabing the opportunity, they tried to manipulate
the grant of party tickets in such a way that they could dominate over the
newly elected Parliament and could claim the Prime Ministerial Gaddi. J.K.
Baral, in a case study, found that one who was more powerful or close to
those who were powerful within the party was beneficiary of nomination
politics at the cost of another who normally should have got the ticket. 6
6 L.N.Sharma,
t1p. cit.
448
S.N. MISHRA AND SWETA MISHRA
Personql Affluence as an Important Factor
Affluence of the candidate also played an important role in the
nomination politics. As a result, while several deserving and competent
candidates were refused tickets due to lack of financial resources several
incompetent and undeserving candidates having criminal record to their
names were rewarded with party ticket as they could mange huge sums of
money not only for themselves but also for some other party candidates.7
This personalised politics even within the Janta Party led to its downfall
in 1979 and polarisation decayed.
In mid-term Parliamentary Poll of 1980, alongwith other prevailing
factors, nomination politics tended towards encouraging family dominance in
the political process of the country. Almost all the top leaders, with a few
exceptions, successfully manipulated to reward with tickets their family
members and close relatives without considering their ideological affinit!)' and
political base or standing in politics. 8 This was the period of meteoric rise of
Sanjay Gandhi at the top of effective political pyramid, the lumpens, which
included emergence of a large number of persons, with a record of either
criminal or civil offences, from the back stage and their entry into the
political mainstream as MLAs, MPs and Ministers.
Unpredictable Nomination Process
In the Assembly Elections of 1980, selection of Congress(I) candidates
had been far from traditional. The final arbitrator of the ticket distribution
managed to distribute tickets in such a way that old bossism and factionalism could be thwarted giving way to evolution of some new equations a~d
cleavages. In such a process, the so-called activists of Youth Congress were,
by and large, proved to be ihe beneficiaries. According to the estimates of
some party insiders, every fourth candidate in Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra and
Rajasthan, overy second in Punjab, every fifth in Bihar, and every sixth in
Gujarat entering the electofal fray had been involved with Youth Congress
activities. 9 The Times of India called this as generational change and "India's
cultural revolution''. As such, this time there was a marked departure from
the usual pattern of selection of candidates as nobody could take nomination
for granted. Nobody's entrenched claim seemed to have been recognised.
Many of those who held seats in dissolved House had been ignored for some
reason or other. 10
·
According to political Pundits, there were no real issues in 1984
Elections, and a pro-Hindu, anti-Sikh backlash brought Rajiv Gandhi into
power. But nobody really made a micro analysis of this hypothesis. After all,
.,l1~i
~S1pthik
Hi11d1m11n, January 20, 1980.
T11d11y. December 16-31, 1979, p.72.
lbul.. May 16-31. 1980, p. 35.
/11dill Putrilw, May 19, 1989.
111N11rt/1em
POLITICAL PROCESS AND POLITICAL PARTIES
449
1984, by all counts, was supposed to be a bad year for Mrs. Gandhi's era of
decisive leadership which was, in a sense, coming to an end. And the
opposition, splintered though it was, stood to gain a dramatic advantage. The
post-assassination pro-Congress wave, a sympathy wave, as it were, was also
a vote for stability, perhaps half of it. The other half, by many
interpretations, was indeed an anti-Congress vote which, ironically, also went
to Rajiv Gandhi because he appeared to represent action, change and
cleanliness. And in a country, in which polit!cian had be~om
a dirty word, it
was a vote for a non-politician. By that account{ the 1984 mandate was also
a public cry out against national drift and decay. 1
Under the circumstances mentioned above, the nomination politics in
1984 Elections did not set a new trend. It was, by and large, the same which
was obtained during the elections of 1980. For the opposition parties too it
was not a new trend setter as, due to sympathy wave ·in favour of Rajiv
Gandhi, most of the aspirants for Janta Party or Lok Dal and for that matter
even the Marxist Parties and BJP were lukewarm in trying to get the ticket.
Resurgence of Old Nominational Criteria
However, during the Elections of 1989-90, the gambler seemed to have
folded his cards. The Mr. Clean of 1984 had acquired a new title in 1989,
i.e., Mr. Safe. The return of old coterie to the fold indicated a return of
wheelers-dealers and musclemen to the ruling party, and beginning of the ~nd
of the reformist process Rajiv Gandhi had initiated in the winter of 1984.1 2
The more things appeared to be changing, the more they remained the same.
The list of candidates showed that Rajiv Gandhi had realised that he could
, not win on his own but needed regional bosses. Even a cursory glance of the
Congress (1) candidates' list of 1989 reinforced the impression that party had
closed on its President. Rajiv Gandhi had to go along in order to get along.
. . The ne~
message was status quo and compromise. To pre-empt major
dissent on election eve, the party had renominated over 80 per cent of its
sitting MPs. This despite the fact that intelligence agencies sent depressing
reports on the chances of dozens of MPs. Selection criteria established by
the party, such as performance in Parliament during the past five years were
thrown to the winds. And the party did not even dare touch some of its
known dissidents. Also Rajiv Gandhi went back on his words that most of
the AICC (I) General Secretaries and PCC (I) Presidents would not contest.
Perhaps what most grotesquely symbolised this phenomenon was the
nomination of Abdul Rehman Antulay from 'Bombay, and Kali Pandey from
Bihar, both with besmirched reputation and dubious track records.
Key groups wldch were targeted by the Congress (I) as new vote
banks--youth for whom a Constitutional Amendment was passed lowering the
11 111dia
12 /bid.
Today, November 19-30, 1989.
450
S.N. MISHRA AND SWETA MISHRA
voting age, and women--who found themselves out in the cold. In the first
list of 206 names, there were only 17 women, far short of Rajiv Gandhi's
promised 30 per cent representation. The youth too did not do better. And
many Youth Congress (I) activists, who had camped in the national capital
(Delhi) for days urging party bosses for tickets, left bitterly disappointed.
The-obvious advantage of the emerging electoral scenario within the
ruling party had gone to what is known as the syndicate--the regional party
bosses--whose power Raj iv Gandhi had· been trying to diminish. They
demonstrated that the party's prospects--and the future of Prime
Mjnister--depended on them.
Since the Hindi heartland generally used to decide the fate of the ruler in
South ~lock,
the role likely to be played by Chief Minister N.D. Tiwar~
•.
Bihar PCC (I) Chief Jagannath Mishra, former Madhya Pradesh Chief
Minister Arjun Singh and Haryana's former Chief Minister Bansi Lal had
been the subject of intense debate. Each having a power base, and a record.
of serious differences with Rajiv Gandhi were shunted around at the Centre.
All of them, on election eve, extracted their pound of flesh.
1977 Nomination Scenario
To take into account the nomination scenario and election strategy of
opposition parties, it may be mentioned that the announcement of election
inspired the opposition to a rare display of unity. With a one to one contest
against the Congress (I) probables in most of the constituencies, the
opposition appeared to. be in an upbeat mood. The atmosphere, the faces, the
vibes, were all familiar and so was the challenge.
This time there was a difference from 1977 ,a new compulsion and a new
mood. Suddenly, the gladiators of the opposition--who routinely spent as
much time fighting one another as they did so fighting the Congress (!)--had
been proi}elled into purposeful action. Rising above the cacophony of familiar
claims and ambitions was a voice of reason they could ignore at their peril:
this election was.the opposition's best chance in more than two decades
except for 1977 after the Emergency.
Despite many hurdles, opposition leaders finally managed to forge some
kind of workable unity at national level. Unmindful of the fact that the 1977
bonhomie was nowhere in evidence.they agreed to give Rajiv Gandhi a
straight fight at least in 80 per cent of the constituencies. ·
In reg,ard to nomination of c~ndiates,
United Front partners took to
manoeuvring and counter manoeuvring_ ~actis
to extract maximum seats. BJP
started the move and it was well-manoeuvred by the Janta Dal. Left parties
also played their games well close to their chest.
The-same 'thrust-and-parry' tactics characterised the manoeuvres of the
different factional leaders within the Janta Dal who, smelling victory, were
disinclined to rock the boat at least till the elections. Within the party, a
truce of sorts had been achieved with Devi Lal, Chandra Shekhar and Arun
Nehru, who functioned as proxy for V.P. Singh, emerging as the core group
POLITICAL PROCF.SS AND POLmCAL PARTIF.S
451
deciding on the division of seats and nominations. Nehru worked as a fixer
as well as a buffer. Armed with reams of data on the candida!es of previous
elections, he put his past experience in distributing tickets to good use. At
the same time, he subtly managed to balance the various groups, making sure
that no one got too many seats and that V.P. Singh's interests were not
compromised.
·
The very momentum of the changing political situation and the
swift response forced the formation of some kind of command structure on
the old patterns of the then syndicate of Congress Party. Accordingly, state
leaders like Devi Lal and R.K. Hegde were given virtually a free hand
in their states. In addition, Biju Patnaik was given charge of Orissa,
Chimanbhai Patel of Gujarat and V.C. Shukla of Madhya Pradesh. Bihar was
left to Devi Lal Loyalists, Lallu Prasad Yadav and Sharad Yadav. Arun
Nehru handled. Uttar Pradesh directly alongwith Ajit Singh and Mulay.am
Singh Yadav.
Post-1989 Election Scenario
After the elections of 1989, the political process in the country took
a different tum and put a holocaust on the future of parliamentary democracy
in our country. The Janta Dal Government, under the Prime Ministership of
V.P. Singh, was not only short-lived but also led to the rise of devisive
forces which threatened the unity and integrity of the country. Due to the
hung character of the Parliament, the ruling partners tried to spread
their tentacles in their own ways, for example, V.P. Singh, played the
card of "sociai justice" and implemented Manda) Commission Report. To
counteract it, the ~JP
President, L.K. Advani _played the Mandir card.
As such, the society was divided on the lines of 'Mandal' and 'Kamandal'.
This also brought a new trend in Indian politics as the underworld
appeared prominently on the political scene for and against the two
issues.
The 1991 mid-term elections were fought on three major planks--the
Congress played its old card of stability and development, the Left
Front--Democratic Front combine played the card of social justice, whereas,
BJP rai:;ed the issue of Ayodhya Mandir.
This strategy was clearly reflected in the nomination of candidates for
the elections of Parliament and State Legislatures.
Sadhtts, Backward Castes and Muscle Power
In the list of BJP nominees, the activists of Vishva Hindu Parishad,
Sad/ms and Sadhavis figured prominently. Similarly, the list of candidates of
Left Front-Democratic Front combine was dominated by Backward Castes,
Muslims, Schedules Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Congress again depended
on the money and muscle power of the states' strongmen. The basic concern
for political parties was to select such candidates who could match in money
and muscle power of their counterparts.
452
S.N. MISHRA AND SWETA MISHRA
IMPACT OF THE NOMINATION PROCESS ON ADMINISTRATION
Looking into the nomination process of political parties in historical
perspective what appears to be the rising phenomena are: corruption not only
in high places but in the whole of the body politic, gangsterism, repression,
institutional decay, politics of survival, personality cult, emergence of mafias
and dadas, ·rise of fascism and erosion of the state.
All these trends, mentioned above, are slowly but gradually subverting
ou.r. administrative and judicial system, for example. the competent
bureaucrats in Uttar Pradesh are being transferred and posted at the dictates
of Mayawati and Kanshi Ram. 13 The same may be said in case of Bihar and
oiher sta~.
even the Centre is no exception. Similarly, the judiciary is also
not left unaffected. The recent action of Bhajan Lal, Chief Minister Of
Haryana, influencing the High Court Judge in 0.P. Jindal's case and
annoyance expressed by the Supreme Court 14 are some of the burnin'g
examples. It leads one to conclude that a conscious effort is being made by
all the political parties, wherever they are in power, to politicise bureaucracy
and. judiciary. Controversy in regard to the position of Chief Election
Commissioner also leads in the same direction.
Looking into the list of candidates who were given tickets by different
political parties, it appears that criminalisation in politics will run supreme in
coming future and mafias and dadas will gradually replace the dedicated and
peace-loving candidates so far as party nomination for elective posts are
concerned .. It also suggests that political ideologies and organisational base of
political parties will have a backseat which is not good for survival and
sustenance of our democratic polity.
The po.litics. of expediency and self-survival in the nomination process
has brought all the politicai parties to a stage where they have lost their
homogeneous characters and institutional norms. If casteism, communalisnl
and regionalism have disrupted the value-oriented and ideology-based
compositjon of political parties, induction of hat changers and unscrupulous
politicians has damaged their representative character. Political parties either
in .power or in Opposition face a common threat in the form of militant
movements of special interest groups, viz.. farmers, organised workers,
students, communalists and regional chauvinists. These emerging trends have
made political parties incapable of harmonising social conflicts, attenuate
regional distance and protect collective interests. As such, they are badly
failing in honouring people's wishes and aspirations .
. Finally,. the analysis of nomination politics, since the first general
elections, makes it quite· clear that political parties are failing to set forth the
process of parliamentary democracy on right track and gradually becoming a
she.lter house of self seekers and power seekers. The general elections have
13 The Time.f of India, New
14 /bid., August 12, 1994.
Delhi, July 22, 1994.
POLITICAL PROCESS AND POLITICAL PARTIES
453
so far failed in setting a sound mechanism of communication, influence.· and
control from grassroots level upwards. They have also failed in
institutionalising people's will. The emerging trends are also not indicative of
stability and viability of a sound parliamentary system. Politics has become
veritable_profession where all that matters is an elective seat. The ticket
based patronisation and personalised party politics ·have destroyed the very
raison d'etre of the election and have left the political parties in the position
of a. by-stander. Thus, all the political parties and thereby the political system
is under pressure of personalised politics which is not good for the
sustenance of parliamentary system in India.
In modest way, we would like to suggest that immediate steps are
required to be taken up to check this phenomena because slowly and
imperceptibly we are moving towards a new political dispensation backed by
11 new political ideology, which, if not countered decisively .and through
united intervention of all° those who care for the country, will put an end to
not only Indian democracy but possibly the Indian state as well.