Roundtable Discussion of “Media Narratives and China’s Future”

651530 research-article2016 GCH0010.1177/2059436416651530Global Media and ChinaRoundtable Discussion Roundtable Discussion Roundtable Discussion of “Media Narratives and China’s Future” Global Media and China 2016, Vol. 1(1–2) 139­–145 © The Author(s) 2016 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/2059436416651530 gch.sagepub.com Discussants: Monroe Price, Jack Qiu, Jiang Fei Editors: Thomas Hollihan and Zhan Zhang Global Media and China intends to address the current, ongoing, and important public controversies that are shaping public perceptions of China around the world. The journal also offers insights into the demands of a rapidly changing global media sphere and considers how such changes impact communication theories and practices. We have elected to include a roundtable discussion of two recent events in China that dominated the global media sphere in 2015. Thus, we invited three distinguished communication scholars to share their perceptions of the recent explosions in the warehouse storing hazardous chemicals in Tianjin and/or the rapid decline of the Shanghai financial markets. These events sorely tested the public’s confidence and trust in the Chinese government and in the accuracy and sufficiency of the news reports offered by state-sanctioned media outlets, and they had impact around the world. Global media outlets frequently offered very harsh criticisms of how the Beijing responded to these occurrences, with some stories warning that they could result in political instability within China and others arguing that these events will chill global investments and impact the public confidence in China’s economic growth and social stability. Monroe Price, professor of communication in the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, Jack Qiu, professor in the School of Journalism and Communication at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Jiang Fei, professor of the Institute of Journalism and Communication at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, accepted our invitation and agreed to participate in this discussion. In the first round of the conversation, we asked them to answer the following questions: 1. What lessons can be learned from these events? Monroe Price: It is impossible to think that major events in China will not see the light of day in the global press. It is also apparent that major elements of the global press like stories pointing to economic or similar crises in China. There is schadenfreude as a factor. The whiff of suppression just makes such a story more appealing. Probably a different analytic has to be established for health-related stories and for financial stories. Each category calls for a different kind of crisis Creative Commons Non Commercial CC-BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). 140 Global Media and China 1(1–2) analysis and response. Similarly, for other big stories like the South China Sea, international political aspects might be different from covering health or finance. Jack Qiu: There are many lessons, the most important being that China can no longer be singlemindedly obsessed with the pursuit of economic growth. Social development with sustainability, good governance with transparency and fairness, these are arguably more important than economic goals now that China has reached its current phase of critical transformation, a phase full of crises. Another lesson is the gap between Beijing central authorities and local government officials or cadres of different sectors. It is not uncommon that national policies (e.g. rule of law) are forgotten, even reversed, when facing local problems or the challenge of special vested interests. This has made crisis communication especially difficult because there are too many layers of influence of control over what is going on, a lot of cacophony, and an information environment most conducive to the spread of rumor. Jiang Fei: Three perspectives of critical shortages were exposed in this case, and as a result it also marked a key moment in China’s development process and revealed that China was not yet a fully modern nation/state. First, the Tianjin incident demonstrated a critical shortage of knowledge and professional management capacity in the handling of combustible and explosive goods. China’s President Xi Jinping has rightly pointed to the need to learn the “extremely profound lessons” from this incident. The State Council has announced it will conduct an inspection of all businesses using dangerous chemicals. The Public Security Minister indicates that those responsible for this incident will be identified and punished (Clark, 2015). The government will also need to create and enforce safety policies that assure the public that it has learned from this tragedy and that it can and will prevent such events in the future. Second, the incident demonstrated that local governments especially lacked the ability to respond to and manage an emergent crisis. President Xi Jinping issued a written statement that said that the Tianjin blasts and a string of other recent serious accidents exposed severe problems in the work safety sector, and that authorities must always keep in mind the notion of “safe development” and the “people’s interest” to avoid such accidents. He demanded a better emergency response mechanism, greater implementation of work safety regulations, and careful checks of all possible safety risks to achieve “substantial improvement” in workplace safety (“Profound Lessons,” 2015). President Xi’s written statement calling for “a better emergency response mechanism” should be a priority of the central government. Citizens should hope that these special crises would serve to increase the awareness of the importance of such problems. Third, the Tianjin explosions revealed a critical shortage of strategic planning, zoning, and environmental management. It was amazing to see that combustible and explosive goods were stored so near a residential community. The size and scope of the tragedy is also noteworthy. Many different chemical and engineering companies conducted business in the area. According to the official website of one corporation located in this area, their site occupied a total area of 46,226.8 m2 and had many buildings, including two warehouses used to store hazardous products (“Investigation and Treatment,” 2015). The blasts were huge, thus demonstrating how significant the risks were to workers and nearby residents. More than 1000 Renault automobiles were destroyed in the explosions and an additional 2748 Volkswagens were incinerated (Liu, 2015). Citizens who live in cities other than Tianjin may have strong grounds to worry that they too may be living close to dangerous industrial sites, that they may face the same potentially dangerous situation, and yet may not have been warned. 2. How do you evaluate the response and follow-up actions from the Chinese authorities in dealing with this kind of crisis (especially through the media channels)? Roundtable Discussion 141 Monroe Price: The sense in the global press is that there has been a tightening of access to information available to people inside China. This may be true but may be attributable to other factors. I guess the point here is to divide the impact of the response on the domestic audiences and to various global audiences and markets. Here, the question is how one measures the response. Is such controlled media coverage likely to render a citizenry more or less dissatisfied with their current situation and their political leadership? If such media controls increase public dissatisfaction, they might constitute a challenge to future stability given that China is undergoing such rapid and vast change. The domestic reactions to such governmental responses are more likely important than the global reactions. It is not yet clear how the handling of the messaging on the crisis has impacted actions by other governments or by foreign populations. Jack Qiu: The Beijing central authorities have become more skillful and more successful in managing internal media outlets, both the urban commercial press that has become more influential since the 1990s (sometimes as a voice of dissent) and the online media including social media that is more influential among young people. Traditional party organs such as People’s Daily and CCTV have gained more market share and they can sway public opinion inside the country without the worry of serious competition from the urban commercial press or online forums and citizen journalists, which was the case a few years ago. Yet, internationally speaking, it seems to have been the very opposite as Beijing lost more credibility in the eyes of outside observers through its handling of the stock-market crash or the explosions in Tianjin or the landslide in Shenzhen. This happens despite the fact that Beijing has invested more in the global news business. The dilemma in improving its international image probably has to do with the increasingly “well-managed” domestic media system, where voices from players other than the authorities are silenced or at least marginalized. Jiang Fei: China still has a long way to go in getting sufficient news to the public on events such as the explosions in Tianjin. First, the news coverage in China, even on breaking news stories, tends to be abstract rather than specific. For example, the term “normal” was used in press descriptions of the air quality in Tianjin after the explosions. This was awkward because people who live close to the explosion site, or even people who live in other communities within Tianjin or around Tianjin, have strong reason to want concrete and accurate information about the impact of the explosion on the quality of the air that they are breathing. What they need are exact data that can resolve their uncertainties about their safety and that of their families. They need to know whether it is safe enough for them to go outside or should they stay at home? Or do they need to take some special precautions to protect themselves from the ambient pollution lingering over their city and region following the explosion. The use of the term “normal” does not enhance media or governmental credibility and may indeed diminish it. 3. What principles drawn from communication theory and research might help Chinese policy-makers better manage their narratives when faced with similar challenges in the future? Monroe Price: Of course, the need to be more forthcoming in providing information is apparent. The question is how to convince the Chinese government to shift to a paradigm of disclosure and transparency. A long-term project of identifying major issues (e.g. climate change) and then presenting information about their complexity in order to create discourse and debate around them would be helpful. In such a situation, when a crisis arises, the context is much more immediately recognized and understood because audiences are already better informed. More complete and 142 Global Media and China 1(1–2) transparent coverage of the financial markets will also likely lead to better-informed investors and a deeper understanding of market fluctuations. A shift to the extent possible, to a public service model of state-owned media where the media become a forum for useful discussion would be desirable. More open and transparent domestic media will likely improve the media coverage that China receives internationally. Jack Qiu: The ecology of games can offer some helpful insights. William Dutton applied this framework to the study of telecom policy (Dutton, 1994), whereas I think it can help Chinese policy-makers as well. A key insight from this theorizing is what it teaches us about the multiplicity and complexity of policy processes. Even if one set of players may be able to dominate the whole process for a certain period of time, they cannot and will not eliminate other sets of players, who have very different objectives and rationales. To me, this means one thing in particular: China has to realign its narratives with its name of the People’s Republic. Policy-makers have to guard against the pitfalls of elitism, especially when faced with similar challenges in the future. To this end, Raewyn Connell’s “Southern Theory” (2008) should be most relevant as it contends that the experiences of the dispossessed, of the common people who are suffering, deserve our attention, so do their diverse and dynamic acts of resistance. The ordinary people who were crushed by the stock-market meltdown and who were victims of the explosion or the landslide are integral parts of the ecology of games as well. The world should hear their voices and learn from the ways they cope with crises. Jiang Fei: Theoretically and generally speaking, what the media provided the public was MESSAGES and not INFORMATION. Unfortunately, especially in the context of new media, this may now be common around the world and is not limited only to China, despite the fact that what the public needs is information that can decrease the uncertainties in their lives and work. Reporters should be educated so that they can successfully transform news events into information that is useful for various audiences. If this does not happen, audiences will turn away and seek the needed information from other sources such as social media. Policy-makers should pay attention to the fact that well-educated Chinese audiences will use other channels and interpersonal networks to clarify their uncertainty if the state-sanctioned media outlets neglect to serve their interests or meet their needs. In addition, because of a lack of concrete and useful information from state-sanctioned media outlets, the production of rumors may become more common. These rumors challenge citizens’ media literacy. Those who create and share rumors may see in ongoing events or crises opportunities to put their own personal interests, concerns, anxieties, and well-being above the interests of sharing useful or truthful information based on real evidence or knowledge. Thus, rumor studies and new media literacy studies in China are an especially important area for further development. In the long run, we may discover that too many restrictions in the flow of news may ruin the media literacy of both governmental officials and the general public living in Mainland China. Developments in new media technologies, especially social media, have pushed government leaders to improve their own media literacy. In addition, more Chinese ministries and enterprises have now invested in educating their public spokespersons so that they can better shape their messages and better interact with journalists. Hopefully, these developments will improve conditions for the flow of useful information to the public. Hollihan and Zhang: After reviewing the very provocative answers to the first set of questions, we posed these follow-up questions. Respondents were asked both to comment on each other’s answers to the first three questions and also to answer the new questions. Roundtable Discussion 1. 143 Given that there are hundreds of thousands of Chinese students studying overseas and hundreds of thousands more traveling or conducting business abroad, is it realistic for China to continue attempting to control the domestic reporting of such news stories? Does not the gap between the domestic news content and the international news stories create its own existential threat to China’s stability at home and diminish its soft power overseas? Jiang Fei: China is too big in size and population to be covered with one umbrella term or perspective. From an academic point of view, NEWS and NEWS STORIES are different and have formed two different research fields: journalism and communication. News is something that happened and is reported through the mass media system; but when we are talking about the NEWS STORIES, ethics, politics, culture, the economy, tradition, and the historical understandings are strongly embedded in the NEWS STORIES. NEWS STORIES should thus remain in the same category as literary works. Jack Qiu: I agree with Jiang Fei. Although there is a large number of Chinese living or traveling overseas these days, they still represent only a fraction of China’s national population. Meanwhile, there are also important internal variations within China’s media system, for example, between party organ newspapers and commercial press, between China Central Television and online forums. With the spread of new media technologies especially social media in recent years, my observations are that overseas Chinese students or business people have actually increased their usage of domestic Chinese news and news stories while they are physically outside China. Hence, to many of them, they may not even notice the gap. Or they have developed a cognitive defense system against international news media, which can be traced back to the “anti-CNN” campaign launched by overseas Chinese students in 2008. Monroe Price: From my observation of Chinese students studying abroad, many are taking on board the issues related to information, news, and their roles as citizens. Going abroad seems to be an educational, though not often a radicalizing, experience. I certainly haven’t measured reactions or done polls scientific or otherwise, but these students are committed to education, to advancement, and to balancing all kinds of considerations. So there is general awareness of government practices, even from a critical perspective, a real curiosity about American approaches, and a contrast between them. I admire ways in which these issues emerge in social life and are dealt with. 2. Might China gain more favorable and even accurate media coverage overseas if it allowed international reporters more unfettered access to sources of information and made it easier for them to do their jobs? Jiang Fei: This is hard to say. I remember hearing a popular story about an incident in 1995 when China chaired the Fourth World Conference on Women. The event seemed to be going well and had served as a vehicle to bring women from around the world together to address important issues of gender equality. Despite its success, however, a reporter from NHK (a Japanese broadcasting network) was claimed to have taken great efforts to find and report a negative news story about the conference. In another instance in 2008, CNN used the wrong picture to report an event purportedly from a Tibetan protest action (“CNN: What’s,” 2008). It is also difficult to forget CNN reporter Jack Cafferty’s famous comments about China: “So I think our relationship with China has certainly changed, I think they’re basically the same bunch of goons and thugs they’ve been for the last 50 years” (“China Demands,” 2008). If these examples constitute the favorable and even 144 Global Media and China 1(1–2) accurate coverage your question suggests from international reporters, it’s a shame to say they are news reporters if they are so careless in their work. Instead they are merely storytellers spinning fictions. Jack Qiu: Yes, anti-CNN was a watershed event, although I think problems in communication (including in news coverage) are better solved by building trust, not by imposing more restrictions. When crises occur, Chinese authorities have tried too hard to hamper journalistic work, not just for international reporters but for domestic journalists as well. As a result, the authorities are perceived as untrustworthy because they seem to be trying to hide things in secrecy even if in fact there is little worth hiding and even if anyone can use Google Earth to see the disasters on the ground. This culture of secrecy is against China’s Open Government Information Act itself. I therefore would want to see Chinese authorities decrease their interventions and respect the professional judgment of journalists, international or domestic. When the Chinese Communist Party hosted international journalists in the 1940s in their revolutionary base of Yan’an, they did not impose such restrictions. That was when international journalists such as Edgar Snow helped the CCP to win support from around the world. The Party today is much more powerful and should be much more confident. Monroe Price: I remember reading the New York Times when I was in Los Angeles and was impressed that the Times printed stories about Los Angeles that usually confirmed stereotypes. I think this is often true of coverage of China by the foreign press. Of course, it is not wholly true as a practice, but interesting in terms of the problem posed. The stories that will be told may be more a function of a New York editor’s biases than the existence of an effective freedom of information regime. These are hardly airtight categories. Some should welcome effective, brilliant reporting because it will notify the government of weaknesses, present or potential, and assist the government in its task of governing. The New York Times series on the financial arrangements of privileged families in Moscow is an illustration. Times reporters had undertaking careful research but this was of little consolation. 3. Might China understand that “keeping the dirty laundry back home” won’t be necessary in this kind of crisis, and is it okay for a big global player to receive international criticism, especially if China could show its determination and practical solutions in following up these crises? Might not other countries also learn from how China responds to these examples? Jiang Fei: China’s local governments might indeed begin to understand that “keeping the dirty laundry back home” won’t be necessary in a crisis such as the one that happened in Tianjin. And yes, it is okay for big global players to receive international criticism. Jack Qiu: Local governments certainly have more to fear. But the Beijing central government is not completely innocent, either. After all, the obsession with economic growth at the local level stems from Deng Xiaoping’s shift to developmentalism as well as his warning against all political debates. If within China sincere criticism and policy debates are not allowed at all levels, how could we expect it to be more receptive to criticisms offered by foreigners? Monroe Price: We are witnessing through the phenomenon of Ai Wei Wei some peculiar mixture of domestic and international criticism, with reactions by the Chinese government that are sometimes draconian. I don’t know whether it’s a case study in how the government reacts (either to the person of Ai Wei Wei or to the issues raised, earthquake-related construction, for example). Roundtable Discussion 4. 145 China has committed to expanding its global communication of news. What impact might the decisions regarding how crisis stories within China are reported have on efforts to communicate to domestic and international audiences? Jiang Fei: When confronted by a crisis such as that which occurred in Tianjin, China’s “global news business” should report the news to international and domestic audiences as quickly as possible. Yet unfortunately, Chinese news outlets are not as effective in storytelling today as are their international competitors. China’s global news outlets should work to assure fair, accurate, and balanced reporting. Jack Qiu: I am hopeful that the expansion of global communication under the auspices of Beijing may change the Chinese news industry for the better. Not only so, as many scholars of international communication have argued, it may also change the global landscape of international news flows dominated by Western news organizations. I know this is mostly hope, and what actually happens often goes against my hopes. But this is another thing I like about China and the Chinese people—we always have hope and strive to improve the situation pragmatically. If one day China’s crisis communication strategies will go through a fundamental facelift, chances are that it will result from some key changes at the very core of the political system, not at its margins. But without the seemingly “marginal” forces, the core may not succeed in bringing about systematic change as in the case of Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour of 1992. The paramount leader had to go to China’s southern borders to launch his new reform initiatives. Mao’s military strategy of “surrounding the cities from the countryside” was essentially the same pattern. What will be the “new margins” or “new countryside” this time? I am hopeful and curious to see how history unfolds. Monroe Price: It is not clear to me that the journalists engaged in the “going out policy” are so deeply reflecting on changing the domestic market. It might be good if they were, but the comparative nature of how information and news are scheduled and how audiences are perceived has distinct approaches. If the system breaks down, it will not be because of the kind of global communication that china fosters. References China demands apology from Cafferty. (2008, April 15). CNN. 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